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Baltimore County (MD) Firefighter Falkenhan Line of Duty Death Report Issued

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Operations at 30 Dowling Circle 01.19.2011 Box 11-09

Mark Gray Falkenhan had dedicated his life to serving others. He perished in the line of duty on January 19, 2011 while performing search and rescue operations at a multi-alarm apartment fire in Hillendale, Baltimore County (Maryland). He was 43 years old. 

Firefighter Mark Falkenhan

Previous coverage from 2011: HERE and here, here, here and here

30 Dowling Circle

 

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 . Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and his partner became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. The second firefighter was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.

FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

The Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department published the Line of Duty Death Investgation Report of the 30 Dowling Circle Fire recently. The report was written by a Line of Duty Death Investigation Team comprised of departmental members, including representatives of the local firefighters’ union and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association.

The following is and executive narrative of  the final report (PDF) on the apartment fire where Volunteer Firefighter Mark Falkenhan sustained fatal injuries. The entire report can be downloaded HERE .

The Baltimore Sun newspaper published an editorial about the death of Firefighter Falkenhan that is required reading; HERE . An excerpt from the editorial reads as follows:

FF Mark Falkenhan

 

The word “hero” gets used too often to describe the most pedestrian of admirable behaviors, from the star quarterback who marches his team for a winning score to the kid who finds a missing wallet and turns it in. But exceptional bravery, special ability, exceptional deeds and noble qualities — those are what define an authentic hero, and Mr. Falkenhan lacked for none of them.

It was not by accidental circumstance or naiveté that he ended up on the third story of that Hillendale apartment complex in the midst of a fire, searching for missing residents. He knew the risks as well as anyone could. But his selfless desire to help others drove him forward into the flames.

That’s what made him exceptional. That’s why his legacy is important. That’s why the community is in his debt.

 Incident Executive Summary

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 (for purposes of this report, Mark will be referred to as FF Falkenhan). Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter (FF # 2) from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and FF # 2 became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. FF # 2 was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued. FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

Baltimore County Fire Department Standard Operating Procedures, Personnel #16, requires a team to be formed, a detailed investigation to be conducted and a report produced for any incident involving a line of duty life threatening injury or death. The team’s objective is to thoroughly analyze and document all the events leading to the injury or death and to make recommendations aimed at preventing similar occurrences in the future. At a minimum, a Division Chief, the Department’s Health and Safety Officer, a member from the Fire Investigation Division, an IAFF Local 1311 union representative, and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association Vice President of Operations (when a volunteer member is involved) is required (see Acknowledgements section for actual team make-up).

The investigating team examined any and all data available, including independent analysis of the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), turnout gear and autopsy report. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) produced a fire model to assist with evaluating fire behavior. Multiple site inspections were conducted. Extensive interviews were conducted by the team which also attended those conducted by investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Photographic and audio transcripts were also thoroughly analyzed. A comprehensive timeline of events was developed. All information used to make decisions regarding recommendations was corroborated by at least two sources.

  • In fairness to those units involved in this incident, the investigating team had the advantage of examining this incident over the period of several months. Furthermore, given the size and nature of the event, and the fact that arriving crews were met with serious fire conditions and several residents trapped and in immediate danger, all personnel should be commended for their efforts for performing several rescues which prevented an even greater tragedy.
  • The team did not identify a particular primary reason for FF Falkenhan’s death.
  • What were identified were many secondary issues involving but not limited to crew integrity, incident command, strategy and tactics, and communications.
  • These issues are identified and discussed, and recommendations are made in appropriate sections of the report, as well as in a consolidated format in the Report Appendix.

Some of the issues identified in this report may require some type of change to current practices, policies, procedures or equipment. Most, however, do not. Specifically, the analysis and recommendations regarding Incident Command and Strategy and Tactics show that if current policies and procedures are adhered to, the opportunity for catastrophic problems may be reduced.

  • Mark Falkenhan was a well-respected and experienced firefighter.
  • He died performing his duties during a very complex incident with severe fire conditions and unique fire behavior coupled with the immediate need to perform multiple rescues of victims in imminent danger.
  • It would be easy if one particular failure of the system could be identified as the cause of this tragedy.
  • We could fix it and move on. Unfortunately it is not that simple.
  • No incident is “routine”. Mark’s death and this report reinforce that fact.

 

 

Incident Summary

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011 at 1816 hours, a call was received at the Baltimore County 911 Center from a female occupant at 30 Dowling Circle in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County. The caller stated that her stove was on fire and the fire was spreading to the surrounding cabinets. Fire box 11-09 was dispatched by Baltimore County Fire Dispatch (Dispatch) at 1818 hours consisting of four engine companies, two truck companies, a floodlight unit, and a battalion chief. All units responded on Talkgroup 1-2.

The location, approximately one mile from the first dispatched engine company, is a three story garden-type apartment complex, with brick construction and a composite shingle, truss supported roof. The fire building contained a total of six apartments divided by a common enclosed stairway in the center with one apartment on the left and one to the right of the stairs.

 

Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta will be used to designate the clockwise geographic locations of the structure, beginning with Alpha on the address side of the building . Entry is gained through the front split-level stairwell by a common entrance door with individual doors leading to each apartment. Each apartment consists of two bedrooms, a kitchen, bathroom, and a living/dining area. There are sliding doors leading to either a wood joist deck/balcony on the second and third floor apartments, or a concrete patio on the first floor apartments. Utilities consist of gas service to the furnace and hot water heaters located in a utility closet in each apartment, with electric service to the remainder of the appliances, including the stove. Interior walls of the apartments are drywall over wood stud construction.

Floor coverings consist of carpeting over tile and concrete on the terrace/first floor. The second and third floor coverings consist of carpeting covering hardwood floors with a plywood subfloor. Interior doors are hollow wood construction. The door to the common hallway is of solid wood construction. The sliding doors to the deck/patio area are glass.

Building Construction

The development and construction of the Towson Crossing Apartments began in the early 1980’s. The buildings are rated in the existing building code for occupancy as Residential 2 (R2). The building code would describe the construction type as Type III. This construction type includes those buildings where the exterior walls are of non-combustible materials and the interior building elements are of any material permitted by the building code.

Building Construction and Features

The subject apartment building, 30 Dowling Circle, is a three story, middle of the group, apartment building constructed on a reinforced concrete slab. The Alpha and Charlie exterior walls are wood framed construction with brick veneer attached by brick ties. The Bravo and Delta exterior walls are block masonry construction and separate adjoining apartment buildings. The interior partition walls consist of wooden 2″x4″ wall studs covered with sheetrock. Paper faced insulation is found between the exterior walls, ceilings and party-walls that separate the apartments.

The apartment building contains six individual apartment units, which are approximately 1000 square feet in size per apartment unit. Two separate units are located on each floor and consist of two bedrooms, a living area, a dining area, a kitchen, and a bathroom. A utility closet is located in each of the living areas. The closet is located along the Alpha wall, and contains the water heater and furnace.

The building is not equipped with an automatic fire suppression system. Smoke detectors were noted; however, it is unknown if they were operational at the time of the fire. A fire extinguisher was noted on the landing between the second and third floor levels of the building.

Topography

From side Alpha the building has two and a half stories above grade while side Charlie is three stories above grade.

The first floor of the building is approximately five feet below ground level with a 20 foot set back from the apartment building parking lot. Side Charlie of the building is at ground level but slopes upward approximately 8 feet with a set-back of 110 feet from the rear alley.

Roof

The roof is constructed of a lightweight truss assembly consisting of 2″x6″ stringers connected by gusset plates. The truss assembly is covered with 5/8 inch plywood and asphalt shingles.

Floor and Ceiling

The floor assembly consists of 2×10 inch floor joists covered by plywood, wooden tongue and groove planking and finished with carpet. The joists run from Alpha to Charlie and are supported by the interior bearing walls. The kitchen floors in all of the units are covered with vinyl tile.

The ceilings throughout the building are sheetrock nailed to the floor joists of the  apartment above with the exception of the third level in which the sheetrock is nailed to the roof joists.

Balconies

The balconies are located on side Charlie of the building. The balconies located on levels two and three consist of 5/4″ deck boards over 2″x10″ wooden joists. The joists are cantilevered off of the floor/ceiling assemblies of levels one and two. The first floor balconies are made of concrete and are at ground level. All balconies are accessible through a single pane sliding glass door located in each apartment.

 

 

 Incident Overview

The first arriving engine, E-11, was staffed with a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. Upon arrival at 1820 hours, the Captain gave a brief initial report describing a three story garden apartment with smoke showing from side Alpha: “The Captain of E-11 will have Command and we are initiating an aggressive interior attack with a 1 ¾” hand line”. Command also instructed the second due engine to bring him a supply line from the hydrant. 

A female resident (victim # 1) appeared in a third floor apartment window, Alpha/Bravo side (Apt. B-1), yelled for assistance, and threatened to jump. Smoke or fire was visible from any of the third floor windows. At 1823 hours, Command advised Dispatch that he had a rescue and that he was establishing Limited Command. Fire Dispatch was in the process of upgrading the response profile to an apartment fire with rescue when the responding Battalion Chief requested that the fire box be upgraded to a fire rescue box. While the Firefighter and Lieutenant prepared for entry into the building, the Captain and Driver/Operator extended a ladder to the 3rd floor apartment window and rescued the resident. The first attempt by the Firefighter and Lieutenant to make entry into the side Alpha entrance was unsuccessful due to the extreme heat and smoke conditions.

Initial Arrival Conditions

The second due engine, E-10, arrived at 1823 with staffing of a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. At 1823, E-10’s crew brought a 4″ supply line to E-11 from the hydrant at Deanwood Rd. and Dowling Circle and assisted the first-in crew with fire attack.

  • The Captain from E-10 conferred with Command and was instructed to advance a second 1 ¾” hand line.
  • The window to the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2) was removed, and the second 1 ¾” line was advanced to the building by the crew of E-10.
  • Fire attack was initiated through the removed window. At 1827, Command requested a second alarm.

At this time, heat and smoke conditions just inside the front door improved enough to allow the Firefighter and Lieutenant from E-11 to make entry through the front door and into the stairwell. There they encountered heavy, thick black

smoke and high heat conditions coming up the stairs from the terrace level apartment. The Lieutenant reported that the doorway to the first floor apartment was orange with fire and he had to fight his way through heavy heat and smoke conditions to attack the fire in the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2). Entry was made approximately 3 feet into the doorway when the Firefighter’s low air alarm began to sound, and he exited the building. A member from E-10’s crew replaced the Firefighter from E-11 on the hose line.

At the same time, the Captain from E-11 proceeded to the rear of the structure to complete his initial 360 degree size up. He noted that there was fire emanating from the open sliding doors on the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2), extending to the balcony above. E-1, staffed by a Captain, Driver/Operator, and two Firefighters arrived and completed the hookup of the supply line that had been laid to the hydrant by E-10. The rest of Engine 1’s crew grabbed tools and an extension ladder and reported to the Charlie side of the building.

Personnel stated that at this point fire conditions seemed to improve, suggesting that crews were making progress extinguishing the fire. (The first arriving attack crew reported that they were able to see apparatus lights through the sliding doors on Charlie side, which indicated to them that smoke and fire conditions were improving.)

Truck 1, a tiller unit staffed by a Lieutenant, two Driver/Operators, and a Firefighter, arrived on side Alpha and immediately began search and rescue operations. Windows on the second floor Alpha/Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2) were vented and ladders were thrown to gain access. T-8 arrived at the alley on side Charlie. E-1 extended a ground ladder to the third floor balcony on the Charlie/Bravo side of the structure (Apt. B-1), and made access to the apartment to search for additional victims.

  • They noted fire venting from the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2) out of the sliding glass doors progressing upwards towards the balcony on the second floor. Upon entering the apartment, they conducted a primary search and noted minimal heat with light smoke conditions.
  • The crew accessed the hallway via the apartment entry door and noticed an increase in the temperature and the amount of smoke.
  • They immediately closed the door and exited the apartment via the ground ladder.
  • Upon exiting the apartment, E-1’s crew observed E-292 on the scene with a hand line extending into the apartment of origin, (first floor, Charlie/Delta side, Apt. T-2). The officer on E-1 noted white smoke coming from the unit.

Having already laid a supply line from the intersection of the alley and Deanwood Road, E-292’s crew extended a 1 ¾” hand line into the apartment of origin. Moderate fire conditions with zero visibility were encountered, and they reported feeling a great deal of heat on their knees as they crawled through the apartment.

The Lieutenant and the Firefighter from Truck-1 entered Apartment A-2 via a second floor bedroom window (Alpha/Delta side) and began a search for additional victims. As they traversed the living room area they found an unconscious male resident (victim #2). At 1836 hours, the Lieutenant notified Command via an urgent transmission that a victim had been located and they needed assistance with evacuation. The Lieutenant and Firefighter noted a small fire in the rear corner near the victim as they exited the room. The crew returned to the bedroom from which they had entered and closed the door behind them. Victim #2 was then evacuated from the apartment via a ground ladder through the bedroom window, and transferred to EMS personnel on side Alpha.

Preflashover conditions Alpha Side 18:37 hours

At 1831 hours, Squad 303, a unit staffed by a Driver/Operator, Firefighter Falkenhan (acting Officer in Charge), and 3 other Firefighters had arrived at the Alpha side of the building. Firefighter Falkenhan and two crew members grabbed their tools and immediately entered the building. One Firefighter (Firefighter #1) proceeded to the terrace floor apartment to assist crews with fire attack. Firefighter Falkenhan and the other Firefighter (Firefighter #2) proceeded to the second floor

Bravo side apartment (Apt. A-1) to search for additional victims. They forced the door to the second floor apartment and conducted their search. Finding no one, they reported to Command that they had encountered high heat in the apartment and at 1838 hours, inquired as to which apartment victim #2 had been found. Firefighter Falkenhan advised Command that he and his fellow Firefighter were proceeding to the third floor to continue their search.

At 1840 hours, Battalion Chief 11 (BC-11) arrived on the scene, performed a face-to-face pass on with the Captain on Engine 11, and assumed Command. BC-11 initially observed limited smoke conditions, indicating to him that crews had made progress in extinguishing the fire.

18:41 hours

Meanwhile, the Lieutenant and Firefighter from T-8 entered the second floor apartment that S-303 had just searched (Apt. A-1, second floor, Bravo side). They proceeded through the apartment and went across the hallway to Apartment A-2 where Truck-1 had just made their rescue (second floor, Delta side).

