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FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.1998

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FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.1998

Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at  fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly.  At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.

As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.

NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.

During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”

The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.

The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.

This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE.  NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

USFA Releases 2010 Fire Estimate Summary Series

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2010 Fire Series

U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) issued the 2010 Fire Estimate Summary Series which presents basic information on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in USFA’s National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). The data summary series was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with the American public, fire departments, and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.

Direct Links to the USFA:

Information from the USFA web site, HERE

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Estimates

Fire Estimate Summaries present basic data on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in the U.S. Fire Administration’s (USFA’s) National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). Each Fire Estimate Summary addresses the size of the specific fire or fire-related issue and highlights important trends in the data.1

Residential Building Estimates

Definition of Residential Building


A structure is a constructed item of which a building is one type.

The term residential structure commonly refers to buildings where people live. To coincide with this concept, the definition of a residential structure fire includes only those fires confined to an enclosed building or fixed portable or mobile structure with a residential property use.

Such fires are referred to as residential buildings to distinguish these buildings from other structures on residential properties that may include fences, sheds, and other uninhabitable structures.

  • Residential buildings include, but are not limited to one- or two-family dwellings, multifamily dwellings, manufactured housing, boarding houses or residential hotels, commercial hotels, college dormitories, and sorority/fraternity houses.

Fire Estimate Summaries of Residential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)


Residential Building Fires (2006-2010)

Year Fires Deaths Injuries Dollar Loss
2006 392,700 2,490 12,550 7,188,000,000
2007 390,300 2,765 13,525 7,527,000,000
2008 378,200 2,650 13,100 8,124,100,000
2009 356,200 2,480 12,600 7,378,800,000
2010 362,100 2,555 13,275 6,646,900,000

Residential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)

Cause Definitions

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Nonresidential Building Estimates

Definition of Nonresidential Building
Nonresidential buildings are a subset of nonresidential structures and refer to buildings on nonresidential properties. Buildings include enclosed structures, subway terminals, underground buildings, and fixed portable or mobile structures.

  • The term nonresidential buildings refers to those nonresidential structures that are enclosed.
  • Nonresidential buildings include assembly, eating and drinking establishments, educational facilities, stores, offices, basic industry, manufacturing, storage, detached garages, outside properties, and other nonpermanent residential buildings.
  • The term nonresidential also includes institutional properties such as prisons, nursing homes, juvenile care facilities, and hospitals, though many people may reside there for short (or long) durations of time.

Fire Estimate Summaries of Nonresidential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)


Nonresidential Building Fires (2006-2010)

Year Fires Deaths Injuries Dollar Loss
2006 98,900 75 1,350 2,536,100,000
2007 103,000 90 1,275 3,015,900,000
2008 97,100 100 1,250 3,496,300,000
2009 89,200 90 1,500 2,804,700,000
2010 84,900 80 1,375 2,400,700,000

Nonresidential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)

Cause Definitions

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1 Fire Estimate Summaries are based on the USFA’s national estimates methodology. The USFA is committed to providing the best and most current information on the United States’ fire problem and, as a result, continually examines its data and methodology. Because of this commitment, changes to data collection strategies and estimate methodologies occur, causing estimates to change slightly over time. Previous estimates on specific issues (or similar issues) may have been a result of different methodologies or data definitions used and may not be directly comparable to current estimates.


Related Topics

Links of Interest

Click charts below to enlarge.

Residential Building Fire Trends: Fires & Deaths

Residential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 Residential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Deaths

Residential Building Fire Trends: Injuries & Dollar Loss

Residential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Injuries Residential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Dollar Loss

Residential Building Fires: Causes Of Fires & Deaths

Leading Causes of Residential Building Fires 2006-2010 Leading Causes of Residential Building Fires 2006-2010 - Deaths

Residential Building Fires: Causes Of Injuries & Dollar Loss

Leading Causes of Residential Building Fires 2006-2010 - Injuries Leading Causes of Residential Building Fires 2006-2010 - Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends: Fires & Deaths

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 Nonresidential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Deaths

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends: Injuries & Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Injuries Nonresidential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fires: Causes Of Fires & Dollar Loss

Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Types

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The Predictability of Performance; It's Occupany Risk not Occupancy Type

Today’s incident demands on the fireground are unlike those of the recent past, requiring incident commanders and commanding officers to have increased technical knowledge of building construction with a heightened sensitivity to fire behavior, a focus on operational structural stability and considerations related to occupancy risk versus the occupancy type.

