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“It’s Not Something You Do; It’s Something You Are”

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Remembering the Sacrifices’ of that day in September and all of those who came before us in this the United States Fire Service and those that were with us, in the commission of our sworn duties who didn’t go home…..as we do what we do best, being Fire Fighters.

International Society of Fire Service Instructors; “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.”

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The International Society of Fire Service Instructors is proud to announce the release of “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.” The program is a train-the trainer package that combines the latest research on light weight building construction from National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), Underwriters Laboratories(UL), Michigan State University, The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and the Chicago Fire Department into a single resource tailored for company-level instruction.

The program was made possible through a Prevention & Research Grant from the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program and the Department of Homeland Security. The ISFSI partnered with Eastern Kentucky University’s Fire & Safety Engineering Technology Program to analyze line of duty deaths between 1997 and 2009 to study the impact that lightweight construction has had on firefighters and firefighting operations.

The DVD included in the program package contains all of the instructional resources necessary to provide quality training on this important topic. A wide variety of support materials are included to provide the user a deep understanding of the challenges with modern building construction techniques. Instructors can tailor the program to meet the needs of their audience, including a 2-hour brief up to a week-long program.

The program will be distributed to all members of the ISFSI as a free member benefit. The ISFSI has also partnered with the Safety & Health Section of the IAFC to provide a copy to each of its members. ISFSI President, Eddie Buchanan, was on hand at the Safety & Health Section Meeting at FRI to personally deliver Chief Billy Goldfeder his copy as chair of the section. All members should expect their copy to arrive in their mailboxes over the next week.

“I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to the ISFSI members and staff who worked so hard to bring this product to firefighters across America and the globe. It is truly a lifesaving program and a fantastic use of grant funds. It is critical that this package get into the hands of every instructor and fire officer to ensure they are educated and prepared to handle the real risk that looms out there on the next call,” said President Buchanan.

Check out the International Society of Fire Service Instructor’s (ISFSI) web site HERE.

Not a member? Take the time to sign up and get connected.

Rules of Engagement 2010

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IAFC Rules of Engagement

Rules of Engagement Project; Increasing Firefighter Survival

Developed by the Safety, Health and Survival Section International Association of Fire Chiefs

The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries.  As part of that effort the nearly 1,000 member Safety, Health and Survival Section of the IAFC has developed the recently approved  “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground. The intent is to provide a set of “model procedures” for Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting to be made available by the IAFC to fire departments as a guide for their own standard operating procedure development.

In August, 2008, following a year of discussion, the Section moved to develop a set of “Rules of Engagement for Structure Firefighting”. A project team was created consisting of Section members and representatives of other several other interested fire service organizations. These included the Fire Department Safety Officer Association (FDSOA), the National Fallen Firefighter Foundation (NFFF), and the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC), the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and other organizations. All draft material has also been shared with representatives of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) who developed a joint IAFF/IAFC “Fire Ground Survival Project”. Three Section members also participated in the IAFF project. The direction provided the project team by the Section leadership was to develop rules of engagement with the following conceptual points;

  • Rules should be a short, specific set of bullets
  • Rules should be easily taught and remembered
  • Rules should define critical risk issues
  • Rules should define “go” or “no‐go” situations
  • A companion lesson plan/explanation section should be provided

Early in development the Rules of Engagement, it was recognized that two separate rules were needed one set for the firefighter, and another set for the incident commander. Thus, the two sets of Rules of Engagement described in the attached document. The ROE were also inserted in the August issue of FireRescue magazine. Each set has several commonly shared bullets and objectives, but the explanations are described somewhat differently based on the level of responsibility (firefighter vs. incident commander).

The attached and linked PDF document reflects nearly two years of public comment and feedback from several presentations at fire service conferences, including the National Fallen Fire Fighters Safety Summit held at the National Fire Academy this past March. The “Rules” were formally adopted by the IAFC Health, Safety and Survival Section at the Fire Rescue International Conference held last week in Chicago.

The development of the rules integrated several nationally recognized programs and principles. They included risk assessment principles from NFPA Standards 1500 and 1561. Also included where concepts and principles from Crew Resource Management (available from iafc.org) and data and lessons from the National Near‐Miss Reporting System (firefighternearmiss.com). The development process also included review of lessons learned from numerous firefighter fatality investigations conducted by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.

It’s incumbent that the fire chief and the Departments management team insure the safety of all firefighters working at structural fires. All command organization officers are responsible for their own safety and the safety of all personnel working with them. All officers and members are responsible are responsible for continually identifying and reporting unsafe conditions or practices. The Rules of Engagement allows both the firefighter and the incident commander to apply and process these principles.

One principle applied in the Rules of Engagement is firefighters and the company officers are the members at most risk for injury or death. The Rules integrate the firefighter into the risk assessment decision making process. These members should be the ultimate decision maker as to whether it’s safe to proceed with assigned objectives. The “Rules” allow a process for that decision to be made while still maintain command unity and discipline. It is well known that firefighting is hazardous with varying levels of risk to the firefighter. However, firefighting is not a military campaign where lives are lost to establish a beach head. No firefighter’s life is a building that eventually will be rebuilt. Keep all members safe so “Everyone Goes Home”!

Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival

  • Size‐Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.
  • Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
  • DO NOT Risk Your Life for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved.
  • Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
  • Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
  • Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together
  • Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions.
  • Constantly Monitor Fireground Communications for Critical Radio Reports.
  • You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
  • You Are Required to Abandon Your Position and Retreat Before Deteriorating Conditions Can Harm You.
  • Declare a May Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger.

The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety

  • Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Size‐Up of the Incident.
  • Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
  • Conduct an Initial Risk Assessment and Implement a SAFE ACTION PLAN.
  • If You Do Not Have The Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
  • DO NOT Risk Firefighter Lives for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
  • Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
  • Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
  • Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Firefighters. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
  • Maintain Frequent Two‐Way Communications and Keep Interior Crews Informed of Changing Conditions.
  • Obtain Frequent Progress Reports and Revise the Action Plan.
  • Ensure Accurate Accountability of All Firefighter Location and Status.
  • If, After Completing the Primary Search, Little or No Progress Towards Fire Control Has Been Achieved ‐ Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
  • Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires
  • Always Have Firefighter Rehab Services in Place at All Working Fires

Rules of Engagement Poster, PDF File ROE 2010

Link to the IAFC Section Page and ROE Concept Paper

Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings Report issued by the USFA

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The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA)has  issued a special report examining the characteristics of fatal fires in residential buildings. The report, Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.

The report is part of the Topical Fire Report Series and is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). According to the report, an estimated 1,800 fatal residential building fires occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss. The leading cause of fatal residential fires is smoking (19 percent) and the leading areas of fire origin are bedrooms (27 percent) and common areas such as living and family rooms (23 percent). In addition, fatal residential fires, which tend to be larger, cause more damage, and have higher injury rates than nonfatal residential fires, occur most frequently in the late evening and early morning hours, peaking from midnight to 5 a.m. Finally, these types of fires are more prevalent in the cooler months, peaking in January (13 percent).

The topical reports are designed to explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS. Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.

Findings

■ An estimated 1,800 fatal residential building fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss.

■ Fatal residential building fires tend to be larger, cause more damage, and have higher injury rates than nonfatal residential fires.

■ Smoking is the leading cause of fatal residential building fires (19 percent).

■ The leading areas of fire origin in fatal residential building fires are bedrooms (27 percent) and common areas such as living and family rooms (23 percent).

■ Fatal residential building fires are more prevalent in the cooler months, peaking in January (13 percent).

■ Fatal residential building fires occur most frequently in the late evening and early morning hours, peaking from midnight to 5 a.m. One-third (33 percent) of fatal residential fires occur during these 5 hours.

■ About two-thirds (66 percent) of fatal residential building fires are confined to the building of origin or extend beyond the building of origin.

The U.S. fire death rate has gone down dramatically over the past three decades since the creation of the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), from over 30 deaths per million population to 11 deaths per million population. The United States, however, continues to have one of the highest fire death rates per capita among Western Nations.

 The original goal for USFA was to help lead a reduction in fire deaths by 50 percent in a generation. With annual fire deaths dropping from over 9,000 to less than 3,500 in that period of time, USFA’s goal has been achieved. Nevertheless, fire deaths are still high. Approximately 1,800 fatal residential building fires occurred annually in recent years (2006 to 2008). These fires resulted in an annual average of approximately 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss.

This report is one of a continuing series of topical reports issued by the USFA’s National Fire Data Center and addresses the characteristics of fatal residential building fires reported to the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) from 2006 to 2008, the most recent data available at the time of the analysis. Because 79 percent of fire deaths occur in residential buildings, they are the focus of this report. The information in this report about fatal residential fires can be used not only to assess progress but also to understand the nature of the fatal fire problem and its implications for targeting of prevention programs. For the purpose of this report, the terms “residential fires” and “fatal residential fires” are synonymous with “residential building fires” and “fatal residential building fires,” respectively. “Fatal residential fires” is used throughout the body of this report; the findings, tables, charts, headings, and footnotes reflect the full category, “fatal residential building fires.”

The report, Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings,HERE 

Thursday 9pm ET: “We Have a Situation; Are You Aware?”

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Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

Check out Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum on Firefighter NetCast.com this Thursday night August 19th at 9pm ET with a live online radio call-in show addressing the most current issues affecting the Fire Service.

This month Christopher Naum’s guests include Battalion Chief Matt Tobia with the Anne Arundel County, MD Fire Department, a metropolitan combination Fire / Rescue / EMS agency in Suburban Baltimore, MD and Battalion Chief Greg W. Collier, Mount Laurel Fire Department, NJ and NFFF/EGH Region II Advocate discussing  the emerging and prevailing issues related to situational awareness on the fireground and incident scene  and its relationship to firefighter safety or operational integrity. The show is titled; “We Have a Situation; Are you Aware?”

Go to www.FirefighterNetCast.com to listen and participate live, with a national and international audience of firefighters, officers and commanders from rural heartlands of Oklahoma to the suburbs of Chicago and the urban streets of DC. Or download the program later in the week for later use. Check out the premiere show with featured guests Chief Billy Hayes (DCFD) and Chief Doug Cline (High Point FD, NC).

Also, if you haven’t taken the time, check out the latest on the FireEMS Blogs Community at CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com. Taking it to the Streets is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production

The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio…

Taking it to the Streets

With Christopher Naum

A New Monthly Radio Talkshow on FireFighter Netcast.com

A Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighter Netcast.com Production

Advancing FireFighter Safety and Operational Intergrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.

 

 

FDNY Deutsche Bank Building LODD Fire Report issued by NIOSH

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The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program has released the investigation report of the line of duty deaths of two career FDNY  firefighters during a 2007 seven-alarm high-rise fire in the former Deutsche Bank building undergoing deconstruction and asbestos abatement.

On August 18, 2007,  two FDNY firefighters; Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo lost thier lives while operating at this incident. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations. FDNY Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran and FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino,  became trapped in the maze-like conditions of a high-rise building undergoing deconstruction. The building’s standpipe system had been disconnected during the deconstruction and the partitions constructed for asbestos abatement prohibited fire fighters from getting water to the seat of the fire. An hour into the incident, the fire department was able to supply water by running an external hoseline up the side of the structure. Soon after the victims began to operate their hoseline, they ran out of air. The victims suffered severe smoke inhalation and were transported to a metropolitan hospital in cardiac arrest where they succumbed to their injuries.

By the time the fire was extinguished, 115 fire fighters had suffered a variety of injuries.Key contributing factors to this incident include: delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel, inoperable standpipe and sprinkler system, delay in establishing water supply, inaccurate information about standpipe, unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously, extreme fire behavior, uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor, blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress, maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris, heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented, failure of fire fighters to always don SCBAs inside structure and to replenish air cylinders, communications overwhelmed with numerous Mayday and urgent radio transmissions, and lack of crew integrity.

NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • review and follow existing standard operating procedures on high-rise fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters are not operating in hazardous areas without the protection of a charged hoseline.
  • be prepared to use alternative water supplies when a building’s standpipe system is compromised or inoperable.
  • develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating guidelines for risk management during complex high-rise operations.
  • ensure that crew integrity is maintained during high-rise fire suppression operations.
  • train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning high-rise structure.
  • ensure that fire fighters diligently wear their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) when working in environments that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).
  • train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
  • use exit locators (both visual and audible) or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit.
  • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
  • encourage building owners and occupants to report emergency situations as soon as possible and provide accurate information to the fire department.
  • consider additional fire fighter training using a high-rise fire simulator.

Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

  • conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters in high-rise structures.
  • continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communications in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Municipalities should:

  • ensure that construction and/or demolition is done in accordance with NFPA 241: Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations.
  • develop a reporting system to inform the fire department of any ongoing, unique building construction activities (such as deconstruction or asbestos abatement) that would adversely affect a fire response.
  • establish a system for property owners to notify the fire department when fire protection/suppression systems are taken out of service.


The Complete NIOSH Report is available HERE

An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of  the PPT program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites

Additional Links, HERE and HERE

New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work, HERE

Other References and postings;

  • NY Daily News: Battle to save trapped firefighters
  • WABC: Fatal Deutsche Bank fire report released (2008)
  • FDNY Penalties After Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Lawyers: Evidence Withheld in Deutsche Bank Fire Trial
  • FDNY Disciplines Company Officers Following Tragic Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Attorney Claims Deutsche Bank Contractors Are “Scapegoats”
  • YouTube Preview Image YouTube Preview Image

    In the Streets; On the Air

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    Taking it to the Streets had its premier July 21st on Firefighter Netcast.com with a lively and provoking discussion on “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen?” The program theme aligned with a recent posting on the same topic. Join me on the program were two prominent and nationally recognized fire service leaders, who I’m honored to have known for many years, Chief Billy Hayes and Chief Doug Cline; the program explored leading fire service issues affecting firefighter safety, training, credentialing and education; fireground operational variables related to the continuing changes in building construction, engineered systems and extreme fire behavior,  and the emerging need for “Tactical Patience” as I’ve been exploring the relationships towards the need for tactical enhancements to our current fire suppression theory and firefighting models.

    Conversations expanded on the NFFF/Everyone Goes Home Campaign and programs, the newest EGH initiatives on Behavioral Health and the successes achieved through the Courage to be Safe Programs and the Advocacy Program.

    Both our guests provided cutting edge perspectives and commentary on the key issues that the fire service needs to have on their radar screen and the need for emerging and practicing fire officers and commanders to continually strive to increase skill sets and maintain a pulse on the leading issues affecting the fire service and apply emerging research  and studies to increase operational capabilities, improve performance and enhance and promote firefighter safety and survival and operational integrity.

    Although technical difficulties from the live feed coming from the Inner Harbor in Baltimore at the Firehouse Expo, precluded the ability to have the call-in segments of the program to work, the 120 minute program gave the listeners a wealth of information to talk over in the firehouse, at the kitchen table or in the apparatus bays.

    The program is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and a Fire Fighter Netcast.com  production, produced by John Mitchell and Rhett Fleitz.  The live program segment will be edited and available for iTunes download soon. You can check out the other programming and shows produced by Fire Fighter Netcast.com HERE. Stay tuned for announcements on the next program date for Taking it to the Streets coming to you live from the IAFC Fire Rescue International Conference in Chicago in August.  

    Taking it to the Streets; Advancing Fire Fighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service. 

    • Firefighter Netcast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets, HERE, HERE
    • “What’s on your Radar Screen?” July 21, 2010 Program, HERE
    • “What’s on your Radar Screen?” post on Commandsafety.com, HERE

     

    Newest NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters at Structure Fires

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    NIOSH released it’s latest Alert on Firefighter Risk Reduction. Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures. These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.

    Fire fighters should take the following steps to minimize their risk of death and injury while fighting structure fires:

    • Report conditions and hazards encountered to your officer, incident commander, or incident safety officers
    • Recognize that maintaining your safety is a shared responsibility
    • Comply with your department’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) / standard operating guidelines (SOGs) and safety rules.
    • Be constantly aware of your surroundings and changing conditions.

    Fire departments (chief officers, company officers and policy makers) should take the following steps to protect fire fighters:

    • Develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating procedures and guide-lines (SOPs/SOGs) for risk management.
    • Train incident commanders, incident safety officers, and fire fighters in the fire department risk management plans and SOPs/SOGs for risk management.

    Develop and implement fire department policies and SOPs/SOGs for emergency response and fire-fighting activities in and around abandoned, vacant, or unoccupied structures.

    • A thorough size-up and risk analysis should be performed before conducting operations in any burning structure.
    • Fire-fighting operations should be limited to defensive (exterior) strategy if the structure is judged to be unsafe and in any situation where the risks to fire fighter safety are excessive.
    • Offensive (interior attack) operations should only be considered when sufficient resources are on scene to conduct offensive operations with a reasonable degree of safety, including the ability to perform essential support functions (i.e., water supply, ventilation, lighting, utility control, accountability, rapid intervention teams).
    • Additional size-ups and risk analyses should be performed before changing strategies, including any decision to conduct interior overhaul operations following a defensive fire attack.
    • Have adequate resources available on scene to per-form rapid intervention team (RIT) duties anytime personnel are operating at any structure fire.
    • Inspect and preplan buildings within your jurisdiction. Note the type of construction, materials used, presence of trusses and/or lightweight construction in the roof and floor, type of occupancy, fuel load, exit routes, and other distinguishing characteristics.
    • Enter preplan information into the dispatch computer so that when a fire is reported at a preplanned location, the critical information is provided to all responding units. Adopt and enforce a standard system of marking dangerous abandoned, derelict, and vacant buildings, based on a prefire assessment of their structural conditions and other risk factors, in cooperation with municipal agencies and local authorities such as local housing authorities.
    • Train fire fighters and officers to recognize the marking system and incorporate the information into their size-up considerations. Additionally, local authorities should ensure programs are in place that provide for the demolition and removal of structures deemed unsafe by code enforcement.
      • Make sure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up of critical fireground factors before beginning fire fighting efforts and continuously re-views and reevaluates these factors during all fire-ground operations. A 360-degree size-up should be conducted for all abandoned, vacant, or unoccupied structures.
      • Ensure those in charge of fire incidents (e.g., incident commanders, chief officers, safety officers) are fully trained to fulfill their responsibilities and obligations in the execution of their duties.
      • Educate the public on the need to have home fire drills and designated meeting places in the event of an emergency. The location of designated meeting
      • places should be communicated to the fire department as a way to help confirm and verify building occupancy status.

