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Supervisor cleared on all charges in Deutsche Bank Building Fire that killed 2 FDNY Firefighters

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AP Photo

 

5-5-5-5 August 18, 2007

Published reports are being stating that the least senior of three construction officials in the Deutsche Bank manslaughter trial was acquitted of all charges today — after telling jurors that he had no idea the giant pipe he helped remove from the basement had anything to do with providing water to firefighters.

A construction foreman charged with the deaths of two firefighters in the Deutsche Bank building blaze was acquitted of all charges. Salvatore DePaola was cleared by a Manhattan jury of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide on the eighth day of deliberations.

According to reports published in a number of NYC newspapers; “It’s a happy day and a sad day,” said DePaola. “We’ve still got two firefighters that are deceased.” Firefighters Robert Beddia, 33, and Joe Graffagnino, 53 perished after they raced into the burning Ground Zero tower in 2007.

Prosecutors argued that DePaola, who works for the John Galt Corporation, and two of his colleagues should have known a key firefighting pipe had been cut. Salvatore DePaola, 56, of Staten Island, broke into tears as he was found not guilty of manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges in the August, 2007, smoke inhalation deaths of firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino.

“I had no idea it was a standpipe,” DePaola insisted of the primary physical evidence in the case — a 42-foot section of pipe that all three defendants were accused of intentionally disregarding and discarding after it crashed to the ground from the basement ceiling nine months before the fire.

The jury is still deliberating in the case of DePaola’s colleague, site safety manager Jeffrey Melofchik.

AP Photo   Deutsche Bank office building Fire in New York
 

Jurors have yet to reach a verdict on identical manslaughter and endangerment charges against their remaining defendant, Jeffrey Melofchik, 48, who worked as site safety manager for the demolition’s general contractor, Bovis Lend Lease. They will continue their deliberations tomorrow.

A third defendant, project asbestos abatement director, Mitchel Alvo, 58, has opted for a non-jury verdict; Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Rena Uviller has not said when she will render that decision.

As to who he thought should have been prosecuted in the defendants’ stead, De Paola — whose own son is a firefighter at Engine 160 in Staten Island — made a reference to “lieutenants” with the FDNY before his lawyer advised him to remain silent on that issue, given that deliberations are continuing.

Today was the seventh full day of deliberations in the three-month-long trial.

Previous CommandSafety.com coverage:

Other References and postings;

  • NY Daily News: Battle to save trapped firefighters
  • WABC: Fatal Deutsche Bank fire report released (2008)
  • FDNY Penalties After Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Lawyers: Evidence Withheld in Deutsche Bank Fire Trial
  • FDNY Disciplines Company Officers Following Tragic Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Attorney Claims Deutsche Bank Contractors Are “Scapegoats”  
  • The Station Nightclub February 20, 2003

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    A fire occurred on the night of February 20, 2003, at The Station Nightclub located in West Warwick, Rhode Island.

    A band that was performing that night, during its performance, used pyrotechnics that ignited foam insulation lining the walls and part of the ceiling of the platform being used as a stage. Based on a video from a news camera operator who was present at the time of the fire, the fire spread quickly along the ceiling area over the dance floor.

    The Station nightclub fire was the fourth deadliest nightclub fire in American history, killing 100 people.

    The fire began at 11:07 PM EST, on Thursday, February 20, 2003, at The Station, a glam metal and rock n roll themed nightclub located at 211 Cowesett Ave. in West Warwick, Rhode Island.

    The fire was caused by pyrotechnics set off by the tour manager of the evening’s headlining band, Great White, which ignited flammable sound insulation foam in the walls and ceilings surrounding the stage. A fast-moving fire engulfed the club in 5½ minutes. Some 230 people were injured and another 132 escaped uninjured.

    Smoke was visible in the exit doorways in a little more than one minute, and flames were observed breaking through a portion of the roof in less than five minutes.

    Egress from the nightclub was hampered by crowding at the main entrance to the building. One hundred people lost their lives in the fire, and hundreds were injured.

    Overview

    The Station Nightclub was a single story wood frame structure with an area of approximately 4484 square feet (412 m2).

    Time “zero” was defined as the time that the polyurethane foam was ignited by the pyrotechnic devices. Two fires started, one on each side of the drummer’s alcove. Approximately 30 seconds after ignition, the band stopped playing, and the crowd began to evacuate.

    At 41 seconds after ignition, the fire alarm sounded and the strobes began to flash, and the fire continued to spread across the back wall of the stage and in the alcove.

    The camera operator exited the building at 71 seconds after ignition, and smoke was flowing out of the front doorway. When the camera operator returned to the front doorway, at 102 seconds after ignition, people were piled up in the doorway. People evacuated to the extent possible through the available doorways, broken windows in the sunroom, and the windows in the main bar area.

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    U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology issued its final technical report on The Station nighclub fire in W. Warwick, R.I., in 2005.

    NIST also made 10 recommendations based on its report, urging all state and local governments to adopt and aggressively enforce national model building and fire safety codes for nightclubs.

    The investigation concluded that “strict adherence to the 2003 model codes available at the time of the fire would go a long way to preventing similar tragedies in the future. Changes to the codes subsequent to the fire made them stronger. By making some additional changes—and state and local agencies adopting and enforcing them — we can strengthen occupant safety even further.”

    “Based on our investigation findings and the comments received on our draft report, we are today making 10 recommendations in our final report for increased occupant safety in nightclubs that reinforce the current model codes and proposing additional changes that will make them even more effective,” said Lead Investigator William Grosshandler.

    • adopt a building and fire code covering nightclubs based on one of the national model codes—as a minimum requirement—and update local codes as the national standards are revised;
    • implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address all aspects of these codes; and
    • ensure that enough fire inspectors and building plan examiners—professionally qualified to a national standard—are on staff to carry out this work.

    Seven of the 10 NIST recommendations support and add to the actions already taken by the State of Rhode Island and national model code development organizations since The Station nightclub fire. The remaining three NIST recommendations call for more research on human behavior in emergencies, fire spread and suppression, and computer-aided decision tools—the data from which could yield further improvements in and maximize the effectiveness of these lifesaving regulations.The first recommendation urges all state and local jurisdictions to:

    Recommendations 2 and 3 address the use of automatic fire sprinkler systems for extinguishing fires in nightclubs and limiting the flammability of materials used as finish products to prevent such fires in the first place. NIST recommends that the current—and recently strengthened—National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems (NFPA 13) be adopted, implemented and enforced for all new nightclubs regardless of size, and for existing nightclubs with an occupancy limit greater than 100 people. Materials that ignite easily and propagate flames rapidly such as non-fire retarded flexible polyurethane foam should be clearly identifiable and be specifically forbidden as a finish material for all new and existing nightclubs, according to the NIST report.

    Recommendation 4 calls for the NFPA 1126 standard on the use of pyrotechnics before an audience to be strengthened by addressing the need for automatic sprinkler systems; minimum occupancy/building size levels; the posting of pyrotechnic use plans and emergency procedures; and setting new minimum clearances between pyrotechnics and the items they potentially could ignite.

    Recommendation 5 calls for changes in national model codes that increase the factor of safety for determining occupancy limits in all new and existing nightclubs. These include setting a maximum permitted evacuation time (90 seconds for nightclubs similar in size to or smaller than The Station), calculating the number of required exits and permitted occupancies (assuming that at least one exit will be inaccessible during an emergency), increasing staff training and evacuation planning, and improving means for occupants to locate emergency routes when standard exit signs are obscured by smoke.

    Recommendation 6 addresses portable fire extinguishers, calling for a better understanding of the numbers, placement locations and staff training required to ensure their effective use.

    Recommendation 7 calls for developing and implementing effective and interoperable communications for mass casualty events within and between first responder organizations. Again, NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions adopt existing model standards on communications, mutual aid, command structure and staffing.

    Finally, recommendations 8 through 10 address critically needed research to serve as the basis for further improvements in codes, standards and practices. NIST urges studies be conducted to:

    • better understand human behavior in emergency situations and to predict the impact of building design on safe egress in emergencies;
    • better understand fire spread and suppression; and
    • develop and refine computer models and computer-aided decision tools that communities can use to make cost-effective choices about code changes, fire safety technologies and emergency resource allocations.

    Details on all 10 recommendations may be found on the Web at http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/factsheet/RI_recomm_factsheet.htm.

    The primary objectives of the NIST Rhode Island nightclub fire investigation were to:

    • determine the conditions in the nightclub prior to the fire;
    • reconstruct the fire ignition, fire spread and survivability using computer models;
    • examine the impact on survivability if a sprinkler system had been installed; and
    • analyze the emergency evacuation and occupant responses to better understand the impediments to safe egress.

    Other Links

    • The NIST Station Nightclub Fire Investigation: Physical Simulation of the Fire By: Daniel Madrzykowski, Nelson Bryner, and Stephen I. Kerber, HERE
    • Engineers from the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Building and Fire Research Laboratory arrived at the fire scene within 48 hours to provide a reconnaissance report to the NIST director. The complete NCST report1 that documents the procedures, experiments, studies, findings, and recommendations of the investigative team can be downloaded from www.nist.gov/public_affairs/ncst.htm#Rhode_Island_Nightclub.
    • RECONSTRUCTING THE STATION NIGHTCLUB FIRE – COMPUTER MODELING OF THE FIRE GROWTH AND SPREAD, PDF HERE

    Resources

    Summary of actions needed and/or taken on recommendations resulting from The Station nightclub fire investigation
    •Crosswalk of Recommendations to Categories http://www.nist.gov/ncst/station_crosswalk.cfm
    •Recommendations—NIST Investigation of The Station Nightclub Fire http://www.nist.gov/ncst/station_recommendations2.cfm
    Final Report – June 29, 2005

    ◦Final NIST Rhode Island Nightclub Fire Report Urges Strict Adherence to and Strengthening of Current Model Safety Codes (News Release) http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/ri_finalreport_june2905.cfm
    ◦Final Report of the Technical Investigation of The Station Nightclub Fire (pdf) http://www.nist.gov/ncst/upload/Vol_I_NCSTAR2.pdf
    ◦Final Report—Appendices (pdf)http://www.nist.gov/ncst/upload/Vol_II_NCSTAR2.pdf
    ◦B-roll of Fire Tests and Simulations (this link requires RealPlayer) http://www.nist.gov/ncst/upload/RI_Fire_Broll.rm

    The fire was the deadliest in the United States since the 1977 Southgate, Kentucky, Beverly Hills Supper Club fire that claimed 165 lives.

    The worst nightclub fire occurred on November 28, 1942, in Boston at the Cocoanut Grove, where 492 died after paper decorations caught fire.

    The Rhythm Night Club Fire in Natchez, Mississippi, claimed the lives of approximately 209 persons during a dance on April 23, 1940.

    The Station fire exceeded the death toll of 87 in the March 25, 1990, Happyland Fire in the Bronx, New York City.

    The fire at 40 seconds. Photo Credit: Daniel R. Davidson

    2008 USFA LODD Report

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    You should make time this weekend and slide on over to the United States Fire Administration (USFA) web site HERE. USFA Report HERE

    The United States Fire Administration (USFA) released the report Firefighter Fatalities in the United States in 2008. The report continues a series of annual studies by the USFA of on-duty firefighter fatalities. The USFA is the single public agency source of information for all on-duty firefighter fatalities in the United States each year.An overview of the 118 firefighters that died while on duty in 2008:

    The total breakdown included 66 volunteer, 34 career, and 18 Wildland agency firefighters.

    There were 5 firefighter fatality incidents where 2 or more firefighters were killed, claiming a total of 18 firefighters’ lives.26 firefighters were killed during activities involving brush, grass or Wildland firefighting, more than twice the number killed the previous year.

    • Activities related to emergency incidents resulted in the deaths of 75 firefighters.
    • 28 firefighters died while engaging in activities at the scene of a fire.
    • 21 firefighters died while responding to, and 3 while returning from, emergency incidents.
    • 12 firefighters died while they were engaged in training activities.
    • 13 firefighters died after the conclusion of their on-duty activity.
    • Heart attacks were the most frequent cause of death for 2008 with 45 firefighter deaths

    Take a look at the issues, the factors and the causes. Take the time to think about what you can personally do to make a change, and what your company or agency must do, to support LODD reduction. Especially for those situations that are in OUR control.

    Don’t forget about the resources at the Everyone Goes Home Program, HERE.
    As well as the The Near Miss Reporting System,
    HERE

    Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program: Leading Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998–2005

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    NIOSH issues Report on: Leading Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998–2005

    The United States currently depends on approximately 1.1 million fire fighters to protect its citizens and property from losses caused by fire. Each year in the United States, approximately 100 fire fighters die in the line of duty. Sudden cardiac death is the leading cause of fatalities, followed by trauma. In 1998, Congress appropriated funds to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for a fire fighter safety initiative. As part of this initiative, NIOSH developed and implemented the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP).

    The overall goal of the NIOSH FFFIPP is to reduce the number of fire fighter fatalities. To accomplish this goal, NIOSH conducts investigations of line-of-duty fire fighter deaths to identify contributing factors and to generate recommendations for prevention.

    This document is a synthesis of the 1,286 individual recommendations from the 335 FFFIPP investigations conducted from 1998 to 2005. We hope that the fire service will use this document as a resource and catalyst for developing, updating, and implementing effective policies, programs, and training to prevent fatalities among fire fighters.

    Executive Summary
    The report document summarizes the most frequent recommendations from the first 8 years of the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP). The overall goal of the program is to reduce the number of fire fighter fatalities.

    Through 2005, the FFFIPP investigated 335 fatal incidents involving 372 fire fighter fatalities. The investigations encompassed a variety of circumstances such as cardiovascular-related deaths, motor vehicle accidents, structure fires, diving incidents, and electrocutions. Fatalities have been investigated in career, volunteer, and combination departments in both urban and rural settings throughout the United States.

    This document shares the most common recommendations from the 335 investigations and more than 1,286 recommendations that were developed by NIOSH investigators. These recommendations were developed using existing fire service standards, guidelines, standard operating procedures, and other relevant resources over the first eight years of the program. Fire departments can use this document when developing, updating, and implementing policies, programs, and training for fire fighter injury prevention efforts.

    Download or review the NIOSH Report HERE

    The USFA Issued the 2007 Firefighter Fatalities Report- Read It!

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    The United States Fire Administration (USFA) has released today its report Firefighter Fatalities in the United States in 2007. The report continues a series of annual studies by the USFA of on-duty firefighter fatalities in the United States. The USFA is the single public agency source of information for all on-duty firefighter fatalities in the United States each year.”One of the greatest challenges we face as a fire service is to stop the needless deaths of firefighters while in service to their communities,” United States Fire Administrator Greg Cade said. “Every day and across this nation, firefighters are responding to emergencies that threaten the lives of their residents. These same threats also threaten the lives of firefighters.Unfortunately, we all lost far too many firefighters in 2007.”
    During calendar year 2007, there were 118 firefighters who lost their lives while on duty across the United States.The unique and specific objective of Firefighter Fatalities in the United States is to identify all on-duty firefighter fatalities that occurred in the United States and its protectorates, and to present in summary narrative form the circumstances surrounding each occurrence.
    In addition to the 2007 overall findings, this study includes information on the hazards to firefighters presented by the lack of seatbelt use.
    In 2007, 27 firefighter fatalities resulted from vehicle-related incidents.
    In 19 of the 27 incidents where seatbelt status was known, 11 firefighters were confirmed as not wearing seatbelts at the time of the event.An overview of the 118 firefighters that died while on duty in 2007:
    • 68 volunteer firefighters and 50 career firefighters died while on duty.
    • There were 7 firefighter fatality incidents where 2 or more firefighters were killed, claiming a total of 21 firefighters’ lives.
    • 11 firefighters were killed during activities involving brush, grass, or wildland firefighting, the lowest in over a decade.
    • Activities related to emergency incidents resulted in the deaths of 76 firefighters.
    • 38 firefighters died while engaging in activities at the scene of a fire.
    • 26 firefighters died while responding to or returning from emergency incidents.
    • 11 firefighters died while they were engaged in training activities.
    • 15 firefighters died after the conclusion of their on-duty activity.
    • Heart attacks were the most frequent cause of death for 2007, with 52 firefighter deaths.
    For the past 22 years, the USFA has tracked all firefighter fatalities and conducted the necessary analysis for the benefit of the fire service. Through the collection of information on the causes of firefighter deaths, the USFA is able to focus on specific problems and direct future efforts towards finding solutions to reduce the number of firefighter fatalities in the future.
    This information is also used by many organizations to measure the effectiveness of their current efforts directed toward firefighter health and safety.The National Fallen Firefighter Foundation maintains the list of firefighters who die in the line-of-duty and are honored during the annual National Fallen Firefighters Memorial Weekend held each October in Emmitsburg, Maryland.