There is an immediate need for today’s emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their foundation of knowledge and insights related to the modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to adjust and modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions.

Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk, not occupancy type, and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumptive fire behavior.

The dramatic changes in buildings and occupancies over the past ten years have resulted inadequate fire suppression methodologies based upon conventional practices that do not align with the manner in which we used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions.

We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system and given an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions, we can safely and effectively mitigate a structural fire situation in any  given building type and occupancy.

Past operational experiences, both favorable and negative; gave us experiences that define and determine how the fireground is assessed, react and how we expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future; this formed the basis for the naturalistic decision-making process.

Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built upon nine decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

Are you aware of the defining changes in structural systems and support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of the fire-loading package in today’s buildings and occupancies? When was the last time you were out in the street with the companies, or spent some time doing a walk-through of construction or renovations site? Have you asked you commanding officers, division or battalion chief or your company officers for insights into what operational demands and risks are being imposed upon them while operating in the street and within the buildings, occupancies and structures that comprise your jurisdiction?

The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed; but no one has told us. The IAFC Safety, Health & Survival Section (SH&S) spent that past year refining and updating The IAFC Ten Rules of Structural Fire Engagement. First published in 2001, the original Ten Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting provided a set of principles and parameters that incident commanders, commanding and company officers could utilize and implement during incident operations to decrease operations risk, increase and amplify personnel safety of operating companies.

The section moved to develop rules of engagement for structural firefighting to serve as nationally developed model procedures (SOPs) offered by the IAFC. These new Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting have been posted on the IAFC SH&S web page and were officially rolled out the Fire Rescue International in Chicago in 2010.

The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety will provide a crucial link towards integrating occupancy risk considerations with more educated and informed understandings of buildings, occupancies, and the behavior of fire with a structure.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned command and company officer knows that at times. It’s what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances.

However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective; aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal-oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed strategic processes that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

Today’s incident commanders need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling, while implementing Tactical Patience.

Think about the following;

  • Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
  • Take a tour of your response area, district, community or city.
  • Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that are affecting your incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
  • Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory
  • Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
  • Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type and align your operations and deployments to match those risks
  • Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling
  • Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of  conducting fire service operations
  • Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going todo about that gap?

If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at risk. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies … You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety

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Commandsafety.com is pleased to make available the latest update to the Buildingsonfire.com’s Building Construction Training and Lecture Series for 2010. Recently updated with a series of new seminar and training program topics addressing the emerging training and educational needs of the fire service, these programs provide timely and relevant information and insights on Building Construction, Command Risk Management, Dynamic and Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Situational Awareness, Engineered Structural Systems and Fire Fighter Safety.

These programs also present and integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and much more.  

These programs, lectures and seminars examine crucial construction elements and occupancy types and correlates building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety. These fast paced programs will utilize extensive multimedia materials, interactive activities, case study activities and simulations to reinforce course content and subject areas, providing exceptional learning opportunities.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)

Down load the program files from the link below for more information.

Building Construction Training Programs 2010

 

Reflecting on These Days of June

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Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is.  Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed.  Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.

We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?

We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to  the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.

The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.

  • Modern building construction is no longer predicable
  • Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
  • Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
  • Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
  • Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
  • Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
  • Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
  • Command & Company Officer dereliction
  • Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.

These behaviors include;
• Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.

• Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.

• Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.

Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;

TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.

If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.

Check out these links;

If you haven’t read Chief Mayers’s discerning reflections on Firehouse Zen, this is a MUST read. Where Were You That Night?

The Lessons Learned from the Past

From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

Combat Fire Engagement

Situations, Size-Up, Actions and Entertainment

Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior

Building Types

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newyork-ogleThe United States Fire Administration (USFA) recently published a series of bulletins under their highly acclaimed Coffee Break Training series of informational bulletins. This series provided insights and awareness of how Buildings are “types” from a codes perspective related to fire resistance. All firefighters and officers need to have a firm understanding of the principles, concepts and methodologies of building construction. Another mission critical concept that I’ve discussed recently is operational risks and tactical deployment must be based upon Occupancy Risk, not Occupancy Type.

Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Here are the USFA document links;

Part 1: Understanding Construction “Types, HERE

Part 2: Where Fire Resistance May Be Required, HERE

Part 3: Fire-Resistive Assemblies, HERE

Part 4: How Fire Resistance Ratings are measured, HERE

Part 5: Understanding Construction: Fire Test “Survival”, HERE

Part 6: Required Fire Resistance, HERE

Part 7: Fire Resistance Based on Separation, HERE

More on Building Types in an upcoming post.

UL Fire Resistive Assemblies Information, HERE

Rating Definitions, HERE

It’s more than just Size-Up; Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment

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FLASHO1Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken.
This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident.
Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.
Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.
To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade.
Traditional incident scene size-up is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.
According to a 1998 published TriData study report, “Situational Awareness is one of the most difficult skills to master and is a weakness in the fire community. The report goes on to state that “The culture must change so that [personnel] are observing, thinking, and discussing the situation constantly.” It’s all about implementing effective human performance tools; perceptions versus reality, expectations versus realization, comprehension and forecasting, informed decision-making and calculated and formulated risk.
 
It’s a whole lot more than just “Size-Up”.  What do you think?

Twenty Ten

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august_detailAs we transition into a new year, and as plans begin to take place that frame and outline the year’s activities, foremost in this planning, preparation, scheduling and outlook should be those activities and commitments that training, education and skill development can be implemented and enhanced. Take the initiative to recognize and identify training and operational gaps and distinguish the risk and options available to lessen or eliminate the risk and reduce the gap deficiencies. Take the time to implement effective, accurate and frequent training and skill development drills, training curriculums and programs.

Don’t sacrifice or forego on this mission critical area when so much is at stake in the domain of combat structural fire suppression. Understand the predictability of performance in the buildings and occupancies not only in your jurisdiction, first or second-due areas, but also in those areas that you may be called upon to respond to for greater alarms or mutual aid. Remember Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Keep an eye in the rear view mirror; learning from the wisdom and knowledge from where you’ve been, what you’ve done and all your past experiences and practice; but at the same time focusing on the road before you with keen attentiveness on situational awareness, anticipating error-likely conditions and balanced risk assessment and operational management in both your strategic and tactical deployments. 

Twenty Ten(2010)

 Here are twenty (20) Suggested activities or initiatives for you to consider in 2010….

Above all, be safe in all your endeavors, assignments and incident tasks.

