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The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program has released the investigation report of the line of duty deaths of two career FDNY firefighters during a 2007 seven-alarm high-rise fire in the former Deutsche Bank building undergoing deconstruction and asbestos abatement.
On August 18, 2007, two FDNY firefighters; Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo lost thier lives while operating at this incident. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations. FDNY Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran and FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, became trapped in the maze-like conditions of a high-rise building undergoing deconstruction. The building’s standpipe system had been disconnected during the deconstruction and the partitions constructed for asbestos abatement prohibited fire fighters from getting water to the seat of the fire. An hour into the incident, the fire department was able to supply water by running an external hoseline up the side of the structure. Soon after the victims began to operate their hoseline, they ran out of air. The victims suffered severe smoke inhalation and were transported to a metropolitan hospital in cardiac arrest where they succumbed to their injuries.
By the time the fire was extinguished, 115 fire fighters had suffered a variety of injuries.Key contributing factors to this incident include: delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel, inoperable standpipe and sprinkler system, delay in establishing water supply, inaccurate information about standpipe, unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously, extreme fire behavior, uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor, blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress, maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris, heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented, failure of fire fighters to always don SCBAs inside structure and to replenish air cylinders, communications overwhelmed with numerous Mayday and urgent radio transmissions, and lack of crew integrity.
NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
- review and follow existing standard operating procedures on high-rise fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters are not operating in hazardous areas without the protection of a charged hoseline.
- be prepared to use alternative water supplies when a building’s standpipe system is compromised or inoperable.
- develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating guidelines for risk management during complex high-rise operations.
- ensure that crew integrity is maintained during high-rise fire suppression operations.
- train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning high-rise structure.
- ensure that fire fighters diligently wear their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) when working in environments that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).
- train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
- use exit locators (both visual and audible) or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit.
- conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
- encourage building owners and occupants to report emergency situations as soon as possible and provide accurate information to the fire department.
- consider additional fire fighter training using a high-rise fire simulator.
Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:
- conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters in high-rise structures.
- continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communications in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Municipalities should:
- ensure that construction and/or demolition is done in accordance with NFPA 241: Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations.
- develop a reporting system to inform the fire department of any ongoing, unique building construction activities (such as deconstruction or asbestos abatement) that would adversely affect a fire response.
- establish a system for property owners to notify the fire department when fire protection/suppression systems are taken out of service.
The Complete NIOSH Report is available HERE
An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of the PPT program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites
Additional Links, HERE and HERE
New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work, HERE
Other References and postings;
The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978
The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.
Thirty-four firefighters, one emergency medical technician and one Emergency Services police officer were injured in the fire and the tragedy is remembered as one of the worst disasters in the New York City Fire Department’s 143-year history.
The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
• Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33
• Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156
• Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42
• Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153
• Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156
• Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153
The fire started at 8:40 am in Waldbaum’s supermarket located at 2892 Avenue Y and Ocean Avenue in the Sheepshead Bay section of Brooklyn. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers and contractors were renovating the building when the fire was discovered in mezzanine area. Box 3300 was transmitted at 08:39 hours and the All hands transmitted at 08:49 and subsequently a 2nd alarm at 09:02 hrs. Shortly after 09:20 with 20 firefighters operating on the bowstring truss roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the roof fell into the smoke and flames. Some of the firefighters were seen running toward the edge of the roof; some made it, others nearby fell into the gaping hole. The third alarm was transmitted at 09:18 3rd alarm and subsequently escalated to a Fifth alarm assignment during the rescue and recovery operations.
Roof Operations prior to collapse
Laborers and firefighters managed to pull out some who were near walls, some crawled out. Several holes were made into the wall to pull out injured survivors and victims.
The Building
The approximately 120 ft. x 120 ft. primary building was originally built in 1952 as a supermarket and at the time of the fire was undergoing extensive renovations and was open and operating. Constructed with exterior masonry bearing walls of with timber roof trusses with a 100-foot clear span, supported on pilaster columns embedded in the exterior walls, it was classical Type III construction. The truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a conventional suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system. A two story mezzanine and machine room was located at the north wall of the original building. Access through the truss loft area was accessible through man-doors at the plane of each truss.
Waldbaum Supermarket FDNY Box 3300 1978
The heavy timber bowstring arch roof consisted of seven (7) truss units constructed of 4-5 bundled 3 inch x 12 inch attached assemblies. Two factors contributed to the collapse of the bowstring arch truss system; double roof (rain roof) alterations with concealed spaces and the extent and severity of the fire within the concealed spaces affecting the assembly’s structural stability. The presence of the double concealed ceiling systems; the truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a convential suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system. The failure of operating companies and command personnel to recognize the signs of an unchecked concealed fire that was propagating at a rapid pace impinging upon critical structural assembly points was a significant contributing factor in the incident outcome.
Typical Heavy Timber Bowstring Arch Truss Configuration
This roof collapsed 32 minutes after the initial units arrived. The immediate collapse occurred approximately 85 feet inward from the Alpha side (Ocean Avenue) and approximately 50 feet from the Bravo side (Avenue Y). The immediate failure and loss of structural stability and collapse of truss unit #5 was followed with the subsequent collapse of truss units #6 and #4 that were interdependent on the roof rafter and purlin system to maintain thier structural stability and vertical orientation. This type of interdependent structural system of structural trusses, rafters and roof deck (membrane) result in large area collapses since the primary truss will usually cause the adjacent two truss systems (on either side of the primary compromised truss) to fail by pulling downward.
The effects of direct flame impingement on the truss assessmblies, thier connection points of bearing at the outter masonry walls, coupled with the tactical trench cut that had been comopleted by the operating ladder companies resulted in 4,000 sf section of roof to collapse in the truss #5, 6 and 4 bay areas. Rapid and progressing fire travel within the concealed spaces and the degradation of the roof assembly and structural support system, failure to recognize the inherent opertaional risks associated with roof and interior operations on heavy timber truss roof systems and the failure to correlate continued interior suppression operations with simultaneous roof ventilation operations with no significant change in operational progress or mitigation contributed to the tragic outcome of the incident.
A short ten years would pass and the lessons from the Waldbaum Fire would soon be forgotten when on July 2, 1988 operations in a Type III building consisting of an auto dealership would lead to the deaths of five (5) Firefighters in Hackensack, New Jersey when operations were being conducted in the truss loft storage area when an 80 foot heavy timber truss collapsed trapping the firefighters. The Hackensack Ford Fire occured less than four weeks short of the tenth anniversary of the Waldbaum Fire right across the Hudson River. More on the Hackensack Ford Fire HERE.
Bravo Side View
Additional References :http://stevespak.com/waldbaums.html
Fire Investigation: An Analysis of the Waldbaum Fire, Brooklyn, New York, August 3, 1978. Quintiere, J. G. NISTIR 6030; June 1997 http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID;=18676&
NFPA Fire Command Magazine, Brooklyn Roof Collapse Claims six Lives. Demers, David P.; December 1978
Waldbaum Fire Facebook page, HERE with numerous photos and recollections honoring those that lost their lives and those that operated at FDNY Brooklyn Box 3300.
Rescue efforts on the Bravo Side
2892 Ocean Avenue Today
The lessons learned in the years following the Walbaum’s fire in 1978 and the subsequent Hackensack Ford Fire, NJ in 1988 focused on understanding building construction systems, occupancies and structural assemblies, in both of these cases the timber bowstring truss systems. Over the years the foundation of knowledge necessary to build competencies and knowledgeable firefighters, fire officers and commanders cognizant in the science and technology of building construction has waned and at time has been less than an area of focus.
Take the time to learn about the FDNY Walbaum’s fire, its history repeating significance as a major fire service LODD event, the lessons learned from the Hackensack Ford Fire (July 2, 1988) and other related case studies that can be found on the NIOSH, USFA and NFPA web sites.
Look at your buildings within your response areas and jurisdiction. Understand how they’re built and more importantly how they are affected by the exposure and impingement of fire and its byproducts. Understand key building performance indicators and appropriate strategic and tactical actions based upon building profiles, occupancies, fire loading, construction features and fire service resources. Take the time to honor the brave brother firefighters from FDNY who made the supreme sacrifice thirty two years ago, and gave a legacy to learn from in this and in future fire service generations.
It’s time to think; BUILDING KNOWLEDGE = FIREFIGHTER SAFETY
Memorial
Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is. Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed. Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.
We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?
We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.
The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.
- Modern building construction is no longer predicable
- Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
- Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
- Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
- Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
- Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
- Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
- Command & Company Officer dereliction
- Nothing is going to happen to me (us)
STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.
These behaviors include;
• Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.
• Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.
• Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.
Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;
TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.
If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.
The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.
Check out these links;
If you haven’t read Chief Mayers’s discerning reflections on Firehouse Zen, this is a MUST read. Where Were You That Night?
The Lessons Learned from the Past
From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety
Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations
A multiple alarm fire consumed the county courthouse in downtown Pittsboro, North Carolina yesterday. The building was undergoing renovations at the time of the fire and was occupied and operational. The fire started in the clock tower of the 130-yr.-old building and is believed to have been caused by welders. The entire building was undergoing renovation with the outside enclosed with scaffolding.
The clock tower had a protective tarp wrapped around it that preventing outside hose streams from reaching the seat of the fire. The fire broke out at 4:45 p.m., according to county and court officials, shortly after court sessions had ended. All who worked in the building were evacuated safely, according to county officials, and no injuries had been reported late Thursday. According to published reports, the courthouse, the centerpiece of the Pittsboro downtown, was built in stages. It was initially constructed in 1881 at a cost of $10,666, according to Paul Shield Crane’s first edition of “North Carolina Taproots: Courthouses of North Carolina.” In 1930, another story was added to the brick building and, in 1959, there was an extensive renovation that cost $130,000.
Bottom line, buildings undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations can pose significant risk to suppression operations and lead to firefighter injuries and fatalities. This can not be stressed enough.
The unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences, requires a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation. You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
- Operational Safety: Structural Anatomy; Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites
- Meridian Plaza Fire: Remembering the One Meridian Plaza High-rise Fire,
- Deutsche Bank Fire: Remembrance: Deutsche Bank Fire FDNY LODD- August 18, 2007
- Power Point Program on Type III & IV Construction: HERE
- Read more: http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/03/26/1337554/historic-chatham-courthouse-destroyed.html#ixzz0jJMsjwr2
- Courthouse Fire Photos and slideshow HERE
The following are assessment considerations that may provide insights in the assessment, risk profile and development of pre-fire plans, operational procedures and field directives to prevent history repeating events (HRE) with similar conditions and attributes;
Construction Type
- What is the construction type or mixed application? How does this affect suppression, rescue, special operations and typical daily operations?
- Stage and/or Phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
- The Stage and/or phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovation has, SIGNIFICANT impact on firefighter safety and operational integrity.
- Understanding these stages and phases can provide mission critical decision-making considerations to incident management teams and company officers.
Site conditions and accessibility
- Considerations for both horizontal, vertical and grade conditions.
- Considerations during changes in stages and phases. Expect changes
- Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
Exposures
- These will be specific to the commonality or uniqueness of the structure and occupancy.
Resources
- Do you have enough of what’s going to be needed? Plan for it now, before you’re in the street needing it “yesterday”.
- Think BIG, as the adage goes, you can always send the companies back. Don’t under estimate the types and kind of resources needs, based upon the structure profile and the potential of undetermined conditions. (reinforces need for pre-planning)
- Share the Knowledge, Situational Awareness and Pre-planning inf
ormation with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.
Operating procedures
Again, response and operations at these types of structures demands that pre-fire plan considerations, dialog, discussions, communications and what ever else is appropriate to you organization is identified and disseminated BEFORE an alarm response occurs. Take advantage of pre-gaming and table top a target occupancy, to increase preparedness and reduce risk potential.
- Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
- Update the plans as conditions change
- Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.
Knowledge and Situational Awareness
- Understand, explore, research and obtain ALL the necessary information on the structure(s) undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
- Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
- Communicate the observations, findings, conditions and considerations.
Communications
- What ever you identify- COMMUNICATE this throughout the organization.
Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.
Special and Unique Conditions
- Identify and plan for the Special and Unique Conditions that may exclusive to you jurisdiction’s structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.
Contingency Plans
- Plan of the unexpected and have contingent plans in place.
The magnitude and complexity of an incident involving a structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations will be directly proportional to the size of the building/construction site and corresponding age profile (vintage) of the existing building, if under renovation, and degree of construction. Operational deployment and the Incident Action Plan- IAP must be addressed during strategic and tactical incident management, risk profiling and pre-incident and on-scene intelligence, reconnaissance and planning considerations: More HERE
When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis.
We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system. That may be true for conventional or legacy structures, but what about modern construction and engineered structural systems? Same expectations?…….
What do you think?
There’s a great series of photos depicting initial operations at a small-sized (square foot) single family residential occupancy fire that captures fire and smoke behavior, HERE and HERE
Take at look the at this residential fire and interior attack that injured a number of Maryland Firefighters HERE
Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. NIOSH Report HERE. NIST References HERE
Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170
For many of us, the events of September 11th, 2001 will forever be etching into our minds and hearts. The magnitude and severity of the sacrifices made that day by the FDNY as well as the NYPD, EMS and PANY/NJ uphold the tradition, beliefs, values and ideals that the Fire, Rescue, EMS and Law Enforcement professions embrace.
The tragic loss of lives, the promise of the future; the unfulfilled opportunities and contributions that were yet to be recognized or made by many of those killed and the subsequent loss of completing life’s journey with their families, loved ones and comrades further magnifies the senseless and grief many of us share to this day.FDNY Assistant Chief Gerard Barbara , the Citywide Tour Commander on the morning of September 11th (Remembrance HERE) whose image was profoundly captured standing in the street within the shadow of the twin towers moments before the first collapse provides a poignant reminder of our sworn duty, obligation and responsibilities as firefighters.
As I was preparing to capture some thoughts that reflected upon this, the eighth anniversary of 911, I came across an article that I had written within the subsequent days of September 11th that was published shortly thereafter.
As I began rereading the narrative, the vivid emotions and sentiments that were present in such a raw manner on that day and in the days and weeks that followed came rushing back to the surface. I reflected on the thought that sharing this narrative once again would echo upon some of what we all shared that day and give rise to where we’ve been in our own personal journeys. This is why we must remember, this is why we must never forget.
The First Steps of Our Journey (originally written and published September, 2001)
Tuesday September 11th began unremarkably like many others. I began my instructional delivery of a course of instruction on Incident Command Management for Structural Collapse Rescue Operations as part of the National Fire Academy’s field delivery programs in Ft. Myers, Florida. The class was comprised of Special Operations Battalion Chiefs, Command and Line Officers from throughout the region. As we began our discussion on the needs for urban search and rescue preparedness and its relationship to strategic incident command management and tactical company level capabilities, the Ft. Myers Chief of Department came into the classroom and directed us immediately to the station day room. The time was 08:55 hours, and so began our journey.
The class immediately became transfixed upon the televised images streaming before us. The live coverage of the evolving sequence of events, the fire and emergency services responses and the devastation inflicted both in New York City and later in Washington, D.C., and the realization that this was a terrorist attack. For the next three hours we watched in disbelief the unfolding events in New York City at the World Trade Center, each of us fully realizing the magnitude and severity of the incident and the impact inflicted upon the fire, rescue, ems and law enforcement personnel operating at the scene.
The transmission of Manhattan Box 55-8087 to the World Trade Center Towers brought New York City’s Bravest and Finest. We witnessed the evolving events of the initial high-rise fires in WTC Tower #1, the vivid images of the second aircraft impacting WTC Tower #2 and shortly thereafter, the horrendous collapse of both towers.
We watched in silence, fully cognizant of the potential toll the resulting collapses could have on the operating personnel and civilians alike.Following numerous telephone calls home and to my fire station, with the impending arrangements and planning being undertaken for our fire department’s possible deployment to NYC, I began a twenty-two hour trek back home. The journey back was consumed with the constant reports filtering through the radio speakers of the ever increasing descriptions of the magnitude and levels of destruction at what has become known as Ground Zero.
The turnpikes I traveled were filled with the passing images of the initial public outpouring of emotions to the day’s tragic events. Lone individuals on overpasses and bridges, waving our nation’s flag. The flags drawn to half staff throughout the communities I passed through and the electronic message boards along the highway, with words of condolence and encouragement in this time of national grief. Still in my Fire Academy shirt with the embroidered words of the NFA and Structural Collapse, I was recognized as a firefighter and approached by numerous people along my route back who questioned the events of the day, who were seeking some sense of understanding for what was becoming recognized as a significant loss of life to unaccounted for fire, rescue, law enforcement and civilians.
There were the unsolicited words of thanks expressed by people at gas pumps and rest areas up the entire east coast, who acknowledged my fire service affiliation and connected to what they may have seen or heard in terms of the of the missing F.D.N.Y. firefighters and N.Y.P.D. law enforcement officers. This level of acknowledgement, seemed so strange, when any other time, we seem to blend into the back round of everyday life. All for having a fire service emblem on.
During my travel back to Syracuse, New York I listened to every report, every update and the ever increasing numbers of potential missing on the radio. Well after midnight I ran into a colleague of mine at a gas station, an Assistant Fire Chief from the Metro Dade Fire & Rescue Department, Florida who, along with four other urban search and rescue specialists were making their way to Washington, D.C. as part of the deployed FEMA USAR Task Force Team from South Florida. We shared in our grief over the immediate notification at a mayoral press briefing that our close friend FDNY Battalion Chief Ray Downey was identified as one of three chief FDNY Officers who died during the tower collapses.
We also shared in our grief in the initial reports of the over forty FDNY fire, rescue and support companies unaccounted for as a result of the fire suppression, rescue and collapse efforts. The continuing ride gave way to the thoughts and concerns of many of my friends within the FDNY. Were they on shift, are they accounted for, are they safe? I thought about everything that we have tried to prepare for, the years of developing our national urban search and rescue task force system, collapse-rescue training, terrorism preparedness and the images of the WTC events of the morning. I thought deeply of my twenty-six years of fire service involvement, my brother & sister firefighters, and again- the fate of my FDNY brothers and sisters in New York Ci
ty.
Subsequently in the days that followed, I became glued to the live televised images from Ground Zero and ever increasing reports of the search and rescue efforts deployed at the incident scene. As I watched alone into the early morning hours the images pouring across my television screen or at the fire station with my brother and sister firefighters, I began to contemplate the journey that lay ahead for our nation’s fire and emergency services. We will be forever changed by the events of 9-11. The most recent accounts have identified over three hundred thirty seven confirmed or unaccounted for firefighters, twenty-three law enforcement officers and over five thousand four hundred missing civilians. Rescue efforts remain the focus, with the realization that the probability of live rescues diminishes with each passing hour as the first week of Herculean efforts draws to a close.
The fabric that binds us within the fire and emergency services, the true bonds of brother and sisterhood in this proudest of professions can not be more poignantly depicted than the image of the three brother FDNY firefighters raising the American flag amidst the mountains of rubble and debris where once stood the World Trade Center. Each and every one of us understands the undertakings during the initial stages of operations at the WTC. We, the fire and emergency service providers protect the heart and soul of our respective communities. We understand the risks and challenges affecting our commitment to protect life and property and to meet those challenges armed with our training, preparedness and tools of our trade. We are the first ones in and the last ones out. The challenges ahead will be immense as the rescue efforts at Ground Zero evolve into the recovery mode of operation, and the continued efforts to bring home- back to quarters these missing firefighters.
In the days, weeks and months ahead, we will be witness to ever changing events in this continuing journey. We will share in the pain, grief and emotions that have become so deeply rooted inside of all of us in the course of these events in NYC and in our nations’ capital. For those who provided direct or support service to the events at the WTC, and those who may yet be called upon to render aide in the weeks and months ahead, each of us understands the calling and we also understand the pain. For each and everyone firefighter, rescue and ems provider would, if they could, would be side by side with those working at Ground Zero.
We must remain vigilant to our own community’s risk potential for future events and incidents and must strive to reduce the gap between our capabilities and those identified deficiencies. We must plan and train for the worst, for it’s not a matter of IF , it’s just a matter of WHEN. Our nation’s fire and emergency services have begun a journey, one that no one could have imagined, yet one that each will meet head- on. Remain safe, stay strong, and meet the challenges of your next alarm, with faith and the foundation of principles that have made our fire services what they are. We are all part of a brotherhood, we share a common belief and mission-we know our duty, we are firefighters, and will answere the call.
Remember and honor the sacrifices of 09.11.01 and the continuing sacrifices that are being made today by those fire and emergency services workers, support personnel and civilians that worked the recovery efforts at Ground Zero in the weeks and months afterwards who are dying or are afflicted by the lingering effects of exposure at the site. Remember the surviving families of those lost, remember the firefighters-who they were and remember who we are.
Remembrance: Deutsche Bank Fire and Double FDNY LODD in lower Manhattan, NYC- August 18, 2007
Structural Anatomy; Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites
Fire operations for structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and danger to operating personnel. This reality was clearly validated when two FDNY firefighters died in the line-of-duty during a seven-alarm fire that tore through the abandoned Deutsche Bank skyscraper in lower Manhattan, next to ground zero in New York City on Saturday August 18, 2007.The Deutsche Bank Building located at 130 Liberty Street adjacent to the quarters of FDNY Engine 10, Ladder 10, was once a 40-story high-rise structure that had been systematically reduced to 26-stories at the time of the fire. Significant building contamination from numerous toxic substances that included asbestos and lead resulting from the destruction of the World Trade Center during the September 11th attacks required the deliberate floor-by-floor dismantling effort as part of the deconstruction process that would ultimately remove the building from its present site.
The two FDNY firefighter fatalities were Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, an eight year veteran and Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran, both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations.
Its these types of unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces that demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences that require a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation.
You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites Power Point program download, HERE
31th Anniversary of the Waldbaum’s Fire
The Waldbaum’s fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.
Thirty-four firefighters, one emergency medical technician and one Emergency Services police officer were injured in the fire and the tragedy is remembered as one of the worst disasters in the New York City Fire Department’s 143-year history.
The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
• Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33;
• Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156;
• Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42;
• Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153;
• Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156; and
• Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153.
The fire started at 8:40 am in Waldbaum’s supermarket, Ave. Y and Ocean Ave., Sheepshead Bay. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers etc were renovating the building when the fire started in the mezzanine area. , All hands at 8:49 2nd at 9:02. Shortly after 9:20 with 20 firefighters on the roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the roof fell into the smoke and flames. Some of the firefighters were seen running toward the edge of the roof, some made it, others nearby fell into the hole. At 9:18 3rd alarm sent in. Later it went to a 5th alarm.
Laborers and firefighters managed to pull out some who were near walls, some crawled out. Several holes were made into the wall to pull out injured survivors and victims.Two factors contributed to the collapse of this bowstring arch truss, a double roof (rain roof) alteration and the extent and severity of the fire.
This roof collapsed 32 minutes after the initial units arrived.
References:http://stevespak.com/waldbaums.html
Fire Investigation: An Analysis of the Waldbaum Fire, Brooklyn, New York, August 3, 1978. Quintiere, J. G. NISTIR 6030; June 1997http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID;=18676&;…
The lessons learned in the years following the Walbaum’s fire in 1978 and the subsequent Hackensack Ford Fire, NJ in 1988 focused on understanding building construction systems, occupancies and structural assemblies, in both of these cases the timber bowstring truss systems. Over the years the foundation of knowledge necessary to build competencies and knowledgeable firefighters, fire officers and commanders cognizant in the science and technology of building construction has waned and at time has been less than an area of focus.
Take the time to read and learn about the FDNY Walbaum’s fire, its History Repeating significance as a major fire service LODD event, the lessons learned from the Hackensack Ford Fire (July 2, 1988).Look at your buildings within your response areas and jurisdiction. Understand how they’re built and more importantly how they are affected by the exposure and impingement of fire and its byproducts. Understand key building performance indicators and appropriate strategic and tactical actions based upon building profiles, occupancies, fire loading, construction features and fire service resources.Take the time to honor the brave brother firefighters from FDNY who made the supreme sacrifice thirty years ago, and gave a legacy to learn from in this and in future fire service generations.
Its time to think; BUILDING KNOWLEDGE = FIREFIGHTER SAFETY
Structural Anatomy; Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites
Fire operations for structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and danger to operating personnel. This reality was clearly validated when; two FDNY firefighters died in the line-of-duty during a seven-alarm fire that tore through the abandoned Deutsche Bank skyscraper in lower Manhattan, next to ground zero in New York City on Saturday August 18, 2007.
The Deutsche Bank Building located at 130 Liberty Street adjacent to the quarters of FDNY Engine 10, Ladder 10, was once a 40-story high-rise structure that had been systematically reduced to 26-stories at the time of the fire. Significant building contamination from numerous toxic substances that included asbestos and lead resulting from the destruction of the World Trade Center during the September 11th attacks required the deliberate floor-by-floor dismantling effort as part of the deconstruction process that would ultimately remove the building from its present site.
The two FDNY firefighter fatalities were Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, an eight year veteran and Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran, both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations.
Post incident investigations, providing insights into fire department operations, physical building conditions, risk profiles, hazards and deficiencies. The fact that the Deutsche Bank building was being dismantled floor by floor- that it was undergoing “Deconstruction” meant that the building was a primary target hazard containing significant operational vulnerabilities, hazards and dangers posing life threatening risk to unsuspecting firefighting personnel. The fact that this building was undergoing asbestos abatement further compounds the degree of risk present.
Following preliminary investigations, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg stated that “The failures have many owners, and they are both in the private sector and in the public sector.”
Mayor Bloomberg further stated failures of oversight, responsibility and judgment may have contributed to the deaths of the two firefighters at the former Deutsche Bank AG building at Ground Zero.
Preliminary investigations, interviews and reviewed transcripts of radio transmissions made by the hundreds of firefighters who responded to the multiple alarm incident, identified faulted lapses in pre-incident planning and preparedness, mandated periodic inspections by the fire department and documented building hazards and operational recommendations, identified by a fire commander that may have been neglected to be acted upon by upper command. In the wake of the tragic events, three New York Fire Department officers were relieved of their commands, pending further investigation two weeks after the incident. Three particular failings were cited, which New York City officials stated were “simply not excusable”:
- First, FDNY Engine Company 10 had responsibility for inspecting the Deutsche Bank building but stopped inspecting it in the year 2006. The reasons for the lack of periodic inspections are pending further investigation.
- Second, city regulatory requirements mandated the Fire Department conduct inspections of the building standpipe every fifteen days when a building is being demolished. This had not been performed at all since demolition began in March 2007.
- Third, and finally, despite the hazards concerning the Deutsche Bank building, which were well publicized and documented following the events of September 11th, senior FDNY fire officers did not act upon creating a unique pre-fire plan for the building. Published documents that were released to the media apparently identified that a Battalion Chief had recommended doing so on three separate occasions to a Division Commander.
New York Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta stated careless smoking was attributed as the caused the fire. Smoking was prohibited in the building during the asbestos abatement and deconstruction efforts. However it was discovered that smoking was allowed to take place unabated on the 17th floor of the building. Additional published reports by City officials stated that the incident commanders acted appropriately, considering what they knew at the time. But it’s what they didn’t know that contributed to the enormous difficulties they encountered: specifically, a broken standpipe, a non-functioning sprinkler system and building deconstruction and decontamination operations that exacerbated the fire and caused unacceptably hazardous conditions.
Its these types of unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces that demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences that require a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation.
You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
Operational factors present at the Deutsche Bank building fire;
(Please note; any of these factors may be present in any building or occupancy undergoing deconstruction and demolition.)
- Deconstruction; the high-rise steel frame structure was being systematically dismantled from the top down.
- Structural assemblies, systems and components were being removed as part of the asbestos abatement and decontamination efforts, creating varying levels of system integrity, exposures and vulnerabilities.
- Various deconstruction stages throughout the building created exposed structural systems, incomplete or compromised structural & building components/ features that posed significant safety risk to personnel.
- The building’s exterior was shrouded in a scaffolding system, with limited accessibility and worker travel volume and unprotected external scaffold support systems that were present.
- Asbestos Abatement Plans created; Abatement Zones, Buffer Zones and Deconstruction Zones- Each Asbestos Zone with significant operations risks and hazards.
- Interior abatement zones were constructed that created undefined and maze-like conditions.
- Due to the Asbestos Abatement work, internal HVAC/ ventilation system operations may have been modified in such a manner to contribute to the migration and distribution of smoke and products of combustion to impact fire operations.
Officials said that in addition to the nonfunctioning stand pipe, fighting the fire was made difficult by the asbestos abatement, which created “maze-like conditions.” - Many areas were partitioned off with plastic, and hallways and walls one would find in other buildings had been torn out.
- Enclosed exterior window walls that were replaced with plywood sheathing creating impenetrable enclosures, limiting egress paths, ventilation paths and providing susceptible fire loading and flame sp
read potential. - Introduction of significant transient combustible loading, i.e., plywood sheathing and panels, poly sheeting and plastics and the introduction of other Class A materials.
- Access and egress systems were changed or removed, creating no level of certainty in movement and travel paths, access and exiting routes and ability to “read” area profiles and configurations during limited visibility operating conditions
- Stairwells were eliminated, boarded-up or enclosed. Deconstruction and Asbestos abatement zones and buffers created sealed areas that could not be readily accesses without labor extensive forcible entry and extrication.
- Compartmentation, enclosures, fire separations and fire barriers were compromised, dismantled or removed, creating undefined open areas, extensive horizontal and vertical voids, plume ways and travel paths.
- Workers stated they had been stripping asbestos from beams that created gaps and voids in the structural assemblies and systems that fire officials stated may have contributed to the rapid fire spread through these unprotected gaps and holes in the structure.
- Designed active and passive fire protection and suppression systems, coatings, enclosures and features were in varying stages of removal, dismantling or non-functional.
- The fire standpipe system was non-operational, compromised and disconnected. An entire of piping was found missing
- The fire sprinkler system was non-operational
- There were no apparent controls of potential ignition sources as mandated by regulatory codes and standards: i.e., evidence of discarded cigarette butts in non-smoking areas.
- The cause of the fire was determined to be careless smoking based upon published reports.
- This was a known problem based upon worker practices and lack of compliance controls.
Staging of compressed gas cylinders, flammable and combustible liquids; i.e. Acetylene, oxygen, oils, diesel and gasoline fuels etc. - Temporary power distribution and lighting systems, devices and equipment
- Construction machinery, equipment, motorized apparatus, tools and devices.
- The state of the building, the asbestos abatement hazard and heavy smoke made conditions especially difficult for firefighters
- Firefighters had to resort to using ropes to haul hoses up from the street to support the fire attack. The lack of an operational sprinkler or standpipe system contributed toward deployment of extensive manpower to implement operational water supplies and suppression lines.
- Firefighters were forced to operate without the protection of handlines in rapidly changing and unpredictable building conditions due to configurations.
- Getting out was no easier than getting in. Only one of the two construction elevators was working and could carry only five or six men at a time, sources said. Yet dozens of firefighters were inside.
- The fire apparently started in the 17th floor according to workers who first reported the fire. The worst of the fire was on floors 14 though 19, but construction holes and vents created unchecked condition that allowed the fire to travel unabated up and down through the floors, igniting floors 20 through 26 as well.
- Firefighters on the 14th floor thought they were safely below the blaze – and in a prime position to tackle it – when they were suddenly surrounded by fire and dense black smoke.
- The two firefighters became trapped in the building and died from exposure to carbon monoxide.
- The two firefighters were found on the 14th floor close to a hose line after numerous Mayday alerts were communicated and rapid intervention rescue efforts initiated by command.
Side Note; Deconstruction work was halted for a week in May, 2006, when a 22-foot-long section of pipe fell from one of the 35th floor and went through the roof of a neighboring quarters of FDNY Engine 10, Ladder 10. It was determined at the time the subcontractor responsible with bringing the building down had little experience in bringing down large towers in urban settings
Safety Considerations
Bottom line, buildings undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations can pose significant risk to suppression operations and lead to firefighter injuries and fatalities. This can not be stressed enough.
The unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences, requires a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation. You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
The National Fire Protection Association- NFPA Standard 241 for Safeguarding Construction, Alternations, and Demolition Operations provides fire service personnel with good insights into what constitutes planning, preparedness, prevention and mitigation methods to prescribe minimum safeguards for construction, alteration, and demolition operations in order to provide reasonable safety to life and property from fire during operations.
Command and company officers should consider a number of crucial factors in accessing and determining acceptable risk management profiles, situational awareness management profiles (SAM) and operational deployment modes that may lead to the most error likely tactic (MELT) that may require the most needed change in incident command management or tactical deployment.
Assessment consideration for Structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
The following are assessment considerations that may provide insights in the assessment, risk profile and development of pre-fire plans, operational procedures and field directives to prevent history repeating events (HRE) such the Deutsche Bank with similar conditions and attributes;
Construction Type
- What is the construction type or mixed application? How does this affect suppression, rescue, special operations and typical daily operations?
- Stage and/or Phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
- The Stage and/or phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovation has, SIGNIFICANT impact on firefighter safety and operational integrity.
- Understanding these stages and phases can provide mission critical decision-making considerations to incident management teams and company officers.
Site conditions and accessibility
- Considerations for both horizontal, vertical and grade conditions.
- Considerations during changes in stages and phases. Expect changes
- Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
Exposures
- These will be specific to the commonality or uniqueness of the structure and occupancy.
Resources
- Do you have enough of what’s going to be needed? Plan for it now, before you’re in the street needing it “yesterday”.
- Think BIG, as the adage goes, you can always send the companies back. Don’t under estimate the types and kind of resources needs, based upon the structure profile and the potential of undetermined conditions. (reinforces need for pre-planning)
- Share the Knowledge, Situational Awareness and Pre-planning inf
ormation with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.
Operating procedures
Again, response and operations at these types of structures demands that pre-fire plan considerations, dialog, discussions, communications and what ever else is appropriate to you organization is identified and disseminated BEFORE an alarm response occurs. Take advantage of pre-gaming and table top a target occupancy, to increase preparedness and reduce risk potential.
- Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
- Update the plans as conditions change
- Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.
Knowledge and Situational Awareness
- Understand, explore, research and obtain ALL the necessary information on the structure(s) undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
- Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
- Communicate the observations, findings, conditions and considerations.
Communications
- What ever you identify- COMMUNICATE this throughout the organization.
Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.
Special and Unique Conditions
- Identify and plan for the Special and Unique Conditions that may exclusive to you jurisdiction’s structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.
Contingency Plans
- Plan of the unexpected and have contingent plans in place.
The magnitude and complexity of an incident involving a structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations will be directly proportional to the size of the building/construction site and corresponding age profile (vintage) of the existing building, if under renovation, and degree of construction. Operational deployment and the Incident Action Plan- IAP must be addressed during strategic and tactical incident management, risk profiling and pre-incident and on-scene intelligence, reconnaissance and planning considerations:
- Degree of exposed construction, systems, assemblies
- Degree of incomplete connections, systems, assemblies
- Transfer and integrity of structural dead loads and support systems
- Civilian Occupancy Load/ or at risk
- Numbers of exposures and vulnerability
- Transient Combustible Fire loading
- Flammable/combustible materials
- Compressed gases and vessels
- Exposed electrical and utility services
- Unprotected openings
- Obstructions
- Accessibility, movement and transport
- Lighting Conditions
- Fire protection suppression system integrity
- Availability of internal and operable standpipe systems
- Availability of water supply sources
- Degree of Compartmentation
- Presence of temporary structural support systems
- Construction equipment, appliances and apparatus present
- Presence of fire zone separations or fire cut-offs
- Presence of Special Hazard Operations; i.e., asbestos, lead or toxin abatement
- Environmental and Weather factors
Proactive engagement, preparedness and planning can offer safe and effective success paths when addressing structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations. The key here is not to assume these buildings and environments can be managed strategically and tactically under the same premises as other day-to-day occupancies and structures.
If recognition primed decision making (RPDM) gives us one truism that is predicable, it’s the fact that fire suppression operations in structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations are;
- High Risk/ High Consequence,
- High Degree Situational Awareness Based
- Operations in these types of structures can and will kill firefighters
- Are Predictably- Unpredictable, BUT Manageable
- Demand competent incident management
- Require effective company officer leadership
- Necessitate skilled Firefighters
- Can be (under circumstances) written-off
- Assume rapid and unchecked fire travel
- Assume unpredictable transient combustible fire loading
- Assume increased fire flow demands for suppression effect
- Assume rapidly changing
- Consider hose stream deployment time in the absence of supporting fixed standpipe or sprinkler systems.
- Other internal building systems such as HVAC/ Ventilation may be compromised or function in an unexpected manner.
- Require Pre-Planning Awareness and Pre-incident Knowledge
- Demands Air Management Considerations
- Timely deployable resource; manpower and equipment
- Mobilization/ Reflex Capabilities of Response Companies
- Incident Command Flexibility
- Conservative Risk Management Profiling AND Conservative Tactical Deployment
- Situational Awareness Management – SAM
- Identification of the Most Error Likely Tactic- MELT
Take a look at what’s going on in your first or second due area. What about your battalion, the adjacent district or community or area? Chances are there’s a lot in the way of structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.
- Are you prepared? If not, what needs to be addressed?
- What can you implement to reduce the risk & increase the safety margin for your personnel?
- Are your personnel adequately trained to deal with these types of situations and occupancies?
- How can the training gaps be closed?
- Are Skills sets, Situational Safety Awareness and knowledge adequate?
- What are the Most Error Likely Tactics (MELT) that you think would be deployed if you responded to a incident involving structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and Renovations?
- What needs to be implemented, changed or communicated?
- Identify and Discuss your local risk factors and what can be done strategically & tactically
Take the time to look at structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations. The message is clear;
- Their unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks
- Create consequences that requiring a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation.
- You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures.
- Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
- Pre-plan, inspect, predict and plan
- Firefighter survivability and Incident Safety demands it.
Post Script; In light of the preliminary investigation in the weeks following the Deutsche Bank building fire and line-of-duty deaths, FDNY Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta ordered the following actions implemented on August 27, 2007 in connection with the fatal fire at the former Deutsche Bank building at 130 Liberty Street in Manhattan:
· Deputy Chiefs in the Department’s nine Divisions have been directed to order surveillance by every fire unit in their respective administrative areas of all buildings under construction/demolition.
· The purpose of these inspections is to insure that all rules and regulations regarding fire protection and p
ublic safety are being adhered to.
· Divisions are also ordered to review all existing pre-fire plans in their respective administrative areas, and to have units and Battalions canvass their areas for any potential structures that might require the creation of such plans.
· Borough Commanders are ordered to oversee and coordinate all field fire inspection activities in their respective boroughs.
· The Chief of Operations will conduct a review of the Department’s field inspection program with emphasis on insuring accountability at all levels and making recommendations to strengthen and improve the quality and frequency of inspections by field units.
Additional References;
Vacant or Idle Properties or Properties Under Construction or Demolition or RenovationNational Fire Protection Association- NFPA Publications August 2001Selections from the U.S. Overview Report on structures that are vacant or under construction, renovation or demolition, Occupancy Cause Tables, and selected published incident descriptions.
New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work http://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2007/08/16/nyregion/20070817_BANK_SLIDESHOW_17.html
Power point program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites, HERE
PDF file of the PPT program Power point program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites
FIRE COMMISSIONER SCOPPETTA ANNOUNCES PENALTIES AGAINST SEVEN FIRE OFFICERS AFTER REVIEW OF DOI REPORT ON FIRE AT 130 LIBERTY STREET
Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta today announced that two fire officers have been permanently relieved of their commands and reprimanded, and five chief officers have also received reprimands, in connection with their failure to insure required inspections were performed at 130 Liberty Street prior to the August 2007 fire that took the lives of two firefighters, Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino. All seven officers agreed to accept these penalties in lieu of formal charges and an administrative trial before the city’s Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH).
Today’s announcement followed the release last week of a report by the City’s Department of Investigations (DOI) on the results of an investigation of the Fire and Buildings Departments’ actions leading up to the 130 Liberty Street fire. DOI’s administrative investigation began after a 16-month criminal investigation by Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau that resulted in indictments against the John Galt Corporation and three of its workers. No criminal charges were filed against any City employees.
Once demolition of 130 Liberty Street began, Fire Department regulations required inspections of the building every 15 days. Fire officers in FDNY Division 1, Battalion 1, and Engine 10, who had responsibility for conducting inspections, failed to inspect 130 Liberty Street between the commencement of demolition in March 2007 and the fire on August 18.
Since the August 2007 fire, the Fire Department has made numerous changes to improve its inspectional program, including the following:
- A new 25-member Construction, Demolition and Abatement (CDA) inspection unit has been created in the Bureau of Fire Prevention and is now performing inspections and enforcing safety regulations at CDA buildings.
- The FDNY is engaged in a comprehensive overhaul of its field inspection program that will result in a shift from cyclical to risk-based inspections.
- IBM is working under a four-year, $24 million contract to create a central database for all FDNY building inspection and safety information that will be shared with and connected to other city agency databases (DOB and DEP). The resulting technology will drive an inspection program that will prioritize based upon factors such as violations, hazards and other risks.
- Fire Department field units have a new computerized system of logging and tracking CDA buildings in their respective administrative districts. The system has significantly improved compliance with required inspections.
- Borough Commands – previously not directly involved in the inspectional activity and reporting structure – now have oversight of all field unit inspectional activity within their boroughs.
- 33 initiatives proposed by the Mayor’s CDA Task Force are being implemented. These wide-ranging initiatives have already improved procedures and information-sharing between the three agencies with jurisdiction over CDA buildings (FDNY, DOB and DEP).
- Key changes include a ban on smoking at CDA sites; training of DEP inspectors on fire safety at abatement sites; and notifications by DEP and DOB to FDNY when either large/complex abatement permits or construction/demolition permits are issued.
- FDNY increased by 50 percent the amount of time allotted for building inspections by field units, from 6 hours to 9 hours.
- Training on inspectional duty has been upgraded in all ranks, from probationary firefighter to deputy chief.
Power point program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites, HERE
Must read postings related to Fire Service Safety Culture versus the Culture of Extinguishment…Read on
Follow the Yellow Brick Road By Chief Art Goodrich
Borrowing and paraphrasing a comment made by FDNY Lt. Ray McCormack, I would wonder in his safety culture if I were the Cowardly Lion for a lack of courage, the Tin Man for lack of a heart or the Scarecrow for lack of a brain. I would think maybe some of all three, but this I know: Last week at FDIC, in just under 40 minutes, Safety in the fire service took a major hit.From the opening salvo delivered by Chief Bobby Halton to his “body-burying buddy”, FDNY Lt. Ray McCormack; disdain, indifference and apathy for a safer fire service was never more evident. And clearly, I will respectfully disagree with their messages in this year of personal responsibility for safety.
This I want to die with my boots on mentality in the fire service is killing us. I cannot recall one incident where SAFETY killed one of us at an incident. So, it is Safety that is our only hope for reducing injuries and deaths; both firefighter AND civilian.
http://thekitchentable.firerescue1.com/2009/04/follow-yellow-safety-brick-road.html
Firefighter Hourly’s Jay Lowry view points
Ray McCormack’s FDIC speech certainly seems to have split opinion across the fire service. Art Goodrich offered his take earlier on TKT. Fellow Kitchen Tabler and FR1 columnist Jay Lowry over at his FirefighterHourly blog gives a different perspective in the following post:
“When Lt. Ray McCormack stated the fire service was wrong in placing the lives of firefighters above the lives of civilians at FDIC the remarks found firefighters scratching their heads.However, to his credit, the Lieutenant said what needed to be said.
In departments nationwide safety is a concern but in some the emphasis on safety detracts from their ability to do the job effectively. This isn’t what firefighters are trained to do nor is it healthy for operations. In fact, an emphasis on safety can put firefighters in unsafe positions due to a timid approach.
http://thekitchentable.firerescue1.com/2009/04/ray-mccormacks-fdic-speech-certainly.html
Chief Mick Mayer’s: Let’s Talk Unemotionally About this
While I have been pursuing the discussion only peripherally as I have been very busy lately, I noted an undertone of something that I guess has nagged at me for quite some time. After thinking about it for a few days, I realized that the issues could actually be approached from a very pragmatic view that I posted at Firehouse Zen today.
Let’s just clarify some statements. I was not at FDIC for the big discussion, so I am only acting on what I am reading. But let’s just say that the argument that some organizations are too worried about safety and are not pursuing fires aggressively enough, and are therefore doing a disservice to their communities is a valid one. And let’s also bring into play another thing I keep hearing, that it is ridiculous to refer to the people we serve as “customers”, as also valid, although I think that customers is a better term for them than some of the other names I have called them under my breath at 0400. But I digress.
So then, what are they? Well, I guess the best thing to say is that they are “taxpayers”. After all, our service is largely supported by tax revenue in one way or another, so I think that is probably a pretty accurate definition, although I could argue that some of them aren’t paying taxes and maybe should be deserving of no service, but then again, I digress. Let’s say that even in a community that supports a robust volunteer response agency by way of donations only, the citizens and other potential users are in some form or fashion, paying for a service in which they expect some competency, timeliness, and efficiency.
Continue Reading Let’s Talk Unemotionally About It
http://thekitchentable.firerescue1.com/search/label/truck6alpha
Chief Ben Waller’s Extinguishment Culture or Safety Culture – Smart Fire Departments can have BOTH!
If you have a personal or departmental “Extinguishment Culture”, would you grab a line and enter this flashed over abandoned house that is showing signs of impending collapse? If you have a personal or departmental “Safety Culture”, would you wear your SCBA , a traffic safety vest, and crank a PPV fan while sitting in the rig a half-mile down the street? Chances are, if you are a U.S. firefighter, you’ll choose an option somewhere in between the two extremes.
In his recent FDIC speech, Lt. Ray McCormack, made some statements that have, to say the least, generated a great deal of controversy in the U.S. fire service. His comments in favor of an “Extinguishment Culture” and against a “Safety Culture” in particular have stimulated a lot of thought, comment, disagreement, and counter-disagreement. Art “ChiefReason” Goodrich, in particular, blogged a sharp and well-articulated counterpoint to Lt. McCormack’s thoughts, here.
http://thekitchentable.firerescue1.com/2009/05/extinguishment-culture-or-safety.html
Chief Art Zern’s Take Risk or Write it Off, Part 2
Back in January, I wrote a blog post asking the questi
on, “Can we establish a common understanding of risk? Or.. should we write it off?” Because my tongue was planted firmly in my cheek when I posed the question, I don’t want the point to be missed. I believe our duty to ourselves and our beloved fire service cannot be separated from our duty to the citizens we are sworn to and are obligated to protect. What is good for us is good for them.
My question is, are we seeing this trend to “let it burn” because we have given-up the fight to provide our members with all of those things that are necessary to provide effective and efficient fire and rescue services? Have we rolled-over, bent-over and given up our hopes to provide excellent service and the ability to accurately assess risk?
Have we allowed those that seek to undermine our mission to gain a foot-hold? Have we become complacent because we don’t believe it can or will happen today? Are the enemies of the fire service going to be allowed to dismantle our combat readiness to the point where the easy or only option is to “let it burn”?
When you have a few minutes, please view the FDIC keynote speech given by Lt. Ray McCormack. It was indeed an honor for me to be present as Lt. McCormack delivered a passionate plea to the fire service, to keep fire in our lives. I couldn’t agree more and as the saying goes, Ray’s speech spoke to me. Rather than commenting on or adding to Ray’s speech, I’ll let it stand on its own as a clarion call to the American fire service. We can’t allow the “safety experts” that promote the “let it burn” philosophy to convince firefighters that we should place our safety and our lives above the lives of our citizens.
http://community.fireengineering.com/profiles/blog/show?id=1219672%3ABlogPost%3A137785
Chief Pete Lamb’s “The Speech..”
There is a whole bunch of banter going on in the Internet world about the FDIC speech of FDNY Lt. Ray McCormack. I am a little late getting to this but I wanted to throw my two cents in about this issue.These thoughts are in no particular order and just represent what I think I heard in replaying it a couple of times.I am going to use the phrase ” I think I heard” in the points listed below. It does not represent the actual quotes that the Lt. used it is my impression and opinion of those points. (Official disclaimer, no flaming emails please ! (grin)
http://thekitchentable.firerescue1.com/search/label/petelamb
Chief Ed Hartin; Culture of Safety or Culture of Extinguishment
I had intended to write today’s post simply about the IFE Compartment Firefighting Special Interest Group in Sydney, Australia. However, the recent keynote presentation at the Fire Department Instructors Conference (FDIC) by FDNY Lieutenant Ray McCormack claiming the fire service needs a “culture of extinguishment not safety” cannot pass without comment.
I wonder how much of the commentary on the web is based on quotations pulled from LT McCormack’s Keynote Presentation or simply extension of comments by others. If you want to know what he said, listen to his entire presentation.
Too Much Safety
I disagree with much, but not all of what LT McCormack had to say. One of the memorable quotes from this speech is “Too much safety makes Johnny a poor leader and a terrible rescuer.” What does this really mean?
FDNY High-Rise Operations Symposium
March 19 & 20, 2009
The FDNY responds to more than two million calls each year. Many of these responses are in high-rise buildings.The information presented will assist Firefighters, Line Officers, Fire Chiefs, Building Managers and Fire Engineers create solutions to problems unique to high-rise buildings.During the Department’s 143-year history, we continue to develop more advanced procedures, tools and training.
FDNY Chief Officers currently operating as Incident Commanders will provide these lifesaving lessons and techniques.
The Wind-Driven Fire Study was supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) for Firefighter Safety Research and Development. The study was a partnership project led by Polytechnic Institute of N.Y.U., the New York City Fire Department and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Topics will include:• Crane Collapses• Firefighting Strategies and Tactics• EMS Operations• Building Evacuations• Study of High-Rise Wind-Driven Fires • Planning for Terrorist & Haz-Mat Incidents• New Tools and Solutions
DON’T MISS OUT ON THIS ONE-OF-A-KIND EDUCATIONAL EVENT!
http://www.fdnyfoundation.com/2008/10/highrise_sympos.php
Lecturer Biographical Information
Sign Up as an Attendee
Sign Up as an Exhibitor
Remembering FDNY Black Sunday…LODD 2005
Take the time to read both NIOSH reports and remember the sacrafice…
Three veteran FDNY firefighters died in the LODD in Brooklyn, New York and the Bronx on Sunday January 23, 2005, a day that has become known as “Black Sunday” and called one of the saddest in fire department history. Two firefighters were killed and four others were badly hurt when they were forced to jump from a fourth-floor window of a burning building in the Bronx. Later, a third firefighter died after tackling a basement blaze in Brooklyn.Lt. Curtis Meyran, 46, of Battalion 26, and Firefighter John Bellew, 37, of Ladder 27, died after battling the Bronx blaze on East 178th Street in the Morris Heights section.
Three firefighters were in critical condition at St. Barnabas, and a fourth was in serious condition at Jacobi Medical Center. Six Bronx firefighters became trapped in the building while searching for people on the fourth floor. When the fire from the third floor broke through to the fourth, they were faced with a horrifying choice. They jumped out a fourth-floor window, knowing that they would be critically injured.
Firefighters Jeffrey Cool, Joseph DiBernardo, Eugene Stolowski, and Cawley were badly hurt in the Bronx fire. They were trapped on the fourth floor and were left with the life-or-death choice of leaping 50 feet or burning up. The Brooklyn firefighter, Richard Sclafani, 37, died at a hospital after being injured at a two-alarm fire in the East New York section.
http://cms.firehouse.com/content/article/article.jsp?sectionId=39&id;=38568
http://cms.firehouse.com/content/article/article.jsp?sectionId=39&id;=38578
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http://cms.firehouse.com/content/article/article.jsp?sectionId=39&id;=38578
http://cms.firehouse.com/content/article/article.jsp?sectionId=39&a…;
NIOSH REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONS
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for structural fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters operating in hazardous areas have charged hoselines.
Discussion: It is department policy to initiate an aggressive interior attack (offensive strategy) whenever possible. Fire departments should ensure that a hoseline is in position prior to entering hazardous or potentially hazardous areas. At this point, the hoseline can be charged and entry made. If the hoseline doesn’t charge or flow is restricted, fire fighters will still have time and space to escape.According to Dunn, the most important fire fighting operation at a structure fire is stretching the first attack hoseline to the fire.
Discussion: It is department policy to initiate an aggressive interior attack (offensive strategy) whenever possible. Fire departments should ensure that a hoseline is in position prior to entering hazardous or potentially hazardous areas. At this point, the hoseline can be charged and entry made. If the hoseline doesn’t charge or flow is restricted, fire fighters will still have time and space to escape.According to Dunn, the most important fire fighting operation at a structure fire is stretching the first attack hoseline to the fire.
A properly positioned and functional fire attack line saves the most lives during a fire.“It confines the fire and reduces property damage. Searches will proceed quickly, rescues will be accomplished under less threat, sufficient personnel will be available for laddering, ventilation will be effective, and overhaul above the fire room will be unimpeded.”Firefighters should continually train on SOPs including but not limited to establishing effective water supply, proper hose deployment, and advancing and operating hoselines to ensure successful interior attacks.
Refresher training should be provided to all fire fighters on a regular basis or as needed to ensure effective fire fighting skills are maintained.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained on the hazards of operating on the floor above the fire without a charged hoseline and follow associated standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Discussion: The most dangerous location on the fire ground is operating above the fire, especially during operations without the protection of a hoseline. Before operating above a fire, it is a good practice to deploy a hoseline. Where there is risk of extension to concealed spaces, additional precautionary hoselines are needed. According to Dunn, fire fighters are most often trapped on a floor above a fire because they fail to size-up the fire below them.Fire fighters should make certain that they take all necessary precautions and size-up the fire before making entry above it. Fire fighters should determine whether suppression teams are capable of extinguishing the fire and notify command.
Discussion: The most dangerous location on the fire ground is operating above the fire, especially during operations without the protection of a hoseline. Before operating above a fire, it is a good practice to deploy a hoseline. Where there is risk of extension to concealed spaces, additional precautionary hoselines are needed. According to Dunn, fire fighters are most often trapped on a floor above a fire because they fail to size-up the fire below them.Fire fighters should make certain that they take all necessary precautions and size-up the fire before making entry above it. Fire fighters should determine whether suppression teams are capable of extinguishing the fire and notify command.
If not, then command should not permit fire fighters above the fire until conditions change. In this incident, operations continued above the fire on the 4th floor after the withdrawal of Engine 75’s hoseline.
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations provide the incident commander with progress reports.
Discussion: Frequent progress reports to the IC are essential in the continuous size-up and assessment of an incident. Interior crews working in areas not visible to the IC are the IC’s eyes and ears during an incident. Progress reports also provide everyone on the fireground with information on aspects of the incident that relate to their activities (primary search, suppression, ventilation, etc.).
Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that team continuity is maintained during interior operations.
Discussion: Fire fighters should always work and remain in teams whenever they are operating inside a burning structure. Team continuity means knowing your team members and who is the team leader, staying within visual contact at all times (if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of each other), communicating needs and observations to the team leader, staging as a team, and watching out for other team members. Teams that enter burning structures should enter and leave together to ensure that team continuity is maintained. Working in teams and maintaining team continuity provides an added safety net of fellow team members.
Recommendation #5: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for incident commanders to divide up functions during complex incidents.
Discussion: Incident commanders have to address multiple tasks simultaneou
sly during high stress activities.Incident commanders can only manage so much information and should divide up functions to make the span of control more manageable. During complex events, the IC should assign other personnel to functions such as accountability, radio communications, incident safety, company tracking, and resident evacuation in order for the IC to effectively focus on fire command.
sly during high stress activities.Incident commanders can only manage so much information and should divide up functions to make the span of control more manageable. During complex events, the IC should assign other personnel to functions such as accountability, radio communications, incident safety, company tracking, and resident evacuation in order for the IC to effectively focus on fire command.
Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that Mayday transmissions are prioritized and fire fighters are trained on initiating Mayday radio transmissions immediately when they become trapped inside a structure.
Discussion: In this incident, there was an initial delay in determining who made the initial Mayday transmission. The incident commander must monitor and prioritize every message, but only respond to those that are critical during a period of heavy communications on the fire ground. A radio transmission reporting a trapped firefighter is the highest priority transmission that command can receive. Mayday transmissions must always be acknowledged and immediate action must be taken. As soon as fire fighters become lost or disoriented, trapped or unsuccessful at finding their way out of the interior of structural fire, they must initiate emergency radio transmissions.
They should manually activate their personal alarm safety system (PASS) device and announce “Mayday-Mayday” over the radio. A Mayday call will receive the highest communications priority from dispatch, the IC, and all other units. The sooner the IC is notified and a RIT is activated, the greater the chance of the fire fighter being rescued. A transmission of the Mayday situation should be followed by the fire fighter providing his last known location. A crew member who initiates a Mayday call for another person should quickly try to communicate with the missing member via radio and, if unsuccessful, initiate a Mayday providing relevant information.
Recommendation #7: Fire departments should develop standard operating procedures (SOP’s) for fire fighting operations during high wind conditions.
Discussion: Fire departments should develop SOPs to protect firefighters, including using defensive tactics if necessary, during incidents when high wind affects fire conditions. According to Dunn, “when the exterior wind velocity is in excess of 30 miles per hour, the chances of a conflagration are great; however, against such forceful winds the chances of successfully advancing an initial hoseline attack on the structure are diminished. The firefighter won’t be able to make forward hoseline progress because the flame and heat under the wind’s additional force will blow into the path of advancement.” The wind at the time of the incident was gusting up to 45 miles per hour, blowing from the northwest, speeding the fire extension to the 4th floor.Fire fighters encountering high wind conditions should change their strategy. According to Dunn, “the interior line should be withdrawn and the door to the fire area closed.
The officer in command must be notified of the inability to advance the interior attack hoseline due to the strong wind. A second hoseline should be advanced on the fire from the opposite end, the window or door through which the wind is blowing. This method may require the firefighters to stretch the line up an aerial ladder, fire escape or portable ladder. The second attack line will advance on the fire from the upwind side.”
Recommendation #8: Fire departments should provide fire fighters with the appropriate safety equipment, such as escape ropes, and associated training in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely.
Discussion: According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Programs, 2007 Edition, Section 7.1.1, “the fire department shall provide each member with appropriate protective clothing and protective equipment to provide protection from the hazards to which the member is or is likely be exposed.”
Discussion: According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Programs, 2007 Edition, Section 7.1.1, “the fire department shall provide each member with appropriate protective clothing and protective equipment to provide protection from the hazards to which the member is or is likely be exposed.”
In this incident, aerials and ground ladders were unable to access the rear of the apartment. When fire fighters are beyond the reach of ladders, aerials, or elevated platforms, an option of last resort is a rope rescue. NFPA 1500, Section 7.16 Life Safety Rope and System Components states “all life safety ropes, harnesses, and hardware used by fire departments shall meet the applicable requirements of NFPA 1983, Standard on Life Safety Rope and Equipment for Emergency Services.” NFPA 1983 specifies the minimum design, performance, testing, and certification requirements for life safety rope, water rescue throwlines, life safety harnesses, belts, and auxiliary equipment for emergency services personnel. Fire departments in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely should provide all fire fighters with escape ropes per NFPA 1983 and the appropriate training to effectively utilize their escape ropes during emergencies.
Additionally,Recommendation #9: Building owners should follow current building codes for the safety of occupants and fire fighters.
Discussion: State building codes require that single room occupancies (SROs) in non-fireproof tenement buildings have automatic fire sprinklers in every hall or passage within the apartment and at least one sprinkler head in every room. This apartment building did not have sprinklers. The transformation of the 4th floor apartment into a SRO led to the construction of an interior partition wall that impeded the discovery of the fire and hindered the fire fighters’ searches. It also prevented fire fighters from reaching the rear fire escape, their secondary means of egress.