The Lieutenant noted smoky conditions, and saw that the sliding doors to the rear of the apartment were open, and saw a small fire in the rear of the apartment to the left of the open doors. On their way back to their point of entry, T-8’s crew discovered an unconscious female victim (victim #3). At 1837 hours, T-8 attempted to reach Command via radio and was covered by inaudible radio traffic. Dispatch was able to receive the radio transmission from T-8, and advised Command that another victim had been located on the second floor.

  • At this point, the crew from S-303 had completed their search of the third floor Bravo side apartment (Apt. B-1).
  • Firefighter Falkenhan and Firefighter #2 were able to look out of the sliding doors on side Charlie down to the first floor apartment, Apt. T-2 (Charlie/Delta side) and could see fire.
  • Smoke conditions on the third floor were light enough to walk upright in a somewhat crouched position.
  • The crew returned to the hallway, forced open the door to the third floor Charlie/Delta side apartment, Apt. B-2, and made entry.
  • Firefighter #2 walked down the hallway to the bedroom on the right while Firefighter Falkenhan searched to the left. After checking the bedroom, Firefighter #2 stated that he heard something behind him and turned to see fire in the hallway.

As the crew from S-303 searched the third floor Delta side apartment (Apt. B-2), The Lieutenant and Firefighter from T-8 were attempting to remove victim #3 from the second floor Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2). As they prepared to move their patient, fire conditions changed suddenly.

The Lieutenant from T-8 observed fire, “…rolling over our heads and out of the apartment door.” An immediate increase in heat conditions was noted. Upon exiting the apartment, T-8’s crew described a “tunnel of fire” coming out of the apartment and into the hallway. At 1841 hours, a radio transmission was made by an unknown source that heavy fire was observed in the hallway through a window at the stairwell landing.

At the same time, (1841) one minute after his arrival, Battalion Chief-11 (Command) noted heavy black smoke coming from the building and observed a “flash” through a second floor window. Command immediately ordered an evacuation of the building. Dispatch sounded the evacuation tones over the radio, and repeated the order to evacuate. Engines on the scene sounded their air horns to indicate that the order to evacuate had been given.

Firefighter #2 from S-303 reported hearing the engines on the fire ground sound their air horns, indicating to him that he needed to leave the building. Smoke conditions in the apartment had changed to thick black smoke, and the fire intensified, blocking his means of egress from the bedroom.

Realizing that he needed to get out of the apartment quickly, Firefighter#2 crawled to a window on the Alpha side of the bedroom and signaled Firefighters below with his hand light to move a ladder to the window. Crews immediately moved the ladder, and at 1841, Firefighter#2 dove headfirst out of the window and down the ladder, where he was assisted by crews working on the exterior of the building.

  • At 1841, Firefighter Falkenhan declared, “Emergency” on his radio, and repeated the same seven seconds later.
  • Command immediately queried S-303 for his location and the transmission “I’m down to the floor, heavy fire” was heard. At 1842 hours, Dispatch sounded emergency tones and restricted the Talkgroup to communications only between S-303 and Command.
  • Seconds later Firefighter Falkenhan again keyed up his portable radio and advised “…trapped on the 3rd floor, heavy fire on the Alpha/Bravo.”
  • Fourteen seconds later he advised “I hear crew members, the third, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY.”
  • Command notified Dispatch, “We have a MAYDAY” and was interrupted by a transmission from Firefighter Falkenhan, “urgent.”
  • Command made several attempts to contact Falkenhan to ascertain his location and determine resources needed (Location Unit Name Assignment Resources) for rescue.

Upon hearing the MAYDAY, crews on side Charlie threw multiple ladders to the third floor balcony to assist with rescue.

Heavy heat, smoke, and fire conditions made rescue difficult, but Firefighter Falkenhan was located and removed from the apartment via the balcony to the extended aerial ladder from T-8. He was unconscious and unresponsive at this time. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued enroute to the hospital. Firefighter Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

 

 

Consolidated List of Recommendations

Crew Integrity

1. Company officers shall ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times by all personnel operating in an IDLH environment. 2. No personnel shall operate in an IDLH environment without a portable radio.

MAYDAY

1. If possible, the firefighter should activate his/her Emergency button on the portable radio. 2. Once personnel have called a MAYDAY and provided the information needed (LUNAR), they will activate their PASS Device manually and intermittently.

Incident Command

1. Tactical Operations Manual 07 allows Incident Commanders the flexibility to adapt to fast-moving and complex incidents. When re-assuming command, the IC must be identified (verbally through Fire Dispatch) to allow units involved and responding to know who is in command.

2. Incident Commanders must understand that an early initial 360° would give the IC the information needed to develop effective strategy and tactics for incident mitigation.

3. Additional arriving units must give the IC an updated report on fire conditions when noticeably different than those announced in the Brief Initial Report.

4. Arriving units should prompt the IC to assign them supervision of a division when conditions warrant such action.

5. The IC must ensure that all division and group supervisors are properly deployed and verbalize same on the radio for Dispatch and units involved on the incident.

6. Reinforce the importance of the ICS and its functional components for all officers.

7. Ensure a manageable span-of-control is maintained throughout the incident.

8. Evaluate the efficiency of command and control as incidents escalate.

9. A Rapid Intervention Team is a vitally important part of the ICS and its assignment should not be overlooked.

Strategy and Tactics

1. Use caution when passing a hydrant that is in your direction of travel and close to the fire building in an attempt to get a closer one.

2. Consider having the initial backup line proceeding into the same point of entry as the initial crew operating in the IDLH environment. Doing this allows for the line to also aid in protecting the common stairwell (i.e. fire extension/protection for egress). Deploy a third line if needed into another point of access.

3. Consider dialing nozzles up to higher gallons per minute for large structures such as apartment buildings.

4. Consider utilizing a 2-1/2″ attack line for fire attack.

5. The current SOP should be modified to state that when the initial Incident Commander feels that the incident has stabilized to a point where there is no longer a need for him/her to be directly involved with incident operations, a notification through Dispatch shall be made to inform crews on and en route to the scene.

6. The Department should develop training to ensure that Incident Commanders relay changes in modes of operations.

7. Consider attacking fires from other sides of the structure that are on grade.

8. Consider the use of “door control” for protection during search and rescue and exposure protection

9. When deviations to initial orders are made, they must be communicated to Command.

10. IC should consider setting up a division supervisor with the first arriving officer to balance his/her span-of-control early into the incident.

11. Command should initiate group and division supervisors early into an incident and use them to reduce his/her span-of-control. Communicate Conditions, Actions, Needs (CAN) reports early and often.

12. When units are the initial crews deployed to a geographic location, consideration should be given to “prompt” Command to make them a division supervisor (in the absence of direction from Command).

13. Units should request resources, or supply their own as necessary to support the operations that they are undertaking.

14. When given a division assignment, “step back” to take in the overall picture and communicate progress reports to Command.

15. Be clear and concise when setting up division assignments.

16. Utilize the division supervisors for incident operations once assigned.

17. Training on effective use of interior doors to control fire spread should be promoted throughout the department.

18. Consider removing common stairwell windows earlier in fire ground operations when appropriate.

19. While performing operations above the fire, notify Command of changing conditions and immediately request resources to support your function.

20. Set up a command post as early as possible to aid in deploying and accounting for resources as they arrive on the fire ground.

21. Notify Command when entering an IDLH.

22. Request resources to support functions.

23. Set up divisions and groups early to aid in managing the strategic priorities.

24. Be clear in communicating strategy and tactics to companies involved in operations.

25. Command should make it a priority to deploy attack lines on all floors to support the operations of crews working in the area.

Communications

1. A rubberized cover for the radio speaker microphone should be tested by communications and field personnel. This device will cover the push-to-talk (PTT) button and will increase the pressure required for activation. If proved effective, this cover will decrease the likelihood of an accidental activation of the PTT button during vigorous fire ground activity.

2. Continuing study should occur to evaluate methods to control inadvertent radio interference from all units (on the scene, responding, or monitoring) during incident operations. Review PTT logs to identify sources of communications interference.

3. As a result of the investigation, PTT log files will now be saved for 25 days.

4. Fire Communications and field personnel will develop and distribute a mandatory training program outlining proper radio procedures including the importance of radio discipline, MAYDAY procedures, and the procedure for establishing a Command restricted talk group during critical operations.

5. All personnel engaged in operations in an environment immediately dangerous to life and health shall carry a portable radio.

6. The aforementioned mandatory training program shall stress the importance of giving regular updates to Command regarding the extent and location of the fire and other pertinent information.

Recommendations PDF File: HERE

 

References

 

 

 

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San Francisco FD Berkeley Way Double LODD Report Issued: Routine Fire….

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Charlie Side Fire View

 
 
 The Chief of the Department directed the Department Safety Officer to conduct a Safety Investigation of this incident. The primary purpose of the investigation was to identify and analyze the contributing factors that led to the incident as well as to create situational awareness to prevent future occurrences. The main objective of the Team’s investigation and subsequent report was to discover the key factor that led to the fatal outcome of two Firefighters. The SFFD report contains the findings and recommendations to help prevent Firefighter injuries or fatalities in the future.

 

In analyzing and recording these events, the Investigation Team acknowledges and respects that members confronted a challenging situation. On‐scene personnel reacted quickly to the changing conditions at this incident. We request that every person who reads this report show respect, appreciation and consideration for all personnel who responded to this incident.

As is a common industry practice, for this report Lieutenant Vincent Perez was referred to as Victim 1 and Firefighter Paramedic Anthony Valerio was referred to as Victim 2, with the exception of the Rescue Events Section.

 Excerpt from Chief of Department’s Letter

“On Thursday, June 2, 2011 at 10:45 a.m., the San Francisco Fire Department responded to Box 8155, at 133 Berkeley Way. What was seemingly a routine working fire in a single family residence quickly transformed into a fierce and unrelenting incident with ultimately tragic results.

When we answered the call to a career in the Fire Service and took our Oath of Allegiance, we were aware of the inherent danger of our occupation. Despite this awareness, we do not expect to encounter a line of duty death of a brother or sister, especially not in our very own Department. The profound loss of Lieutenant Vincent Perez and Firefighter/Paramedic Anthony Valerio has left an indelible impression in our hearts and will forever be remembered in the annals of SFFD history.

Even as we mourned our fallen brothers in the early days after the tragedy, our Department began the painful and difficult, but necessary, steps of a Line of Duty Death investigation. We were resolute in understanding what occurred during those fateful minutes and compelled to uncover any recommendations for improvement that may arise to future operations so that their passing will not have been in vain. For over six months, the Investigative Team worked tirelessly, scrutinizing every piece of evidence in order to produce a comprehensive report.”

SFFD

 

Joanne Hayes‐White

Chief of Department

 

 

 

Executive Summary and Report Excerpt

On June 2, 2011 at 10:45 hours, the San Francisco Fire Department was dispatched to a report of a fire in the building at 133 Berkeley Way in the City’s Diamond  Heights neighborhood. The first unit arriving on the scene, Engine 26, observed light smoke showing from the garage of the 4 story (2 above grade, 2 below grade) wood framed building, detached on the Bravo side.

 

Aerial from the Charlie Side

An aggressive interior fire attack was initiated through the front door, which is on a level between the ground level and second floor. After investigating the garage (ground level), Engine 24, the second Engine on the scene, led a small line through the garage to the interior door to back up the first Company. Battalion 9 was assigned Fire Attack by Battalion 6, who had assumed Command. Battalion 9 entered the fire building and, after conferring face to face with Engine 26 on the first floor (ground level), concluded that the fire was below them.

 

Alpha Side Operations

Battalion 9 exited the building and proceeded to the Bravo side to check for an entrance leading directly to the fire floor. Engine 11 led a large line wye to the driveway with the intention of leading a 1 ¾ inch line through the garage. They were redirected by Battalion 6 to make their lead down the Bravo side of the building to Sublevel 1 (one floor below grade) to assist Battalion 9. The Division Chief, upon arrival, assumed Command. He assigned Battalion 6 to Division 3 (ground floor).

Truck 15 was assigned Roof Division. Truck 11 split their crew, two members to the roof and three members to search and ventilate the top floor of the fire building. The Rescue Squad was ordered to conduct a search. Two members initially attempted to make entry through the garage but, due to extreme heat conditions, redeployed and entered through Sublevel 1 on the Bravo side.

The other two members of the Rescue Squad made entry through the front door, were pushed back by the heat and then made a successful second effort and conducted a search of the top floor.

 

In the course of fireground operations, members of several Companies came upon the stricken members on the first level and removed them from the building. All possible efforts were employed to revive the members and they were transported to San Francisco General Hospital (SFGH). One member (Victim 1) succumbed to his injuries that day and the second member (Victim 2) succumbed to his injuries two days later. Two other Firefighters were treated at SFGH for various injuries and released that day.

The Medical Examiner determined the cause of death for both members was due to complications from external and internal thermal injuries. Both victims suffered burns to 40% of their body surface. This fire was determined to be accidental by the SFFD Fire Investigative Unit. The fire originated on Sublevel 1, on the West side of the family room, near the large floor to ceiling windows. The ignition was a non‐specific electrical sequence in the electrical wiring or appliance (handheld vacuum cleaner) in this area.

There was a delay in reporting the fire due to the occupants’ attempting to extinguish it on their own. (SFFD Fire Investigation Report 11‐0500532)

The investigation identified that the failing of the window on Sublevel 1, located near the seat of the fire and directly across the stairwell leading to the ground floor, led to the extreme fire behavior which ultimately caused the death of two Firefighters. This fire was in a stage of deprived oxygen when the window failed, causing a rapid extreme high heat event to occur. The extreme heat followed the natural flow path up the interior stairs where Victims 1 and 2 were located.

The Safety Investigation Team found no conclusive evidence that the members were exposed to direct flame impingement during this rapid extreme heat event. However,

Victims 1 and 2 received varying degree of burns up to 40% of their body. The investigation concluded that this was caused by the rapid extreme heat conditions that radiated through their Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to their bodies. These temperatures exceed the ability for human survival regardless of PPE.

The PPE was inspected and evaluated by NIOSH and the manufacturer. Both reviewing parties concluded that the PPE performed to its specifications and design. The manufacturer concluded that the PPE was exposed to temperatures in the range of 550‐ 700°F. These extreme temperatures were short in duration which caused limited damage to the outer shell of the PPE.

The Safety Investigation Team noticed severe heat damage to the portable radios remote speaker/microphones on Victims 1 and 2 and had the radios tested. The testing indicated that the remote speaker/microphones failed to operate correctly due to heat damage. The Safety Investigation Team was not able to determine, after testing, exactly when the remote speaker/microphones failed. The investigation has shown that multiple attempts were made to contact Engine 26 with no response.

The investigation also found that no radio transmissions of distress were received from Victims 1 or 2. Command and Control of any incident in the San Francisco Fire Department is acquired and maintained through the use of the Incident Command System (ICS).

The Incident Command System provides the tools for clear objectives, a single action plan, clear and acknowledged communications, and accountability for all members assigned to an incident. At this incident, some of the components of Incident Command System that were not followed include:

  • Single action plan
  • Fireground Accountability

From these findings, this report makes recommendations for several areas of the Department, including:

  • Training
  • Equipment
  • Policy Development
  • Policy Enforcement

The Safety Investigation Team gathered and analyzed many facts and conducted interviews of members directly involved in this incident. The Team identified several factors that occurred that contributed to the deaths at this incident.

These factors include:

  • Extreme heat conditions accelerated by the failure of a window on the fire floor.
  • Layout of building
  • Excessive live fuel load which contributed to the growth of the fire

Conclusion

This incident appeared from the onset to be a routine “room and contents” fire that the SFFD encounters on a regular basis. As the Companies were performing standard fireground operations, the incident rapidly deteriorated due to a hostile fire event. The failure of a window in the fire room allowed fresh oxygen to enter the room, providing a fire that was deprived of one of the key elements of combustion to rapidly intensify.

Due to the growth of the fire, the room flashed, causing extreme and rapid heat conditions which traveled up the interior stairs (the flow path) to the location which our members were operating. Our members were caught in this high heat, causing the injuries that ultimately claimed their lives.

Due to this fire event, other Companies attempting to conduct fireground support operations were prevented from making entry into the structure from street level (through garage) to back up Engine 26. These Companies were forced to regroup and find an alternate point of entry. In the process of doing so, crews made entry from the Bravo side directly into the fire room and extinguished the fire. This allowed members to make entry from above which led to the discovery and rescue of our members.

These events happened in a time frame of less than fourteen minutes.

 During the course of this investigation, the Safety Investigation Team recognized that no matter how experienced or properly prepared we are, we must always approach all incidents with the utmost awareness.

This incident showed that a simple failure of a piece of glass/window caused unforeseeable and fatal consequences.

We, as a Department, need to gain further knowledge and understanding of the following:

  • Having Situational Awareness prior to taking action, this would include the ongoing process when conditions change
  • How Risk Management must be used when making all decisions
  • Limitations of the PPE (turnouts, SCBA, and equipment)
  • Building construction, including layout and how fire/smoke will
  • move within the structure
  • Ventilation practices and how they affect fire conditions
  • Importance of Communications for all members operating on the scene
  • Companies must use strict discipline when assigned task/locations

Previous  CommandSafety Coverage from 2011, HERE, HERE  and HERE

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

Other Links;

Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE  and HERE.

SFFD Report PDF, HERE


 

SFFD Web Link, HERE

SFFD Mission

The mission of the Fire Department is to protect the lives and property of the people of San Francisco from fires, natural disasters, and hazardous materials incidents; to save lives by providing emergency medical services; to prevent fires through prevention and education programs; and to provide a work environment that values health, wellness and cultural diversity and is free of harassment and discrimination.

SFFD Color Seal

IN TRIBUTE TO
OUR FALLEN HEROES
 

 

Alpha Side

 

 STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION

Site overview: Steep downhill slope adjacent to Glen Canyon

Date of Construction: 1975

 

 Building overview:

  • Attached garage located in the front of the house. Main structure is 2 stories above grade and 2 stories below grade

 Type of Construction:

  • Four story, Type 5 wood framed, single family home, detached on three sides
  • Approximate square footage: 4,000 sq ft.
  • Four stories of living space
    • First Floor (Ground floor): garage, 3 bedrooms, 2 bathrooms
    • Second floor: dining room, living room, kitchen, bathroom and family room
    • Sublevel 1: large family room (origin of fire), mechanical room, bathroom, bedroom, balcony, side entrance on Bravo side
    • Sublevel 2: enclosed finished storage area, bathroom (no windows)

 Construction features:

  • Roof type: Flat roof, bitumen roofing membrane, normal dimensional lumber
  • Exterior: siding T1-11 plywood, 5/8”
  • Interior: drywall over normal insulated framing
    • Note: Fire origin room had decorative plywood veneer panels over drywall
  • Steel I beams wrapped in drywall were used as structural supports
    • Note: Fire origin room had a steel I beam that spanned horizontally from Bravo to Delta side
  • Rear of structure had extensive use of glass to capture views, including windows and sliding doors
  • Second floor and Sublevel 1 (fire origin) had large balconies
  • Flooring consisted of tile, carpet and sheet vinyl throughout the house
  • Dual glazed windows throughout, installed in 2003
  • Ground level had a two car garage with access to residence
    • Note: Two large vehicles occupying garage at time of fire
  • Main entrance was accessed by ascending a flight of stairs adjacent to the garage
    • Note: Main entrance stairs led to an interior landing which allowed access to top floor (5 stairs up) or grade level (7 stairs down)
  • Sublevel 1 had an access door from the exterior Bravo side along with access from interior stairs
  • Sublevel 2 had access door from exterior Bravo side. (no interior access)
    • Note: Access through the Bravo side was difficult due to unfinished terrain and poor housekeeping

 

 

 

 

 

Posted by on February 24, 2012 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, construction, Fatalities, firefighting, firefighting-operations, floors, LODD, major-incidents, Mayday • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Building-Occupancy Relationships and Firefighting

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Knowledge and proficiencies related to building construction are formulative to all strategic, tactical and task level assignments.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, the compartment, occupancy risk, fire dynamics and fire behavior, fluid situational awareness and risk analysis, the art and science of aggressive and smart firefighting with well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies; You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

What do you think? Where do you fit in?

New Strategic Thinking for Today’s Evolving Fireground and Challenges…..

Posted by on February 16, 2012 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, compentencies, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement: Random Thoughts

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The New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement:

  • How do You Measure  Your Effectiveness on the Fireground?
  • What are Your Rules of Engagement Based upon?
  • Are Your Operations SOP Driven? Are they Aggressive or Measured?
  • What is Employed in your Size-up?
  • How is Risk Assessed, Monitored, Adjusted?
  • Do Company Officers Manage Tactical Objectives?
  • Is Tactical Entertainment a Fundamental Part of OPS? 
  • Occupancy Type driven Strategies?
  • Successes Drive Tactical Assignments?
  • Fire Suppression a Function of Hose Bed Capacity? 
  • Staffing Equal to Strategic Formulas and Task Demands?

    Random Thoughts

 

Posted by on February 15, 2012 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, compentencies, construction, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.1998

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FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.1998

Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at  fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly.  At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.

As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.

NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.

During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”

The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.

The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.

This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE.  NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

Posted by on December 28, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, FDNY, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, Highrise, LODD, major-incidents, Mayday, ventilation, Wind Driven • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

SFFD Diamond Heights LODD Safety Violations

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State investigators have cited the San Francisco Fire Department for “serious” worker safety violations in the deaths of two firefighters killed battling a Diamond Heights house fire in June. Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE  and HERE.

 Firefighters lost track of Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, after they went into the four-level home at 133 Berkeley Way on June 2 and failed to respond quickly to the men’s last radio communication, investigators with the state Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health said in a report issued Monday.

In recommending that the Fire Department be fined $21,000, the state investigators also said the department had violated state rules requiring that two firefighters be designated outside to assist any two firefighters who venture into a life-threatening environment.

Only one firefighter from Perez and Valerio’s engine company – the first on the scene – was available to come to their help during the blaze, the investigation found.

The state also cited the Fire Department for an incident – evidently before the fatal flareup – in which an unidentified battalion chief ventured into the burning building alone, without keeping in contact with Perez and Valerio. That was also deemed a serious violation of safety rules.

“These are serious in that they had protocols in place, but they weren’t following them,” said Erika Monterroza, spokeswoman for the worker safety agency. “There’s no question that a lack of communications was a big issue here. The investigator found there was a breakdown there.”

Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White said the department would appeal the findings. She said state officials have told her commanders that the violations fell short of finding the department’s actions responsible for the two firefighters’ deaths. “None of the citations involved a direct cause of the line-of-duty deaths,” Hayes-White said. Monterroza confirmed that, saying the exact circumstances of the firefighters’ deaths could not be determined.

Valerio, Perez and a third member of Engine Company 26 in Diamond Heights were the first firefighters to arrive at the mid-morning blaze, which started when a sparking electrical outlet set curtains on fire.

The third firefighter manned the pumper hose while Valerio and Perez went inside to fight the fire, but the safety regulations require a fourth firefighter to be available outside to assist.

A scene commander, identified by firefighters as Battalion Chief Thomas Abbott, ordered a crew from Engine Company 24 to back up Valerio and Perez inside the building. For several minutes, however, scene commanders tried to find the Engine 26 firefighters, without success.

There was an unspecified gap between that last communication and any effort by firefighters to respond over the radio or track down the men, the state investigation found.

The reports goes on to state that Hayes-White said the department’s investigative report – still in draft form – concluded that the fire had melted one of the firefighters’ microphone cords, cutting off communications. She said any delay in firefighters’ response would be addressed in the final report.

Firefighters ultimately found Perez and Valerio in a landing area and carried the injured men outside. Perez was pronounced dead at San Francisco General Hospital, and Valerio died there two days later.

The state probe also faulted the actions of the unnamed battalion chief who went into the building “alone and also did not remain in contact with the firefighters who were inside.”

Hayes-White said the battalion chief had gone inside only briefly, had seen Perez and Valerio alive and had never been out of other firefighters’ view.

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/02/BANQ1M7JBO.DTL#ixzz1fUEug7hu

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

 

Posted by on December 3, 2011 • Filed under: Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, decision-making, failures, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting, firefighting-operations, first-due, floors, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD, Mayday • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

FDNY: The 23 Street Collapse October 17,1966 Box 55 598

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Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page

On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.

Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.

Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.

Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.

The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.

Building Construction Insights

  • Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
  • Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”

Fire Building Construction:

  • 7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
  • The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
  • The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.

Collapse Building Construction:

  • 6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
  • The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
  • The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street

    Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011

 

Building Alteration

(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.

(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.

(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.

 The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.

It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.

The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.

The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001. 
 

FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank

Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.

  • DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
  • BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
  • Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
  • Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
  • Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
  • Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
  • Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
  • Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
  • Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
  • Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
  • Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
  • Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18

 

From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html

 

 

A wreath is laid at the new plaque honoring the 12 FDNY members killed at the 23rd Street fire on Oct. 17, 1966. © FDNY Photo Unit.

FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary

Posted by on October 18, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, FDNY, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, floors • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Remembering Hackensack and Gloucester

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Hackensack (NJ) Ford Fire July 1, 1988

As we approach the July 4th holiday period, two significant LODD incidents previously occurred during this time frame that hold a number of lessons learned related to command management, operations, building construction principles and building performance, fire behavior and the ever present dangers of the job.

Take the opportunity to learn more about these events, and expand your insights and knowledge base.

Take a moment to reflect upon the supreme sacrifice made by these heroic firefighters and the messages that lay within the pages of the incident case studies, reports and summaries.

There’s a lot of practical safety and operational information on these events along with a tremendous volume of information in the various text books on strategy and tactics, incident command and building construction.

Learn from the past so we don’t repeat it. Remember- NO MORE HISTORY REPEATING EVENTS!

The Hackensack Ford Fire & Collapse occurred nearly ten years AFTER another tragic LODD event involving a bowstring truss roof collapse; the August 2nd, 1978 FDNY Waldbaum’s Fire, Brooklyn, New York that took the lives of six FDNY firefighters.

Street Smarts for Safety and Survival…………Stay safe.
Additional Relevant Safety considerations, HERE and HERE

Twenty-Three Year Anniversary Hackensack Ford Fire and Truss roof collapse, Hackensack Fire Department. July 1st, 1988

Pause to remember our brothers who made the ultimate sacrifice twenty-three years ago, on July 1st, 1988 and the lessons learned from this event.

On July 1, 1988 Hackensack’s Captain RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Lieutenant RICHARD REINHAGEN, Firefighter WILLIAM KREJSA, firefighter LEONARD RADUMSKI, and Firefighter STEPHEN ENNIS lost their lives at Hackensack Ford when a bowstring arch truss collapsed entrapping them in the area below. The five firefighters were in the structure, a bowstring truss building, when the roof suddenly collapsed a 60-foot square section of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof collapsed, and an intense fire immediately engulfed the area. Williams, Kresja and Radumski were killed instantly, and four other firefighters escaped. Reinhagen and Ennis survived the initial collapse and found refuge in a tool room where they spent the next 13 minutes calling for help.. . despite heroic rescue attempts, succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning. Approximately 90 minutes after the collapse, firefighters located the bodies of their fallen comrades.

Three (3) building factors contributed to the collapse of this bowstring trussed roof:

• Alterations that consisted of a heavy ceiling of cementitious material on wire lathe;
• Auto parts storage in the attic; and
• The Fire burned for a significant length of time and was well advanced prior to detection.
• This roof collapsed 35 Minutes after the initial units arrived.

Remember:
• CAPT. RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Engine Co. No. 304
• LIEUT. RICHARD REINHAGEN, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F WILLIAM KREJSA, Engine Co. No. 301
• F/F LEONARD RADUMSKI, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F STEPHEN ENNIS, Rescue Co. No. 308

NFPA SUMMARY
Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Fighter Fatalities July 1, 1988

Five fire fighters from the Hackensack, New Jersey Fire Department were killed while they were engaged in interior fire suppression efforts at an automobile dealership when portions of the building’s wood bowstring truss roof suddenly collapsed. The incident occurred on Friday, July 1, 1988, at approximately 3:00 p.m., when the fire department began to receive the first of a series of telephone calls reporting “flames and smoke” coming from the roof of the Hackensack Ford Dealership.

Two engines, a ladder company, and a battalion chief responded to the first alarm assignment. The first arriving fire fighters observed a “heavy smoke condition” at the roof area of the building. Engine company crews investigated the source of the smoke inside the building while the truck company crew assessed conditions on the roof. For the next 20 minutes, the focus of the suppression effort was concentrated on these initial tactics.

During this time, however, little headway appeared to have been made by the initial suppression efforts, and the magnitude of the fire continued to grow. The overall fire ground tactics were shifted to a more “defensive” posture (exterior operation) and the battalion chief gave the order to “back your lines out.” However, before suppression crews could exit form the interior, a sudden partial collapse of the truss roof occurred, trapping six fire fighters. An intense fire immediately engulfed the area of the collapse. One trapped fire fighter was able to escape through an opening in the debris. The other five died as a result of the collapse. This incident and several others before and since, provide important lessons to the fire service regarding the fire ground hazards of wood truss roof assemblies.

This NFPA Summary may be reproduced in whole or in part for fire safety educational purposes as long as the meaning of the summary is not altered, credit is given to NFPA and the copyright of the NFPA is protected.

Following is an excerpt from the New York Times article:
Demers contended that Chief Williams, primarily because of the volume of fire on the rooftop, should have ordered nine firefighters out of the garage within 7 minutes of his arrival. The order to pull out was given at 3:34 p.m., about 30 minutes after his arrival, the report said.

  • “This radio message was not acknowledged by any companies,” the report said.

The roof collapsed at 3:36 p.m. Three firefighters were hit by burning debris and killed, four escaped, and two, Lieut. Richard R. Reinhagen and Stephen Ennis, took refuge in the tool room.

  • At 3:39 p.m., Lieutenant Reinhagen began to radio his location and appeal for help, the report said.

In one of the major communications flaws cited by Mr. Demers at the fire scene, all departmental communications were transmitted on a single channel, or frequency. Consequently, Lieutenant Reinhagen’s appeals for help were intermingled with orders for deploying men and hoses and instructions to arriving companies.

  • “You have to hurry, we’re running out of air,” Lieutenant Reinhagen said at 3:42 p.m.

Headquarters then radioed to Chief Williams: “Expedite on that, they’re running out of air.” The transcript did not show any response from Chief Williams.Over the next 6 minutes, through 3:48 p.m., Lieutenant Reinhagen made 10 more calls. None was answered. For three of the minutes, bells indicating depletion of his air tanks’ supply were ringing repeatedly. At one point, a civilian who overheard the ringing on a radio scanner called fire headquarters to tell officials of the noise.

At 3:49 p.m., the Lieutenant radioed: “Chief, this is Lieutenant Reinhagen. I’m still stuck back in the right rear of the building in the closet. We are out of air in a closet. We’re out of air.”
“What’s your location?” Chief Williams said. The response was inaudible and the Chief began ordering water from a truck.

At 3:50 p.m., the Lieutenant got the Chief directly and repeated that they were “stuck in a closet” and “out of air.”

  • “Stuck in a closet?” Chief Williams asked.

Twelve seconds later, the Chief Williams asked: “Where you at?”

  • “Right there in the closet,” came the response.
  • Fourteen seconds later, Lieutenant Reinhagen radioed again: “Help. The right rear. Out of air. Anybody out there? Stuck in the closet, right rear. No air. Help.”

The Lieutenant was asked if he was on the first or second floor. “First floor, underneath the collapsed ceiling,” the Lieutenant said at 3:52 p.m. It was his last transmission. Firemen eventually punched a hole through an exterior wall about 10 feet from the tool room, but saw only a mass of flame, Mr. Demers said. The burning timbers were leaning against the tool room, he said, but neither fireman was burned.

Learn from the past so we don’t repeat it. Remember- NO MORE HISTORY REPEATING EVENTS!

Some Open Questions;

  • What impact did the Hackensack Ford Fire & Collapse have upon you in your career?
  • Were you aware of this event and its lessons learned prior to this posting?
  • What do you feel you need to learn related to Building Construction, Fire Behavior or Strategy and Tactics related to various occupancies and construction types?
  • What is you knowledge base on Truss Construction related to Timber Bow String or Engineered Structural Systems?

Additional References:
NFPA REPORT, HERE

Dave STATter’s 2008 Coverage, HERE

Fire Rescue Magazine Article, A Failure in Command; HERE

Lessons Learned from Tim Sendelbach, Editor-in-Chief, FireRescue magazine, HERE

Other Resource Links:
http://www.wusa9.com/news/columnist/blogs/2008/06/hackensack-ford-20-years-later.html
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE3D6143FF931A357…
http://www3.gendisasters.com/new-jersey/6534/hackensack-nj-fire-aut…
http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID=18676&;…;…

Memorial Park, Hackensack, NJ (http://www.cyberonic.net/~mikef6/p0000120.htm)

Three Firefighters and Three Sisters Killed in Gloucester City, New Jersey Building Collapse during Fire Attack, Rescue Operation, July 4th, 2002

Gloucester City (NJ) Collapse 2002

On July 4th, 2002 at 0136 hrs.,The Gloucester City Fire Department was dispatched to 200 North Broadway for a reported house fire. Responding units were advised that occupants may be trapped. First arriving units were on location in less than three minutes.

They found heavy fire on all exposures of a three-story multi-family dwelling and initiated a search for entrapped occupants. (Various reports from bystanders were at times conflicting regarding the number and location of victims). While providing an aggressive interior attack and rescue operation, an occupant was rescued from the dwelling. Due to the severity of their injuries they were unable to give direction regarding the whereabouts of any other occupants.

While all hands were operating by continuing an aggressive interior attack and rescue, a partial collapse of the structure occurred. An emergency evacuation signal was sounded and while that was commencing a further and much more substantial collapse occurred trapping eight firefighters inside the burning debris.

Additional specialized collapse rescue resources were requested, firefighter accountability was initiated and rescue efforts were intensified. Five of the eight trapped firefighters were rescued. Three of the eight gave the ultimate sacrifice in service to their fellow man. Unfortunately these three children did not survive. A total of nine victims were transported to area hospitals, one civilian and eight firefighters.

Remember:
• James Sylvester
Fire Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
Sylvester, 31, a 17 year veteran, was survived by his wife, who was pregnant with the couple’s first child
• John West
Deputy Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
West, 40, a 23-year veteran, was survived by his wife and three children
• Thomas G. Stewart III
Paid Firefighter, Gloucester City Fire Department
Stewart, 30, a 13 year veteran, was survived by his fiancée and their son. Stewart publicly proposed to his girlfriend, hours before the fire while they watched the city’s fireworks from high atop a fire truck ladder at Gloucester City High School.

NIOSH REPORT: Structural Collapse at Residential Fire Claims Lives of Two Volunteer Fire Chiefs and One Career Fire Fighter – New Jersey, HERE

Philadelphia Inquirer Posting, HERE

Everyone Goes Home Newsletter Article by Chris Collier, HERE

New Jersey Division of Fire Safety LODD Report, HERE

SUMMARY
On July 4, 2002, a 30-year-old male volunteer fire chief, a 40-year-old male volunteer deputy fire chief, and a 30-year-old male career fire fighter died when a residential structure collapsed, trapping them, along with four fire fighters and an officer who survived. At 0136 hours, a combination fire department and a mutual-aid volunteer fire department were dispatched to a structure fire. Local law enforcement radioed Central Dispatch reporting a fully involved structure with three children trapped on the second floor. The first officer on the scene assumed incident command and reported to Central Dispatch that the incident site was a three-story structure with fire showing and that people could be seen at the windows. Note: The female resident (survivor) was the person seen in the window.

The three children that were reported as being trapped did not survive and were later found in the debris. Additional units were requested, including a mutual-aid ladder company from a career department. Crews were on the scene searching for occupants and fighting the fire for approximately 27 minutes when the building collapsed.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar incidents, fire departments should;
• Ensure that the department’s structural fire fighting standard operating guidelines (SOGs) are followed and refresher training is provided
• Ensure that the Incident Commander (IC) formulates and establishes a strategic plan for offensive and defensive operations
• Ensure that the incident commander (IC) continuously evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
• Ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed
• Ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations (e.g., search and rescue, initial attack, etc.) provide progress reports to the IC
• Ensure that accountability for all personnel at the fire scene is maintained
• Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) is established and in position
• Ensure that the officer in charge of an incident recognize factors (e.g., structural defects, large body of fire in an old structure, etc.) when analyzing potential building collapse
• Ensure, when feasible, that fire fighters should respond together, in one emergency vehicle, as a crew
Additionally, municipalities should consider
• Establishing and maintaining regional mutual-aid radio channels to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions

In order to minimize the risk of similar incidents, the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety identified key issues that must be addressed and remedies that should be implemented within all departments.

1. FACTOR: There appears to be a disconnect between career and volunteer personnel in the Gloucester City Fire Department (GCFD). Many personnel expressed the concern that the GCFD operated as separate fire departments rather than as one.

REMEDY: It is essential that all firefighters put individual differences aside in order to work together successfully as a team to achieve their common goal of saving lives and property.

2. FACTOR: The GCFD, faces a common dilemma associated with combination fire departments: staffing levels may be unpredictable depending on how many volunteers are available to respond to any one incident. This unpredictability can result in insufficient staff to perform required tasks until additional staff arrives.

REMEDY: Elected or appointed municipal officials need to make a commitment to the adequate staffing of the fire department and staffing levels must allow for compliance with the two-in / two-out provisions of the Public Employees Occupational Safety and Health (PEOSH) Standard 29CFR1910.134. The New Jersey Division of Fire Safety can provide assistance to the municipalities and provide examples of how this can be accomplished

3. FACTOR: Due to the limited number of firefighting personnel who arrived at this incident, all initial efforts were focused on the rescue of occupants. This postponed fire suppression operations until additional resources arrived. Because rescue and fire suppression operations were performed sequentially rather than simultaneously, the fire may have spread more quickly resulting in the early failure of the structure.

REMEDY: Sufficient personnel are critical to ensure that all necessary operations can be performed at the appropriate time. Furthermore, a continual size-up assessment must be maintained so that the Incident Commander (IC) can be kept aware of the conditions as the incident progresses. This continual size-up will allow the IC to modify the strategy and / or tactics as deemed necessary.

4. FACTOR: Although the GCFD was equipped with a thermal imaging camera (TIC), firefighters failed to utilize it for the initial search for victims. The TIC was also not used properly to analyze the scope of the incident and determine what tactics to employ.

REMEDY: Fire departments that possess TIC units should use them regularly during routine operations such as training, scene size up, search and rescue and structural fire fighting.

5. FACTOR: From the onset of operations, the Incident Management System (IMS) was not properly expanded as the incident progressed. Given the scale of this incident, the span of control quickly became too large for the IC to effectively manage and additional functions were not delegated to subordinates. Critical tasks such as safety and accountability were not effectively implemented.

REMEDY: N.J.A.C. 5:75 mandates that all fire departments utilize an IMS. It is a modular system, which allows the IC to apply only those elements that are necessary at a particular incident, and allows elements to be activated or deactivated as incidents escalate or decline. Fire departments are required to adopt written plans, or Standard Operating Guidelines (SOG’s) based on the IMS, to address different types of incidents. The NJ Division of Fire Safety distributed suggested SOGs upon adoption of this regulation and they continue to be available to all fire departments.

6. FACTOR: The GCFD did not assign a dedicated safety officer (SO) to observe operations and terminate potentially unsafe actions.

REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 mandate the use of safety officers (SO’s) at all incidents. An SO is required to observe operations on the fire scene, identify next steps and order the correction of safety hazards to personnel. Given the scope of this incident, the IC should have assigned at least one SO.

7. FACTOR: The GCFD did not designate accountability officers to monitor each area of entry into the structure. Nor was a Personal Accountability Report (PAR) or roll sheet utilized to track personnel and monitor their functions. Therefore, the concept of accountability of personnel location, function, and time failed.

REMEDY: Although not enforceable at the time of this incident, the regulations for the NJ Personal Accountability System (NJPAS) under N.J.A.C 5:75 now require that fire departments utilize an accountability system. This system includes the designation of accountability officers and the use of PAR’s / roll calls, all within the framework of the IMS that is required to be utilized at all incidents. The NJ Division of Fire Safety is in the process of finalizing suggested SOGs and will distribute them to all fire departments when complete.

8. FACTOR: Although firefighters Sylvester and Stewart were equipped with Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices, they did not activate them prior to entering the structure. It should be further noted that their PASS devices were not automated; they had to be manually activated by the user. Firefighter West was not equipped with a PASS device.

REMEDY: PASS devices must be provided, used, and maintained in accordance with PEOSH regulations under N.J.A.C. 12:100-10 et seq. Although many departments still rely on PASS devices that must be activated manually, – devices that are acceptable by PEOSH regulations – they are not ideal because the firefighter must remember to activate the PASS device. For this reason, fire departments should strongly consider upgrading their SCBA to those employing automatic activating PASS devices.

9. FACTOR: The GCFD did not specifically designate the required personnel for the rescue of distressed firefighters through the establishment of Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) or Firefighter Assist and Search Teams (FAST). Consequently, when the building collapsed, there was not a properly equipped team in place for immediate rescue operations.

REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 require that fire departments utilize RIT or FAST to rescue distressed firefighters when operating in a hazardous atmosphere. The IC should request a RIT or FAST as soon as possible after dispatch to allow the team to arrive quickly.

10. FACTOR: Not all fire departments operating on the fire ground were communicating on the same radio frequency, which resulted in communication failures. Although, the Camden Fire Department (CFD) did have the capability to communicate on the GCFD “Fire 5” frequency they chose not to.

REMEDY: IMS regulations under N.J.A.C. 5:75 require that a communication system allow for inter-agency communication during mutual aid responses by providing a direct communication link between companies. Fire departments should work with other departments that are used routinely for mutual aid to ensure radio interoperability.

11. FACTOR: An emergency evacuation signal was sounded upon reports of a firefighter missing inside the structure before the impending collapse, however, the signal was never sounded at any other time prior to the collapse, nor was it sounded immediately after the collapse.

REMEDY: In the event an emergency evacuation becomes necessary and an emergency signal is required, N.J.A.C. 5:75 requires that fire departments utilize an emergency evacuation signal that is easily recognizable and distinguishable from all other fireground noises. The signal must be utilized when conditions on the fireground indicate an imminent and extreme risk to firefighters. At this time NJ DFS is finalizing a proposal that would establish a statewide emergency evacuation signal.

12. FACTOR: During this incident, fireground conditions were not properly analyzed, which led to the failure to recognize an impending building collapse.

REMEDY: Firefighters and officers need to learn the warning signs and causes of building collapses. Often following a collapse, as was the case with this incident, personnel on the scene report that the structure collapsed “without warning”. However, this is usually not the case; the reality is that the IC and firefighters simply failed to identify the indicators that were present prior to the collapse.

13. FACTOR: After removal of all victims, the remaining structure was demolished and the incident scene was cleared of all debris within 48 hours of law enforcement concluding their origin and cause investigation. This prevented a thorough assessment of the remaining structure in order to identify the cause and contributing factors of the collapse.

