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2004 PA Church Fire and Collapse: Situational Awareness and Collapse Zone Management

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Remembrance:Pittsburgh(PA) Bureau of Fire- Post Fire Collapse and Double LODD

NIOSH Report F2004-17:  Career battalion chief and career master fire fighter die and twenty-nine career fire fighters are injured during a five alarm church fire -Pennsylvania.

On March 13, 2004, a 55-year-old male career Battalion Chief (Victim #1) and a 51-year-old male career master fire fighter (Victim #2) were fatally injured during a structural collapse at a church fire. Victim #1 was acting as the Incident Safety Officer and Victim #2 was performing overhaul, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. Twenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were pronounced dead at the scene.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should

  • ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations
  • establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations
  • ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone
  • train fire fighters to recognize conditions that forewarn of a backdraft
  • ensure consistent use of personal alert safety system (PASS) devices during overhaul operations
  • ensure that pre-incident planning is performed on structures containing unique features such as bell towers
  • ensure that Incident Commanders conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing fire fighters to an interior operation, and continue to assess risk-versus-gain throughout the operation including overhaul
  • develop standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to assign additional safety officers during complex incidents
  • provide interior attack crews with thermal imaging cameras

Additionally,

  • municipalities should enforce current building codes to improve the safety of occupants and fire fighters

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200417.html

Pittsburgh Bureau of Fire: HERE

Pre-Collapse Photo

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations.

Discussion: Due to the destructive powers of fire, most structures that have been involved in fires are structurally weakened. In this incident, the structural integrity of the bell tower was weakened by a fire of several hours duration, the addition of thousands of gallons of water, and possibly the destructive effect of the backdraft. Analysis of the exterior of the structure should be performed continuously while conducting interior operations. Similarly, before overhaul operations are begun, the structure should be determined safe to work in by the IC and a designated Safety Officer. If necessary, the IC should seek the help of qualified structural experts or other competent persons to assess the need for the removal of dangerously weakened construction, or should make provisions for shoring up load-bearing walls, floors, ceilings, roofs, or as in this case, the bell tower.

Recommendation #2: Fire departments should establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations.

Discussion: During fire operations, two rules exist about structural collapse: (1) the potential for structural failure always exists during and after a fire, and (2) a collapse danger zone must be established. A defensive attack was declared within an hour after fire suppression activities began. Part of a defensive strategy is establishing and moving fire fighters outside of the collapse zone.

 A collapse zone is an area around and away from a structure in which debris might land if a structure fails. Immediate safety precautions must be taken if factors indicate the potential for a building collapse. All persons operating inside the structure must be evacuated immediately and a collapse zone should be established around the perimeter. The collapse zone area should be equal to the height of the building plus an additional allowance for debris scatter and at a minimum should be equal to 1½ times the height of the building. For example, since the bell tower was 115 feet high, the collapse zone boundary should be established at least 173 feet away from the church. Once a collapse zone has been established, the area should be clearly marked and monitored, to make certain that no fire fighters enter the danger zone.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone.

In this incident, command suffered a serious lapse after the Incident Commander and several company officers were injured in the collapse. The command post from which the IC manages the fireground must be located in an area outside of the collapse zone. The IC must ensure that the command post is protected from danger so that an effective command structure is maintained throughout the incident.1, 5

Remembering the Strand Theater Fire of 1941

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The Strand Theater | Brockton, MA

March 10, 1941: The Strand Theater Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Brockton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapsed, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters.

Check out the comprehensive past post from CommandSafety.com from 2011

http://commandsafety.com/2011/03/the-strand-theatre-fire-brockton-ma-march-10-1941-13-firefighter-lodd/

Worcester FF Brian Carroll recalls the Arlington Street Fire of December 8, 2011

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Firefighter Brian Carroll reflects on the 2011 Arlington Street Fire and Cold Storage Fire of 1999.

Firefighter Brian Carroll was trapped in the basement of 49 Arlington St. after the second-floor of the three-decker collapsed underneath him and his partner on Rescue 1. He thought his close friend was OK. Firefighter Carroll lay trapped and didn’t learn until after he was freed that Firefighter Davies had died.

“What happened to my brother, the three-decker collapsed in a way no one could predict,” Robert Davies said. “Certainly I think it serves as a lesson going forward, and even if it saves one life going forward, then at least something good came out of it.”

Firefighter Davies, who was 43 when he died, has a son, Jon D. Davies Jr., in the department now as a firefighter.

  • From the Worcester Telegram & Gazette;  A cruel month for Worcester firefighters HERE
  • NIOSH REPORT Career Fire Fighter Dies and Another is Injured Following Structure Collapse at a Triple Decker Residential Fire – Massachusetts: HERE

Memorial Dedicated to Six Boston FF Killed In 1942 East Boston Luongo Fire

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1942 November 15 2012

 

Memorial dedicated in East Boston (MA) honoring Six Boston firefighters who made the supreme sacrifice while battling a fire in 1942.

Bagpipes echoed through Maverick Square Thursday at the conclusion of a ceremony dedicating a memorial to six Boston firefighters who died 70 years ago.

WBZ NewsRadio 1030′s Carl Stevens reports  Download: fire-memorial-stevens-w1.mp3

2012 Memorial to the Six firefighters

Six Boston Firefighters were killed in the line of duty as a result of the collapse, all of whom were conducting operations and working on the second floor with hose lines.

Supreme Sacrifice in the Line of Duty:

  • Hoseman John F. Foley, Engine Company 3
    • 57 years of age | 30 year veteran
  • Hoseman Edward F. Macomber, Engine Company 12
    • 47 years of age | 24 year veteran
  • Hoseman Peter F. McMorrow, Engine Company 50
    • 45 years of age | 19 year veteran
  • Hoseman Francis J. Degan, Engine Company 3
    • 24 years of age | 15 month veteran
  • Ladderman Daniel E. McGuire, Ladder Company 2
    • 44 years of age | 19 year veteran
  • Hoseman Malachi F. Reddington, Engine Company 33
    • 48 years of age | 19 year veteran

      In Memoriam

 

  • CommandSafety.com Full Article, HERE 
  • CBS Boston, HERE
  • Boston Globe w Video, HERE

The 1942 Luongo’s Restaurant Fire and Collapse in East Boston; Six Boston Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths

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The 1942 Luongo’s Restaurant Fire and Collapse in East Boston; Six Boston Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths

Boston Fire Department Box 6153 Five Alarm November 15,1942

 

Boston Fire Department Box 6153 Five Alarm November 15,1942

A multiple alarm fire and collapse 70 years ago resulting in six Boston Firefighter LODDs was overshadowed by the Coconut Grove Fire which occurred 13 days later. Here’ the story and legacy.  

 The 1942 Luongo’s Restaurant Fire and Collapse in East Boston; Six Boston Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths

During the early morning hours of Sunday November 15, 1942, a still alarm followed by box alarm 6153 was received for a fire at 4-6 Henry Street located in the Old Armory Building at Maverick Square in East Boston (MA). The address was for a report of fire in the Luongo’s Restaurant. A fire broke out in the rear of Luongo’s Restaurant on the first floor at about 2:26 a.m. The Boston Fire- District #1 report stated the fire originated in the rear kitchen ceiling.

November 16, 1942 New York Times:

The following is a description of the fire from the November 16, 1942 New York Times: “The fire, starting from a fireless cooker in the cafe on the ground floor at Henry Street and Maverick Square, suddenly swept through the building.

The firemen who were killed had just entered a restaurant on the second floor with a line of hose. As the flames ate through the cross timbers the wall collapsed with a roar, burying two men on the stairs and crushing the three others manning the hose.  That part of the wall which fell outward felled about forty firemen standing on the Henry Street side of the building beside the new $20,000 ladder truck, which was buried under the wreckage. At the same, a hot air explosion blew a half dozen firemen across Henry Street.”

The Building

The Luongo’s Restaurant was housed in what was called the Armory Building a five and one half story Type III Building of ordinary construction (Brick and joist) consisting of masonry bearing walls with approximate dimensions of 35 feet width x 60 feet depth x 65 foot height. The ensuing fire would spread to the exposure building at 10 Henry Street a three story 20 ft. X 40 ft. x 40 ft type III (brick and joist) structure.

Courtesy of the Boston Public Library, Leslie Jones Collection.

 

Fire and Collapse

Upon arrival of the first alarm companies, the fire initially was commanded by Fire Captain Amsler, Ladder Co. 2. District Chief Crowley rapidly assumed command upon his arrival and directed initial fire suppression activities of the companies to interior operations and quickly ordered a second alarm at 03:04hours.

Command was subsequently transferred to Deputy Chief Louis Stickel who ordered a third alarm struck due to fire extension twenty minutes later.

Suppression, ventilation and rescue operations were conducted with the fire under control when at 04:15 hours with without warning, it was reported the 3rd, 4th and 5th floors began to collapse with the brick masonry wall on the Henry Street side collapsing outward into the street. Ladder Company 8, a new 125 ft. aerial ladder, the largest in the United States at the time was buried in the timber and brick rubble and collapse pile. It was reported that as many of 43 firefighters in the street were injured as a result of the collapse.

 

Search, Rescue and Recovery Efforts

 

The arrival of Chief of Department Samuel Pope ordered fourth and fifth alarms. This brought Engine Companies 40, 9, 5, 11, 50, 8, 32, 6, 39, 3, 33, 12, 13, 38, 21, 35, 37, 20, 16, 10, 42, 51, 19; Ladder Companies 2, 31, 21, 8 and 3.

  • First Alarm: 02:27 hrs.
  • Second Alarm: 03:05 hrs.
  • Third Alarm: 03:24 hrs.
  • Fourth Alarm: 04:20 hrs.
  • Fifth Alarm: 04:35 hrs.

With both extensive interior and exterior collapse conditions with numerous trapped and injured firefighters, rescue efforts and medical assistance was being rendered by all fire service, military, hospital and civilian resources. Local Coast Guardsman were deployed to support the massive search and rescue efforts.

 

Rescue and Recovery

Six Boston Firefighters were killed in the line of duty as a result of the collapse, all of whom were conducting operations and working on the second floor with hose lines.

Supreme Sacrifice in the Line of Duty:

  • Hoseman John F. Foley, Engine Company 3
    • 57 years of age | 30 year veteran
  • Hoseman Edward F. Macomber, Engine Company 12
    • 47 years of age | 24 year veteran
  • Hoseman Peter F. McMorrow, Engine Company 50
    • 45 years of age | 19 year veteran
  • Hoseman Francis J. Degan, Engine Company 3
    • 24 years of age | 15 month veteran
  • Ladderman Daniel E. McGuire, Ladder Company 2
    • 44 years of age | 19 year veteran
  • Hoseman Malachi F. Reddington, Engine Company 33
    • 48 years of age | 19 year veteran

 Post Requiem

The Department’s 125 foot “jinx” aerial ladder, reported to be the largest in the nation at that time, was standing beside the falling wall on Henry Street. It was buried in the wreckage. The ladder was originally purchased by the City of Somerville. They found upon delivery that it was too big for their firehouse. Boston bought it. The truck had a series of problems. (additional Story on the 1941 American La France 125′ metal aerial By William Noonan,   HERE)  Apparatus Info – See Bostonfirehistory.org HERE

Boston Ladder 8 1941 ALF 125 ft. Aerail Ladder Shop#207. Photo Courtesy BostonFireHistory.org

There was some speculation that due to the long ladder and wide bed, the large ladder might have caused the wall collapse. This theory was later ruled out. In fact, some of the firefighters who were on the ladder at the time of the collapse, credit the ladder bed with saving their lives. When the granite and debris began falling, they lay down in the bed and the rubble slid down over them to the street.

Many felt that this was the end to the ladder. But, it was repaired and returned to service in South Boston as Ladder 19. Tragedy would continue to haunt this piece of apparatus. On December 3, 1947, Ladder 19 was out of service conducting tests on its brakes when it overturned and rolled. Provisional Firefighter Joseph B. Sullivan, on the job for less than six months, was killed. The Department took the truck out of service and scrapped

Individuals Remembered

As with many of these incidents, the men involved came from different backgrounds and circumstances that put them on that second floor that fateful night.

Edward Macomber was the father of eight children and considered to be one of the best firefighters in the department according to his superior officers. He was a member of the department for 28 years, and had been injured while on duty more than seven times.

Francis Degan, at age 24 was one of the youngest members of the Boston Fire Department at the time. He had been on the job only 19 months prior to November 15th. His officers thought that the young fireman was well on his way to becoming an officer. Young Degan took great pride in being a firefighter and realized his life’s ambition when he was appointed to the department to follow in the footsteps of his father, who was attached to Ladder Company 1.

John Foley, a hoseman on Engine Company 3, had been a member of the department for more than 30 years. He was planning to retire in a short time. In a tragic case of irony , Firefighter Foley should have been on a day off at the time of the fire, but had changed his schedule in order to get some time off later.

World War 1 veteran Pete McMorrow was a bachelor member of Engine Company 50 and was loved by many of the school children of Charlestown. He had served in the Navy in the first war and was telling his closest pals that he might just be going back to serve again. At age 46, he had carried the colors of the Boston Fireman’s Post #94, American Legion, through downtown Boston. While trapped in the debris for eleven hours, McMorrow’s fellow company members crawled into the space where he lay to tell him to hang on and they’d get him out soon. Throughout the early morning and into the next day the rescue efforts continued. However, when they were finally able to get to McMorrow, it was too late.

This fire and the subsequent six firefighter line of duty deaths were overshadowed by the Cocoanut Grove Fire which occurred only 13 days later on November 28, 1942.

Memorial, Dedication, and Reception

On Thursday November 15, 2012 the East Boston Neighborhood Health Center and the Boston Fire Department will be conducting a Memorial, Dedication, and Reception in Recognition of the 70th Anniversary of the Luongo Fire at Maverick Square, East Boston.

The event is scheduled from 12:00 pm to 2:00 pm at 20 Maverick Square, Boston, MA.

 

Video: Former Boston Fire Commissioner Paul Christian shares the story of the little-known Luongo fire as well as that of the 8-alarm Thanksgiving Day Fire of 1889. November has been a tragic month in Boston’s fire history. On November 15, 1942, a fire started in the back room of the Luongo Restaurant.

Collapse Scene from Maverick Square

 

Boston Fire Department 125 ft. Aerial Ladder on Henry Street Side

  

Rescue operations on Henry Street Side

 

Present sidewalk memorial marker

 

Memorial Dedication

 

Aerial Image of current property block in East Boston (MA). Bing Maps Image

  Historical Note: Three and a half story high, with granite faced and brick exterior walls, the interior wooden joisted building at the corner of Henry Street and Maverick Square in 1942 was one of the oldest buildings in East Boston. It was typical of mid 19th century Boston commercial construction. In accounts of the fire it is frequently referred to as “Old Armory Hall”. “Armory Hall” is the name by which it was known in the early years of the 20th century. That building however never was actually an armory as such. There once was an armory in East Boston. It was located at the corner of Maverick and Bremen Streets in a wooden building that preceded the still standing brick Overseers of the Public Welfare Building. The building in which the “Luongo Fire” occurred was built sometime before 1858. It was known originally as “Ritchie Hall” likely from the name of its owner.

 

Armory Hall Building is to the left of Photo – Circa 1910

 

 

Bromley Map Image Circa 1922

Sanborn Map Image Circa 1888

Looking Back at One Meridian Plaza High Rise Fire: 1991

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One Meridian Plaza Fire 1991, Provided Photo Source Not Known, All rights reserved

On what began as an uneventful Saturday night twenty-one years ago, a fire on the 22nd floor of the 38-story Meridian Bank Building, also known as One Meridian Plaza, was reported to the Philadelphia Fire Department on February 23, 1991 at approximately 2040 hours and went on to burned for more than 19 hours.

The fire caused three firefighter fatalities (LODD) and injuries to 24 firefighters.

PFD Line of Duty Deaths:

  • Captain David P. Holcombe, age 52
  • Firefighter Phyllis McAllister, age 43
  • Firefighter James A. Chappell, age 29

 The 12-alarms brought 51 engine companies, 15 ladder companies, 11 specialized units, and over 300 firefighters to the scene. It was one of the largest high-rise office building fire in modern American history –completely consuming eight floors of the building –and was controlled only when it reached a floor that was protected by automatic sprinklers.

  • The Fire Department arrived to find a well-developed fire on the 22nd floor, with fire dropping down to the 21st floor through a set of convenience stairs.
  • Heavy smoke had already entered the stairways and the floors immediately above the 22nd.
  • Fire attack was hampered by a complete failure of the building’s electrical system and by inadequate water pressure, caused in part by improperly set pressure reducing valves on standpipe hose outlets.

For a detailed accounting, diagrams and links, click over to Buildingsonfire.com HERE

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

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Remembering

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

Buffalo Box 191

As Buffalo (NY) firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III Ordinary and Type IV Heavy Timber construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically.

The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5′s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1′s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32′s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.

Previously posted on Thecompanyofficer.com HERE

NIOSH LODD Report Issued: Fire Department faulted in firefighter deaths

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NIOSH Released its report (F2010-18) on the July 24, 2010 house fire that resulted in the two fire fighter LODDs. Bridgeport fire officials’ failure on nearly every level led to the deaths of two firefighters battling a West Side blaze last July, the NIOSH report has concluded.

Among the findings of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health report released Wednesday:

  • The deputy fire chief and his assistant at the scene of the Elmwood Street fire had a discussion about whether they heard a mayday call from the two fallen firefighters instead of taking immediate action to rescue them.
  • There was no rapid intervention team readily available to come to the firefighters’ aid.
  • The report stated firefighters failed to immediately treat one of the firefighters who managed to make it to relative safety before collapsing.
  • Officials also did not properly manage firefighters’ air supplies — both firefighters’ air cylinders were empty when they were found, the report stated.
  • The department’s incident safety officer, who is required to be on scene for assistance in a fire, also did not arrive until more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch.

According to the NIOSH report, the 40-year-old Velasquez and the 49-year-old Baik, along with two other firefighters, had been assigned to conduct a search for victims and hot spots on the third floor of the multi-family house. The fire already had been extinguished on the second floor.

While the two were pulling the walls and ceiling on the third floor, the fire suddenly reignited. Velasquez transmitted a mayday that was not acknowledged or acted on, the report states. Minutes later, the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the third floor. As a firefighter exited the third floor he discovered Velasquez sitting on the stairs unconscious and not breathing. Baik was found about seven minutes later on the third floor in heavy smoke conditions.

The investigation of this fatal fire by CT State Fire Marshal’s Office remains ongoing.

The NIOSH report details will be published following a more detailed review of the findings and recommendations.

The Strand Theatre Fire Brockton (MA) 1941; 13 Firefighter LODD

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The Strand Theater, Brockton, MA

Strand Theatre Background 

The Strand Theatre was first erected in 1915 on the site of a previous theatre which was destroyed by fire on April 7, 1915. The Strand Theatre opened in March, 1916 on School Street between Main Street and City Hall in Brockton. It replaced another theatre that was destroyed by fire April 7, 1915. With a seating capacity of 1,685, it was the largest playhouse in the City. 

When opened, the Strand Theatre was considered a leader in modern fire safety. The stage area included a dry pipe sprinkler system termed “fireproof” and the surface exits were 20% more than state law requirements. 

Located on an irregular lot, the Theatre measured 139 feet deep and 60 feet tall. The walls were made of brick and the roof was made up of wood boards on joists supported by unprotected steel trusses. The interior walls were metal lath and plaster as was the ceiling, which was suspended from the trusses. The balcony covered a large area above the auditorium and housed a manager’s office, usher’s room and rest rooms. The area under the auditorium was dead space with the exception of the west end of the basement where finished rooms contained the furnace, ventilation equipment and a janitor’s room. The lobby was an open area with two open stairwells on each end providing access to the balcony. A long corridor connected the Theatre lobby to School Street. 

In August, 1937, the Strand Theatre underwent extensive remodeling and improvements under new management. The building remained intact under the new management until the fire occurred in 1941. 

March 10, 1941: The Stand Theatre Fire 

In the heart of Brockton’s business district, people usually flocked to the downtown area to shop or take in a show in what was a busy part of the city. Sunday, March 9, 1941, like all other Sundays, drew large crowds looking for the entertainment of a movie or vaudeville show. That evening the Strand showed the double feature, “Hoosier School Boy” starring Mickey Rooney, followed by “Secret Evidence,” a crime drama. 

Long after the curtain had closed and the crowds had filtered out, a custodian discovered a fire burning in the Theatre basement and instructed his helper to activate the fire alarm box located at Main and High Street. At 12:38 a.m., the fire department received Box 1311 and sent the first alarm apparatus to the scene. A second alarm followed shortly after the first, and finally a general alarm was sounded bringing all of Brockton’s apparatus to the Strand Theatre. 

When firefighters first arrived on the scene, the fire did not seem very serious. However, as time progressed, the fire gained headway. This became more apparent to those on the outside of the theatre than crews working inside. 

Crews knocked down the fire in the basement with cellar pipes while flames raced through the vertical voids in the walls and ventilation ducts. Firefighters worked feverishly to extinguish hidden fire while crews opened walls and ceilings in the lobby and under the balcony. A number of men moved up to the balcony to attack the fire which had made its way to the auditorium ceiling just below the roof. 

The first signs of visible outside fire erupted from the southwest corner of the building as outside crews played a large hose-line on the exposed flames. Firefighters on the balcony continued their efforts to expose the fire within the ceiling as hose streams were directed overhead from the auditorium floor. 

Less than one hour later, the Strand Theatre Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Brockton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapsed, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters. 

Roof Collapse

Uninjured firefighters worked tirelessly to save their fellow brothers despite the danger and fear of another collapse. Eventually, fire departments from neighboring towns relieved Brockton firefighters. 

No definite cause for the fire was ever discovered. Initial reports of arson proved to be inconclusive. Further investigation revealed that the unprotected steel roof trusses played a major role in the collapse. The heat of the fire within the concealed space between the roof and the auditorium ceiling was believed to have distorted the steel trusses, causing them to buckle and separate with ease. Experts questioned the effectiveness of the construction and design used in the roof assembly. Some reports state that the weight of a previous snowfall may have added to the collapse. However, witness accounts and photographs indicate a minimal amount of snow. 

March 10, 1941 Newspaper Headlines

Every year on March 10th a commemorative service is held at Brockton City Hall to honor the 13 Brockton firefighters who made the ultimate sacrifice that winter night: 

  • Captain John F. Carroll –Ladder Company 3
  • Lieutenant Raymond A. Mitchell–Engine Company 4
  • Firefighter Roy A. McKeraghan–Squad A
  • Firefighter Denis P. Murphy–Squad A
  • Firefighter William J. Murphy–Squad A
  • Firefighter Daniel C. O’Brien–Squad A
  • Firefighter George A. Collins–Engine Company 1
  • Firefighter Frederick F. Kelley–Engine Company 1
  • Firefighter Martin E. Lipper–Engine Company 1
  • Firefighter Henry E. Sullivan–Engine Company 1
  • Firefighter Bartholomew Herlihy–Ladder Company 1
  • Firefighter Matthew E. McGeary–Ladder Company 3
  • Firefighter John M. McNeill–Ladder Company 1

 

From Brockton IAFF Local 144 site, The following information is available:  

  • Strand Theatre Memorial Dedication
  •  67th Strand Theatre Tragedy Remembrance
  •  Strand Theater Remembered
  •  History
  •  May 10th Dedication
  •  Strand Theatre Memorial Video
  •  Boston Globe Article.. Strand Theatre Tragedy
  •  Background
  •  Scranton PA Local 60 Memorial Gift 
  •    

     

    Brockton’s Strand Theatre fire disaster recalled, HERE

    Firefighter Memorial

    Brockton Church Street today