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FDNY Deutsche Bank Building LODD Fire Report issued by NIOSH

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The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program has released the investigation report of the line of duty deaths of two career FDNY  firefighters during a 2007 seven-alarm high-rise fire in the former Deutsche Bank building undergoing deconstruction and asbestos abatement.

On August 18, 2007,  two FDNY firefighters; Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo lost thier lives while operating at this incident. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations. FDNY Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran and FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino,  became trapped in the maze-like conditions of a high-rise building undergoing deconstruction. The building’s standpipe system had been disconnected during the deconstruction and the partitions constructed for asbestos abatement prohibited fire fighters from getting water to the seat of the fire. An hour into the incident, the fire department was able to supply water by running an external hoseline up the side of the structure. Soon after the victims began to operate their hoseline, they ran out of air. The victims suffered severe smoke inhalation and were transported to a metropolitan hospital in cardiac arrest where they succumbed to their injuries.

By the time the fire was extinguished, 115 fire fighters had suffered a variety of injuries.Key contributing factors to this incident include: delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel, inoperable standpipe and sprinkler system, delay in establishing water supply, inaccurate information about standpipe, unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously, extreme fire behavior, uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor, blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress, maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris, heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented, failure of fire fighters to always don SCBAs inside structure and to replenish air cylinders, communications overwhelmed with numerous Mayday and urgent radio transmissions, and lack of crew integrity.

NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • review and follow existing standard operating procedures on high-rise fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters are not operating in hazardous areas without the protection of a charged hoseline.
  • be prepared to use alternative water supplies when a building’s standpipe system is compromised or inoperable.
  • develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating guidelines for risk management during complex high-rise operations.
  • ensure that crew integrity is maintained during high-rise fire suppression operations.
  • train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning high-rise structure.
  • ensure that fire fighters diligently wear their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) when working in environments that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).
  • train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
  • use exit locators (both visual and audible) or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit.
  • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
  • encourage building owners and occupants to report emergency situations as soon as possible and provide accurate information to the fire department.
  • consider additional fire fighter training using a high-rise fire simulator.

Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

  • conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters in high-rise structures.
  • continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communications in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Municipalities should:

  • ensure that construction and/or demolition is done in accordance with NFPA 241: Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations.
  • develop a reporting system to inform the fire department of any ongoing, unique building construction activities (such as deconstruction or asbestos abatement) that would adversely affect a fire response.
  • establish a system for property owners to notify the fire department when fire protection/suppression systems are taken out of service.


The Complete NIOSH Report is available HERE

An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of  the PPT program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites

Additional Links, HERE and HERE

New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work, HERE

Other References and postings;

  • NY Daily News: Battle to save trapped firefighters
  • WABC: Fatal Deutsche Bank fire report released (2008)
  • FDNY Penalties After Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Lawyers: Evidence Withheld in Deutsche Bank Fire Trial
  • FDNY Disciplines Company Officers Following Tragic Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Attorney Claims Deutsche Bank Contractors Are “Scapegoats”
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    Buildings Under Construction

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    It’s been a busy week for a couple of departments nationally with major fires at buildings under construction. A multiple alarm fire struck a 5 –story Apartment Complex in Renton, Washington that occupies nearly a full city block on Tuesday June 30th, HERE and HERE for details.

    On Monday June 29th, a spectacular multiple alarm fire destroyed approximately 55 townhouses that were under construction in Mississauga, Ontario Canada. HERE and HERE for details.

    Buildings and construction sites pose unique strategic and tactical operational profiles and are considered high risk incidents to both manage and operate at. What were the operational and safety issues you may have encountered at similar events in your own jurisdiction?

    Check out the Ten Minutes in the Street: Buildings under Construction-Fire Scenario posted at FFN, HERE
    The building environments that form and shape our respective response districts pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations at structural alarms. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable measures that must be taken.

    Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. With any structure, regardless of its construction type, materials, occupancy classification, age or size, the majority of incidents requiring actual operation time occur when the structure is in use or vacant.

    But what about the early stages of the life cycle of a building – when a company is called to respond to an incident at a building under construction or at a construction site? Fire department responses and operations at building and construction sites present unique circumstances and considerations that are not part of that day-to-day alarm response procedure.

    During the construction process, building and construction sites represent the highest potential for fire, injuries and large-scale operations than at any other time within the life cycle of a structure. When completed, the building may have state-of-the-art detection and suppression equipment present, it may be compartmentalized and use the best fire resistive materials available. However, during the construction process the building represents a high-risk target hazard with the potential to stretch to the limit the capabilities and resources of any fire service agency.

    Buildings can be classified within five fundamental construction types:

    • Fire-Resistive
    • Non-Combustible
    • Ordinary (exterior protected)
    • Heavy Timber
    • Wood Frame

    These are represented in various forms and sub-classifications within the NFPA 220 Standard on Types of Building Construction, as well as other Model Codes

    Regardless of construction classification, during the construction process each building can be affected adversely by flame and heat impingement due to fires, weather and environmental conditions, improper or inadequate construction techniques and methods as well as substandard or inappropriate construction materials and system assemblies.

    When referring to the broad range of building and construction sites, there are five general classifications for most projects:

    • Renovations
    • Rehabilitations
    • Conversions
    • Expansions
    • New construction

    Although there are some overlaps, each project presents hazards that affect life safety, structural integrity and exposures. Projects within the renovation and rehabilitation areas may include vacant or abandoned structures that are transformed into new occupancy/use buildings, or can include older structures that are brought back to their original state. Current development trends are those in which older structures of brick-and-joist construction typically are renovated into commercial shopping centers, apartments and mixed-use occupancies. In many instances, the building interiors are altered extensively to accommodate the design criteria and, in doing so, may alter the integrity of the structures.

    Conversions usually involve change from one occupancy use to another. For example, a factory used for manufacturing is converted into arts and crafts shops or into a multiple-occupancy facility. Most sought after structures of this kind include the heavy timber building (New England Mill Type) as well as old, reinforced concrete frame or steel-framed factory or manufacturing structures. Expansions, on the other hand, constitute existing buildings that broaden their building layouts and floor areas to accommodate the owners’ needs. Many times the buildings will stay in operation while the expansion construction is undertaken, creating myriad life safety, suppression and control concerns.

    New construction involves site preparation, mobilization of materials and manpower and the evolution of a new structure. Each project category, when coupled with a specific construction type, presents specific hazards and conditions that must be identified, assessed and acted upon correctly. The potential that exists in any construction area during fire department response can include, but not be limited to:

    • Fire
    • Explosions
    • Collapse
    • Excavation & Trench Cave-In
    • Compromised Structural Conditions
    • Hazardous Materials Situations
    • Accidents
    • Failures

    The ability for a fire department to intervene in the progression of an incident will be related directly to the magnitude of the incident, its complexity and its demands on resources, manpower and technical based competencies, familiarity with the site and construction methods used, the stage of construction, as well as the effectiveness of SOP’s/ SOG’s, communications and the incident command management structure of the involved agency.

    The most critical aspect to any operation in a building or on a construction site is the effect the incident will have upon the surrounding area or construction. The hazards present on a building and/or construction site pose threats to workers on the site, firefighters, civilians and exposures. Any one of these categories can strain an operation and response. But add two, three or all four concerns and the situation, however small initially, can escalate into a complex operation involving multiple agencies and resources. All with variable risks for significant challenge to firefighter survivability and injuries.

    Exposure threa
    t to site workers creates life safety concerns that require determination of their work area assignments, numbers present and actual location for accountability. Information detailing the magnitude of the life safety concerns can be derived from on-site field offices and contractors’ trailers. The ability to relocate personnel from areas of immediate danger to an area of safe refuge may prove to be a major strategic undertaking. Limited access points, passenger elevator cranes and hoist ways present life safety concerns. Incident commanders and company officers also must consider firefighter life safety and have the ability to judge operational areas and surrounding construction exposures. Ventures into areas of recent concrete pours (“green” concrete) or suppression operations involving wood shoring, formwork or unprotected steel components could be fatal if decisions are based on faulty operations and decision-making parameters.

    Civilian dangers include situations involving equipment failures, material drops and toxic products of combustion. Recent incidents involving crane collapses, exterior scaffolding assembly failures resulted in injuries and rescues at protected walkway areas. Materials falling or blowing off job sites onto streets and walkways, as well as mechanical and other equipment failures resulting in the collapse of building components onto vehicles and roadways, create situations requiring special attention for the incident stabilization and rescue.

    Unique challenges to fire control are presented by exposure concerns and hazards at building construction sites. Depending on the construction stage and area(s) of fire involvement, materials present and construction type, the exposure concerns could be negligible to major. A job site consisting of three-story, wood-frame apartment units could create serious exposure concerns due to flying brands, rapid flame spread and fire intensity toward surrounding exposures, which include additional framed units under construction, construction equipment and fire apparatus, as well as adjacent structures and occupancies.

    When such exposure concerns become evident, rapid deployment of additional response companies and resources should be communicated as quickly as possible. Often when the problem becomes evident, it may be too late to gain offensive fire control. Based on incident considerations, areas should be written off defensively, with protective measures deployed effectively to get ahead of the situation.

    The complexities and hazards and assessment factors present at building and construction sites become the focus when a company is dispatched to an on-site incident. Each construction stage represents a milestone in the process that, when coupled with respective safety considerations, can give an incident commander or company officer insight into the risk potential present at the job site. The stages are represented by percent of completion of the project or structure. The stages overlap, as do some of the safety conditions and hazards.

    Start up/mobilization to 15 percent Stage
    Initial project start up is underway. At a jobsite involving new construction, site work is taking place and excavation, trench and subsurface work is in progress. Temporary roadways, usually consisting of exposed earth with gravel topping, are compacted. Adjacent utilities are tapped into with temporary on-site services. Construction equipment is mobilized or brought on site. Materials, components and equipment are stockpiled and stored. Temporary storage buildings are constructed and makeshift offices and rest areas for workers are built. Construction work includes laying the foundation, formwork placement and support structuring.

    Risk potential is greatest when dealing with the stored/stockpiled equipment and materials and site considerations that affect emergency access and response and construction worker safety. Site accessibility may be hindered by excavation areas, site trenches and pits, construction worker vehicles and construction equipment, as well as temporary fencing and barricades.
    Weather conditions may play a critical role in response access with temporary roadways and site areas affected by rain, snow, thawing and mud. Companies should determine, through site inspection and preplanning, designated entry gates to site areas, alternate access roads or areas to project locations and use of heavy construction equipment for accessibility.

    Many times, response maps may not have information available for effective and accurate response. Coordination between local building officials and fire department commanders is a must. Incomplete connections, closed valves and inadequate water pressure can create water supply problems with on-site systems. Unknown or nonexistent hydrant locations may make it necessary to preplan alternate water sources. Additionally, during initial size up and incident assessment , take into account possible time delays for long and multiple hoselays.

    Trench cave-ins, excavation collapses, shoring and framework failures present challenges to even the largest agency. Undertake pre-incident training to ensure safe and effective rescue operations. In response districts or divisions where extensive, ongoing construction is present, consider securing adequate trench/cave-in rescue equipment, material and tools and develop a company with trained personnel.

    In the rehabilitation, renovation or conversion stages, interior and exterior finishes and materials may be in the process of removal or alteration. Interior partitions may be partially removed, with materials stockpiled and staged at various areas. This stockpiling, with its high fire loading, presents a potential hazard. A fire in a 52-story office building gutted the entire fourteenth floor of the structure, where building materials had been stocked for a renovation project. Interior floor and wall partition removal creates serious deficiencies in the compartmentalization capabilities of the areas, as well as allowing for avenues of fire travel both vertically and horizontally.

    The 30 to 60 percent Stage.
    This is the phase in which the structure begins to evolve into its designed form. The framing systems used rise up with materials being bolted, cast or framed in place. Skeletal steel frames are built up and the structure is fastened together temporarily to allow for the positioning of additional members. Inadequate or incomplete connection points could be affected by weather and environmental conditions, causing the structure to fail and collapse. The dead load of the material itself may shear connecting bolts. Unprotected steel columns and beams are affected by fire and heat exposure from even a small rubbish fire which, in turn, may cause the member to buckle, expand and collapse. Some steel framing may rely on cold-drawn steel cables to provide tension on the frame elements until the exterior skin is applied. These cables can fail at temperatures as low as 500 degrees Fahrenheit, precipitating a collapse.

    Exposed cast-in-place, as well as precast concrete construction, also can be affected by fire and heat exposure. The connection points may fail at a faster rate than that of the material itself, due to the smaller mass of the connecting components. Additionally, the outer layers of concrete can break away when exposed to fire and hear. This action, called spalling, occurs when the moisture content within the concrete is drawn out due to extreme heat conditions. There are two types of spalling. The first is an explosive kind that blows the material in large components away from the members, causing the pieces to be propelled outward toward operating companies, often accompanied by a loud noise. The second type of spalling is a dropping off or flaking action in which the spalling falls from the components with little force. Regardless of the action type, the size of the spall material may be such that crushing injuries are sustained.

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    Since both precast and cast-in-place concrete rely on steel reinforcement for its tensile strength capabilities (the concrete itself provides the compressive strength), spalling actions cause the embedded steel “rebars” to be exposed to the heating and expansion action of heat and fire conditions. This can cause the materials to separate, loosening the bonding action and causing a collapse. Additionally, concrete when applied in a cast-in-place application – where the concrete relies on formwork that is held in place by adjustable steel column rods, wood shoring and bracing – creates an extremely high fire load factor.

    Typically, concrete requires a 28-day cycle to cure to reach its compressive its design strength. Any fire conditions encountered within these formwork and shored floor areas should be treated as conditions in which the concrete is assumed to be “green” or freshly poured. No immediate fire suppression activities should be attempted within these floor areas because of the likelihood of collapse.

    In wood -frame structures, again, the main concern can be toward fire suppression capabilities due to the fire loading of the materials present, as well as the surface-to-mass ratio as a result of exposed framing present. Be aware that rapid fire spread within single structures and to adjoining structures can occur.

    As the structural framing is completed, the exterior skin or building envelope is applied. Windows and doors are fastened, interior partitions are framed and open floor areas begin to become compartmentalized. The mechanical, electrical and service systems begin to be put in place. During the 30 to 90 percent construction phases, there are still numerous conditions that contribute to fire.

    According to NFPA studies as referenced within the NFPA 24 Standard, 60 percent of the fires occurring in buildings undergoing construction, alteration or demolition originates from three specific causes:

    • Salamanders or portable heating equipment (25 percent)
    • Cutting, welding and plumbers’ torch operations (20 percent)
    • Matches and smoking (15 percent)

    During construction phase operations in adverse and cold climates, the use of portable heating devices and salamanders, along with heavy tarps and reinforced plastic sheeting cover the building to maintain a minimum temperature, is common.

    Scaffolding around the perimeter of the building may be covered, allowing no visible indication of building type, materials or alarm response conditions upon the arrival of a company. The heating devices usually fueled by LPG tanks pose dangers because of valve and tank malfunctions, contact with combustible and exposure to fire areas during suppression operations. BLEVEs are common with construction site fires and must be considered when mounting an attack.

    The 60 to 90 percent stage.
    The conditions and hazards present within the 30 to 90 percent phase can be addressed in similar fashion. During this phase, rooms, floors and other areas are undergoing completion with more finish work done with fewer trade personnel.

    During the early 60 to 75 percent stages, conditions still exist requiring full awareness of interior mobility, access and operations. There may be floor areas that still are incomplete or unprotected. Drop-offs and walk-offs may be present at any number of locations. Open shaft-ways, hoist ways, mechanical chase areas and stairwells may exist in uncompleted stages.
    As in the previous 30 to 60 percent stage, floor obstructions, pipe stubs and capped-off services may exist. Firefighters should use personal lighting to detect whether walkway areas are clear and safe. Extreme care must be taken during the night and in smoky conditions to be certain of floor area integrity.

    There are many times that shaftways and chase wells extending through multiple floors are covered temporarily with plywood. Although they may support a worker passing over them, they may not support a fully outfitted firefighter with SCBA and tools. Inadequate lighting conditions may exist throughout the complex and site, with many exposed electrical lines, conduits and power panels. Exposed wiring coming into contact with exposed steel framing and tools can energize a large area, endangering personnel in the immediate area.

    As additional systems are put in place, such as HVAC duct work, plumbing and electrical lines, additional wall areas may be penetrated. Fires originating on one level or area may travel quickly due to convection and conduction. Built-in sprinkler systems may be inoperative due to incomplete pipe runs, closed valves, lines plugged from debris or non-capped branches.
    Fire department connections may be blocked by dumpsters or heavy construction equipment. Interior standpipes may not reach to topped-off floor areas or may have open valves, incomplete connections or non-capped branches.

    Assign manpower to valve determination if attempts at using the standpipe system prove inadequate. Many times an open valve at a lower level may be the culprit. Again, manpower allocations in these areas must be augmented by multiple-alarm and mutual-aid units early in the incident. As the finish work nears completion, stockpiles of new materials begin to form. Solvents, adhesives and flammable, combustible and toxic materials used in the finish/completion stages may be present in large quantities. Class A materials from packing, furniture and equipment boxes may be located throughout the structure.

    Site accessibility improves as more of the interior building areas are completed. Paved access areas and roadways are completed; trenches, excavations and fill have been removed or backfilled. Exterior scaffolding, begins to be removed and heavy construction equipment and cranes are taken off-site. The final stage, consisting of the move-in, may not necessarily take place when the building is completed. Move-ins, when dealing with large-scale structures or high-rises, may take place on the bottom floors while construction proceeds in upper areas.
    It is critical for the safe and effective stabilization and conclusion of any incident within these building sites to assume a greater degree of assessment and subsequent operations.

    Assessment considerations include:

    • Construction type
    • Stage of construction
    • Site conditions and accessibility
    • Exposures
    • Resources
    • Operating procedures
    • Communications

    All operations must assume the risk potential present for the deployment of manpower and equipment, with the full understanding of material, component and site condition integrity during suppression and emergency operations. The magnitude and complexity of the incident will be directly proportional to the size of the building/construction site and age of the existing building, if under renovation, and degree of construction.

    Operational conditions must be addressed during strategic and tactical incident management:

    • Degree of exposed construction
    • Degree of incomplete connections
    • Number of exposures
    • Fire loading
    • Flammable/combustible materials
    • Compressed gases and vessels
    • “Green” concrete and shored, supported areas
    • Exposed electrical and utility services
    • Unprotected openings
    • Obstructions
    • Access
    • Lighting
    • Fire protection system integrity

    The ability for a response agency to safely handle an emergency incident depends upon a set of specific operational factors that include but are not limited to:

    • Incident type
    • Size-up and Assessment Factors
    • Pre-Planning Awareness & Knowledge
    • Strong Command Presence
    • Effective Modular Incident Command Management System
    • Effective Communications
    • Mobilization/ Reflex Capabilities of Response Companies
    • Anticipate
      d & Immediate Resource Needs
    • Apparatus Deployment
    • Operational Modes
    • Exposure Concerns
    • Incident stabilization, time factors
    • Incident Control
    • Fire companies should periodically inspect the construction sites in their response districts. They can assess the risk potential present and preplan for potential incidents. Information should be transmitted to second and third-due company units in the event of a large-scale incident.
    • Serviceability of all existing fire suppression systems on-site must be ascertained. This, alone, may help control situations in a time frame where deployment, application and operation become critical.

    Never assume, but be cautious and analytical in any incident that takes you to a building or construction site. The success of any operation will be dependent upon coordination of companies, technical basis of knowledge, skills and training, and the ability to remain highly flexible, based upon the continuum of information processing, cue-based analysis and incident command management.

    Other resources HERE, HERE and HERE

    Structural Anatomy; Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites

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    Structural Anatomy; Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites

    Fire operations for structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and danger to operating personnel. This reality was clearly validated when; two FDNY firefighters died in the line-of-duty during a seven-alarm fire that tore through the abandoned Deutsche Bank skyscraper in lower Manhattan, next to ground zero in New York City on Saturday August 18, 2007.

    The Deutsche Bank Building located at 130 Liberty Street adjacent to the quarters of FDNY Engine 10, Ladder 10, was once a 40-story high-rise structure that had been systematically reduced to 26-stories at the time of the fire. Significant building contamination from numerous toxic substances that included asbestos and lead resulting from the destruction of the World Trade Center during the September 11th attacks required the deliberate floor-by-floor dismantling effort as part of the deconstruction process that would ultimately remove the building from its present site.

    The two FDNY firefighter fatalities were Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, an eight year veteran and Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran, both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations.

    Post incident investigations, providing insights into fire department operations, physical building conditions, risk profiles, hazards and deficiencies. The fact that the Deutsche Bank building was being dismantled floor by floor- that it was undergoing “Deconstruction” meant that the building was a primary target hazard containing significant operational vulnerabilities, hazards and dangers posing life threatening risk to unsuspecting firefighting personnel. The fact that this building was undergoing asbestos abatement further compounds the degree of risk present.

    Following preliminary investigations, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated that “The failures have many owners, and they are both in the private sector and in the public sector.”

    Mayor Bloomberg further stated failures of oversight, responsibility and judgment may have contributed to the deaths of the two firefighters at the former Deutsche Bank AG building at Ground Zero.

    Preliminary investigations, interviews and reviewed transcripts of radio transmissions made by the hundreds of firefighters who responded to the multiple alarm incident, identified faulted lapses in pre-incident planning and preparedness, mandated periodic inspections by the fire department and documented building hazards and operational recommendations, identified by a fire commander that may have been neglected to be acted upon by upper command. In the wake of the tragic events, three New York Fire Department officers were relieved of their commands, pending further investigation two weeks after the incident. Three particular failings were cited, which New York City officials stated were “simply not excusable”:

    • First, FDNY Engine Company 10 had responsibility for inspecting the Deutsche Bank building but stopped inspecting it in the year 2006. The reasons for the lack of periodic inspections are pending further investigation.
    • Second, city regulatory requirements mandated the Fire Department conduct inspections of the building standpipe every fifteen days when a building is being demolished. This had not been performed at all since demolition began in March 2007.
    • Third, and finally, despite the hazards concerning the Deutsche Bank building, which were well publicized and documented following the events of September 11th, senior FDNY fire officers did not act upon creating a unique pre-fire plan for the building. Published documents that were released to the media apparently identified that a Battalion Chief had recommended doing so on three separate occasions to a Division Commander.

    New York Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta stated careless smoking was attributed as the caused the fire. Smoking was prohibited in the building during the asbestos abatement and deconstruction efforts. However it was discovered that smoking was allowed to take place unabated on the 17th floor of the building. Additional published reports by City officials stated that the incident commanders acted appropriately, considering what they knew at the time. But it’s what they didn’t know that contributed to the enormous difficulties they encountered: specifically, a broken standpipe, a non-functioning sprinkler system and building deconstruction and decontamination operations that exacerbated the fire and caused unacceptably hazardous conditions.

    Its these types of unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces that demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences that require a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation.
    You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.

    Operational factors present at the Deutsche Bank building fire;
    (Please note; any of these factors may be present in any building or occupancy undergoing deconstruction and demolition.)

    • Deconstruction; the high-rise steel frame structure was being systematically dismantled from the top down.
    • Structural assemblies, systems and components were being removed as part of the asbestos abatement and decontamination efforts, creating varying levels of system integrity, exposures and vulnerabilities.
    • Various deconstruction stages throughout the building created exposed structural systems, incomplete or compromised structural & building components/ features that posed significant safety risk to personnel.
    • The building’s exterior was shrouded in a scaffolding system, with limited accessibility and worker travel volume and unprotected external scaffold support systems that were present.
    • Asbestos Abatement Plans created; Abatement Zones, Buffer Zones and Deconstruction Zones- Each Asbestos Zone with significant operations risks and hazards.
    • Interior abatement zones were constructed that created undefined and maze-like conditions.
    • Due to the Asbestos Abatement work, internal HVAC/ ventilation system operations may have been modified in such a manner to contribute to the migration and distribution of smoke and products of combustion to impact fire operations.
      Officials said that in addition to the nonfunctioning stand pipe, fighting the fire was made difficult by the asbestos abatement, which created “maze-like conditions.”
    • Many areas were partitioned off with plastic, and hallways and walls one would find in other buildings had been torn out.
    • Enclosed exterior window walls that were replaced with plywood sheathing creating impenetrable enclosures, limiting egress paths, ventilation paths and providing susceptible fire loading and flame sp
      read potential.
    • Introduction of significant transient combustible loading, i.e., plywood sheathing and panels, poly sheeting and plastics and the introduction of other Class A materials.
    • Access and egress systems were changed or removed, creating no level of certainty in movement and travel paths, access and exiting routes and ability to “read” area profiles and configurations during limited visibility operating conditions
    • Stairwells were eliminated, boarded-up or enclosed. Deconstruction and Asbestos abatement zones and buffers created sealed areas that could not be readily accesses without labor extensive forcible entry and extrication.
    • Compartmentation, enclosures, fire separations and fire barriers were compromised, dismantled or removed, creating undefined open areas, extensive horizontal and vertical voids, plume ways and travel paths.
    • Workers stated they had been stripping asbestos from beams that created gaps and voids in the structural assemblies and systems that fire officials stated may have contributed to the rapid fire spread through these unprotected gaps and holes in the structure.
    • Designed active and passive fire protection and suppression systems, coatings, enclosures and features were in varying stages of removal, dismantling or non-functional.
    • The fire standpipe system was non-operational, compromised and disconnected. An entire of piping was found missing
    • The fire sprinkler system was non-operational
    • There were no apparent controls of potential ignition sources as mandated by regulatory codes and standards: i.e., evidence of discarded cigarette butts in non-smoking areas.
    • The cause of the fire was determined to be careless smoking based upon published reports.
    • This was a known problem based upon worker practices and lack of compliance controls.
      Staging of compressed gas cylinders, flammable and combustible liquids; i.e. Acetylene, oxygen, oils, diesel and gasoline fuels etc.
    • Temporary power distribution and lighting systems, devices and equipment
    • Construction machinery, equipment, motorized apparatus, tools and devices.
    • The state of the building, the asbestos abatement hazard and heavy smoke made conditions especially difficult for firefighters
    • Firefighters had to resort to using ropes to haul hoses up from the street to support the fire attack. The lack of an operational sprinkler or standpipe system contributed toward deployment of extensive manpower to implement operational water supplies and suppression lines.
    • Firefighters were forced to operate without the protection of handlines in rapidly changing and unpredictable building conditions due to configurations.
    • Getting out was no easier than getting in. Only one of the two construction elevators was working and could carry only five or six men at a time, sources said. Yet dozens of firefighters were inside.
    • The fire apparently started in the 17th floor according to workers who first reported the fire. The worst of the fire was on floors 14 though 19, but construction holes and vents created unchecked condition that allowed the fire to travel unabated up and down through the floors, igniting floors 20 through 26 as well.
    • Firefighters on the 14th floor thought they were safely below the blaze – and in a prime position to tackle it – when they were suddenly surrounded by fire and dense black smoke.
    • The two firefighters became trapped in the building and died from exposure to carbon monoxide.
    • The two firefighters were found on the 14th floor close to a hose line after numerous Mayday alerts were communicated and rapid intervention rescue efforts initiated by command.

    Side Note; Deconstruction work was halted for a week in May, 2006, when a 22-foot-long section of pipe fell from one of the 35th floor and went through the roof of a neighboring quarters of FDNY Engine 10, Ladder 10. It was determined at the time the subcontractor responsible with bringing the building down had little experience in bringing down large towers in urban settings

    Safety Considerations
    Bottom line, buildings undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations can pose significant risk to suppression operations and lead to firefighter injuries and fatalities. This can not be stressed enough.

    The unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences, requires a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation. You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.

    The National Fire Protection Association- NFPA Standard 241 for Safeguarding Construction, Alternations, and Demolition Operations provides fire service personnel with good insights into what constitutes planning, preparedness, prevention and mitigation methods to prescribe minimum safeguards for construction, alteration, and demolition operations in order to provide reasonable safety to life and property from fire during operations.

    Command and company officers should consider a number of crucial factors in accessing and determining acceptable risk management profiles, situational awareness management profiles (SAM) and operational deployment modes that may lead to the most error likely tactic (MELT) that may require the most needed change in incident command management or tactical deployment.

    Assessment consideration for Structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations

    The following are assessment considerations that may provide insights in the assessment, risk profile and development of pre-fire plans, operational procedures and field directives to prevent history repeating events (HRE) such the Deutsche Bank with similar conditions and attributes;

    Construction Type

    • What is the construction type or mixed application? How does this affect suppression, rescue, special operations and typical daily operations?
    • Stage and/or Phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
    • The Stage and/or phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovation has, SIGNIFICANT impact on firefighter safety and operational integrity.
    • Understanding these stages and phases can provide mission critical decision-making considerations to incident management teams and company officers.

    Site conditions and accessibility

    • Considerations for both horizontal, vertical and grade conditions.
    • Considerations during changes in stages and phases. Expect changes
    • Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s

    Exposures

    • These will be specific to the commonality or uniqueness of the structure and occupancy.

     

    Resources

    • Do you have enough of what’s going to be needed? Plan for it now, before you’re in the street needing it “yesterday”.
    • Think BIG, as the adage goes, you can always send the companies back. Don’t under estimate the types and kind of resources needs, based upon the structure profile and the potential of undetermined conditions. (reinforces need for pre-planning)
    • Share the Knowledge, Situational Awareness and Pre-planning inf
      ormation with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

    Operating procedures
    Again, response and operations at these types of structures demands that pre-fire plan considerations, dialog, discussions, communications and what ever else is appropriate to you organization is identified and disseminated BEFORE an alarm response occurs. Take advantage of pre-gaming and table top a target occupancy, to increase preparedness and reduce risk potential.

    • Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
    • Update the plans as conditions change
    • Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

    Knowledge and Situational Awareness

    • Understand, explore, research and obtain ALL the necessary information on the structure(s) undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
    • Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
    • Communicate the observations, findings, conditions and considerations.

    Communications

    • What ever you identify- COMMUNICATE this throughout the organization.
      Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

    Special and Unique Conditions

    • Identify and plan for the Special and Unique Conditions that may exclusive to you jurisdiction’s structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.

    Contingency Plans

    • Plan of the unexpected and have contingent plans in place.

    The magnitude and complexity of an incident involving a structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations will be directly proportional to the size of the building/construction site and corresponding age profile (vintage) of the existing building, if under renovation, and degree of construction. Operational deployment and the Incident Action Plan- IAP must be addressed during strategic and tactical incident management, risk profiling and pre-incident and on-scene intelligence, reconnaissance and planning considerations:

    • Degree of exposed construction, systems, assemblies
    • Degree of incomplete connections, systems, assemblies
    • Transfer and integrity of structural dead loads and support systems
    • Civilian Occupancy Load/ or at risk
    • Numbers of exposures and vulnerability
    • Transient Combustible Fire loading
    • Flammable/combustible materials
    • Compressed gases and vessels
    • Exposed electrical and utility services
    • Unprotected openings
    • Obstructions
    • Accessibility, movement and transport
    • Lighting Conditions
    • Fire protection suppression system integrity
    • Availability of internal and operable standpipe systems
    • Availability of water supply sources
    • Degree of Compartmentation
    • Presence of temporary structural support systems
    • Construction equipment, appliances and apparatus present
    • Presence of fire zone separations or fire cut-offs
    • Presence of Special Hazard Operations; i.e., asbestos, lead or toxin abatement
    • Environmental and Weather factors

    Proactive engagement, preparedness and planning can offer safe and effective success paths when addressing structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations. The key here is not to assume these buildings and environments can be managed strategically and tactically under the same premises as other day-to-day occupancies and structures.

    If recognition primed decision making (RPDM) gives us one truism that is predicable, it’s the fact that fire suppression operations in structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations are;

    • High Risk/ High Consequence,
    • High Degree Situational Awareness Based
    • Operations in these types of structures can and will kill firefighters
    • Are Predictably- Unpredictable, BUT Manageable
    • Demand competent incident management
    • Require effective company officer leadership
    • Necessitate skilled Firefighters
    • Can be (under circumstances) written-off
    • Assume rapid and unchecked fire travel
    • Assume unpredictable transient combustible fire loading
    • Assume increased fire flow demands for suppression effect
    • Assume rapidly changing
    • Consider hose stream deployment time in the absence of supporting fixed standpipe or sprinkler systems.
    • Other internal building systems such as HVAC/ Ventilation may be compromised or function in an unexpected manner.
    • Require Pre-Planning Awareness and Pre-incident Knowledge
    • Demands Air Management Considerations
    • Timely deployable resource; manpower and equipment
    • Mobilization/ Reflex Capabilities of Response Companies
    • Incident Command Flexibility
    • Conservative Risk Management Profiling AND Conservative Tactical Deployment
    • Situational Awareness Management – SAM
    • Identification of the Most Error Likely Tactic- MELT

    Take a look at what’s going on in your first or second due area. What about your battalion, the adjacent district or community or area? Chances are there’s a lot in the way of structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.

    • Are you prepared? If not, what needs to be addressed?
    • What can you implement to reduce the risk & increase the safety margin for your personnel?
    • Are your personnel adequately trained to deal with these types of situations and occupancies?
    • How can the training gaps be closed?
    • Are Skills sets, Situational Safety Awareness and knowledge adequate?
    • What are the Most Error Likely Tactics (MELT) that you think would be deployed if you responded to a incident involving structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and Renovations?
    • What needs to be implemented, changed or communicated?
    • Identify and Discuss your local risk factors and what can be done strategically & tactically

    Take the time to look at structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations. The message is clear;

    • Their unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks
    • Create consequences that requiring a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation.
    • You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures.
    • Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
    • Pre-plan, inspect, predict and plan
    • Firefighter survivability and Incident Safety demands it.

    Post Script; In light of the preliminary investigation in the weeks following the Deutsche Bank building fire and line-of-duty deaths, FDNY Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta ordered the following actions implemented on August 27, 2007 in connection with the fatal fire at the former Deutsche Bank building at 130 Liberty Street in Manhattan:
    · Deputy Chiefs in the Department’s nine Divisions have been directed to order surveillance by every fire unit in their respective administrative areas of all buildings under construction/demolition.
    · The purpose of these inspections is to insure that all rules and regulations regarding fire protection and p
    ublic safety are being adhered to.
    · Divisions are also ordered to review all existing pre-fire plans in their respective administrative areas, and to have units and Battalions canvass their areas for any potential structures that might require the creation of such plans.
    · Borough Commanders are ordered to oversee and coordinate all field fire inspection activities in their respective boroughs.
    · The Chief of Operations will conduct a review of the Department’s field inspection program with emphasis on insuring accountability at all levels and making recommendations to strengthen and improve the quality and frequency of inspections by field units.

    Additional References;
    Vacant or Idle Properties or Properties Under Construction or Demolition or RenovationNational Fire Protection Association- NFPA Publications August 2001Selections from the U.S. Overview Report on structures that are vacant or under construction, renovation or demolition, Occupancy Cause Tables, and selected published incident descriptions.

    New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2007/08/16/nyregion/20070817_BANK_SLIDESHOW_17.html
    Power point program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites, HERE

    PDF file of the PPT program Power point program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites