Knowledge and proficiencies related to building construction are formulative to all strategic, tactical and task level assignments.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, the compartment, occupancy risk, fire dynamics and fire behavior, fluid situational awareness and risk analysis, the art and science of aggressive and smart firefighting with well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies; You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.
What do you think? Where do you fit in?
New Strategic Thinking for Today’s Evolving Fireground and Challenges…..
Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.
As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.
NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.
During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”
The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.
The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.
This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE. NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE
Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170
In this week's issue of the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss ReportingSystem's Report of the Week (ROTW) an informative focus was provided on near-miss reports related to ceiling collapse. We're posting the ROTW alert in it's entirety below and are expanding upon this discussion to include materials previously posted on Buildingsonfire.com from the posts that surrounded the LAFD LODD of Firefighter Glenn L. Allen who was killed in the line of duty as a result of being trapped beneath rubble when the roof and ceiling collapsed during a blaze at a 12,000-square-foot mansion in the Hollywood Hills on Feb. 17, 2011. (HERE and HERE)
Included in that reporting was expanded information on gypsum wall board ceiling systems. If you don't know about the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System and the Report of the Week (ROTW) follow these links HERE , HERE and HERE. More importantly, get involved and post some of your current OR past near-miss experiences and close calls, so the fire service can learn and everyone can go home. www.firefighternearmiss.com. Check out the extensive resources and materials avaiable on the site to support your training and operational needs.
The collapse of a ceiling is one of the more disorienting situations a firefighter can face. Sixty near-miss reports are returned when the keyword "ceiling collapse" is typed into the text box on www.firefighternearmiss.com. Each of these accounts provides lessons on the value of heightened situational awareness, correct use of PPE, rigorous training, and recognizing the effect of fire on building materials. The National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System'ss Report of the Week (ROTW) featured report this week, 11-025, recounts one example.
"Our station was dispatched for a residential structure fire and we responded with two engines and four on-duty personnel… The near-miss happened about 30 minutes into the fire and there were two hoselines in place. One hoseline was on the second floor and one hoseline was on the first floor. Most of the fire was extinguished and overhaul was in progress. There were three members of my crew pulling ceiling to reach hot spots. The lieutenant stated to be careful because the floor above was moving when pulling down on overhead material. The firefighter and the lieutenant continued to pull down the ceiling. This is when the second floor collapsed down into the first floor and the room that we were in…"
The overhead world of a fire scene is fraught with hazards. Many of the hazards we can dispassionately discuss at the kitchen table, but seem to overlook when we are engaged in firefighting. Electrical wiring, telecommunication cables, structural support systems and storage are all elements hidden behind the drywall. Whether you are looking up at a ceiling that covers an attic or an upper floor, shoving your hook through the drywall is usually a benign act that simply pulls down a section of sheetrock to expose the hidden area above. However, it can also be a catastrophic act that brings down an entrapment hazard that has you fighting for survival.
Once you have read the entire account of 11-025, and the related reports, consider the following:
Before ceiling pulling begins, is there an assessment of the structural stability and review of what might be behind the drywall before the first piece is removed?
Do you and your crews observe best practices when pulling ceilings (i.e., starting at the doorway and working into the room, noting the location of structural members through visual notation of nails, "shadowing" or "ghosting" of studs, etc.) before pulling ceilings?
Do you consider limiting the number of personnel in a room when ceilings and walls are being pulled?
Who is responsible for ensuring utilities have been controlled before pulling ceilings and walls? How is utility control documented and confirmed before ceiling pulling begins?
What is the likelihood that the space above the ceiling you are pulling is being used for storage? If storage is noted, can you determine what effect pulling down the ceiling will have on the structural members resisting the weight of the storage?
Overhaul activities occur during a transitional time in the firefighting process. The adrenaline and effort of the fire attack begins to fade, but there is still enough pent up energy that some members of the crews are propelled from one action to another without an assessment of conditions. The thinking officer and crew make periodic assessments, or benchmarks, to ensure the incident reality still matches the company's perception.
Have you escaped a ceiling collapse due to exceptional vigilance? Have you ever gotten caught in a ceiling collapse? Submit your report to www.firefighternearmiss.com today so everyone goes home tomorrow.
Note: The questions posed above from the NFFNMRS-ROTW by the reviewers are designed to generate discussion and thought in the name of promoting firefighter safety. They are not intended to pass judgment on the actions and performance of individuals in the reports.
The recent events in Los Angeles and the line of duty death of veteran LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen who died Friday from injuries he sustained when a ceiling collapsed on him in a house fire late Wednesday night in the Hollywood Hills again gives us pause to reflect on the demands and hazards present at all fire suppression operations in buildings on fire. The past two months have borne consist reports of floor, roof, wall and ceiling collapses leading to firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.
Incident event coverage from this past week HERE, HERE and HERE
The importance of maintaining heightened situational awareness, identifying and monitoring suspected or inherent building construction hazards coupled with inherent occupancy risk factors, and aligning those with strategic objectives, incident actions plans and tactical deployment operations. Building Knowledge equating to firefighter safety is still a driving principle that is formulative to all firefighting operations in buildings, occupancies and structures. Let’s take this opportunity to gain some insights into the material that compromises nearly all wall and ceiling membrane systems and assemblies in nearly all buildings, occupancies and structures; that is gypsum board components.
I’ve included a number of video clips that center on our discussion, as the videos center on the operation parameters at this extremely large (floor area/square footage) residential occupancy. Most clips have good coverage of the structure and firefighting efforts. Take a few moments to review these clips before you proceed;
Gypsum board is the generic name for a family of panel-type products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges.
In 1888, Augustine Sackett used plaster of Paris sandwiched between several layers of paper to produce what would eventually become "Sackett Board," the original gypsum board. By the 1950s, many innovations in gypsum board technology had been developed, including the listing of many fire-resistance rated designs, rounded edges, specialized nails, curved partitions, studless partitions, sound control systems, lightweight gypsum lath, plaster, and gypsum board systems that fueled a boom period for the use of gypsum products in both the residential and commercial construction industries.
By 1955, an estimated 50 percent of new homes were built using gypsum wallboard. Lightweight gypsum board systems permitted the use of lightweight steel in steel framed buildings, which enabled the widespread growth of high-rise residential and commercial construction during the 1960s and 1970s.
Today gypsum board, along with a variety of other gypsum panel products, continues to serve as a preferred building material in both residential and commercial construction for interior walls and ceilings, exterior sheathing, fire-resistant partitions and membranes, and liner material for elevator shafts and stairwells. These properties make gypsum board well suited for building and space types requiring cost-effectiveness as well as fire resistiveness and maintainability.
Gypsum board is often called drywall, wallboard, or plasterboard and differs from products such as plywood, hardboard, and fiberboard, because of its noncombustible core. It is designed to provide a monolithic surface when joints and fastener heads are covered with a joint treatment system.
Gypsum is a mineral found in sedimentary rock formations in a crystalline form known as calcium sulfate dehydrate. One hundred pounds of gypsum rock contains approximately 21 pounds (or 10 quarts) of chemically combined water. Gypsum rock is mined or quarried and then crushed. The crushed rock is then ground into a fine powder and heated to about 350 degrees F, driving off three fourths of the chemically combined water in a process called calcining. The calcined gypsum (or hemihydrate) is then used as the base for gypsum plaster, gypsum board and other gypsum products.
To produce gypsum board, the calcined gypsum is mixed with water and additives to form a slurry which is fed between continuous layers of paper on a board machine. As the board moves down a conveyer line, the calcium sulfate recrystallizes or rehydrates, reverting to its original rock state. The paper becomes chemically and mechanically bonded to the core. The board is then cut to length and conveyed through dryers to remove any free moisture.
Gypsum manufacturers also rely increasingly on “synthetic” gypsum as an effective alternative to natural gypsum ore. Synthetic gypsum is a byproduct primarily from the desulfurization of the flue gases in fossil-fueled power plants. Gypsum board is an excellent fire resistive material. It is the most commonly used interior finish where fire resistance classifications are required. Its noncombustible core contains chemically combined water which, under high heat, is slowly released as steam, effectively retarding heat transfer. Even after complete calcination, when all the water has been released, it continues to act as a heat insulating barrier. In addition, tests conducted in accordance with ASTM E 84 show that gypsum board has a low flame spread index and smoke density index. When installed in combination with other materials it serves to effectively protect building elements from fire for prescribed time periods.
Developed through modern technology as a result of specific requirements, gypsum board is mainly used as the surface layer of interior walls and ceilings; as a base for ceramic, plastic, and metal tile; for exterior soffits; for elevator and other shaft enclosures; as area separation walls between occupancies; and to provide fire protection to structural elements. Most gypsum board is available with aluminum foil backing which provides an effective vapor retarder for exterior walls when applied with the foil surface against the framing.
Standard size gypsum boards are 4ft. wide and 8, 10, 12, or 14 ft. long. The width is compatible with the standard framing of studs or joists spaced 16 in. and 24 in. on center. Some thicknesses and types of gypsum board are also produced as a standard 54 in. width material. Other lengths and widths are available as special order materials.
Depending on thickness and type of gypsum board, the weight can vary from 2 – 4 lbs./ per square foot
A typical 4 ft. x 8 ft. sheet of 5/8-in gypsum board can weigh 96 lbs.
A 4ft. x 12ft. sheet can weigh upwards of 150 lbs.
In large span designs with attachments varying from 16 inches on center to 24 inches on center with z-strips or resilient channels attached to the structural members; these ceiling panels and assemblies can fail and collapse in a monolithic manner creating a significant safety concern to operating companies below.
As an example a 12ft x 12ft. monolithic assembly collapse ( single layer-gypsum board only) could have a collapse weight of 500 lbs.
Add the weight of compromised and attached structural members components, fixtures and insulation and the absorption of added water into the gypsum board from hose streams the combined weight of the collapse area may increase to 800-1000 lbs. Increase the size of the collapse area and the weight impacting operating companies is significant.
The various thicknesses of gypsum board available in regular, type X, improved type X and pre-decorated board are as follows:
¼-in. A low cost gypsum board used as a base in a multi-layer application for improving sound control, or to cover existing walls and ceilings in remodeling.
5/16-in. A gypsum board used in manufactured housing.
3/8-in. A gypsum board principally applied in a double-layer system over wood framing and as a face layer in repair or remodeling.
½-in. Generally used as a single-layer wall and ceiling material in residential work and in double-layer systems for greater sound and fire ratings.
5/8-in. Used in quality single-layer and double-layer wall systems. The greater thickness provides additional fire resistance, higher rigidity, and better impact resistance.
¾-in. Used in a similar manner to 5/8-in.
1 in. Used in interior partitions, shaft walls, stairwells, chaseways, area separation walls and corridor ceilings. Manufactured only in 24 in. wide panels and usually installed as an integral part of a system.
Depending on the type and the use, gypsum board is manufactured with a tapered, square, beveled, rounded, or tongue and groove edge. Some gypsum board types may incorporate a combination of different edge types. The fire resistance of gypsum board can be described using three distinct terms: regular core, type ‘X’ core and improved type ‘X’ core.
Regular core gypsum board is made of a noncombustible core material composed mainly of gypsum. Although it does not have the specially enhanced fire-resistive properties of type ‘X’, regular core gypsum board affords a degree of natural fire resistance.
In the 1940s different gypsum board formulations were investigated to increase the naturally occurring fire resistance of regular core gypsum board. A new product was eventually introduced that clearly demonstrated “eXtra” fire resistance, hence the name “type X.” The basic components of type ‘X’ that give it a superior fire resistance are gypsum, glass fibers, and vermiculite.
In the 1960s, further modifications were made to the original successful type ‘X’ formulations of gypsum board used in some systems – particularly ceiling systems – without compromising the fire-resistive qualities. The new product demonstrates additional fire resistance over type ‘X’ core, and thus the term “improved type X” was coined. Gypsum board products make up the predominant portion of a family of materials identified as gypsum panel products. Gypsum panel products are defined as sheet materials consisting essentially of gypsum. They can be faced with paper or another material, or may be unfaced. Gypsum board, glass-faced sheathing materials with a gypsum core and unfaced gypsum-based products are all considered to be gypsum panel products. Technically, gypsum board is defined as the generic name for a family of sheet products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges. In recent years the family of gypsum-based panel materials has grown to include panel products other than those with the familiar paper facers. A number of specialized gypsum panel products and gypsum boards have been developed for specific uses which include:
Gypsum Wallboard for interior walls and ceilings
Gypsum Ceiling Board for interior ceilings
Type X Gypsum Board for fire-resistance-rated building systems
Fiber Reinforced Gypsum Panels for interior and exterior walls, ceilings, and tile base
Gypsum Sheathing for exterior walls and roof systems
Glass Mat Gypsum Substrate for use as sheathing on exterior walls and ceilings
Gypsum Soffit Board for use on exterior soffits and ceilings
Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
Glass Mat Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
Gypsum Backing Board for use as a base for multi-ply systems
Gypsum Lath for use as a base for gypsum plaster
Gypsum Plaster Base for use as a base for veneer plaster
Gypsum Shaft Liner Board for shaft, stairway, and duct enclosures
Pre-decorated Gypsum Board for accent walls, office and movable partitions
Foil backed gypsum board for use as a vapor retardent
Identified by their technically correct names, gypsum board products are as follows:Gypsum Wallboard is produced primarily for use as an interior surfacing for buildings. It is the most often used commodity gypsum board and annually accounts for over 50 percent of all the gypsum board manufactured and sold in North America. Gypsum wallboard has a manila-colored face paper and is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.
Gypsum Ceiling Board is an interior surfacing material with the same physical appearance as gypsum wallboard. Gypsum ceiling board is manufactured as a ½-inch thick material; it is designed for application on interior ceilings, primarily those intended to receive a water-based texture finish. It has a sag resistance equal to 5/8-inch thick gypsum wallboard.
Predecorated Gypsum Board has a decorative surface which does not require further treatment. The surfaces may be coated or painted, printed, textured, or have a film – such as vinyl wallcovering – applied. It is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.
Water-resistant Gypsum Board is a gypsum board designed for use on walls primarily as a base for the application of ceramic or plastic tile. It is readily identified by its green-tinted face paper and is commonly referred to as “Greenboard.” It has a water-resistant core and a water-repellent face and back paper; it is generally installed in bath, kitchen, and laundry areas.
Gypsum Backing Board, Gypsum Coreboard, and Gypsum Shaftliner Panel are all designed to be used as base materials in multi-layer, solid and semi-solid, and shaftwall systems. Gypsum backing board is used as a base layer for other gypsum board materials in systems or as a base for dry claddings such as acoustic tile. Gypsum coreboard and gypsum shaftliner are manufactured with a type X core, using a specific edge configuration to facilitate installation into specialized stud systems and a type X core.
Exterior Gypsum Soffit Board is designed for use on the underside of eaves, canopies, carports, soffits, and other horizontal exterior surfaces that are indirectly exposed to the weather. It has water-repellent face and back paper and is more sag-resistant than regular wallboard. Exterior gypsum soffit board can be manufactured with a type X core and typically has a light brown face paper.
Gypsum Sheathing Board is used as a backing under exterior siding or cladding. It has a water-repellent face and back paper and can be manufactured with a water-resistant core. Depending on the thickness of the board, gypsum sheathing board is manufactured with either a square or a tongue-and-groove edge and a fire-resistive core. It generally has a brown or light black face paper.
Gypsum Base for Veneer Plaster has a distinctive blue-tinted face paper that is treated to facilitate the adhesion of thin coats of hard, high strength gypsum veneer plaster. It is produced in sheets that are the same width as gypsum wallboard and can be manufactured with a fire-resistive core. Application of Gypsum Board
A wide variety of gypsum board application methods are available to meet virtually any need in building design and construction. Gypsum board is applied in either single-layer or multi-layer systems to achieve specific fire or sound ratings. Gypsum board is applied over wood or steel framing or furring. It is also applied to masonry or concrete surfaces, either laminated directly or attached to wood furring strips or steel furring channels. Gypsum board ceilings can be directly attached to joists or trusses or attached to furring or grid systems suspended below structural members. Gypsum board is generally attached to the framing with nails, screws, or staples. Although nails are commonly used in wood frame construction, screws are often preferred because they are applied with automatic screw guns, have excellent holding power, and reduce the possibility of nail pops. A combination of nails and screws may also be used, with nails along edges and screws in the field. Staples are used because they are economical and can be quickly applied with staple guns; however, the use of staples should be limited to the base-layer in multi-layer systems or to gypsum sheathing on wood framing. Gypsum board wall and ceiling surfaces are typically decorated with paint, texture, wallpaper, tile, or paneling. When pre-decorated gypsum board is used, joints are generally covered with matching molding or battens; no additional finishing or decoration is necessary. Single-Layer Application
Single-layer gypsum board applications are the most common in light commercial and in residential construction.
These systems rely on one layer of gypsum board attached to framing or furring.
Although single-layer gypsum board systems are generally adequate to meet most minimum requirements for fire resistance and sound control, multi-layer systems are preferred for higher quality construction and to upgrade beyond the "bare minimums" of many code requirements.
Multi-Layer Application
Multi-layer systems have two or more layers of gypsum board and are used to meet higher sound and fire resistance requirements or to enhance these comfort and safety qualities beyond minimum code requirements.
They also provide better surface quality because face layers can often be laminated over base layers eliminating many or all of the fasteners in the face layer. In addition, face-layer joints are stronger by virtue of the continuous backing provided by the base layers.
Nail pops and ridging are less frequent and imperfectly aligned framing has less effect on the quality of the finished surface.
GYPSUM BOARD TYPICAL MECHANICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES (GA-235-10) A common misconception is that there are just two basic types of drywall—regular and type X—and beyond this difference, drywall products from various manufacturers are about the same. However, laboratory fire tests by United States Gypsum Company and various independent testing organizations provide strong evidence that there are significant fire-performance differences between drywall products from various manufacturers. It is well known in the construction industry that the single most important characteristic of gypsum drywall is its fire resistance. This is provided by the principal raw material used in its manufacture, CaSO4- 2H2O (gypsum). As the chemical formula shows, gypsum contains chemically combined water (about 50% by volume). When gypsum drywall panels are exposed to fire, the heat converts a portion of the combined water to steam. The heat energy that converts water to steam is thus used up, keeping the opposite side of the gypsum panel cool as long as there is water left in the gypsum, or until the gypsum panel is breached.
In the case of regular gypsum panels, as the water is driven off by heat, the reduction in volume within the gypsum causes large cracks to form, eventually causing the panel to fail.
In a special fire test designed to demonstrate the relative performance of different types of gypsum cores (described later in this section), it was shown that in a fire with a temperature of 1,850ºF, a 5/8" thickness of regular-core gypsum panels would fail in this manner in 10 to 15 minutes.
Type X gypsum panels, such as Sheetrock brand Firecode gypsum panels, have glass fibers mixed with the gypsum to reinforce the core of the panels.
These fibers have the effect of reducing the extent of and size of the cracks that form as the water is driven off, thereby extending the length of time the gypsum panel can resist the heat without failure.
Fire test results indicate that the same thickness of the type X gypsum drywall exposed to the same temperature (1,850ºF) will last 45 to 60 minutes.
USG has developed a third-generation gypsum drywall product called Sheetrock brand Firecode C gypsum panels that provides even greater resistance to the heat of fire. The core of Firecode C contains more glass fibers than type X—but also a shrinkage-compensating additive, a form of vermiculite that expands in the presence of heat at about the same rate as the gypsum in the core shrinks (from loss of water). Thus the core becomes highly stable in the presence of fire and remains intact even after the combined water is driven off. Tests have shown that this third-generation product resisted the fire for more than two hours, as compared to 45 to 60 minutes for the type X, and 10 to 15minutes for the regular panel under the same test conditions.
In a future posting we’ll discuss the issues facing the fire service related to the newest generation of impact resistant gypsum board that will restrict or preclude entirely our ability to breach walls in residential or commercial occupancies. Here are some links and Spec Sheets to look at in advance, HERE , HERE, HERE and HERE
References and Links Summarizing the many different types of gypsum board used in the industry, this quick reference gives typical uses of, and the ASTM and CSA standards for, each type. Also included is the appropriate industry standard designation for the installation of each type of gypsum board, along with the sizes and thicknesses generally available. Download
APPLICATION OF GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-253-07)
This publication describes the industry's latest recommendations for handling, storing, and installing gypsum sheathing under a variety of conditions. A must for anyone hanging gypsum sheathing or involved in EIFS work. Download
FIRE-RESISTANT GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-254-07)
This publication describes the advantages, recommended uses, limitations, and properties of gypsum sheathing in exterior walls.
Reference guide of construction procedures for gypsum drywall, cement board, veneer plaster and conventional plaster.
Trade Associations and other Organizations
Association of the Wall and Ceiling Industry (AWCI)—Provides services and undertake activities that enhance the members' ability to operate a successful business. AWCI represents acoustics systems, ceiling systems, drywall systems, exterior insulation and finishing systems, fireproofing, flooring systems, insulation, and stucco contractors, suppliers and manufacturers, and allied trades.
ASTM International (ASTM)—Provides a global forum for the development and publication of voluntary consensus standards for materials, products, systems, and services. In over 130 varied industry areas, ASTM standards serve as the basis for manufacturing, procurement, and regulatory activities. Provides standards that are accepted and used in research and development, product testing, quality systems, and commercial transactions around the globe.
Ceilings and Interior Systems Construction Association (CISCA)—Association for the advancement interior commercial construction, providing education, technical guidance and related resources. CISCA membership includes over 600 of the leading contractors, distributors, manufacturers and independent manufacturer's representatives worldwide.
Gypsum Association (GA)—Founded in 1930, GA promotes the use of gypsum while advancing the development, growth, and general welfare of the gypsum industry in the United States and Canada on behalf of its member companies.
ICC Evaluation Service (ICC-ES)—Provides technical evaluations of building products, components, methods, and materials and issues reports on code compliance to building regulators, contractors, specifiers, architects, engineers, and the public.
Relevant Codes and Standards
Guide Specifications
Department of Defense (DoD) Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS)
Published reports are being stating that the least senior of three construction officials in the Deutsche Bank manslaughter trial was acquitted of all charges today — after telling jurors that he had no idea the giant pipe he helped remove from the basement had anything to do with providing water to firefighters.
A construction foreman charged with the deaths of two firefighters in the Deutsche Bank building blaze was acquitted of all charges. Salvatore DePaola was cleared by a Manhattan jury of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide on the eighth day of deliberations.
According to reports published in a number of NYC newspapers; “It’s a happy day and a sad day,” said DePaola. “We’ve still got two firefighters that are deceased.” Firefighters Robert Beddia, 33, and Joe Graffagnino, 53 perished after they raced into the burning Ground Zero tower in 2007.
Prosecutors argued that DePaola, who works for the John Galt Corporation, and two of his colleagues should have known a key firefighting pipe had been cut. Salvatore DePaola, 56, of Staten Island, broke into tears as he was found not guilty of manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges in the August, 2007, smoke inhalation deaths of firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino.
“I had no idea it was a standpipe,” DePaola insisted of the primary physical evidence in the case — a 42-foot section of pipe that all three defendants were accused of intentionally disregarding and discarding after it crashed to the ground from the basement ceiling nine months before the fire.
The jury is still deliberating in the case of DePaola’s colleague, site safety manager Jeffrey Melofchik.
AP Photo Deutsche Bank office building Fire in New York
Jurors have yet to reach a verdict on identical manslaughter and endangerment charges against their remaining defendant, Jeffrey Melofchik, 48, who worked as site safety manager for the demolition’s general contractor, Bovis Lend Lease. They will continue their deliberations tomorrow.
A third defendant, project asbestos abatement director, Mitchel Alvo, 58, has opted for a non-jury verdict; Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Rena Uviller has not said when she will render that decision.
As to who he thought should have been prosecuted in the defendants’ stead, De Paola — whose own son is a firefighter at Engine 160 in Staten Island — made a reference to “lieutenants” with the FDNY before his lawyer advised him to remain silent on that issue, given that deliberations are continuing.
Today was the seventh full day of deliberations in the three-month-long trial.
An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of the PPT programon Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released its final report on its study of the June 18, 2007, fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., that trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter deaths in a single event since 9/11. The final report was strengthened by clarifications and supplemental text based on comments provided by organizations and individuals in response to the draft report of the study, released for public comment on Oct. 28, 2010. (HERE)
The revisions did not alter the study team’s main finding: the major factors contributing to the rapid spread of the fire at the Sofa Super Store were large open spaces with furniture providing high-fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows, and a lack of sprinklers.
Based on its findings, the study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes. These codes are used as models for building and fire regulations promulgated and enforced by U.S. state and local jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions have the option of incorporating some or all of the code’s provisions but often adopt most provisions.
If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented.
Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).
Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.
Two of the recommendations in the draft report were slightly modified to increase their effectiveness.
The recommendation “that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard” was improved by listing three nationally accepted certification examinations as examples of “how professional qualification may be demonstrated.”
Another recommendation has been enhanced by urging state and local jurisdictions to “provide education to firefighters on the science of fire behavior in vented and non-vented structures and how the addition of air can impact the burning characteristics of the fuel.”
Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:
The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.
NIST is working with various public and private groups toward implementing changes to practices, standards, and building and fire codes based on the findings from this study.
The complete text of the final report, Volumes I and II, may be downloaded as Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) files from the links below;
For a detailed summary of the Sofa Super Store study, its findings and recommendations, and links to supporting materials such as graphics and video segments from computer simulations of the fire, go to “NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements” at www.nist.gov/el/fire_research/charleston_102810.cfm.
jurisdictions have the option of incorporating some or all of the code’s provisions but generally adopt most provisions.
Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire
1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised.
2. Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address:
a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.
3. Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031.
4. Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision:
a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).
5. Comprehensive Risk Management Plans: NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to:
a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.
6. Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities:
a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground.
7. Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are:
a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires.
8. Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are:
a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service.
9. Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:
a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective.
10. Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to:
a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations.
11. Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:
a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies.
The recent events in Los Angeles and the line of duty death of veteran LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen who died Friday from injuries he sustained when a ceiling collapsed on him in a house fire late Wednesday night in the Hollywood Hills again gives us pause to reflect on the demands and hazards present at all fire suppression operations in buildings on fire. The past two months have borne consist reports of floor, roof, wall and ceiling collapses leading to firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.
Incident event coverage from this past week HERE, HERE and HERE
The importance of maintaining heightened situational awareness, identifying and monitoring suspected or inherent building construction hazards coupled with inherent occupancy risk factors, and aligning those with strategic objectives, incident actions plans and tactical deployment operations. Building Knowledge equating to firefighter safety is still a driving principle that is formulative to all firefighting operations in buildings, occupancies and structures. Let’s take this opportunity to gain some insights into the material that compromises nearly all wall and ceiling membrane systems and assemblies in nearly all buildings, occupancies and structures; that is gypsum board components. I’ve included a number of video clips that center on our discussion, as the videos center on the operation parameters at this extremely large (floor area/square footage) residential occupancy. Most clips have good coverage of the structure and firefighting efforts. Take a few moments to review these clips before you proceed;
Aeria Overview of the massive residential structure Ventilation Cuts in the Roof Assembly
Helicopter View of the Collapse Area from the Exterior
Fire ground Roof Ventilation Operations and extension
Interior Operations Pre-collapse
Handlines being stretched into the interior
Post Collapse Interior
Gypsum board is the generic name for a family of panel-type products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges.
In 1888, Augustine Sackett used plaster of Paris sandwiched between several layers of paper to produce what would eventually become “Sackett Board,” the original gypsum board. By the 1950s, many innovations in gypsum board technology had been developed, including the listing of many fire-resistance rated designs, rounded edges, specialized nails, curved partitions, studless partitions, sound control systems, lightweight gypsum lath, plaster, and gypsum board systems that fueled a boom period for the use of gypsum products in both the residential and commercial construction industries.
By 1955, an estimated 50 percent of new homes were built using gypsum wallboard. Lightweight gypsum board systems permitted the use of lightweight steel in steel framed buildings, which enabled the widespread growth of high-rise residential and commercial construction during the 1960s and 1970s.
Today gypsum board, along with a variety of other gypsum panel products, continues to serve as a preferred building material in both residential and commercial construction for interior walls and ceilings, exterior sheathing, fire-resistant partitions and membranes, and liner material for elevator shafts and stairwells. These properties make gypsum board well suited for building and space types requiring cost-effectiveness as well as fire resistiveness and maintainability.
Gypsum board is often called drywall, wallboard, or plasterboard and differs from products such as plywood, hardboard, and fiberboard, because of its noncombustible core. It is designed to provide a monolithic surface when joints and fastener heads are covered with a joint treatment system.
Gypsum is a mineral found in sedimentary rock formations in a crystalline form known as calcium sulfate dehydrate. One hundred pounds of gypsum rock contains approximately 21 pounds (or 10 quarts) of chemically combined water. Gypsum rock is mined or quarried and then crushed. The crushed rock is then ground into a fine powder and heated to about 350 degrees F, driving off three fourths of the chemically combined water in a process called calcining. The calcined gypsum (or hemihydrate) is then used as the base for gypsum plaster, gypsum board and other gypsum products.
To produce gypsum board, the calcined gypsum is mixed with water and additives to form a slurry which is fed between continuous layers of paper on a board machine. As the board moves down a conveyer line, the calcium sulfate recrystallizes or rehydrates, reverting to its original rock state. The paper becomes chemically and mechanically bonded to the core. The board is then cut to length and conveyed through dryers to remove any free moisture.
Gypsum manufacturers also rely increasingly on “synthetic” gypsum as an effective alternative to natural gypsum ore. Synthetic gypsum is a byproduct primarily from the desulfurization of the flue gases in fossil-fueled power plants. Gypsum board is an excellent fire resistive material. It is the most commonly used interior finish where fire resistance classifications are required. Its noncombustible core contains chemically combined water which, under high heat, is slowly released as steam, effectively retarding heat transfer. Even after complete calcination, when all the water has been released, it continues to act as a heat insulating barrier. In addition, tests conducted in accordance with ASTM E 84 show that gypsum board has a low flame spread index and smoke density index. When installed in combination with other materials it serves to effectively protect building elements from fire for prescribed time periods.
Developed through modern technology as a result of specific requirements, gypsum board is mainly used as the surface layer of interior walls and ceilings; as a base for ceramic, plastic, and metal tile; for exterior soffits; for elevator and other shaft enclosures; as area separation walls between occupancies; and to provide fire protection to structural elements. Most gypsum board is available with aluminum foil backing which provides an effective vapor retarder for exterior walls when applied with the foil surface against the framing.
Standard size gypsum boards are 4ft. wide and 8, 10, 12, or 14 ft. long. The width is compatible with the standard framing of studs or joists spaced 16 in. and 24 in. on center. Some thicknesses and types of gypsum board are also produced as a standard 54 in. width material. Other lengths and widths are available as special order materials.
Depending on thickness and type of gypsum board, the weight can vary from 2 – 4 lbs./ per square foot
A typical 4 ft. x 8 ft. sheet of 5/8-in gypsum board can weigh 96 lbs.
A 4ft. x 12ft. sheet can weigh upwards of 150 lbs.
In large span designs with attachments varying from 16 inches on center to 24 inches on center with z-strips or resilient channels attached to the structural members; these ceiling panels and assemblies can fail and collapse in a monolithic manner creating a significant safety concern to operating companies below.
As an example a 12ft x 12ft. monolithic assembly collapse ( single layer-gypsum board only) could have a collapse weight of 500 lbs.
Add the weight of compromised and attached structural members components, fixtures and insulation and the absorption of added water into the gypsum board from hose streams the combined weight of the collapse area may increase to 800-1000 lbs. Increase the size of the collapse area and the weight impacting operating companies is significant.
The various thicknesses of gypsum board available in regular, type X, improved type X and pre-decorated board are as follows:
¼-in. A low cost gypsum board used as a base in a multi-layer application for improving sound control, or to cover existing walls and ceilings in remodeling.
5/16-in. A gypsum board used in manufactured housing.
3/8-in. A gypsum board principally applied in a double-layer system over wood framing and as a face layer in repair or remodeling.
½-in. Generally used as a single-layer wall and ceiling material in residential work and in double-layer systems for greater sound and fire ratings.
5/8-in. Used in quality single-layer and double-layer wall systems. The greater thickness provides additional fire resistance, higher rigidity, and better impact resistance.
¾-in. Used in a similar manner to 5/8-in.
1 in. Used in interior partitions, shaft walls, stairwells, chaseways, area separation walls and corridor ceilings. Manufactured only in 24 in. wide panels and usually installed as an integral part of a system.
Depending on the type and the use, gypsum board is manufactured with a tapered, square, beveled, rounded, or tongue and groove edge. Some gypsum board types may incorporate a combination of different edge types. The fire resistance of gypsum board can be described using three distinct terms: regular core, type ‘X’ core and improved type ‘X’ core.
Regular core gypsum board is made of a noncombustible core material composed mainly of gypsum. Although it does not have the specially enhanced fire-resistive properties of type ‘X’, regular core gypsum board affords a degree of natural fire resistance.
In the 1940s different gypsum board formulations were investigated to increase the naturally occurring fire resistance of regular core gypsum board. A new product was eventually introduced that clearly demonstrated “eXtra” fire resistance, hence the name “type X.” The basic components of type ‘X’ that give it a superior fire resistance are gypsum, glass fibers, and vermiculite.
In the 1960s, further modifications were made to the original successful type ‘X’ formulations of gypsum board used in some systems – particularly ceiling systems – without compromising the fire-resistive qualities. The new product demonstrates additional fire resistance over type ‘X’ core, and thus the term “improved type X” was coined. Gypsum board products make up the predominant portion of a family of materials identified as gypsum panel products. Gypsum panel products are defined as sheet materials consisting essentially of gypsum. They can be faced with paper or another material, or may be unfaced. Gypsum board, glass-faced sheathing materials with a gypsum core and unfaced gypsum-based products are all considered to be gypsum panel products. Technically, gypsum board is defined as the generic name for a family of sheet products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges. In recent years the family of gypsum-based panel materials has grown to include panel products other than those with the familiar paper facers. A number of specialized gypsum panel products and gypsum boards have been developed for specific uses which include:
Gypsum Wallboard for interior walls and ceilings
Gypsum Ceiling Board for interior ceilings
Type X Gypsum Board for fire-resistance-rated building systems
Fiber Reinforced Gypsum Panels for interior and exterior walls, ceilings, and tile base
Gypsum Sheathing for exterior walls and roof systems
Glass Mat Gypsum Substrate for use as sheathing on exterior walls and ceilings
Gypsum Soffit Board for use on exterior soffits and ceilings
Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
Glass Mat Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
Gypsum Backing Board for use as a base for multi-ply systems
Gypsum Lath for use as a base for gypsum plaster
Gypsum Plaster Base for use as a base for veneer plaster
Gypsum Shaft Liner Board for shaft, stairway, and duct enclosures
Pre-decorated Gypsum Board for accent walls, office and movable partitions
Foil backed gypsum board for use as a vapor retardent
Identified by their technically correct names, gypsum board products are as follows:Gypsum Wallboard is produced primarily for use as an interior surfacing for buildings. It is the most often used commodity gypsum board and annually accounts for over 50 percent of all the gypsum board manufactured and sold in North America. Gypsum wallboard has a manila-colored face paper and is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.
Gypsum Ceiling Board is an interior surfacing material with the same physical appearance as gypsum wallboard. Gypsum ceiling board is manufactured as a ½-inch thick material; it is designed for application on interior ceilings, primarily those intended to receive a water-based texture finish. It has a sag resistance equal to 5/8-inch thick gypsum wallboard.
Predecorated Gypsum Board has a decorative surface which does not require further treatment. The surfaces may be coated or painted, printed, textured, or have a film – such as vinyl wallcovering – applied. It is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.
Water-resistant Gypsum Board is a gypsum board designed for use on walls primarily as a base for the application of ceramic or plastic tile. It is readily identified by its green-tinted face paper and is commonly referred to as “Greenboard.” It has a water-resistant core and a water-repellent face and back paper; it is generally installed in bath, kitchen, and laundry areas.
Gypsum Backing Board, Gypsum Coreboard, and Gypsum Shaftliner Panel are all designed to be used as base materials in multi-layer, solid and semi-solid, and shaftwall systems. Gypsum backing board is used as a base layer for other gypsum board materials in systems or as a base for dry claddings such as acoustic tile. Gypsum coreboard and gypsum shaftliner are manufactured with a type X core, using a specific edge configuration to facilitate installation into specialized stud systems and a type X core.
Exterior Gypsum Soffit Board is designed for use on the underside of eaves, canopies, carports, soffits, and other horizontal exterior surfaces that are indirectly exposed to the weather. It has water-repellent face and back paper and is more sag-resistant than regular wallboard. Exterior gypsum soffit board can be manufactured with a type X core and typically has a light brown face paper.
Gypsum Sheathing Board is used as a backing under exterior siding or cladding. It has a water-repellent face and back paper and can be manufactured with a water-resistant core. Depending on the thickness of the board, gypsum sheathing board is manufactured with either a square or a tongue-and-groove edge and a fire-resistive core. It generally has a brown or light black face paper. Gypsum Base for Veneer Plaster has a distinctive blue-tinted face paper that is treated to facilitate the adhesion of thin coats of hard, high strength gypsum veneer plaster. It is produced in sheets that are the same width as gypsum wallboard and can be manufactured with a fire-resistive core. Application of Gypsum Board
A wide variety of gypsum board application methods are available to meet virtually any need in building design and construction. Gypsum board is applied in either single-layer or multi-layer systems to achieve specific fire or sound ratings. Gypsum board is applied over wood or steel framing or furring. It is also applied to masonry or concrete surfaces, either laminated directly or attached to wood furring strips or steel furring channels. Gypsum board ceilings can be directly attached to joists or trusses or attached to furring or grid systems suspended below structural members. Gypsum board is generally attached to the framing with nails, screws, or staples. Although nails are commonly used in wood frame construction, screws are often preferred because they are applied with automatic screw guns, have excellent holding power, and reduce the possibility of nail pops. A combination of nails and screws may also be used, with nails along edges and screws in the field. Staples are used because they are economical and can be quickly applied with staple guns; however, the use of staples should be limited to the base-layer in multi-layer systems or to gypsum sheathing on wood framing. Gypsum board wall and ceiling surfaces are typically decorated with paint, texture, wallpaper, tile, or paneling. When pre-decorated gypsum board is used, joints are generally covered with matching molding or battens; no additional finishing or decoration is necessary. Single-Layer Application
Single-layer gypsum board applications are the most common in light commercial and in residential construction.
These systems rely on one layer of gypsum board attached to framing or furring.
Although single-layer gypsum board systems are generally adequate to meet most minimum requirements for fire resistance and sound control, multi-layer systems are preferred for higher quality construction and to upgrade beyond the “bare minimums” of many code requirements.
Multi-Layer Application
Multi-layer systems have two or more layers of gypsum board and are used to meet higher sound and fire resistance requirements or to enhance these comfort and safety qualities beyond minimum code requirements.
They also provide better surface quality because face layers can often be laminated over base layers eliminating many or all of the fasteners in the face layer. In addition, face-layer joints are stronger by virtue of the continuous backing provided by the base layers.
Nail pops and ridging are less frequent and imperfectly aligned framing has less effect on the quality of the finished surface.
GYPSUM BOARD TYPICAL MECHANICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES (GA-235-10) A common misconception is that there are just two basic types of drywall—regular and type X—and beyond this difference, drywall products from various manufacturers are about the same. However, laboratory fire tests by United States Gypsum Company and various independent testing organizations provide strong evidence that there are significant fire-performance differences between drywall products from various manufacturers. It is well known in the construction industry that the single most important characteristic of gypsum drywall is its fire resistance. This is provided by the principal raw material used in its manufacture, CaSO4- 2H2O (gypsum). As the chemical formula shows, gypsum contains chemically combined water (about 50% by volume). When gypsum drywall panels are exposed to fire, the heat converts a portion of the combined water to steam. The heat energy that converts water to steam is thus used up, keeping the opposite side of the gypsum panel cool as long as there is water left in the gypsum, or until the gypsum panel is breached.
In the case of regular gypsum panels, as the water is driven off by heat, the reduction in volume within the gypsum causes large cracks to form, eventually causing the panel to fail.
In a special fire test designed to demonstrate the relative performance of different types of gypsum cores (described later in this section), it was shown that in a fire with a temperature of 1,850ºF, a 5/8″ thickness of regular-core gypsum panels would fail in this manner in 10 to 15 minutes.
Type X gypsum panels, such as Sheetrock brand Firecode gypsum panels, have glass fibers mixed with the gypsum to reinforce the core of the panels.
These fibers have the effect of reducing the extent of and size of the cracks that form as the water is driven off, thereby extending the length of time the gypsum panel can resist the heat without failure.
Fire test results indicate that the same thickness of the type X gypsum drywall exposed to the same temperature (1,850ºF) will last 45 to 60 minutes.
USG has developed a third-generation gypsum drywall product called Sheetrock brand Firecode C gypsum panels that provides even greater resistance to the heat of fire. The core of Firecode C contains more glass fibers than type X—but also a shrinkage-compensating additive, a form of vermiculite that expands in the presence of heat at about the same rate as the gypsum in the core shrinks (from loss of water). Thus the core becomes highly stable in the presence of fire and remains intact even after the combined water is driven off. Tests have shown that this third-generation product resisted the fire for more than two hours, as compared to 45 to 60 minutes for the type X, and 10 to 15minutes for the regular panel under the same test conditions.
In a future posting we’ll discuss the issues facing the fire service related to the newest generation of impact resistant gypsum board that will restrict or preclude entirely our ability to breach walls in residential or commercial occupancies. Here are some links and Spec Sheets to look at in advance, HERE , HERE, HERE and HERE
LAFD FF Glenn Allen Associated Press / February 18, 2011
References and Links Summarizing the many different types of gypsum board used in the industry, this quick reference gives typical uses of, and the ASTM and CSA standards for, each type. Also included is the appropriate industry standard designation for the installation of each type of gypsum board, along with the sizes and thicknesses generally available. Download
APPLICATION OF GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-253-07)
This publication describes the industry’s latest recommendations for handling, storing, and installing gypsum sheathing under a variety of conditions. A must for anyone hanging gypsum sheathing or involved in EIFS work. Download
FIRE-RESISTANT GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-254-07)
This publication describes the advantages, recommended uses, limitations, and properties of gypsum sheathing in exterior walls.
Reference guide of construction procedures for gypsum drywall, cement board, veneer plaster and conventional plaster.
Trade Associations and other Organizations
Association of the Wall and Ceiling Industry (AWCI)—Provides services and undertake activities that enhance the members’ ability to operate a successful business. AWCI represents acoustics systems, ceiling systems, drywall systems, exterior insulation and finishing systems, fireproofing, flooring systems, insulation, and stucco contractors, suppliers and manufacturers, and allied trades.
ASTM International (ASTM)—Provides a global forum for the development and publication of voluntary consensus standards for materials, products, systems, and services. In over 130 varied industry areas, ASTM standards serve as the basis for manufacturing, procurement, and regulatory activities. Provides standards that are accepted and used in research and development, product testing, quality systems, and commercial transactions around the globe.
Ceilings and Interior Systems Construction Association (CISCA)—Association for the advancement interior commercial construction, providing education, technical guidance and related resources. CISCA membership includes over 600 of the leading contractors, distributors, manufacturers and independent manufacturer’s representatives worldwide.
Gypsum Association (GA)—Founded in 1930, GA promotes the use of gypsum while advancing the development, growth, and general welfare of the gypsum industry in the United States and Canada on behalf of its member companies.
ICC Evaluation Service (ICC-ES)—Provides technical evaluations of building products, components, methods, and materials and issues reports on code compliance to building regulators, contractors, specifiers, architects, engineers, and the public.
Relevant Codes and Standards
Guide Specifications
Department of Defense (DoD) Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS)
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) has recently issued a special report examining the characteristics of Attic Fires in Residential Buildings (PDF, 884 Kb). Developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center, the report is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).
According to the report:
An estimated 10,000 attic fires in residential buildings occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 30 deaths, 125 injuries, and $477 million in property damage.
The leading cause of all attic fires is electrical malfunction (43 percent).
The most common heat source is electrical arcing (37 percent).
Almost all residential building attic fires are nonconfined (99 percent) and a third of all residential building attic fires spread to involve the entire building.
Ninety percent of residential attic fires occur in one- and two-family residential buildings.
Residential building attic fires are most prevalent in December (12 percent) and January (11 percent) and peak between the hours of 4 and 8 p.m.
Attic Fires in Residential Buildings is part of the USFA’s Topical Fire Report Series. Topical reports explore facets of the U.S. fire problem that USFA shares with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe. Each report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.
The location of the attic provides many difficulties for firefighters when extinguishing the fire. Careful planning goes into deciding the best way to extinguish an attic fire.
Firefighters must decide whether to fight the fire from above or below, both of which present many difficulties. In both instances, firefighters have to consider that roofs or ceilings may collapse. The large amounts of water used to extinguish the blaze causes the insulation and wood beams to become saturated. Firefighters have been known to fall through the roof into the attic or through the attic into the floor(s) below.
In addition, not all attics have flooring. If firefighters enter the attic, they must be careful not to step outside the flooring area since they risk falling through the ceiling.
The construction of the attic is another area that presents difficulties to firefighters. Older and newer homes are constructed using different techniques. Older homes tend to have roofs that are framed with larger sized lumber, 2 by 6 inches.
These attics usually provide a continuous attic space with a peak as high as 8 feet. Conventional attics are not generally compartmentalized like many new home attics. Newer home attics typically employ a truss-framed construction that involves smaller wood boards placed in “A” (or triangular) shapes throughout the attic from the ceiling to the floor.
This construction can be difficult for a firefighter to navigate.
In addition, wood members in truss-framed construction can conceal fires and make extinguishing the fire more difficult. In large new homes and multifamily dwellings, many attics are constructed with fire stops, which can be as substantial as 2-hour, fire-resistance rated walls.
These help limit the spread of the fire from the attic to surrounding areas.
Wednesday Night’s Program has been postponed due to Emergent Server issues at BlogTalkRadio.
The Program has been rescheduled for Thursday November 4th at 9:00pm EDT
Turn Out to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”
If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.
The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued. Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.
Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention? Join the live broadcast on Thursday night November 4th at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.
For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
For a Rockin’ Hot Time, Tune in this coming Wednesday night, November 3rd to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”
If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.
The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued. Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.
Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention? Join the live broadcast on Wednesday night November 3rd at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.
For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
Major factors contributing to a rapid spread of fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., on June 18, 2007, included large open spaces with furniture providing high fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows and a lack of sprinklers, according to a draft report released for public comment today by the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The fire trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter fatalities in a single event since 9/11.
Based on its findings, the NIST technical study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes.1 If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented.
“Furniture stores typically have large amounts of combustible material and represent a significant fire hazard,” said NIST study leader Nelson Bryner. “Model building codes should require both new and existing furniture stores to have automatic sprinklers, especially if those stores include large, open display areas.”
Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet). Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.
Using a state-of-the-art computer model to simulate the fire, the study team found that the addition of automatic sprinklers inside the loading dock could have significantly slowed the fire (which began just outside the dock area), prevented it from spreading beyond the dock, and eventually, extinguished it completely. The model also showed that sprinklers on the loading dock likely would have maintained what firefighters call tenability conditions, the ability for individuals in a fire event to escape unassisted.
Factors identified as contributing to the fire’s progress include: (1) the high fuel loads—especially furniture—present throughout the building; (2) the lack of sprinklers throughout the Sofa Super Store; (3) the open floor plan of the facility; (4) the hidden build-up of combustible smoke and gases in the area between the drop ceiling and the roof of the main showroom; (5) the non-fire-activated roll-up door that was open between the loading dock and the holding area; (6) the four fire-activated roll-up doors (out of seven) that activated but did not close during the fire; (7) the metal walls in the warehouse and west showroom that allowed heat from the fire to ignite items next to the walls; and (8) the breaking of windows at the front of the store that supplied air to the fire.
NIST’s team of experts traveled to Charleston to gather data within 36 hours of the Sofa Super Store fire. Using these data and other information collected in the following months (such as building design documents, records, plans, video and photographic data, radio transmissions, interviews with emergency responders, and informal discussions with store employees), the NIST study team developed its computer model to simulate and analyze the characteristics of the fire, including fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, and the operation of active and passive fire protection systems.
Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:
The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.
NIST welcomes comments on the draft report and its recommendations. To be considered for the final report, comments must be received by noon EST on Dec. 2, 2010. Comments may be submitted via e-mail to firesafety@nist.gov; fax to (301) 975-4052; or mail to the attention of NIST Technical Study: Sofa Super Store, NIST, 100 Bureau Dr., Stop 8660, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8660.
Once the final report is published, NIST will work with the appropriate committees of the International Code Council (ICC) on using the study’s recommendations to improve provisions in model building and fire codes. NIST also will work with the major organizations representing state and local governments—including building and fire officials—and firefighters to encourage them to seriously consider its recommendations.
Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire
1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised.
2. Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address:
a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.
3. Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031.
4. Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision:
a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).
5. Comprehensive Risk Management Plans: NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to:
a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.
6. Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities:
a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground.
7. Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are:
a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires.
8. Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are:
a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service.
9. Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:
a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective.
10. Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to:
a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations.
11. Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:
a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies.
NIST has more than 40 years of experience conducting building and fire safety studies and researching the aftermath of disasters and failures. By understanding the technical causes for such incidents and making the information available to the public, NIST scientists and engineers strive to improve the safety of buildings, their occupants and emergency responders. NIST’s technical building failure and fire studies do not address fault.
Commandsafety.com is pleased to make available the latest update to the Buildingsonfire.com’s Building Construction Training and Lecture Series for 2010. Recently updated with a series of new seminar and training program topics addressing the emerging training and educational needs of the fire service, these programs provide timely and relevant information and insights on Building Construction, Command Risk Management, Dynamic and Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Situational Awareness, Engineered Structural Systems and Fire Fighter Safety.
These programs also present and integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and much more.
These programs, lectures and seminars examine crucial construction elements and occupancy types and correlates building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety. These fast paced programs will utilize extensive multimedia materials, interactive activities, case study activities and simulations to reinforce course content and subject areas, providing exceptional learning opportunities.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
Down load the program files from the link below for more information.
NIOSH released it’s report on the August 24, 2009 three alarm fire at 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo, New York that resulted in the LODD of Lt. Charles McCarthy and FF Jonathan Croom. On August 24, 2009, 45-year-old career Lieutenant Charles McCarthy died following a partial floor collapse into a basement fire, and 34-year-old career fire fighter Jonathan Croom was fatally injured while attempting to rescue the Lieutenant. The Buffalo Fire Department was dispatched for “an alarm of fire” with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. Repeated attempts were made to force open this basement door in order to search for trapped civilians, but crews had difficulty gaining access through this door because it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the 1st and 2nd floors with no civilians found.
Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional manpower was sent with special tools to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2. Lieutenant Charles McCarthy and two fire fighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify all fire fighters had exited a 1st floor deli. Lt. McCarthy following a hoseline into the structure, was well ahead of the other two fire fighters when the 1st floor partially collapsed beneath him. McCarthy fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire. The other two fire fighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. Lt. McCarthy made several Mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device. Confusion erupted exteriorly on scene when trying to verify who was calling the Mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement.
The incident commander was aware that he had crews attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure. Simultaneously, FF Croom, a member of the fire fighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside Lieutenant McCarthy’s point of entry when the Mayday calls came out. It is believed that FF Croom knew where the Lt., was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. FF Croom grabbed a tool, went on air, and rushed into the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other fire fighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device alarming. Lt. McCarthy was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but FF Croom was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after Lt. McCarthy’s Mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the 1st floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. the Lt’s. PASS device was still alarming. They were pronounced dead on scene. Four fire fighters and one lieutenant suffered minor injuries during the incident. No civilians were discovered within the structure.
Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity not maintained.
NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
1815 Genesee Street
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that may have led to the fatalities:
Working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire.
Interior condition reports not communicated to command.
Inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments.
Crew integrity not maintained.
Time Line from the Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report
3:51 a.m. – fire crews were sent to 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo. When they arrived, they were met by a resident who said he heard people trapped inside. Crews began searching the building, but were eventually ordered out as conditions deteriorated.
4:22 a.m. – Members of Rescue 1 entered the building to make sure all firefighters had evacuated the building. Less than two minutes later the floor in the rear of the building collapsed. Lt. McCarthy of Rescue 1 fell into the basement as the floor collapsed. according to the report, other members of Rescue 1 were unaware of the collapse and only reported hearing a loud noise. McCarthy began calling for help on his radio, but other members of Rescue 1 were unable to determine where the calls were coming from and left the building unaware that Lt. McCarthy was trapped.
4:23 a.m. – Firefighter Croom entered the building after hearing the calls for help. the report says he did not exit the building, apparently falling into the basement near Lt. McCarthy.
4:31 a.m. – An emergency head count was ordered to determine the identity of the missing firefighter. Lt. McCarthy was reported missing at that time, but FF Croom was not. Firefighters in the front of the store reported hearing a pass alarm, but could not reach it due to extreme fire conditions, a weakened floor and continuing collapse.
4:48 a.m. – all crews were ordered out of the building because it had become unsafe.
Later, concerns began to arise that FF Croom was missing. the report says he was erroneously reported in a remote area.
5:46 a.m. – On scene personal realize FF Croom is missing and likely inside the building.
6:10 a.m. – Another head count is taken and FF Croom is reported missing.
9:18 a.m. – the Recovery Group reports that the two missing firefighters had been located in the basement, covered in fallen debris.
9:32 a.m. – the debris is cleared and Recovery Group firefighters reach Lt. McCarthy and FF Croom.
Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report, issued December 2, 2009, HERE
For a comprehensive Power Point Program on Operational Safety at Heavy Timber and Ordinary Construction Occupancys that you can down load, go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting Web Site HERE.
I produced an informational training PPT program and support information that aligned with a previoulsy reported Near Miss Event Report. You can download the PPT Training Program HERE and the PDF File HERE
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE
A multiple alarm fire consumed the county courthouse in downtown Pittsboro, North Carolina yesterday. The building was undergoing renovations at the time of the fire and was occupied and operational. The fire started in the clock tower of the 130-yr.-old building and is believed to have been caused by welders. The entire building was undergoing renovation with the outside enclosed with scaffolding.
The clock tower had a protective tarp wrapped around it that preventing outside hose streams from reaching the seat of the fire. The fire broke out at 4:45 p.m., according to county and court officials, shortly after court sessions had ended. All who worked in the building were evacuated safely, according to county officials, and no injuries had been reported late Thursday. According to published reports, the courthouse, the centerpiece of the Pittsboro downtown, was built in stages. It was initially constructed in 1881 at a cost of $10,666, according to Paul Shield Crane’s first edition of “North Carolina Taproots: Courthouses of North Carolina.” In 1930, another story was added to the brick building and, in 1959, there was an extensive renovation that cost $130,000.
Bottom line, buildings undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations can pose significant risk to suppression operations and lead to firefighter injuries and fatalities. This can not be stressed enough.
The unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences, requires a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation. You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
The following are assessment considerations that may provide insights in the assessment, risk profile and development of pre-fire plans, operational procedures and field directives to prevent history repeating events (HRE) with similar conditions and attributes;
Construction Type
What is the construction type or mixed application? How does this affect suppression, rescue, special operations and typical daily operations?
Stage and/or Phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
The Stage and/or phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovation has, SIGNIFICANT impact on firefighter safety and operational integrity.
Understanding these stages and phases can provide mission critical decision-making considerations to incident management teams and company officers.
Site conditions and accessibility
Considerations for both horizontal, vertical and grade conditions.
Considerations during changes in stages and phases. Expect changes
Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
Exposures
These will be specific to the commonality or uniqueness of the structure and occupancy.
Resources
Do you have enough of what’s going to be needed? Plan for it now, before you’re in the street needing it “yesterday”.
Think BIG, as the adage goes, you can always send the companies back. Don’t under estimate the types and kind of resources needs, based upon the structure profile and the potential of undetermined conditions. (reinforces need for pre-planning)
Share the Knowledge, Situational Awareness and Pre-planning inf
ormation with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.
Operating procedures
Again, response and operations at these types of structures demands that pre-fire plan considerations, dialog, discussions, communications and what ever else is appropriate to you organization is identified and disseminated BEFORE an alarm response occurs. Take advantage of pre-gaming and table top a target occupancy, to increase preparedness and reduce risk potential.
Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
Update the plans as conditions change
Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.
Knowledge and Situational Awareness
Understand, explore, research and obtain ALL the necessary information on the structure(s) undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
Communicate the observations, findings, conditions and considerations.
Communications
What ever you identify- COMMUNICATE this throughout the organization.
Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.
Special and Unique Conditions
Identify and plan for the Special and Unique Conditions that may exclusive to you jurisdiction’s structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.
Contingency Plans
Plan of the unexpected and have contingent plans in place.
The magnitude and complexity of an incident involving a structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations will be directly proportional to the size of the building/construction site and corresponding age profile (vintage) of the existing building, if under renovation, and degree of construction. Operational deployment and the Incident Action Plan- IAP must be addressed during strategic and tactical incident management, risk profiling and pre-incident and on-scene intelligence, reconnaissance and planning considerations: More HERE
NIOSH recently released it’s report on the Penn-Mar Shopping Center Explosion that occured on May 7, 2008 in Prince George’s County, Maryland. Report Copy HERE. A number of mission critial lessons and insights can be gained regarding initial response, command management, operational safety, tactical deployment and effective situational awareness and dynamic risk assessment through an unstable progressing incident. Here are some of the insights and specifics.
At 12:54 PM on Thursday, May 7, 2009, Prince George’s County Firefighter/Medics were dispatched to respond to the Penn-Mar Shopping Center, a large 1-story strip mall, in the 3400 Block of Donnell Drive in Forestville and arrived at 12:59 PM. First arriving crews initiated an investigation into a strong odor of natural gas inside the businesses. Firefighters evacuated 5 of the 6 stores that were in the area of the odor, a sixth store was vacant.
Forty-five people were evacuated from the 5 stores and firefighters then started ventilation efforts and called for assistance of the Washington Gas Company. Firefighters discovered natural gas bubbling up from the ground on the exterior rear of the vacant store and minutes later reported that there was a fire on the interior.
Within a minute, at about 1:20 PM, a massive explosion occurred.
A MAYDAY call was sounded and additional resources including paramedics and a second alarm of firefighters were summoned to the scene.
Large plate glass windows blew shattered glass and other debris 60-70 feet into the front parking lot, the roof assembly appeared to have been lifted up and then fell back into place and the rear brick and block wall was completely blown out. Firefighters were in the direct line of the explosion and suffered burns and injuries from flying debris. Firefighters were wearing their personal protective gear which is believed to have minimized injuries. They quickly gathered themselves and checked on other crew members and civilians that may have been injured. A total of eight firefighters sustained a variety of injuries ranging from lacerations to second degree burns. Four Firefighters were transported to the Washington Hospital Center Burn Unit where two were treated and released and two were admitted for additional treatment. While initially transported with serious injuries, the firefighter’s conditions have been upgraded to “good.” Four other firefighters were transported to other area hospitals and were treated and released. One civilian, an employee of the Washington Gas Company was also treated and released from an area hospital. There were no injuries to any of the 45 evacuated civilians.
A small fire resulted from the explosion that was quickly contained and extinguished. The investigation so far has determined that the release of natural gas occurred in the vacant store and reached an ignition point that resulted in the explosion. The Fire/EMS Department’s Technical Rescue Team completed a through secondary post-blast search of the damaged stores confirming that everyone heeded the orders of first arriving firefighters to evacuate. (Excerpt from PGFD Press Release 05.07.2009)
Building Knowledge
The south side of the structure was comprised of 10 business spaces (three of which were vacant) in a strip mall designed and constructed as a Type II, noncombustible classification in the 1970s. The section of the commercial structure involved in the incident was comprised of a main 2 story building, which included 2 vacant businesses and a mall office, with an adjoining wing on the right consisting of 6 businesses (1 unoccupied) in a single story with high dropped ceilings, large attic void spaces, and a sprinkler system. In the wing along the C-side were utility rooms housing the electrical circuit panels, sprinkler system controls, and security panels. It was constructed of brick/block and mortar with large plate glass windows on the A-side, block and mortar exterior C and D-side walls, and a block and mortar interior B-side wall adjoining the rest of the structure. The roof was a commercial flat roof consisting of open web, steel bar flat roof trusses covered with corrugated metal “q-deck” with multi-layered plies of bitumen laminated roof felts and topped with a granule-surfaced cap sheet. The open web steel bar roof trusses were connected to a steel beam and column structural assembly system.
The interior walls separating the businesses were primarily light weight galvanized metal studs covered with a ½ inch gypsum wall board providing tenant separation and compartmentation. The ceiling was a suspended acoustic tile ceiling system which provided a common void space over the business occupied areas of the adjoining right wing. The businesses contained office furniture, partitions, restaurant equipment and supplies, and health and beauty equipment and products.
NIOSH Report Summary
On May 7, 2009, two captains, a lieutenant, and five fire fighters were injured during a natural gas explosion at a strip mall in Maryland. At 1254 hours, dispatch reported a natural gas leak inside a business at a strip mall. Five minutes later, the initial responding crew and the incident commander (IC) arrived on scene to find a gas company employee looking for an underground gas leak. Approximately 6 minutes later, a natural gas leak was found near the exterior rear corner of the structure. After 23 minutes on scene, approximately 45 civilians were evacuated from 7 occupied businesses.
A captain exited the rear door of the business that had called in the natural gas leak and noticed fire along the roof line. Crews in the front and rear of the structure had begun to pull hoselines as another captain was looking out the rear doorway of a middle unoccupied business and noticed the electric meter located on the exterior wall on fire. Anticipating an explosion, he tried to leap out the rear doorway. At the same time, a fire fighter had entered the front door of the unoccupied business, noticed the heavy smell of natural gas, and felt air rush by as the structure exploded. Debris and fire blew out the front, rear, and roof of the structure. The captain who tried to leap out the rear doorway was blown into the rear parking lot and the fire fighter who had entered the front of the structure was blown out the front door and covered with debris. Numerous other fire fighters, primarily near the front of the structure were blown off their feet and hit with debris.
An uninjured captain issued a Mayday, followed by the IC ordering evacuation tones and a personnel accountability report. Crews began to look for the captain who was blown out the rear doorway. He had walked around the side to the front of the structure, and radioed his location to command. Fire fighters began moving injured personnel to ambulances staged in the front parking lot. Eight fire fighters and a gas company employee were transported to local hospitals. The injuries ranged from third degree burns to an ankle sprain.
Key contributing factors identified in this investigation included: insufficient execution of the fire department’s updated standard operating guidelines (SOGs) on incidents involving flammable gas, e.g., apparatus and fire fighters operating in a flammable area (hot zone); the accumulation of natural gas in the structure’s void spaces; unmitigated ignition source; insufficient combustible gas monitoring equipment usage and training; and, ineffective ventilation techniques.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should
ensure that standard operating guidelines for natural gas leaks are understood and followed
contact utility companies (natural gas and electric) immediately to cut external supply/power to structures when gas leaks are suspected
ensure gas monitoring equipment is adequately maintained and fire fighters are routinely trained on proper use
ensure ventilation techniques are conducted after ignition sources are mitigated
ensure that rapid intervention teams are staged at the onset of an incident
ensure that collapse/explosion control zones are established when dealing with a potential explosion hazard
Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations would have prevented these injuries, they are being provided as a reminder of good safety practices.
provide manual personal alert safety system (PASS) or tracking devices to locate potentially missing fire fighters when SCBA are not utilized
ensure standard operating guidelines for communications are understood by dispatch
ensure adequate staffing for emergency medical services and rapid intervention teams (RITs)
ensure training is evaluated for rank and skill levels across the combination department personnel
Contributing Incident Factors
Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately led to the injuries of eight fire fighters:
Insufficient execution of the fire department’s updated standard operating guideline on incidents involving flammable gas, e.g., apparatus and fire fighters operating in a flammable area (hot zone).
The accumulation of natural gas in the structure’s void spaces.
An unmitigated ignition source.
Insufficient combustible gas monitoring equipment usage and training
Ineffective ventilation techniques.
Building Knowledge=Fire Fighter Safety
When was the last time you and your company took a good look around some of your commercial shopping centers, strip centers, malls and business retail complexes? There is a wealth of mission critical information to be gained by conducting a basis walk through and looking at some key construction, configuration, layout and access and utilities features.
Take note of the structural systems that comprise the roof assemblies and the wall and supporting interface. Identify the basic volume of the commercial spaces paying close attention to the common tenant storage, storerooms, access and transfer loading dock and delivery areas. Focus and take note of the fire loading and its expected degree of fire behavior and intensity. Check out the condition and operability of the fixed suppression systems and the integrity of fire barriers and separations.
There’s so much “free” data and information to be gained by going “shopping”; all of which will transcend and can be retrieved at such time a response materializes at that location in the future. If you can, capture the pertinent information into your pre-fire planning data base and make sure you discuss and share your observations, postulated strategies and tactics around the kitchen table or as a table top exercise or better yet in the form of an on-site drill or multi-company training exercise.
Be prepared for the unexpected and always use extreme caution and heightened situational awareness and fluid risk assessment and reconnaissance processing to stay atop of any undefined and evolving incident. Do not allow the potential lack of severity; of what may have all the indications of an unremarkable/uneventful and common call run such as a gas odor investigation or a natural gas leak cause your companies to have less than a high level of alert, focus and attentive accretions through all phases and deployments of the incident. Don’t become complacent.
In addition, take a look at some information relate to another tragic incident response to a reported gas leak that occurred in December, 1983 that lead to five fire fighter LODD’s in Buffalo, New York. HERE
Archived Report From STATter911, from May, 2009 HEREand recent 2010 update HERE with fireground Audio
Prince George’s County (MD) Fire Press Release from May 7, 2009, HERE
Maintaining focused situational awareness while recognizing and processing a wide latitude of incoming information and observations at complex and multiple alarm incidents is a significant challenge to even the most experienced of incident command teams. However, things can go wrong and they can go wrong in a rapidly escalating manner with little time to recover. A prominent double LODD incident from six years ago provides poignant lessons learned as does another history repeating event (HRE) from 1972.
The Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972) have a number of commonalities related to extended multi-alarm operations, building compromise and collapse and multiple line-of-duty deaths of operating fire service personnel. Although building type, construction features and systems are unique for each incident as are the circumstances that lead to the events, there are mission critical lessons to be reexamined or newly introduced if you’re not familiar with either event. This is especially true when we talk about operational challenges and adverse conditions that result in firefighter injuries and fatalities during overhaul and take-up phases of an incident.
Remember Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.
Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.
To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. We’ll expand on some posting in the near future and address Dynamic Risk Assessment in the context of building and occupancy profiling and operations. Additionally, maintaining a heightened sense of risk and safety integrity when operating within non-combat fire suppression modes or phases also requires due diligence, focused and fluid situational awareness coupled with concise monitoring of building conditions, indicators (both evident and projected) and taking conservative actions and postures to ensure personnel are not placed in high risk, no value positions that have a high potential for error likely outcomes.
Check out the detailed posting at our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com for insights into both the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972)HERE. Think about the questioned posed related to complex multi-company operations, command safety and operational integrity of compromised buildings and structural systems. Remember; Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.
Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.
The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived. We seek the elusive “Rosetta stone” that aligns and interprets the emerging and traditionalist acumen related to fire stream effectiveness, flow rates, cooling capacity, extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics, compartment fire theory, propagation and cooling capacity and tactical deployment all relate towards defining an engineering approach to firefighting tactics versus the manual, labor-driven tactics of line deployment and rudiment placement of water on a fuel source within the fire compartment (room).
It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that defines structural fire suppression operations. It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined engine company operations within the modern building construction setting. We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.
The work of such notable suppression theory pioneers as P. Grimwood, E. Hartin, S. Särdqvist and S. Svennson and the concepts surrounding 3D firefighting, B-SAHF and other emerging research from the NIST and UL are areas that today’s discerning and progressive fire officer and commanders must become well-informed and conversant. The quantitative scientific data and emerging concepts from continuing research and testing such as the NIST’s Wind Drive Fire Studies and UL’s The Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions are providing enlightenment on fire development, fuel controlled and ventilation controlled fire development, operational time-duration parameters and degradation and failure mechanisms related to compromise and structural collapse in occupancies.
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement.
Building Construction Systems
Heritage
Pre-1919
Legacy
1920-1949
Conventional
1950-1979
Engineered
1980-2010
Hybrid
Chameleon
The fundamental compartment that comprised a typical room configuration in terms of area (square footage), volume (height/Width), furnishings (fire load package) and materials of construction (structural anatomy) found within conventional, legacy or heritage construction provided predictability in terms of fire suppression, fire behavior, operational time and survivability (civilian/firefighter). The dramatic changes since the early 1980’s in the evolution of modern building construction and the institutionalization of engineered structural systems (ESS) have created compartment (room) areas in excess 500 SF, volumes that are open and spaciously interconnected to other habitable space, fire load packages that create extreme fire behavior, compromising structural stability in shorter time spans creating decreasing interior operational time and requiring increasing fire flow rates and volume to sustain requisite extinguishment demands.
Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.
When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.
Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.
If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.
Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting
Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
Predictive Strategic Process
Tactical Deployment Model
Dynamic Tactical Deployment
Performance Indicators and Street Aides
Fire Dynamics
Resistance
Resilience
Structural Systems
Occupancy Hazard Profiles
The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.
Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional or legacy construction and occupancies;
Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.
The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988…
“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes”.
When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.
Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.
Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken.
This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident.
Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.
Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.
To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade.
Traditional incident scene size-up is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.
According to a 1998 published TriData study report, “Situational Awareness is one of the most difficult skills to master and is a weakness in the fire community. The report goes on to state that “The culture must change so that [personnel] are observing, thinking, and discussing the situation constantly.” It’s all about implementing effective human performance tools; perceptions versus reality, expectations versus realization, comprehension and forecasting, informed decision-making and calculated and formulated risk.
It’s a whole lot more than just “Size-Up”. What do you think?
CNN recently presented an informative piece on the continuing trends in the design and use of engineered structural systems (ESS) . CNN correspondant Gerri Willis provides an informative and insightful look at something the fire service knows all too well. Here’s some additional information for you; According to the Wood Truss Council of America (WTCA), wooden trusses are used in roof systems in more than 60% of all buildings in the United States [SBCMAG 2004]. Truss and related engineered wooden floor systems are also becoming more common. Today, more engineered structures use lighter weight materials, producing …larger spans and clear openings. Trusses can be designed to carry expected loads, be produced economically, be safely handled, and reduce construction costs.
Engineered building components may provide adequate strength under normal loading; but under fire conditions, these truss systems can become weakened and fail, leading to the collapse of roofs, floors, and possibly the entire structure. Truss systems are usually hidden, and fires within truss systems may go unnoticed for long periods of time, resulting in loss of integrity.
Structural design codes often do not factor in this decreased system integrity, as fire degrades the structural members. Fire fighters typically rely on warning signs to indicate imminent truss failure such as roofs and floors that feel spongy or are visibly sagging. Quite often, these warning signs are not good predictors of truss system failures. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) reports that during 1990-2000, structural fires and explosions accounted for 46.1% of all reported fire fighter fatalities (500 of 1,085) [USFA 2002]. Statistics compiled by the WTCA suggest that 4.7% of the total fatalities (108 of 2,286) during 1980-2001 were due to structural collapse [Grundahl 2003b]. Fifteen separate incidents investigated by NIOSH identified at least 20 fatalities and 12 injuries that have occurred from 1998-2003 during fire-fighting operations in buildings containing truss systems.
At least three scenarios can occur in which fire fighters suffer fatalities and injuries while operating at fires involving truss roof and floor systems: 1. While fire fighters are operating above a burning roof or floor truss , they may fall into a fire as the sheathing or the truss system collapses below them.
2. While fire fighters are operating below the roof or floor inside a building with burning truss floor or roof structures , the trusses may collapse onto them.
3. While fire fighters are operating outside a building with burning trusses , the floor or roof trusses may collapse and cause a secondary wall collapse.
Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse
Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building. Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement. The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.
The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.
There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.
This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.
The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act of 2008 became law on December 13, 2009 after unanimously passing the Florida House and Senate in 2008. The new law is named in honor of two Orange County, Florida Firefighters, Todd Aldridge and Mark Benge, who died in 1989 after the roof of a gift shop collapsed; the bill is called the Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act. For a copy of the Act, HERE
The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act will require owners of any commercial, industrial, or any multi-unit residential structure, to mark these buildings in a manner that identifies them as light-frame truss-type construction. A sign or symbol will alert firefighters of the construction material and allow them to modify their tactics for fighting fires in buildings.
Aldridge-Benge Florida Placards
633.027 Buildings with light-frame truss-type construction; notice requirements; enforcement.
(1) The owner of any commercial or industrial structure, or any multiunit residential structure of three units or more, that uses light-frame truss-type construction shall mark the structure with a sign or symbol approved by the State Fire Marshal in a manner sufficient to warn persons conducting fire control and other emergency operations of the existence of light-frame truss-type construction in the structure.
(2) The State Fire Marshal shall adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of this section, including, but not limited to:
(a) The dimensions and color of such sign or symbol.
(b) The time within which commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structures that use light-frame truss-type construction shall be marked as required by this section.
(c) The location on each commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structure that uses light-frame truss-type construction where such sign or symbol must be posted.
(3) The State Fire Marshal, and local fire officials in accordance with s. 633.121, shall enforce the provisions of this section. Any owner who fails to comply with the requirements of this section is subject to penalties as provided in s. 633.161
Truss Systems Placards For Firefighter Safety from across the United States. This was originally posted HERE . Check out the link for examples of various types of placards from various locations around the US. Additional Links HERE and HERE
The following represent various state or local level efforts that have been instituted to provide the fire service with identification placards for attachment to buildings constructed with truss support systems. What we don’t have is a unified national standard, nor do we have these systems in all states. The political strife and lobbying backed by special interest groups and mfg. associations that DO NOT Support these types of placard systems is appalling and inexcusable. This post is to make many of you aware of the various enhacements that exist to support firefighter safety.
New York State TRUSS TYPE CONSTRUCTION PlacardsNYS 19 NYCRR Part 1264 – IDENTIFICATION OF BUILDINGS UTILIZING TRUSS TYPE CONSTRUCTION http://www.dos.state.ny.us/code/trussID.htm
City of San Francisco, CA
5.05 Signage of Buildings with Wood or Lightweight Steel Truss, or Composite Wood Joist (TJI) or Roof Construction
Reference: 2007 San Francisco Fire Code Section 507.3.2 http://www.sfgov.org/site/sffd_page.asp?id=80083
State of New Jersey TRUSS SIGNS (Truss Roof and Truss Floor Assembly Signs)
Exterior Placard NJAC 5:70 – 2.20(a)1 and 2 This attachment was provided by the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety and is referenced as Exterior Placard NJAC 5:70 – 2.20(a)1 and 2.
Truss roof signs are required by the New Jersey State Uniform Fire Code for buildings, which utilize either a floor or roof assembly consisting of truss construction. A truss sign gives early warning to fire and emergency service members that the roof and/or floor may be subject to early collapse in the event of a fire condition.
ISOSCELES TRIANGLE SIGNS
N.J.A.C. 5:70-2.20(a)1.
“The emblem shall be of a bright and reflective color, or made of reflective material. The shape of the emblem shall be an isosceles triangle and the size shall be 12 inches horizontally by 6 inches vertically. With letters of a size and color to make them conspicuous, shall be printed on the emblem, as shown in images below.”
N.J.A.C. 5:70-2.20(a)2
“The emblem shall be permanently affixed to the left of the main entrance door at the height of between 4 feet and 6 feet above the ground, and shall be installed and maintained by the owner of the building”.
New Jersey Truss Placards
NIOSH Suggested Truss Placard Type EXAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR A LAW REQUIRING LABELING OF BUILDINGS FOR THE FIRE SERVICE
This sample language is based on recommendations in the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) report entitled “NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Firefighters due to Truss System Failures.”
The report states: “Consider placing building construction information outside the building. Include
information about roof and floor type.
The NIOSH report also recommends as part of pre-fire planning to: Record data regarding roof and floor construction (e.g., wooden joist, wood truss, steel joist, steel truss, beam and girder, etc.) [NFPA 2003]. The sample language below provides building labeling that identifies the building’s construction type, is simple yet logical, and should allow firefighters to quickly know the building’s floor and roof construction materials, promoting better and more complete information on the fireground and increased firefighter safety.
xxx Identification of structural construction. Structural construction types shall be identified by a sign or signs, in accordance with the provisions of this section.
xxx.1 Signs. Signs shall be affixed where a building or a portion thereof is classified as Group A, B, E, F, H, I, M, R-1, R-2, R-4 or S occupancy. The owner of the building shall be responsible for the installation of the sign.
xxx.2 New buildings and buildings being added to. Signs shall be provided in newly constructed buildings and in existing buildings where an addition that extends or increases the floor area of the building. Signs shall be affixed prior to the issuance of a certificate of occupancy or a certificate of compliance.
xxx.3 Existing buildings. Signs shall be provided in existing buildings. Signs shall be affixed within ninety days of being notified in writing by the Code Enforcement Official.
xxx.4 Contents of signs. Signs shall consist of a diagram 6 inches (152.4 mm)in height and width, with a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm). The sign background shall be reflective white in color. The diagram and contents shall be reflective red in color, conforming to Pantone matching system (PMS) #187. Where a sign is directly applied to a door or sidelight, it may be a permanent non-fading sticker or decal. Signs not directly applied to doors or sidelights shall be of sturdy, non-fading, weather resistant material.
xxx.5 Identification of construction classification. Signs shall contain the roman alphanumeric designation of the construction classification of the building, in accordance with the provisions for the classification of types of construction (types I through V) of the building code. The roman numeral designating construction classification shall be 1 inch (25.4 mm) minimum in height and have a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm) minimum, and it shall be reflective white in color on a background of reflective red.
xxx.6 Identification of year of construction. Signs shall indicate the building’s year of construction or major reconstruction. The arabic numeral indicating year of construction shall be 1 inch (25.4 mm) minimum in height and have a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm) minimum, and it shall be reflective white in color on a background of reflective red.
xxx.7 Identification of structural construction types. Signs shall contain the alphabetic designations identifying the structural construction types used in the building, as follows:
“W” shall mean sawn joist/rafter construction, wood members
“I” shall mean engineered I-joist construction, wood members
“S” shall mean steel construction
“T” shall mean truss type construction
“C” shall mean concrete construction
NIOSH Suggested Truss Placard
State of Florida, Truss Placard System 2008;
The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act. The law was named in honor of Orange County firefighters Todd Aldridge and Mark Benge, who died in 1989 after the truss roof of a gift shop collapsed. Under the new law, owners of any commercial, industrial or multi unit residential structure, have to clearly mark if their buildings have lightweight roof or floor trusses, allowing firefighters to change their tactics when working in these types of structures
633.027 Buildings with light-frame truss-type construction; notice requirements; enforcement
(1) The owner of any commercial or industrial structure, or any multiunit residential structure of three units or more, that uses light-frame truss-type construction shall mark the structure with a sign or symbol approved by the State Fire Marshal in a manner sufficient to warn persons conducting fire control and other emergency operations of the existence of light-frame truss-type construction in the structure.
(2) The State Fire Marshal shall adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of this section, including, but not limited to:
(a) The dimensions and color of such sign or symbol.
(b) The time within which commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structures that use light-frame truss-type construction shall be marked as required by this section.
(c) The location on each commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structure that uses light-frame truss-type construction where such sign or symbol must be posted.
(3) The State Fire Marshal, and local fire officials in accordance with s. 633.121, shall enforce the provisions of this section. Any owner who fails to comply with the requirements of this section is subject to penalties as provided in s. 633.161.
Florida Placard
Wheeling, Illinois Wood Truss Warning Signs
Attached is information from Wheeling, Illinois, who enacted thier own local code requriement. April 18, 1994 adopted Ordinance 2948 amending Title 14, Fire, of the Wheeling Municipal Code by adding Chapter 14.08 “Wood Truss Warning Signs”
CITY OF CHESAPEAKE, VA TRUSS ID PROGRAM; A designated sticker is used for quick recognition of potential Collapse Dangers associated with TRUSS constructed buildings. The sticker is placed on every entry door of all commercial buildings with Truss construction. The use of trusses in building construction presents a great danger to firefighting personnel when those structures are involved in fire conditions. By design, the truss members in floor and roof assemblies will collapse, without warning, after being exposed to heat or flame contact for a very short period of time. Because of the inherent danger firefighters must face while operating within these buildings, a Truss Identification Program (TIP) has been instituted to alert personnel of the danger prior to beginning fire suppression operations. The Truss Identification Program is intended to alert the members of the Chesapeake Fire Department with pertinent pre-plan information before firefighting forces are committed to an interior attack.
The City of Greencastle, Indiana and the Greencastle Fire Department recently enacted and approved an Engineered Lumber ID Program consisting of a sticker that is used for quick recognization of potential Collapse Dangers associated with Engineered Lumber constructed buildings. The sticker is placed on every electrical meter of all residential & commercial buildings with Engineered Lumber construction built after May 13th 2008. The news release states that; the use of this type of lumber in building construction presents a great danger to firefighting personnel when those structures are involved in fire conditions. By design, the Engineered Lumber in floor and roof assemblies will collapse, without warning, after being exposed to heat or flame contact for a very short period of time. Because of the inherent danger firefighters must face while operating within these buildings, an Engineered Lumber Identification Program (ELIP) has been instituted to alert personnel of the danger prior to beginning fire suppression operations.
The Engineered Lumber Identification Program is intended to alert the members of the Greencastle Fire Department with pertinent pre-plan information before firefighting forces are committed to an interior attack. The sticker is unobtrusive and is placed directly on a meter box, for example, and alerts the FD if either the floor joists and/or the trusses are made of and Engineered Lumber System and materials. The fire officers are already checking the utility boxes on all fires as part of their initial size-up. The ELIP shall be an ongoing program applied to all residential & commercial buildings inspected by the Greencastle Fire Department.
ORDINANCE 2008 – 4 states;AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING A REFLECTIVE SYMBOL ON STRUCTURES USING ENGINEERED LUMBER WHEREAS, many new building structures currently use engineered lumber in their construction;
WHEREAS, some types of engineered lumber burn at a rate faster that other types of lumber; and
WHEREAS, in fighting fires, it would be helpful to know the types of materials used in the construction of a structure.
NOW THEREFORE be it ordained by the Common Council of the City of Greencastle as follows:
1. Definitions:
a. Engineered Lumber shall mean prefabricated I-joists, truss joists, and truss rafters, and laminated beams and studs.
b. Structure shall mean primary, secondary and accessory structures as defined in the Greencastle Zoning Code that have electrical meters that serve the structure.
2. All structures constructed with engineered lumber after the effective date of this ordinance must have a reflective symbol affixed to each electrical meter serving the structure.
3. The reflective symbol shall be in the form of a sticker, issued by the City of Greencastle that states that the structure is constructed with engineered lumber
4. Any person violating this ordinance by refusing to use the reflective symbol or by removing the reflective symbol shall be subject to a fine in an amount of $25.00 per violation. Each day that a violation occurs shall constitute a separate violation, subject to a separate fine.
5. The owner of any structure that was constructed with engineered lumber prior to the effective date of this ordinance is requested to place the reflective symbol on the electrical meter serving the structure on a voluntary basis.
This is another great example how local level insights, actions and legislation can go a long way in supporting fire service operational challanges as they relate to building construction systems, methodologies and materials. Remember, We can certainly work diligently AND cooperativley with local government officials to enhance incident operations and make our jobs safety, one step at a time….
For additional information on the Fire Department’s efforts in Greencastle, IN contact Lt. John Shafer, Lieutenant/Training Officer HERE.
An invaluable free on-line training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions – is available from UL, check HERE for further information.
A million dollar Baltimore County, Maryland home was destroyed Sunday December 13, 2009 by a fire that tore through the 4,700-square-foot structure with such intensity that firefighters were forced to battle the flames from the exterior. Shortly after 21:00 hours, Baltimore County Fire Dispatch alerted crews for Fire Box 50-2 at 12607 Nancy Lee Court in the Worthington Trace subdivision in the Chestnut Ridge area. As firefighters were responding, dispatch advised they were receiving multiple calls to 911, with some reporting the entire house was on fire. While en route to the scene, Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Company Captain Dan Uddeme reported heavy fire was visible and requested a 2nd alarm and a Tanker Strike Team as the house sits in an area without fire hydrants. Upon arrival, Capt. Uddeme reported fire had consumed the entire 2nd floor and roof area and was spreading. Firefighters were forced to use exterior operations due to the heavy volume of fire. Responding units set up for rural water operations, shuttling more than 17,000 gallons of water from an underground tank on Greenspring Avenue and Walnut Avenue near the scene. Reisterstown Volunteer Fire Companys Engine 412 was also utilized for its Compressed Air Foam System, with several handlines and the ladder pipe from Glyndon Volunteers Truck 404 flowing foam. The Baltimore County Fire Investigation Division is investigating to determine the fires cause and origin. Video and data was obtained from Michael Schwartzberg’s Firepix1075 . Additional photos, HERE and newsreports, HERE
While watching the video, take the time to listen to the wind howling across the mic and observe the intesity level of the fire severity and propogation in the Charlie side. This provides an opportunity for those that are not familiar with the NIST Wind Driven Fire Studies or the PWC (VA) Kyle Wilson LODD to take some time to read about the affects of wind on incident operations, strategies and tactical personnel safety. This was a 4,700 SF large volume residential structure. Think about the performance and your deparment’s capabilities? Remember, it’s not “just” a house fire
Take a look at the Prince William County (VA) Fire & Rescue case study information related to Technician I Kyle Wilson – LODD Report. This event: Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive. Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure. Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.
National Institute of Standards and Technology – NIST Wind Driven Fire Research HERE Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them. Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire. This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building. In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure. This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway. The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries.
What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented? Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening. If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants. NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service. Fire Chief Magazine article HERE
A video of one of the wind driven fire experiments showing the pulsing flames out of the window. Pulsing Fire(83 MB)
A video of one of the wind driven fire experiments showing the deployment of a Wind Control Device (WCD). WCD Deployment. (40 MB)
A 4-view video of one of the wind driven fire experiments conducted where the wind control curtain is deployed. The video is 4 times real time. WDF Curtain Deploy (486 MB)
An 8-view video of experiment number five conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of a WCD on a wind driven fire. The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 5-Oct View (450MB)
An 8-view video of experiment number eight conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of externally applied water, solid stream and fog stream, at 160 gpm. The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 8- Oct View (419MB)
Of the many issues affecting the Fire Service, the prevailing challenge that has a pronounced impact on operational safety is the assimilation of engineered structural systems (ESS) into mainstream building design and construction. The presence of engineered structural systems (ESS) are no longer considered to be an innocuous feature in a given building or occupancy; it is the predominate feature in nearly all current construction, renovation and adaptive reuse or infill applications. It has become far more than just concerning ourselves with the presence of a simple light-weight or “engineered” truss roof system or a wood I-beam floor assembly.
There is a new lexicon of building construction components and systems that must be added to your operational safety vocabulary and incident action plans. There is a new terminology, applications and a knowledge base to learn that will support operational excellence and support the integrity of incident safety performance of companies and personnel. Do you know what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence an incident?
The fire service continues to apply the term “light weight construction” to a wide variety of building construction and systems. This expression has become a miss-application of both term and the correlation of risk and severity related to operational profiling. In other words, we apply and express the use of “light weight construction” for all types of engineered components, systems, designs and assemblies in nearly all types of building construction and occupancy use. Although the roots of the term can be traced back to the early 1980′s, and its application to the (then) emerging use of trussed roofing systems and the advent of wood I-beam floor supports (sans solid dimensional lumber joists), the use of the terminology in today’s context of risk assessment, strategic and tactical management and deployment models and within the context of incident operational tactics is no longer applicable, valid or suitable. It must be expanded into a more specific and descriptive level of classification and correlation.
For the most part, when discussing buildings and occupancies, aside from classifications related to code type or class as an element of fire resistance; the emphasis has been to differentiate between conventional and engineered construction, and the application of the term “light weight construction”. I continue advocating and promoting through my lectures that it’s much more than this when looking at the spectrum of construction and the structural anatomy of buildings. Current and past generations of buildings, construction and occupancies can be more accurately differentiated and classified within six (6) expanding categories in the following Building Construction Systems;
· Heritage: Pre-1900
· Legacy: 1900-1949
· Conventional: 1950-1979
· Engineered: 1980-2009 Current into 2010…
· Blended Hybrid: 1995-2009 Current into 2010…
· Enigmatic: 2010- Projected
We’ll discuss these six classifications in greater details in future postings here and expand the level of details on the CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com sites. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past “conventional” construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address the advancement of new rules of combat structural fire engagement. But if you don’t understand or know what and how those changes in predictability have occurred, you may be operating with a false sense of operational risk and safety margin.
It’s a Lot More than just talking about “Light Weight” Construction….
· From Plywood-CDX….to
· Particle Board- PB…..to;
· Orient Strand Board-OSB
· Structural Composite Lumber- SCL
· Laminate Strand Lumber- LSL
· Laminate Veneer Lumber-LVL
· Structural Insulated Panels-SIP
· Parallel Strand Lumber-PSL
· Machine Stress Rated Lumber- MSR
· Medium Density Fiberboard-MDF and MDL (Lumber)
· Finger Jointed Lumber-FJL
· Adhesives…..
Do some research and check these terms out for starters. We’ll talk more about these components and assemblies in the near future. So get busy on your down time today over the next few days and discover the implications these components may have in your community….
Here’s a link to a past informative posting related to engineered systems and their relationship to firefighter safety and operations, HERE. There’s some great contributed information and manufacturer “insights” on the subject engineered wood I-joists and beams and firefighter safety. There are some interesting statistical extrapolations, correlations and conveniences’ that attempt to make the case. But then again, You be the judge. Take at look at the presentation developed by the American Forest and Paper Association, HERE and HERE.
If you haven’t done so yet, don’t forget to check out the free online training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions at the UL University developed and provided by Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL), HERE
Here’s a series of other important Reference Links that provide some insights on operational safety, incident conditions and factors and the lessons-learned from a number of LODD events;
NIOSH Publication No. 2009-114: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors HERE
NIOSH Publication No. 2005-132: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters Due to Truss System FailuresHERE
Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE
First-floor collapse during residential basement fire claims the life of two fire fighters (career and volunteer) and injures a career fire fighter captain – New York, Report HERE
Career Fire Fighter Dies After Falling Through the Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence – Ohio, HERE
Colerain Township, Ohio Double LODD Preliminary Report, HERE
Career engineer dies and fire fighter injured after falling through floor while conducting a primary search at a residential structure fire – Wisconsin, HERE
Remembrance: Deutsche Bank Fire and Double FDNY LODD in lower Manhattan, NYC- August 18, 2007
Structural Anatomy; Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites
Fire operations for structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and danger to operating personnel. This reality was clearly validated when two FDNY firefighters died in the line-of-duty during a seven-alarm fire that tore through the abandoned Deutsche Bank skyscraper in lower Manhattan, next to ground zero in New York City on Saturday August 18, 2007.The Deutsche Bank Building located at 130 Liberty Street adjacent to the quarters of FDNY Engine 10, Ladder 10, was once a 40-story high-rise structure that had been systematically reduced to 26-stories at the time of the fire. Significant building contamination from numerous toxic substances that included asbestos and lead resulting from the destruction of the World Trade Center during the September 11th attacks required the deliberate floor-by-floor dismantling effort as part of the deconstruction process that would ultimately remove the building from its present site.
The two FDNY firefighter fatalities were Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, an eight year veteran and Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran, both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations.
Its these types of unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces that demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences that require a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation.
You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
For more information on Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites, go HERE and HERE
Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites Power Point program download, HERE
Laminated veneer lumber (LVL) Are you aware of the product and it’s characteristics? Here’s a quick primer, ready or not here it comes in a neighborhood close to you.
According to the manufacturer, Laminated veneer lumber (LVL) is a vast improvement over solid wood beams. Problems that naturally occur as solid sawn lumber dries – twisting, splitting, checking, crowning and warping – are greatly reduced. And pound for pound, LVL has more load-carrying capacity than solid sawn lumber. The result: a building material that is more reliable, high-performing and useable than traditional lumber.
LVL is made from ultrasonically and visually graded veneers arranged in a specific pattern so that naturally occurring defects have no concentrated effect on the beam’s performance. The veneers are then bonded together under pressure and heat with waterproof adhesives. LVL beams are exceptionally strong, solid and straight making them exceptional for most primary load-carrying beam applications.
Can be used as columns or studs with proper engineering
Accepted by all major building codes
LVL is available in three bending strengths: 2950Fb 2.0E, 2650Fb 1.9E, and 2250Fb 1.5E, and in lengths up to 60 feet. · 1-1/2″ and 1-3/4″ thicknesses are standard, · with billet thicknesses of 3-1/2″, 5-1/4″ and 7″ available in 2950Fb 2.0E. · LVL comes in a wide range of depths including; o 7-1/4″, o 9-1/4″, o 9-1/2″, o 11-1/4″, o 11-7/8″, o 14″, o 16″, o 18″, o 20″, o 22″ and o 24″. · In addition to the standard natural finish, a water-resistant coating called SiteCote™ is available for extra weather protection during construction. · LVL is accepted by all major code evaluation agencies including: BOCA, CCMC, DSA – California, HUD, ICBO, LA City, New York City, New York State, SBCCI and Wisconsin.
Manufacturer; HERE Product Specifications; HERE Video Clip; Here
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum. On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com. A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production. Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.
