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Remembrance: Worcester Cold Storage Tragedy

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Worcester Cold Storage Tragedy

On December 3, 1999, a five-alarm fire at the Worcester Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. building claimed the lives of six brave firefighters who responded to the call. These six heros, The Worcester 6, sacrificed their lives to try and rescue two individuals who were believed to be trapped inside the inferno. May the Worcester 6 always be remembered; “Fallen Heroes Never Forgotten.”

Firefighter Paul A. Brotherton
Firefighter
Paul A. Brotherton
Firefighter Timothy P. Jackson
Firefighter
Timothy P. Jackson
Firefighter Jeremiah M. Lucey
Firefighter
Jeremiah M. Lucey
Firefighter James F. Lyons
Firefighter
James F. Lyons
Firefighter Joseph T. McGuirk
Firefighter
Joseph T. McGuirk
Lieutenant Thomas E. Spencer
Lieutenant
Thomas E. Spencer

Training Programs for Today’s Evolving Fireground Series for 2013

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The Command Institute’s Buildings on Fire Training Series

PROGRAM OFFERINGS

The Command Institute announces the 2013 Buildingsonfire training, seminar and lecture series.

These program offerings and deliveries are part of the Buildingsonfire.com Series of Training Programs designed and developed to support the continuing professional and operational development of the American Fire Service in meeting the challenges of the today’s evolving fireground. These programs are presented and facilitated by Chief Christopher J. Naum, SFPE.

 

 

 

 

Keynote Address- Opening or Closing Deliveries

  • Adaptive Management for Today’s Evolving  Fireground
    • Firefighting and Incident Command Management is the essence of the Fire Service; it is formulative to our rich history but at the same time is being impacted by numerous internal and external influences reflective of social and economic climate, values and challenges. The Art and Science of Firefighting and the quest to achieve operational excellence while maintaining Firefighter Safety suggests our future success rests with our ability to create a new adaptive operational model to meet the demands of today’s fires and the evolving fireground of tomorrow. 
  • Today’s Evolving Fireground: Are You Ready to Make the Necessary Changes?
    • Today’s fireground and structure fires are different from those of recent past; empirical research and data, new insights and emerging dialog is identifying an emerging fireground with new demands. Energizing insights with provoking perspectives asking if as Leaders you’re ready to make the necessary changes
  • Command Resiliency and Tactical Patience for Operational Excellence
    • Energizing insights on the needs for preparedness, resiliency and patience to effectively address the evolving fireground and increasing demands associated with incidents while attaining operational excellence and increasing firefighter safety.
  • The Company and Command Officer in 2013 and Beyond
    • A thought provoking discussion on the increasing demands for today’s emerging, practicing or future Company and Command Officer and a challenge on how to meet tomorrows demands today through self-determination and personal accountability.  
  • Tactical Renaissance and the New Rules of Engagement
    • Today’s buildings and occupancies present challenging fires that are redefined strategic and tactical fireground operations and are changing the rules of engagement in structural fire incidents. An intuitive proclamation on the emerging Tactical Renaissance directed at today’s Emerging or Practicing Company and Command Officers.
  • The Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement 2013
    • What has today’s fireground evolved into when we talk about combat fire suppression and engagement? Has it remained constant-Has it changed? Do we continue to operate utilizing time proven methodologies or are we prepared to identify new adaptive methodologies and practices? What is the New Doctrine and are we ready to accept it? 
  • What’s on YOUR Radar Screen? Meeting the New Operational Demands
    • There are a lot of things going on in the Fire Service today, the need to filter through to the key issues that affect all organizations and personnel is imperative. An affirmation of what should be on the radar screen of today’s emerging, practicing or future Company and Command Officers.
  • Fireground Leadership for Company& Command Officers
    • Today’s fire ground presents new found challenges that are redefined strategic and tactical fire operations and are testing past practices in structural firefighting and incident management. An open and frank discussion on what will be defining attributes and traits of the emerging fire officer and commander influenced by new strategic, tactical and operational modeling.

 

New Conference Training Curriculums

  • Adaptive Fireground Management for Company and Command Officers
  • Fireground Leadership for Company & Command Officers
  • Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
  • Five Star Command & Fire Fighter Safety
  • The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & Tactics
  • Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting Operations
  • Command Institute’s Fire Ground Leadership Series

Target Training Curricula Audience

  • Command Officers
  • Company Grade Officers
  • Training Officers
  • Fire Service Instructors
  • Safety Offices
  • Firefighters

 

Training Curriculums Descriptions 

Adaptive Fireground Management for Company and Command Officers This program presents insights into emerging concepts and methodologies related to the unique challenges during combat structural fire engagement that require new strategic, tactical and operational modeling due to extreme fire behavior, building construction and occupancy risk.

The principles of Adaptive Fire Ground Management (AFM) will be presented along with integrated discussions on Predictive Risk Management, Command Resiliency, Tactical Patience and integration of Five-Star CommandTM theories and model will be presented. Integrated into the program will be the latest insights into emerging fire ground tactical theory, suppression needs for effective combat operations and methodologies for operational excellence and firefighter safety. This is an interactive and thought provoking program that challenges conventional fire service paradigms and explores leading edge theories and fire service discussion points from across the American Fire Service profession.

 Fireground Leadership for Company& Command Officers Today’s fire ground presents new found challenges that are redefined strategic and tactical fire operations and are testing past practices in structural firefighting and incident management.

This program will present insights into emerging concepts and methodologies related to today’s unique challenges for combat structural fire engagement requiring new strategic, tactical and operational modeling due to extreme fire behavior, building construction and occupancy risk and the need for new training and operational requirements for firefighters, company and command officers.

The program will provide insights into the new Rules of Engagement, Redefining Tactical Operations, The Company and Command Officer in 2013 and Beyond, Integrating Safety into Aggressive Firefighting, Predictive Risk Management, Command Compression and Tactical Patience, Training for Tomorrow’s Fires, Adaptive Management for today’s Evolving Fireground, Achieving Operational Excellence and integrating Five-Star CommandTM theories. Incorporating the lasted testing and research findings on vent path theory, extreme fire behavior, structural system integrity, wind driven fire theory and fire suppression and incident management theory the program will also integrate extensive case studies and interactive exercises and group discussions. 

 

Reading the Building; Predictive Occupancy Profiling Today’s buildings and occupancies continue to present unique challenges to command and operating companies during combat structural fire engagement.

Building and occupancy profiling, identifying occupancy risk versus occupancy type, emerging construction methods, features, systems and components coupled with the increasing commonality of extreme fire behavior and the increased fire load package require new skill sets in reading the building and implementing predictive occupancy profiling for firefighters, company and command officers. Focusing on a wide variety of residential, commercial and multiple occupancy dwellings, the program will present leading insights on improved building size-up, risk assessment and determining and implementing appropriate tactical operations for today’s evolving fireground challenges, operations and incident management.

Fire Star CommandTM and Firefighter Safety The challenges of today’s evolving fireground require shifting the fire service’s paradigms; evolving the safety culture of the fire services and the way we do business in the streets. These paradigm shifts require redefining firefighting methodologies and training focus for combat structural fire engagement and incident operations.

This program will present the concepts and methodologies of Five Star CommandTM and the five (5) fundamental core relationships of; Building Construction, Risk Management, Firefighter Behaviors, Incident Operations and Situational Safety. The concept of Five Star CommandTM will present these five fundamental core elements along with the five points of excellence within each domain that provide an intelligent and safe approach towards unified fireground safety, risk reduction, operational superiority  and company integrity and the template for focused training and curriculum development for today’s evolving fireground. The program presents a new concept towards an integrate approach to enhanced incident operations at structure fires adding values towards an improved fire service safety culture. Presenting emerging and timely insights affecting a wide latitude of audience interests, experience levels and relevancy to work assignments in the areas of incident fireground operations from strategic, tactical and task levels of operations, the presentation concepts, methodologies and materials have relevancy to all operational levels of the fire service. The Five Star CommandTM model integrates with the emerging methodologies incorporating Adaptive Fireground Management concepts.

 The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & Tactics The explosive increase in Engineered Structural Systems (ESS) and their utilization in nearly all forms of current building construction and occupancies have created demands for redefining command decision-making and fire suppression tactics that must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. This program will examine materials, methods and crucial assembly systems affected by fire dynamics, fire behavior and tactical and task level operations for firefighter safety and combat survival, integrating relevant fire ground case studies and incident overviews.

Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.

Due to the resulting increase design and use of Engineered Structural Systems (ESS), and their use in nearly all facets of new construction and alterations and renovations, command and company officers need to increase their understanding of the engineering and design principles associated with these systems, their application and use in various building types and occupancies and the impact of these systems under fire conditions during incident operations.  Current conventional strategies and tactics and decision-making are proving to be ineffective and unsafe requiring a different perspective toward redefined operations and dynamic risk assessment.

The program will address timely issues related to Engineered structural systems, testing and technical data from large scale testing and studies; integrate operational elements related to fire dynamics and fire behavior and the effects on command and company officer dynamic risk assessment, situational awareness, decision-making and correlation to aggressive/ measured tactical deployment. The program will integrate inherent building construction and occupancy profiling with performance indicators and newly defined tactical protocols that address the newest concepts and methodologies of strategic and tactical fire suppression theory based upon the most current technical data. Case studies and events will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety. The fast paced program will utilize extensive multimedia materials, interactive activities and case study review activities.  The program will review a wide variety of ESS, including floor, wall and roofing systems, enclosure and modified support systems, new technology wood and synthetic products, alternate building systems and incorporate data from the latest analytical studies, tests and research in the areas of ESS and firefighting safety.

Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting Operations  This program will present the new rules of structural fire engagement and provide insights into integrated command and operational risk management, tactical safety and tactical protocols based upon occupancy risks versus occupancy type.

Presenting insights on building and occupancy profiling, emerging construction methods, features, systems and components coupled with the increasing commonality of extreme fire behavior and the increased fire load package require new skill sets in reading the building and implementing predictive occupancy profiling and appropriate tactics for firefighters, company and command officers. Integrating extensive case studies, history repeating event, the latest testing and research findings on vent path theory, fire behavior, structural system integrity, wind driven fire theory and fire suppression theory will complement interactive exercises and group discussions.

These programs represent three distinctive and interrelated training programs that are essential and mission critical in today’s fire ground context and demands. Building upon emerging research, fundamental firefighting principles, values and doctrines, these programs present new and original theories, suggested new methodologies and provide insights on the latest developments for operational excellence, fire fighter safety and incident mitigation

 

 

 Command Institute’s Fire Ground Leadership Series

  • CI Fire Ground Leadership for Company Officers (Silver Series)

  • CI Fire Ground Leadership for Command Officers (Gold Series)

The Command Institute’s Premier Fire Ground Leadership Series are training programs designed and directed towards emerging, new or practicing Company Officers or Command Officers.

Each training program consists of new curricula subject material selected and implemented to provide the Company or Command Officer with new insights, cutting edge methodologies, insights, awareness  and skill development in functional areas of importance that affect fire ground operations. The programs will incorporate the defining elements discussed in the FSC section and will integrate and assimilate technology and media into a rewarding training experience.

Topics include the IAFC Rules of Engagement, Extreme Fire Behavior, Building Construction, Occupancy Risk Profiling, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Crew Resource Management, Five Star Command, Tactical Determination in today’s Occupancies, Survivability Profiling, Emerging Strategic and Tactical Models, Command Resiliency and Tactical Patience, Command Compression, Tactical Entertainment, Adaptive Fireground Management, Predicative Theory of Buildings, NIOSH LODD and Near Miss Reports Case Study Analysis, Interactive Activities and Simulation, Operational Safety, Firefighter Survivability, Tactical Operations with limited Staffing/ Resources, Engineered & Light Weight Construction Considerations, and Operational Safety, and more.

The programs are designed to be sequential, providing a reoccurring opportunity for returnees in subsequent years to take the next level program, or can be standalone delivery programs.  A single day refresher class program would be available after a run-in period for program graduates, providing a value added curriculum program with continuity versus termination for subsequent semester offerings. Integration of Blog content and other media support to provide full, 360 integration and training may be available.

  • A single day, eight hour Seminar version is available w limited content   for the conference program  
    • 8 Hour (Single Day Seminar overview program)
  • CI Fire Ground Leadership for Company Officers (Silver Series)       
    • 12 hour (Two Day Program)  Available as a sponsored program in 201
  • CI Fire Ground Leadership for Command Officers (Gold Series)
    • 12 hour (Two Day Program)   Available as a sponsored program in 2013

 

Additional Concurrent Seminar Program Offerings  

 Tactical Operations and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement 2013 Today’s buildings and occupancies present challenges that have redefined strategic and tactical fireground operations and have changed the rules of engagement in structural fire incidents. This program will present the new rules of structural fire engagement and provide insights into integrated command and operational risk management, tactical safety and tactical protocols based upon occupancy risks and reading a building and the new IAFC Rules of Engagement.

Today’s Evolving Fireground: Are You Ready to Make the Necessary Changes? Today’s fireground and structure fires are different from those of the recent past; empirical research and data, new insights and emerging theories and dialog are identifying an emerging new fireground with new operational demands; strategically, tactically, mentally and physically. Energizing insights with provoking perspectives asking if you’re ready to make the necessary changes.

The Company and Command Officer in 2013 and Beyond A thought provoking presentation and interactive discussion on the increasing demands for today’s emerging, practicing or future Company and Command Officers and the challenge on how to meet tomorrows demands today through self-determination and personal accountability. A look at the emerging fireground in 2013 and beyond will be examined and how that translates to the increased needs for advanced training, skill sets and operational models.  

 Redefining Combat Fire Engagement for the Company and Command Officer This program will present insights into emerging concepts and methodologies related to the unique challenges during combat structural fire engagement that require new strategic, tactical and operational modeling due to extreme fire behavior, building construction and occupancy risk. Predictive Risk Management, Command Compression, Tactical Patience and Five-Star CommandTM theories will be presented. Integrated into the program will be the latest insights into emerging fire ground tactical theory, suppression needs for effective combat operations and methodologies for operational excellence and firefighter safety.

 The Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement 2013 Combat fire suppression and field operations are being impacted on a variety of levels with demands for increased integration of firefighter safety, expanding risk management; modified tactical protocols and new skill sets for fire service personnel. Addressing the five fundamental core relationships of building construction, risk management, firefighter behaviors, incident operations and situational safety, this program will present where the fire service is heading in 2013 and beyond. 

 Please note all of these programs are available for delivery as a full day seminar program that can be sponsored and delivered on a state-wide, regional or local delivery basis. Multi-deliveries across a state wide system thru the Firefighter or Fire Chiefs’ Association/sponsorship are available at competitive delivery costs. 

PEDAGOGY

All programs incorporate rich multimedia, exceptional graphics and stimulating visuals that combine the appeal of the visually stimulating images while integrating content that provides the latest in research, data, insights, information and methodologies. 

These programs have been designed and developed to incorporate the latest training delivery concepts and methodologies while integrating current and emerging technology, social media platforms, eMedia and internet based content management systems and material in order to provide unparalleled fire service curricula, training and education, The Command Institute has been actively researching, developing and promoting such training program and content since 1987.

Remembrance: Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse Fire and the Worcester Six

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Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.   

For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.   

The Worcester Six;   

  • Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
  • Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
  • Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
  • Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
  • Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
  • Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine

   

On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.   

   

NIOSH Findings Reported on Bridgeport (CT) Double LODD Fire; Failed to Respond to Maydays

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2 Bridgeport firefighters die in line of duty: wtnh.com

Fire vented through the roof. Note: NIOSH investigators believe this photo shows conditions very close to the time that the Mayday was called for Victim #2 by FF4. Wind was pushing the smoke plume from right to left. (Photo courtesy of Keith Muratori.)

Bridgeport (CT) fire officials’ failure on nearly ever level led to the line-of-duty deaths of two firefighters battling a fire in a residential occupancy in Bridgeport, CT on July 24, 2010. 

Among the findings of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) released Wednesday:

  • the deputy fire chief and his assistant at the scene of the Elmwood Street fire were having a discussion about whether they heard a mayday call from the two fallen firefighters instead of taking immediate action to rescue them.
  • The report also stated firefighters failed to immediately treat one of the firefighters who managed to make it to relative safety before collapsing.
  • Officials also did not properly managed firefighters’ air supplies — both firefighter’s air cylinders were empty when they were found, the report stated.
  • The department’s incident safety officer, who is required to be on scene for assistance in a fire also did not arrive more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch.

Lt. Steven Velasquez and Firefighter Michel Baik were on the third-floor of the wood-frame home at 41 Elmwood Ave. checking for hot spots and making sure there were no people in the smoldering blaze. Then trouble hit. The two sent mayday signals back to dispatch. Within minutes, the fire department’s rapid intervention team found the pair on the floor, unconscious, and gave them CPR. The two men could not be revived.

Full NIOSH Report F2010- 18 FINAL CT F2010-18

NIOSH Executive Summary

On July 24, 2010, a 40-year-old male career fire lieutenant and a 49-year-old male career fire fighter were found unresponsive at a residential structure fire. The victims and two additional crew members were tasked with conducting a primary search for civilians and fire extension on the 3rd floor of a multifamily residential structure. The fire had been extinguished on the 2nd floor upon their entry into the structure.

While pulling walls and the ceiling on the 3rd floor, smoke and heat conditions changed rapidly. The first firefighter transmitted a Mayday (audibly under duress) that was not acknowledged or acted upon. Minutes later the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the 3rd floor. As a fire fighter exited the 3rd floor, the lieutenant was discovered unconscious and not breathing, sitting on the stairs to the 3rd floor.

Approximately 7 minutes later, the second firefighter  was discovered on the 3rd floor in thick, black smoke conditions. Both victims were removed by the rapid intervention team (RIT) and other fire fighters who assisted them. Both victims were pronounced dead at local hospitals.

Contributing Factors

  • Failure to effectively monitor and respond to Mayday transmissions
  • Less than effective Mayday procedures and training
  • Inadequate air management
  • Removal and/or dislodgement of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
  • Incident safety officer (ISO) and rapid intervention team (RIT) not readily available on scene
  • Possible underlying medical condition(s) (coronary artery disease)
  • Command, control, and accountability.

Aerial View of House and Exposures

 
 

Key Recommendations

  • Ensure that radio transmissions are effectively monitored and quickly acted upon, especially when a Mayday is called
  • Ensure that Mayday training program(s) and department procedures adequately prepare fire fighters to call a Mayday
  • Train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their SCBA
  • Ensure that fire fighters use their SCBA during all stages of a fire and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures
  • Ensure that a separate incident safety officer (ISO), independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire with the initial dispatch
  • Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is readily available and prepared to respond to fire fighter emergencies
  • Consider adopting a comprehensive wellness and fitness program, provide annual medical evaluations consistent with NFPA standards, and perform annual physical performance (physical ability) evaluations for all fire fighters.

Timeline

This timeline is provided to set out, to the extent possible, the sequence of events according to recorded and intelligible radio transmissions. Two channels were used during this incident: the main dispatch channel and channel 2 (fireground). Times are approximate and were obtained from review of the dispatch records, witness interviews, photographs of the scene, and other available information. Times have been rounded to the nearest minute. NIOSH investigators have attempted to include all intelligible radio transmissions, but some may be missing. This timeline is not intended, nor should it be used, as a formal record of events.

  • 1544 Hours E3 and L5 dispatched to a report of an elevator rescue.
  • 1546 Hours While en route, E3 contacted the dispatcher on the main dispatch channel and advised them they needed to redirect all companies to a possible house fire.
  • 1547 Hours L5 copied E3‘s transmission on the main dispatch channel and redirected to the possible house fire. E3 advised the dispatcher, on the main dispatch channel, that they had a fire on the 2nd floor and that they did not have a hydrant. Note: It is unclear whether E3 established command, but L5 arrived just after E3 and established command.
  • 1548 Hours E3, E4, E1, E7 as RIT, L11, L5, R5, and B1 were dispatched on the main dispatch channel to the house fire.
  • 1549 Hours L5 arrived on scene and their officer stated over the main dispatch channel, ―2½-story wood frame with heavy fire coming from the 2nd floor, Alpha/Bravo side, L5 is now command.‖
  • 1550 Hours E7 en route.
  • 1551-1552 Hours E4 arrived on scene and laid a supply line in from the hydrant. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer (initial arriving IC) advised the dispatcher that the bulk of the fire was knocked down by E3 and the primary search was in progress. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised L11 and E7 which way they should approach the scene. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer requested an ambulance for an injured fire fighter (ankle injury). Over the main dispatch channel, B1 advised the dispatcher that he was on scene, and he confirmed the first report of heavy fire with the bulk of the fire knocked down. B1 then took command of the incident.
  • 1553 Hours L11 arrived on scene. E1 took an additional hydrant. A7116 dispatched to the incident for an injured fire fighter. Note: Dispatch of A7116 was not part of the initial fire assignment. The 9-1-1 center contacted the EMS dispatch center via landline to request an ambulance for the injured fire fighter on scene after the request from the L5 officer.
  • 1554 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the BA advised the dispatcher that the command post would be in front of the fire building and tag collection would be at the command post. On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 to charge the second hoseline. E7 (RIT) arrived on scene.
  • 1555 Hours On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 again to charge the second hoseline. Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested the dispatcher to have the safety officer respond to the incident. IC checked on the status of the ambulance. Fire dispatch advised the IC that the ambulance was en route.
  • 1556 Hours E3 advised the IC (on the main dispatch channel) that he needed hooks on the 2nd floor in the room of origin; the IC acknowledged the request. Over the main dispatch channel, IC advised all companies, ―Channel 2 fireground, channel 2 fireground.‖ Note: Up to this point, companies on scene were operating on the main dispatch and channel 2. Fire dispatch assigned fireground operations to channel 2 for the incident.
  • 1557-1558 Hours IC called L11 on channel 2. IC (on the main dispatch channel) confirmed with the dispatcher who was RIT (which was E7) on scene and advised them that their equipment was available at the command post. Victim#1 acknowledged the IC‘s request for L11 on channel 2, but the IC did not respond. E3 officer, who incorrectly identified himself as ―E4,‖ called command on channel 2 and stated they had a slight extension into the A/B corner. Note: He was working overtime the day of the incident at the station that houses E3 and E4, which is also his normal duty station. The IC copied the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2 and asked him if he had enough hooks available; the E3 officer stated he did. A7116 arrived on scene.
  • 1559 Hours E3 officer on channel 2 advised the IC that they needed a hoseline to the 3rd floor because they could not reach it (fire extension) from the 2nd floor. The IC acknowledged the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2. The IC, on channel 2, advised Victim #1 that E1 was bringing a hoseline to the 3rd floor. Victim #1 acknowledged the IC‘s transmission on channel 2 and advised, ―A primary is in progress, which is negative; and, they are still checking for extension.‖ The IC acknowledged Victim #1‘s transmission.
  • 1600 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the ISO advised the dispatcher that he was responding (from home). A7116 contacted EMS dispatch requesting a single ambulance to standby at the incident per the IC. A7110 dispatched and en route to fire to standby. On channel 2, the IC (at the command post) advised the E4 officer that he could see fire extending up the A/B corner. Note: NIOSH investigators were not sure if this transmission was meant for the E4 officer or the officer from E3 who identified himself as E4. At 1559 hours, the E3 officer advised the IC of the extension to the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the E4 officer advised the IC that he was working on getting a line up to the 3rd floor.
  • 1601 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised the IC that the ISO and DC were responding. On channel 2, the L5 officer contacted ―L5-Alpha‖ (believed to be L5‘s aerial ladder) to assist in the bucket; L5-Alpha acknowledged the transmission.
  • 1602-1603 Hours On channel 2, the IC contacted the L5 officer to verify whether he thought he could make the roof with L5. On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
  • 1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
  • 1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
  • 1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, ―…line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
  • 1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
  • On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
  • 1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
  • 1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
  • 1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
  • 1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
  • The IC called the L11 officer (Victim #1) on channel 2 (no response).
  • 1615 Hours On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to all companies on the 3rd floor, vacate the 3rd floor; I repeat, command to L11 and E1, vacate the 3rd floor.‖
  • 1616-1619 Hours (2nd Mayday Call) The IC attempted to contact L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The IC, on channel 2, then stated, ―Command to E1.‖ (1616.50 hours) On channel 2, FF2 stated, ―Mayday, Mayday…Rescue 5 Bravo command we have a downed fire fighter rear steps. Mayday-Mayday-Mayday fire fighter down rear steps, 2nd floor.‖ IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11‖ (no response). Note: An apparatus air horn is heard sounding in the background of this transmission. FF2 on channel 2 stated, ―Rescue 5 Bravo command, Rescue 5 Bravo command we need help 2nd floor, send the RIT, we need fresh bodies.‖ Note: No audio transmissions or emergency tones are heard on channel 2 or the main dispatch channel advising that the Mayday call had been acknowledged. DC contacted the IC on channel 2 to have him send the RIT to the rear stairs; the IC acknowledged. Note: The RIT may have already been advancing up the rear stairs, but they ran into difficulty accessing the 2nd floor landing off the rear stairs because a charged hoseline was against the closed door. Dispatch attempted to contact command on channel 2 (no response). The IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The DC contacted the IC requesting the ambulance on scene to come to the rear of the house. Victim #1 was extricated out the rear of the house.
  • 1620 Hours A7110 began medical care for the downed fire fighter (Victim #1). Over the main dispatch channel, the BA requested an advanced life support ambulance to the fire scene. A7126 was dispatched to intercept A7110 at the fire scene to provide advanced life support. (~1620.35 Hours) The following transmission is heard on channel 2, ―…Ladder 11 ‗mayday‘ (very quick transmission)…Ladder 11 (unintelligible word(s)).‖ Note: The dispatch caller ID for this radio is designated as “L-11 FF3,” which was assigned to the fire fighter (designated as FF4 for this report) who later finds Victim #2 (see below 1624 hours). FF4 had not found Victim #2 at the time of this transmission. On channel 2, FF4 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11 can‖ (no response). Note: “Ladder 11 can” was Victim #2’s designation that shift.
  • 1621 Hours A7126 en route to fire scene.
  • 1622 Hours On channel 2, the ISO advised the IC that the fire fighter (Victim #1) was removed and they needed to do a roll call for everyone on scene. On channel 2, the IC advised all company officers that the ―incident is taking a PAR‖ (personnel accountability report). Officers began calling in their respective PARs.
  • 1624 Hours (3rd and 4th Mayday Calls) FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Mayday-Mayday, I have a fire fighter trapped on the 3rd floor, Mayday-Mayday-Mayday 3rd floor.‖ Note: This Mayday is for Victim #2. A PASS device is heard alarming during FF4‘s transmission. On channel 2, the IC stated, ―This is command to all companies, vacate the building, I report, command to all companies, vacate the building.‖ FF4 on channel 2 stated again, ―Mayday-Mayday-Mayday, I‘ve got another fire fighter down, another one, 3rd floor, hurry!‖
  • 1625 Hours Over channel 2, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones. Note: It is unknown why the evacuation tones were sounded instead of the Mayday tones. Their evacuation tone is an alternating, high-low sound, similar to a European siren. Their Mayday tone is a rapid, high to low pitch, chirping sound. This was dispatch’s first acknowledgement of a Mayday over the radio. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on channel 2. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones as well. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on the main dispatch channel.
  • 1626 Hours The IC contacted the DC on channel 2. DC acknowledged with no further traffic from the IC. The IC on channel 2 again advised all companies to vacate the building. The dispatcher then activated the emergency tones on channel 2 and the main dispatch channel, and stated, ―All companies per command vacate the building, all companies vacate the building.‖
  • 1627 Hours The ISO contacted the IC on channel 2 and stated, ―We need to make contact with that Mayday, we need more information, we have not heard from them since the initial call.‖ On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to company declaring a Mayday; I repeat, command to the company declaring a Mayday sound off, sound off.‖ A fire fighter from the RIT advised the IC on channel 2 that they were moving the fire fighter off the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the dispatcher advised the IC that the Mayday call was for the 3rd floor. A7126 arrived at the fire scene.
  • 1628 Hours RIT advised the IC that they have the fire fighter (Victim #2) on the 3rd floor and will be bringing him down the rear stairs from the 3rd floor.
  • 1630 Hours A7110 en route to the hospital with Victim #1 without assistance from A7126.
  • 1632 Hours ISO asked for a progress report from the RIT on the Mayday. RIT replied, ―Coming down…3rd floor.‖ ISO asked RIT to repeat their traffic. A radio was keyed, but there was no transmission.
  • 1634 Hours RIT personnel advised the IC that they had the fire fighter (Victim #2) down to the 2nd floor landing.
  • 1640 Hours A7110 arrived at local hospital with Victim #1.
  • 1643 Hours A7126 began medical care on second downed fire fighter (Victim #2). Note: This time was taken from Victim #2’s patient care report and may not be accurate.
  • 1703 Hours A7126 arrived at local hospital with Victim #2.

 

Fire Behavior

The room and contents fire was determined to have originated in a bedroom on the 2nd floor, A/B corner; it was quickly knocked down by E3 (see Photo 2). It is believed that the fire got into the eves when it was lapping out the A/B corner windows, and then spread within the large void spaces in the ceiling and walls of the 3rd floor. The fire was situated toward the A/B corner of the 3rd floor, but the open void areas allowed smoke to accumulate within the ceilings and walls before they were opened.

Operating on the 3rd floor at varying times were members from L5, R5, L11, E4, and E7. Initially, light-to-moderate smoke conditions were observed on the 3rd floor, depending on how close fire fighters were to the A-side of the 3rd floor. Fire fighters recalled the 3rd floor being very hot. TICs used by different individuals on the 3rd floor showed the room to be hot on the A-side and ceiling. Windows on the A-, B-, and D-sides were opened, allowing most of the smoke to self ventilate. Light smoke remained within the 3rd floor, with good visibility.

Extension was checked around A- and B-side baseboards. Some fire fighters recall Victim #1 telling them the fire was in the ceiling and possibly the walls, and to not open those areas until a hoseline was in place. Even after providing horizontal ventilation on the 3rd floor, smoke conditions worsened, banking down to fire fighters‘ chin levels and becoming denser.

While waiting for the hoseline, L5 members were reassigned by the IC to ventilate the roof to provide additional relief to the 3rd floor. The IC reported to NIOSH investigators that he ordered the roof vented because he saw smoke pushing out the B-side windows. Personnel from E4 advanced the charged hoseline to the 3rd floor, allowing the ceilings and walls to be opened. A mixture of thick, brown/black smoke quickly filled the room, reducing visibility.

  

Initial conditions observed when the BC arrived on scene at approximately 1551 hours. Note: Fire was under control on the 2nd floor and fire fighters were checking for extension. White-to-gray smoke can be seen flowing in the direction of right to left from the gables. The A-side window on the 3rd floor had been opened for ventilation (unsure at what stage of the fire or by whom).

  

  

Structure

Built in the early 1900s, the two-and-half-story house (see Photo 1) was purchased approximately 4 years prior to the incident as a multifamily rental occupancy. One family lived in the 1st floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.); a second family lived in the 2nd floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.) and the owner occupied the finished half-story or attic space (approx. 700 sq. ft.).  The house also contained an unfinished basement (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.).

The common front entrance contained access to the 1st floor apartment and a private stairwell, located at the A/D corner of the house, which provided access to the 2nd floor apartment. The house also had a single rear-entry door that provided access to a stairwell that led up to the owner‘s apartment and had landings to access all the apartments from the rear. According to the owner of the house, smoke detectors were installed within the house about a year prior to the incident. These smoke detectors were installed in every bedroom, in each hallway, and in the stairwells.

The house did not have an installed sprinkler system and had been inspected in accordance with Department of Housing and Urban Development Section 8a guidelines, according to the homeowner. The house was Type V wood frame construction, but, during the initial stages of the fire, was presumed by arriving fire fighters to be balloon-framed due to the era when it was constructed. State fire investigators were able to confirm Type V construction after closer inspection.

The Office of the State Fire Marshal‘s building code compliance inspection showed that the house did not meet certain Connecticut Fire Safety Code requirements for this type of structure. NIOSH investigators do not believe that these non-compliance issues contributed to the deaths of the two fire fighters.

  

Typical Ballon Framing Construction

 

 LINKS

 

2 Bridgeport firefighters die in line of duty: wtnh.com

Albuquerque Fire Department; Learnings from Close Call Collapse and Fire Fighter Injuries

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The Albuquerque Fire Department seeks to improve operations from past performance

Four firefighters with the Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department were injured during operations at a three-alarm fire that injured raged through the Royal Crown Apartment Complex  in southeast Albuquerque on Friday February 4, 2011.

The injured firefighters were among four who fell through the floor from the second story to the first while searching for residents of the, according to the Albuquerque Fire Department. Both suffered leg injuries, one had minor burn, and they were treated and released from University of New Mexico Hospital a few hours later, an AFD spokesperson said.

According to published reports at the time of the event, the first alarm came in at 3 p.m. bringing personnel and apparatus to the three-story building at 4801 Gibson SE. First units on the scene reported heavy smoke and flames on the north side of the building.

A crew from AFD Engine 13 entered the building and during a search rescued two uninjured residents from one apartment and also save a cat.

At 3:40 p.m. Incident command transitioned to a defense operations to fight the fire from outside the building. The third alarm was transmitted due to the projected heavy fuel load in the large complex.

Overall 75 fire personnel responded and operated at the alarm.

The fire is believed to have started behind a washing machine in the first-floor laundry room. An electric cause is suspected, but AFD said the exact cause is still under investigation.

The three-story multiple occupancy apartment complex was built in 1976 and housed 47 apartment units in 31,896 square feet of space.

In the months since the fire, the Albuquerque Fire Department has conducted a critique and post incident assessment of the operations, mayday and close-calls and overall performance of the department. As reported in the media video leading into this article, the department has taken the results of that post incident assessment and has developed training being delivered to al personnel to increase future operational performance, efficiencies and to reduce the likely hood of a similar event from occurring.

According to the Fire Department, they were playing catch-up from the early advancing stages of the incident and experienced difficulty in being able to make strategic strides to get ahead of the escalating incident severity, magnitude and rapid development.

The unexpected events leading to the multiple maydays and firefighter injuries challenged incident command and operations and could have resulted in possible multiple firefighter LODDs versus the close-call, near-miss events that subsequently lead towards the efforts to undertake  critical review of the incident and operations.

Some Insights and Learning’s from the Incident included that have resulted in enhancements;

  • Communications
  • Situational Awareness
  • Calling the Mayday
  • Radio Communications
  • Distractions and Error Prevention
  • Accountability
  • Command Response to Mayday Events
  • Communications Mayday Alerts

It is imperative that all departments initiate at the least a formal or informal post incident critique or review. This may be at the company or station level or escalated to a more formal department level assessment and review based upon the incident parameters and conditions.

The initiation and development of post incident analysis or assessment can be more involving and complex, with the commitment of personnel, resources and time but the benefits derived from such a review will contribute highly to the continued development and improvement of any organization. 

There are a number of recent after action, post incident or assessments reports that have been published and have been reviewed and discussed here on CommandSafety.com.

Take the time to review your incidents and runs at the company, station or battalion level. These reviews will identify and address low threshold, latent or emerging conditions before they escalate into apparent or root cause conditions that may contribute to significant adverse events and incidents.

The Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s self-critical review of this event has identified short comings at a number of levels that they are working to improve.

As they state in the video report, the outcome of this event could have been a lot worse than the injuries sustained and the resultant near-misses. The focus on improvements and enhancements within the functional areas of Calling the Mayday, Rapid Intervention and Mayday Communications and Operations is commendable and aligns with this year’s theme for Safety, Health and Survival Week.

The 2011 Safety Week theme is; Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

  • Previous Safety Week announcement and details; HERE.
  • We’ll post under a separate article details on the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program soon.

Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s Web Site, HERE

This year’s Safety Week will focus on delivering the online IAFF Fire Ground Survival (FGS) awareness training course to all fire departments. The program is the most comprehensive survival skills and MAYDAY prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Additional planning tools and resources will be available on the Safety Week website.

The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.

For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics covered include:

  • Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
  • Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
  • Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
  • Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
  • Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

Keep watching the website and the IAFC’s Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn pages for continuing updates to this year’s program and planning resources.

Remember to visit the SHS Section’s website for more information on health and safety issues and the IAFF’s Health, Safety and Medicine’s website for more information on health, wellness and safety programs.

Additionally, look for a comprehensive series of articles, activities, insights, downloads, podcasts, video clips and resources that will be posted each day of Safety, Health and Survival Week here on Commandsafety.com, Thecompanyofficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com.

Announcements and campaign materials will begin posting in Mid-May.

We will be offering a special series of live shows nightly on Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com and blogtalkradio during the week of June 19-25, 2011 addressing key issues with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders.

This will be an exceptional opportunity to listen in, call in and participate actively in the week’ theme of Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

These shows will be mission critical. Stay Tuned for more upcoming information.

Be Self-Critical and a Learning Organization

  • In the meantime think about your operations; are you self-critical and a learning organization seeking to identify gaps or areas for improvement?
  • There is a lot that can be learned from our daily responses and operations, whether they be that single company response or that multiple alarm incident. 
  • All it takes is the recognition to see things for what they are and your may not be as good as you think and the understanding and desire to identify those conditions and improve .

 

Addtional Resources, videos and images related to the Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s operations at the Royal Crown Apartment Complex

Alpha Street Side View

 

Aerial View from the Delta Side

 

KASA News 13 photo by Alex Tomlin.

The Ides of March

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Operational Safety

Here are five (5) NIOSH Firefighter LODD Event report summaries for incidents that occurred in the March 4th through the 8th time frame in the years 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008.   

Take the time to look over the event summaries, discuss and comment on the factors that lead to the events and the recommendations formulated from the subsequent investigations.   

Take the opportunity to identify the common themes and apparent causes that were identified and discuss with your company, team or station, relevant considerations that may have a direct or indirect relationship to your organization, past incident calls or district risk profile.   

What are your capabilities?   

What are your gaps?   

How can you prevent a similar situation from occurring?

    

Promote questions and dialog related to operational issues such as these;   

  • Coordinated multi-company operations; how “coordinated” is your incident scene?
  • Do rapidly changing incident conditions get identified promptly and communicated to Command in rapid succession for actions?
  • How effective is the base line knowledge and skill set of company and command officers in “reading the building”?
  • What is the adequacy of your training for conducting operations above the fire floor?
  • When was the last time you “tested” the effectiveness of your RIT/FAST Team? Can they truly perform under the most demanding of incident conditions?
  • When was the last time you trained or drilled on Fire Behavior or on Building Construction?
  • Are you training on calling the mayday and personal survival techniques?
  • Have you implemented and trained on procedures for rapid and efficient transition in operational modes on the fireground?
  • Do you implement a 360 when applicable?

Down load the complete NIOSH Reports and expand on the lessons learners and their applicably to your organization and capabilities.    

Manlius, New Yrok

Floor Collapse and Fire Conditions:
On March 7, 2002, a 28-year-old male volunteer fire fighter and a 41-year-old male career fire fighter died after becoming trapped in the basement. One firefighter manned the nozzle while second firefighter provided backup on the handline as they entered the house. After entering the structure, the floor collapsed, trapping both victims in the basement.   

A career fire fighter captain joining the fire fighters near the time of the collapse was injured trying to rescue one of the fire fighters. Crew members responded immediately and attempted to rescue the victims; however, the heat and flames overcame both victims and eliminated any rescue efforts from the garage entrance.   

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;
   

  • Ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual responsible for the overall coordination and direction of all activities at an incident
  • Ensure that the Incident Commander conveys strategic decisions to all suppression crews on the fireground and continually reevaluates the fire condition
  • Ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • Ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts
  • Ensure that fire fighters report conditions and hazards encountered to their team leader or Incident Commander
  • Ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200206.html    

    

Wall Collapse and Fire Conditions
On March 7, 2008, two male career fire fighters, aged 40 and 19 were killed when they were trapped by rapidly deteriorating fire conditions inside a millwork facility in North Carolina. The captain of the hose line crew was also injured, receiving serious burn injuries.   

The victims were members of a crew of four fire fighters operating a hose line protecting a firewall in an attempt to contain the fire to the burning office area and keep it from spreading into the production and warehouse areas. The captain attempted to radio for assistance as the conditions deteriorated but fire fighters on the outside did not initially hear his Mayday. Once it was realized that the crew was in trouble, multiple rescue attempts were made into the burning warehouse in an effort to reach the trapped crew as conditions deteriorated further.   

Three members of a rapid intervention team (RIT) were hurt rescuing the injured captain. One firefighter was located and removed during the fifth rescue attempt. The second firefighter could not be reached until the fire was brought under control.   

The fourth crew member had safely exited the burning warehouse prior to the deteriorating conditions that trapped his fellow crew members. Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include radio communication problems (unintelligible transmissions in and out of the fire structure that may have led to misunderstanding of operational fireground communications), inadequate size up and incomplete pre-plan information, a deep-seated fire burning within the floor of the office area that was able to spread into the production and warehouse facility, the procedures used in which operational modes were repeatedly changed from offensive to defensive, lack of crew integrity at a critical moment in the event, and weather which restricted fireground visibility.   

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:   

  • Ensure that detailed pre-incident plan information is collected and available when needed, especially in high risk structures
  • Limit interior offensive operations in well-involved structures that are not equipped with sprinkler systems and where there are no known civilians in need of rescue
  • Develop, implement, and enforce clear procedures for operational modes. Changes in modes must be coordinated between the Incident Command, the command staff and fire fighters
  • Ensure that Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC) / Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) have at least one charged hose line in place before entering hazardous environments for rescue operations
  • Ensure that the incident commander establishes the incident command post in an area that provides a good visual view of the fire building and enhances overall fireground communication
  • Ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
  • Encourage local building code authorities to adopt code requirements for automatic protection (sprinkler) systems in buildings with heavy fire loads.

NIOSH REPORT http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200807.html    

  

Floor Collapses in Residential Fire - North Carolina

    

Floor Collapse
On March 4, 2002, a 22-year-old male career fire fighter was injured and subsequently died and a 25-year-old male Captain was injured when the floor collapsed while they were fighting a residential fire.   

The Captain was transported by ambulance to an area hospital where he was admitted overnight for first- and second-degree burns. The victim was conscious and was transported by medical helicopter to a State medical center where he died 2 days later.   

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;   

  • Ensure that each Incident Commander conducts a size-up of the incident before initiating fire-fighting efforts, after command is transferred, and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • Ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the dangers of searching above a fire
  • Ensure that an Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed
  • Ensure that ventilation is closely coordinated with fire attack
  • Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position immediately upon arrival
  • Ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to operate safely and effectively

NIOSH REPORT http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200211.html   

    

Fall Through Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence - Ohio

     

Floor Collapse
On March 8, 2001, a 38-year-old male career fire fighter fell through the floor while fighting a structure fire, and died 12 days later from his injuries. At 1231 hours, Central Dispatch notified the career department of a structure fire with reports of the occupants still inside. The Assistant Chief arrived on the scene along with Engine 70 and assumed Incident Command (IC).   

The IC immediately called for the second alarm, began conducting the initial size-up of the structure, and confirmed heavy fire in the left front section. At that time, the neighbors approached the IC and informed him that the occupants were trapped inside. The IC ordered the fire fighters on scene to commence search and rescue efforts, and then verified the stability of the structure through radio and face-to-face communications.   

Engine 68 arrived on the scene at approximately 1250 hours with an Assistant Chief and the victim. The Assistant Chief provided tactical command of the fire ground, and along with the victim, conducted search and rescue operations. Other crews conducted searches with a thermal imaging camera of the first floor and basement level of the residence with no sign of any occupants. During these searches the stability of the structure was diminishing due to the intense fire that was now venting through the roof.   

Fire fighter #3 and the victim were at the front entrance conducting a defensive attack as the third emergency evacuation signal was sounded. The neighbors were still insisting to the IC and fire fighters that the occupants were trapped inside, and one of the occupants was handicapped. The victim and one other fire fighter conducted another search of the structure.   

The heat and flames were now extending from the basement level to the first floor when the fire fighter’s low air alarm sounded. The victim and the fire fighter were backing out of the structure when the floor beneath the victim gave way, causing him to fall through the floor and become trapped in the basement.   

Attempts were made from the first floor to rescue the victim by utilizing a handline and an attic ladder, but they were unsuccessful due to the intense heat and flames. Two Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT #1 & RIT #2) were deployed simultaneously from separate entrances into the basement to perform a search and rescue operation for the downed fire fighter. The RITs were able to locate and remove the victim on their initial entry. He sustained third degree burns to over half of his body and died 12 days later.   

NIOSH investigators concluded that to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;   

  • Ensure that Incident Command continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
  • Ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer independent from the Incident Commander is appointed
  • Ensure that fire fighters are trained in the tactics of defensive search
  • Ensure that fire fighters performing fire fighting operations under or above trusses are evacuated as soon as it is determined that the trusses are exposed to fire
  • Ensure consistent use of Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices at all incidents and consider providing fire fighters with a PASS integrated into their Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus which provides for automatic operation
  • Ensure that personnel equipped with a radio, position the radio to receive and respond to radio transmissions

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200116.html    

    

     

Roof Collapse and Fire Conditions
On March 8, 1998, one male fire fighter, the Captain on Engine 57, died while trying to exit a commercial structure after his egress was cut off by the wooden trussed roof that collapsed. Task Force 66 was the first on scene and reported light smoke showing from a one-story commercial building. A ventilation team from Truck 66 proceeded to the roof of the building and commenced roof ventilation. Forcible entry into the building required about 7 ½ to 9 ½ minutes from arrival on scene to force open the two metal security doors in the front. While fire companies waited for the security doors to be opened, fire conditions changed dramatically on the roof.   

Fire was coming from the ventilation holes opened by the ventilation crew. As soon as the security doors were opened, three engine crews (Engine 66, Engine 57, and Engine 46) advanced hand lines through the front door in an attempt to determine the origin of the fire. Approximately 15 feet inside the front door, the fire fighters encountered heavy smoke with near zero visibility conditions. The engine crews advanced their hose lines approximately 30 to 40 feet inside the building.   

As conditions continued to deteriorate inside the building, the members from the four engine companies involved in the fire attack began to withdraw. During this time the victim became separated from his crew and remained in the building. The victim was subsequently located by the Rapid Intervention Team and cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed immediately and en-route to the hospital, where the victim was pronounced dead.   

NIOSH investigators conclude that, to prevent similar occurrences, fire departments should:    

  • Ensure that incident command conducts an initial size up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts, and continually evaluate the risk versus gain during operation at an incident
  • Ensure that incident command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene
  • Ensure communications are established between the interior and exterior attack crews, e.g., the ventilation crew and the interior fire attack crew should communicate conditions among themselves and back to incident command
  • Ensure that Rapid Intervention Teams are in place before conditions become unsafe
  • Ensure that some type of tone or alert that is recognized by all fire fighters be transmitted immediately when conditions become unsafe for fire fighters
  • Ensure sufficient personnel are available and properly functioning communications equipment are available to adequately support the volume of radio traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes
  • Consider placing a bright, narrow-beamed light at the entry portal to a structure to assist lost or disoriented fire fighters in emergency egress.

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9807.html    

  

Stay tuned for upcoming announcements for the March 16th Taking it to the Streets Program on Firefighternetcast.com

  

Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com

Taking it to the StreetsTM  

Featuring a two part program on Near Miss Firefighter Reporting with Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret) and Capt. CJ Haberkorn, Denver (CO) Fire Department and joing us on the second part of the program will be special guest, Captain Michael Long, with a personal Near-Miss Event account you won’t want to miss. 

Join in on the live open discussion with fire service personnel from around the country. 

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com. 

  • Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening March 16th at 9:00 pm ET on Firefighternetcast.com HERE 
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2010-2011 All Rights Reserved

Collapse of Bowstring Truss Roof Seriously Injures Fire Fighter

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Fire suppression operations on Alpha side prior to collapse. Firefighter is seen in the immediate collapse zone

The NIOSH Fire fighter Investigation and Prevention Program, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports  recently released Report # F2009-12 for a Near-Miss event that seriously injured a firefighter  wih significant learnings;   HERE   

Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.  

On May 21, 2009, a 36-year-old male career fire fighter was seriously injured while operating in a non-designated collapse zone of a commercial structure when an overhang of a bowstring truss roof system collapsed and struck him. The first arriving company officer reported a working fire in a single story Type II warehouse.  

The officer looked under a steel roll-up door that was raised approximately three feet off of the ground and saw heavy fire towards the rear of the structure from floor to ceiling. Per department procedures, the first arriving companies went into a “Fast Attack” mode. Crews attempted but were unable to enter the structure because the steel roll-up door wasn’t functioning and the man door was heavily secured.  

The department’s Deputy Chief arrived on the scene 9 minutes after the initial crew and determined that the fire should be fought defensively, however, this command was not relayed over the radio or verified with all crews. A crew was operating a 2 ½-inch handline just outside the structure approximately 20 minutes after the first apparatus arrived when the overhang collapsed and trapped the nozzleman.  

Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include:  

  • scene management and risk analysis,
  • a well-involved fire in a structure with hazardous construction features, and
  • fire fighters operating within a potential collapse area.

STRUCTURE

The building was constructed in 1954 and was a single-story warehouse of Type IV construction. The dimensions of the building were 110 feet deep by 50 feet wide, covering approximately 5,500 square feet. The height of the building was approximately 20 feet. The occupancy use of the building was commercial and it operated as a warehouse. The building’s structural system consisted of masonry block bearing walls with four heavy timber wood bowstring trusses for a roof system.  

The heavy timber wood trusses had a 50-foot clear span to the bearing walls and were located 19 feet 9 inches on center. The heavy timber wood truss assemblies were 48 feet 7 inches in depth and were constructed of 4-inch x 6-inch timber cords and webs connected with bolt fasteners with a metal splice plate and bolt configuration at the bottom chord span. Solid 2-inch x 10-inch wood purlins located on 24-inch centering spanned perpendicular to the truss assembly with a ¾-inch plywood roofing deck. The roofing system assembly was exposed and did not have a membrane or other passive fire protection features.  

Aerial view of Building

Structural stability to the heavy timber truss units was provided by 2-inch x 6-inch wood cross bracing in conjunction with the stability provided by the wood purlins and plywood deck roofing membrane. The structure contained six skylights that were 3 feet by 6 feet .  

The overall integrity and structural stability of this type of structural support and roofing system is contingent upon all components maintaining their connections and load bearing or load transferring capacity.  

The A-side was a non-load bearing wall that showed the traditional arched roof profile that is consistent with bowstring roof construction. The A-side wall also consisted of what appeared to be an overhanging or cantilevered façade that was covered by stucco.  The overhang was part of the original construction that tied back into the bowstring truss system. The fire building was integrated into a block of commercial occupancies so that only the A-side was accessible for interior fire fighting activities.  

The B-side exposure of the building was adjacent to a parking lot and was of masonry construction without any windows or doors. The C-side and D-side exposures were of similar size and construction and shared party walls between their respective sides. A pre-plan had not been completed for this structure.  

Similar Interior Construction Features

At the time of the fire, the building was used as a place to grow marijuana illegally. The man door was heavily barricaded and a false wall was constructed to shield the operations from the exterior when the roll-up door was lifted. The electric service was severed and rerouted to circumvent the electric meter in order to conceal the operations.  

TRAINING and EXPERIENCE

The state requires all career fire fighters to complete training equivalent to NFPA, 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, Fire Fighter 1. The department provides up to 17 months of training to certify fire fighters to NFPA Fire Fighter 1 and 2 qualifications, and a one year probationary period of supervised training for department fire fighter certification. The additional training during this probationary time focuses on driver training, pump operations, aerial ladder operations, and specialized equipment training.  

  

Alpha Side

Injured Fire Fighter
The injured fire fighter had more than six years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training on topics such as: live fire training, rapid intervention crew (RIC) procedures, and hazardous materials.  

Initial Incident Commander (IC)
The first due company officer had more than 15 years of experience with the department. Six of those years were as a fire fighter, seven years as a cross-trained paramedic, and 18 months as a lieutenant in an acting and permanent appointment at the time of the incident. The initial IC had completed the department provided five four-day sessions on critical fireground topics that were required for newly appointed lieutenants. This training included the following topics: building construction, incident management system (IMS), size-up, company operations, and rapid intervention company (RIC) operations.  

Incident Commander (IC)
The IC had more than 30 years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training in topics such as: health and safety 1, 2, 3 & 4; fire command; fire instructor; fire investigation; fire management; fire officer; fire prevention; incident command; incident safety officer;  and RIC procedures.  

Incident Safety Officer (ISO)
The battalion chief who was assigned as the ISO for this incident had more than 20 years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training in topics such as: health and safety 1,2,3,and 4; fire command; fire instructor; RIC procedures; hazardous materials; heavy rescue 1 and 2; training officer development; wildland training; and emergency vehicle operations.  

INVESTIGATION INSIGHTS

At 0446 hours central dispatch received an alarm for a reported structure fire with fire and smoke showing at a commercial occupancy. Engine 42 (E42) was the first apparatus on the scene at 0449 hours and the officer reported on the radio a working fire in a single story Type II warehouse. Note: The classification of Type II was incorrect. This building was a Type IV construction due to the heavy timber bowstring trusses.   

The E42 Lieutenant and a fire fighter ran to a steel garage roll-up door that was raised approximately three feet off of the ground on the left of the A-side wall. The E42 Lieutenant looked under the door and saw heavy fire towards the rear of the structure from floor to ceiling. The E42 Lieutenant and the fire fighter attempted to raise the door but could not due to the door being dislodged from its track. Note: The door frame had been compromised by the fire and the tracks were not attached to the wall. They immediately went to a man door to the right of the A-side. It was locked and had heavy security bars. The E42 Lieutenant called Battalion Chief 6 for a truck company to perform forcible entry.  

The E42 Lieutenant ordered the crew to prepare the multiversal, which is a master stream appliance that can be used on the ground, and 2 ½-inch handlines to attempt to attack the fire through the roll-up door. Note: Per department policy, all first arriving companies and officers go to work in a “fast attack” mode. At approximately 0452 hours Engine 32 (E32) and Engine 17 (E17) pulled onto the road leading to the structure within a block from the structure.  

Both the E32 and E17 officers immediately radioed dispatch and requested a second alarm due to the heavy fire self-venting from the roof of the structure. E32 proceeded to the front of the structure, dropped off two 3-inch supply lines for E42, and went to hook up to a hydrant to supply E42. E32 used a 10-foot section of 3-inch supply line to hook up to one side of the hydrant. They used another 50-foot section of 3-inch supply line to hook up to the other side of the hydrant.  

During this same time, at approximately 0452 hours, BC6 arrived on the scene, called to ensure a second alarm, and conducted a size-up of the front of the building and the operations taking place. A division chief arrived on the scene at 0453 hours, assumed incident command (IC), and ordered BC6 to protect Exposure D. The E17 officer and fire fighters [including the injured fire fighter (IFF)] walked up to the front of the structure and saw the E42 and E32 crews attempting to deploy the multiversal and two 2 ½-inch handlines off of E42. Note: The crews were having difficulty due to having to assemble the three 50-foot sections of 2 ½-handlines from a bag stored on top of each apparatus. The crew also removed the multiversal from on top of E42 and placed it on the ground for operation.   

The IFF took the nozzle of one of the 2 ½-inch handlines and was backed up by an E17 fire fighter. Two additional fire fighters manned the other 2 ½-inch handline and were protecting the D-exposure by shooting water onto the roof from over 20 feet away from the structure. The E17 officer and E17 fire fighter operated the multiversal over 20 feet back from the roll-up door and attempted to shoot water through the opening where the door had pulled away from the wall. The E17 officer noticed that both handlines were ineffective and he went to check on the IFF. The IFF’s handline stream was ricocheting off of the man door and the four windows above it.  

The L7 crew had assembled handtools on the ground in front of the Command Post. The E17 officer took a saw to the man door in an attempt to open it so that the handline could be effective. He quickly determined that the saw would not work due to the door being so heavily protected. Battalion Chief 09 arrived on the scene at 0500 hours and was designated by the IC as the Incident Safety Officer (ISO) at approximately 0504 hours. He instructed the E17 officer to attempt to open the door with a rabbit tool; the E17 officer informed the ISO he wasn’t sure where the truck company kept it. Immediately after, BC6 ordered the E17 officer to take his saw to the roll-up door and cut an opening for access.  

He cut a three foot by six foot hole in the door and was attempting to cut across the door when he was tapped on the shoulder by the Deputy Chief which he assumed meant he was to quit. During this time, BC6 had received orders from the Deputy Chief to pull everyone back from the front of the building and to ensure that no one went inside. Note: According to interviews conducted by NIOSH investigators, this is the first time that anyone on the scene communicated the need to go defensive to the initial arriving officers. It was reported to the NIOSH investigators that every officer who reported to the command post was given face-to-face directions that the fire was defensive and that no one was to enter the building. This tactical decision was not relayed over the radio.   

BC6 ordered the crews from E42 and E17 to set up and direct a master stream into the hole through the roll-up door from a distance. The crews fought fire from a distance with the master stream for several minutes. The IFF and the E17 fire fighter continued to fight fire with the handline moving from the roll-up door to the man door several times. Note: This crew, along with many other members that were interviewed, reported not receiving any orders regarding a defensive operation.  

BC6 noticed that the fire had compromised an electrical weather head and that the power lines were going to come down soon. He turned to order crews to vacate the area where the power lines would possibly fall when he heard a large crash. He turned back and saw that the roof overhang had fallen onto the sidewalk. The collapse trapped the IFF who was operating the handline into the windows along with the E17 fire fighter. Members immediately rushed to the scene to rescue the trapped fire fighter.  

  • The IC ordered BC6 to command the rescue crew and complete a personnel accountability report (PAR) for the fireground.
  • A full PAR was completed and the trapped fire fighter was removed and transported to a local hospital. 

Collapse into the street on Alpha Side

 

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:  

  • ensure that they have consistent policies and training on an incident management system
  • develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
  • ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning fire fighting operations
  • ensure that the first due company officer establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in firefighting efforts
  • implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that define a defensive strategy
  • ensure that policies are followed to establish and monitor a collapse zone when conditions indicate the potential for structural collapse
  • train all fire fighting personnel on building construction and the risks and hazards related to structural collapse
  • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics

NIOSH RECOMMENDATIONS  

  • Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that they have consistent policies and training on an incident management system.
  • Recommendation #2: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
  • Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning fire fighting operations
  • Recommendati on #4: Fire departments should ensure that the first due company officer establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in firefighting efforts.
  • Recommendation #5: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures that define defensive fire fighting operations.
  • Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that policies are followed to establish and monitor a collapse zone when conditions indicate the potential for structural collapse.
  • Recommendation #7: Fire departments should train all fire fighting personnel in building construction and in the risks and hazards related to structural collapse.
  • Recommendation #8: Fire departments should conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
  • Discussion: NFPA 1620 Standard for Pre-Incident Planning, states “The purpose of this document shall be to develop pre-incident plans to assist responding personnel in effectively managing emergencies for the protection of occupants, responding personnel, property, and the environment.” A pre-incident plan identifies deviations from normal operations and can be complex and formal, or simply a notation about a particular problem such as the presence of flammable liquids, explosive hazards, modifications to structural building components, or structural damage from a previous fire.
  • Building characteristics including type (or more importantly risk) of construction, materials used, occupancy, fuel load, roof and floor design, and unusual or distinguishing characteristics should be recorded, shared with other departments who provide mutual aid, and if possible, entered into the dispatcher’s computer so that the information is readily available if an incident is reported at the noted address.
  • Since many fire departments have tens and hundreds of thousands of structures within their jurisdiction, it is a challenge to establish an effective preplanning system. Priority should be given to those having elevated or unusual fire hazards and life safety considerations.
  • One tool for fire departments to use in assessing their risks for structures within their jurisdictions is the mnemonic, BECOME SAFE: (HERE) 
    • Building
    • Evaluation
    • Construction/occupancy
    • Operational hazards
    • Manage time and elements
    • Engagement
    • Situational awareness
    • Assessment and risk analysis
    • Fire behavior and effects
    • Evaluate and execute  
 
 

BECOME SAFE by CJ Naum

In this incident, the presence of the bowstring truss presented an elevated life safety consideration in the event of a fire. A thorough building inspection and pre-incident plan for a single-story, bowstring truss occupancy in this area could have potentially identified the hazards typically associated with this type of construction such as: ceiling voids, fuel loads, non-permitted renovations, roof construction, HVAC location, and exit locations. Evaluating the construction features and layout of the structure allows the fire department the opportunity to determine a response protocol for the specific identified hazards and to develop fireground strategies and tactics (ventilation strategies, avenues of fire spread, proper attack line selection, etc.) before an incident occurs.  

The construction features of occupancy (bowstring truss), possible commercial fuel loads and access restrictions suggested large volumes of water would be necessary to fight a major fire at the site. A more complete pre-planning process, involving individual fire companies within their response territory could have noted this information which may have aided the IC in developing a safer and more effective offensive or defensive strategy. In order to facilitate open communication, fire department personnel and building code officials should be cross-trained on each-others’ duties and responsibilities.  

Fire fighters should have a basic understanding of what a code violation is and how to report them during a pre-plan, and building code inspectors should have a basic understanding of fire fighter safety issues during their inspections. The relay of this information could be used to facilitate dynamic risk management and enhanced command and control. 

  • See Report Insights related to Bowstring Truss Roof Operations on the FDNY Waldbaum’s Fire August 1978; HERE 

  

Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse Fire 1999

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Today December 3, 2010 marks the 11th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.   

For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.   

The Worcester Six;   

  • Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
  • Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
  • Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
  • Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
  • Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
  • Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine

   

On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.   

Due to these and other factors, the responding District Chief ordered a second alarm within 4 minutes of the initial dispatch. The first alarm assignment brought 30 firefighters and officers and 7 pieces of apparatus to the scene. The second provided an additional 12 men and 3 trucks as well as a Deputy Chief. Firefighters encountered a light smoke condition throughout the warehouse, and crews found a large fire in the former office area of the second floor. An aggressive interior attack was started within the second floor and ventilation was conducted on the roof. There were no windows or other openings in the warehousing space above the second floor.   

Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors. Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.   

Copywrite 1999 Roger B. Conant All Rights Reserved

An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.   

A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and deluge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts.   

According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities.     

 

Fireground Operations

    

KEY ISSUES   

Abandoned building left unprotected and unsecured.   

  • The failure to properly secure and maintain security at this warehouse allowed vagrants to enter, live in, and cause a fire in the building.
  • The lack of detection and suppression systems allowed the fire to grow unrestrained until discovered from the outside.

No barriers to prevent the spread of fire and smoke in a large space.   

  • Despite some floors having over 15,000 square feet of storage space, there were no rated fire walls, functioning fire doors, or even an interior finish that would help limit fire growth and the spread of heat and smoke.

Fire spread via combustible interior finishes.   

  • Being a cold storage warehouse, many walls and ceilings were covered with a combustible insulation material including cork, tar, expanded polystyrene foam, and sprayed-on polyurethane foam.

Delayed fire reporting   

  • The building occupants left the warehouse without notifying authorities, and the fire was reported by passing motorists who observed smoke venting from the roof.
  • The absence of uncovered windows also prevented earlier detection from the exterior.

Access limitations for fire suppression and rescue.   

  • Building construction featured a single staircase from the basement to the roof. This vertical opening was the only way to move through all levels and was congested with men and equipment from the start of operations.
  • The storage areas of the warehouse had no windows. These two factors left firefighters above the first floor without a secondary escape route and prevented ladder and rescue operations through windows.

Unusually long interior travel distances.   

  • Firefighters had to crawl over 200 feet through heavy smoke from the single staircase to conduct a proper search.
  • Most lifelines were only 50 foot and SCBA air was limited to 30 minutes.
  • Searches and rescue operations were ineffective under these circumstances.

    

Exterior Circa 1998

BUILDING HISTORY AND CONSTRUCTION   

The Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse building was a six story structure at 266 Franklin Street in the heart of Worcester’s former warehousing and cold storage district. In the first half of the 21st century, cold storage was vital to the preservation and delivery of food before refrigerators became commonplace in American kitchens. The location was ideal with rail service provided by the former Boston and Albany Railroad which had a siding against the south end of the warehouse.   

Even after the post-WWII decline in railroads, truck traffic was easily accommodated over nearby roads and later on the abutting Interstate 290 which was built in the late 1960’s.   

The original warehouse (called “A-building” in previous reports) was constructed in 1906, faced due north onto Franklin Street and bordered Arctic Street to the east. There were six storage levels as well as a basement. The building measured 88 feet by 88 feet and had over 7,000 square feet of floor space on each level. The warehouse had an approximate exterior height of 80 feet.   

An addition (called “B-building”) was constructed in 1912 against the west wall of A-building and measured 72 feet by 120 feet on the third floor and above. The 72 foot wall faced Franklin Street. The first and second floors were 88 foot and 101 foot deep respectively to accommodate railroad sidings and other structures on the southern on “C” side. Other investigations have referred to the former western exterior wall of A-building as “the fire wall” but there is no indication that this was a planned function. At least one opening was cut through this party wall on each level to access the new addition. B-building provided an additional 7,000 square feet of storage on the third floor and over 8,000 on floors four through six.   

The Worcester Cold Storage complex involved additional structures to the south, but these were physically separate buildings and were not involved in this incident. The known openings between the warehouse and the southern structures were for utilities and refrigerants. The only effect was to block aerial access from the south during the fire.   

  • Construction methods appear to be the same in both A and B buildings.
  • Exterior walls were 18 inches thick and consisted of brick and mortar. Interior floors on the first and second levels were poured concrete and were supported by cast iron columns.
  • The concrete was covered with carpet or asbestos tile where appropriate for use.
  • Upper floors were of heavy timber construction with 12 foot long 4 inch by 12 inch wood joists (16 inch o.c.) resting in pockets in the east and west brick exterior walls and attached to 16 inch by 16 inch wood girders on the inside.
  • The girders were on 12 foot centers and rested on 16 inch by 16 inch wood columns which were spaced 12 feet apart in both dimensions.
  • Flooring consisted of two layers of tongue and groove hardwood with some areas having an additional layer of 3/8 inch diamond plate.
  • Ceilings on individual floors varied from open joists in storage areas to be a suspended ceiling in the office area on the second floor.
  • Photographs taken prior to the fire suggest that some sections also had “glass board” as a finished surface. The exact make up of this material has not been determined.
  • No documentation was made of ceiling heights within the warehouse, but it appears they were approximately 11 foot throughout.
  • The roof was tar and gravel over a wood deck which covered a 4 foot tall cockloft above the sixth floor ceiling/roof assembly.
  • Roof penetrations included the stairway and elevator shaft on the east end of A-building and a skylight over the elevator shafts on B-building. An illuminated billboard sat on the roof of B-building and received power external to the warehouse structure.

NOTE: For the balance of this report the entire fire building will be referred to as the “warehouse” which consists of “A-building” on the east and “B-building” on the west. The A and B terminology was adopted early on in other investigations and should not be confused with fireground identifications of sides “A, B, C, & D”. In a large complex such as this, other terminology could have been created such as “Building 1”, “Building Z”, etc. (refer to the USFA Report for diagrams)   

BUILDING USE   

Worcester Cold Storage, a business, occupied the warehouse from 1906 until 1983 when it was sold to Chicago Dressed Beef. In 1987, CDB Realty Trust purchased the warehouse. CDB moved its operations to Millbrook Street in 1988 and shut down the refrigeration system in 1989 at which time the building was abandoned.   

During its use, various petroleum based insulation materials were incorporated into the building including rigid expanded polystyrene boards and blown on polyurethane foam. These were applied to improve the temperature performance of the buildings Additionally, condensation along the exterior walls lead to the decay of some floor joists. Steel beams or angle brackets were added against the brick walls to pick up the floor load in several places.   

  • Even to long term employees, the building was hard to navigate.
  • The upper four stories were almost identical, and some workers reported getting lost under the dim interior lighting conditions.
  • Condensation would cause ice to form around the ceiling fixtures, and this cone of ice would severely limit the amount of illumination.
  • There was no useful external light then or during the fire.

After it’s closing in 1989, the building was illegally entered on many occasions, resulting in vandalism, occupancy by homeless individuals, and a number of small “campfires.” At the time the fire occurred, there were no utility services in operation. Significant amounts of garbage and human wastes were scattered around the warehouse. The homeless woman involved in this incident said the interior smelled like a sewer.   

VERTICAL PENETRATIONS   

There were three stairways in the warehouse. Stairway 1 was in the northwest corner of B-building and went from the first floor (approximate street level) up to the second floor office area. Stairway 2 was located in the southern portion of B-building and went from the first floor to the third. It may have also accessed the basement. Stairway 3 was on the east side of A-building and ran from the basement to the roof. This was the only means of egress from the upper floors and was used heavily during the fire.   

Two elevators were adjacent to stairway 3, and two more were adjacent to Stairway 2. At the time of the fire, all had been disabled, and the cars were in the basement. It is unknown if individual access doors were open or closed. The elevator shaft in B-building had a reinforced glass canopy at the roof level.   

  • A 14 inch by 14 inch shaft penetrated the ceiling of the second floor office area and originally housed a 12 inch pipe for the ammonia recovery system.
  • This may have opened through all floors, and the presence of the pipe could not be confirmed.

HORIZONTAL PENETRATIONS   

There was one opening on each level through the party wall dividing A-building from B-building. There were numerous doors and windows on the first floor, and several were forced open by firefighters to gain access. All windows on this level were secured with plywood to prevent entry. Windows on the second floor of B-building were limited to the office area in the northwest section and were also covered with plywood. There was a window on each of the second, third, and fourth floors in stairway 3 on the east side of A-building. A window opened into the adjacent elevator shaft on each of these floors also. All were blocked with plywood.   

INTERIOR FINISH   

Because the warehouse was used for cold storage, the insides of exterior walls and the roof were heavily insulated. Barriers between office space and freezer space were also heavily insulated. The original material of choice was cork which was impregnated or secured with tar. The thickness has been described from 6 inches to 18 inches depending on the location. Evidence was also found of additional layers of expanded polystyrene sheets and blown on polyurethane. In many places the finished surface was “glass board”. A recovered piece of this glass board was ignited by Worcester Fire personnel after this incident. The sample sustained combustion and gave off stringy black smoke not unlike pure styrene.   

It was reported that all the interior partitions were made of corkboard, but it was probably a covering rather than a structural element. The office walls on the second floor were paneling installed over drywall. Many photographs of the cold storage areas taken before the fire show interior surfaces with a clean outer appearance consistent with the glass board. This would have provided a cleanable and wear resistant surface as opposed to bare cork or foam insulation.   

INTERIOR LAYOUT   

Since the fire did not extend to the basement or first floor, the layout of these spaces is less important. The first floor did, however, provide the access to the rest of the building for fire operations. All space above the first floor was used for cold storage or moving goods with the exception of the second floor office area on the northern half of B-building.   

  

    

 

  

What’s On Your Radar Screen?

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BuildingsonFire 2010; Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Operational Safety

Major Influencing Fire Service Reports, Issues or Focus that should be on Your Radar Screen

The following list is but a modest cross section of pertinent information or focus areas today’s Firefighter, Company or Command Officer MUST be knowledgeable in, have insights and proficiency based technical skills to function with a level of competencies demanded in  today’s  fire service.

If these are not on your radar screen or you haven’t got a blip of a clue what they’re about; then you are derelict and not doing your job- and the end result could be a less than desirable outcome on the fireground; it’s that simple, it’s that direct.

Have you read these reports, understand the issues & influences, increased your knowledge, skills and abilities in any gap areas or taken the time to research the cutting edge issues affecting today’s fire service?

The City of Charleston Sofa Super Store LODD-Routley Fire Report

Read the report; understand the incident, the building performance, the fire behavior and the operation process deployed. Gain the insights from the overall apparent and contributing causes identified and presented and assess how these relate to your fire service perspective and department’s culture and performance today.

  • City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team Phase I Report, HERE
  • Routley Final Phase II Report HERE
  • NIOSH Investigative Report, HERE
  • NIOSH REPORT SUMMARY
  • NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
  • develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for an occupational safety and health program in accordance with NFPA 1500
  • develop, implement, and enforce a written Incident Management System to be followed at all emergency incident operations
  • develop, implement, and enforce written SOPs that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
  • ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual with overall authority and responsibility for management of all activities at an incident
  • ensure that the Incident Commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior fire fighting operations
  • train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
  • ensure that the Incident Commander establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in fire-fighting efforts
  • ensure the early implementation of division / group command into the Incident Command System
  • ensure that the Incident Commander continuously evaluates the risk versus gain when determining whether the fire suppression operation will be offensive or defensive
  • ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
  • ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed at each structure fire
  • ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
  • ensure that a rapid intervention crew (RIC) / rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents
  • ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents
  • ensure that ventilation to release heat and smoke is closely coordinated with interior fire suppression operations
  • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics
  • consider establishing and enforcing standardized resource deployment approaches and utilize dispatch entities to move resources to fill service gaps
  • develop and coordinate pre-incident planning protocols with mutual aid departments
  • ensure that any offensive attack is conducted using adequate fire streams based on characteristics of the structure and fuel load present
  • ensure that an adequate water supply is established and maintained
  • consider using exit locators such as high intensity floodlights or flashing strobe lights to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit
  • ensure that Mayday transmissions are received and prioritized by the Incident Commander
  • train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure
  • ensure that all fire fighters and line officers receive fundamental and annual refresher training according to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021
  • implement joint training on response protocols with mutual aid departments
  • ensure apparatus operators are properly trained and familiar with their apparatus
  • protect stretched hose lines from vehicular traffic and work with law enforcement or other appropriate agencies to provide traffic control
  • ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression and overhaul activities
  • ensure that fire fighters are trained in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
  • develop, implement and enforce written SOPS to ensure that SCBA cylinders are fully charged and ready for use
  • use thermal imaging cameras (TICs) during the initial size-up and search phases of a fire
  • develop, implement and enforce written SOPs and provide fire fighters with training on the hazards of truss construction
  • establish a system to facilitate the reporting of unsafe conditions or code violations to the appropriate authorities
  • ensure that fire fighters and emergency responders are provided with effective incident rehabilitation
  • provide fire fighters with station / work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments.

Additionally, federal and state occupational safety and health administrations should:

  • consider developing additional regulations to improve the safety of fire fighters, including adopting National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus standards.

Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

  • continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn SCBA
  • conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.

Additionally, code setting organizations and municipalities should:

  • require the use of sprinkler systems in commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards, and establish retroactive requirements for the installation of fire sprinkler systems when additions to commercial buildings increase the fire and life safety hazards
  • require the use of automatic ventilation systems in large commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards.

Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:

  • coordinate the collection of building information and the sharing of information between building authorities and fire departments
  • consider establishing one central dispatch center to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions
  • ensure that fire departments responding to mutual aid incidents are equipped with mobile and portable communications equipment that are capable of handling the volume of radio traffic and allow communications among all responding companies within their jurisdiction.

Everyone Goes Home Campaign

  • Everyone Goes Home® is a national program by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries. In March 2004, a Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held to address the need for change within the fire service. At this summit, the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives were created and a program was born to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
  • Recognizing the need to do more to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation has launched a national initiative to bring prevention to the forefront.
  • In March 2004, the Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held in Tampa, Florida to address the need for change within the fire and emergency services. Through this meeting, 16 Life Safety Initiatives were produced to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
  • The first major action was to sponsor a national gathering of fire and emergency services leaders. The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation will play a major role in helping the U.S. Fire Administration meet its stated goal to reduce the number of preventable firefighter fatalities. The Foundation sees fire service adoption of the summit’s initiatives as a vital step in meeting this goal.
  • The Courage to Be Safe® On-Line Program , HERE
  • Media CenterUsing variations of the Courage to Be Safe ®…So Everyone Goes Home® field program, along with material from the Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resource Kit we will develop and deploy a new online learning segment each month. These online learning segments will allow you to expand upon your personal and professional development when you want and how you want. Watch them by yourself or integrate them into your organizational training programs. Remember, that safety results from constant training and putting those skills to work everyday, on every call – SO EVERYONE GOES HOME. HERE
  • The Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Advocates Program will play a key role in helping to bring about awareness of the Initiatives and act as a conduit for resources to enable departments to implement and advocate them. HERE
  • The 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives
    1. Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.
    2. Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.
    3. Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.
    4. All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
    5. Develop and implement national standards for training, qualifications, and certification (including regular recertification) that are equally applicable to all firefighters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
    6. Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that are equally applicable to all firefighters, based on the duties they are expected to perform.
    7. Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.
    8. Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety.
    9. Thoroughly investigate all firefighter fatalities, injuries, and near misses.
    10. Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement.
    11. National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should be developed and championed.
    12. National protocols for response to violent incidents should be developed and championed.
    13. Firefighters and their families must have access to counseling and psychological support.
    14. Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a critical fire and life safety program.
    15. Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the installation of home fire sprinklers.
    16. Safety must be a primary consideration in the design of apparatus and equipment.

NIST Wind Driven Fire Study

  • Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
  • What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented?  Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening.  If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants.  NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
  • This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions.  There are many questions regarding wind driven fires.  For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures?  Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires.  In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
  • Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
  • A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings.  All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set.  All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player.  NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
  • NIST References HERE and HERE

NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments

  • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
  • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
  • Reference Data HERE

NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments

  • The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments was recently released to the public providing . A copy of the report is attached.
  • Report Abstract:
  • Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.
  • This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.
  • This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.
  • Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.
  • The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
  • Synopsis HERE

USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002

  • Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
  • As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
  • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
  • Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies

UL Fire Academy CBT

  • UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions
  • Base on the UL research and
  • This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
  • This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This self-guided course, which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions, is targeted toward the 1.1 million fire service personnel in the United States and Canada. The knowledge developed and shared in this course is critically important to firefighter and civilian safety.
  • This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
  • Program Objectives:
  • Provide brief history of events leading up to DHS Grant tests
  • Identify the fire test hypothesis, parameters, and steps completed in the testing process
  • Compare tests results (legacy vs. modern construction)
  • Communicate learnings from our partners representing the fire service
  • Discuss code recommendations
  • UL University on-line Program HERE

USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002

  • Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
  • As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
  • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
  • Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies

NIOSH LODD Reports

  • Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
  • NIOSH Web Page HERE
  • Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
  • Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports, HERE

NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

  • Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
  • These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
  • Report HERE

NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors

  • Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
  • Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
  • NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
  • Report HERE

NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures

  • Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
  • The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
  • NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
  • ALERT Report HERE

National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience

  • The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
  • Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
  • National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
  • Search Reports, HERE
  • Resources, HERE

USFA Incident Reports (Stop History Repeating Events-HRE)

  • USFA provides information resources in many formats, including books, pamphlets and DVD’s, free of charge.
  • The U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire–the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are devel­oped to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.
  • The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announce­ments of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters
  • This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas.
  • The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made
  • Technical Reports and On-line Publications, HERE

Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report

  • The Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire and Rescue published a comprehensive line of duty death report for Technician I Kyle R. Wilson on Saturday, January 26, 2008. Technician I Wilson was the first line of duty death in the Department’s 41-year history. The Department is sharing the LODD Investigative Report to honor Kyle, and in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels.
  • Technician Kyle Robert Wilson was 24-years old and was born in Olney, Maryland. He grew up in Prince William County and graduated from Hylton High School and George Mason University. He was an avid baseball and softball player. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006. Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive.
  • Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure.
  • Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.
  • The Department of Fire and Rescue immediately formed a multi-dimensional investigation team following the incident. The investigation team was comprised of five Department of Fire and Rescue uniform personnel and two external members from area fire departments. For eight months, the team thoroughly examined the events that occurred at the Marsh Overlook fire incident and identify the factors involved with the line of duty death of Technician I Kyle Wilson. The resulting report represents thousands of hours of effort to analyze fire and rescue operations and is a factual representation of the events that occurred. The report also provides a frame work for organizational level improvements.
  • The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be:
    • The initial arriving fire suppression force size.
    • The size up of fire development and spread.
    • The impact of high winds on fire development and spread.
    • The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials.
    • The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts.
    • The incident control and management.
    • The Marsh Overlook fire incident was an immense fire fueled by extremely flammable building material products and a vicious wind. It was an environment where information gathering and decision making had to be performed in the time measurement of seconds. During the chain of events that occurred and under severe circumstances, fire and rescue personnel performed at exceptional levels.
  • During the repeated attempts to reach and rescue Technician I Wilson, personnel displayed heroic efforts and jeopardized their own safety. The Department will never forget the sacrifice that Technician Wilson made in an attempt to ensure others were safe. By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure his sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire and rescue departments can avoid another similar occurrence.
  • Resources and Report

Loudoun County (VA) Fire Rescue  Significant Near Miss Event Report

  • On May 25, 2008, fire and rescue personnel from Loudoun County responded to a structure fire at 43238 Meadowood Court in Leesburg, Virginia. During the course of the incident, seven responders were injured. Of those injured, four firefighters received significant burn injuries, two firefighters sustained orthopedic injuries, and one EMS provider was treated for minor respiratory distress. To date, five of the injured personnel have returned to duty. Two firefighters continue to recover from their injuries, including one who was severely burned.
  • Given the severity of the injuries and magnitude of the event, an independent Investigative Team was assembled to review the incident. The Team was comprised of four Loudoun County personnel, three external members from area fire departments, and two resource/support personnel. The Team was tasked with reviewing “the events leading up to the incident, the incident operation(s), the firefighter MAYDAY(s), and incident mitigation.”
  • For three months, the Team thoroughly examined the events surrounding the Meadowood Court fire incident and identified the factors associated with the injury of personnel.
  • The Report contains the results of the Investigative Team’s comprehensive review and analysis.
  • Fact Sheet, HERE
  • SIGNIFICANT INJURY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 43238 MEADOWOOD COURT MAY 25, 2008 Report HERE

Worcester (MA) Fire Cold Storage Fire LODD Report; Abandoned Cold Storage Warehouse Multi-Firefighter Fatality Fire 1999, Worcester, Massachusetts

  • A technical review of the 1999 Worcester, MA fire that claimed six firefighters concludes that abandoned buildings are a serious threat to firefighters and fire departments must make a concerted effort to use technology to maintain data on buildings in their response districts.
  • On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dis­patched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motor­ist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
  • Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors. Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.
  • An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.
  • A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and del­uge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts. According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities.
  • USFA Report HERE

Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department Final Report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels Nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths

  • The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter.  This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.
  • Incident Overview, HERE
  • NIOSH Report, HERE
  • Investigative Report, HERE

Field Trips

  • Take a good look at the structures, occupancies and  buildings in you first, second and third due areas, look around your community and jurisdiction as well as your mutual aid and greater alarm response box areas.
  • Have you stopped for a minute today and taken a good look around? Whether you’re sitting in the front seat at the stop light of an intersection or as you’re peering out the side cab window coming back from an alarm or while running errands in your POV; have you taken a good look around? As the Springsteen song goes; “this is your town”.
  • There’s a lot that can be gleaned from your surroundings on any given day. We sometimes take for granted the subtle changes that are happening all around us as we take care of business on our rounds, runs and calls. We tend to focus in on the immediacy of the events that are happening in front of us that demand our attention but fail to take a look around to pick up on information, data and insights that can help us on that next run or down the road in the future.
  • Take a look at the construction that might be going up in your areas. I’m certain you’re paying close attention to what’s happening in your first-due, but what about that third-due area, that neighboring jurisdiction or the mutual-aid area that you occasionally run in to? When you’re on that next EMS run or an investigation of an odor or alarm bells service call, take a few extra minutes to walk through the occupancy. Conduct your own mini company level pre-plan.
  • Look at the layout, features, access and construction features. If you have a chance, verify the structural support systems employed by the building for the floor and roof systems. If you have time, take the company on a quick site visit to that building that’s under construction or the renovations that are again underway in that commercial or business occupancy around the corner from quarters.
  • These continuing challenging economic times places a great deal of influence on what’s being built, how it might be constructed, the manner in which a building may be operational one day, vacant the other and under renovation the next. Sometimes these transformations occur literally overnight.
  • Take a good look around, this is your town…your district, your response area. Know your buildings, understand their performance profiles, and assess the predictability of performance. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Building Construction

I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must adjusted and enhanced to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a profound need to gain building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Its all about the new formula….Bk=F2S.

Additionally, think about the following

  • Don’t Treat Your Buildings and Occupancies the Same anymore
  • Increase Situational Awareness
  • Increase Your Competencies
  • Know Your Buildings
  • Be aware of Command Compression
  • Implement Tactical Patience
  • Tactical Entertainment
  • Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety
  • Fire Behavior & Fire Dynamics
  • Situational Awareness
  • Naturalistic Decision Making

More on these and some additional key reports on a future post…..

Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety

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Commandsafety.com is pleased to make available the latest update to the Buildingsonfire.com’s Building Construction Training and Lecture Series for 2010. Recently updated with a series of new seminar and training program topics addressing the emerging training and educational needs of the fire service, these programs provide timely and relevant information and insights on Building Construction, Command Risk Management, Dynamic and Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Situational Awareness, Engineered Structural Systems and Fire Fighter Safety.

These programs also present and integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and much more.  

These programs, lectures and seminars examine crucial construction elements and occupancy types and correlates building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety. These fast paced programs will utilize extensive multimedia materials, interactive activities, case study activities and simulations to reinforce course content and subject areas, providing exceptional learning opportunities.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)

Down load the program files from the link below for more information.

Building Construction Training Programs 2010

 

In Search of Tactical Patience

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Today commemorates the anniversary of the Sofa Superstore fire in Charleston, South Carolina, in which nine firefighters lost their lives while engaged in aggressive interior operations at a commercial building occupied and operating as a furniture store and warehouse. On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters and changed the lives of countless others. The incident galvanized the nation’s fire service and to this day continues to generate commentary and observations within wide latitude of functional areas. What has changed since that day, three years ago?

The publication of the Routley Report was a wake-up call to the fire service, but did we hit the snooze button and roll back over? Are we catching those extra forty winks at the expense of what we should be jumping out of our bunks and engaging in? If you haven’t taken the time to read the authoritative reports, now is the time to do so. Make it one of your definitive activities for the weekend. Reflect upon its insights, recommendations and suggestions and think about your organization, department or agency.

Stop and think about where the fire service is today; where is your department today? Any measurable changes that reflect the front page news of past events or reports? Or is it business as usual? More importantly; where are YOU today? What have you done based upon the lessons learned or insights expressed to make you a better prepared and knowledgeable firefighter, officer or commander?

During the past twelve months of travels around the country presenting programs on building construction and command risk management and firefighter safety, there continues to be a common thread within the Fire Service that resonates loudly (at times and in some regions); “were’ just not getting it”.  Dialog and discussion, ranting and challenges; sometimes on the verge of aggression and hostility at times continue to punctuate and permeate program conversation and debate. We argue about the merits of operational aggressiveness at the expense of looking (and understanding) the ways to increase our proficiency and knowledge that can translate into refined and intelligent tactical operations.

I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling. ( more on these in upcoming posts…)

Take the time today to remember and honor the Charleston Nine.

Comprehend the sacrifice and grasp the essence of our noble profession and the tradition of the Fire Service. Remember the past and learn from it and improve the future so that that the cycle of potential history repeating events is disrupted and eventually broken.

Work conscientiously and diligently to improve our profession and yourself; identifying gaps, correcting the deficiencies and improving the job, through a legacy of operational excellence and safety- for tomorrow’s firefighters.

Honor and Remembrance- The Charleston Nine

  • Bradford Rodney “Brad” Baity – Engineer 19
  • Theodore Michael Benke – Captain 16
  • Melvin Edward Champaign – Firefighter 16
  • James “Earl” Allen Drayton – Firefighter 19
  • Michael Jonathon Alan French – Engineer 5
  • William H. “Billy” Hutchinson, III – Captain 19
  • Mark Wesley Kelsey – Captain 5
  • Louis Mark Mulkey – Captain 15
  • Brandon Kenyon Thompson – Firefighter 5