  1. Regardless of my years of experience, I will increase my understanding of the basic principles of Building Construction, because; Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.  
  2. Identify ten (10) buildings within your first-due or response district and complete a pre-fire plan and present this to my company of organization.
  3. Identify an area where new residential construction is underway and follow the construction process from foundation through completion to gain an understanding of operational issues.
  4. I will complete the UL Structural stability of engineered lumber in fire conditions online course and implement the lessons learned in my strategic and tactical operations.
  5. I will not take any building or occupancy for granted, and shall take all precautions to ensure crew integrity and safety during my task assignments.
  6. Complete a 360 assessment of all buildings upon arrival, when ever feasible to gain reconnaissance information on the building and incident risks and implement this info into my strategic, tactical plans or company task assignments.
  7. Research the issues affecting; Engineered Structural Systems (ESS), Fire Behavior/Fire Dynamics or Fire Suppression Management/Fire Loading and develop a training drill to share the lessons learned.
  8. Select a new or previous published fire service text book and read up on a subject area that I may have neglected or ignored to increase my skill set.
  9. Implement an objective approach towards effective risk assessment and profiling of all buildings and occupancies during incident operations and implement balanced tactical deployment with aggressive/measured assignments; recognizing that my company and I are not invincible.
  10. During demanding Combat Structural Fire Engagements, I will; Do the Right Thing at the Right Time for the Right Reasons and will not practice Tactical Entertainment.
  11. Read the Report of the Week (ROTW) on the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System web site and share the operating experience (OE) lessons with my company or department, to reduce the likelihood of a similar or more serious event.
  12. I will read Ten (10) NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Reports and present the lessons learned in a discussion, table top, drill or training program.
  13. I will attend a regional or national training conference to increase my perspective and awareness of other firefighting, safety or operational methodologies, process or practices to increase firefighter safety in my home organization.
  14. I will increase my understanding of the NFFF Everyone Goes Home Program initiatives, including the Sixteen Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives, Safety Thru Leadership and the Courage to Be Safe Programs and other new program initiatives and advocate and promote enhanced safety measures in my organization.
  15. I will advocate and promote safe and defensive apparatus operations during emergency responses and will always buckle-up my seat belt and ensure my crew is always belted-in, not placing my company at risk and obeying traffic signals and postings.
  16. I will implement the New Rules of Engagement during combat structural fire operations; while monitoring and reacting to on-going building performance and fire behavior.
  17. I will increase my understanding of the Predictability of Building Performance and base my operational deployments on Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type.
  18. I will become a mentor to a new or less experienced firefighter and promote the traditions, honor and duty of our fire service profession, tempered with an emphasis on firefighter safety, survival and wellness.
  19. I will take NO emergency incident responses as being routine in nature, due to frequency , regularity or  past performance, demands or outcomes, nor will I take any building for granted; Company, Team and personal safety and integrity is paramount and I will not be complacent, but remain vigilant based upon my training, skills and experience.
  20. This one’s for you to identify and fill in………..

Ensure you’re glancing occasionally in your rear view mirror to monitor where you’ve been, while driving your initiatives, programs, processes and actions forward. Above all, maintain the courage to be safe. We don’t know what’s in the cards on any given day, but the citizens we protect can rest assured, we will do our job as firefighters, to the best of our abilities, because of who we are; today, in 2010 and certainly well into the next decade and beyond. Stay safe, with the hopes for a Happy New Year.

Remembering Brackenridge 1991 Floor Collapse and LODD

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12-21-2009 9-53-23 PMRemembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse

Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building. Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement. The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.  

 SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

  • Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
  • Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
  • Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
  • Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
  • Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
  • Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
  • Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
  • Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
  • Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
  • Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
  • Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
  • Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.

The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.

There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.

This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

USFA Report; HERE

NFPA Summary; HERE

NFPA Report Order; HERE 

Brackenridge Pioneer Hose Co. Memorial, Pennsylvania, HERE

Predicated Building Performance

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6When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis.

We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system. That may be true for conventional or legacy structures, but what about modern construction and engineered structural systems? Same expectations?…….

What do you think?

There’s a great series of photos depicting initial operations at a small-sized (square foot) single family residential occupancy fire that captures fire and smoke behavior, HERE and HERE

Take at look the at this residential fire and interior attack that injured a number of Maryland Firefighters HERE

Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. NIOSH Report HERE. NIST References HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

The New Lexicon and Challenges

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Floor TrussOf the many issues affecting the Fire Service, the prevailing challenge that has a pronounced impact on operational safety is the assimilation of engineered structural systems (ESS) into mainstream building design and construction. The presence of engineered structural systems (ESS) are no longer considered to be an innocuous feature in a given building or occupancy; it is the predominate feature in nearly all current construction, renovation and adaptive reuse or infill applications. It has become far more than just concerning ourselves with the presence of a simple light-weight or “engineered” truss roof system or a wood I-beam  floor assembly.

There is a new lexicon of building construction components and systems that must be added to your operational safety vocabulary and incident action plans. There is a new terminology, applications and a knowledge base to learn that will support operational excellence and support the integrity of incident safety performance of companies and personnel. Do you know what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence an incident?

The fire service continues to apply the term “light weight construction” to a wide variety of building construction and systems. This expression has become a miss-application of both term and the correlation of risk and severity related to operational profiling. In other words, we apply and express the use of “light weight construction” for all types of engineered components, systems, designs and assemblies in nearly all types of building construction and occupancy use. Although the roots of the term can be traced back to the early 1980′s, and its application to the (then) emerging use of trussed roofing systems and the advent of wood I-beam floor supports (sans solid dimensional lumber joists), the use of the terminology in today’s context of risk assessment, strategic and tactical management and deployment models and within the context of incident operational tactics is no longer applicable, valid or suitable. It must be expanded into a more specific and descriptive level of classification and correlation.

For the most part, when discussing buildings and occupancies, aside from classifications related to code type or class as an element of fire resistance; the emphasis has been to differentiate between conventional and engineered construction, and the application of the term “light weight construction”. I continue advocating and promoting through my lectures that it’s much more than this when looking at the spectrum of construction and the structural anatomy of buildings. Current and past generations of buildings, construction and occupancies can be more accurately differentiated and classified within six (6) expanding categories in the following Building Construction Systems;

·        Heritage:              Pre-1900
·        Legacy:                1900-1949
·        Conventional:      1950-1979
·        Engineered:         1980-2009     Current into 2010…
·        Blended Hybrid:  1995-2009     Current into 2010…
·        Enigmatic:            2010-             Projected
 
We’ll discuss these six classifications in greater details in future postings here and expand the level of details on the CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com sites. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past “conventional” construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address the advancement of new rules of combat structural fire engagement. But if you don’t understand or know what and how those changes in predictability have occurred, you may be operating with a false sense of operational risk and safety margin.

It’s a Lot More than just talking about “Light Weight” Construction….
·        From Plywood-CDX….to
·        Particle Board- PB…..to;
·        Orient Strand Board-OSB
·        Structural Composite Lumber- SCL
·        Laminate Strand Lumber- LSL
·        Laminate Veneer Lumber-LVL
·        Structural Insulated Panels-SIP
·        Parallel Strand Lumber-PSL
·        Machine Stress Rated Lumber- MSR
·        Medium Density Fiberboard-MDF and MDL (Lumber)
·        Finger Jointed Lumber-FJL
·        Adhesives…..
 
Do some research and check these terms out for starters. We’ll talk more about these components and assemblies in the near future. So get busy on your down time today over the next few days and discover the implications these components may have in your community….

Here’s a link to a past informative posting related to engineered systems and their relationship to firefighter safety and operations, HERE. There’s some great contributed information and manufacturer “insights” on the subject engineered wood I-joists and beams and firefighter safety. There are some interesting statistical extrapolations, correlations and conveniences’ that attempt to make the case. But then again, You be the judge. Take at look at the presentation developed by the American Forest and Paper Association, HERE and HERE.
 
If you haven’t done so yet, don’t forget to check out the free online training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions at the UL University developed and provided by Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL),  HERE

Here’s a series of other important Reference Links that provide some insights on operational safety, incident conditions and factors and the lessons-learned from a number of LODD events;  

NIOSH Publication No. 2009-114: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors HERE

 NIOSH Publication No. 2005-132: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters Due to Truss System Failures HERE

Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE

First-floor collapse during residential basement fire claims the life of two fire fighters (career and volunteer) and injures a career fire fighter captain – New York, Report HERE

Career Fire Fighter Dies After Falling Through the Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence – Ohio, HERE

Colerain Township, Ohio Double LODD Preliminary Report, HERE

Career engineer dies and fire fighter injured after falling through floor while conducting a primary search at a residential structure fire – Wisconsin, HERE

NFPA Report on Light Weight Construction, HERE

Informative USFA Coffee Break series postings related to Building Types & Fire Resistance:  HERE. HEREHERE, HERE, and HERE

Remember, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk-F2S)

The Wrong Dragon…..just look over your shoulder

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I’ve commented with more than a few postings on the issues related to engineer building construction components and assemblies. I posed some questions related to Engineered Structural Assemblies & Systems (ESS) and asked if you knew what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence incident operations.

I also presented some information on the pioneering efforts and quantitative results of the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) engineers and fire service representatives from the Chicago Fire Department, HERE and HERE.

If you’ve spent any amount of time reading through the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, LODD Reports or have invested time and effort to look through the data base of near miss reports and ROTW at the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System, you’d recognize the magnitude of the issues and multi-faceted challenges confronting the U.S. Fire Services in the areas of engineered structural assemblies, components and building features.

Paul Comb’s editorial image provides a poignant and distressing reality that the fire service needs to come to terms with, addressing and implementing the necessary components that assimilating refined combat firefighting techniques and methodologies; that align with the risks and hazards presented by current and emerging construction techniques, materials and consumer lifestyles that comprise our buildings and occupancies. We need to start looking over our shoulders; we need redefined strategies and tactics for today’s buildings and occupancies. When we do have the opportunity to engage in firefighting with the dragon; we may not recognize the dragon has changed, it has evolved. Yet we stand poised to engage or take-on the dragon with faulted incident operations, strategic plans and tactical intentions that provide less than adequate results.

In those situations where we are deficient or we achieved less than expected results, we continue to miss the apparent or root causes and fall back on perceived notions and excuses. Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety; Understanding today’s building construction, fire dynamics, fire loading and behaviors and instituting appropriate firefighting methodologies, we can achieve safe and successful fireground operations. Remember, the Predictability of Performance and the combat firefighting based upon Occupancy Risk not Occupany Type.

Have you and your company, battalion or department discussed limiting factors, enhanced firefighting tactics or operational experiences related to engineered systems, past fires, observed new construction or renovations and what it all means to your assigned duties or company assignments?

Are you and your company adequately trained to address “modern” construction, occupancies and conditions or is a much bigger dragon lurking in the shadows?

Understanding the New Building-Occupancy Relationships

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Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating;construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

How much knowledge and formal training have you had as a Commanding Officer or Company Officer on Building Construction?

Have any clue on the performance of Engineered Structural Systems….? Are your strategic plans and tactics aligned with Occupancy Risk and Building Performance Profiles AND the projected fire load/heat release rate?

If you think these factors are not important OR you dismiss them as being non-material-think again; They are Mission Critical for firefighter safety and incident mitigation.

Take a Good Look Around

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Have you stopped for a minute today and taken a good look around? Whether you’re sitting in the front seat at the stop light of an intersection or as you’re peering out the side cab window coming back from an alarm or while running errands in your POV; have you taken a good look around? As the Springsteen song goes; “this is your town”.

There’s a lot that can be gleaned from your surroundings on any given day. We sometimes take for granted the subtle changes that are happening all around us as we take care of business on our rounds, runs and calls. We tend to focus in on the immediacy of the events that are happening in front of us that demand our attention but fail to take a look around to pick up on information, data and insights that can help us on that next run or down the road in the future.

Take a look at the construction that might be going up in your areas. I’m certain you’re paying close attention to what’s happening in your first-due, but what about that third-due area, that neighboring jurisdiction or the mutual-aid area that you occasionally run in to? When you’re on that next EMS run or an investigation of an odor or alarm bells service call, take a few extra minutes to walk through the occupancy. Conduct your own mini company level pre-plan.

Look at the layout, features, access and construction features. If you have a chance, verify the structural support systems employed by the building for the floor and roof systems. If you have time, take the company on a quick site visit to that building that’s under construction or the renovations that are again underway in that commercial or business occupancy around the corner from quarters.

These continuing challenging economic times places a great deal of influence on what’s being built, how it might be constructed, the manner in which a building may be operational one day, vacant the other and under renovation the next. Sometimes these transformations occur literally overnight.

Take a good look around, this is your town…your district, your response area. Know your buildings, understand their performance profiles, and assess the predictability of performance. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

It’s Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type

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The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified..

Risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…

Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predicable as past Conventional Construction; Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.

Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type. The occupancies and buildings ( of all types and vintage) that require combat fire engagement and structural today demand firefighting strategies and tactics that are NOT the same as they were twenty or even ten years ago.

  • Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled;
  • Most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures.
  • This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.
  • Modern building construction is no longer predicable
  • Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
  • Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
  • Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
  • Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessmentRisk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
  • Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
  • Command & Company Officer dereliction
  • Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

The Job: Doing the Right Thing, At the Right Time, for the Right Reasons

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On Monday August 24th, two Buffalo (NY) Firefighters sustained injuries and died in the line-of-duty (LODD) during the conduct of operations at a two-story Type III (brick and joist) commercial occupancy in Buffalo, New York. The 911 call reported someone may be trapped inside the 1815 Genesee Street occupancy just before 4:00 hours. (more HERE and HERE)
Arriving companies reported a working fire in the basement. Lt. Charles “Chip” McCarthy of Rescue Company 1 was conducting search and rescue operations, when the number one floor collapsed, plunging him into the basement. Firefighter Jonathan Croom of Ladder Company 7 entered the building to search for Lt. McCarthy in response to the Mayday call. The mayday was called a little more than a half-hour into the incident. At about 4:09 AM, Command gave the following report:
“Twenty minutes into 1815 Genesee Street. Two-story ordinary. We are now operating three, inch and three quarter lines. We are doing an aggressive interior search. We still have a report of civilians trapped. We believe they may be in the basement. We are going to hold everybody we have including the two and one.”
Command soon asks for the balance of the second alarm. According to published reports and radio communication transcripts, companies reported difficulty getting into a basement door and deteriorating conditions on the number one floor. Genesee Street Command reported at the thirty-minute mark:
“Thirty minutes into 1815 Genesee Street. Still continuing to operate all hands. We will continue to hold the second alarm.” ( MP3 Communications, HERE)
There’s been a lot of talk of recent regarding the fire service cultural divides. We should take a moment to pause and reflect on the job of firefighting in light of the Buffalo LODD’s and refocus and recognize the job of firefighting has inherent risks, and the job requires us to; Do the Right Thing, at the Right Time, for the Right Reasons.
Lt. Chip McCarthy and Firefighter Jonathan Croom were doing the right thing, when deployed on the primary search and rescue assignment on the first-due, and the subsequent search and rescue on the RIT/mayday assignment. Their sacrifice in the line-of-duty, reflects the honor, courage, protection, fortitude and duty of the fire service.
Operations at buildings of Ordinary and Heavy Timber construction require a clear understanding of their inherent structural features and conditions, and a firm knowledge of structural degradation and compromise resulting from fire suppression operations. Firefighter safety and operational integrity is contingent upon knowing how these buildings perform and may be impacted by structure fires within their occupancies. More information and support training materials HERE and HERE. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

NIOSH issues the Charleston LODD Report

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The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), Division of Safety Research, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, issued its long awaited report on the Charleston, SC Sofa Store Fire that occurred on June 18, 2007, in which nine career fire fighters died in the line of duty, when they became disoriented in rapidly deteriorating conditions inside a burning commercial furniture showroom and warehouse facility. At least seven other municipal fire fighters and two mutual aid fire fighters barely escaped serious injury.

NIOSH issued thirty-five (35) fire service based recommendations and eight (8) industry, organizational and municipal recommendations.

How many of these recommendations could apply to your organization?

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for an occupational safety and health program in accordance with NFPA 1500
  • develop, implement, and enforce a written Incident Management System to be followed at all emergency incident operations
  • develop, implement, and enforce written SOPs that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
  • ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual with overall authority and responsibility for management of all activities at an incident
  • ensure that the Incident Commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior fire fighting operations
  • train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
  • ensure that the Incident Commander establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in fire-fighting efforts
  • ensure the early implementation of division / group command into the Incident Command System
  • ensure that the Incident Commander continuously evaluates the risk versus gain when determining whether the fire suppression operation will be offensive or defensive
  • ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
  • ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the IncidentCommander, is appointed at each structure fire
  • ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
  • ensure that a rapid intervention crew (RIC) / rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents
  • ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents
  • ensure that ventilation to release heat and smoke is closely coordinated with interior fire suppression operations
  • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate
  • development of safe fireground strategies and tactics
  • consider establishing and enforcing standardized resource deployment approaches and utilize dispatch entities to move resources to fill service gaps
  • develop and coordinate pre-incident planning protocols with mutual aid departments
  • ensure that any offensive attack is conducted using adequate fire streams based on characteristics of the structure and fuel load present
    ensure that an adequate water supply is established and maintained
  • consider using exit locators such as high intensity floodlights or flashing strobe lights to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit
  • ensure that Mayday transmissions are received and prioritized by the Incident Commander
  • train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure
  • ensure that all fire fighters and line officers receive fundamental and annual refresher training according to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021
  • implement joint training on response protocols with mutual aid departments
  • ensure apparatus operators are properly trained and familiar with their apparatus
    protect stretched hose lines from vehicular traffic and work with law enforcement or other appropriate agencies to provide traffic control
  • ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression and overhaul activities
  • ensure that fire fighters are trained in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
  • develop, implement and enforce written SOPS to ensure that SCBA cylinders are fully charged and ready for use
  • use thermal imaging cameras (TICs) during the initial size-up and search phases of a fire
    develop, implement and enforce written SOPs and provide fire fighters with training on the hazards of truss construction
  • establish a system to facilitate the reporting of unsafe conditions or code violations to the appropriate authorities
    ensure that fire fighters and emergency responders are provided with effective incident rehabilitation
  • provide fire fighters with station / work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments.

Additionally, federal and state occupational safety and health administrations should:

  • consider developing additional regulations to improve the safety of fire fighters, including adopting National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus standards.

Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

  • continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn SCBA
  • conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.

Additionally, code setting organizations and municipalities should:

  • require the use of sprinkler systems in commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards, and establish retroactive requirements for the installation of fire sprinkler systems when additions to commercial buildings increase the fire and life safety hazards
  • require the use of automatic ventilation systems in large commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards.

Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:

  • coordinate the collection of building information and the sharing of information between building authorities and fire departments
  • consider establishing one central dispatch center to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions
  • ensure that fire departments responding to mutual aid incidents are equipped with mobile and portable communications equipment that are capable of handling the volume of radio traffic and allow communications among all responding companies within their jurisdiction.

What Do You Really Know about the Buildings in Your District?

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What do you Really know about the buildings in your district? As you drive about your response district today, coming back from an alarm, heading to the firehouse tonight or running errands around your community this weekend, take a good look around.

Ask your self a simple question; “How well do you know the buildings, structures and occupancies in your response jurisdiction?”
Be honest, do you really understand how those “older residential”
structures were built and understand how fire travels and impacts your fireground operations? Are your aware of the newest features of engineered structural support systems being constructed within that new set of homes going up in your second-due area? Are you aware, that vacant office building is being converted into a light manufacturing and assembly business? How about those unoccupied store fronts and businesses that have recently closed up due to the tough economic times…. any special hazards or operational concerns to your company should you get a dispatch to respond? Have the senior members of your station or department shared their stories of operations and incidents at various buildings around your district or community?

Did you listen to them, or were you quick to dismiss those “old war stories”. There’s a wealth of “pre-planning’ nuggets hidden in those stories. Take the time to listen, remember or postulate. Take a good look around….think about any given building, the one across the street that you’re looking at while you wait for the traffic light to change; Think about a fire in that same building. Do you really understand how it will truly perform under combat structural fire conditions? What’s the building’s collapse profile, how much operational time will you have, what dynamic risk assessment factors will you have to deal with, how safe is it for you to engage in interior operations upon your arrival? How can this building, its occupancy and structural system hurt, my team, my company, my firefighters, my department, me?

Sometimes things aren’t as obvious as them seem. You may have responded and operated at numerous incidents at a wide variety of buildings in your response area, or very few; some routine, others maybe more demanding…the question remains, “What do you Really know about your buildings?” Your life may one day depend on what you actually do know or recollect. Take a good look around.