    Incident commanders (IC) and incident safety officers (ISO) should do the following:

    • The IC should conduct an initial size-up of each incident weighing critical fireground factors (i.e., occupancy status; occupant survivability and rescue potential; vacant building markings or indicators; size, construction and use of the building; age and condition of the building; and the location, size, and extent of the fire in the building) against the department’s risk management profile to determine the initial incident strategy (offensive or defensive). The IC should develop an incident action plan before beginning firefighting efforts and continually review and reevaluate the factors and the risk management plan throughout the operation.
    • The IC should use appropriate risk management criteria to decide whether an offensive or defensive strategy should be employed to attack a fire. The IC should attempt to determine whether the building is occupied or not. Signs to look for include vehicles in garage, driveway, or parked nearby; people at windows of apartment or office buildings calling for help indicates the possibility of other occupants as well; time of day; type of occupancy; and reports from occupants who have escaped the burning structure. Reports from neighbors and bystanders may also provide valuable information.
    • The IC should consider the number of fire fighters, the amount and type of apparatus and equipment available, and the stage of the fire when determining the type of fire attack.
    • Follow departmental policies (risk management plans, SOPs/SOGs) for risk management.
    • Establish, clearly mark, and monitor an exterior collapse zone at structure fires where there is a risk of collapse.
    • Use effective and universal evacuation signals when command personnel determine that all fire fighters should be evacuated from a burning building, as well as during the initiation of defensive operations and during overhaul and salvage operations.

    NIOSH Summary HERE

    NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE

    Taking it to The Streets on FireFighter Netcast.com

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    Taking it to the Streets

    With Christopher Naum

    A New Monthly Radio Talkshow on  FireFighter Netcast.com  Premiering on Wednesday July 21 at 9pm ET

    A Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighter Netcast.com Production 

    Advancing FireFighter Safety and Operational Intergrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service. 

    Watch for More Taking it to the Streets  Annoucements over the next seven days here on CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com and on Firefighter Netcast.com 

    Programming

    Ten Minutes in the Street

    • Presenting an informational recap and discussion on leading topcs, events and issues from the past 30 days.

     Feature Segments Program will have one (1) selected segment based upon topic and guest 

     Buildingsonfire

    • Addressing today’s topical issues within the areas of Firefighting, Building Construction, Dynamic Risk Assessment, and Command & Tactical Safety
      • Open interative discussions and call-in
    • Street Stories
      • Presenting first-hand accounts and insights on an event, response or operation with a featured guest
      • Open interative discussions and call-in
    • Smoke Showin’
      • Featured Guest Interviews and discussions focusing on the NFFF Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives and Everyone Goes Home Campaign 
      • Open interative discussions and call-in

    HRE History Repeating Events  

    • Discussion on recent History Repeating Events, LODD, NIOSH Reports or other
    • Open interative discussions and call-in

     A View from the Street

    • Closing Commentary on timely and relevant issues affecting the Fire Service

    What’s On Your Radar Screen?

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    BuildingsonFire 2010; Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Operational Safety

    Major Influencing Fire Service Reports, Issues or Focus that should be on Your Radar Screen

    The following list is but a modest cross section of pertinent information or focus areas today’s Firefighter, Company or Command Officer MUST be knowledgeable in, have insights and proficiency based technical skills to function with a level of competencies demanded in  today’s  fire service.

    If these are not on your radar screen or you haven’t got a blip of a clue what they’re about; then you are derelict and not doing your job- and the end result could be a less than desirable outcome on the fireground; it’s that simple, it’s that direct.

    Have you read these reports, understand the issues & influences, increased your knowledge, skills and abilities in any gap areas or taken the time to research the cutting edge issues affecting today’s fire service?

    The City of Charleston Sofa Super Store LODD-Routley Fire Report

    Read the report; understand the incident, the building performance, the fire behavior and the operation process deployed. Gain the insights from the overall apparent and contributing causes identified and presented and assess how these relate to your fire service perspective and department’s culture and performance today.

    • City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team Phase I Report, HERE
    • Routley Final Phase II Report HERE
    • NIOSH Investigative Report, HERE
    • NIOSH REPORT SUMMARY
    • NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
    • develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for an occupational safety and health program in accordance with NFPA 1500
    • develop, implement, and enforce a written Incident Management System to be followed at all emergency incident operations
    • develop, implement, and enforce written SOPs that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
    • ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual with overall authority and responsibility for management of all activities at an incident
    • ensure that the Incident Commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior fire fighting operations
    • train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
    • ensure that the Incident Commander establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in fire-fighting efforts
    • ensure the early implementation of division / group command into the Incident Command System
    • ensure that the Incident Commander continuously evaluates the risk versus gain when determining whether the fire suppression operation will be offensive or defensive
    • ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
    • ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed at each structure fire
    • ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
    • ensure that a rapid intervention crew (RIC) / rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents
    • ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents
    • ensure that ventilation to release heat and smoke is closely coordinated with interior fire suppression operations
    • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics
    • consider establishing and enforcing standardized resource deployment approaches and utilize dispatch entities to move resources to fill service gaps
    • develop and coordinate pre-incident planning protocols with mutual aid departments
    • ensure that any offensive attack is conducted using adequate fire streams based on characteristics of the structure and fuel load present
    • ensure that an adequate water supply is established and maintained
    • consider using exit locators such as high intensity floodlights or flashing strobe lights to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit
    • ensure that Mayday transmissions are received and prioritized by the Incident Commander
    • train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure
    • ensure that all fire fighters and line officers receive fundamental and annual refresher training according to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021
    • implement joint training on response protocols with mutual aid departments
    • ensure apparatus operators are properly trained and familiar with their apparatus
    • protect stretched hose lines from vehicular traffic and work with law enforcement or other appropriate agencies to provide traffic control
    • ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression and overhaul activities
    • ensure that fire fighters are trained in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
    • develop, implement and enforce written SOPS to ensure that SCBA cylinders are fully charged and ready for use
    • use thermal imaging cameras (TICs) during the initial size-up and search phases of a fire
    • develop, implement and enforce written SOPs and provide fire fighters with training on the hazards of truss construction
    • establish a system to facilitate the reporting of unsafe conditions or code violations to the appropriate authorities
    • ensure that fire fighters and emergency responders are provided with effective incident rehabilitation
    • provide fire fighters with station / work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments.

    Additionally, federal and state occupational safety and health administrations should:

    • consider developing additional regulations to improve the safety of fire fighters, including adopting National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus standards.

    Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

    • continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn SCBA
    • conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.

    Additionally, code setting organizations and municipalities should:

    • require the use of sprinkler systems in commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards, and establish retroactive requirements for the installation of fire sprinkler systems when additions to commercial buildings increase the fire and life safety hazards
    • require the use of automatic ventilation systems in large commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards.

    Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:

    • coordinate the collection of building information and the sharing of information between building authorities and fire departments
    • consider establishing one central dispatch center to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions
    • ensure that fire departments responding to mutual aid incidents are equipped with mobile and portable communications equipment that are capable of handling the volume of radio traffic and allow communications among all responding companies within their jurisdiction.

    Everyone Goes Home Campaign

    • Everyone Goes Home® is a national program by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries. In March 2004, a Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held to address the need for change within the fire service. At this summit, the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives were created and a program was born to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
    • Recognizing the need to do more to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation has launched a national initiative to bring prevention to the forefront.
    • In March 2004, the Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held in Tampa, Florida to address the need for change within the fire and emergency services. Through this meeting, 16 Life Safety Initiatives were produced to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
    • The first major action was to sponsor a national gathering of fire and emergency services leaders. The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation will play a major role in helping the U.S. Fire Administration meet its stated goal to reduce the number of preventable firefighter fatalities. The Foundation sees fire service adoption of the summit’s initiatives as a vital step in meeting this goal.
    • The Courage to Be Safe® On-Line Program , HERE
    • Media CenterUsing variations of the Courage to Be Safe ®…So Everyone Goes Home® field program, along with material from the Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resource Kit we will develop and deploy a new online learning segment each month. These online learning segments will allow you to expand upon your personal and professional development when you want and how you want. Watch them by yourself or integrate them into your organizational training programs. Remember, that safety results from constant training and putting those skills to work everyday, on every call – SO EVERYONE GOES HOME. HERE
    • The Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Advocates Program will play a key role in helping to bring about awareness of the Initiatives and act as a conduit for resources to enable departments to implement and advocate them. HERE
    • The 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives
      1. Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.
      2. Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.
      3. Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.
      4. All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
      5. Develop and implement national standards for training, qualifications, and certification (including regular recertification) that are equally applicable to all firefighters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
      6. Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that are equally applicable to all firefighters, based on the duties they are expected to perform.
      7. Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.
      8. Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety.
      9. Thoroughly investigate all firefighter fatalities, injuries, and near misses.
      10. Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement.
      11. National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should be developed and championed.
      12. National protocols for response to violent incidents should be developed and championed.
      13. Firefighters and their families must have access to counseling and psychological support.
      14. Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a critical fire and life safety program.
      15. Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the installation of home fire sprinklers.
      16. Safety must be a primary consideration in the design of apparatus and equipment.