REMEDY: A protocol should be adopted to ensure that fire scenes are secured in a manner that not only allows for public safety, but also prevents immediate demolition. This will provide agencies with an opportunity to conduct any investigations that may be necessary.

14. FACTOR It was difficult to gauge the amount of training for all GCFD personnel due to insufficient record keeping. Although it was determined that the GCFD firefighters and officers met the minimum regulatory training requirements, many members did not possess a great deal of supplemental training with regard to structural firefighting. Additionally, the volunteer firefighters and officers often did not attend the scheduled departmental drills and rarely trained with the career personnel despite having frequent opportunities to participate.

REMEDY: Standards such as NFPA 1500 recommend that fire departments establish a regular training and education program that is commensurate with the duties and functions that firefighters are expected to perform. Additionally, proper record keeping is essential to certify that all personnel have received both required and supplemental training or education.

15. FACTOR: Qualifications of volunteer officers were difficult to judge and there were serious concerns voiced by the career members of the department regarding the suitability of some of the volunteer officers. This resulted in a lack of confidence by several career personnel in the volunteer officers and reluctance to take direction from them.

REMEDY: In addition to the NJ DFS requirement that all fire service supervisors obtain incident management certification; municipal officials need to establish uniform minimum qualifications for fire officers in order to ensure the effective provision of fire suppression services to the public. The NJ DFS recently adopted voluntary fire officer standards and will be developing a training curriculum to meet those standards.

16. FACTOR: It was not possible to determine if a smoke detector inspection was conducted in the building after a change in occupancy in October of 2001 as required by the NJ Uniform Fire Code. The city’s housing department, who has the responsibility for these inspections, was unable to provide documentation of such an inspection to either the Division of Fire Safety or to the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office. It was not clear whether smoke detectors were activated during this fire incident.

REMEDY: It is recommended that the responsibility for smoke detector inspections be transferred to the fire department to ensure complete and documented inspections.


Discovery Channel Special on the Gloucester City Incident. A must see for all Company and Command Officers…

Addtional Link on Bowstring Truss Safety Considerations;

Posted by on July 1, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, failures, Fire Service Tradition, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, honor, LODD, Remembrance • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

NIOSH Findings Reported on Bridgeport (CT) Double LODD Fire; Failed to Respond to Maydays

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2 Bridgeport firefighters die in line of duty: wtnh.com

Fire vented through the roof. Note: NIOSH investigators believe this photo shows conditions very close to the time that the Mayday was called for Victim #2 by FF4. Wind was pushing the smoke plume from right to left. (Photo courtesy of Keith Muratori.)

Bridgeport (CT) fire officials’ failure on nearly ever level led to the line-of-duty deaths of two firefighters battling a fire in a residential occupancy in Bridgeport, CT on July 24, 2010. 

Among the findings of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) released Wednesday:

  • the deputy fire chief and his assistant at the scene of the Elmwood Street fire were having a discussion about whether they heard a mayday call from the two fallen firefighters instead of taking immediate action to rescue them.
  • The report also stated firefighters failed to immediately treat one of the firefighters who managed to make it to relative safety before collapsing.
  • Officials also did not properly managed firefighters’ air supplies — both firefighter’s air cylinders were empty when they were found, the report stated.
  • The department’s incident safety officer, who is required to be on scene for assistance in a fire also did not arrive more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch.

Lt. Steven Velasquez and Firefighter Michel Baik were on the third-floor of the wood-frame home at 41 Elmwood Ave. checking for hot spots and making sure there were no people in the smoldering blaze. Then trouble hit. The two sent mayday signals back to dispatch. Within minutes, the fire department’s rapid intervention team found the pair on the floor, unconscious, and gave them CPR. The two men could not be revived.

Full NIOSH Report F2010- 18 FINAL CT F2010-18

NIOSH Executive Summary

On July 24, 2010, a 40-year-old male career fire lieutenant and a 49-year-old male career fire fighter were found unresponsive at a residential structure fire. The victims and two additional crew members were tasked with conducting a primary search for civilians and fire extension on the 3rd floor of a multifamily residential structure. The fire had been extinguished on the 2nd floor upon their entry into the structure.

While pulling walls and the ceiling on the 3rd floor, smoke and heat conditions changed rapidly. The first firefighter transmitted a Mayday (audibly under duress) that was not acknowledged or acted upon. Minutes later the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the 3rd floor. As a fire fighter exited the 3rd floor, the lieutenant was discovered unconscious and not breathing, sitting on the stairs to the 3rd floor.

Approximately 7 minutes later, the second firefighter  was discovered on the 3rd floor in thick, black smoke conditions. Both victims were removed by the rapid intervention team (RIT) and other fire fighters who assisted them. Both victims were pronounced dead at local hospitals.

Contributing Factors

  • Failure to effectively monitor and respond to Mayday transmissions
  • Less than effective Mayday procedures and training
  • Inadequate air management
  • Removal and/or dislodgement of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
  • Incident safety officer (ISO) and rapid intervention team (RIT) not readily available on scene
  • Possible underlying medical condition(s) (coronary artery disease)
  • Command, control, and accountability.

Aerial View of House and Exposures

 
 

Key Recommendations

  • Ensure that radio transmissions are effectively monitored and quickly acted upon, especially when a Mayday is called
  • Ensure that Mayday training program(s) and department procedures adequately prepare fire fighters to call a Mayday
  • Train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their SCBA
  • Ensure that fire fighters use their SCBA during all stages of a fire and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures
  • Ensure that a separate incident safety officer (ISO), independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire with the initial dispatch
  • Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is readily available and prepared to respond to fire fighter emergencies
  • Consider adopting a comprehensive wellness and fitness program, provide annual medical evaluations consistent with NFPA standards, and perform annual physical performance (physical ability) evaluations for all fire fighters.

Timeline

This timeline is provided to set out, to the extent possible, the sequence of events according to recorded and intelligible radio transmissions. Two channels were used during this incident: the main dispatch channel and channel 2 (fireground). Times are approximate and were obtained from review of the dispatch records, witness interviews, photographs of the scene, and other available information. Times have been rounded to the nearest minute. NIOSH investigators have attempted to include all intelligible radio transmissions, but some may be missing. This timeline is not intended, nor should it be used, as a formal record of events.

  • 1544 Hours E3 and L5 dispatched to a report of an elevator rescue.
  • 1546 Hours While en route, E3 contacted the dispatcher on the main dispatch channel and advised them they needed to redirect all companies to a possible house fire.
  • 1547 Hours L5 copied E3‘s transmission on the main dispatch channel and redirected to the possible house fire. E3 advised the dispatcher, on the main dispatch channel, that they had a fire on the 2nd floor and that they did not have a hydrant. Note: It is unclear whether E3 established command, but L5 arrived just after E3 and established command.
  • 1548 Hours E3, E4, E1, E7 as RIT, L11, L5, R5, and B1 were dispatched on the main dispatch channel to the house fire.
  • 1549 Hours L5 arrived on scene and their officer stated over the main dispatch channel, ―2½-story wood frame with heavy fire coming from the 2nd floor, Alpha/Bravo side, L5 is now command.‖
  • 1550 Hours E7 en route.
  • 1551-1552 Hours E4 arrived on scene and laid a supply line in from the hydrant. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer (initial arriving IC) advised the dispatcher that the bulk of the fire was knocked down by E3 and the primary search was in progress. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised L11 and E7 which way they should approach the scene. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer requested an ambulance for an injured fire fighter (ankle injury). Over the main dispatch channel, B1 advised the dispatcher that he was on scene, and he confirmed the first report of heavy fire with the bulk of the fire knocked down. B1 then took command of the incident.
  • 1553 Hours L11 arrived on scene. E1 took an additional hydrant. A7116 dispatched to the incident for an injured fire fighter. Note: Dispatch of A7116 was not part of the initial fire assignment. The 9-1-1 center contacted the EMS dispatch center via landline to request an ambulance for the injured fire fighter on scene after the request from the L5 officer.
  • 1554 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the BA advised the dispatcher that the command post would be in front of the fire building and tag collection would be at the command post. On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 to charge the second hoseline. E7 (RIT) arrived on scene.
  • 1555 Hours On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 again to charge the second hoseline. Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested the dispatcher to have the safety officer respond to the incident. IC checked on the status of the ambulance. Fire dispatch advised the IC that the ambulance was en route.
  • 1556 Hours E3 advised the IC (on the main dispatch channel) that he needed hooks on the 2nd floor in the room of origin; the IC acknowledged the request. Over the main dispatch channel, IC advised all companies, ―Channel 2 fireground, channel 2 fireground.‖ Note: Up to this point, companies on scene were operating on the main dispatch and channel 2. Fire dispatch assigned fireground operations to channel 2 for the incident.
  • 1557-1558 Hours IC called L11 on channel 2. IC (on the main dispatch channel) confirmed with the dispatcher who was RIT (which was E7) on scene and advised them that their equipment was available at the command post. Victim#1 acknowledged the IC‘s request for L11 on channel 2, but the IC did not respond. E3 officer, who incorrectly identified himself as ―E4,‖ called command on channel 2 and stated they had a slight extension into the A/B corner. Note: He was working overtime the day of the incident at the station that houses E3 and E4, which is also his normal duty station. The IC copied the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2 and asked him if he had enough hooks available; the E3 officer stated he did. A7116 arrived on scene.
  • 1559 Hours E3 officer on channel 2 advised the IC that they needed a hoseline to the 3rd floor because they could not reach it (fire extension) from the 2nd floor. The IC acknowledged the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2. The IC, on channel 2, advised Victim #1 that E1 was bringing a hoseline to the 3rd floor. Victim #1 acknowledged the IC‘s transmission on channel 2 and advised, ―A primary is in progress, which is negative; and, they are still checking for extension.‖ The IC acknowledged Victim #1‘s transmission.
  • 1600 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the ISO advised the dispatcher that he was responding (from home). A7116 contacted EMS dispatch requesting a single ambulance to standby at the incident per the IC. A7110 dispatched and en route to fire to standby. On channel 2, the IC (at the command post) advised the E4 officer that he could see fire extending up the A/B corner. Note: NIOSH investigators were not sure if this transmission was meant for the E4 officer or the officer from E3 who identified himself as E4. At 1559 hours, the E3 officer advised the IC of the extension to the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the E4 officer advised the IC that he was working on getting a line up to the 3rd floor.
  • 1601 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised the IC that the ISO and DC were responding. On channel 2, the L5 officer contacted ―L5-Alpha‖ (believed to be L5‘s aerial ladder) to assist in the bucket; L5-Alpha acknowledged the transmission.
  • 1602-1603 Hours On channel 2, the IC contacted the L5 officer to verify whether he thought he could make the roof with L5. On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
  • 1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
  • 1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
  • 1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, ―…line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
  • 1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
  • On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
  • 1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
  • 1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
  • 1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
  • 1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
  • The IC called the L11 officer (Victim #1) on channel 2 (no response).
  • 1615 Hours On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to all companies on the 3rd floor, vacate the 3rd floor; I repeat, command to L11 and E1, vacate the 3rd floor.‖
  • 1616-1619 Hours (2nd Mayday Call) The IC attempted to contact L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The IC, on channel 2, then stated, ―Command to E1.‖ (1616.50 hours) On channel 2, FF2 stated, ―Mayday, Mayday…Rescue 5 Bravo command we have a downed fire fighter rear steps. Mayday-Mayday-Mayday fire fighter down rear steps, 2nd floor.‖ IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11‖ (no response). Note: An apparatus air horn is heard sounding in the background of this transmission. FF2 on channel 2 stated, ―Rescue 5 Bravo command, Rescue 5 Bravo command we need help 2nd floor, send the RIT, we need fresh bodies.‖ Note: No audio transmissions or emergency tones are heard on channel 2 or the main dispatch channel advising that the Mayday call had been acknowledged. DC contacted the IC on channel 2 to have him send the RIT to the rear stairs; the IC acknowledged. Note: The RIT may have already been advancing up the rear stairs, but they ran into difficulty accessing the 2nd floor landing off the rear stairs because a charged hoseline was against the closed door. Dispatch attempted to contact command on channel 2 (no response). The IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The DC contacted the IC requesting the ambulance on scene to come to the rear of the house. Victim #1 was extricated out the rear of the house.
  • 1620 Hours A7110 began medical care for the downed fire fighter (Victim #1). Over the main dispatch channel, the BA requested an advanced life support ambulance to the fire scene. A7126 was dispatched to intercept A7110 at the fire scene to provide advanced life support. (~1620.35 Hours) The following transmission is heard on channel 2, ―…Ladder 11 ‗mayday‘ (very quick transmission)…Ladder 11 (unintelligible word(s)).‖ Note: The dispatch caller ID for this radio is designated as “L-11 FF3,” which was assigned to the fire fighter (designated as FF4 for this report) who later finds Victim #2 (see below 1624 hours). FF4 had not found Victim #2 at the time of this transmission. On channel 2, FF4 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11 can‖ (no response). Note: “Ladder 11 can” was Victim #2’s designation that shift.
  • 1621 Hours A7126 en route to fire scene.
  • 1622 Hours On channel 2, the ISO advised the IC that the fire fighter (Victim #1) was removed and they needed to do a roll call for everyone on scene. On channel 2, the IC advised all company officers that the ―incident is taking a PAR‖ (personnel accountability report). Officers began calling in their respective PARs.
  • 1624 Hours (3rd and 4th Mayday Calls) FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Mayday-Mayday, I have a fire fighter trapped on the 3rd floor, Mayday-Mayday-Mayday 3rd floor.‖ Note: This Mayday is for Victim #2. A PASS device is heard alarming during FF4‘s transmission. On channel 2, the IC stated, ―This is command to all companies, vacate the building, I report, command to all companies, vacate the building.‖ FF4 on channel 2 stated again, ―Mayday-Mayday-Mayday, I‘ve got another fire fighter down, another one, 3rd floor, hurry!‖
  • 1625 Hours Over channel 2, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones. Note: It is unknown why the evacuation tones were sounded instead of the Mayday tones. Their evacuation tone is an alternating, high-low sound, similar to a European siren. Their Mayday tone is a rapid, high to low pitch, chirping sound. This was dispatch’s first acknowledgement of a Mayday over the radio. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on channel 2. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones as well. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on the main dispatch channel.
  • 1626 Hours The IC contacted the DC on channel 2. DC acknowledged with no further traffic from the IC. The IC on channel 2 again advised all companies to vacate the building. The dispatcher then activated the emergency tones on channel 2 and the main dispatch channel, and stated, ―All companies per command vacate the building, all companies vacate the building.‖
  • 1627 Hours The ISO contacted the IC on channel 2 and stated, ―We need to make contact with that Mayday, we need more information, we have not heard from them since the initial call.‖ On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to company declaring a Mayday; I repeat, command to the company declaring a Mayday sound off, sound off.‖ A fire fighter from the RIT advised the IC on channel 2 that they were moving the fire fighter off the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the dispatcher advised the IC that the Mayday call was for the 3rd floor. A7126 arrived at the fire scene.
  • 1628 Hours RIT advised the IC that they have the fire fighter (Victim #2) on the 3rd floor and will be bringing him down the rear stairs from the 3rd floor.
  • 1630 Hours A7110 en route to the hospital with Victim #1 without assistance from A7126.
  • 1632 Hours ISO asked for a progress report from the RIT on the Mayday. RIT replied, ―Coming down…3rd floor.‖ ISO asked RIT to repeat their traffic. A radio was keyed, but there was no transmission.
  • 1634 Hours RIT personnel advised the IC that they had the fire fighter (Victim #2) down to the 2nd floor landing.
  • 1640 Hours A7110 arrived at local hospital with Victim #1.
  • 1643 Hours A7126 began medical care on second downed fire fighter (Victim #2). Note: This time was taken from Victim #2’s patient care report and may not be accurate.
  • 1703 Hours A7126 arrived at local hospital with Victim #2.

