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The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978
The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.
Thirty-four firefighters, one emergency medical technician and one Emergency Services police officer were injured in the fire and the tragedy is remembered as one of the worst disasters in the New York City Fire Department’s 143-year history.
The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
• Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33
• Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156
• Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42
• Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153
• Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156
• Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153
The fire started at 8:40 am in Waldbaum’s supermarket located at 2892 Avenue Y and Ocean Avenue in the Sheepshead Bay section of Brooklyn. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers and contractors were renovating the building when the fire was discovered in mezzanine area. Box 3300 was transmitted at 08:39 hours and the All hands transmitted at 08:49 and subsequently a 2nd alarm at 09:02 hrs. Shortly after 09:20 with 20 firefighters operating on the bowstring truss roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the roof fell into the smoke and flames. Some of the firefighters were seen running toward the edge of the roof; some made it, others nearby fell into the gaping hole. The third alarm was transmitted at 09:18 3rd alarm and subsequently escalated to a Fifth alarm assignment during the rescue and recovery operations.
Roof Operations prior to collapse
Laborers and firefighters managed to pull out some who were near walls, some crawled out. Several holes were made into the wall to pull out injured survivors and victims.
The Building
The approximately 120 ft. x 120 ft. primary building was originally built in 1952 as a supermarket and at the time of the fire was undergoing extensive renovations and was open and operating. Constructed with exterior masonry bearing walls of with timber roof trusses with a 100-foot clear span, supported on pilaster columns embedded in the exterior walls, it was classical Type III construction. The truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a conventional suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system. A two story mezzanine and machine room was located at the north wall of the original building. Access through the truss loft area was accessible through man-doors at the plane of each truss.
Waldbaum Supermarket FDNY Box 3300 1978
The heavy timber bowstring arch roof consisted of seven (7) truss units constructed of 4-5 bundled 3 inch x 12 inch attached assemblies. Two factors contributed to the collapse of the bowstring arch truss system; double roof (rain roof) alterations with concealed spaces and the extent and severity of the fire within the concealed spaces affecting the assembly’s structural stability. The presence of the double concealed ceiling systems; the truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a convential suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system. The failure of operating companies and command personnel to recognize the signs of an unchecked concealed fire that was propagating at a rapid pace impinging upon critical structural assembly points was a significant contributing factor in the incident outcome.
Typical Heavy Timber Bowstring Arch Truss Configuration
This roof collapsed 32 minutes after the initial units arrived. The immediate collapse occurred approximately 85 feet inward from the Alpha side (Ocean Avenue) and approximately 50 feet from the Bravo side (Avenue Y). The immediate failure and loss of structural stability and collapse of truss unit #5 was followed with the subsequent collapse of truss units #6 and #4 that were interdependent on the roof rafter and purlin system to maintain thier structural stability and vertical orientation. This type of interdependent structural system of structural trusses, rafters and roof deck (membrane) result in large area collapses since the primary truss will usually cause the adjacent two truss systems (on either side of the primary compromised truss) to fail by pulling downward.
The effects of direct flame impingement on the truss assessmblies, thier connection points of bearing at the outter masonry walls, coupled with the tactical trench cut that had been comopleted by the operating ladder companies resulted in 4,000 sf section of roof to collapse in the truss #5, 6 and 4 bay areas. Rapid and progressing fire travel within the concealed spaces and the degradation of the roof assembly and structural support system, failure to recognize the inherent opertaional risks associated with roof and interior operations on heavy timber truss roof systems and the failure to correlate continued interior suppression operations with simultaneous roof ventilation operations with no significant change in operational progress or mitigation contributed to the tragic outcome of the incident.
A short ten years would pass and the lessons from the Waldbaum Fire would soon be forgotten when on July 2, 1988 operations in a Type III building consisting of an auto dealership would lead to the deaths of five (5) Firefighters in Hackensack, New Jersey when operations were being conducted in the truss loft storage area when an 80 foot heavy timber truss collapsed trapping the firefighters. The Hackensack Ford Fire occured less than four weeks short of the tenth anniversary of the Waldbaum Fire right across the Hudson River. More on the Hackensack Ford Fire HERE.
Bravo Side View
Additional References :http://stevespak.com/waldbaums.html
Fire Investigation: An Analysis of the Waldbaum Fire, Brooklyn, New York, August 3, 1978. Quintiere, J. G. NISTIR 6030; June 1997 http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID;=18676&
NFPA Fire Command Magazine, Brooklyn Roof Collapse Claims six Lives. Demers, David P.; December 1978
Waldbaum Fire Facebook page, HERE with numerous photos and recollections honoring those that lost their lives and those that operated at FDNY Brooklyn Box 3300.
Rescue efforts on the Bravo Side
2892 Ocean Avenue Today
The lessons learned in the years following the Walbaum’s fire in 1978 and the subsequent Hackensack Ford Fire, NJ in 1988 focused on understanding building construction systems, occupancies and structural assemblies, in both of these cases the timber bowstring truss systems. Over the years the foundation of knowledge necessary to build competencies and knowledgeable firefighters, fire officers and commanders cognizant in the science and technology of building construction has waned and at time has been less than an area of focus.
Take the time to learn about the FDNY Walbaum’s fire, its history repeating significance as a major fire service LODD event, the lessons learned from the Hackensack Ford Fire (July 2, 1988) and other related case studies that can be found on the NIOSH, USFA and NFPA web sites.
Look at your buildings within your response areas and jurisdiction. Understand how they’re built and more importantly how they are affected by the exposure and impingement of fire and its byproducts. Understand key building performance indicators and appropriate strategic and tactical actions based upon building profiles, occupancies, fire loading, construction features and fire service resources. Take the time to honor the brave brother firefighters from FDNY who made the supreme sacrifice thirty two years ago, and gave a legacy to learn from in this and in future fire service generations.
It’s time to think; BUILDING KNOWLEDGE = FIREFIGHTER SAFETY
Memorial
NIOSH released it’s latest Alert on Firefighter Risk Reduction. Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures. These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
Fire fighters should take the following steps to minimize their risk of death and injury while fighting structure fires:
- Report conditions and hazards encountered to your officer, incident commander, or incident safety officers
- Recognize that maintaining your safety is a shared responsibility
- Comply with your department’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) / standard operating guidelines (SOGs) and safety rules.
- Be constantly aware of your surroundings and changing conditions.
Fire departments (chief officers, company officers and policy makers) should take the following steps to protect fire fighters:
- Develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating procedures and guide-lines (SOPs/SOGs) for risk management.
- Train incident commanders, incident safety officers, and fire fighters in the fire department risk management plans and SOPs/SOGs for risk management.
Develop and implement fire department policies and SOPs/SOGs for emergency response and fire-fighting activities in and around abandoned, vacant, or unoccupied structures.
- A thorough size-up and risk analysis should be performed before conducting operations in any burning structure.
- Fire-fighting operations should be limited to defensive (exterior) strategy if the structure is judged to be unsafe and in any situation where the risks to fire fighter safety are excessive.
- Offensive (interior attack) operations should only be considered when sufficient resources are on scene to conduct offensive operations with a reasonable degree of safety, including the ability to perform essential support functions (i.e., water supply, ventilation, lighting, utility control, accountability, rapid intervention teams).
- Additional size-ups and risk analyses should be performed before changing strategies, including any decision to conduct interior overhaul operations following a defensive fire attack.
- Have adequate resources available on scene to per-form rapid intervention team (RIT) duties anytime personnel are operating at any structure fire.
- Inspect and preplan buildings within your jurisdiction. Note the type of construction, materials used, presence of trusses and/or lightweight construction in the roof and floor, type of occupancy, fuel load, exit routes, and other distinguishing characteristics.
- Enter preplan information into the dispatch computer so that when a fire is reported at a preplanned location, the critical information is provided to all responding units. Adopt and enforce a standard system of marking dangerous abandoned, derelict, and vacant buildings, based on a prefire assessment of their structural conditions and other risk factors, in cooperation with municipal agencies and local authorities such as local housing authorities.
- Train fire fighters and officers to recognize the marking system and incorporate the information into their size-up considerations. Additionally, local authorities should ensure programs are in place that provide for the demolition and removal of structures deemed unsafe by code enforcement.
- Make sure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up of critical fireground factors before beginning fire fighting efforts and continuously re-views and reevaluates these factors during all fire-ground operations. A 360-degree size-up should be conducted for all abandoned, vacant, or unoccupied structures.
- Ensure those in charge of fire incidents (e.g., incident commanders, chief officers, safety officers) are fully trained to fulfill their responsibilities and obligations in the execution of their duties.
- Educate the public on the need to have home fire drills and designated meeting places in the event of an emergency. The location of designated meeting
- places should be communicated to the fire department as a way to help confirm and verify building occupancy status.
Incident commanders (IC) and incident safety officers (ISO) should do the following:
- The IC should conduct an initial size-up of each incident weighing critical fireground factors (i.e., occupancy status; occupant survivability and rescue potential; vacant building markings or indicators; size, construction and use of the building; age and condition of the building; and the location, size, and extent of the fire in the building) against the department’s risk management profile to determine the initial incident strategy (offensive or defensive). The IC should develop an incident action plan before beginning firefighting efforts and continually review and reevaluate the factors and the risk management plan throughout the operation.
- The IC should use appropriate risk management criteria to decide whether an offensive or defensive strategy should be employed to attack a fire. The IC should attempt to determine whether the building is occupied or not. Signs to look for include vehicles in garage, driveway, or parked nearby; people at windows of apartment or office buildings calling for help indicates the possibility of other occupants as well; time of day; type of occupancy; and reports from occupants who have escaped the burning structure. Reports from neighbors and bystanders may also provide valuable information.
- The IC should consider the number of fire fighters, the amount and type of apparatus and equipment available, and the stage of the fire when determining the type of fire attack.
- Follow departmental policies (risk management plans, SOPs/SOGs) for risk management.
- Establish, clearly mark, and monitor an exterior collapse zone at structure fires where there is a risk of collapse.
- Use effective and universal evacuation signals when command personnel determine that all fire fighters should be evacuated from a burning building, as well as during the initiation of defensive operations and during overhaul and salvage operations.
NIOSH Summary HERE
NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE
BuildingsonFire 2010; Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Operational Safety
Major Influencing Fire Service Reports, Issues or Focus that should be on Your Radar Screen
The following list is but a modest cross section of pertinent information or focus areas today’s Firefighter, Company or Command Officer MUST be knowledgeable in, have insights and proficiency based technical skills to function with a level of competencies demanded in today’s fire service.
If these are not on your radar screen or you haven’t got a blip of a clue what they’re about; then you are derelict and not doing your job- and the end result could be a less than desirable outcome on the fireground; it’s that simple, it’s that direct.
Have you read these reports, understand the issues & influences, increased your knowledge, skills and abilities in any gap areas or taken the time to research the cutting edge issues affecting today’s fire service?
The City of Charleston Sofa Super Store LODD-Routley Fire Report
Read the report; understand the incident, the building performance, the fire behavior and the operation process deployed. Gain the insights from the overall apparent and contributing causes identified and presented and assess how these relate to your fire service perspective and department’s culture and performance today.
- City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team Phase I Report, HERE
- Routley Final Phase II Report HERE
- NIOSH Investigative Report, HERE
- NIOSH REPORT SUMMARY
- NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
- develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for an occupational safety and health program in accordance with NFPA 1500
- develop, implement, and enforce a written Incident Management System to be followed at all emergency incident operations
- develop, implement, and enforce written SOPs that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
- ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual with overall authority and responsibility for management of all activities at an incident
- ensure that the Incident Commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior fire fighting operations
- train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
- ensure that the Incident Commander establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in fire-fighting efforts
- ensure the early implementation of division / group command into the Incident Command System
- ensure that the Incident Commander continuously evaluates the risk versus gain when determining whether the fire suppression operation will be offensive or defensive
- ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
- ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed at each structure fire
- ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
- ensure that a rapid intervention crew (RIC) / rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents
- ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents
- ensure that ventilation to release heat and smoke is closely coordinated with interior fire suppression operations
- conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics
- consider establishing and enforcing standardized resource deployment approaches and utilize dispatch entities to move resources to fill service gaps
- develop and coordinate pre-incident planning protocols with mutual aid departments
- ensure that any offensive attack is conducted using adequate fire streams based on characteristics of the structure and fuel load present
- ensure that an adequate water supply is established and maintained
- consider using exit locators such as high intensity floodlights or flashing strobe lights to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit
- ensure that Mayday transmissions are received and prioritized by the Incident Commander
- train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure
- ensure that all fire fighters and line officers receive fundamental and annual refresher training according to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021
- implement joint training on response protocols with mutual aid departments
- ensure apparatus operators are properly trained and familiar with their apparatus
- protect stretched hose lines from vehicular traffic and work with law enforcement or other appropriate agencies to provide traffic control
- ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression and overhaul activities
- ensure that fire fighters are trained in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
- develop, implement and enforce written SOPS to ensure that SCBA cylinders are fully charged and ready for use
- use thermal imaging cameras (TICs) during the initial size-up and search phases of a fire
- develop, implement and enforce written SOPs and provide fire fighters with training on the hazards of truss construction
- establish a system to facilitate the reporting of unsafe conditions or code violations to the appropriate authorities
- ensure that fire fighters and emergency responders are provided with effective incident rehabilitation
- provide fire fighters with station / work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments.
Additionally, federal and state occupational safety and health administrations should:
- consider developing additional regulations to improve the safety of fire fighters, including adopting National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus standards.
Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:
- continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn SCBA
- conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.
Additionally, code setting organizations and municipalities should:
- require the use of sprinkler systems in commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards, and establish retroactive requirements for the installation of fire sprinkler systems when additions to commercial buildings increase the fire and life safety hazards
- require the use of automatic ventilation systems in large commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards.
Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:
- coordinate the collection of building information and the sharing of information between building authorities and fire departments
- consider establishing one central dispatch center to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions
- ensure that fire departments responding to mutual aid incidents are equipped with mobile and portable communications equipment that are capable of handling the volume of radio traffic and allow communications among all responding companies within their jurisdiction.
Everyone Goes Home Campaign
- Everyone Goes Home® is a national program by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries. In March 2004, a Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held to address the need for change within the fire service. At this summit, the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives were created and a program was born to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
- Recognizing the need to do more to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation has launched a national initiative to bring prevention to the forefront.
- In March 2004, the Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held in Tampa, Florida to address the need for change within the fire and emergency services. Through this meeting, 16 Life Safety Initiatives were produced to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
- The first major action was to sponsor a national gathering of fire and emergency services leaders. The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation will play a major role in helping the U.S. Fire Administration meet its stated goal to reduce the number of preventable firefighter fatalities. The Foundation sees fire service adoption of the summit’s initiatives as a vital step in meeting this goal.
- The Courage to Be Safe® On-Line Program , HERE
- Media CenterUsing variations of the Courage to Be Safe ®…So Everyone Goes Home® field program, along with material from the Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resource Kit we will develop and deploy a new online learning segment each month. These online learning segments will allow you to expand upon your personal and professional development when you want and how you want. Watch them by yourself or integrate them into your organizational training programs. Remember, that safety results from constant training and putting those skills to work everyday, on every call – SO EVERYONE GOES HOME. HERE
- The Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Advocates Program will play a key role in helping to bring about awareness of the Initiatives and act as a conduit for resources to enable departments to implement and advocate them. HERE
- The 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives
- Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.
- Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.
- Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.
- All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
- Develop and implement national standards for training, qualifications, and certification (including regular recertification) that are equally applicable to all firefighters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
- Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that are equally applicable to all firefighters, based on the duties they are expected to perform.
- Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.
- Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety.
- Thoroughly investigate all firefighter fatalities, injuries, and near misses.
- Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement.
- National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should be developed and championed.
- National protocols for response to violent incidents should be developed and championed.
- Firefighters and their families must have access to counseling and psychological support.
- Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a critical fire and life safety program.
- Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the installation of home fire sprinklers.
- Safety must be a primary consideration in the design of apparatus and equipment.
NIST Wind Driven Fire Study
- Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them. Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire. This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building. In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure. This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway. The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
- What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented? Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening. If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants. NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
- This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions. There are many questions regarding wind driven fires. For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures? Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires. In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
- Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
- A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings. All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set. All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player. NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
- NIST References HERE and HERE
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
- A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
- Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
- Reference Data HERE
NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments
- The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments was recently released to the public providing . A copy of the report is attached.
- Report Abstract:
- Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.
- This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.
- This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.
- Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.
- The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
- Synopsis HERE
USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002
- Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
- As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
- Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
- Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies
UL Fire Academy CBT
- UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions
- Base on the UL research and
- This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
- This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This self-guided course, which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions, is targeted toward the 1.1 million fire service personnel in the United States and Canada. The knowledge developed and shared in this course is critically important to firefighter and civilian safety.
- This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
- Program Objectives:
- Provide brief history of events leading up to DHS Grant tests
- Identify the fire test hypothesis, parameters, and steps completed in the testing process
- Compare tests results (legacy vs. modern construction)
- Communicate learnings from our partners representing the fire service
- Discuss code recommendations
- UL University on-line Program HERE
USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002
- Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
- As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
- Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
- Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies
NIOSH LODD Reports
- Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
- NIOSH Web Page HERE
- Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
- Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports, HERE
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
- Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
- These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
- Report HERE
NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors
- Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
- Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
- NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
- Report HERE
NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
- Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
- The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
- NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
- ALERT Report HERE
National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience
- The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
- Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
- National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
- Search Reports, HERE
- Resources, HERE
USFA Incident Reports (Stop History Repeating Events-HRE)
- USFA provides information resources in many formats, including books, pamphlets and DVD’s, free of charge.
- The U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire–the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.
- The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters
- This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas.
- The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made
- Technical Reports and On-line Publications, HERE
Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report
- The Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire and Rescue published a comprehensive line of duty death report for Technician I Kyle R. Wilson on Saturday, January 26, 2008. Technician I Wilson was the first line of duty death in the Department’s 41-year history. The Department is sharing the LODD Investigative Report to honor Kyle, and in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels.
- Technician Kyle Robert Wilson was 24-years old and was born in Olney, Maryland. He grew up in Prince William County and graduated from Hylton High School and George Mason University. He was an avid baseball and softball player. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006. Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive.
- Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure.
- Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.
- The Department of Fire and Rescue immediately formed a multi-dimensional investigation team following the incident. The investigation team was comprised of five Department of Fire and Rescue uniform personnel and two external members from area fire departments. For eight months, the team thoroughly examined the events that occurred at the Marsh Overlook fire incident and identify the factors involved with the line of duty death of Technician I Kyle Wilson. The resulting report represents thousands of hours of effort to analyze fire and rescue operations and is a factual representation of the events that occurred. The report also provides a frame work for organizational level improvements.
- The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be:
- The initial arriving fire suppression force size.
- The size up of fire development and spread.
- The impact of high winds on fire development and spread.
- The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials.
- The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts.
- The incident control and management.
- The Marsh Overlook fire incident was an immense fire fueled by extremely flammable building material products and a vicious wind. It was an environment where information gathering and decision making had to be performed in the time measurement of seconds. During the chain of events that occurred and under severe circumstances, fire and rescue personnel performed at exceptional levels.
- During the repeated attempts to reach and rescue Technician I Wilson, personnel displayed heroic efforts and jeopardized their own safety. The Department will never forget the sacrifice that Technician Wilson made in an attempt to ensure others were safe. By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure his sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire and rescue departments can avoid another similar occurrence.
- Resources and Report
- LODD Report Fact Sheet (23.9kb)
- LODD Investigative Report (9.16 mb)
- LODD Report Presentation (6.65 mb)
- LODD Report Basic House Model (Section 1) (1.87 mb)
- LODD Report Fire Model (Section 3) (5.16 mb)
- LODD Flashover Chart (60 kb)
- Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE
Loudoun County (VA) Fire Rescue Significant Near Miss Event Report
- On May 25, 2008, fire and rescue personnel from Loudoun County responded to a structure fire at 43238 Meadowood Court in Leesburg, Virginia. During the course of the incident, seven responders were injured. Of those injured, four firefighters received significant burn injuries, two firefighters sustained orthopedic injuries, and one EMS provider was treated for minor respiratory distress. To date, five of the injured personnel have returned to duty. Two firefighters continue to recover from their injuries, including one who was severely burned.
- Given the severity of the injuries and magnitude of the event, an independent Investigative Team was assembled to review the incident. The Team was comprised of four Loudoun County personnel, three external members from area fire departments, and two resource/support personnel. The Team was tasked with reviewing “the events leading up to the incident, the incident operation(s), the firefighter MAYDAY(s), and incident mitigation.”
- For three months, the Team thoroughly examined the events surrounding the Meadowood Court fire incident and identified the factors associated with the injury of personnel.
- The Report contains the results of the Investigative Team’s comprehensive review and analysis.
- Fact Sheet, HERE
- SIGNIFICANT INJURY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 43238 MEADOWOOD COURT MAY 25, 2008 Report HERE
Worcester (MA) Fire Cold Storage Fire LODD Report; Abandoned Cold Storage Warehouse Multi-Firefighter Fatality Fire 1999, Worcester, Massachusetts
- A technical review of the 1999 Worcester, MA fire that claimed six firefighters concludes that abandoned buildings are a serious threat to firefighters and fire departments must make a concerted effort to use technology to maintain data on buildings in their response districts.
- On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
- Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors. Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.
- An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.
- A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and deluge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts. According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities.
- USFA Report HERE
Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department Final Report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels Nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths
- The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter. This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.
- Incident Overview, HERE
- NIOSH Report, HERE
- Investigative Report, HERE
Field Trips
- Take a good look at the structures, occupancies and buildings in you first, second and third due areas, look around your community and jurisdiction as well as your mutual aid and greater alarm response box areas.
- Have you stopped for a minute today and taken a good look around? Whether you’re sitting in the front seat at the stop light of an intersection or as you’re peering out the side cab window coming back from an alarm or while running errands in your POV; have you taken a good look around? As the Springsteen song goes; “this is your town”.
- There’s a lot that can be gleaned from your surroundings on any given day. We sometimes take for granted the subtle changes that are happening all around us as we take care of business on our rounds, runs and calls. We tend to focus in on the immediacy of the events that are happening in front of us that demand our attention but fail to take a look around to pick up on information, data and insights that can help us on that next run or down the road in the future.
- Take a look at the construction that might be going up in your areas. I’m certain you’re paying close attention to what’s happening in your first-due, but what about that third-due area, that neighboring jurisdiction or the mutual-aid area that you occasionally run in to? When you’re on that next EMS run or an investigation of an odor or alarm bells service call, take a few extra minutes to walk through the occupancy. Conduct your own mini company level pre-plan.
- Look at the layout, features, access and construction features. If you have a chance, verify the structural support systems employed by the building for the floor and roof systems. If you have time, take the company on a quick site visit to that building that’s under construction or the renovations that are again underway in that commercial or business occupancy around the corner from quarters.
- These continuing challenging economic times places a great deal of influence on what’s being built, how it might be constructed, the manner in which a building may be operational one day, vacant the other and under renovation the next. Sometimes these transformations occur literally overnight.
- Take a good look around, this is your town…your district, your response area. Know your buildings, understand their performance profiles, and assess the predictability of performance. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
Building Construction
I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.
We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.
The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must adjusted and enhanced to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a profound need to gain building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Its all about the new formula….Bk=F2S.
Additionally, think about the following
- Don’t Treat Your Buildings and Occupancies the Same anymore
- Increase Situational Awareness
- Increase Your Competencies
- Know Your Buildings
- Be aware of Command Compression
- Implement Tactical Patience
- Tactical Entertainment
- Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety
- Fire Behavior & Fire Dynamics
- Situational Awareness
- Naturalistic Decision Making
More on these and some additional key reports on a future post…..
The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter. This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.
This is one of those distinctive reports that has influential and critical operational, training and preparedness elements embedded throughout the report. Following my review of the report, having previously read the preliminary report findings, it is apparent there continues to be common threads shared by this and other events and incidents where a single of multiple firefighters have lost their lives due to similarities in the apparent and common cause deficiencies and short comings identified.
All company and command officers should read and comprehend the lessons learned. Then, take these new found insights and see what the gaps are at the personal level (yours or those you supervise) as well as the shift, group, station, battalion, division or department as a whole. If there are gaps, then identify a way to implement timely changes as necessary so there are No History Repeating (HRE) events.
I have provided a comprehensive synopsis of the report for your review. Take the time to read the entire report, make the time to improve where you need to.
On Friday, April 4, 2008 at 06:13:02 hours, what began as a routine response for Colerain Township Fire and EMS Engine 102 to investigate a fire alarm activation at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane, Colerain Township, Ohio resulted in the deaths of Colerain Township Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira.
Upon their arrival at the scene of the two-story wood framed, residential building working fire conditions existed in the basement. The initial attack team consisted of Broxterman, Schira, and one other firefighter. The team advanced a 1¾-inch attack hose line through the interior of the building for fire control.
Even though, they were provided with some of the most technologically advanced protective clothing for structural firefighting and self-contained breathing apparatus, it appeared that Broxterman and Schira were overwhelmed by severe fire conditions in the basement.
During their attempt to evacuate the building, the main-level family room flooring system in which the two were traveling on collapsed into the basement trapping the firefighters. Eleven minutes elapsed from time of arrival to the catastrophic chain of events.
The investigation of this incident provided a number of findings and recommendations that should be considered by Colerain’s fire department, as well as other fire department organizations. The examination encompassed issues that related to building construction, firefighting tactics, command and control, situational awareness, communications, training, firefighting equipment and the individual responsibility of firefighters of the Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (Colerain Fire & EMS). In addition, a segment of the examination included a review of the individual and group affects following such an event, and the measures initiated that attempted to ensure individual, family and organizational wellness.
The following factors were believed to have directly contributed to the deaths of Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira:
- A delayed arrival at the incident scene that allowed the fire to progress significantly;
- A failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices; and
- A failure to abide by fundamental firefighter self-rescue and survival concepts
Although the aforementioned factors were believed to have directly contributed to their deaths, they might have been prevented if:
- Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident;
- Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators;
- The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
- timely manner relative to the incident;
- Personnel assigned to Engine 102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their first-due response area;
- A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis
- was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations;
- Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural
- firefighting existed within the department;
- The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time;
- The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
- Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions;
- Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
- Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.
Incident Reported
On Friday, April 4, 2008, at 06:11:23, the Hamilton County Communications Center (HCCC) received notification of an automatic alarm activation (smoke detector and carbon monoxide) at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane (LN).
- An automatic fire alarm response complement of two engine companies (Engines 102 & 109), one ladder company (Ladder 25), and the Battalion Chief (District 25) were dispatched to investigate at 06:13:02.
- At 06:13:43, a second notification was received from the female homeowner reporting a fire in the basement of the building.
- At 06:20:43, a third notification by means of a cellular phone from the female homeowner to HCCC routed through the City of Cincinnati’s Fire and Police Communications Center was received.
- At 06:22:41, the initial response complement was then upgraded to a building fire, also known as a structure fire response complement to include one additional engine company (Engine 25), one rescue company (Rescue 26), and one basic life support transport unit (Squad 25).
Property and Building Description: The building at 5708 Squirrels nest LN was a single-family residence that set back approximately 450-feet from the street at the end of a private driveway on a heavily wooded lot.
- The building was two-stories in height, approximately 45-feet wide by 30-feet deep with a finished below-grade (basement) living space and attached two-car garage.
- For simplicity, the report refers to the living space under the main-level of the building as a basement.
- From the front (side Alpha), the building was two-stories above grade. The vertical distance between floors was approximately eight-feet. The exterior main entrance was located in the front middle of the building approximately one-foot above grade level.
- Additional entrances to the first-floor living space were by means of a rear entry door from an upper-level deck area and through the garage area.
- The interior stairway to the basement was located approximately 15-feet from the front main entry door towards the rear of the building. There were no exposed buildings on the adjacent sides of the fire building.
The building was located approximately 450-feet from the curb and a driveway leading to the front entrance. The nearest fire hydrant was located approximately 500- feet from the front entrance. To provide for uniform identification of locations and operationalforces at the incident scene, the scene was divided geographically into smaller parts, which were designated as sectors. Specific areas of the incident scene were designated as follows:
- The side of the building that bears the postal address of the location was designated as Side Alpha or front by the Incident Commander;
- The property sloped downward towards the rear (side Charlie) of the building with an approximate 13-foot elevation difference from side Alpha to Charlie. The
- Charlie side of the building was three-stories above the rear grade level with the building’s basement floor approximately five-feet above grade level. The exterior entrance to the building’s’ basement area, also known as a walk-out was by means of a stairway that led to a wooden deck on the Charlie side adjacent to the Delta side. A second stairway led to an upper level deck that served the main level of the building.
Initial Fire Attack Operation: Upon arrival at the incident address, Engine 102 (E102), assigned four personnel (one captain, one fire apparatus operator [FAO], and two firefighters) entered and proceeded down the driveway deploying a five-inch supply hose line.
- With their apparatus positioned in front of the building Captain (Capt.) Broxterman radioed, “Moderate smoke showing. E102 will be Squirrelsnest Command.” at 06:24:01.
- Verification was made by the E102’s FAO through face-to-face communication with the male homeowner that all occupants were out of the building, which was then relayed to Capt. Broxterman.
District 25 (D25) arrived at the scene at 06:26:35 and assumed Command from Capt. Broxterman. Capt. Broxterman, Firefighter (Ffr.) Schira and E102’s Ffr. #2 advanced a 1¾-inch pre-connected hose line through the front main entrance. The fire was determined to be located in the basement of the building.
- At 06:27:52, Capt. Broxterman radioed, “E102 making entry into the basement, heavy smoke”.
- At 06:30:35, E109′s captain radioed, “Command from E109, contact 102,have them pull out of the first floor, redeploy to the back. It’s easy access. Conditions are changing at the front door.”
- At 06:34:48, Engine 25 (E25), the designated Rapid Assistance Team, had just completed their 360-degree size-up around the building, and encountered E102’s Ffr. #2 in front of the building, whom reported that he had lost contact with his crew.
- During the time period between 06:29:24 and 06:34:48, the investigation committee believed that one or more catastrophic events occurred including a failure of the main-level flooring system near the Beta – Charlie corner of the building.
Rescue and Recovery Operations
- At 06:35:34, the Incident Commander (IC) identified a potential Mayday operation, which indicates a life threatening situation to a firefighter.
- RAT25 was deployed at 06:36:48. The actual Mayday operation was initiated by the IC at 06:37:41 followed by a request at 06:37:53 to the HCCC for a second alarm complement of firefighting resources.
- At 06:42:01, RAT25 entered the basement from the rear of the building. At 07:00:27, E26’s personnel entered through the front main entrance of the building and into the basement by means of the interior stairway.
- Both missing firefighters were located in the basement near the Charlie side wall adjacent to the Beta side following a floor collapse. Capt. Broxterman and Ffr. Schira were obviously deceased as a result of their injuries.
Fire Origin and Cause: Information from the property owners was that the female had smelled an odor in the house. She told her husband, who went to investigate. Neither of them observed any smoke or flames at that time. The husband went to the basement, and located a fire near a cedar wood lined closet used to cultivate orchids in the unfinished utility room. He attempted to extinguish the fire with portable fire extinguishers and pans of water. As the fire alarm activated, the husband had his wife call 9-1-1 to report the fire. The state of Ohio Fire Marshal’s Office Fire and Explosion Investigation Bureau ruled the fire to be accidental in nature. The fire was determined to have originated in the unfinished utility room of the basement level in or near the cedar closet. This area was directly below the family room on the first floor. The probable ignition source for this fire was determined to be at and about a plastic air circulation fan and the associated electrical wiring.
Cause of Deaths
Capt. Broxterman was a 37-year old employee of the Colerain Fire & EMS with approximately 17-years of certified firefighting experience. Capt. Broxterman became trapped in the basement area for a prolonged amount of time following the sudden floor collapse. Capt. Broxterman was found positioned face down over top of Ffr. Schira. The majority of her protective clothing ensemble and equipment were heavily damaged as a result of exposure to heat and direct flame impingement. She was pronounced deceased following her removal from the building. Her body was transported to the Hamilton County Coroner’s Office for autopsy. The Coroner’s report cited the manner of death as “accidental” and the cause of death as “burns and inhalation of smoke and superheated and noxious gases.” Capt. Broxterman sustained burns to 100% of her body surface, which ranged from first to fourth degree in severity as described in the coroner’s autopsy report. Postmortem carboxyhemoglobin (COHb), which is a measure of carbon monoxide exposure, was measured at 22% saturation and soot was observed in portions of her upper and lower respiratory system.
- Based on the injuries sustained and the damage to Capt. Broxterman’s protective clothing ensemble and equipment, it is likely that she was exposed to a rapid intensification of heat and flames in the building’s basement that overwhelmed her protective ensemble and equipment, exposing her body and respiratory system to intense heat and toxic products of combustion.
Ffr. Schira was a 29-year old employee of Colerain Fire & EMS with approximately 3½-years of certified firefighting experience. He also became trapped in the basement area for a prolonged amount of time following the sudden floor collapse. Ffr. Schira was found positioned on his right side and back, face-up beneath Capt. Broxterman. The majority of his protective clothing ensemble and equipment was heavily damaged as a result of exposure to heat and direct flame impingement. Ffr. Schira was pronounced deceased following his removal from the building. His body was transported to the Hamilton County Coroner’s Office for autopsy. The Coroner’s report cited the manner of death as “accidental” and the cause of death as “burns and inhalation of smoke and superheated and noxious gases”. Ffr. Schira sustained burns to 100% of his body surface, which ranged from first to fourth degree in severity as described in the coroner’s autopsy report. Postmortem COhb was measured at 8% saturation and soot was observed in portions of his upper and lower respiratory system.
- Based on the injuries sustained and the damage to Ffr. Schira’s protective equipment, it is likely that that he was exposed to a rapid intensification of heat and flames in the building’s basement that overwhelmed his protective ensemble and equipment, exposing his body and respiratory system to intense heat and toxic products of combustion.
Select Findings and Recommendations
Findings, Discussions and Recommendations
FINDING #3.1: The area of fire origin had no finished ceiling, which exposed the floor joists and the underside of the floor decking to direct fire impingement causing rapid deterioration and failure of the flooring system directly underneath the main-level family room.
During this incident, based on communications transcripts (telephone and radio) it’s probable that the fire had advanced from its incipient stage to a free burning stage in approximately 18 to 20-minutes by the time Capt. Broxterman radioed that they were making entry into the basement.
- As stated in the Incident Overview section, during the time period between 06:29:24 and 06:34:48, it is believed that one or more catastrophic events occurred within the building, which included a failure of the flooring system near the Beta-Charlie corner of the building’s first floor.
It has been widely believed in the firefighting profession that traditional sawn lumber is far superior to some of the more innovative lightweight construction components (e.g., wood I-joist) in use today. With dimensional lumber, two-inch by eight-inch and larger, there is a greater surface to mass ratio to resist the damaging effects of fire and the structural components will maintain their integrity for a longer period of time. While this has traditionally been accurate, this incident clearly shows that this may not always be the case. Heavy charring was evident to structural members in the fire area of origin. Notice the burn damage shows how the wooden floor joists had been burned to and away from the band joist. A band joist is a vertical member that forms the perimeter of a floor system in which the floor joists tie in to. Also known as the rim joist. Early platform framed homes very likely used solid, dimensional lumber and plywood, which provided a reasonable surface to mass ratio. But the later the home was built, the less mass even dimensional lumber has due to the reduction in the actual thickness of solid dimensional lumber provided by the lumber industry through the mid-1900’s. As the years go by, building materials will likely keep getting lighter and lighter and introduce more resins and other chemicals.
Laboratory tests that exposed structural wood components to the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E119 Assembly Test indicated that a traditional two-inch by ten-inch structural member failed in 12-minutes and six-seconds. ASTM E119 test is the standard test method for evaluating building and construction materials exposed to fire. Unlike the standardized ASTM test fires, it is widely recognized that real building fires are highly variable in their size, rate of growth and intensity. Responding firefighters are unlikely to know when a given fire started, how hot it had been prior to arrival, how long it had been at any given temperature, the design capacity and actual loads on the floors over the fire or the amount of actual damage that the fire may have done to the joists. All of these factors make it impossible to predict the remaining capacity of a floor by even the most knowledgeable, professional fire experts.
RECOMMENDATION #3.1a: Fire departments should ensure that firefighters and incident commanders are aware that unprotected floor and ceiling joist systems, no matter the type, may fail at a faster rate when exposed to direct fire impingement.
Unfinished basement ceilings and other areas that have exposed joists or trusses jeopardize flooring and roof systems unnecessarily during a fire, causing premature failure. Often, a weakened floor and ceiling joist system can be difficult to detect from above as the floor surface above may still appear intact. Firefighters operating on floors above fire-damaged joist systems may fall through a weakened area and become trapped in a fire below. IC’s and firefighters must be aware that these systems can fail rapidly and without warning, and plan interior operations accordingly.
Firefighters must also be aware that while floor sag may be a widely accepted warning of an impending structural failure, floor sag is not always present or visible prior to a catastrophic collapse in a fire, regardless of the joist type, due to floor coverings, the fire’s intensity, the combination of joist spans and loads present, the location of serious structural fire damage or simply because it is too dark and smoky to see a sag in the floor. This is true for all types of structural joists, including materials such as sawn lumber, wood I-joists, and open web wood trusses and noncombustible members such as lightweight steel joists. The floor covering in this area was carpeting that transitioned to ceramic tile. When unprotected, any traditional or lightweight residential floor or ceiling assembly material, either combustible or noncombustible, may fail within several minutes of the fire’s ignition. It makes sense, therefore, that when there is a serious fire beneath a floor, there is no predictable safe amount of time that anyone can remain on that floor. Any floor system protected or not, can fail unpredictably when exposed to a substantial fire beneath.
FINDING # 4.2: E102′s officer failed to properly analyze the scene by not performing a 360-degree scene size-up to determine an overall strategy, and implement safe and effective firefighting tactics.
After the apparatus was positioned in front of the building, E102’s FAO was ordered by Capt. Broxterman to, “Ask the homeowner where the fire [location] was”, which was indicated to be in the basement by the male homeowner. As this was taking place, Capt. Broxterman continued donning her protective clothing ensemble (coat, helmet and self-contained breathing apparatus). Although E102′s officer provided a brief radio report of conditions observed upon arrival, she did not properly evaluate the scene so as to develop a basic strategy for implementation of safe and effective firefighting tactics. Had the officer visually evaluated the Charlie side of the building, the advanced fire conditions may have been noted, and that the lower level fire area was accessible by means of an exterior entry door for a more direct fire attack from the interior unburned side.
This means that firefighters enter a building and position the attack hose line between the fire and the uninvolved portions of the building. This direction of fire attack is preferred because it is likely to contain the fire, protect occupants, and push heat and gases out of the building if ventilation has been performed. On the other hand, danger increases significantly when attacking from the unburned side and is not always practical based on fire location, intensity, and building construction.
It cannot be conclusively known as to why Capt. Broxterman and Ffr. Schira proceeded into the area of the building that eventually collapsed resulting in their deaths. The investigation committee has concluded that the most probable explanation is that E102′s three-person interior team was successful in advancing their uncharged attack hose line into the basement recreation room area; reaching a point approximately 10 to15-feet from the bottom of the basement stairway as shown in the Incident Overview chapter. Once the team reached this area, it was realized they did not have sufficient hose line to continue advancing towards the seat of the fire. The team’s third member (Ffr. #2) reversed his travel and made his way back to the exterior of the building to advance additional hose line. As the team of two waited for additional hose line to be stretched and the hose line to be charged by the pump operator, the interior conditions rapidly deteriorated to a stage that it became untenable for them to hold their position.
The team evacuated back-up the stairway without following the hose line, which by all indications was tight up against the stairway wall and tightly wrapped around the stairway door entry. Once at the top of the stairway, one of the two deceased, if not both were likely in some form of distress; became disoriented and proceeded into the family room in a direction opposite the route of travel from which they entered the building. As the two moved across the family room floor, the flooring system collapsed into the utility room area of the basement. When the third team member re-entered the building, he was unable to locate the other two members.
The inability of Ffr. #2 to locate his team and the loss of radio communications contact with the interior team prompted the IC to declare a Mayday and activation of the RATs. This incident resulted in tragedy primarily due to the concealment of several burned-through floor joists under the carpet covered flooring system, which was nearly impossible to recognize due to heavy smoke conditions inside the burning building.
The following factors are believed to have directly contributed to the deaths that occurred in this incident:
- The delayed arrival at the incident scene allowed the fire to progress significantly and the hazardous conditions to exponentially increase;
- The failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices (e.g., entry into an enclosed building with obvious working fire conditions without a charged attack hose line)
- The failure to abide by the fundamental concepts of fire fighter self-rescue and survival (e.g., following of the hose line in the direction of travel back to the building’s entrance or exit).
Although the aforementioned factors are believed to have directly contributed to the deaths reported here, they might have been prevented if:
- Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident which eventually led to being overwhelmed in their response to their initial findings;
- Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators, and the potential threats and risks that presented themselves;
- The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
- timely manner relative to the incident, especially critical was the information given to the emergency communications center from the homeowners reporting an actual fire
- Personnel assigned to E102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their firstdue response area specifically related to road and street locations, and any particular characteristics related to those areas.
- A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations; the risk of an action must be weighed against the probable benefit that may be reasonably and realistically expected.
- Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural firefighting existed within the department;
- The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time. This competition led to missed and distorted messages and less than efficient use of resources, which exacerbated the problems of already taxed communications.
- The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
- Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions as encountered with an emphasis placed on fire ground tactical priorities (i.e., life safety, incident stabilization and property conservation);
- Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
- Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.
In Memory
The Colerain Township (OH) Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services’s report examined the events of April 4th, 2008 with the benefit of hindsight, while seeking to be independent, impartial, and thorough. From the beginning, Colerain Fire & EMS has been committed to share our findings with others in the hope that it may prevent another such event.
The deaths of Captain Robin M. Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira had a profound loss not only to their parents, family and this organization, but also to the larger fire service community. In order to prevent these tragic losses in the future, we must first understand how and why our sister and brother firefighters died. We must learn from their incident and take that knowledge forward. If it was possible, what would these firefighters tell us today that might prevent a similar death of a firefighter in the future? What would they want us as firefighters, company officers and chief officers to know about the circumstances that lead to their deaths and the things we (and they) might have done to alter the most tragic of outcomes?
From the information that was made available for review, it was evident that these two individuals were well-loved in life, and greatly missed in death. Every line of duty death of a firefighter in the United States is significant. This investigative analysis document is dedicated to Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira, their families, friends and the community whose lives were forever changed. In working to improve the health and safety of all United States firefighters, we have much to learn from the supreme sacrifice of these two individuals, who they were in life and in death. We honor their memories.
References
- Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Web Site HERE
- Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths April, 2010 Full Report HERE
- NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
- WLTW.com news report Summary HERE
- WLTW.com Previous Stories:
- November 18, 2009: Firefighter’s Parents File Wrongful Death Suit
- August 8, 2009: Report On Fatal Colerain Twp. Fire Released
- April 3, 2009: Service Planned For Anniversary Of Firefighter’s Death
- July 11, 2008: Report On Fire That Killed Firefighters Released
- June 28, 2008: Firefighters Hold Benefit For Fallen Friends
- June 12, 2008: Owner Of Home Where 2 Firefighters Died Sentenced On Pot Charges
- May 21, 2008: Firefighter Recalls Fiancee Killed In Colerain Twp. Fire
- May 13, 2008: Burned Home’s Owner Pleads No Contest To Drug Charge
- May 6, 2008: Tri-State Residents Reach Out To Families Of Fallen Firefighters
- April 20, 2008: Deaths Of Firefighters Lead To New Proposed Regulations
- April 18, 2008: Fatal Fire Home’s Owner Indicted On Drug Charge
- April 14, 2008: Prosecutor: Homeowners Won’t Be Charged In Firefighters’ Deaths
- April 11, 2008: Coroner: Fire, Smoke, Heated Air Killed Firefighters
- April 11, 2008: Firefighters Make Emotional Return To Work
- April 10, 2008: Fallen Firefighters Memorialized By Comrades, Family
- April 9, 2008: Sources: Marijuana Growing Operation Found In Burned Home
- April 9, 2008: Firefighters At Visitation For Fallen Comrades Called To Fight Fire
- April 9, 2008: Thousands Attend Colerain Firefighters’ Visitation
- April 8, 2008: Firefighters Pour In, Pay Tribute To Two Of Their Own
- April 8, 2008: Sources: ‘Hidden’ Marijuana Grow Room Found At Fatal Fire Scene
- April 8, 2008: Officials Adjust Fallen Firefighters’ Funeral Procession Plans
- April 8, 2008: Candlelight Vigil Held For Fallen Firefighters
- April 7, 2008: Sources: Plant Containers, Grow Room Found In Burned Home
- April 7, 2008: Blaze That Killed Firefighters Ruled Accidental
- April 7, 2008: Families Of Firefighters Thank Community For Support
- April 7, 2008: Candlelight Vigil Planned For Two Fallen Firefighters
As we approach the July 4th holiday period, two significant LODD incidents previously occurred during this time frame that hold a number of lessons learned related to command management, operations, building construction principles and building performance, fire behavior and the ever present dangers of the job. Take the opportunity to learn more about these events, and expand your insights and knowledge base. Those events being the 1988 Hackensack (NJ) Ford Fire which resulted in five (5) LODD and the 2002 Gloucester City (NJ) Fire that resulted in three (3) LODD along with three children.
Take a moment to reflect upon the supreme sacrifice made by these heroic firefighters and the messages that lay within the pages of the incident case studies, reports and summaries. Our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com has a comprehensive overview of both events with report links and a must see video on the Gloucester City (NJ) 2002 LODD event. For Remembering Hackensack and Gloucester follow the link HERE
Remembrance (1988)
Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department
• CAPT. RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Engine Co. No. 304
• LIEUT. RICHARD REINHAGEN, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F WILLIAM KREJSA, Engine Co. No. 301
• F/F LEONARD RADUMSKI, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F STEPHEN ENNIS, Rescue Co. No. 308
Remember (2002)
Gloucester City (NJ) Fire
• James Sylvester Fire Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
• John West Deputy Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
• Thomas G. Stewart III Paid Firefighter, Gloucester City Fire Department
Today commemorates the anniversary of the Sofa Superstore fire in Charleston, South Carolina, in which nine firefighters lost their lives while engaged in aggressive interior operations at a commercial building occupied and operating as a furniture store and warehouse. On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters and changed the lives of countless others. The incident galvanized the nation’s fire service and to this day continues to generate commentary and observations within wide latitude of functional areas. What has changed since that day, three years ago?
The publication of the Routley Report was a wake-up call to the fire service, but did we hit the snooze button and roll back over? Are we catching those extra forty winks at the expense of what we should be jumping out of our bunks and engaging in? If you haven’t taken the time to read the authoritative reports, now is the time to do so. Make it one of your definitive activities for the weekend. Reflect upon its insights, recommendations and suggestions and think about your organization, department or agency.
Stop and think about where the fire service is today; where is your department today? Any measurable changes that reflect the front page news of past events or reports? Or is it business as usual? More importantly; where are YOU today? What have you done based upon the lessons learned or insights expressed to make you a better prepared and knowledgeable firefighter, officer or commander?
During the past twelve months of travels around the country presenting programs on building construction and command risk management and firefighter safety, there continues to be a common thread within the Fire Service that resonates loudly (at times and in some regions); “were’ just not getting it”. Dialog and discussion, ranting and challenges; sometimes on the verge of aggression and hostility at times continue to punctuate and permeate program conversation and debate. We argue about the merits of operational aggressiveness at the expense of looking (and understanding) the ways to increase our proficiency and knowledge that can translate into refined and intelligent tactical operations.
I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.
We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.
The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling. ( more on these in upcoming posts…)
Take the time today to remember and honor the Charleston Nine.
Comprehend the sacrifice and grasp the essence of our noble profession and the tradition of the Fire Service. Remember the past and learn from it and improve the future so that that the cycle of potential history repeating events is disrupted and eventually broken.
Work conscientiously and diligently to improve our profession and yourself; identifying gaps, correcting the deficiencies and improving the job, through a legacy of operational excellence and safety- for tomorrow’s firefighters.
Honor and Remembrance- The Charleston Nine
- Bradford Rodney “Brad” Baity – Engineer 19
- Theodore Michael Benke – Captain 16
- Melvin Edward Champaign – Firefighter 16
- James “Earl” Allen Drayton – Firefighter 19
- Michael Jonathon Alan French – Engineer 5
- William H. “Billy” Hutchinson, III – Captain 19
- Mark Wesley Kelsey – Captain 5
- Louis Mark Mulkey – Captain 15
- Brandon Kenyon Thompson – Firefighter 5
Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is. Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed. Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.
We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?
We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.
The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.
- Modern building construction is no longer predicable
- Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
- Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
- Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
- Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
- Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
- Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
- Command & Company Officer dereliction
- Nothing is going to happen to me (us)
STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.
These behaviors include;
• Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.
• Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.
• Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.
Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;
TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.
If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.
The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.
Check out these links;
If you haven’t read Chief Mayers’s discerning reflections on Firehouse Zen, this is a MUST read. Where Were You That Night?
The Lessons Learned from the Past
From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety
Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations
NIOSH released it’s report on the August 24, 2009 three alarm fire at 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo, New York that resulted in the LODD of Lt. Charles McCarthy and FF Jonathan Croom. On August 24, 2009, 45-year-old career Lieutenant Charles McCarthy died following a partial floor collapse into a basement fire, and 34-year-old career fire fighter Jonathan Croom was fatally injured while attempting to rescue the Lieutenant. The Buffalo Fire Department was dispatched for “an alarm of fire” with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. Repeated attempts were made to force open this basement door in order to search for trapped civilians, but crews had difficulty gaining access through this door because it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the 1st and 2nd floors with no civilians found.
Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional manpower was sent with special tools to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2. Lieutenant Charles McCarthy and two fire fighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify all fire fighters had exited a 1st floor deli. Lt. McCarthy following a hoseline into the structure, was well ahead of the other two fire fighters when the 1st floor partially collapsed beneath him. McCarthy fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire. The other two fire fighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. Lt. McCarthy made several Mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device. Confusion erupted exteriorly on scene when trying to verify who was calling the Mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement.
The incident commander was aware that he had crews attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure. Simultaneously, FF Croom, a member of the fire fighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside Lieutenant McCarthy’s point of entry when the Mayday calls came out. It is believed that FF Croom knew where the Lt., was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. FF Croom grabbed a tool, went on air, and rushed into the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other fire fighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device alarming. Lt. McCarthy was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but FF Croom was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after Lt. McCarthy’s Mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the 1st floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. the Lt’s. PASS device was still alarming. They were pronounced dead on scene. Four fire fighters and one lieutenant suffered minor injuries during the incident. No civilians were discovered within the structure.
Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity not maintained.
NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
- Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
- Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
- Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
- Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
- Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
- Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
1815 Genesee StreetCONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that may have led to the fatalities:
- Working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire.
- Interior condition reports not communicated to command.
- Inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments.
- Crew integrity not maintained.
Time Line from the Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report
3:51 a.m. – fire crews were sent to 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo. When they arrived, they were met by a resident who said he heard people trapped inside. Crews began searching the building, but were eventually ordered out as conditions deteriorated.
4:22 a.m. – Members of Rescue 1 entered the building to make sure all firefighters had evacuated the building. Less than two minutes later the floor in the rear of the building collapsed. Lt. McCarthy of Rescue 1 fell into the basement as the floor collapsed. according to the report, other members of Rescue 1 were unaware of the collapse and only reported hearing a loud noise. McCarthy began calling for help on his radio, but other members of Rescue 1 were unable to determine where the calls were coming from and left the building unaware that Lt. McCarthy was trapped.
4:23 a.m. – Firefighter Croom entered the building after hearing the calls for help. the report says he did not exit the building, apparently falling into the basement near Lt. McCarthy.
4:31 a.m. – An emergency head count was ordered to determine the identity of the missing firefighter. Lt. McCarthy was reported missing at that time, but FF Croom was not. Firefighters in the front of the store reported hearing a pass alarm, but could not reach it due to extreme fire conditions, a weakened floor and continuing collapse.
4:48 a.m. – all crews were ordered out of the building because it had become unsafe.
Later, concerns began to arise that FF Croom was missing. the report says he was erroneously reported in a remote area.
5:46 a.m. – On scene personal realize FF Croom is missing and likely inside the building.
6:10 a.m. – Another head count is taken and FF Croom is reported missing.
9:18 a.m. – the Recovery Group reports that the two missing firefighters had been located in the basement, covered in fallen debris.
9:32 a.m. – the debris is cleared and Recovery Group firefighters reach Lt. McCarthy and FF Croom.
Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report, issued December 2, 2009, HERE
For a comprehensive Power Point Program on Operational Safety at Heavy Timber and Ordinary Construction Occupancys that you can down load, go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting Web Site HERE.
I produced an informational training PPT program and support information that aligned with a previoulsy reported Near Miss Event Report. You can download the PPT Training Program HERE and the PDF File HERE
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE
NIOSH Compilation of Line-of-Duty Injury and Death Investigation Reports and Publications CD
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If you’re looking for a great resource check this out at NIOSH’s Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program and Prevention Program. HERE.
NIOSH is offering a Compilation of Line-of-Duty Injury and Death Investigation Reports and Publications CD. This CD-ROM contains a compilation of all NIOSH fire fighter fatality and injury investigation reports completed through August 2009. Since 1998 NIOSH has investigated over 420 incidents involving fire fighter line-of-duty deaths and injuries. This CD-ROM also contains 21 NIOSH publications and 1 Safety Advisory covering a number of topics specific to fire fighter safety and health.
CD ROMs of this publication can be downloaded directly from the web site and a copy created using CD authoring software.
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program web site HERE
Maintaining focused situational awareness while recognizing and processing a wide latitude of incoming information and observations at complex and multiple alarm incidents is a significant challenge to even the most experienced of incident command teams. However, things can go wrong and they can go wrong in a rapidly escalating manner with little time to recover. A prominent double LODD incident from six years ago provides poignant lessons learned as does another history repeating event (HRE) from 1972.
The Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972) have a number of commonalities related to extended multi-alarm operations, building compromise and collapse and multiple line-of-duty deaths of operating fire service personnel. Although building type, construction features and systems are unique for each incident as are the circumstances that lead to the events, there are mission critical lessons to be reexamined or newly introduced if you’re not familiar with either event. This is especially true when we talk about operational challenges and adverse conditions that result in firefighter injuries and fatalities during overhaul and take-up phases of an incident.
Remember Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.
Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.
To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. We’ll expand on some posting in the near future and address Dynamic Risk Assessment in the context of building and occupancy profiling and operations. Additionally, maintaining a heightened sense of risk and safety integrity when operating within non-combat fire suppression modes or phases also requires due diligence, focused and fluid situational awareness coupled with concise monitoring of building conditions, indicators (both evident and projected) and taking conservative actions and postures to ensure personnel are not placed in high risk, no value positions that have a high potential for error likely outcomes.
Check out the detailed posting at our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com for insights into both the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972) HERE. Think about the questioned posed related to complex multi-company operations, command safety and operational integrity of compromised buildings and structural systems. Remember; Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.
Risk versus Gain: Operations in Vacant or Abandoned Structures
Fire Fighter LODD after Being Trapped in a Roof Collapse During Overhaul of a Vacant/Abandoned Building. NIOSH recently published a report on a 2008 LODD that occurred in a vacant/ abandoned building. NIOSH Report F2008-0037. The full report is available HERE. Let’s look at some insights and overviews of that report.
Report Summary
On November 15, 2008, a 38-year-old male fire fighter died after being crushed by a roof collapse in a vacant/abandoned building. Fire fighters initially used a defensive fire attack to extinguish much of the fire showing from the second-floor windows on arrival. After the initial knockdown, fire crews entered the second floor to perform overhaul operations. During overhaul, the roof collapsed with several fire fighters still inside, on the second floor. The victim and two other fire fighters were trapped under a section of the roof. Crews were able to rescue two fire fighters (who self-extricated), but could not immediately find the victim. After cutting through roofing materials, the victim was located by fire fighters, unconscious and unresponsive.
He was removed from the structure and transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: dilapidated building conditions, incendiary fire originating in the unprotected structural roof members, inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing to interior operations involving a vacant/abandoned structure, inadequate accountability system, lack of a safety officer, an inadequate maintenance program for self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and a poorly maintained and likely inoperable personal alert safety systems (PASS), ineffective strategies for the prevention of and the remediation of vacant/abandoned structures and arson prevention.
Inherent Construction Issues
This incident occurred in a vacant unsecured residential structure which had experienced a previous fire approximately one year prior to this incident. During interviews with NIOSH investigators, fire fighters reported large amounts of fire showing from all windows on the second floor on arrival. Fire fighters also reported that the roof had burned through on the Side B/C and one fire fighter reported he could see the sky while ascending the interior stairs to perform overhaul. It is not known if the roof conditions were communicated to the incident commander before fire fighters were assigned to operate on the roof. The fire fighters were unaware of the conditions such as the exposed roof assembly, possible removal of rafter connectors (collar beams), and the use of a flammable liquid in the structural members of the roof and second floor attic area. The roof assembly (being unprotected) was directly involved as part of the fuel in this fire.
The large dormer on the A-side presents an identifiable inherent risk factor (due to the potential for structural compromise or failure) when found on 1.5 story bungalow style residential structure due to the integral manner in which the dormer structure, i.e., roof rafters, dormer framing and roofing boards along with the functionality of the ridge beam must function in order to retain structural integrity under fire conditions. The dormer may be actually supported at the upper end directly onto the roofing boards, which in turn are supported by the perpendicular roof rafters. This creates a potential area for pronounced degradation when exposed to direct or indirect flame impingement creating an area prone to early structural compromise and eventual failure.
Although the initial defensive strategy in fighting the fire was successful in knocking down the fire, the incident commander may have benefited from a continuous risk-versus-gain analysis before allowing crews to operate on interior during overhaul. The first arriving officer reported that he performed a walk around prior to allowing crews to enter the structure and the building appeared intact, but he would not have known of the alterations to the interior roof system and the removal of critical structural members. Interior condition and roof condition reports might have revealed the burned-through area of the roof, and tactics could have been altered to keep fire fighters off the roof and out of the structure.
Report Recommendations included;
- Ensure that the incident commander conducts a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing to interior operations in vacant/abandoned structures and continues the assessment throughout the operations
- Ensure SOPs are developed for fighting fires in vacant/abandoned buildings
- Ensure that the incident commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
- Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire
- Ensure that a respiratory protection program is in place to provide for the selection, care, maintenance, and use of respiratory protection equipment, including PASS devices.
Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:
- Develop strategies for the prevention of and the remediation of vacant/abandoned structures and for arson prevention.
Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations could have prevented this fatality, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments:
- Ensure that an EMS unit is on scene and available for fire fighter emergency care at working structure fires
- Develop inspection criteria to ensure that all protective ensembles meet the requirements of NFPA 1851, Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting
- Be aware of programs that provide assistance in obtaining alternative funding, such as grant funding, to replace or purchase fire equipment that can support critical fire department operations.
Vacant or Unoccupied: Tactical Risk and Safety
I’ve commented on this subject a few times. We seem to do a lot of things at times out of common practice and repetition, you know; “We’ve always done it that way….” syndrome. There’s a resonating theme that is making its way around the fire service dealing with going to a defensive tactical posture at vacant or unoccupied structure fires.
This command posture leads to limiting interior operating engagement, while promoting a high degree of risk management. With that being said, there are also plenty of opinions on these types of policies as such, since this type of tactical effort may be contrary to the local “culture and traditions” of the responding agencies and may be a hard pill to swallow, since we’re in the job of “ fighting ALL fires..” Please refresh your memories on a past post on Tactical Entertainment HERE and HERE
Here are some basic definitions to keep us all on the same playing field;
Vacant; refers to a building that is not currently in use, but which could be used in the future. The term “vacant” could apply to a property that is for sale or rent, undergoing renovations, or empty of contents in the period between the departure of one tenant and the arrival of another tenant. A vacant building has inherent property value, even though it does not contain valuable contents or human occupants.
Unoccupied; generally refers to a building that is not occupied by any persons at the time an incident occurs. An unoccupied building could be used by a business that is temporarily closed (i.e. overnight or for a weekend). The term unoccupied could also apply to a building that is routinely or periodically occupied; however the occupants are not present at the time an incident occurs. A residential structure could be temporarily unoccupied because the residents are at work or on vacation. A building that is temporarily unoccupied has inherent property value as well as valuable contents.
Here’s a formulative question;
- As a responding company, you arrive at the scene of a vacant or unoccupied structure. The building’s construction features and systems have inherent risk associated with the occupancy, (as is the case with nearly all of our structures and occupancies).
- Your company determines that you’re going to go defensive, even though you probably could make a reasonably safe entry and engage in interior structural fire suppression.
- Would there be any repercussions in your station, battalion/district/community or organization if you took this tactic?
- What are YOUR personal thoughts on this form of risk management?
Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.
The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived. We seek the elusive “Rosetta stone” that aligns and interprets the emerging and traditionalist acumen related to fire stream effectiveness, flow rates, cooling capacity, extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics, compartment fire theory, propagation and cooling capacity and tactical deployment all relate towards defining an engineering approach to firefighting tactics versus the manual, labor-driven tactics of line deployment and rudiment placement of water on a fuel source within the fire compartment (room).
It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that defines structural fire suppression operations. It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined engine company operations within the modern building construction setting. We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.
The work of such notable suppression theory pioneers as P. Grimwood, E. Hartin, S. Särdqvist and S. Svennson and the concepts surrounding 3D firefighting, B-SAHF and other emerging research from the NIST and UL are areas that today’s discerning and progressive fire officer and commanders must become well-informed and conversant. The quantitative scientific data and emerging concepts from continuing research and testing such as the NIST’s Wind Drive Fire Studies and UL’s The Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions are providing enlightenment on fire development, fuel controlled and ventilation controlled fire development, operational time-duration parameters and degradation and failure mechanisms related to compromise and structural collapse in occupancies.
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement.
- Building Construction Systems
- Heritage
- Pre-1919
- Legacy
- 1920-1949
- Conventional
- 1950-1979
- Engineered
- 1980-2010
- Hybrid
- Chameleon
- Heritage
The fundamental compartment that comprised a typical room configuration in terms of area (square footage), volume (height/Width), furnishings (fire load package) and materials of construction (structural anatomy) found within conventional, legacy or heritage construction provided predictability in terms of fire suppression, fire behavior, operational time and survivability (civilian/firefighter). The dramatic changes since the early 1980’s in the evolution of modern building construction and the institutionalization of engineered structural systems (ESS) have created compartment (room) areas in excess 500 SF, volumes that are open and spaciously interconnected to other habitable space, fire load packages that create extreme fire behavior, compromising structural stability in shorter time spans creating decreasing interior operational time and requiring increasing fire flow rates and volume to sustain requisite extinguishment demands.
Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.
When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.
Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.
If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.
Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting
- Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
- Predictive Strategic Process
- Tactical Deployment Model
- Dynamic Tactical Deployment
- Performance Indicators and Street Aides
- Fire Dynamics
- Resistance
- Resilience
- Structural Systems
- Occupancy Hazard Profiles
The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.
Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional or legacy construction and occupancies;
- Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
- You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
- Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.
The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988…
“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes”.
As the end of the year fast approaches and in turn the end of the decade, it amazes me how “fast” time seems to have passed. Certainly when looking back and reflecting upon the past year or the previous few years, each of us thinks and contemplates upon those events, milestones, anniversaries, highlights as well as those common everyday occurrences that seem to permeate back and forth in our minds and hang at times like the smoke from a smoldering contents fire. When reflecting, there are the good times as well as those that were not so good. There are those events that were life altering and changing that forever formulate a different view upon each of our respective worlds we live and work within. As well as those events that have provided us with the joys and virtue of what we do everyday as firefighters both on and off the job, at the firehouse and at home.
For each or us, the events that form and shape our worlds; our families at home and our families at the fire station and within the fire department or agencies we volunteer or work for, leave indelible marks upon us that at times formulate and transcend us. My good friend Chief Ben Waller reflected upon a number of issues and insights in his recent post that was right on the mark as did my partner Chief Doug Cline in his perspective of 2009 and for 2010. A lot has happened to this our Fire Service during the past ten years and most certainly in the past twelve months that has shaped and forged a new generation of firefighters and tempered the existing veterans. Stop and think about it.
Looking back at 2009 and in the waning decade, the one certainty that we all share is that we have the ability and look forward to a new year, a new decade and to new challenges. Prior to this week, the 2009 Firefighter LODD events that sadly have occurred seemed like it would pause and we’d end the year with no further events. Tragically, in the past few days, five additional line-of-duty deaths have been reported through the USFA. From the events of 9-11, to the seeds that were planted in Tampa and the crusade that was embarked upon to ensure everyone [has] the opportunity to go home, through the tragedy, wake-up call and the lessons-learned from Charleston. A lot has happened, many tears have been shed, alot was learned, with so much more work still remaining.
As of this posting, the United States Fire Service has borne ninety-three (93) LODDs this year. In comparison to previous years, this may finally indicate a turning point in the previous escalating trends in LODD we’ve experienced during the past decade. Take a moment to look through the USFA postings and the narratives of each of the firefighters who made the supreme sacrifice in 2009 and reflect upon the circumstances and events that lead to their respective LODD incident. Take the time to spend an evening reading through some of the recent or past reports published on the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program web site. Look the History Repeating Events (HRE) and think about what you can do to champion changes in your organization, department or company to eliminate or reduce the likelihood for a similar event from occurring to you or your organization.
The formulative and diligent efforts of the NFFF and the Everyone Goes Home Program and the Sixteen Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives have made their mark in this decade and must continue to be embraced and institutionalized as we move forward to twenty ten. Don’t forget about the inroads made by the National Firefigher Near-Miss Reporting System and the knowledge being gained to reduce HRE. We must look at and examine the successes and the failures of our methodologies, processes, culture and perspectives and continue to seek behaviors and practices that make our job safer. When we focus our attention on Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety and the essence of combat structural fires; Structural firefighting is what it’s all about, is it not? The fundamental nature and reason we have such veneration for firefighting and the fire service and all it entails, has a lot to do with going into burning buildings and fighting fire. But firefighting has its adverse consequences, with all too familiar costs, in the form of injuries, debilitating accidents and line of duty deaths. As a firefighter; to say that we love firefighting would be an understatement, BUT one issue that we need to address is the fact that there are many individual firefighters, companies and organizations that employ fireground operational practices that promote the “enjoyment and entertainment” of working a good job within the occupancy compartment of a structural fire in the building environment.
One of the formulative postings I published this past year focused on working that good job for the shear enjoyment of what and who we are; firefighters. It’s worth repeating again, since this is an opportune time to reflect. Today’s incident scene and structural fires are unlike those in past decades and will continue to challenge us operationally when confronted with structural fire engagement and combat operations. Operationally, we need to be doing the right thing, for the right reason in the right place to increase our safety and incident survivability.
We also can share the belief and understanding that we at times may have found ourselves staying too long in the wrong place, operating tactically in an adverse environment with known hazards that do not have value, for nothing other than the enjoyment of nozzle and operating time in the fire. We have a tendency when working a room and contents, compartment fire or a structural fire in the building environment placing operating companies and personnel in high hazard environments- sometimes at the expense of justifying our own entertainment value in working the job, the assignment or in maintaining the interior operational interface. Think about it.
We need to stop “entertaining” ourselves. Don’t mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference. The job is dangerous, it has risks, we are not invincible, and we can die; at any alarm, in any fire, at anytime for any number of reasons. But it’s tragic when we die for all the wrong reasons. Think about the definitions; think about how they apply to you, your personnel, your company or your operations; past, present or future. More importantly, think about when and where you’ve found yourself doing any one of these; could the outcome have been different?
TACTICAL AMUSEMENT “tak-ti-kəl ə- myüz-mənt”
1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL DIVERSION “tak-ti-kəl də- vər-zhən”
1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION “tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- ven(t)-shən”
1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk
The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel. We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.
On any given day, at any give alarm, the dynamics around us at times may be in or out of our direct control. We may not be able to see what the cards have in store for us, BUT we must ensure we use every fragment of training, fortitude, knowledge, skills, courage, bravery, insights, luck and sometimes (other divine) intervention to get us through. We must have the fortitude and courage to be both safety conscious and measured in the performance of our sworn duties while maintaining the appropriate balance of risk and bravery.
• The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger.
• As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel.
• We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.
• The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified.
Risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.
• Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…
• Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…
There is a melting of both pragmatic aggressive firefighting with measured and deliberate tactical approaches. It’s a balance and equilibrium; the question is do you know when to recognize that balance, where it exists and how not to cross that adverse threshold?
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past Conventional Construction; Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
Looking Forward through the Rear View Mirror; remember the past, recall those history repeating events that seem to manifest themselves time and time again; are we ever going to learn. I truly believe we are starting to finally “get it”-even if it’s on a smaller incremental scale, it’s a starting point. Remember the lessons from those events that have impacted you, your department, your community and the fire service; from close-calls to near-miss events; from minor or debilitating injuries to the tragedy and sorrow of a LODD event.
As we transition into a new year, and as plans begin to take place that frame and outline the year’s activities, foremost in this planning, preparation, scheduling and outlook should be those activities and commitments that training, education and skill development can be implemented and enhanced. Take the initiative to recognize and identify training and operational gaps and distinguish the risk and options available to lessen or eliminate the risk and reduce the gap deficiencies. Take the time to implement effective, accurate and frequent training and skill development drills, training curriculums and programs. Don’t sacrifice or forego on this mission critical area when so much is at stake in the domain of combat structural fire suppression. Understand the predictability of performance in the buildings and occupancies not only in your jurisdiction, first or second-due areas, but also in those areas that you may be called upon to respond to for greater alarms or mutual aid. Understand the structural anatomy of your community. Remember Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Understand the fomulative issues affecting engineered structural systems (ESS) and the change in operational deployment and tactics on the fire ground. Keep an eye in the rear view mirror; learning from the wisdom and knowledge from where you’ve been, what you’ve done and all your past experiences and practice; but at the same time focusing on the road before you with keen attentiveness on situational awareness, anticipating error-likely conditions and balanced risk assessment and operational management in both your strategic and tactical deployments.
We don’t know what’s in the cards on any given day, but the citizens we protect can rest assured, we will do our jobs as firefighters, to the best of our abilities, because of who we are; today, in 2010 and certainly well into the next decade and beyond.
Ensure you’re glancing occasionally in your rear view mirror to monitor where you’ve been, while driving your initiatives, programs, processes and actions forward. Above all, maintain the courage to be safe.
CNN recently presented an informative piece on the continuing trends in the design and use of engineered structural systems (ESS) . CNN correspondant Gerri Willis provides an informative and insightful look at something the fire service knows all too well. Here’s some additional information for you; According to the Wood Truss Council of America (WTCA), wooden trusses are used in roof systems in more than 60% of all buildings in the United States [SBCMAG 2004]. Truss and related engineered wooden floor systems are also becoming more common. Today, more engineered structures use lighter weight materials, producing …larger spans and clear openings. Trusses can be designed to carry expected loads, be produced economically, be safely handled, and reduce construction costs.
Engineered building components may provide adequate strength under normal loading; but under fire conditions, these truss systems can become weakened and fail, leading to the collapse of roofs, floors, and possibly the entire structure. Truss systems are usually hidden, and fires within truss systems may go unnoticed for long periods of time, resulting in loss of integrity.
Structural design codes often do not factor in this decreased system integrity, as fire degrades the structural members. Fire fighters typically rely on warning signs to indicate imminent truss failure such as roofs and floors that feel spongy or are visibly sagging. Quite often, these warning signs are not good predictors of truss system failures. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) reports that during 1990-2000, structural fires and explosions accounted for 46.1% of all reported fire fighter fatalities (500 of 1,085) [USFA 2002]. Statistics compiled by the WTCA suggest that 4.7% of the total fatalities (108 of 2,286) during 1980-2001 were due to structural collapse [Grundahl 2003b]. Fifteen separate incidents investigated by NIOSH identified at least 20 fatalities and 12 injuries that have occurred from 1998-2003 during fire-fighting operations in buildings containing truss systems.
http://us.cnn.com/video/?/video/living/2009/12/18/willis.new.housing.fire.danger.cnn CNN Reports on ESS Dangers
At least three scenarios can occur in which fire fighters suffer fatalities and injuries while operating at fires involving truss roof and floor systems:
1. While fire fighters are operating above a burning roof or floor truss , they may fall into a fire as the sheathing or the truss system collapses below them.
2. While fire fighters are operating below the roof or floor inside a building with burning truss floor or roof structures , the trusses may collapse onto them.
3. While fire fighters are operating outside a building with burning trusses , the floor or roof trusses may collapse and cause a secondary wall collapse.
Buffalo Box 191
December 27, 1983 Buffalo, New York Five Firefighter Line-of-Duty Deaths
As Buffalo (NY) firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III ordinary and Type IV heavy timber construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically. The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5′s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1′s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32′s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.
Two civilians were also killed and another 60 to 70 were injured. While operating at the rescue effort, another 19 firefighters were injured. The blast and ensuing fire ignited 14 residences and damaged as many as 130 buildings over a four block area. The explosion occurred when an employee was moving an illegal 500-lb. propane tank with a forklift truck and dropped it, breaking off a valve. The gas leaked out, found an ignition source, and the explosion occurred.
At 20:23 hours, a full assignment was dispatched to North Division & Grosvenor streets. The three engines, two trucks, rescue and 3rd Battalion were responding to a report of a large propane tank leaking in a building. Engine 32 arrived and reported nothing showing, but they were talking to some workmen from the four-story, heavy-timber warehouse (approx. 50′ x 100′). Truck 5, Engine 1 and BC Supple arrived right behind E-32. Thirty-seven seconds after the chief announced his arrival, there was a tremendous explosion. It completely leveled the four-story building. It demolished many buildings on four different blocks. It seriously damaged buildings that were over a half a mile away. The ensuing fireball started buildings burning on a number of streets. A large gothic church on the next block had a huge section ripped out of it as if a great hand carved out the middle. A ten-story housing projects a couple blocks away had every window broken and some had even more damage. Engine 32 and Truck 5′s firehouse, which was a half mile away or so, had all its windows shattered.
Killed in the line of duty were all assigned to Buffalo FD Ladder Company 5;
- Firefighter Michael Austin,
- Firefighter Michael Catanzaro,
- Firefighter Matthew Colpoys,
- Firefighter James Lickfield and
- Firefighter Anthony Waszkielewicz.
Remember to think about occupancy risk and not occupancy type and the factors related to the occupancy usage and the nature of the call. Nothing is ever routine.
WKBW.com Cached video clip, HERE
Buffalo, NY Propane Gas Explosion, Dec 1983, HERE
Propane blast death affects son of fireman, HERE and HERE
PROPANE EXPLOSION 25th ANNIVERSARY IN BUFFALO,NEW YORK, HERE
Rememberance, HERE and History Repeating Events, HERE
Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse
Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building. Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement. The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
- Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
- Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
- Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
- Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
- Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
- Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
- Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
- Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
- Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
- Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
- Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
- Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.
The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.
There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.
This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.
USFA Report; HERE
NFPA Summary; HERE
NFPA Report Order; HERE
Brackenridge Pioneer Hose Co. Memorial, Pennsylvania, HERE
The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act of 2008 became law on December 13, 2009 after unanimously passing the Florida House and Senate in 2008. The new law is named in honor of two Orange County, Florida Firefighters, Todd Aldridge and Mark Benge, who died in 1989 after the roof of a gift shop collapsed; the bill is called the Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act. For a copy of the Act, HERE
The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act will require owners of any commercial, industrial, or any multi-unit residential structure, to mark these buildings in a manner that identifies them as light-frame truss-type construction. A sign or symbol will alert firefighters of the construction material and allow them to modify their tactics for fighting fires in buildings.
Aldridge-Benge Florida Placards
633.027 Buildings with light-frame truss-type construction; notice requirements; enforcement.
(1) The owner of any commercial or industrial structure, or any multiunit residential structure of three units or more, that uses light-frame truss-type construction shall mark the structure with a sign or symbol approved by the State Fire Marshal in a manner sufficient to warn persons conducting fire control and other emergency operations of the existence of light-frame truss-type construction in the structure.
(2) The State Fire Marshal shall adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of this section, including, but not limited to:
(a) The dimensions and color of such sign or symbol.
(b) The time within which commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structures that use light-frame truss-type construction shall be marked as required by this section.
(c) The location on each commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structure that uses light-frame truss-type construction where such sign or symbol must be posted.
(3) The State Fire Marshal, and local fire officials in accordance with s. 633.121, shall enforce the provisions of this section. Any owner who fails to comply with the requirements of this section is subject to penalties as provided in s. 633.161
Truss Systems Placards For Firefighter Safety from across the United States. This was originally posted HERE . Check out the link for examples of various types of placards from various locations around the US. Additional Links HERE and HERE
- The Valley Independent Sentinel covers the proposed law in Derby, Can You Spare Five Dollars (To Save A Life)?.
- NFPA Journal: It’s not lightweight construction. It’s what happens when lightweight construction meets fire.
- Firehouse.com: Understanding the Dangers of Lightweight Truss Construction
-FireRescue1.com: Enhancing Firefigher SAfety, One Step at a time:
New York State: PDF HERE
The following represent various state or local level efforts that have been instituted to provide the fire service with identification placards for attachment to buildings constructed with truss support systems. What we don’t have is a unified national standard, nor do we have these systems in all states. The political strife and lobbying backed by special interest groups and mfg. associations that DO NOT Support these types of placard systems is appalling and inexcusable. This post is to make many of you aware of the various enhacements that exist to support firefighter safety.
New York State TRUSS TYPE CONSTRUCTION PlacardsNYS 19 NYCRR Part 1264 – IDENTIFICATION OF BUILDINGS UTILIZING TRUSS TYPE CONSTRUCTION
http://www.dos.state.ny.us/code/trussID.htm
More from New York State…..
http://www.trussid.org/index.html
City of San Francisco, CA
5.05 Signage of Buildings with Wood or Lightweight Steel Truss, or Composite Wood Joist (TJI) or Roof Construction
Reference: 2007 San Francisco Fire Code Section 507.3.2
http://www.sfgov.org/site/sffd_page.asp?id=80083
State of New Jersey TRUSS SIGNS (Truss Roof and Truss Floor Assembly Signs)
Exterior Placard NJAC 5:70 – 2.20(a)1 and 2 This attachment was provided by the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety and is referenced as Exterior Placard NJAC 5:70 – 2.20(a)1 and 2.
Truss roof signs are required by the New Jersey State Uniform Fire Code for buildings, which utilize either a floor or roof assembly consisting of truss construction. A truss sign gives early warning to fire and emergency service members that the roof and/or floor may be subject to early collapse in the event of a fire condition.
ISOSCELES TRIANGLE SIGNS
N.J.A.C. 5:70-2.20(a)1.
“The emblem shall be of a bright and reflective color, or made of reflective material. The shape of the emblem shall be an isosceles triangle and the size shall be 12 inches horizontally by 6 inches vertically. With letters of a size and color to make them conspicuous, shall be printed on the emblem, as shown in images below.”
N.J.A.C. 5:70-2.20(a)2
“The emblem shall be permanently affixed to the left of the main entrance door at the height of between 4 feet and 6 feet above the ground, and shall be installed and maintained by the owner of the building”.
New Jersey Truss Placards
NIOSH Suggested Truss Placard Type
EXAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR A LAW REQUIRING LABELING OF BUILDINGS FOR THE FIRE SERVICE
This sample language is based on recommendations in the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) report entitled “NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Firefighters due to Truss System Failures.”
The report states: “Consider placing building construction information outside the building. Include
information about roof and floor type.
The NIOSH report also recommends as part of pre-fire planning to: Record data regarding roof and floor construction (e.g., wooden joist, wood truss, steel joist, steel truss, beam and girder, etc.) [NFPA 2003]. The sample language below provides building labeling that identifies the building’s construction type, is simple yet logical, and should allow firefighters to quickly know the building’s floor and roof construction materials, promoting better and more complete information on the fireground and increased firefighter safety.
xxx Identification of structural construction. Structural construction types shall be identified by a sign or signs, in accordance with the provisions of this section.
xxx.1 Signs. Signs shall be affixed where a building or a portion thereof is classified as Group A, B, E, F, H, I, M, R-1, R-2, R-4 or S occupancy. The owner of the building shall be responsible for the installation of the sign.
xxx.2 New buildings and buildings being added to. Signs shall be provided in newly constructed buildings and in existing buildings where an addition that extends or increases the floor area of the building. Signs shall be affixed prior to the issuance of a certificate of occupancy or a certificate of compliance.
xxx.3 Existing buildings. Signs shall be provided in existing buildings. Signs shall be affixed within ninety days of being notified in writing by the Code Enforcement Official.
xxx.4 Contents of signs. Signs shall consist of a diagram 6 inches (152.4 mm)in height and width, with a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm). The sign background shall be reflective white in color. The diagram and contents shall be reflective red in color, conforming to Pantone matching system (PMS) #187. Where a sign is directly applied to a door or sidelight, it may be a permanent non-fading sticker or decal. Signs not directly applied to doors or sidelights shall be of sturdy, non-fading, weather resistant material.
xxx.5 Identification of construction classification. Signs shall contain the roman alphanumeric designation of the construction classification of the building, in accordance with the provisions for the classification of types of construction (types I through V) of the building code. The roman numeral designating construction classification shall be 1 inch (25.4 mm) minimum in height and have a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm) minimum, and it shall be reflective white in color on a background of reflective red.
xxx.6 Identification of year of construction. Signs shall indicate the building’s year of construction or major reconstruction. The arabic numeral indicating year of construction shall be 1 inch (25.4 mm) minimum in height and have a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm) minimum, and it shall be reflective white in color on a background of reflective red.
xxx.7 Identification of structural construction types. Signs shall contain the alphabetic designations identifying the structural construction types used in the building, as follows:
“W” shall mean sawn joist/rafter construction, wood members
“I” shall mean engineered I-joist construction, wood members
“S” shall mean steel construction
“T” shall mean truss type construction
“C” shall mean concrete construction
NIOSH Suggested Truss Placard
State of Florida, Truss Placard System 2008;
The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act. The law was named in honor of Orange County firefighters Todd Aldridge and Mark Benge, who died in 1989 after the truss roof of a gift shop collapsed. Under the new law, owners of any commercial, industrial or multi unit residential structure, have to clearly mark if their buildings have lightweight roof or floor trusses, allowing firefighters to change their tactics when working in these types of structures
http://www.cfnews13.com/News/Local/2008/7/2/new_firefighter_protect….
633.027 Buildings with light-frame truss-type construction; notice requirements; enforcement
(1) The owner of any commercial or industrial structure, or any multiunit residential structure of three units or more, that uses light-frame truss-type construction shall mark the structure with a sign or symbol approved by the State Fire Marshal in a manner sufficient to warn persons conducting fire control and other emergency operations of the existence of light-frame truss-type construction in the structure.
(2) The State Fire Marshal shall adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of this section, including, but not limited to:
(a) The dimensions and color of such sign or symbol.
(b) The time within which commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structures that use light-frame truss-type construction shall be marked as required by this section.
(c) The location on each commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structure that uses light-frame truss-type construction where such sign or symbol must be posted.
(3) The State Fire Marshal, and local fire officials in accordance with s. 633.121, shall enforce the provisions of this section. Any owner who fails to comply with the requirements of this section is subject to penalties as provided in s. 633.161.
Florida Placard
Wheeling, Illinois Wood Truss Warning Signs
Attached is information from Wheeling, Illinois, who enacted thier own local code requriement. April 18, 1994 adopted Ordinance 2948 amending Title 14, Fire, of the Wheeling Municipal Code by adding Chapter 14.08 “Wood Truss Warning Signs”
State of Vermont
F or additional Info HERE
CITY OF CHESAPEAKE, VA TRUSS ID PROGRAM; A designated sticker is used for quick recognition of potential Collapse Dangers associated with TRUSS constructed buildings. The sticker is placed on every entry door of all commercial buildings with Truss construction. The use of trusses in building construction presents a great danger to firefighting personnel when those structures are involved in fire conditions. By design, the truss members in floor and roof assemblies will collapse, without warning, after being exposed to heat or flame contact for a very short period of time. Because of the inherent danger firefighters must face while operating within these buildings, a Truss Identification Program (TIP) has been instituted to alert personnel of the danger prior to beginning fire suppression operations. The Truss Identification Program is intended to alert the members of the Chesapeake Fire Department with pertinent pre-plan information before firefighting forces are committed to an interior attack.
The TIP shall be an ongoing program applied to all commercial buildings inspected by the Chesapeake Fire Department.
http://www.chesapeake.va.us/services/depart/fire/truss.shtml
City of Greencastle, Indiana
The City of Greencastle, Indiana and the Greencastle Fire Department recently enacted and approved an Engineered Lumber ID Program consisting of a sticker that is used for quick recognization of potential Collapse Dangers associated with Engineered Lumber constructed buildings. The sticker is placed on every electrical meter of all residential & commercial buildings with Engineered Lumber construction built after May 13th 2008. The news release states that; the use of this type of lumber in building construction presents a great danger to firefighting personnel when those structures are involved in fire conditions. By design, the Engineered Lumber in floor and roof assemblies will collapse, without warning, after being exposed to heat or flame contact for a very short period of time. Because of the inherent danger firefighters must face while operating within these buildings, an Engineered Lumber Identification Program (ELIP) has been instituted to alert personnel of the danger prior to beginning fire suppression operations.
The Engineered Lumber Identification Program is intended to alert the members of the Greencastle Fire Department with pertinent pre-plan information before firefighting forces are committed to an interior attack. The sticker is unobtrusive and is placed directly on a meter box, for example, and alerts the FD if either the floor joists and/or the trusses are made of and Engineered Lumber System and materials. The fire officers are already checking the utility boxes on all fires as part of their initial size-up. The ELIP shall be an ongoing program applied to all residential & commercial buildings inspected by the Greencastle Fire Department.
ORDINANCE 2008 – 4 states; AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING A REFLECTIVE SYMBOL ON STRUCTURES USING ENGINEERED LUMBER
WHEREAS, many new building structures currently use engineered lumber in their construction;
WHEREAS, some types of engineered lumber burn at a rate faster that other types of lumber; and
WHEREAS, in fighting fires, it would be helpful to know the types of materials used in the construction of a structure.
NOW THEREFORE be it ordained by the Common Council of the City of Greencastle as follows:
1. Definitions:
a. Engineered Lumber shall mean prefabricated I-joists, truss joists, and truss rafters, and laminated beams and studs.
b. Structure shall mean primary, secondary and accessory structures as defined in the Greencastle Zoning Code that have electrical meters that serve the structure.
1. Definitions:
a. Engineered Lumber shall mean prefabricated I-joists, truss joists, and truss rafters, and laminated beams and studs.
b. Structure shall mean primary, secondary and accessory structures as defined in the Greencastle Zoning Code that have electrical meters that serve the structure.
2. All structures constructed with engineered lumber after the effective date of this ordinance must have a reflective symbol affixed to each electrical meter serving the structure.
3. The reflective symbol shall be in the form of a sticker, issued by the City of Greencastle that states that the structure is constructed with engineered lumber
4. Any person violating this ordinance by refusing to use the reflective symbol or by removing the reflective symbol shall be subject to a fine in an amount of $25.00 per violation. Each day that a violation occurs shall constitute a separate violation, subject to a separate fine.
5. The owner of any structure that was constructed with engineered lumber prior to the effective date of this ordinance is requested to place the reflective symbol on the electrical meter serving the structure on a voluntary basis.
This is another great example how local level insights, actions and legislation can go a long way in supporting fire service operational challanges as they relate to building construction systems, methodologies and materials. Remember, We can certainly work diligently AND cooperativley with local government officials to enhance incident operations and make our jobs safety, one step at a time….
For additional information on the Fire Department’s efforts in Greencastle, IN contact Lt. John Shafer, Lieutenant/Training Officer HERE.
An invaluable free on-line training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions – is available from UL, check HERE for further information.
The 2006 NIOSH LODD Report, HERE
December 3, 2009 marks the 10th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.
The Worcester Six;
Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine 3
Overview
On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dis¬patched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motor¬ist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years. Due to these and other factors, the responding District Chief ordered a second alarm within 4 minutes of the initial dispatch.
The first alarm assignment brought 30 firefighters and officers and 7 pieces of apparatus to the scene. The second provided an additional 12 men and 3 trucks as well as a Deputy Chief. Firefighters encountered a light smoke condition throughout the warehouse, and crews found a large fire in the former office area of the second floor. An aggressive interior attack was started within the second floor and ventilation was conducted on the roof. There were no windows or other openings in the warehousing space above the second floor.
Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors.
Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.
An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.
A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and del¬uge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts.
According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities. (Excerpt from USFA report )
Take a moment to reflect on the events of December 3, 1999 and what they may mean to you. Consider your knowledge and understanding of buildings and structures within your district and surrounding response areas. Remember; “Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety”. For those of you who do not know about this incident, attached is the USFA Incident Report that provides insights into the event and the lessons learned. Also check out the NIOSH Report and numerous archived articles on the web and within various journals.
Take at look at The Worcester Telegram & Gazette which has an archived webpage; http://www.telegram.com/static/fire/video.html
HERE ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 1999 USFA REPORT
1. Abandoned buildings remain a serious threat to the fire service and a danger to the communities in which they stand.
Fire departments have long recognized the danger of abandoned buildings in their communities, and fires in these structures have to be approached with a certain amount of caution and restraint. If questionable structural integrity, unknown hazardous materials, unusual dangers to firefighters, or other extreme risks exist, the buildings should not be entered. It is paramount that the fire service apply tactical risk assessment in its daily operations.
Because of the building design, the fire’s magnitude and location could not be ascertained from the exterior, and the Incident Commander had to assess the risks of sending in teams to evaluate the fire and sending in firefighters for suppression. Initial interior reports did not indicate a serious threat to personnel, and operations were conducted accordingly. To assist arriving crews, a placard system should be instituted which clearly defines the risks at an abandoned building. Subsequent to the fire, Worcester Fire put such a system in place. The process has an added benefit of placing firefighters and/or inspectors on locations which might be at risk and where prefire planning should be initiated.
Risks are not limited to the fire service. Homeless people and drug addicts have been known to inhabit such buildings out of necessity. Ordinary citizens can be impacted by increased crime, and these properties can become a very dangerous playground for inquisitive children. Efforts should be made to renovate or demolish such places even if public funding is not required.
2. Firefighters must make a concerted effort to know the buildings in their response districts.
Commercial buildings, by their very nature, pose additional dangers to firefighters, and their familiarity with any given fire building will help to lower these dangers. Company tours are an excellent way to accomplish this goal, and can serve to strengthen the bonds between firefighters and business owners. Such efforts must be conducted with sensitivity, and observed conditions or problems within a business should be conveyed in a helpful rather than confrontational manner.
3. Fire prevention efforts should be maximized in abandoned and temporarily vacated building to avoid fires in the first place.
Even temporarily vacated properties can be at risk if utilities like water for a sprinkler system or electricity for an alarm system are disconnected. Although service cessation often occurs when properties are the subject of financial problems it may also take place at the end of a lease or during the sale or renovation of a commercial building. Every effort should be made to forward change of occupancy or use information to first response stations.
4. Fire departments should continue to grown their file information on buildings in their communities.
Through the use of mobile computer systems, much information can be forwarded to responding companies and Incident Command during an emergency. Data could include floor plans, occupancies, hazardous materials, water supplies, special hazards, and much more. A system of this type would certainly not be limited to abandoned buildings, but it could be invaluable at such a scene since the probability of an owner showing up is unlikely.
Although this is laborious process, it may also be a valid use of on duty personnel who can gather information during regular shift time and either forward it to fire prevention or enter it themselves on provided computer terminals. Data could be gathered during in-service inspections and tours.
5. Delayed reporting allowed the fire growth to exceed the capabilities of aggressive interior attack suppression.
The exact time of ignition remains an unknown, but it has been established that the fire was burning for a minimum of 25 minutes before smoke was observed venting from the roof. It could have been burning for over an hour and a half. The huge volume of air in the warehouse could supports a large fire without any additional air from the outside.
Because flames weren’t visible from the exterior, passers-by did not recognize the presence of the fire, and it wasn’t discovered until smoke vented from the roof. Even that was apparently not enough to motivate the hundred of average citizens driving on I-290 that evening to call 9-1-1.
The trained eyes of public safety professionals were needed to separate this from “the ordinary” and then react appropriately. By this time, however, most of the second floor of B-building was burning, and few barriers were present to prevent further growth.
The initial report from Ladder 1 on the second floor describes a “room full of fire” in B-building beyond the door in the party wall. This location is some 30 feet from the room or origin, so a one room fire had enough time to engulf the entire floor. A sustained flow of 1000 GPM for 20 minutes had virtually no effect on the fire, and conditions deteriorated around attack crews.
6. Combustible interior finishes contributed to the rapid fire spread.
The concept of having 18 inches of combustible materials on the inside of all exterior walls of a building is almost unthinkable to firefighters. The original cork insulation which appears to have been attached with a tar-like substance provided a large volume of fuel, and additional layers of polystyrene and polyurethane with there ferocious burn characteristics gave this fire enormous intensity.
The area of origin was office space converted from a cold storage area. Under its original design and intent, insulation would only have been placed on exterior walls since the third floor was also cooled. Large amounts of insulation were put into place during the transition and would have included heavy insulation above the suspended ceiling on the underside of the third floor deck. An easily applied insulation would have been sprayed-on polyurethane foam which would have adhered to the wood joists and girders. Once the ceiling tiles were in place, it would not be noticed. The southern wall of the office space would have also required substantial insulation to keep out the cold and to retain the forced hot water heat from the radiators.
The fire fed on ordinary combustibles during its initial growth, but once the ceiling tiles were breached, flame contacted combustible wire insulation and ceiling insulation. The stubborn flames observed by fire crews and the smoke conditions described on upper floors are consistent with the sustained burning of petroleum based products including rigid polystyrene, polyurethane, tar, and glass board.
Proper permitting and on going inspections for construction changes within business occupan¬cies can help reduce non-complaint interior finishes.
7. The fire service should initiate life safety activities early on at a fire scene.
The concept of a Rapid Intervention Team was known to the Worcester Fire Department and was being implemented before the Worcester Cold Storage Fire, but it was not put into place until the 5th alarm on December 3rd. Firefighters had entered an unknown structure over one hour before the team was assigned. It is now standard procedure in Worcester to assign a RIT at the onset of each structure fire attack.
The first radio transmission by the Safety Officer was 10 minutes after the RIT was assigned. For control and monitoring of personnel, structural integrity, and other safety concerns, this position should also be filled early on. In an ideal fire scene, the Safety Officer and RIT would be in place before the first firefighters enter the building. Command should strive to have these jobs filled as early as possible even if doing so escalates the event to a higher alarm level to provide sufficient personnel. A system of personnel accountability should be in place. Someone should be tracking who enters the building, the time of entry, and time of exit. Firefighters who are nearing expected times of air exhaustion could then be contacted to ascertain their safety. The establishment of a Safety Officer at the onset of an event can work towards the goal of accountability. The Safety Officer need not be a department officer but could be a chief’s aide or available firefighter familiar with the duties and responsibilities of the assignment.
8. Large buildings such as warehouses and highrise merit unique search techniques and tools.
While the standard air bottle for SCBA has a 30 minute capacity, it might be necessary to have available 60 minute bottles for extended search situations and/ or RIT use. Some fire depart¬ments have obtained 60 minute systems for use in confined space rescues or other unusually long events. The 30 minute system has remained the norm in recent years as the necessity of Rehab time has gained prominence, and it would not be advisable to use longer air supplies on a regular basis.
In high rise incidents, it is common practice to carry in extra SCBA bottles. The same can be done in large space searches. Development of equipment and techniques to change bottles in a hot environment would give extra range to rescuers, and it could prolong their survival should their own rescue be required.
Long lifelines should be maintained for entry crews in these types of structures as well as marking devises for the interior. These devices include luminescent stickers to show direction, labels to signify searched areas, and other commercially available products. Their effectiveness, how¬ever, depends on their use. And the fire service should incorporate these procedures into more common firegrounds, such as single family houses. The time to try out a new technique is not during a major fire scene.
For searches involving extended distances, it might be helpful to position secondary search teams part way into a search area. They can wait in reserve in case they are needed, and they can serve as a rescue team for civilians or firefighters.
Finally, all firefighters who enter a structure must be wearing an SCBA. Worcester Fire has such a policy. Although the facemask and air may not be needed, it must be available. This includes chief officers, aides, and ladder personnel. Even firefighters who are outside structure like apparatus drivers should have SCBA protection available in case of wind shifts or air born particles and debris. With the preponderance of hazardous materials in businesses and residences, SCBA’s use is an essential.
9. Techniques must be improved to better track the movements of firefighters within a structure.
Under current technology limitations, Incident Command is essentially limited voice communication/radio to track the movements of firefighters once they enter a building and disappear from sight. IC normally knows where a crew entered and possibly what their destination is, but without good radio reports, the exact movements and locations of crews are uncertain at best.
Rescue 1’s crew and Engine 3’s Lieutenant both had difficulty communicating their positions which complicated and delayed rescue attempts. Crews continued to search multiple floors in the warehouse because of this uncertainty tying up precious personnel resources and adding more congestion to Stairway 3.
Despite all lost firefighters wearing integral PASS alarms on their SCBA’s, no surviving firefighters recalled hearing them at any time. The building insulation may have absorbed much of their sound, and the ever present background noise of the fire scene itself may have obscured the rest.
10. Radio channels are often overloaded at multiple alarm fires, and alternatives must be explored.
The 800 Mhz trunked radio system used by the Worcester Fire Department had several major failures during this event. Mechanical failure of individual units occurred when the “emergency alert” button on the hand microphone shorted out on contact with water. Fire Alarm repeatedly ordered individual radio operators to shut down, and this took precious air time during an escalating multiple alarm event. In some cases the microphones were detached in the field at which time they functioned normally. Microphones without the alert button were placed on all radios after the conclusion of this fire. During interior operations, there were 1,000 “push-to-talks” registered for the Operations A talk group, the assigned fireground channel.
Like many progressive fire departments, Worcester has taken steps to insure that all crews enter¬ing a fire building have radio communications. A typical piece of apparatus carries one portable for the officer and one for a second firefighting crew. All members of the Rescue Company carry portables. Having multiple radios is good for safety, but their use requires significant training and discipline. It is all too easy to clog up the air with nonessential transmissions.
In some events it may even be necessary to use more than one radio and frequency to properly manage the incident. This would require someone to assist the Incident Commander and keep communications in order. If nothing else, a fireground frequency must be adopted by Command and all working units. One possible way to limit talk time would be to have a staging officer communicate with, and pass along assignments to incoming companies on a frequency other than those used for dispatch and fireground command. Once an assignment was initiated, the company would switch over to the fire- ground channel.
Departments must also choose their radio equipment carefully. The band used must be the best for the standard physical environment in which operations are conducted. Urban departments working inside cement buildings have requirements that contrast greatly with a rural department operating over long geographical distances. If transmission quality continues to suffer, the use of mobile repeaters or other devices might need to be explored.
11. The use of Thermal Imaging Cameras should be further developed.
The Thermal Imaging Camera has become a useful rescue and investigative tool for the fire ser¬vice over the past six years. Although early models had some operational problems, the latest versions are reliable and offer more options such as transmission capabilities. It is a device that belongs in every fire department, but its high cost has prevented the purchase by many agencies. Sales volume will hopefully bring down the price of this beneficial tool.
The camera used at the Worcester fire failed to operate properly, and the manufacturer attributed the problem to thermal overload. This was an early model, and the rescue crew using it was nearly prevented from entering the warehouse by the high heat. Their attempt to enter was one of the last, and no other crews made significant interior progress.
Under this high heat, the effectiveness of the device is questionable. Thermal imaging devices work well in cooler environments where the body temperature of a victim is higher than the surrounding air or a hot spot within a wall is warmer than the abutting construction. At high heat levels, these cameras will often “white out” because everything in its view is hot enough to affect the imager. If a victim was down in elevated heat, he would absorb the thermal energy of his environment. The turnout gear, for instance, would get hotter and the camera would not be able to differentiate between it and its surrounds. The survivability of a person in high heat for an extended time is negligible.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should
ensure that inspections of vacant buildings and pre-fire planning are conducted which cover all potential hazards, structural building materials (type and age), and renovations that may be encountered during a fire, so that the Incident Commander will have the necessary structural information to make informed decisions and implement an appropriate plan of attack
ensure that the incident command system is fully implemented at the fire scene
ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed when activities, size of fire, or need occurs, such as during multiple alarm fires, or responds automatically to pre-designated fires
ensure that standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment are adequate and sufficient to support the volume of radio traffic at multiple-alarm fires
ensure that Incident Command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene
use guide ropes/tag lines securely attached to permanent objects at entry portals and place high-intensity floodlights at entry portals to assist lost or disoriented fire fighters in emergency escape
ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position upon their arrival at the fire scene
implement an overall health and safety program such as the one recommended in NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program
consider using a marking system when conducting searches
identify dangerous vacant buildings by affixing warning placards to entrance doorways or other openings where fire fighters may enter
ensure that officers enforce and fire fighters follow the mandatory mask rule per administrative guidelines established by the department
explore the use of thermal imaging cameras to locate lost or downed fire fighters and civilians in fire environments
In addition,
manufacturers and research organizations should conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters on the fireground.
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9947.html
Derelict buildings marked after Mass. LODDs
Haunting memories spurred Mass. chief to positive action
During this week, there were on average, over 10,173 structure fires in the United States. According to NFPA statistics the following occur on average in the U.S;
• A fire department responded to a fire every 20 seconds.
• One structure fire was reported every 59 seconds.
• One home structure fire was reported every 79 seconds
• One civilian fire injury was reported every 30 minutes.
• One civilian fire death occurred every 2 hours and 33 minutes.
• One outside fire was reported every 41 seconds.
• One vehicle fire was reported every 122 seconds.
There are on average of Eight to Ten Firefighter Line-of-duty Deaths each month. There have been two LODD’s reported this first week of November alone.
The fire service continues to struggle with the challenges, opposition and merits in adjusting, altering, and changing our strategic and tactical ways of doing business in the streets. Some disagree others are indifferent, but regardless of your positions; the business of firefighting is changing, to some it’s just not being recognized or acknowledged. The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.
Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting continues to be a passionate discussion point.
The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel. We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.
Don’t mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference, a big difference! When we address relationships of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety with the occupancy and structural environment, all personnel, regardless of rank, need to equate the occupancy risk with strategic and tactical incident action plans.
These safely compliment the identified firefighting operation risk, with the projected building risk profile and interface appropriate behavioral characteristics in the task level firefighting activities. Again, equating building, occupancy risk profiles with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.
Stop and reflect today, where do you stand? What are your true beliefs and convictions in regards to the developing safety culture that is being forged and institutionalized within our fire service?
Remembering the One Meridian Plaza High-rise Fire,1991
Ceremonies took place on Wednesday October 21 in Philadelphia, PA unvieling a memorial honoring PFD Fire Capt. David P. Holcombe, Firefighter Phyllis McAllister and Firefighter James A. Chappell who died in the line of duty while conducting operations at a high-rise fire in what is known as the One Meridian Plaza Fire which occurred on February 23, 1991.
A fire on the 22nd floor of the 38-story Meridian Bank Building, also known as One Meridian Plaza, was reported to the Philadelphia Fire Department on February 23, 1991 at approximately 2040 hours and burned for more than 19 hours.
· The fire caused three firefighter fatalities (LODD) and injuries to 24 firefighters.
· The 12-alarms brought 51 engine companies, 15 ladder companies, 11 specialized units, and over 300 firefighters to the scene.
· It was one of the largest high-rise office building fire in modern American history –completely consuming eight floors of the building –and was controlled only when it reached a floor that was protected by automatic sprinklers.
· The Fire Department arrived to find a well-developed fire on the 22nd floor, with fire dropping down to the 21st floor through a set of convenience stairs.
· Heavy smoke had already entered the stairways and the floors immediately above the 22nd.
· Fire attack was hampered by a complete failure of the building’s electrical system and by inadequate water pressure, caused in part by improperly set pressure reducing valves on standpipe hose outlets.
The USFA published a technical report (USFA-TR-049) on the One Meridian Plaza fire that is still available for download from the USFA web site, HERE. The report clearly defined the need in 1991, for built-in fire protection systems and reiterated the fact that fire departments alone cannot expect or be expected to provide the level of fire protection that modem high-rises demand. That fire protection must be built-in to the structures. This was clearly illustrated in this event when the One Meridian Plaza fire was finally stopped when it reached a floor where automatic sprinklers had been installed.
One Meridian Plaza was a 38-story high-rise office building, located in the heart of downtown Philadelphia, in an area of high-rise and mid-rise structures. The building had three underground levels, 36 above ground occupiable floors, two mechanical floors (12 and 38), and two rooftop helipads. The building was rectangular in shape, approximately 243 feet in length by 92 feet in width (approximately 22,400 gross square feet), with roughly 17,000 net usable square feet per floor. Site work for construction began in 1968, and the building was completed and approved for occupancy in 1973.
Construction was classified by the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections as equivalent to BOCA Type 1B construction which requires 3-hour fire rated building columns, 2-hour fire rated horizontal beams and floor/ ceiling systems, and l-hour fire rated corridors and tenant separations. Shafts, including stairways, are required to be 2-hour fire rated construction, and roofs must have l-hour fire rated assemblies.
The building frame was structural steel with concrete floors poured over metal decks. All structural steel and floor assemblies were protected with spray-on fireproofing material. The exterior of the building was covered by granite curtain wall panels with glass windows attached to the perimeter floor girders and spandrels. The building utilized a central core design, although one side of the core is adjacent to the south exterior wall. The core area was approximately 38 feet wide by 124 feet long and contained two stairways, four banks of elevators, two HVAC supply duct shafts, bathroom utility chases, and telephone and electrical risers.
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
· Origin and Cause: The fire started in a vacant 22nd floor office in a pile of linseed oil-soaked rags left by a contractor. Fire Alarm System The activation of a smoke detector on the 22nd floor was the first notice of a possible fire. Due to incomplete detector coverage, the fire was already well advanced before the detector was activated.
· Building Staff Response Building employees did not call the fire department when the alarm was activated. An employee investigating the alarm was trapped when the elevator opened on the fire floor and was rescued when personnel on the ground level activated the manual recall. The Fire Department was not called until the employee had been rescued.
· Alarm Monitoring Service The private service which monitors the fire alarm system did not call the Fire Department when the alarm was first activated. A call was made to the building to verify that they were aware of the alarm. The building personnel were already checking the alarm at that time.
· Electrical Systems Installation of the primary and secondary electrical power risers in a common unprotected enclosure resulted in a complete power failure when the fire-damaged conductors shorted to ground. The natural gas powered emergency generator also failed.
· Fire Barriers Unprotected penetrations in fire-resistance rated assemblies and the absence of fire dampers in ventilation shafts permitted fire and smoke to spread vertically and horizontally.
· Ventilation openings in the stairway enclosures permitted smoke to migrate into the stairways, complicating firefighting.
· Unprotected openings in the enclosure walls of 22nd floor electrical closet permitted the fire to impinge on the primary and secondary electrical power risers.
· Standpipe System and Pressure Reducing Valves (PRVs): Improperly installed standpipe valves provided inadequate pressure for fire department hose streams using 1 3/ 4-inch hose and automatic fog nozzles. Pressure reducing valves were installed to limit standpipe outlet discharge pressures to safe levels. The PRVs were set too low to produce effective hose streams; tools and expertise to adjust the valve settings did not become available until too late.
· Locked Stairway Doors: For security reasons, stairway doors were locked to prevent reentry except on designated floors. (A building code variance had been granted to approve this arrangement.) This compelled firefighters to use forcible entry tactics to gain access from stairways to floor areas.
· Fire Department Pre-Fire Planning: Only limited pre-fire plan information was available to the Incident Commander. Building owners provided detailed plans as the fire progressed. · Firefighter Fatalities: Three firefighters from Engine Company 11 died on the 28th floor when they became disoriented and ran out of air in their SCBAs.
· Exterior Fire Spread: “Autoexposure” Exterior vertical fire spread resulted when exterior windows failed. This was a primary means of fire spread.
· Structural Failures: Fire-resistance rated construction features, particularly floor-ceiling assemblies and shaft enclosures (including stair shafts), failed when exposed to continuous fire of unusual intensity and duration.
· Int
erior Fire Suppression Abandoned: After more than 11 hours of uncontrolled fire growth and spread, interior firefighting efforts were abandoned due to the risk of structural collapse.
· Automatic Sprinklers: The fire was eventually stopped when it reached the fully sprinklered 30th floor. Ten sprinkler heads activated at different points of fire penetration. · The three firefighters who died were attempting to ventilate the center stair tower: They radioed a request for help stating that they were on the 30th floor. After extensive search and rescue efforts, their bodies were later found on the 28th floor. They had exhausted all of their air supply and could not escape to reach fresh air. At the time of their deaths, the 28th floor was not burning but had an extremely heavy smoke condition.
· After the loss of three personnel, hours of unsuccessful attack on the fire, with several floors simultaneously involved in fire, and a risk of structural collapse, the Incident Commander withdrew all personnel from the building due to the uncontrollable risk factors. The fire ultimately spread up to the 30th floor where it was stopped by ten automatic sprinklers.
Take the time to review this report and examine some of similar issues affecting the fire service today in the areas of staffing and resources, construction and materials, building codes, built-in fire suppression systems, training, pre-fire planning, fire load, fire dynamics and the current methodologies on wind-drive fire theory. Also take a look at the issues that affected operations at the 1988 Interstate Bank Fire in downtown Los Angeles, California.
Have you dropped in on the EGH web site recently and made use of the vast array of resources and media that can support a wide latitude of firefighter safety, health and survival initiatives?
Everyone Goes Home® is a national program by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries. In March 2004, a Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held to address the need for change within the fire service. Through this meeting, the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives were produced and a program was born to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
Have you made use of the Firefighter Life Safety Learning Media Center?Using variations of the Courage to Be Safe…So Everyone Goes Home® field program, along with material from the Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resource Kit the EGH program develops and deploys a new online learning segment each month. These online learning segments allow personnel to expand upon thier personal and professional development on demand. For more information regarding the EGH presentations or if you have additional comments please write to Robert Colameta, National Courage To Be SafeSM Program Manager at bobc@publicsafetyedu.com
Check out the NFFF’s Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives (FLSI) Research DatabaseThis database was created to support NFFF/FLSI goal of reducing firefighter deaths and injuries and, more specifically, partial fulfillment of FLSI Initiative 7: “Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.” There is a wealth of information available to support a wide range of firefigher safety, health and survival initiatives and programs within your organization.
If this is new to you, become aware of the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives , increase your knowledge and understanding of the efforts needed to support the injury and LODD reduction efforts that all begin at the department level and extend to the company level and ultimately to the individual firefighter level. YOU have the power to progress change and to support making the job safer. Take advantage of the opportunites before you, each and every day.
It’s all in your hands…
Here’s another prominent and important program that each of you should be visiting on a regular basis, The National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System.
The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety. Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
Check out the 2009 October Calendar Module on Decision Making on the resources page under 2009 Near-Miss Calendar or click on the featured resources on the NMR homepage. This interactive PowerPoint was created by Program Advisor John Tippett and can be used along with the case study and photo provided in the offical calendar. HERE
Did you know that the NMRS publishes a Report of the Week?ROTW 100809: What flashover? (09-171)ROTW 100109: The 35’ Ladder Raise Gone Wrong. (09-355)Past Reports Of The Week
Featured ReportsReport 09-433: Coupling disengages during hose testingAll Featured Reports
Featured ResourcesOctober Module: Decision MakingSeptember Module: Operational Readiness PowerPoint
There are three main goals of the reporting system:
1. To give firefighters the opportunity to learn from each other through real-life experiences;
2. To help formulate strategies to reduce the frequency of firefighter injuries and fatalities; and 3. To enhance the safety culture of the fire and emergency service.
The information is used in a variety of ways. Fire fighters can use submitted reports as educational tools. Analyzed data will be used to identify trends which can assist in formulating strategies to reduce fire fighter injuries and fatalities. Depending on the urgency, information will be presented to the fire service community via program reports, press releases and e-mail alerts.
What is a near-miss event?
A near-miss event is defined as an unintentional unsafe occurrence that could have resulted in an injury, fatality, or property damage. Only a fortunate break in the chain of events prevented an injury, fatality or damage.
Why should you submit a near-miss report?
A near miss experienced by a firefighter can improve the knowledge, skills and abilities of everyone who is made aware of it. Reporting your near-miss event to http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/ will help prevent an injury or fatality of a firefighter. Near-miss reporting has worked effectively in other industries, especially aviation, since team members have more knowledge. Industries using near-miss reporting systems have lower injury rates and fewer worker fatalities.
These are the kinds of questions that are asked on the report;
Section 1: 7 questions about the reporter (title, years of fire service experience, department type, etc.)
Section 2: 9 questions about the event (type, cause, etc.)
Section 3: Event description: Describe the event in your own words.
Section 4: Lessons Learned: Describe the lessons learned, suggestions to prevent a similar event, etc.
Section 5: Contact Information (OPTIONAL and CONFIDENTIAL)
Looking for Resources, take a look at the materials HERE
Each year a NMR Calendar is published and distributed nationally, the NMR web site provides monthly power point programs and references that align with each month’s near-miss case study report to provide you with training materials that can use to support training programs and drills at the local level to increase awareness and support injury and LODD reduction, HERE and HERE.
Look for the 2010 calendar coming out in December 2009.
For more insights on the NMRS, HERE
http://www.blogger.com/img/videoplayer.swf?videoUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fvp.video.google.com%2Fvideodownload%3Fversion%3D0%26secureurl%3DqAAAAPEbdexZYqODP9Nt5kZfcH34HcrE1NkMlRf1z9L5802W6MRijrAOIqO4Khc8a-iyiU21BLipII46M6bwZzj2TMNlHvVIWradMjQfMmmqAZEv905jcQfEl1E7fymwM_S3dI8kqJRYY3rQzZNp616CfDzDEq39EvRHJ6nhTvmOnyAvD-mC9i0e1oEoGH04l_f2CuEbEAiYgiCGcvLHq5_UZBhAOvCiwATEG0tBpQxqlBQj%26sigh%3DbXt_-I5jjPPpFwQVenZawE7KhzY%26begin%3D0%26len%3D86400000%26docid%3D0&nogvlm=1&thumbnailUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fvideo.google.com%2FThumbnailServer2%3Fapp%3Dblogger%26contentid%3D5b9468a8794109e2%26offsetms%3D5000%26itag%3Dw320%26sigh%3DES-m6qqvkxWeZue7lJt8TvhsWXk&messagesUrl=video.google.com%2FFlashUiStrings.xlb%3Fframe%3Dflashstrings%26hl%3DenTwo common Structure Fires; one in Syracuse, New York, the other in Yonkers, New York. Both involving residential occupancies of legacy construction, both requiring tactical deployment assignments for search and rescue under heavy fire conditions; but each incident having profoundly different outcomes. One a close-call and near-miss, the other a LODD.
The Syracuse fire evolved into a firefighter mayday, when a firefighter’s air supply apparently became inoperable or depleted during primary search and rescue operations resulting in a maycall and subsequent rapid exit through a narrow upper window in the attic. The video clearly depicts the tense minutes during which time the mayday was transmitted and firefighter Ray Duncanson bailed through the attic window.
The Yonkers fire (HERE) also involved an early morning response to report of a structure fire in a multiple occupancy residential dwelling. Firefighter Patrick Joyce, a 39-year-old city firefighter and a 16-year veteran of the department, either jumped or fell from the top floor of the burning 2-story multi-family home and was pronounced dead at the hospital. Two other firefighters were seriously injured as they also searched for tenants in an early morning house fire. The cause for the bailout has yet to be determined.
Both bread and butter and common fires, that many of us have experienced in our years on the job; yet the unique circumstances of each building, of each occupancy, the fire behavior and incident parameters resulted in vastly different outcomes.
It continues to be all about doing the right thing, at the right time for the right reasons. Unfortunately, that also involves calculate risk, measured determination and circumstance that are reflected by who and what we do on every alarm, at every call, on every shift. Just as Buffalo, New York FD Lt. Chip McCarthy and Firefighter Jonathan Croom were doing the right thing, when deployed on the primary search and rescue assignment on the first-due, and the subsequent search and rescue on the RIT/mayday assignment at the August 24th fire in the City of Buffalo, NY. Their sacrifice in the line-of-duty, reflected the honor, courage, protection, fortitude and duty of the fire service, just as Yonkers (NY) firefighter Patrick Joyce displayed in the course of his assignment on October 2, 2009.
On any given day, at any give alarm, the dynamics around us at times may be in or out of our direct control. We may not be able to see what the cards have in store for us, BUT we must ensure we use every fragment of training, fortitude, knowledge, skills, courage, bravery, insights, luck and sometimes (other divine) intervention to get us through. We must have the fortitude and courage to be both safety conscious and measured in the performance of our sworn duties while maintaining the appropriate balance of risk and bravery.
· The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger.
· As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel.
· We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.
We don’t know what’s in the cards on any given day, but the citizens we protect can rest assured, we will do our job, as firefighters to the best of our abilities, because of who we are.
Firefighter Spot videos: Syracuse Fire HERE, Yonkers Fire, HERE