    NIST Wind Driven Fire Study

    • Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
    • What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented?  Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening.  If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants.  NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
    • This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions.  There are many questions regarding wind driven fires.  For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures?  Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires.  In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
    • Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
    • A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings.  All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set.  All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player.  NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
    • NIST References HERE and HERE

    NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments

    • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
    • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
    • Reference Data HERE

    NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments

    • The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments was recently released to the public providing . A copy of the report is attached.
    • Report Abstract:
    • Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.
    • This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.
    • This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.
    • Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.
    • The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
    • Synopsis HERE

    USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002

    • Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
    • As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
    • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
    • Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies

    UL Fire Academy CBT

    • UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions
    • Base on the UL research and
    • This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
    • This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This self-guided course, which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions, is targeted toward the 1.1 million fire service personnel in the United States and Canada. The knowledge developed and shared in this course is critically important to firefighter and civilian safety.
    • This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
    • Program Objectives:
    • Provide brief history of events leading up to DHS Grant tests
    • Identify the fire test hypothesis, parameters, and steps completed in the testing process
    • Compare tests results (legacy vs. modern construction)
    • Communicate learnings from our partners representing the fire service
    • Discuss code recommendations
    • UL University on-line Program HERE

    USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002

    • Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
    • As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
    • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
    • Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies

    NIOSH LODD Reports

    • Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
    • NIOSH Web Page HERE
    • Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
    • Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports, HERE

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

    • Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
    • These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
    • Report HERE

    NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors

    • Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
    • Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
    • NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
    • Report HERE

    NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures

    • Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
    • The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
    • NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
    • ALERT Report HERE

    National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience

    • The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
    • Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
    • National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
    • Search Reports, HERE
    • Resources, HERE

    USFA Incident Reports (Stop History Repeating Events-HRE)

    • USFA provides information resources in many formats, including books, pamphlets and DVD’s, free of charge.
    • The U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire–the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are devel­oped to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.
    • The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announce­ments of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters
    • This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas.
    • The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made
    • Technical Reports and On-line Publications, HERE

    Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report

    • The Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire and Rescue published a comprehensive line of duty death report for Technician I Kyle R. Wilson on Saturday, January 26, 2008. Technician I Wilson was the first line of duty death in the Department’s 41-year history. The Department is sharing the LODD Investigative Report to honor Kyle, and in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels.
    • Technician Kyle Robert Wilson was 24-years old and was born in Olney, Maryland. He grew up in Prince William County and graduated from Hylton High School and George Mason University. He was an avid baseball and softball player. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006. Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive.
    • Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure.
    • Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.
    • The Department of Fire and Rescue immediately formed a multi-dimensional investigation team following the incident. The investigation team was comprised of five Department of Fire and Rescue uniform personnel and two external members from area fire departments. For eight months, the team thoroughly examined the events that occurred at the Marsh Overlook fire incident and identify the factors involved with the line of duty death of Technician I Kyle Wilson. The resulting report represents thousands of hours of effort to analyze fire and rescue operations and is a factual representation of the events that occurred. The report also provides a frame work for organizational level improvements.
    • The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be:
      • The initial arriving fire suppression force size.
      • The size up of fire development and spread.
      • The impact of high winds on fire development and spread.
      • The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials.
      • The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts.
      • The incident control and management.
      • The Marsh Overlook fire incident was an immense fire fueled by extremely flammable building material products and a vicious wind. It was an environment where information gathering and decision making had to be performed in the time measurement of seconds. During the chain of events that occurred and under severe circumstances, fire and rescue personnel performed at exceptional levels.
    • During the repeated attempts to reach and rescue Technician I Wilson, personnel displayed heroic efforts and jeopardized their own safety. The Department will never forget the sacrifice that Technician Wilson made in an attempt to ensure others were safe. By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure his sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire and rescue departments can avoid another similar occurrence.
    • Resources and Report

    Loudoun County (VA) Fire Rescue  Significant Near Miss Event Report

    • On May 25, 2008, fire and rescue personnel from Loudoun County responded to a structure fire at 43238 Meadowood Court in Leesburg, Virginia. During the course of the incident, seven responders were injured. Of those injured, four firefighters received significant burn injuries, two firefighters sustained orthopedic injuries, and one EMS provider was treated for minor respiratory distress. To date, five of the injured personnel have returned to duty. Two firefighters continue to recover from their injuries, including one who was severely burned.
    • Given the severity of the injuries and magnitude of the event, an independent Investigative Team was assembled to review the incident. The Team was comprised of four Loudoun County personnel, three external members from area fire departments, and two resource/support personnel. The Team was tasked with reviewing “the events leading up to the incident, the incident operation(s), the firefighter MAYDAY(s), and incident mitigation.”
    • For three months, the Team thoroughly examined the events surrounding the Meadowood Court fire incident and identified the factors associated with the injury of personnel.
    • The Report contains the results of the Investigative Team’s comprehensive review and analysis.
    • Fact Sheet, HERE
    • SIGNIFICANT INJURY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 43238 MEADOWOOD COURT MAY 25, 2008 Report HERE

    Worcester (MA) Fire Cold Storage Fire LODD Report; Abandoned Cold Storage Warehouse Multi-Firefighter Fatality Fire 1999, Worcester, Massachusetts

    • A technical review of the 1999 Worcester, MA fire that claimed six firefighters concludes that abandoned buildings are a serious threat to firefighters and fire departments must make a concerted effort to use technology to maintain data on buildings in their response districts.
    • On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dis­patched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motor­ist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
    • Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors. Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.
    • An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.
    • A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and del­uge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts. According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities.
    • USFA Report HERE

    Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department Final Report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels Nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths

    • The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter.  This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.
    • Incident Overview, HERE
    • NIOSH Report, HERE
    • Investigative Report, HERE

    Field Trips

    • Take a good look at the structures, occupancies and  buildings in you first, second and third due areas, look around your community and jurisdiction as well as your mutual aid and greater alarm response box areas.
    • Have you stopped for a minute today and taken a good look around? Whether you’re sitting in the front seat at the stop light of an intersection or as you’re peering out the side cab window coming back from an alarm or while running errands in your POV; have you taken a good look around? As the Springsteen song goes; “this is your town”.
    • There’s a lot that can be gleaned from your surroundings on any given day. We sometimes take for granted the subtle changes that are happening all around us as we take care of business on our rounds, runs and calls. We tend to focus in on the immediacy of the events that are happening in front of us that demand our attention but fail to take a look around to pick up on information, data and insights that can help us on that next run or down the road in the future.
    • Take a look at the construction that might be going up in your areas. I’m certain you’re paying close attention to what’s happening in your first-due, but what about that third-due area, that neighboring jurisdiction or the mutual-aid area that you occasionally run in to? When you’re on that next EMS run or an investigation of an odor or alarm bells service call, take a few extra minutes to walk through the occupancy. Conduct your own mini company level pre-plan.
    • Look at the layout, features, access and construction features. If you have a chance, verify the structural support systems employed by the building for the floor and roof systems. If you have time, take the company on a quick site visit to that building that’s under construction or the renovations that are again underway in that commercial or business occupancy around the corner from quarters.
    • These continuing challenging economic times places a great deal of influence on what’s being built, how it might be constructed, the manner in which a building may be operational one day, vacant the other and under renovation the next. Sometimes these transformations occur literally overnight.
    • Take a good look around, this is your town…your district, your response area. Know your buildings, understand their performance profiles, and assess the predictability of performance. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

    Building Construction

    I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

    We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.

    The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling.

    Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must adjusted and enhanced to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a profound need to gain building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Its all about the new formula….Bk=F2S.

    Additionally, think about the following

    • Don’t Treat Your Buildings and Occupancies the Same anymore
    • Increase Situational Awareness
    • Increase Your Competencies
    • Know Your Buildings
    • Be aware of Command Compression
    • Implement Tactical Patience
    • Tactical Entertainment
    • Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety
    • Fire Behavior & Fire Dynamics
    • Situational Awareness
    • Naturalistic Decision Making

    More on these and some additional key reports on a future post…..

    Taking it to the Streets

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    Coming July 2010

    The Summer Tour is about to Begin..

    Taking it to the Streets

    With Christopher Naum

    A New Monthly Radio Talkshow on FireFighter Netcast.com

    A Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighter Netcast.com Production

    Advancing FireFighter Safety and Operational Intergrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.

    Watch for the Latest Announcements here on CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com and on Firefighter Netcast.com

    Programming

    Ten Minutes in the Street

    • Presenting an informational recap and discussion on leading topcs, events and issues from the past 30 days.

    Feature Segments Program will have one (1) selected segment based upon topic and guest

    Buildingsonfire

    • Addressing today’s topical issues within the areas of Firefighting, Building Construction, Dynamic Risk Assessment, and Command & Tactical Safety
      • Open interative discussions and call-in
    • Street Stories
      • Presenting first-hand accounts and insights on an event, response or operation with a featured guest
      • Open interative discussions and call-in
    • Smoke Showin’
      • Featured Guest Interviews and discussions focusing on the NFFF Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives and Everyone Goes Home Campaign
      • Open interative discussions and call-in

    HRE History Repeating Events

    • Discussion on recent History Repeating Events, LODD, NIOSH Reports or other
    • Open interative discussions and call-in

    A View from the Street

    • Closing Commentary on timely and relevant issues affecting the Fire Service

    In Search of Tactical Patience

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    Today commemorates the anniversary of the Sofa Superstore fire in Charleston, South Carolina, in which nine firefighters lost their lives while engaged in aggressive interior operations at a commercial building occupied and operating as a furniture store and warehouse. On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters and changed the lives of countless others. The incident galvanized the nation’s fire service and to this day continues to generate commentary and observations within wide latitude of functional areas. What has changed since that day, three years ago?

    The publication of the Routley Report was a wake-up call to the fire service, but did we hit the snooze button and roll back over? Are we catching those extra forty winks at the expense of what we should be jumping out of our bunks and engaging in? If you haven’t taken the time to read the authoritative reports, now is the time to do so. Make it one of your definitive activities for the weekend. Reflect upon its insights, recommendations and suggestions and think about your organization, department or agency.

    Stop and think about where the fire service is today; where is your department today? Any measurable changes that reflect the front page news of past events or reports? Or is it business as usual? More importantly; where are YOU today? What have you done based upon the lessons learned or insights expressed to make you a better prepared and knowledgeable firefighter, officer or commander?

    During the past twelve months of travels around the country presenting programs on building construction and command risk management and firefighter safety, there continues to be a common thread within the Fire Service that resonates loudly (at times and in some regions); “were’ just not getting it”.  Dialog and discussion, ranting and challenges; sometimes on the verge of aggression and hostility at times continue to punctuate and permeate program conversation and debate. We argue about the merits of operational aggressiveness at the expense of looking (and understanding) the ways to increase our proficiency and knowledge that can translate into refined and intelligent tactical operations.

    I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

    We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.

    The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling. ( more on these in upcoming posts…)

    Take the time today to remember and honor the Charleston Nine.

    Comprehend the sacrifice and grasp the essence of our noble profession and the tradition of the Fire Service. Remember the past and learn from it and improve the future so that that the cycle of potential history repeating events is disrupted and eventually broken.

    Work conscientiously and diligently to improve our profession and yourself; identifying gaps, correcting the deficiencies and improving the job, through a legacy of operational excellence and safety- for tomorrow’s firefighters.

    Honor and Remembrance- The Charleston Nine

    • Bradford Rodney “Brad” Baity – Engineer 19
    • Theodore Michael Benke – Captain 16
    • Melvin Edward Champaign – Firefighter 16
    • James “Earl” Allen Drayton – Firefighter 19
    • Michael Jonathon Alan French – Engineer 5
    • William H. “Billy” Hutchinson, III – Captain 19
    • Mark Wesley Kelsey – Captain 5
    • Louis Mark Mulkey – Captain 15
    • Brandon Kenyon Thompson – Firefighter 5

    Reflecting on These Days of June

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    Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is.  Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed.  Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.

    We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?

    We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to  the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.

    • Modern building construction is no longer predicable
    • Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
    • Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
    • Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
    • Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
    • Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
    • Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
    • Command & Company Officer dereliction
    • Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

    STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
    There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.

    These behaviors include;
    • Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.

    • Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.

    • Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.

    Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;

    TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
    1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
    1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
    2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
    1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.

    The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.

    Check out these links;

    If you haven’t read Chief Mayers’s discerning reflections on Firehouse Zen, this is a MUST read. Where Were You That Night?

    The Lessons Learned from the Past

    From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

    Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

    Combat Fire Engagement

    Situations, Size-Up, Actions and Entertainment

    Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior

    Ten Minutes in the Street: Interactive Scenarios Returning to Firefighter Nation

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    Ten Minutes in the Street

     After a bit of an extended hiatus on the lecture circuit, Ten Minutes in the Street is returning to the Firefighter Nation Forums with more of what you came to expect with high quality scenarios and thought provoking discussions to get you engaged and thinking: strategically and tactically with a balanced risk approach.

     We launch the summer series of Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios during this year’s Safety, Health & Survival Week starting on June 21.

    These interactive scenario programs will be featured weekly on the FFN Fire Ground Tactics and FireFighter Safety Forum, HERE

    In the mean time, here are some great Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios that we presented, take some time to look these over if you’re new to the content and interactive participation.

    • Ten Minutes in the Street: Read “through” the Smoke, HERE
    • Ten Minutes in the Street; “But its only a Garage..!”, HERE
    • Ten Minutes in the Street; Pipin’ Hot First Due..30 Minutes or Less, HERE
    • Ten Minutes in the Street; “Here’s lookin’ at You”, HERE
    • Ten Minutes in the Street; Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due, HERE

    Also, take a moment to check out our other activity and postings at Fire EMS Blogs at TheCompanyOfficer.com. You can also follow the latest informational links on Facebook at Buildingsonfire.com 

    Can you keep a secret? Stay tuned for some great upcoming  announcements regarding a new program series that will be brought to you by some very familiar names…..”The Summer Tour is about to begin..”

    NIST Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments ISSUED

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    4-28-2010 5-18-34 PMReport-on-Residential-Fireground-Field-Experiments

    The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiements was issued this morning. A copy of the report is attached. The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE

    Report Abstract:

    Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.

    This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.

    This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.

    A were deployed in response to live fires within this facility. In addition to systematically controlling for the arrival times of the first and subsequent fire apparatus, crew size was varied to consider two-, three-, four-, and five-person staffing. Each deployment performed a series of 22 tasks that were timed, while the thermal and toxic environment inside the structure was measured. Additional experiments with larger fuel loads as well as fire modeling produced additional insight. Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.

    We will review the report findings and provide insights over the upcoming weekend.

    Addition project information and insights, HERE

    NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study to be issued Wednesday

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    The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is scheduled to issue the results of a multi-institutional landmark national study on the effects of firefighter staffing levels and crew arrival times on residential firefighting operations. This landmark report will provide scientific data that will help inform fire chiefs and public officials in making decisions on firefighting budgets, crew sizes and placement of fire stations. The study was funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program and will be released Wednesday April 28, 2010 in Washington, D.C., before the start of the annual Congressional Fire Services Institute (CFSI) meeting. Speakers will include principal investigators from NIST, the U.S. Fire Administrator, representatives from NFPA, IAFC, IAFF, Metropolitan Fire Chiefs, CFAI, and Worcester Polytechnic Institute. The Press Event will take place at the Washington Hilton, Jefferson East (Concourse Level) 1919 Connecticut Avenue NW. Washington, D.C. at 9:00 a.m. EDT

    The significance of this much awaited study is certain to provide critical data and benchmarks that will influence operational deployment, firefighter safety and strategic and tactical considerations related to combat fire suppression. I recall a series of studies and evolutions that were last dome in the mid-1980’s that looked at cursory functional deployment considerations related to engine company efficiency for six, five, four and three personnel staffed units.

    The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study is a multi-year project, being conducted jointly by the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI), the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), whose purpose is to establish a technical basis for risk evaluation and deployment of resources by local fire departments and create tools the departments can use to better assess the risks and hazards in their communities; plan adequate resource deployment to respond to and mitigate emergency events; and measure their effectiveness in responding to and handling events.

    The first two phases of the study were to establish a technical basis for risk evaluation and deployment of resources by local fire departments and to create tools fire departments can use to better assess the risks and hazards in their communities. This would allow the Fire Department to plan adequate resource deployment to respond to and mitigate emergency events. The final phase of the NIST study will assist departments to measure their effectiveness in responding to and handling events.

    Study Details
    Within the past fifteen years, studies have advanced in the sophistication of their methods but nonetheless have continued to support the finding that crew size per piece of apparatus clearly affects the effectiveness and safety of fire department personnel during emergency response and fire suppression. In an effort to supplement the scientific evidence available, the intent of this study was to determine how well the fire service decision makers match resources to risk and what factors are important in making better decisions about these matches in the future recognizing that decisions must be made in light of available funding in the community and the level of service the community expects.

    The overall goal is to reduce firefighter injury and death by making better decisions about resource deployment in a risk filled environment. The study is delineated into three phases.

    • Phase I – Develop a scientifically-based community risk assessment and resource deployment model;
    • Phase II – Conduct field experiments to assess resource deployment including crew size and time to task analysis;
    • Phase III – Develop performance evaluation tools to be used by departments to assess how well they match their community risk level to resources deployed.

    Based on analysis of data collected in phase I, investigators will address three outcomes; 1) firefighter injury and death, 2) civilian injury and death; and 3) economic impact. They will work to identify the most important factors in determining appropriate deployment to varied levels of adverse risk events occurring in a community. It is their hope to use those data to program a predictive model to be converted into software.

    We’ll issue and update this post with the latest information as it’s released Wednesday.

    Progress Reports Issued

    A series of program progress reports were issued and are available from the following links;

    • Project Year One, Progress Report, HERE
    • In September, 2008, the Two-Year Progress Report was issued; The Multi-Phased Study on Firefighter Safety and the Deployment of Resource, HERE
    • DHL, Phase II Report, HERE

    Other related links for further insights;

    • The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), HERE
    • Firereportingsystem.org, HERE
    • Field Experiment Photos, HERE
    • Worcester Polytechnic Institute, HERE
    • Live Fire Experiments Provide Data on the Effects of Fire Resources, HERE
    • Fire Service Leaders to Conduct Study to Improve Fire Fighter Safety and Deployment, FFN 2009; HERE
    • STATter911 and WUSA9 Postings,HERE and HERE
    • Commandsafety.com, HERE

    More Building Details from the Emmitsburgs Fire

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    Here’s some details on the incident and the building profile from our good friend Wayne Powell with the Vigilant Hose Company of Emmitsburg and a long time former staff member of the National Fire Academy. The excerpt that was posted on Dave’s STATter911 blog:  Fire units were alerted at 0559 hours to a reported building fire with people trapped in an apartment building on the Square (southeast corner) above a popular Pizza Restaurant known as Stavro’s and which many from around the country and beyond have visited. Being Easter Weekend, all NETC classes had ended yesterday. For those who admire good “truck work” – in the photos you’ll note multiple ground ladders were placed around the building in addition to the 5 aerials which were quickly summoned to the scene where 4 were actively used.

    President Frank Davis of Vigilant Hose Company (the community’s all volunteer fire department // which is located 4 doors west of the fire building) was out back of the fire station, while it was still dark out, cleaning up items from a major 2-day fund-raiser, VHC’s annual Easter Seafood Bonanza, when his pager alerted for the fire – he looked up at the rear portion of the building (easily seen from the fire station’s rear parking lot) and nothing was obvious. Upon reaching the station’s front overhead doors he could see the glow reflecting on windows across the street plus smoke started coming into the firehouse as the overhead doors were going up. He quickly radioed in that he had fire showing (designated the sides, etc.) and immediately requested that a 2nd alarm be transmitted.

    The fully occupied 145-year old unsprinklered (pre-existing) building had fire extending out windows on the South Seton Avenue side (Side D) and as apparatus was arriving fire began extending out the front (Side A) meaning that the main interior stairwell had already become compromised as it was heavily involved in fire. Fortunately, there were no deaths and only one injury (a civilian with a cut to the hand) and equally amazing was that the structure did not collapse during the fire as had been potentially feared by generations of area firefighters. As can be seen in the photos heavy fire conditions were present as fire personnel arrived.

    The circa 1865 fire building, whose construction was completed at the end of the Great Civil War, sits at the corner of East Main Street (MD Route 140) and South Seton Avenue (the road that passes in front of NETC). The “Old Hotel on the Square” as it commonly known today went by various names over the years – Eagle Hotel, Slagle Hotel and Western Maryland Hotel – and had always been of special concern to firefighters as well as state and local fire marshals for decades due to limited egress and its construction. Used in the modern era for rental apartments, all or nearly all of those displaced today reportedly had no insurance.

    Although fought via aggressive interior firefighting efforts, operations were shifted from offensive to defensive given the age of the building and the numerous structural renovations that have occurred over the years. Authorities from the Frederick County Sheriffs Office (trained in fire investigations) plus fire investigators from the Frederick County Department of Fire and Rescue Services and the Maryland State Fire Marshal’s Office worked together to determine the actual cause of the fire and further interactions. The building was condemned by building inspectors with further review by structural inspectors planned to determine structure stability. A civilian living in the building is credited with saving lives by her actions of quickly alerting residents.

    Here’s the link to theVigilant Hose Company of Emmitsburg’s web ite for some great photo series of the incident, HERE

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    Fire in Emmitsburg’s Four Corners

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    For those of you that have attended courses at the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland; many of you have  eaten at Stavro’s Pizza  or passed this building onthe way into town in the four corners of Emmitsburg. A major fire broke out early Saturday morning. Here’s a link to a series of photographs thanks to the USFA’s Mark Aaron Whitney, HERE  . The fire building is a few doors down from both  the Ott House and the Fire Station. No information on any injuries or status of the occupants as this posting. Latest Here

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    Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report

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    8-26-2009 7-07-53 AMNIOSH released it’s report on the August 24, 2009 three alarm fire at 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo, New York that resulted in the LODD of Lt. Charles McCarthy and FF Jonathan Croom. On August 24, 2009, 45-year-old career Lieutenant Charles McCarthy died following a partial floor collapse into a basement fire, and  34-year-old career fire fighter Jonathan Croom was fatally injured while attempting to rescue the Lieutenant.  The Buffalo Fire Department was dispatched for “an alarm of fire” with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. Repeated attempts were made to force open this basement door in order to search for trapped civilians, but crews had difficulty gaining access through this door because it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the 1st and 2nd floors with no civilians found.

    Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional manpower was sent with special tools to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2. Lieutenant Charles McCarthy and two fire fighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify all fire fighters had exited a 1st floor deli. Lt. McCarthy following a hoseline into the structure, was well ahead of the other two fire fighters when the 1st floor partially collapsed beneath him. McCarthy fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire. The other two fire fighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. Lt. McCarthy made several Mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device. Confusion erupted exteriorly on scene when trying to verify who was calling the Mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement.

    The incident commander was aware that he had crews attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure. Simultaneously, FF Croom, a member of the fire fighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside  Lieutenant McCarthy’s point of entry when the Mayday calls came out. It is believed that FF Croom  knew where the Lt., was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. FF Croom grabbed a tool, went on air, and rushed into the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other fire fighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device alarming. Lt. McCarthy was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but FF Croom was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after Lt. McCarthy’s Mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the 1st floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. the Lt’s. PASS device was still alarming. They were pronounced dead on scene. Four fire fighters and one lieutenant suffered minor injuries during the incident. No civilians were discovered within the structure.

    Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity not maintained.

    NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

    • Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
    • Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
    • Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
    • Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
    • Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
    • Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
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    1815 Genesee Street 1815 Genesee Street

    CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

    Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that may have led to the fatalities:

    • Working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire.
    • Interior condition reports not communicated to command.
    • Inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments.
    • Crew integrity not maintained.

    Time Line from the Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report

    3:51 a.m. – fire crews were sent to 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo. When they arrived, they were met by a resident who said he heard people trapped inside. Crews began searching the building, but were eventually ordered out as conditions deteriorated.

    4:22 a.m. – Members of Rescue 1 entered the building to make sure all firefighters had evacuated the building. Less than two minutes later the floor in the rear of the building collapsed. Lt. McCarthy of Rescue 1 fell into the basement as the floor collapsed. according to the report, other members of Rescue 1 were unaware of the collapse and only reported hearing a loud noise. McCarthy began calling for help on his radio, but other members of Rescue 1 were unable to determine where the calls were coming from and left the building unaware that Lt. McCarthy was trapped.

    4:23 a.m. – Firefighter Croom entered the building after hearing the calls for help. the report says he did not exit the building, apparently falling into the basement near Lt. McCarthy.

    4:31 a.m. – An emergency head count was ordered to determine the identity of the missing firefighter. Lt. McCarthy was reported missing at that time, but FF Croom was not. Firefighters in the front of the store reported hearing a pass alarm, but could not reach it due to extreme fire conditions, a weakened floor and continuing collapse.

    4:48 a.m. – all crews were ordered out of the building because it had become unsafe.

    Later, concerns began to arise that FF Croom was missing. the report says he was erroneously reported in a remote area.

    5:46 a.m. – On scene personal realize FF Croom is missing and likely inside the building.

    6:10 a.m. – Another head count is taken and FF Croom is reported missing.

    9:18 a.m. – the Recovery Group reports that the two missing firefighters had been located in the basement, covered in fallen debris.

    9:32 a.m. – the debris is cleared and Recovery Group firefighters reach Lt. McCarthy and FF Croom.

    Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report, issued December 2, 2009, HERE

    For a comprehensive Power Point Program on Operational Safety at Heavy Timber and Ordinary Construction Occupancys that you can down load, go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting Web Site HERE.

    I produced an informational training PPT program and support information that aligned with a previoulsy reported Near Miss Event Report. You can download the PPT Training Program HERE and the PDF File HERE

    NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE

    Buildingsonfire reaches Milestone

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    Buildingsonfire on Face Book reaches 3,000 fan milestone, are you one? Sign up and follow Buildingsonfire on Facebook today

    Remember, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety

    Follow Commandsafety on Twitter, HERE and Buildingsonfire on Twitter, HERE

    3-26-2010 9-31-01 PM

    Shopping Center Explosion: Fluid Risk Assessment

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    NIOSH recently released it’s report on the Penn-Mar Shopping Center Explosion that occured on May 7, 2008 in Prince George’s County, Maryland. Report Copy HERE. A number of mission critial lessons and insights can be gained regarding initial response, command management, operational safety, tactical deployment and effective situational awareness and dynamic risk assessment through an unstable progressing incident. Here are some of the insights and specifics.

    At 12:54 PM on Thursday, May 7, 2009, Prince George’s County Firefighter/Medics were dispatched to respond to the Penn-Mar Shopping Center, a large 1-story strip mall, in the 3400 Block of Donnell Drive in Forestville and arrived at 12:59 PM.  First arriving crews initiated an investigation into a strong odor of natural gas inside the businesses.  Firefighters evacuated 5 of the 6 stores that were in the area of the odor, a sixth store was vacant. 

    • Forty-five people were evacuated from the 5 stores and firefighters then started ventilation efforts and called for assistance of the Washington Gas Company.  Firefighters discovered natural gas bubbling up from the ground on the exterior rear of the vacant store and minutes later reported that there was a fire on the interior. 
    • Within a minute, at about 1:20 PM, a massive explosion occurred. 
    • A MAYDAY call was sounded and additional resources including paramedics and a second alarm of firefighters were summoned to the scene.

    Large plate glass windows blew shattered glass and other debris 60-70 feet into the front parking lot, the roof assembly appeared to have been lifted up and then fell back into place and the rear brick and block wall was completely blown out.  Firefighters were in the direct line of the explosion and suffered burns and injuries from flying debris.  Firefighters were wearing their personal protective gear which is believed to have minimized injuries.  They quickly gathered themselves and checked on other crew members and civilians that may have been injured.  A total of eight firefighters sustained a variety of injuries ranging from lacerations to second degree burns.  Four Firefighters were transported to the Washington Hospital Center Burn Unit where two were treated and released and two were admitted for additional treatment.  While initially transported with serious injuries, the firefighter’s conditions have been upgraded to “good.”  Four other firefighters were transported to other area hospitals and were treated and released.  One civilian, an employee of the Washington Gas Company was also treated and released from an area hospital.  There were no injuries to any of the 45 evacuated civilians. 

     3-18-2010 9-29-48 PM

    A small fire resulted from the explosion that was quickly contained and extinguished.  The investigation so far has determined that the release of natural gas occurred in the vacant store and reached an ignition point that resulted in the explosion.  The Fire/EMS Department’s Technical Rescue Team completed a through secondary post-blast search of the damaged stores confirming that everyone heeded the orders of first arriving firefighters to evacuate.  (Excerpt from PGFD Press Release 05.07.2009)

     3-18-2010 9-09-52 PM

    Building Knowledge

    The south side of the structure was comprised of 10 business spaces (three of which were vacant) in a strip mall designed and constructed as a Type II, noncombustible classification in the 1970s. The section of the commercial structure involved in the incident was comprised of a main 2 story building, which included 2 vacant businesses and a mall office, with an adjoining wing on the right consisting of 6 businesses (1 unoccupied) in a single story with high dropped ceilings, large attic void spaces, and a sprinkler system. In the wing along the C-side were utility rooms housing the electrical circuit panels, sprinkler system controls, and security panels. It was constructed of brick/block and mortar with large plate glass windows on the A-side, block and mortar exterior C and D-side walls, and a block and mortar interior B-side wall adjoining the rest of the structure. The roof was a commercial flat roof consisting of open web, steel bar flat roof trusses covered with corrugated metal “q-deck” with multi-layered plies of bitumen laminated roof felts and topped with a granule-surfaced cap sheet. The open web steel bar roof trusses were connected to a steel beam and column structural assembly system.

    The interior walls separating the businesses were primarily light weight galvanized metal studs covered with a ½ inch gypsum wall board providing tenant separation and compartmentation. The ceiling was a suspended acoustic tile ceiling system which provided a common void space over the business occupied areas of the adjoining right wing. The businesses contained office furniture, partitions, restaurant equipment and supplies, and health and beauty equipment and products.

    NIOSH Report Summary

    On May 7, 2009, two captains, a lieutenant, and five fire fighters were injured during a natural gas explosion at a strip mall in Maryland. At 1254 hours, dispatch reported a natural gas leak inside a business at a strip mall. Five minutes later, the initial responding crew and the incident commander (IC) arrived on scene to find a gas company employee looking for an underground gas leak. Approximately 6 minutes later, a natural gas leak was found near the exterior rear corner of the structure. After 23 minutes on scene, approximately 45 civilians were evacuated from 7 occupied businesses.

    A captain exited the rear door of the business that had called in the natural gas leak and noticed fire along the roof line. Crews in the front and rear of the structure had begun to pull hoselines as another captain was looking out the rear doorway of a middle unoccupied business and noticed the electric meter located on the exterior wall on fire. Anticipating an explosion, he tried to leap out the rear doorway. At the same time, a fire fighter had entered the front door of the unoccupied business, noticed the heavy smell of natural gas, and felt air rush by as the structure exploded. Debris and fire blew out the front, rear, and roof of the structure. The captain who tried to leap out the rear doorway was blown into the rear parking lot and the fire fighter who had entered the front of the structure was blown out the front door and covered with debris. Numerous other fire fighters, primarily near the front of the structure were blown off their feet and hit with debris.

    An uninjured captain issued a Mayday, followed by the IC ordering evacuation tones and a personnel accountability report. Crews began to look for the captain who was blown out the rear doorway. He had walked around the side to the front of the structure, and radioed his location to command. Fire fighters began moving injured personnel to ambulances staged in the front parking lot. Eight fire fighters and a gas company employee were transported to local hospitals. The injuries ranged from third degree burns to an ankle sprain.

    Key contributing factors identified in this investigation included: insufficient execution of the fire department’s updated standard operating guidelines (SOGs) on incidents involving flammable gas, e.g., apparatus and fire fighters operating in a flammable area (hot zone); the accumulation of natural gas in the structure’s void spaces; unmitigated ignition source; insufficient combustible gas monitoring equipment usage and training; and, ineffective ventilation techniques.

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should

    • ensure that standard operating guidelines for natural gas leaks are understood and followed
    • contact utility companies (natural gas and electric) immediately to cut external supply/power to structures when gas leaks are suspected
    • ensure gas monitoring equipment is adequately maintained and fire fighters are routinely trained on proper use
    • ensure ventilation techniques are conducted after ignition sources are mitigated
    • ensure that rapid intervention teams are staged at the onset of an incident
    • ensure that collapse/explosion control zones are established when dealing with a potential explosion hazard

    Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations would have prevented these injuries, they are being provided as a reminder of good safety practices.

    • provide manual personal alert safety system (PASS) or tracking devices to locate potentially missing fire fighters when SCBA are not utilized
    • ensure standard operating guidelines for communications are understood by dispatch
    • ensure adequate staffing for emergency medical services and rapid intervention teams (RITs)
    • ensure training is evaluated for rank and skill levels across the combination department personnel

    Contributing Incident Factors

    Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately led to the injuries of eight fire fighters:

    • Insufficient execution of the fire department’s updated standard operating guideline on incidents involving flammable gas, e.g., apparatus and fire fighters operating in a flammable area (hot zone).
    • The accumulation of natural gas in the structure’s void spaces.
    • An unmitigated ignition source.
    • Insufficient combustible gas monitoring equipment usage and training
    • Ineffective ventilation techniques.

    Building Knowledge=Fire Fighter Safety

    When was the last time you and your company took a good look around some of your commercial shopping centers, strip centers, malls and business retail complexes? There is a wealth of mission critical information to be gained by conducting a basis walk through and looking at some key construction, configuration, layout and access and utilities features.

    Take note of the structural systems that comprise the roof assemblies and the wall and supporting interface. Identify the basic volume of the commercial spaces paying close attention to the common tenant storage, storerooms, access and transfer loading dock and delivery areas.  Focus and take note of the fire loading and its expected degree of fire behavior and intensity. Check out the condition and operability of the fixed suppression systems and the integrity of fire barriers and separations.

    There’s so much “free” data and information to be gained by going “shopping”; all of which will transcend and can be retrieved at such time a response materializes at that location in the future. If you can, capture the pertinent information into your pre-fire planning data base and make sure you discuss and share your observations, postulated strategies and tactics around the kitchen table or as a table top exercise or better yet in the form of an on-site drill or multi-company training exercise.

    Be prepared for the unexpected and always use extreme caution and heightened situational awareness and fluid risk assessment and reconnaissance processing to stay atop of any undefined and evolving incident. Do not allow the potential lack of severity; of what may have all the indications of an unremarkable/uneventful and common call run such as a gas odor investigation or a natural gas leak cause your companies to have less than a high level of alert, focus and attentive accretions through all phases and deployments of the incident. Don’t become complacent.

    In addition, take a look at some information relate to another tragic incident response to a reported gas leak that occurred in December, 1983 that lead to five fire fighter LODD’s in Buffalo, New York. HERE

    Archived Report From STATter911, from May, 2009 HERE and recent 2010 update HERE with fireground Audio

    Prince George’s County (MD) Fire Press Release from May 7, 2009, HERE

    Slide Show from WUSA9.com HERE 

    BING mapping Images, HERE

    NIOSH Compilation of Line-of-Duty Injury and Death Investigation Reports and Publications CD

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    3-18-2010 5-26-09 PMIf you’re looking for a great resource check this out at NIOSH’s Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program and Prevention Program. HERE.

    NIOSH is offering a Compilation of Line-of-Duty Injury and Death Investigation Reports and Publications CD. This CD-ROM contains a compilation of all NIOSH fire fighter fatality and injury investigation reports completed through August 2009. Since 1998 NIOSH has investigated over 420 incidents involving fire fighter line-of-duty deaths and injuries. This CD-ROM also contains 21 NIOSH publications and 1 Safety Advisory covering a number of topics specific to fire fighter safety and health.

    CD ROMs of this publication can be downloaded directly from the web site and a copy created using CD authoring software.

    Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program web site HERE

    Maintaining Situational Awareness

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    00-EOY-ss-buildingcollapseMaintaining focused situational awareness while recognizing and processing a wide latitude of incoming information and observations at complex and multiple alarm incidents is a significant challenge to even the most experienced of incident command teams. However, things can go wrong and they can go wrong in a rapidly escalating manner with little time to recover. A prominent double LODD incident from six years ago provides poignant lessons learned as does another history repeating event (HRE) from 1972.

    The Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972) have a number of commonalities related to extended multi-alarm operations, building compromise and collapse and multiple line-of-duty deaths of operating fire service personnel. Although building type, construction features and systems are unique for each incident as are the circumstances that lead to the events, there are mission critical lessons to be reexamined or newly introduced if you’re not familiar with either event. This is especially true when we talk about operational challenges and adverse conditions that result in firefighter injuries and fatalities during overhaul and take-up phases of an incident.

    Remember Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.

    Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.

    To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. We’ll expand on some posting in the near future and address Dynamic Risk Assessment in the context of building and occupancy profiling and operations. Additionally, maintaining a heightened sense of risk and safety integrity when operating within non-combat fire suppression modes or phases also requires due diligence, focused and fluid situational awareness coupled with concise monitoring of building conditions, indicators (both evident and projected) and taking conservative actions and postures to ensure personnel are not placed in high risk, no value positions that have a high potential for error likely outcomes.

    Check out the detailed posting at our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com for insights into both the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972) HERE. Think about the questioned posed related to complex multi-company operations, command safety and operational integrity of compromised buildings and structural systems. Remember; Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.

    Risk versus Gain: Operations in Vacant or Abandoned Structures

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    DFD102406138Risk versus Gain: Operations in Vacant or Abandoned Structures

    Fire Fighter LODD after Being Trapped in a Roof Collapse During Overhaul of a Vacant/Abandoned Building. NIOSH recently published a report on a 2008 LODD that occurred in a vacant/ abandoned building. NIOSH Report F2008-0037. The full report is available HERE. Let’s look at some insights and overviews of that report.

    Report Summary

    On November 15, 2008, a 38-year-old male fire fighter  died after being crushed by a roof collapse in a vacant/abandoned building. Fire fighters initially used a defensive fire attack to extinguish much of the fire showing from the second-floor windows on arrival. After the initial knockdown, fire crews entered the second floor to perform overhaul operations. During overhaul, the roof collapsed with several fire fighters still inside, on the second floor. The victim and two other fire fighters were trapped under a section of the roof. Crews were able to rescue two fire fighters (who self-extricated), but could not immediately find the victim. After cutting through roofing materials, the victim was located by fire fighters, unconscious and unresponsive.

    He was removed from the structure and transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: dilapidated building conditions, incendiary fire originating in the unprotected structural roof members, inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing to interior operations involving a vacant/abandoned structure, inadequate accountability system, lack of a safety officer, an inadequate maintenance program for self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and a poorly maintained and likely inoperable personal alert safety systems (PASS), ineffective strategies for the prevention of and the remediation of vacant/abandoned structures and arson prevention.

    Inherent Construction Issues

    This incident occurred in a vacant unsecured residential structure which had experienced a previous fire approximately one year prior to this incident. During interviews with NIOSH investigators, fire fighters reported large amounts of fire showing from all windows on the second floor on arrival. Fire fighters also reported that the roof had burned through on the Side B/C and one fire fighter reported he could see the sky while ascending the interior stairs to perform overhaul. It is not known if the roof conditions were communicated to the incident commander before fire fighters were assigned to operate on the roof. The fire fighters were unaware of the conditions such as the exposed roof assembly, possible removal of rafter connectors (collar beams), and the use of a flammable liquid in the structural members of the roof and second floor attic area. The roof assembly (being unprotected) was directly involved as part of the fuel in this fire.

    The large dormer on the A-side presents an identifiable inherent risk factor (due to the potential for structural compromise or failure) when found on 1.5 story bungalow style residential structure due to the integral manner in which the dormer structure, i.e., roof rafters, dormer framing and roofing boards along with the functionality of the ridge beam must function in order to retain structural integrity under fire conditions. The dormer may be actually supported at the upper end directly onto the roofing boards, which in turn are supported by the perpendicular roof rafters. This creates a potential area for pronounced degradation when exposed to direct or indirect flame impingement creating an area prone to early structural compromise and eventual failure.

    Although the initial defensive strategy in fighting the fire was successful in knocking down the fire, the incident commander may have benefited from a continuous risk-versus-gain analysis before allowing crews to operate on interior during overhaul. The first arriving officer reported that he performed a walk around prior to allowing crews to enter the structure and the building appeared intact, but he would not have known of the alterations to the interior roof system and the removal of critical structural members. Interior condition and roof condition reports might have revealed the burned-through area of the roof, and tactics could have been altered to keep fire fighters off the roof and out of the structure.

    Report Recommendations included;

    • Ensure that the incident commander conducts a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing to interior operations in vacant/abandoned structures and continues the assessment throughout the operations
    • Ensure SOPs are developed for fighting fires in vacant/abandoned buildings
    • Ensure that the incident commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
    • Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire
    • Ensure that a respiratory protection program is in place to provide for the selection, care, maintenance, and use of respiratory protection equipment, including PASS devices.

    Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:

    • Develop strategies for the prevention of and the remediation of vacant/abandoned structures and for arson prevention.

    Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations could have prevented this fatality, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments:

    • Ensure that an EMS unit is on scene and available for fire fighter emergency care at working structure fires
    • Develop inspection criteria to ensure that all protective ensembles meet the requirements of NFPA 1851, Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting
    • Be aware of programs that provide assistance in obtaining alternative funding, such as grant funding, to replace or purchase fire equipment that can support critical fire department operations.

    Vacant or Unoccupied: Tactical Risk and Safety

    I’ve commented on this subject a few times. We seem to do a lot of things at times out of common practice and repetition, you know; “We’ve always done it that way….” syndrome. There’s a resonating theme that is making its way around the fire service dealing with going to a defensive tactical posture at vacant or unoccupied structure fires.

    This command posture leads to limiting interior operating engagement, while promoting a high degree of risk management. With that being said, there are also plenty of opinions on these types of policies as such, since this type of tactical effort may be contrary to the local “culture and traditions” of the responding agencies and may be a hard pill to swallow, since we’re in the job of “ fighting ALL fires..” Please refresh your memories on a past post on Tactical Entertainment HERE and HERE

    Here are some basic definitions to keep us all on the same playing field;

    Vacant; refers to a building that is not currently in use, but which could be used in the future. The term “vacant” could apply to a property that is for sale or rent, undergoing renovations, or empty of contents in the period between the departure of one tenant and the arrival of another tenant. A vacant building has inherent property value, even though it does not contain valuable contents or human occupants.

    Unoccupied; generally refers to a building that is not occupied by any persons at the time an incident occurs. An unoccupied building could be used by a business that is temporarily closed (i.e. overnight or for a weekend). The term unoccupied could also apply to a building that is routinely or periodically occupied; however the occupants are not present at the time an incident occurs. A residential structure could be temporarily unoccupied because the residents are at work or on vacation. A building that is temporarily unoccupied has inherent property value as well as valuable contents.

    Here’s a formulative question;

    • As a responding company, you arrive at the scene of a vacant or unoccupied structure. The building’s construction features and systems have inherent risk associated with the occupancy, (as is the case with nearly all of our structures and occupancies).
    • Your company determines that you’re going to go defensive, even though you probably could make a reasonably safe entry and engage in interior structural fire suppression.
    • Would there be any repercussions in your station, battalion/district/community or organization if you took this tactic?
    • What are YOUR personal thoughts on this form of risk management?

     Some insights, HERE and HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE

    Additional Links, HERE, HERE and HERE

    The “Routiness” of Success, Or Not..

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    BM11

    It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and traditions that defines the fire service.”- Christopher Naum

    The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine coordinated suppression operations in order to identify with; the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations, thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.

    Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of Compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

     

     It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined suppression operations within the modern building construction setting.

     

    We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel. Does your company, your officers, your commanders, your department treat all things as equals when addressing the variables of structural combat fire operations? Is the equation of Occupancy Risk balanced with Occupancy Type? Are inherent structural stability and compromise conditions adequately identified and considered in the evolving progression of an incident action plan? Or do SOP and SOG’s drive the manner in which fire ground strategies and tactics are orchestrated and implemented at the company task level?

     

    How does this fit into your “culture, values and philosophy as a firefighter, officer or commander?”