Wind Driven Fires

Wind blowing into the broken window of a room on fire can turn a “routine room and contents fire” into a floor-to-ceiling firestorm. Historically, this has led to a significant number of firefighter fatalities and injuries, particularly in high-rise buildings where the fire must be fought from the interior of the structure.

Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House in Texas, 2009

On April 12, 2009, a fire in a one-story ranch home in Texas claimed the lives of two fire fighters.  (NIOSH REPORT HERE) Sustained high winds occurred during the incident.  The winds caused a rapid change in the dynamics of the fire after the failure of a large section of glass in the rear of the house. 

Wind Driven Fire in Home, Texas, 2009. Aerial view of damage to the structure. Photo credit: Houston Fire Department.

NIST performed computer simulations of the fire using the Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS)  and Smokeview, a visualization tool, to provide insight on the fire development and thermal conditions that may have existed in the residence during the fire.

The FDS simulation that best represents the witnessed fire conditions indicates that the fire that spread throughout the attic and first floor developed a wind driven flow with temperatures in excess of 260 °C (500 °F) between the den and front door.  The critical event in this fire was the creation of a wind-driven flow path between the upwind side of the structure and the exit point on the downwind side of the structure, the front door.  The flow path was created by the failure of a large span of windows in the den, in the rear of the structure.  Floor-to-ceiling temperatures rapidly increased in the flow path where multiple crews were performing interior operations.  In a simulation that excluded wind, the flow path was not created, and the thermal environment surrounding the location of interior operations was improved.

Still image from FDS simulation.  Temperatures at 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor throughout the house 10 s after solarium failure. Image credit: NIST.

Wind has been recognized as a contributing factor to fire spread in wildland fires and large-area conflagrations and wildland fire fighters are trained to account for the wind in their tactics.  While structural fire departments have recognized the impact of wind on fires, in general, the standard operating guidelines for structural fire fighting have not changed to address the hazards created by a wind driven fire inside a structure.  The results of the “no-wind” and “wind” fire simulations demonstrate how wind conditions can rapidly change the thermal environment from tenable to untenable for fire fighters working in a single-story residential structure fire.

The simulation results emphasize the importance of including wind conditions in the scene size-up before beginning and while performing fire fighting operations and adjusting tactics based on the wind conditions.  These results are in agreement with NIST studies conducted to examine wind driven fire conditions in high-rise structures.

LESSONS  LEARNED

Based on the analysis of this fire incident and results from previous studies, adjusting fire fighting tactics to account for wind conditions in structural fire fighting is critical to enhancing the safety and the effectiveness of fire fighters.  Previous studies demonstrated that applying water from the exterior, into the upwind side of the structure can have a significant impact on controlling the fire prior to beginning interior operations.  It should be made clear that in a wind-driven fire, it is most important to use the wind to your advantage and attack the fire from the upwind side of the structure, especially if the upwind side is the burned side.  Interior operations need to be aware of potentially rapidly changing conditions.

See full report, Simulation of the Dynamics of a Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House – Texas (NIST TN 1729, January 2012)

F2009-11

Apr 12, 2009

Career probationary fire fighter and captain die as a result of rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire – Texas

PDF

Career Probationary Fire Fighter and Captain Die as a Result of Rapid Fire Progression in a Wind-Driven Residential Structure Fire – Texas

SUMMARY

Shortly after midnight on Sunday, April 12, 2009, a 30-year old male career probationary fire fighter and a 50-year old male career captain were killed when they were trapped by rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire. The victims were members of the first arriving company and initiated fast attack offensive interior operations through the front entrance. Less than six minutes after arriving on-scene, the victims became disoriented as high winds pushed the rapidly growing fire through the den and living room areas where interior crews were operating. Seven other fire fighters were driven from the structure but the two victims were unable to escape. Rescue operations were immediately initiated but had to be suspended as conditions deteriorated. The victims were located and removed from the structure approximately 40 minutes after they arrived on location.

Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: an inadequate size-up prior to committing to tactical operations; lack of understanding of fire behavior and fire dynamics; fire in a void space burning in a ventilation controlled regime; high winds; uncoordinated tactical operations, in particular fire control and tactical ventilation; failure to protect the means of egress with a backup hose line; inadequate fireground communications; and failure to react appropriately to deteriorating conditions.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

• ensure that an adequate initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene is conducted before beginning interior fire fighting operations
• ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior (such as smoke color, velocity, density, visible fire, heat)
• ensure that fire fighters are trained to recognize the potential impact of windy conditions on fire behavior and implement appropriate tactics to mitigate the potential hazards of wind-driven fire
• ensure that fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively apply ventilation and fire control tactics in a coordinated manner
• ensure that fire fighters and officers understand the capabilities and limitations of thermal imaging cameras (TIC) and that a TIC is used as part of the size-up process
• ensure that fire fighters are trained to check for fire in overhead voids upon entry and as charged hoselines are advanced
• develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to insure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday
• ensure fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures
• ensure all fire fighters on the fire ground are equipped with radios capable of communicating with the Incident Commander and Dispatch

Additionally, research and standard setting organizations should:

• conduct research to more fully characterize the thermal performance of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece lens materials and other personal protective equipment (PPE) components to ensure SCBA and PPE provide an appropriate level of protection.
• Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation could have specifically prevented the fatalities, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments:
• ensure that all fire fighters recognize the capabilities and limitations of their personal protective equipment when operating in high temperature environments.

The Chicago Fire Department: Everyone Goes Home

NFFF News Release: In an effort to  make personal safety a  top priority, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) and the Chicago Fire Department (CFD) today released a new video, Chicago Fire Department – Everyone  Goes Home®.  Members of the CFD and families of fallen firefighters share their stories in this compelling and moving testimonial of the importance of adhering to safety standards and accepting personal responsibility for following procedures.

Chicago Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff was impressed by a video that the NFFF and the Fire Department of New York produced several years earlier to educate members about the importance of training and safety standards. The FDNY leadership had noticed behavioral improvement among its members following the release of their video. Hoff felt that the members of the CFD could benefit from hearing first-hand accounts of the lessons learned by their colleagues and invited the NFFF to collaborate on a video for Chicago.

“The culture of firefighting requires us to do everything we can to make sound decisions so we can be in a position to help the people we serve when they most need it,” said Ronald J. Siarnicki, executive director of the NFFF. “With this video the firefighters and leadership of the Chicago Fire Department are clearly showing the rest of the fire service you can still be a firefighter and at the same time do your best to make sure Everyone Goes Home®.”

Direct Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vODww1qwSuE

The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) and the Chicago Fire Department (CFD) released a new safety video, Chicago Fire Department – Everyone Goes Home®, to help raise awareness of personal safety in the fire service. Nearly two dozen members of the CFD and survivors of fallen firefighters share their stories.  See the video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vODww1qwSuE

Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse

Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building.

Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement.

The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.  

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

• Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
• Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
• Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
• Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
• Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
• Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
• Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
• Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
• Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
• Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
• Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
• Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.

The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.

There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.

This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

• USFA Report; HERE
• NFPA Summary; HERE
• NFPA Report Order; HERE 
• Issues related to recent trends in floor collapse incidents, HERE

Remembering

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

Buffalo Box 191

As Buffalo (NY) firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III Ordinary and Type IV Heavy Timber construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically.

The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5′s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1′s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32′s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.

Previously posted on Thecompanyofficer.com HERE

• Remember to think about occupancy risk and not occupancy type and the factors related to the occupancy usage and the nature of the call. Nothing is ever routine.
• WKBW.com Cached video clip, HERE
• Buffalo, NY Propane Gas Explosion, Dec 1983, HERE
• Propane blast death affects son of fireman, HERE and HERE
• PROPANE EXPLOSION 25th  ANNIVERSARY IN BUFFALO,NEW YORK, HERE
• New York Times, HERE and HERE
• Rememberance, HERE and History Repeating Events, HERE
• Insights from Mike Lombardo, HERE
• http://www.wivb.com/dpp/news/buffalo/Firefighters-remember-North-Division-Street-explosion

I’ve been absent a while attending to what was a totally unexpected medical emergency that significantly impacted our family with all of my attention focused in another direction.

My great Dad passed away this past Sunday. Behind all of us, we have or have had those special family members; parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents, wives, husbands, aunts, uncles, cousins, extended family, significant others, life partners and special friends-the list can go on, that have had a significance in our lives and in what we endeavor to do each and every day.  You know who I might be referring to.

My father worked very, very hard his entire life and exemplified many of life’s attributes and provided a wealth of examples to learn from in life’s journey. He was an extremely humble man, who lived out his life quietly in the hometown in which he was born. He was the youngest of eight children (four sisters and three brothers) and the son of Greek immigrants who settled in America in the early 1900’s. He was a veteran of World War II, a restaurateur and an executive chef, eventually settling  into the role of grandfather and great grandfather. He loved the Yankees, Syracuse University sports and my Mom. He was my Dad.

Being as fortunate to graciously and humbly do what I do; I want to celebrate my Dad’s quiet life, his life’s lessons, the love he gave so freely and his passing in a way he never would have considered, much less allowed.  I wanted to share with you a glimpse of one simple quiet man, unlike so many others like him all around us. Thanks Dad for everything, for helping to make me who I am today and for having the chance to say goodbye. I love you.

John "Johnnie" Naum 1928-2011

Without being presumptuous; Take some time to reflect upon the true meaning of this holiday season and in what and how you might celebrate. Think about who and what is really important in our respective lives and all the people who are behind us, around us, and with us-both physically and spiritually.  Stay safe.

Firefighters rush into a burning commercial building with too-small hoses and insufficient water. The commander can’t reach them because the captain forgot his radio. Backup crews aren’t sure where to go or what to do. Confusion reigns as the building’s truss roof collapses in an explosion of flames.

This reads like the playbook from the deadly Sofa Super Store fire in June 2007, but it’s not. These dangerous missteps occurred at a March 1 blaze on Daniel Island, according to an internal report obtained by The Post and Courier.

They occurred despite nearly four years of intensive and expensive efforts to instill a culture of safety in the Charleston Fire Department.

What’s more, the commander in charge that day — a man repeatedly faulted in the in-house review of the blaze — was recently promoted to a top position in the department. And that’s causing some dissension in the ranks.

City fire officials stand behind their promotion of Troy Williams to battalion chief, and they said the portion of the draft report that leaked to the newspaper is incomplete, unfair, unofficial and riddled with inaccuracies.

Fire Chief Thomas Carr acknowledged problems at the fire, which gutted a two-story office building at 899 Island Park Drive. That’s why he authorized a six-member committee of firefighters to conduct what’s known as a critical incident review. But Carr said he rejected the resulting draft report when it landed on his desk six weeks ago because it had errors and failed to live up to its intended purpose, which is to be an educational tool, not an instrument for blame.

The 12-page portion obtained by the The Post Courier newspaper describes “major” violations of policy and assigns blame for those mistakes. It raises questions about the handling of the blaze, the effectiveness of the training firefighters have received and the integrity of the promotion process.

It also highlights the continuing conflict between the department’s hard-charging past and its new, risk-sensitive methods.

• For the Complete Full version Article: The Post and Courier HERE
• SConfire HERE
• Draft Fire Report-Read more: Fire report

High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year
  

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is reporting that in 2005-2009, there were an average of 15,700 reported structure fires in high-rise buildings per year with an associated $235 million in direct property damage.

The report, “High-Rise Building Fires,” (PDF, 499 KB) cites apartments, hotels, offices, and facilities that care for sick as accounting for roughly half of all high-rise fires. Structure fires in these four property classes resulted in $99 million in direct property damage per year.

There is a downward trend in high-rise fires. In the last few decades, a range of special provisions have migrated into the codes and standards for tall buildings.

Other findings from the report:

• In 2005-2009, high-rise fires claimed the lives of 53 civilians and injured 546 others, per year.
• The risks of fire, fire death, and direct property damage due to fire tend to be lower in high-rise buildings than in shorter buildings of the same property use.
• An estimated three percent of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.
• Usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings of the same property use.Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story.  The risk of a fire is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

 In 2005-2009, an estimated 15,700 reported high-rise structure fires per year resulted in associated losses of 53 civilian deaths, 546 civilian injuries, and $235 million in direct property damage per year. An estimated 2.6% of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.

The trends in high-rise fires and associated losses (inflation-adjusted for property damage) are clearly down, but the sharp post-1998 reduction appears to be mostly due to the change to NFIRS Version 5.0, which is shifting estimates to lower levels that also appear to be more accurate.

Four property classes account for roughly half of high-rise fires: apartments, hotels, facilities that care for the sick, and offices. In 2005-2009, in these four property classes combined, there were 7,800 reported high-rise structure fires per year and associated losses of 30 civilian deaths, 352 civilian injuries, and $99 million in direct property damage per year. The property damage average is inflated by the influence of one 2008 hotel fire, whose $100 million loss projected to nearly $40 million a year in the analysis.

The report emphasizes these four property classes.

Some other property uses – such as stores and restaurants – may represent only a single floor in a tall building primarily devoted to other uses. Some property uses – such as grain elevators and factories – can be as tall as a high-rise building but without a large number of separate floors or stories.

• For these reasons, the four property use groups listed above define most of the buildings we think of as high-rise buildings, and their fires come closest to defining what we think of as the high-rise building fire problem.
• By most measures of loss, the risks of fire and of associated fire loss are lower in highrise buildings than in other buildings of the same property loss.
• This statement applies to risk of fire, civilian fire deaths, civilian fire injuries, and direct property damage due to fire, relative to housing units, for apartments, and risk of fire for hotels, offices, and facilities that care for the sick.

The usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings, for each property use group. Even so, considering the extensive requirements in NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, for fire and life safety features in both new and existing high-rise buildings, it seems clear that there are still major gaps, particularly in adoption and enforcement of the provisions requiring retrofit of automatic sprinkler systems and other life safety systems in existing high-rise buildings. NFPA 1®,Fire Code, has sprinkler retrofit requirements.

This has implications for public officials and ordinary citizens in any city. Public officials should make sure that the latest editions of NFPA 1®, Fire Code, and NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, are in place and that the codes they have are supported by effective code enforcement provisions, including plan review and inspection processes, both for new construction and for continued supervision of code compliance in existing buildings.

The public can take responsibility for their own safety by insisting that their public officials take these steps. As in so many areas of fire safety, we know what to do, but we still need to do it.

The trend had been toward a smaller share of fires being reported each year as occurring in buildings with fire-resistive construction, both for high-rise and other buildings, with the decline being most dramatic in facilities that care for the sick.

• This statistical decline could reflect any or all of the following:
• (a) a shift in construction between the two types permitted by codes, from Type I (442 or 332) construction, which is coded as fire-resistive, to Type II (222) construction, which is coded as protected non-combustible;
• (b) a shift to acceptable alternative designs using more sprinklers and less fire-resistive construction; or
• (c) enough success in containing fires that a rising fraction never are reported to fire departments, because the fires are caught and controlled so early by occupants.

 Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The fraction of 2005-

2009 high-rise fires that began on the 7th floor or higher was 32% for apartments, 22% for hotels and motels, 21% for facilities that care for the sick, and 39% for office buildings. The risk of a fire start is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

• High-rise apartments have a slightly larger share of their fires originating in means of egress than do their shorter counterparts (4% vs. 3%).
• The same is true of hotels (7% vs. 5%) and facilities that care for the sick (6% vs. 4%).
• In offices (4% vs. 6%), the differences in percentages are in the opposite direction, which means that high-rise buildings in those properties have a smaller share of their fires originating in means of egress.
• In all four property classes, the differences are so small that one can say there is no evidence that high-rise buildings have a bigger problem with fires starting in means of egress.

NFPA FACT SHEET

• More information on Solomon’s NFPA session and the conference can be found at www.nfpa.org/FLSCONF.
• NFPA Report Download, HERE

State investigators have cited the San Francisco Fire Department for “serious” worker safety violations in the deaths of two firefighters killed battling a Diamond Heights house fire in June. Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE  and HERE.

 Firefighters lost track of Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, after they went into the four-level home at 133 Berkeley Way on June 2 and failed to respond quickly to the men’s last radio communication, investigators with the state Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health said in a report issued Monday.

In recommending that the Fire Department be fined $21,000, the state investigators also said the department had violated state rules requiring that two firefighters be designated outside to assist any two firefighters who venture into a life-threatening environment.

Only one firefighter from Perez and Valerio’s engine company – the first on the scene – was available to come to their help during the blaze, the investigation found.

The state also cited the Fire Department for an incident – evidently before the fatal flareup – in which an unidentified battalion chief ventured into the burning building alone, without keeping in contact with Perez and Valerio. That was also deemed a serious violation of safety rules.

“These are serious in that they had protocols in place, but they weren’t following them,” said Erika Monterroza, spokeswoman for the worker safety agency. “There’s no question that a lack of communications was a big issue here. The investigator found there was a breakdown there.”

Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White said the department would appeal the findings. She said state officials have told her commanders that the violations fell short of finding the department’s actions responsible for the two firefighters’ deaths. “None of the citations involved a direct cause of the line-of-duty deaths,” Hayes-White said. Monterroza confirmed that, saying the exact circumstances of the firefighters’ deaths could not be determined.

Valerio, Perez and a third member of Engine Company 26 in Diamond Heights were the first firefighters to arrive at the mid-morning blaze, which started when a sparking electrical outlet set curtains on fire.

The third firefighter manned the pumper hose while Valerio and Perez went inside to fight the fire, but the safety regulations require a fourth firefighter to be available outside to assist.

A scene commander, identified by firefighters as Battalion Chief Thomas Abbott, ordered a crew from Engine Company 24 to back up Valerio and Perez inside the building. For several minutes, however, scene commanders tried to find the Engine 26 firefighters, without success.

There was an unspecified gap between that last communication and any effort by firefighters to respond over the radio or track down the men, the state investigation found.

The reports goes on to state that Hayes-White said the department’s investigative report – still in draft form – concluded that the fire had melted one of the firefighters’ microphone cords, cutting off communications. She said any delay in firefighters’ response would be addressed in the final report.

Firefighters ultimately found Perez and Valerio in a landing area and carried the injured men outside. Perez was pronounced dead at San Francisco General Hospital, and Valerio died there two days later.

The state probe also faulted the actions of the unnamed battalion chief who went into the building “alone and also did not remain in contact with the firefighters who were inside.”

Hayes-White said the battalion chief had gone inside only briefly, had seen Perez and Valerio alive and had never been out of other firefighters’ view.

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/02/BANQ1M7JBO.DTL#ixzz1fUEug7hu

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

• 2nd San Francisco Firefighter Dies After Diamond Heights Fire
• San Francisco FD: The Diamond Heights Fire Updates
• Flags at the NFFF Memorial; SFFD LODD

Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.   

For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.   

The Worcester Six;   

• Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
• Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
• Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
• Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
• Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
• Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine

On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.   

• From last year’s posting and links here at CommandSafety.com: HERE
• • Take at look at The Worcester Telegram & Gazette which has an archived webpage; http://www.telegram.com/static/fire/video.html
  • Derelict buildings marked after Mass. LODDs
  • Haunting memories spurred Mass. chief to positive action
  • Special 10 Year Anniversary Coverage HERE
  • NIOSH REPORT HERE
  • USFA REPORT HERE

Bridging The Gap: Fire Safety and Green Buildings Guide

A Fire and Safety Building Guide to Green Construction

The National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) has released its fire and building safety guide to green construction called “Bridging the Gap: Fire Safety and Green Buildings.” This guide identifies some of the key areas where rapidly growing green building construction issues coincide with building and fire safety needs.

“This guide will give both the fire service and the green construction community a reference point for developing buildings and sites that are not only environmentally sound, but also continue to meet fire safety needs,” said NASFM President Alan Shuman. “This will provide a much-needed reference on issues that impact the life safety of building occupants, emergency responders and the larger community.”

Included are topical areas such as Site Selection and Use, Building Envelope and Design Attributes, and Building Systems and Alternative Power Sources. A key feature of the guide is a series of checklists focusing on plan reviews for commercial and residential occupancies. This document is meant as an introductory guide for fire chiefs and firefighters, building and fire code enforcement officials, architects and anyone involved in building design, plan reviews and construction.

Click here to download a copy of the guide, which was developed for NASFM by Jim Tidwell of Tidwell Code Consulting, with Jack Murphy, as part of a larger program under a Department of Homeland Security Fire Prevention and Safety Grant.

Direct Link:  http://www.firemarshals.org/programs/green-buildings-fire-safety-project/guide/

http://www.firemarshals.org/