 

Fire Behavior

The room and contents fire was determined to have originated in a bedroom on the 2nd floor, A/B corner; it was quickly knocked down by E3 (see Photo 2). It is believed that the fire got into the eves when it was lapping out the A/B corner windows, and then spread within the large void spaces in the ceiling and walls of the 3rd floor. The fire was situated toward the A/B corner of the 3rd floor, but the open void areas allowed smoke to accumulate within the ceilings and walls before they were opened.

Operating on the 3rd floor at varying times were members from L5, R5, L11, E4, and E7. Initially, light-to-moderate smoke conditions were observed on the 3rd floor, depending on how close fire fighters were to the A-side of the 3rd floor. Fire fighters recalled the 3rd floor being very hot. TICs used by different individuals on the 3rd floor showed the room to be hot on the A-side and ceiling. Windows on the A-, B-, and D-sides were opened, allowing most of the smoke to self ventilate. Light smoke remained within the 3rd floor, with good visibility.

Extension was checked around A- and B-side baseboards. Some fire fighters recall Victim #1 telling them the fire was in the ceiling and possibly the walls, and to not open those areas until a hoseline was in place. Even after providing horizontal ventilation on the 3rd floor, smoke conditions worsened, banking down to fire fighters‘ chin levels and becoming denser.

While waiting for the hoseline, L5 members were reassigned by the IC to ventilate the roof to provide additional relief to the 3rd floor. The IC reported to NIOSH investigators that he ordered the roof vented because he saw smoke pushing out the B-side windows. Personnel from E4 advanced the charged hoseline to the 3rd floor, allowing the ceilings and walls to be opened. A mixture of thick, brown/black smoke quickly filled the room, reducing visibility.

  

Initial conditions observed when the BC arrived on scene at approximately 1551 hours. Note: Fire was under control on the 2nd floor and fire fighters were checking for extension. White-to-gray smoke can be seen flowing in the direction of right to left from the gables. The A-side window on the 3rd floor had been opened for ventilation (unsure at what stage of the fire or by whom).

  

  

Structure

Built in the early 1900s, the two-and-half-story house (see Photo 1) was purchased approximately 4 years prior to the incident as a multifamily rental occupancy. One family lived in the 1st floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.); a second family lived in the 2nd floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.) and the owner occupied the finished half-story or attic space (approx. 700 sq. ft.).  The house also contained an unfinished basement (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.).

The common front entrance contained access to the 1st floor apartment and a private stairwell, located at the A/D corner of the house, which provided access to the 2nd floor apartment. The house also had a single rear-entry door that provided access to a stairwell that led up to the owner‘s apartment and had landings to access all the apartments from the rear. According to the owner of the house, smoke detectors were installed within the house about a year prior to the incident. These smoke detectors were installed in every bedroom, in each hallway, and in the stairwells.

The house did not have an installed sprinkler system and had been inspected in accordance with Department of Housing and Urban Development Section 8a guidelines, according to the homeowner. The house was Type V wood frame construction, but, during the initial stages of the fire, was presumed by arriving fire fighters to be balloon-framed due to the era when it was constructed. State fire investigators were able to confirm Type V construction after closer inspection.

The Office of the State Fire Marshal‘s building code compliance inspection showed that the house did not meet certain Connecticut Fire Safety Code requirements for this type of structure. NIOSH investigators do not believe that these non-compliance issues contributed to the deaths of the two fire fighters.

  

Typical Ballon Framing Construction

 

 LINKS

 

2 Bridgeport firefighters die in line of duty: wtnh.com

Posted by on June 30, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, command-leadership, construction, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, Mayday, Naum, NIOSH, residential, RIT • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011: Day Five: Near-Misses, Maydays and Floor Collapses

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Do you know what's underneath you as you're making entry?

During the last quarter of 2010 and leading well into the second quarter of 2011 there has been a significant emerging trend developing in basement fires, compromised floor systems and assemblies leading to collapse and numerous near-miss events, close calls and unfortunatly, line of duty deaths during fire operations.

If you’ve been paying attention to the various news and on the job reports these past number of months, you may have noticed the increasing numbers of emerging trend evident in near miss, close-calls resulting in maydays, RIT deployments and self-rescue resulting from floor compromise and floor collapse. The double line of duty deaths of two San Francisco (CA) Fire fighers while operating in a Terraced (Hillside construction) residential occupancy while operating below the base level diaphragm (upper street level access). (HERE)

In December 2010,  I was doing some research and posting links related to the first one or two events on Buildingsonfire on Facebook, HERE, it became evident at the time that there was an immediate opportunity to get some learning’s and insights out. If you have a chance head over to Facebook and link into Buildingsonfire and check out the incident links posted as well as some immediate report links. (Demember 2010 time frame)

In a coincidential posting on July 28, 2010, I posted on CommandSafety.com an interesting incident that I came across while preparing for a new post related to a near-miss event that occured in which a Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel after calling a mayday.

This event has all the ingrediants the the 2011 Safety Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground and managing the Mayday. Little did I know that later, in February 2011, while participating in the National FireFighter Near-Miss Reporting System Stakeholders meeting in California, would I have the chance to hear Captain Long’s story first hand, and then also have the opportunity to have him as a guest, sharing his story live on the Taking it to the Streets Radio program in February. (HERE)

Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long’s near-miss and story of survival resonates with this year’s theme of  Surviving the Fire Ground- Firefighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness and Managing the Mayday and provides an opportunity to focus on the event in this, Day Five of the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Surival Week activities. The details of Captain Long’s story can be found on the National FireFighter Near Miss Reporting System web site (HERE) as well as in the June 2011 issue of Fire Engineering Magazine titled, Floor Collapse: A Survivors Story. Let me state upfront also the Captain Michael Long will be presenting the accounts of his near miss event and the lessons-learned at IAFC Fire-Rescue International Conference in Atlanta in August (HERE).

 On July 25, 2010, Captain Michael Long of the Camp Taylor (Ky.) Fire Protection District fell through the floor of a house during a four-alarm fire and suffered severe burn injuries. On Aug. 30, 2010, Capt. Long submitted a near-miss report based on this event. The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is an anonymous and confidential reporting system; however, Capt. Long wanted to have his name associated with this report so that others would understand the value of sharing near-miss events. What follows is an excerpt from his report and excerpts from a recent phone interview. To read his full report, including an extensive lessons learned section, search by report number for report #10-1072 on the Search Reports page of www.firefighternearmiss.com.

  

Near Miss Report Event #2010-1072

  

 “I made sure my crew was ready to enter, sounded the floor for stability and then crossedover the threshold, entering the structure. When I was approximately 5 feet inside the structure, I felt the floor start to give way. I turned toward the front door to try to bail out, and at the same time yelled at others to get out, when the floor system collapsed. This was no ordinary collapse. More than two-thirds of the first floor collapsed simultaneously. The living room, dining room, kitchen, bathroom and foyer all fell at once. “When the collapse happened, I was the only one who fell into the basement, right into the heart of the fire. All I could see around me were flames.

I could not see the hole that I had fallen through. I could not see my fellow firefighters above me. All I could see was fire. I began to try to find something to use to climb back up with. Since I did not know what type of collapse had occurred, I just started clawing away at anything as I was trying to climb. During this time, my legs were burning.

Fire was burning up between my boots and my bunker pants. The pain was intense. My deputy chief was trying to put a line on me for protection, but the fire was extremely intense. He was lying on the porch with fire shooting out over his head. He stated he could occasionally see the top of my helmet and the reflective stripes on my coat sleeves.

By a bit of luck, a roof ladder was laying in the front yard that had just been taken off the roof after the completion of a ventilation operation.

My deputy chief directed the crew to put the ladder into the hole for my escape. “By this time, I was burned on my legs and struggling with exhaustion and the intense heat. I was screaming both from pain and due to fear. I could hear screaming coming from above, butwas unable to make out the majority of it. I finally heard the word “ladder” and then felt something across my back. Once they got the ladder into the basement, I had to get around to it. I still could not see anything but fire, so this was all by feel. As I started up the ladder, I got two rungs up, reached for the third rung, and lost my grip and fell back into the basement landing on my back. I was so exhausted that I started making my peace with God that this was where I was going to die.

For the full excerpt from Captain Long’s near miss report go to the NFF Near Miss Reporting Site and Resource Link, HERE

  

Captain Long

Incident Lessons Learned from Captain Long:

  • Train as if it is real. Train, train, train, and then train some more. Take advantage of every opportunity to train. The better we are trained, the less our chance of injury. The training must be physically and mentally. Crews must focus on more hands-on scenario-based training that allows for problem solving. If crews are taught that the outcome to every scenario is static, they are not being encouraged to think. Every run is different; no single solution applies to every situation. Adaptations or decisions that are not in step with changing conditions can actually be disadvantageous. We must make the right decisions based on the correct interpretation of the environment and blend those observations with our knowledge, skills, and abilities to map a course of action that will lead us to a successful outcome. Read reality and come up with the best possible plan. In my situation, quick thinking and adapting to the problem that presented itself saved my life.
  • Mutual-aid training is a must. We must train more with our neighboring departments to improve operations. It is occasionally difficult to work in situations where you do not really know with whom you will be working or where the command structure and tactics differ from those of your department. We all learn from the same book; however, the interpretations and tactics differ from person to person and department to department. I am not saying anyone is right or wrong in the way they do things—we all just need to do a better job of understanding that there is more than one way to get the job done.
    We cannot know exactly how everyone on an emergency scene will perform because each person has a different interpretation of his surroundings and role in the system. Standard operating guidelines (SOGs) can assist in this area, but SOGs rely on perceptions and interpretations by individuals to be implemented as intended. Accidents often happen because everyone has a unique perspective on the environment, and each makes different decisions based on their perception.
    We must perceive the environment correctly to ensure we make the right move. If these actions are not communicated and coordinated in the intricate system that is the fireground, accidents will be the inevitable and regrettable results. Training and frequent reviewing of SOGs are vital to our safety.
  • Risk assessment. Sounding the floor prior to entry is not always a good indicator of the floor’s stability. Less than two minutes before I made entry, there were three other firefighters, at least the same weight as I, in the same area where the collapse occurred. Everything changed in a very short time. There was no warning. Adkins told me at the hospital that all he heard was a “whoosh” sound when the floor collapsed. Then I disappeared. Within two minutes, the floor assembly went from being able to sustain a live load of at least 900 pounds in that area (accounting for gear, equipment, SCBA, and so on) to collapsing with about a 300-pound load, and I was close to a load-bearing wall. A good way to evaluate risk vs. gain is to get the most accurate report on burn time as possible to help determine structural integrity.
  • Rapid intervention. RIT is a critical fireground benchmark and is very important for safety, but it would have been ineffective in this situation. Had my crew not reacted the way they did immediately, I would not have been able to last long enough to wait for the RIT. In the time it would have taken for the RIT to gear up, come up with a plan, and enter, I would have died. The stars aligned in my favor that night. The person calling the Mayday or a nearby crew often mitigates personnel emergencies. My crew was able to act decisively at the correct time, and I am alive because of it. It is important to remember that a large percentage of Maydays are mitigated by the crew to which the lost firefighter is assigned or a nearby crew. RIT deployments account for a small number of rescues; we must always be alert and ready for the “incident within the incident.”
  • Manage your emotional response. From a personal standpoint, you must rely on your training and try not to panic. Know your equipment and procedures well. I did panic, but I was still able to keep myself together enough to know not to leave the area since I had been told that the stairs had burned away. Keeping my SCBA on, resisting the emotional reaction to remove my mask because of claustrophobia, was a huge factor in my survival. If I had tried to find another way out, my crew could not have gotten to me with the ladder. Had I removed my mask, the story would have ended quite differently. When I teach, I try to train as if it is the real thing. Never take a run for granted. Always expect the worst; you will be better prepared to deal with the unexpected.
    If we continually study accident reports and learn from them, the likelihood of being surprised will be diminished. Peter Leschak writes in Ghosts of the Fireground: ”In fire and other emergency operations, you must not only tolerate uncertainty; you must savor it, or you won’t last long. The most efficient preparation is a general mental, physical, and professional readiness nurtured over years of training and experience. You live to live. Preparing is itself an activity, and action is preparation.”
  • Talk about it. Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) is important for ensuring that personnel from all departments on scene are taken care of emotionally. CISD needs to extend beyond just one or two briefings. Personnel involved in a highly emotional event must be given the opportunity to speak to a trained CISD team member early and be given as much time as is needed to work through their issue. Some firefighters have a macho attitude and try to deal with their emotions on their own, or maybe they don’t deal with them at all. Others self-medicate with alcohol or, worse, these difficult emotional events are allowed to fester with no relief. People should be accepting of those who deal with issues up front and tell their stories. Telling these stories makes us better and helps to keep us safe. This reduces the possibility of “snapping” because you have too much pent-up emotion.
    My fellow firefighters are still affected by this event, even those who were not there. Department personnel must be open-minded and receptive to the fact that emotional events will affect your performance and your personal life and that it is acceptable to be open and deal with them. When difficult emotional situations present themselves, members should attempt to deal with them as soon as possible.
  • Know what is possible and what is not. Know the experience level of your crew. Going into a bad situation with a crew that may not have exposure to a lot of different situations or that you aren’t that familiar with could make operations more difficult. I had everything from a 30-year veteran to a one-year recruit, so the experience level was all across the board. I knew that the situation we were going into was getting worse and required quick action, so I took the lead to ensure that the operation would be completed as quickly as possible. I knew my deputy chief would be watching us to ensure things were proceeding safely. I knew my crew could get the job done; however, this was an operation that is not often practiced and I wanted to make sure it was done correctly. I will not send my crew into an area that I am not comfortable going into. The more you train and the more people you can train with, the better you will understand your capabilities.

 Listen or download the special interview I had with Captain Mike Long as well as

Taking it to the Streets Radio Program and Interview with Capt. Long

 

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

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The progam was taped from the Live Broadcast on March 16th at 9pm EST

Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

On Your Street, In Your City, Across the Country, Around the WorldTM

The direct show link is here

The line-up of Program guests included, Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret), Captain CJ Haberkorn Denver (CO) Fire Department and Special Guest Captain Michael Long, Camp Taylor (KY) Fire Protection District.

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the National Near-Miss Reporting System and the untapped resources that the program and system provides with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire service leaders. The second part of the program will dedicated to the personal account of Captain Long’s Close Call event from July 25, 2010 (NMR #10-1072) when a catastrophic floor collapse at a residential occupancy plunged him into a fire involved basement.

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
  • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE  

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production, in affiliation with the Command Institute

 

National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System’s Support for the 2011 Safety Week

Don’t forget to go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System for  number of exceptional training aids, resources, PPT and more. NFFNMRS, HERE

Here are some of the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System Produced 2011 Safety Week Products

 
File Title File Size File Description
  • Presentation: Preventing The Mayday
    		•  176 KB A powerpoint presentation about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Presentation: Being Ready for the Mayday
    		•  176 KB A powerpoint presentation about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
  • Presentation: Fire Fighter Expectations of Command
    		•  176 KB A powerpoint presentation about fire fighter expectations of command.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Skills
    		•  176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival skills at a mayday.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Procedures
    		•  176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival procedures.
  • Grouped Report: Preventing The Mayday
    		•  176 KB A grouped report about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Grouped Report: Self Survival Procedures
    		•  176 KB A grouped report about self survival procedures
  • Grouped Report: Being Ready for the Mayday
    		•  176 KB A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems

    In the meantime here are some links I pulled together that you should take the time to read and share with your companies, personnel and staff…..

    This seems like a good time to have a ten minute drill on these events as Operating Experience (OE) on floor systems and operational safety, calling or commanding the mayday.

     Or take some time to visit the The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)site which has the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.  (Day One: Are you ready, HERE)

    • For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

    Self-Survival Procedures

    FGS Online Program Chapter 3
    To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
    When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:

    • First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
    • Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
    • If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
    • Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
    • Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
    • Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall. 

    Self-Survival Skills

    FGS Online Program Chapter 4

    Disentanglement Maneuvers

    Fires inside an enclosed structure create a mess for fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters often encounter debris that has fallen off shelves, and ceiling and wall fixtures that have burned and are left hanging to the floor. These hazards, coupled with the mess a fire fighter creates when searching for victims in smoky environments, can create egress problems for a fire fighter.

    As fire burns draperies, blinds, lighting fixtures, computer wiring, and HVAC ducting, the possibility of encountering an entanglement hazard increases. The overhead ducting of the HVAC system contains wires that give the ducting its stability.

    If a fire breaches the ceiling and burns the ducting, the wires within the ducting fall to the floor. These wires can cause a dangerous entanglement hazard to fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters must anticipate these hazards and have a plan to follow when egress is cut off.

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters

    Fire Fighter Expectations of Command

    FGS Online Program Chapter 5
    A discussion of what command must communicate to the distressed fire fighter, dispatch, the RIT group supervisor and all others assigned to the incident to assure a successful rescue.

    Here are Some Mission Critical Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE) to support Your Training and Operational Needs not only this week, but through the entire year.

     

    Here are some Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) for Operations at Basement Fires that will support fireground operational safety:

    • Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
    • Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
    • Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
    • Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
    • Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
    • Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
    • Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
    • Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
    • Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
    • If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
    • Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
    • Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
    • Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner. 
    • Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
    • Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
    • Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
    • Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
    • Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
    • Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
    • Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
    • Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
    • Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment

    Here’s some screen shots from Buildingsonfire on Facebook. Go HERE or follow the link at the left column. Join the growing list of over 3900 fans with Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Buildingsonfire.com

    Posted by on June 22, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "health and safety", "pre-fire planning", "Safety Week", "Situational Awareness" assessment, assemblies, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, close-call, command presence, construction, courage to be safe, Engineered Structural Systems, ESS, failures, fire behavior, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, floors, IAFC, IAFF, LODD, Mayday, Naum, NFFF, NFPA, NIOSH • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    2nd San Francisco Firefighter Dies After Diamond Heights Fire

    4 comments

    SFFD Firefighter Anthony Valerio

    It’s being reported that San Francisco Fire Fighter Anthony Valerio passed away this morning as a result of injuries sustained while operating the Diamond Heights fire on Thursday June 2nd. This becomes the second line of duty death from this incident that also resulted in the LODD of Lt. Vincent Perez.  Anthony “Tony” Valerio, a 53-year-old firefighter and paramedic critically injured in the Thursday blaze, died at San Francisco General Hospital at about 7:40 a.m., city officials said.

    Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/06/04/BA2F1JPNS2.DTL#ixzz1OKjGjnNs

    San Francisco firefighter Anthony Valerio is the second firefighter to die from Thursday’s Diamond Heights fire.  According to San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White, Valerio had “significant damage to his respiratory system” and burns across his body after Thursday’s fire. Valerio has burns to 12 percent of his body.

     WKGO TV  ABC7 reports that according to San Francisco Fire Deputy Chief Mike Gardner said most of Fire Fighter Valerio’s burns were from steam and not from fire, adding that the temperature inside the structure was between 500 and 700 degrees.

    Previous Coverage, HERE, HERE and HERE

    • Logs show desperate hunt for doomed SF firefighters, HERE

    Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/06/03/BAJG1JPBKV.DTL#ixzz1OKn7vgot

    From Thursday

    Posted by on June 4, 2011 • Filed under: Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, fires, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    San Francisco FD: The Diamond Heights Fire Updates

    6 comments
     
    Courtesy Patty Stanton

     

    Courtesy Patty Stanton

     

    Courtesy Patty Stanton

     

    Updates from San Francisco;

     

    Charlie Side

     

    Charlie Side, Fire Extending

     

    Alpha Street Side from Google Streets

     

    Aerial Charlie Side

     

    Coincidentially, we posted a remembrance to the DCFD Cherry Road Townhouse Fire and Double FireFighter LODD from May, 1999 that is worth another look as it has similar connotations related to fire behavior, flashover conditions and multiple floor level construction factors during initial fire suppression operations, HERE

    Posted by on June 4, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    San Francisco FD Flashover LODD, two others injured

    5 comments

    San Francisco firefighters carry one of their own from the scene of a house blaze today in the Diamond Heights neighborhood. Patty Stanton / Special to The Chronicle

    San Francisco (CA) Fire Department Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, died in the line of duty during fire suppression operations trying to extinguish a fire at a four-story residential occupancy in the Diamond Heights section of San Francisco. FF Anthony Valerio, 53, is reported in critical condition at San Francisco General Hospital’s intensive care unit with severe burns.

    According to published reports, a third firefighter was treated and released for minor burns and smoke inhalation, Talmadge said. Her name was not released.

    The single family home was constructed in 1975 and has 2058 square foot of living space,  3 bedrooms and 3.0 bathrooms.

    by Mark (via uReport) ( Photo)

    Alpha Street Side

     

     

    San Francisco Chronical; S.F. firefighter dies, second fighting for life; Article and Photos HERE

    Posted by on June 2, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Building Construction for the Fire Srvice, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Albuquerque Fire Department; Learnings from Close Call Collapse and Fire Fighter Injuries

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    The Albuquerque Fire Department seeks to improve operations from past performance

    Four firefighters with the Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department were injured during operations at a three-alarm fire that injured raged through the Royal Crown Apartment Complex  in southeast Albuquerque on Friday February 4, 2011.

    The injured firefighters were among four who fell through the floor from the second story to the first while searching for residents of the, according to the Albuquerque Fire Department. Both suffered leg injuries, one had minor burn, and they were treated and released from University of New Mexico Hospital a few hours later, an AFD spokesperson said.

    According to published reports at the time of the event, the first alarm came in at 3 p.m. bringing personnel and apparatus to the three-story building at 4801 Gibson SE. First units on the scene reported heavy smoke and flames on the north side of the building.

    A crew from AFD Engine 13 entered the building and during a search rescued two uninjured residents from one apartment and also save a cat.

    At 3:40 p.m. Incident command transitioned to a defense operations to fight the fire from outside the building. The third alarm was transmitted due to the projected heavy fuel load in the large complex.

    Overall 75 fire personnel responded and operated at the alarm.

    The fire is believed to have started behind a washing machine in the first-floor laundry room. An electric cause is suspected, but AFD said the exact cause is still under investigation.

    The three-story multiple occupancy apartment complex was built in 1976 and housed 47 apartment units in 31,896 square feet of space.

    In the months since the fire, the Albuquerque Fire Department has conducted a critique and post incident assessment of the operations, mayday and close-calls and overall performance of the department. As reported in the media video leading into this article, the department has taken the results of that post incident assessment and has developed training being delivered to al personnel to increase future operational performance, efficiencies and to reduce the likely hood of a similar event from occurring.

    According to the Fire Department, they were playing catch-up from the early advancing stages of the incident and experienced difficulty in being able to make strategic strides to get ahead of the escalating incident severity, magnitude and rapid development.

    The unexpected events leading to the multiple maydays and firefighter injuries challenged incident command and operations and could have resulted in possible multiple firefighter LODDs versus the close-call, near-miss events that subsequently lead towards the efforts to undertake  critical review of the incident and operations.

    Some Insights and Learning’s from the Incident included that have resulted in enhancements;

    • Communications
    • Situational Awareness
    • Calling the Mayday
    • Radio Communications
    • Distractions and Error Prevention
    • Accountability
    • Command Response to Mayday Events
    • Communications Mayday Alerts

    It is imperative that all departments initiate at the least a formal or informal post incident critique or review. This may be at the company or station level or escalated to a more formal department level assessment and review based upon the incident parameters and conditions.

    The initiation and development of post incident analysis or assessment can be more involving and complex, with the commitment of personnel, resources and time but the benefits derived from such a review will contribute highly to the continued development and improvement of any organization. 

    There are a number of recent after action, post incident or assessments reports that have been published and have been reviewed and discussed here on CommandSafety.com.

    Take the time to review your incidents and runs at the company, station or battalion level. These reviews will identify and address low threshold, latent or emerging conditions before they escalate into apparent or root cause conditions that may contribute to significant adverse events and incidents.

    The Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s self-critical review of this event has identified short comings at a number of levels that they are working to improve.

    As they state in the video report, the outcome of this event could have been a lot worse than the injuries sustained and the resultant near-misses. The focus on improvements and enhancements within the functional areas of Calling the Mayday, Rapid Intervention and Mayday Communications and Operations is commendable and aligns with this year’s theme for Safety, Health and Survival Week.

    The 2011 Safety Week theme is; Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

    • Previous Safety Week announcement and details; HERE.
    • We’ll post under a separate article details on the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program soon.

    Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s Web Site, HERE

    This year’s Safety Week will focus on delivering the online IAFF Fire Ground Survival (FGS) awareness training course to all fire departments. The program is the most comprehensive survival skills and MAYDAY prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Additional planning tools and resources will be available on the Safety Week website.

    The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.

    For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

    The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics covered include:

    • Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
    • Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
    • Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
    • Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
    • Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

    Keep watching the website and the IAFC’s Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn pages for continuing updates to this year’s program and planning resources.

    Remember to visit the SHS Section’s website for more information on health and safety issues and the IAFF’s Health, Safety and Medicine’s website for more information on health, wellness and safety programs.

    Additionally, look for a comprehensive series of articles, activities, insights, downloads, podcasts, video clips and resources that will be posted each day of Safety, Health and Survival Week here on Commandsafety.com, Thecompanyofficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com.

    Announcements and campaign materials will begin posting in Mid-May.

    We will be offering a special series of live shows nightly on Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com and blogtalkradio during the week of June 19-25, 2011 addressing key issues with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders.

    This will be an exceptional opportunity to listen in, call in and participate actively in the week’ theme of Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

    These shows will be mission critical. Stay Tuned for more upcoming information.

    Be Self-Critical and a Learning Organization

    • In the meantime think about your operations; are you self-critical and a learning organization seeking to identify gaps or areas for improvement?
    • There is a lot that can be learned from our daily responses and operations, whether they be that single company response or that multiple alarm incident. 
    • All it takes is the recognition to see things for what they are and your may not be as good as you think and the understanding and desire to identify those conditions and improve .

     

    Addtional Resources, videos and images related to the Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s operations at the Royal Crown Apartment Complex

    Alpha Street Side View

     

    Aerial View from the Delta Side

     

    KASA News 13 photo by Alex Tomlin.

    Posted by on April 24, 2011 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, close-call, Collapse, construction, decision-making, firefighting-operations, floors, pre-planning, size-up, Skills, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire; Final NIST Report Issued

    1 comment

      

    The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released its final report on its study of the June 18, 2007, fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., that trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter deaths in a single event since 9/11. The final report was strengthened by clarifications and supplemental text based on comments provided by organizations and individuals in response to the draft report of the study, released for public comment on Oct. 28, 2010. (HERE) 

    The revisions did not alter the study team’s main finding: the major factors contributing to the rapid spread of the fire at the Sofa Super Store were large open spaces with furniture providing high-fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows, and a lack of sprinklers. 

    Based on its findings, the study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes. These codes are used as models for building and fire regulations promulgated and enforced by U.S. state and local jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions have the option of incorporating some or all of the code’s provisions but often adopt most provisions. 

    If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented. 

    • Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).
    • Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.
    • Two of the recommendations in the draft report were slightly modified to increase their effectiveness.
    • The recommendation “that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard” was improved by listing three nationally accepted certification examinations as examples of “how professional qualification may be demonstrated.”
    • Another recommendation has been enhanced by urging state and local jurisdictions to “provide education to firefighters on the science of fire behavior in vented and non-vented structures and how the addition of air can impact the burning characteristics of the fuel.”

    Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:

    • The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
    • During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
    • The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
    • The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
    • When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
    • The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
    • Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.

    NIST is working with various public and private groups toward implementing changes to practices, standards, and building and fire codes based on the findings from this study. 

    The complete text of the final report, Volumes I and II, may be downloaded as Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) files from the links below; 

      

      

    Other Resources on the Charleston Fire from NIST Here; 

    jurisdictions have the option of incorporating some or all of the code’s provisions but generally adopt most provisions. 

    Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire

    1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised. 

    2.   Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address: 

    a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
    b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
    c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
    d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
    e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions. 

    3.  Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031. 

    4.  Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision: 

    a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
    b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet). 

    5.  Comprehensive Risk Management Plans:  NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to: 

    a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
    b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
    c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks. 

    6.  Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities:  

    a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
    b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground. 

    7.  Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are: 

    a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
    b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
    c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires. 

    8.  Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are: 

    a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
    b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
    c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
    d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service.  

    9.  Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to: 

    a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
    b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective. 

    10.  Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to: 

    a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
    b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations. 

    11.  Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to: 

    a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
    b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
    c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies. 

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Posted by on March 17, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, fire behavior, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Taking it to the Streets: Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror

    1 comment
    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

     

    Taking it to the Streets: Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror

    On Your Street, In Your City, Across the Country, Around the WorldTM

     Join us on Wednesday night December 15th at 9:00 pm EST for an insightful look back at 2010 and forward into 2011 and beyond with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders. 

    The lineup of Scheduled guests include, Deputy Coordinator Tiger Schmittendorf (NY), Chief Glenn Usdin (PA), Captain Willie Wines (VA), Bill Carey (MD), Chief Doug Cline (NC), Lt. Rhett Fleitz (VA), Lt. John Mitchell (IL), and a few others on the invite list who might just drop in on us.

    Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll be Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire officers, fire service leaders and visionaries.

    Join in on the live open discussion with fire service personnel from around the country. Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

    • Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening December 15th at 9:00 pm EST, HERE
    • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
    • Look back at Twenty Ten, for 2010, HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2010 All Rights Reserved 

     YDMVG5GJD6H8

    Posted by on December 14, 2010 • Filed under: Christopher Naum, command-leadership, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, professional development, Taking it to the Streets, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Taking it to the Streets; “Redefining the Fire Ground” Rescheduled

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    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

    Wednesday Night’s Program has been postponed due to Emergent Server issues at BlogTalkRadio.

    The Program has been rescheduled for Thursday November 4th at 9:00pm EDT

    Turn Out to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

    If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

    The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued.  Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

    Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention?  Join the live broadcast on Thursday night November 4th at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

    • For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
    • Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the WorldTM ©2010

    Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

    Posted by on November 3, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, behaviors, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Charleston, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, decision-making, fire behavior, Fire Flow, fire suppression, fire-rescue-topics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, Naum, NIST, occupancies, risk-based assessment, Safety Culture, size-up, structure fires, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Taking it to the Streets; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

    No comments

    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

    For a Rockin’ Hot Time, Tune in this coming Wednesday night, November 3rd  to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

    If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

    The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued.  Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

    Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention?  Join the live broadcast on Wednesday night November 3rd at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

    • For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
    • Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the WorldTM ©2010

    Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

    Posted by on November 1, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, fire behavior, Fire Service Tradition, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Naum, research, Taking it to the Streets, training-development • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements

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    Major factors contributing to a rapid spread of fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., on June 18, 2007, included large open spaces with furniture providing high fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows and a lack of sprinklers, according to a draft report released for public comment today by the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The fire trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter fatalities in a single event since 9/11.

    Based on its findings, the NIST technical study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes.1 If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented.

    “Furniture stores typically have large amounts of combustible material and represent a significant fire hazard,” said NIST study leader Nelson Bryner. “Model building codes should require both new and existing furniture stores to have automatic sprinklers, especially if those stores include large, open display areas.”

    Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet). Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.

    Using a state-of-the-art computer model to simulate the fire, the study team found that the addition of automatic sprinklers inside the loading dock could have significantly slowed the fire (which began just outside the dock area), prevented it from spreading beyond the dock, and eventually, extinguished it completely. The model also showed that sprinklers on the loading dock likely would have maintained what firefighters call tenability conditions, the ability for individuals in a fire event to escape unassisted.

    Factors identified as contributing to the fire’s progress include: (1) the high fuel loads—especially furniture—present throughout the building; (2) the lack of sprinklers throughout the Sofa Super Store; (3) the open floor plan of the facility; (4) the hidden build-up of combustible smoke and gases in the area between the drop ceiling and the roof of the main showroom; (5) the non-fire-activated roll-up door that was open between the loading dock and the holding area; (6) the four fire-activated roll-up doors (out of seven) that activated but did not close during the fire; (7) the metal walls in the warehouse and west showroom that allowed heat from the fire to ignite items next to the walls; and (8) the breaking of windows at the front of the store that supplied air to the fire.

    NIST’s team of experts traveled to Charleston to gather data within 36 hours of the Sofa Super Store fire. Using these data and other information collected in the following months (such as building design documents, records, plans, video and photographic data, radio transmissions, interviews with emergency responders, and informal discussions with store employees), the NIST study team developed its computer model to simulate and analyze the characteristics of the fire, including fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, and the operation of active and passive fire protection systems.

    Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:

    • The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
    • During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
    • The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
    • The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
    • When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
    • The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
    • Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.

    The complete draft report is available online at http://www.nist/gov/el

    NIST welcomes comments on the draft report and its recommendations. To be considered for the final report, comments must be received by noon EST on Dec. 2, 2010. Comments may be submitted via e-mail to firesafety@nist.gov; fax to (301) 975-4052; or mail to the attention of NIST Technical Study: Sofa Super Store, NIST, 100 Bureau Dr., Stop 8660, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8660.

    Once the final report is published, NIST will work with the appropriate committees of the International Code Council (ICC) on using the study’s recommendations to improve provisions in model building and fire codes. NIST also will work with the major organizations representing state and local governments—including building and fire officials—and firefighters to encourage them to seriously consider its recommendations.

    Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire

    1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised.

    2.   Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address:

    a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
    b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
    c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
    d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
    e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.

    3.  Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031.

    4.  Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision:

    a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
    b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).

    5.  Comprehensive Risk Management Plans:  NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to:

    a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
    b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
    c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.

    6.  Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities: 

    a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
    b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground.

    7.  Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are:

    a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
    b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
    c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires.

    8.  Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are:

    a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
    b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
    c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
    d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service. 

    9.  Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

    a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
    b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective.

    10.  Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to:

    a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
    b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations.

    11.  Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

    a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
    b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
    c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies.

    NIST has more than 40 years of experience conducting building and fire safety studies and researching the aftermath of disasters and failures. By understanding the technical causes for such incidents and making the information available to the public, NIST scientists and engineers strive to improve the safety of buildings, their occupants and emergency responders. NIST’s technical building failure and fire studies do not address fault.

  • Volume I: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
  • Volume II: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
    (Note: The reports are presented in .pdf. To read these files, you can download Adobe Acrobat Reader free.)
  • Statement to the Media Delivered at NIST Charleston Fire Study Press Briefing, Oct. 28, 2010, by Nelson Bryner, Lead, Study Team
  • PowerPoint Presentation Accompanying Statement at Press Briefing
  • Video B-Roll on the NIST Charleston Fire Study (mp4)
  • Graphic Showing Floor Plan of Charleston Sofa Super Store
  • Graphic Showing Smoke and Fire Movement at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Temperature Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Oxygen Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
    • Posted by on October 28, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Charleston, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, decision-making, events, failures, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, History Repeating Event, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Naum, NIST, Reports, Safety, Sprinklers • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    No More History Repeating Events-Remembrance

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    As we approach the July 4th holiday period, two significant LODD incidents previously occurred during this time frame that hold a number of lessons learned related to command management, operations, building construction principles and building performance, fire behavior and the ever present dangers of the job. Take the opportunity to learn more about these events, and expand your insights and knowledge base.  Those events being the 1988 Hackensack (NJ) Ford Fire which resulted in five (5) LODD and the 2002 Gloucester City (NJ) Fire that resulted in three (3) LODD along with three children.

    Take a moment to reflect upon the supreme sacrifice made by these heroic firefighters and the messages that lay within the pages of the incident case studies, reports and summaries.  Our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com   has a comprehensive overview of both events with report links and a must see video on the Gloucester City (NJ) 2002 LODD event. For Remembering Hackensack and Gloucester follow the link HERE

    Remembrance (1988)

    Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department
    • CAPT. RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Engine Co. No. 304
    • LIEUT. RICHARD REINHAGEN, Engine Co. No. 302
    • F/F WILLIAM KREJSA, Engine Co. No. 301
    • F/F LEONARD RADUMSKI, Engine Co. No. 302
    • F/F STEPHEN ENNIS, Rescue Co. No. 308      

    Remember (2002)

    Gloucester City (NJ) Fire
    • James Sylvester Fire Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
    • John West Deputy Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
    • Thomas G. Stewart III Paid Firefighter, Gloucester City Fire Department

    Posted by on July 2, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, command-leadership, compentencies, construction, decision-making, failures, Fatalities, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, honor, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, mass-casualty-incident, NFPA, NIOSH, Remembrance, special-operations, structure fires, Trapped, Truss • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Reflecting on These Days of June

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    Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is.  Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed.  Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.

    We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?

    We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to  the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.

    • Modern building construction is no longer predicable
    • Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
    • Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
    • Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
    • Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
    • Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
    • Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
    • Command & Company Officer dereliction
    • Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

    STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
    There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.

    These behaviors include;
    • Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.

    • Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.

    • Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.

    Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;

    TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
    1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
    1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
    2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
    1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.

    The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.

    Check out these links;

    If you haven’t read Chief Mayers’s discerning reflections on Firehouse Zen, this is a MUST read. Where Were You That Night?

    The Lessons Learned from the Past

    From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

    Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

    Combat Fire Engagement

    Situations, Size-Up, Actions and Entertainment

    Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior

    Posted by on June 17, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Safety Week", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Charleston, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, courage to be safe, dynamics, FDNY, fire behavior, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, lessons, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Naum, NIOSH, occupancies, Remembrance, Safety Culture, tradition, training • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    The “Routiness” of Success, Or Not..

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    BM11

    It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and traditions that defines the fire service.”- Christopher Naum

    The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine coordinated suppression operations in order to identify with; the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations, thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.

    Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of Compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

     

     It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined suppression operations within the modern building construction setting.

     

    We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel. Does your company, your officers, your commanders, your department treat all things as equals when addressing the variables of structural combat fire operations? Is the equation of Occupancy Risk balanced with Occupancy Type? Are inherent structural stability and compromise conditions adequately identified and considered in the evolving progression of an incident action plan? Or do SOP and SOG’s drive the manner in which fire ground strategies and tactics are orchestrated and implemented at the company task level?

     

    How does this fit into your “culture, values and philosophy as a firefighter, officer or commander?”

    Posted by on March 5, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, behaviors, building construction, Christopher Naum, compentencies, courage to be safe, decision-making, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting, risk-based assessment, Risk-preferring, Safety Culture, size-up, strategies, tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

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    2-2-2009 3-20-14 PMOur buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

    The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived. We seek the elusive “Rosetta stone” that aligns and interprets the emerging and traditionalist acumen related to fire stream effectiveness, flow rates, cooling capacity, extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics, compartment fire theory, propagation and cooling capacity and tactical deployment all relate towards defining an engineering approach to firefighting tactics versus the manual, labor-driven tactics of line deployment and rudiment placement of water on a fuel source within the fire compartment (room).

    It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that defines structural fire suppression operations. It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined engine company operations within the modern building construction setting. We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

    The work of such notable suppression theory pioneers as P. Grimwood, E. Hartin, S. Särdqvist and S. Svennson and the concepts surrounding 3D firefighting, B-SAHF and other emerging research from the NIST and UL are areas that today’s discerning and progressive fire officer and commanders must become well-informed and conversant. The quantitative scientific data and emerging concepts from continuing research and testing such as the NIST’s Wind Drive Fire Studies and UL’s The Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions are providing enlightenment on fire development, fuel controlled and ventilation controlled fire development, operational time-duration parameters and degradation and failure mechanisms related to compromise and structural collapse in occupancies.

    Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement.

    • Building Construction Systems
      • Heritage
        • Pre-1919
      • Legacy
        • 1920-1949
      • Conventional
        • 1950-1979
      • Engineered
        • 1980-2010
      • Hybrid
      • Chameleon

    The fundamental compartment that comprised a typical room configuration in terms of area (square footage), volume (height/Width), furnishings (fire load package) and materials of construction (structural anatomy) found within conventional, legacy or heritage construction provided predictability in terms of fire suppression, fire behavior, operational time and survivability (civilian/firefighter). The dramatic changes since the early 1980’s in the evolution of modern building construction and the institutionalization of engineered structural systems (ESS) have created compartment (room) areas in excess 500 SF, volumes that are open and spaciously interconnected to other habitable space, fire load packages that create extreme fire behavior, compromising structural stability in shorter time spans creating decreasing interior operational time and requiring increasing fire flow rates and volume to sustain requisite extinguishment demands.

    Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.

    When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

    Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

    If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

    Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting

    • Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
      • Predictive Strategic Process
      • Tactical Deployment Model
      • Dynamic Tactical Deployment
      • Performance Indicators and Street Aides
        • Fire Dynamics
        • Resistance
        • Resilience
        • Structural Systems
        • Occupancy Hazard Profiles

    The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

    Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

    Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional or legacy construction and occupancies;

    • Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
    • You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
    • Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.

    The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988…

    “If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes”.

    Posted by on February 12, 2010 • Filed under: "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildings, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, decision-making, dynamics, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, LODD, Lumber, occupancies, operations, risk-based assessment, Safety Culture, structure fires, survival • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement

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    1Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again;

    Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting; New Terminology and operational perspectivies to meet today’s challenges….Here’s your introduction to the new lexicon;

    • Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
      • Predictive Strategic Process
      • Tactical Deployment Model
      • Dynamic Tactical Deployment
      • Performance Indicators and Street Aides
        • Fire Dynamics
        • Resistance
        • Resilience
        • Structural Systems
        • Occupancy Hazard Profiles

    The Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement, coming soon with a new persepctive and outlook on firefighting operations…are you going to be ready?

    Posted by on January 24, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, dynamics, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting, firefighting-operations, fires, first-due, hydraulics, risk, risk-based assessment, size-up, strategies, tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Executing Effective Tactical Plans

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    45418t1When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

    Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

    Posted by on January 24, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, assemblies, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, construction, decision-making, dynamics, Engineered Structural Systems, fire behavior, occupancies, risk-based assessment, size-up, strategies, tactics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , ,