AP Photo

5-5-5-5 August 18, 2007

Published reports are being stating that the least senior of three construction officials in the Deutsche Bank manslaughter trial was acquitted of all charges today — after telling jurors that he had no idea the giant pipe he helped remove from the basement had anything to do with providing water to firefighters.

A construction foreman charged with the deaths of two firefighters in the Deutsche Bank building blaze was acquitted of all charges. Salvatore DePaola was cleared by a Manhattan jury of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide on the eighth day of deliberations.

According to reports published in a number of NYC newspapers; “It’s a happy day and a sad day,” said DePaola. “We’ve still got two firefighters that are deceased.” Firefighters Robert Beddia, 33, and Joe Graffagnino, 53 perished after they raced into the burning Ground Zero tower in 2007.

Prosecutors argued that DePaola, who works for the John Galt Corporation, and two of his colleagues should have known a key firefighting pipe had been cut. Salvatore DePaola, 56, of Staten Island, broke into tears as he was found not guilty of manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges in the August, 2007, smoke inhalation deaths of firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino.

“I had no idea it was a standpipe,” DePaola insisted of the primary physical evidence in the case — a 42-foot section of pipe that all three defendants were accused of intentionally disregarding and discarding after it crashed to the ground from the basement ceiling nine months before the fire.

The jury is still deliberating in the case of DePaola’s colleague, site safety manager Jeffrey Melofchik.

Jurors have yet to reach a verdict on identical manslaughter and endangerment charges against their remaining defendant, Jeffrey Melofchik, 48, who worked as site safety manager for the demolition’s general contractor, Bovis Lend Lease. They will continue their deliberations tomorrow.

A third defendant, project asbestos abatement director, Mitchel Alvo, 58, has opted for a non-jury verdict; Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Rena Uviller has not said when she will render that decision.

As to who he thought should have been prosecuted in the defendants’ stead, De Paola — whose own son is a firefighter at Engine 160 in Staten Island — made a reference to “lieutenants” with the FDNY before his lawyer advised him to remain silent on that issue, given that deliberations are continuing.

Today was the seventh full day of deliberations in the three-month-long trial.

• Read more: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/manhattan/deutsche_bank_contracter_found_not_r8IIytYrswxr2ixNgkryMN#ixzz1Qcb1qQEe

Previous CommandSafety.com coverage:

• Remembrance: Deutsche Bank Fire FDNY LODD- August 18, 2007
• FDNY Deutsche Bank Building LODD Fire Report issued by NIOSH 
• The Complete NIOSH Report is available HERE 
• An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of  the PPT program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites 
• Additional Links, HERE and HERE
• New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work, HERE

Other References and postings;

Thirty years ago on the morning of November 21, 1980, 85 people died and more than 700 were injured as a result of a fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. This was the second largest life-loss hotel fire in United States history. It was determined during the investigation that the fire originated in the wall soffit of the side stand in the Deli, one of five restaurants located on the casino level. The investigators concluded that several factors contributed to the cause of the fire but the primary source of ignition was an electrical ground fault. 

Once the fire ignited, it quickly traveled to the ceiling and the giant air-circulation system above the casino. In the casino, flames fed on flammable furnishings, including wall coverings, PVC piping, glue, fixtures, and even the mirrors on the walls, which were made of plastic.  

The fire burned undetected for hours until it flashed over just after 7 a.m. and began spreading at a rate of 19 feet (5.8 meters) per second through the casino. As fire companies and firefighters were arriving, according to published reports, an estimated one-million-cubic-foot wall of flames was rushing through the casino, melting slot machines and sending a cyanide-laced cloud of killer smoke pouring upward.  

The investigation determined that the rapid fire spread was due to a series of installation and building design flaws. A wire at the point of fire origin that had been improperly grounded could’ve been discovered had the area been inspected. A compressor wasn’t properly installed. A piece of copper wasn’t insulated correctly. A fire alarm never sounded. A stairwell that was a crucial escape route filled with smoke. The laundry chutes failed to seal and defects existed in the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems. All of these factors contributed to the spread of smoke.  

Photo: AP/World Wide

This fire provided a wake-up call for the industry to improve fire safety standards in hotels around the country. As a result, hotels today are safer than ever.  

• About 5,000 people were in the resort when the blaze started to burn in earnest.
• Many were trapped in their rooms, in the corridors, and in stairwells, and most of the victims died at the scene or in Las Vegas Valley hospitals.
• Another handful of victims succumbed to fire-related injuries within a year.
• Fourteen firefighters were hospitalized, most suffering from smoke inhalation.
• According to the newspapers reports, NFPA’s Fire Investigation Manager, David Demers, concluded that “with sprinklers, it would have been a one or two sprinkler fire, and we would never have heard about it.”
• An employee cutting through the closed Deli on the way to work was the first to see the fire. The worker, not identified by name in the fire investigation report, called security, then tried to put it out. The worker wasn’t trained and the proper equipment wasn’t there, the NFPA investigation said.
• A visiting firefighter from Illinois breakfasting in an adjacent coffee shop also tried to help a security guard find an extinguisher to put out the electrical fire, but they couldn’t locate one.
• A flame front moved into the casino, where the fire gained speed and strength, fueled by more flammable materials, including the highly flammable adhesive used to attach ceiling tiles.
• Again, sprinklers would have put the fire out there.
• Without them, within minutes, the fireball tore through the casino, blowing out the doors leading to the valet area.
• Soon, killer smoke rose through the 26-floor high-rise tower via ventilation ducts.
• While the lack of sprinklers was a major factor contributing to the severity of the MGM fire, it’s not that simple. Blame also has to be given to code violations, design flaws, installation errors, and materials that made the fire worse.
• The fire alarms didn’t sound because they were manual and nobody pulled them. However, the disaster might have been worse if the alarms had prompted more people to rush into smoke-filled hallways.
• Despite the discovery of 83 building code violations, nobody was ever charged criminally with any wrongdoing

 To make matters worse, fire marshals had insisted sprinklers be installed in the casino during the building’s construction in 1972, but the hotel refused to pay for the $192,000 system, and a Clark County building official sided with the resort. Authorities later said the sprinkler system could have prevented the disaster at the hotel, which is now Bally’s Las Vegas Hilton Casino Resort. The fallout was $223 million in legal settlements, in addition to the lives lost.   

• Construction of the 26-story MGM Grand Hotel and Casino (currently Bally’s) started in 1972 and it opened in December of 1973.
• There were 2,078 rooms at the hotel and the total area of the hotel and casino was approximately two million square feet.
• Fire sprinkler systems were not installed in the high-rise hotel, the casino (approximately 380 by 1200 feet, or 450,000 square feet), and the restaurant areas.
• Only partial fire sprinkler protection was provided for limited areas (arcade, showrooms and convention areas) on the ground level.
• Where the sprinklers had been installed, they clearly worked. But sprinklers weren’t anywhere near where the fire broke out behind a wall near a serving station at The Deli that Friday morning about 7:10 a.m.
• The Deli had received an exemption for sprinklers because it was supposed to be a 24-hour restaurant. It was assumed someone would always be there to put out a fire.
• But then the hours changed and The Deli wasn’t open all the time. It was closed when the fire erupted.
• The fire, caused by an electrical ground-fault, smoldered for hours before breaking through the wall.

• According to NFPA’s final investigation report , several major factors contributed to the large loss of life in this fire. Among them was the rapid fire and smoke development in the casino in the early stages of the fire due, in part, to the lack of sprinklers and adequate fire barriers.
• The fire generated massive amounts of smoke that spread up the hotel’s 23-story high-rise tower through unprotected vertical seismic joints and elevator hoistways and the substandard interior stair enclosures and exit passages.
• In addition, the hotel’s heating, ventilating, and air conditioning continued to operate during the fire, pushing smoke throughout the high-rise.
• Investigators found no evidence that the hotel had executed an emergency plan or sounded an evacuation alarm signal. Nor was there any evidence of manual fire alarm pull stations in the natural escape path in the casino.
• The number and capacity of the exits from the casino were deficient, and the travel distances from certain areas of the casino to the exits were too long.
• Finally, there was no automatic means of recalling the elevators to the main floor during the fire to prevent people from boarding them. Ten of the MGM Grand victims were found in the hotel’s elevators.
• As a result of this fire, NFPA Life Safety Code® requirements for stairwell re-entry onto building floors if the exit stair enclosure becomes untenable were changed to include three options.
• Stairwell doors must now remain unlocked on the inside of the stairwell so that people can get from the stairwell back to guest room floor.
• Or they may be locked, but they must automatically unlock when the building’s fire alarm system activates.
• Or hotels may use selected re-entry, in which there may be no more than four intervening floors between unlocked doors and signs must be provided to direct occupants to the floors with unlocked doors

Graphic by Mike Johnson.

  On the night of February 10, 1981, just 90 days after the devastating MGM Grand fire, an arson fire started at the Las Vegas Hilton, which at the time was being retrofitted with modern fire safety equipment. Firefighters, using the knowledge they had learned from the MGM fire, used local television networks to notify people to stay in their rooms and not go out to the halls and stairwells. Because of the lessons learned, only eight people died in this fire compared with the 84 people who died in the MGM Grand fire 

   

   

Reference Links: HERE, HERE, HERE , HERE and HERE   

Clark County (NV) Fire Department Report: HERE and Link to FD Page HERE   

NFPA Summary Report, HERE and HERE  and Article Link HERE 

NFPA Looking back at the MGM Fire, HERE   

RELATED NFPA INFORMATION
 NFPA Investigation Report: Las Vegas MGM Grand Fire  

 U.S. Hotel Fire Incident With 10 Or More Fatalities (PDF, 17KB)
 Additional Hotel/Motel Safety Information and Statistics
 Looking Back: The MGM Grand Hotel Fire (NFPA Journal, May/June 2010)
 NFPA remembers the 1980 MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas (NFPA Journal, March/April 2001) 

Las Vegas Review Journal Media Research: Here   

USFA Topical Fire Report Series; Hotel and Motel Fires, HERE 

Lessons from the Past: MGM Grand Fire on Firehouse.com, HERE   

Las Vegas and Nevada history as told by those who lived it- The MGM Fire 1980. This six part series was broadcast in 2000 and produced by KNPR’s Tim Anderson with support from the Nevada Humanities Committee. HERE   

These links from the Las Vegas Review Journal Media covered the 25th Anniversary of the event;   

IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER
IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Disaster didn’t have to be
IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Officer recalls eerie scene at burned hotel   

MGM Grand Fire Photos, HERE   

Current Data from the USFA:  

• An estimated 3,900 hotel and motel fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 15 deaths, 150 injuries, and $76 million in property loss.
• Hotel and motel fires are considered part of the residential fire problem. However, they comprise only approximately 1 percent of residential building fires.
• Half of hotel and motel fires are small, confined fires.
• Cooking is the leading cause of hotel and motel fires (46 percent). Almost all hotel and motel cooking fires are small, confined fires (97 percent).
• Eighteen percent of non-confined hotel and motel fires extend beyond the room of origin. The leading causes of these larger fires are electrical malfunctions (24 percent), intentionally set fires (15 percent), and fires caused by open flames (12 percent). In contrast, 42 percent of all non-confined residential building fires extend beyond the room of origin.
• While bedrooms are the primary origin of non-confined fires (23 percent), when confined cooking fires are considered, the kitchen or other cooking area is the most prevalent area of fire origin.
• Hotel and motel fires are more prevalent in the cooler months due to increases in heating fires and peak in February (9 percent).

Bally's Las Vegas, formerly the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino today

Remembering the One Meridian Plaza High-rise Fire,1991

Ceremonies took place on Wednesday October 21 in Philadelphia, PA unvieling a memorial honoring PFD Fire Capt. David P. Holcombe, Firefighter Phyllis McAllister and Firefighter James A. Chappell who died in the line of duty while conducting operations at a high-rise fire in what is known as the One Meridian Plaza Fire which occurred on February 23, 1991.

A fire on the 22nd floor of the 38-story Meridian Bank Building, also known as One Meridian Plaza, was reported to the Philadelphia Fire Department on February 23, 1991 at approximately 2040 hours and burned for more than 19 hours.

· The fire caused three firefighter fatalities (LODD) and injuries to 24 firefighters.
· The 12-alarms brought 51 engine companies, 15 ladder companies, 11 specialized units, and over 300 firefighters to the scene.
· It was one of the largest high-rise office building fire in modern American history –completely consuming eight floors of the building –and was controlled only when it reached a floor that was protected by automatic sprinklers.
· The Fire Department arrived to find a well-developed fire on the 22nd floor, with fire dropping down to the 21st floor through a set of convenience stairs.
· Heavy smoke had already entered the stairways and the floors immediately above the 22nd.
· Fire attack was hampered by a complete failure of the building’s electrical system and by inadequate water pressure, caused in part by improperly set pressure reducing valves on standpipe hose outlets.

The USFA published a technical report (USFA-TR-049) on the One Meridian Plaza fire that is still available for download from the USFA web site, HERE. The report clearly defined the need in 1991, for built-in fire protection systems and reiterated the fact that fire departments alone cannot expect or be expected to provide the level of fire protection that modem high-rises demand. That fire protection must be built-in to the structures. This was clearly illustrated in this event when the One Meridian Plaza fire was finally stopped when it reached a floor where automatic sprinklers had been installed.

One Meridian Plaza was a 38-story high-rise office building, located in the heart of downtown Philadelphia, in an area of high-rise and mid-rise structures. The building had three underground levels, 36 above ground occupiable floors, two mechanical floors (12 and 38), and two rooftop helipads. The building was rectangular in shape, approximately 243 feet in length by 92 feet in width (approximately 22,400 gross square feet), with roughly 17,000 net usable square feet per floor. Site work for construction began in 1968, and the building was completed and approved for occupancy in 1973.

Construction was classified by the Philadelphia Department of Licenses and Inspections as equivalent to BOCA Type 1B construction which requires 3-hour fire rated building columns, 2-hour fire rated horizontal beams and floor/ ceiling systems, and l-hour fire rated corridors and tenant separations. Shafts, including stairways, are required to be 2-hour fire rated construction, and roofs must have l-hour fire rated assemblies.

The building frame was structural steel with concrete floors poured over metal decks. All structural steel and floor assemblies were protected with spray-on fireproofing material. The exterior of the building was covered by granite curtain wall panels with glass windows attached to the perimeter floor girders and spandrels. The building utilized a central core design, although one side of the core is adjacent to the south exterior wall. The core area was approximately 38 feet wide by 124 feet long and contained two stairways, four banks of elevators, two HVAC supply duct shafts, bathroom utility chases, and telephone and electrical risers.

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
· Origin and Cause: The fire started in a vacant 22nd floor office in a pile of linseed oil-soaked rags left by a contractor. Fire Alarm System The activation of a smoke detector on the 22nd floor was the first notice of a possible fire. Due to incomplete detector coverage, the fire was already well advanced before the detector was activated.
· Building Staff Response Building employees did not call the fire department when the alarm was activated. An employee investigating the alarm was trapped when the elevator opened on the fire floor and was rescued when personnel on the ground level activated the manual recall. The Fire Department was not called until the employee had been rescued.
· Alarm Monitoring Service The private service which monitors the fire alarm system did not call the Fire Department when the alarm was first activated. A call was made to the building to verify that they were aware of the alarm. The building personnel were already checking the alarm at that time.
· Electrical Systems Installation of the primary and secondary electrical power risers in a common unprotected enclosure resulted in a complete power failure when the fire-damaged conductors shorted to ground. The natural gas powered emergency generator also failed.
· Fire Barriers Unprotected penetrations in fire-resistance rated assemblies and the absence of fire dampers in ventilation shafts permitted fire and smoke to spread vertically and horizontally.
· Ventilation openings in the stairway enclosures permitted smoke to migrate into the stairways, complicating firefighting.
· Unprotected openings in the enclosure walls of 22nd floor electrical closet permitted the fire to impinge on the primary and secondary electrical power risers.
· Standpipe System and Pressure Reducing Valves (PRVs): Improperly installed standpipe valves provided inadequate pressure for fire department hose streams using 1 3/ 4-inch hose and automatic fog nozzles. Pressure reducing valves were installed to limit standpipe outlet discharge pressures to safe levels. The PRVs were set too low to produce effective hose streams; tools and expertise to adjust the valve settings did not become available until too late.
· Locked Stairway Doors: For security reasons, stairway doors were locked to prevent reentry except on designated floors. (A building code variance had been granted to approve this arrangement.) This compelled firefighters to use forcible entry tactics to gain access from stairways to floor areas.
· Fire Department Pre-Fire Planning: Only limited pre-fire plan information was available to the Incident Commander. Building owners provided detailed plans as the fire progressed. · Firefighter Fatalities: Three firefighters from Engine Company 11 died on the 28th floor when they became disoriented and ran out of air in their SCBAs.
· Exterior Fire Spread: “Autoexposure” Exterior vertical fire spread resulted when exterior windows failed. This was a primary means of fire spread.
· Structural Failures: Fire-resistance rated construction features, particularly floor-ceiling assemblies and shaft enclosures (including stair shafts), failed when exposed to continuous fire of unusual intensity and duration.
· Int
erior Fire Suppression Abandoned: After more than 11 hours of uncontrolled fire growth and spread, interior firefighting efforts were abandoned due to the risk of structural collapse.
· Automatic Sprinklers: The fire was eventually stopped when it reached the fully sprinklered 30th floor. Ten sprinkler heads activated at different points of fire penetration. · The three firefighters who died were attempting to ventilate the center stair tower: They radioed a request for help stating that they were on the 30th floor. After extensive search and rescue efforts, their bodies were later found on the 28th floor. They had exhausted all of their air supply and could not escape to reach fresh air. At the time of their deaths, the 28th floor was not burning but had an extremely heavy smoke condition.
· After the loss of three personnel, hours of unsuccessful attack on the fire, with several floors simultaneously involved in fire, and a risk of structural collapse, the Incident Commander withdrew all personnel from the building due to the uncontrollable risk factors. The fire ultimately spread up to the 30th floor where it was stopped by ten automatic sprinklers.

Take the time to review this report and examine some of similar issues affecting the fire service today in the areas of staffing and resources, construction and materials, building codes, built-in fire suppression systems, training, pre-fire planning, fire load, fire dynamics and the current methodologies on wind-drive fire theory. Also take a look at the issues that affected operations at the 1988 Interstate Bank Fire in downtown Los Angeles, California.

Structural Anatomy; Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites

Fire operations for structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and danger to operating personnel. This reality was clearly validated when; two FDNY firefighters died in the line-of-duty during a seven-alarm fire that tore through the abandoned Deutsche Bank skyscraper in lower Manhattan, next to ground zero in New York City on Saturday August 18, 2007.

The Deutsche Bank Building located at 130 Liberty Street adjacent to the quarters of FDNY Engine 10, Ladder 10, was once a 40-story high-rise structure that had been systematically reduced to 26-stories at the time of the fire. Significant building contamination from numerous toxic substances that included asbestos and lead resulting from the destruction of the World Trade Center during the September 11th attacks required the deliberate floor-by-floor dismantling effort as part of the deconstruction process that would ultimately remove the building from its present site.

The two FDNY firefighter fatalities were Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, an eight year veteran and Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran, both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations.

Post incident investigations, providing insights into fire department operations, physical building conditions, risk profiles, hazards and deficiencies. The fact that the Deutsche Bank building was being dismantled floor by floor- that it was undergoing “Deconstruction” meant that the building was a primary target hazard containing significant operational vulnerabilities, hazards and dangers posing life threatening risk to unsuspecting firefighting personnel. The fact that this building was undergoing asbestos abatement further compounds the degree of risk present.

Following preliminary investigations, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated that “The failures have many owners, and they are both in the private sector and in the public sector.”

Mayor Bloomberg further stated failures of oversight, responsibility and judgment may have contributed to the deaths of the two firefighters at the former Deutsche Bank AG building at Ground Zero.

Preliminary investigations, interviews and reviewed transcripts of radio transmissions made by the hundreds of firefighters who responded to the multiple alarm incident, identified faulted lapses in pre-incident planning and preparedness, mandated periodic inspections by the fire department and documented building hazards and operational recommendations, identified by a fire commander that may have been neglected to be acted upon by upper command. In the wake of the tragic events, three New York Fire Department officers were relieved of their commands, pending further investigation two weeks after the incident. Three particular failings were cited, which New York City officials stated were “simply not excusable”:

• First, FDNY Engine Company 10 had responsibility for inspecting the Deutsche Bank building but stopped inspecting it in the year 2006. The reasons for the lack of periodic inspections are pending further investigation.
• Second, city regulatory requirements mandated the Fire Department conduct inspections of the building standpipe every fifteen days when a building is being demolished. This had not been performed at all since demolition began in March 2007.
• Third, and finally, despite the hazards concerning the Deutsche Bank building, which were well publicized and documented following the events of September 11th, senior FDNY fire officers did not act upon creating a unique pre-fire plan for the building. Published documents that were released to the media apparently identified that a Battalion Chief had recommended doing so on three separate occasions to a Division Commander.

New York Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta stated careless smoking was attributed as the caused the fire. Smoking was prohibited in the building during the asbestos abatement and deconstruction efforts. However it was discovered that smoking was allowed to take place unabated on the 17th floor of the building. Additional published reports by City officials stated that the incident commanders acted appropriately, considering what they knew at the time. But it’s what they didn’t know that contributed to the enormous difficulties they encountered: specifically, a broken standpipe, a non-functioning sprinkler system and building deconstruction and decontamination operations that exacerbated the fire and caused unacceptably hazardous conditions.

Its these types of unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces that demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences that require a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation.
You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.

Operational factors present at the Deutsche Bank building fire;
(Please note; any of these factors may be present in any building or occupancy undergoing deconstruction and demolition.)

• Deconstruction; the high-rise steel frame structure was being systematically dismantled from the top down.
• Structural assemblies, systems and components were being removed as part of the asbestos abatement and decontamination efforts, creating varying levels of system integrity, exposures and vulnerabilities.
• Various deconstruction stages throughout the building created exposed structural systems, incomplete or compromised structural & building components/ features that posed significant safety risk to personnel.
• The building’s exterior was shrouded in a scaffolding system, with limited accessibility and worker travel volume and unprotected external scaffold support systems that were present.
• Asbestos Abatement Plans created; Abatement Zones, Buffer Zones and Deconstruction Zones- Each Asbestos Zone with significant operations risks and hazards.
• Interior abatement zones were constructed that created undefined and maze-like conditions.
• Due to the Asbestos Abatement work, internal HVAC/ ventilation system operations may have been modified in such a manner to contribute to the migration and distribution of smoke and products of combustion to impact fire operations.
  Officials said that in addition to the nonfunctioning stand pipe, fighting the fire was made difficult by the asbestos abatement, which created “maze-like conditions.”
• Many areas were partitioned off with plastic, and hallways and walls one would find in other buildings had been torn out.
• Enclosed exterior window walls that were replaced with plywood sheathing creating impenetrable enclosures, limiting egress paths, ventilation paths and providing susceptible fire loading and flame sp
  read potential.
• Introduction of significant transient combustible loading, i.e., plywood sheathing and panels, poly sheeting and plastics and the introduction of other Class A materials.
• Access and egress systems were changed or removed, creating no level of certainty in movement and travel paths, access and exiting routes and ability to “read” area profiles and configurations during limited visibility operating conditions
• Stairwells were eliminated, boarded-up or enclosed. Deconstruction and Asbestos abatement zones and buffers created sealed areas that could not be readily accesses without labor extensive forcible entry and extrication.
• Compartmentation, enclosures, fire separations and fire barriers were compromised, dismantled or removed, creating undefined open areas, extensive horizontal and vertical voids, plume ways and travel paths.
• Workers stated they had been stripping asbestos from beams that created gaps and voids in the structural assemblies and systems that fire officials stated may have contributed to the rapid fire spread through these unprotected gaps and holes in the structure.
• Designed active and passive fire protection and suppression systems, coatings, enclosures and features were in varying stages of removal, dismantling or non-functional.
• The fire standpipe system was non-operational, compromised and disconnected. An entire of piping was found missing
• The fire sprinkler system was non-operational
• There were no apparent controls of potential ignition sources as mandated by regulatory codes and standards: i.e., evidence of discarded cigarette butts in non-smoking areas.
• The cause of the fire was determined to be careless smoking based upon published reports.
• This was a known problem based upon worker practices and lack of compliance controls.
  Staging of compressed gas cylinders, flammable and combustible liquids; i.e. Acetylene, oxygen, oils, diesel and gasoline fuels etc.
• Temporary power distribution and lighting systems, devices and equipment
• Construction machinery, equipment, motorized apparatus, tools and devices.
• The state of the building, the asbestos abatement hazard and heavy smoke made conditions especially difficult for firefighters
• Firefighters had to resort to using ropes to haul hoses up from the street to support the fire attack. The lack of an operational sprinkler or standpipe system contributed toward deployment of extensive manpower to implement operational water supplies and suppression lines.
• Firefighters were forced to operate without the protection of handlines in rapidly changing and unpredictable building conditions due to configurations.
• Getting out was no easier than getting in. Only one of the two construction elevators was working and could carry only five or six men at a time, sources said. Yet dozens of firefighters were inside.
• The fire apparently started in the 17th floor according to workers who first reported the fire. The worst of the fire was on floors 14 though 19, but construction holes and vents created unchecked condition that allowed the fire to travel unabated up and down through the floors, igniting floors 20 through 26 as well.
• Firefighters on the 14th floor thought they were safely below the blaze – and in a prime position to tackle it – when they were suddenly surrounded by fire and dense black smoke.
• The two firefighters became trapped in the building and died from exposure to carbon monoxide.
• The two firefighters were found on the 14th floor close to a hose line after numerous Mayday alerts were communicated and rapid intervention rescue efforts initiated by command.

Side Note; Deconstruction work was halted for a week in May, 2006, when a 22-foot-long section of pipe fell from one of the 35th floor and went through the roof of a neighboring quarters of FDNY Engine 10, Ladder 10. It was determined at the time the subcontractor responsible with bringing the building down had little experience in bringing down large towers in urban settings

Safety Considerations
Bottom line, buildings undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations can pose significant risk to suppression operations and lead to firefighter injuries and fatalities. This can not be stressed enough.

The unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences, requires a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation. You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.

The National Fire Protection Association- NFPA Standard 241 for Safeguarding Construction, Alternations, and Demolition Operations provides fire service personnel with good insights into what constitutes planning, preparedness, prevention and mitigation methods to prescribe minimum safeguards for construction, alteration, and demolition operations in order to provide reasonable safety to life and property from fire during operations.

Command and company officers should consider a number of crucial factors in accessing and determining acceptable risk management profiles, situational awareness management profiles (SAM) and operational deployment modes that may lead to the most error likely tactic (MELT) that may require the most needed change in incident command management or tactical deployment.

Assessment consideration for Structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations

The following are assessment considerations that may provide insights in the assessment, risk profile and development of pre-fire plans, operational procedures and field directives to prevent history repeating events (HRE) such the Deutsche Bank with similar conditions and attributes;

Construction Type

• What is the construction type or mixed application? How does this affect suppression, rescue, special operations and typical daily operations?
• Stage and/or Phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
• The Stage and/or phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovation has, SIGNIFICANT impact on firefighter safety and operational integrity.
• Understanding these stages and phases can provide mission critical decision-making considerations to incident management teams and company officers.

Site conditions and accessibility

• Considerations for both horizontal, vertical and grade conditions.
• Considerations during changes in stages and phases. Expect changes
• Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s

Exposures

• These will be specific to the commonality or uniqueness of the structure and occupancy.

Resources

• Do you have enough of what’s going to be needed? Plan for it now, before you’re in the street needing it “yesterday”.
• Think BIG, as the adage goes, you can always send the companies back. Don’t under estimate the types and kind of resources needs, based upon the structure profile and the potential of undetermined conditions. (reinforces need for pre-planning)
• Share the Knowledge, Situational Awareness and Pre-planning inf
  ormation with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

Operating procedures
Again, response and operations at these types of structures demands that pre-fire plan considerations, dialog, discussions, communications and what ever else is appropriate to you organization is identified and disseminated BEFORE an alarm response occurs. Take advantage of pre-gaming and table top a target occupancy, to increase preparedness and reduce risk potential.

• Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
• Update the plans as conditions change
• Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

Knowledge and Situational Awareness

• Understand, explore, research and obtain ALL the necessary information on the structure(s) undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
• Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
• Communicate the observations, findings, conditions and considerations.

Communications

• What ever you identify- COMMUNICATE this throughout the organization.
  Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

Special and Unique Conditions

• Identify and plan for the Special and Unique Conditions that may exclusive to you jurisdiction’s structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.

Contingency Plans

• Plan of the unexpected and have contingent plans in place.

The magnitude and complexity of an incident involving a structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations will be directly proportional to the size of the building/construction site and corresponding age profile (vintage) of the existing building, if under renovation, and degree of construction. Operational deployment and the Incident Action Plan- IAP must be addressed during strategic and tactical incident management, risk profiling and pre-incident and on-scene intelligence, reconnaissance and planning considerations:

• Degree of exposed construction, systems, assemblies
• Degree of incomplete connections, systems, assemblies
• Transfer and integrity of structural dead loads and support systems
• Civilian Occupancy Load/ or at risk
• Numbers of exposures and vulnerability
• Transient Combustible Fire loading
• Flammable/combustible materials
• Compressed gases and vessels
• Exposed electrical and utility services
• Unprotected openings
• Obstructions
• Accessibility, movement and transport
• Lighting Conditions
• Fire protection suppression system integrity
• Availability of internal and operable standpipe systems
• Availability of water supply sources
• Degree of Compartmentation
• Presence of temporary structural support systems
• Construction equipment, appliances and apparatus present
• Presence of fire zone separations or fire cut-offs
• Presence of Special Hazard Operations; i.e., asbestos, lead or toxin abatement
• Environmental and Weather factors

Proactive engagement, preparedness and planning can offer safe and effective success paths when addressing structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations. The key here is not to assume these buildings and environments can be managed strategically and tactically under the same premises as other day-to-day occupancies and structures.

If recognition primed decision making (RPDM) gives us one truism that is predicable, it’s the fact that fire suppression operations in structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations are;

• High Risk/ High Consequence,
• High Degree Situational Awareness Based
• Operations in these types of structures can and will kill firefighters
• Are Predictably- Unpredictable, BUT Manageable
• Demand competent incident management
• Require effective company officer leadership
• Necessitate skilled Firefighters
• Can be (under circumstances) written-off
• Assume rapid and unchecked fire travel
• Assume unpredictable transient combustible fire loading
• Assume increased fire flow demands for suppression effect
• Assume rapidly changing
• Consider hose stream deployment time in the absence of supporting fixed standpipe or sprinkler systems.
• Other internal building systems such as HVAC/ Ventilation may be compromised or function in an unexpected manner.
• Require Pre-Planning Awareness and Pre-incident Knowledge
• Demands Air Management Considerations
• Timely deployable resource; manpower and equipment
• Mobilization/ Reflex Capabilities of Response Companies
• Incident Command Flexibility
• Conservative Risk Management Profiling AND Conservative Tactical Deployment
• Situational Awareness Management – SAM
• Identification of the Most Error Likely Tactic- MELT

Take a look at what’s going on in your first or second due area. What about your battalion, the adjacent district or community or area? Chances are there’s a lot in the way of structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.

• Are you prepared? If not, what needs to be addressed?
• What can you implement to reduce the risk & increase the safety margin for your personnel?
• Are your personnel adequately trained to deal with these types of situations and occupancies?
• How can the training gaps be closed?
• Are Skills sets, Situational Safety Awareness and knowledge adequate?
• What are the Most Error Likely Tactics (MELT) that you think would be deployed if you responded to a incident involving structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and Renovations?
• What needs to be implemented, changed or communicated?
• Identify and Discuss your local risk factors and what can be done strategically & tactically

Take the time to look at structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations. The message is clear;

• Their unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks
• Create consequences that requiring a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation.
• You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures.
• Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
• Pre-plan, inspect, predict and plan
• Firefighter survivability and Incident Safety demands it.

Post Script; In light of the preliminary investigation in the weeks following the Deutsche Bank building fire and line-of-duty deaths, FDNY Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta ordered the following actions implemented on August 27, 2007 in connection with the fatal fire at the former Deutsche Bank building at 130 Liberty Street in Manhattan:
· Deputy Chiefs in the Department’s nine Divisions have been directed to order surveillance by every fire unit in their respective administrative areas of all buildings under construction/demolition.
· The purpose of these inspections is to insure that all rules and regulations regarding fire protection and p
ublic safety are being adhered to.
· Divisions are also ordered to review all existing pre-fire plans in their respective administrative areas, and to have units and Battalions canvass their areas for any potential structures that might require the creation of such plans.
· Borough Commanders are ordered to oversee and coordinate all field fire inspection activities in their respective boroughs.
· The Chief of Operations will conduct a review of the Department’s field inspection program with emphasis on insuring accountability at all levels and making recommendations to strengthen and improve the quality and frequency of inspections by field units.

Additional References;
Vacant or Idle Properties or Properties Under Construction or Demolition or RenovationNational Fire Protection Association- NFPA Publications August 2001Selections from the U.S. Overview Report on structures that are vacant or under construction, renovation or demolition, Occupancy Cause Tables, and selected published incident descriptions.

New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2007/08/16/nyregion/20070817_BANK_SLIDESHOW_17.html
Power point program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites, HERE

PDF file of the PPT program Power point program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites