A fire in a three story multiple family apartment building injured four City of Chicago (IL) firefighters when an interior stairway collapsed during firefighting operations.
The building was constructed in 1927 and consisted of 5456 square feet of space with 3-5 apartment units. Built of masonry wall construction with a wood floor joist system, the fire was reported at 8:43 a.m., in the Type III classified occupancy.
Street View Pre-Fire
The fire began as a basement fire that travelled up two floors, eventually compromising an upper stairway which resulted in compromise and collapsed injuring four Chicago firefighters.
The inherent characteristics of the building and the manner of fire travel and impingement are apparent contributors to the event.
Aerial- Alpha; Goggle Maps
CFD Fireground Operations: Photo Tim Olk
The four firefighters sustained injures during operations when the internal stairwell connecting the second and third floors gave way.
The mayday was transmitted, and a 211 Plan 1 at approximately 09:00 hrs., seventeen minutes into the operation according to published reports issued by Deputy District Chief Lynda Turner. Following the mayday and firefighter removals, defensive operations were initiated.
Two of the firefighters sustained smoke inhalation and two firefighters minor injuries, according to Fire Department officials.
A large warehouse fire in a 211,000 SF complex resulted from from a transformer explosion this morning at the Wix Distribution Center in Gastonia, NC. The building complex was a former textile mill and was built in 1917.
Published report indicate that more than 60 firefighters operated at the scene to control the fire.
It was reported that Fire Chief Phillip Welch stated firefighters started fighting the fires inside the building after the transformer explosion occurred, but it quickly got out of control.“There was an aggressive attack inside, but just because of the storage fight, we were not able to overcome that nor was the sprinkler system,” Welch said.
How prepared is your department for a large scale fire in a large footprint warehouse?
Have you completed pre-fire plans, walk through tours and table top exercises for the key at risk buildings or complexes?
Do you know what the sustained water flow requirements might be for a heavily or fully involved complex or building?
Practices and honed your skills on establishing and managing a complex, multi-operatonal period incident?
Have you looked at creating box alarms or pre-arranged greater alarm response and resource requests?
Have you trained with the departments, jurisdictions and companies that might respond?
Do you have strategies and tactics identified and have you trained on them for operations in large scale buildings? Don’t implment and treat the incident like you would a residential or small commercial fire….
Respect the building and predict with conservative decision-making
Manage and expect compromise and collapse, rapid fire extention and operational challenges to fixed suppression systems and protectivies
Don’t over extend companies while attmtping to operate in the interior: These are typcially closed building ( lack of immedate exiting capabilties) with a special need for air management and accountability and access control.
FDNY Bronx 66-33-2224 Third Alarm at 225 E 149th Street;
A three-alarm blaze tore through a South Bronx building on Saturday morning — leaving at least 37 people, including a child, hurt, according to published reports. The fire started on the fifth floor of the 27-story E. 149th St. building near Park Ave. about o7:40 a.m. More than 135 firefighters were operating. News media is reporting taht the fire was under control in a two hour time span. Fire officials say 37 people suffered injuries as a result of a three-alarm fire Saturday morning at a 27-story building in the Bronx.
From NYC Fire Wire on Facebook
There are almost 500 apartments in the building, along with more than 20 stores. Video Clip and FDNY Interview HERE
The Predictability of Building Performance must take into consideration that in the context of today’s fire ground, buildings and fire dynamics, small changes on initial compartment or structure conditions may often produce and result in large-scale or magnitude changes that affect the long term outcome of the incident.
We have assumed that the routiness or successes of past operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past construction systems, occupancies and building types; therefore the risk assessment and size-up process, and resulting strategies and tactics must adapt to address these evolving rules of combat structural fire engagement that challenge anecdotal practices and methodologies.
Today’s evolving fireground demands greater adaptive insights and management with an amplified understanding of buildings, occupancy risk profiling (ORP) and building anatomy by all operating companies on the fireground; demanding greater skill sets and knowledge of building construction, architecture, engineering, fire dynamics and fire suppression methodologies.
The equation for success rests directly on Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
Don’t be complacent based on alarm type, building or occupancy type…expect fire, be prepared and understand the predictability of building performance. It should not be a surprise upon arrival of the first-due.
Some Training Aide Links from past Ten Minutes in the Streets
Ten Minutesin the Street A Buildingsonfire.com SeriesExecutive Producer: Christopher Naum, SFPE Ten Minutes in the Street; bringing you insightful and provoking street scenarios for the discriminating and perspective Firefighter, Company Officer and Commander; where you make the call. You don’t have to have any special rank to participate in this interactive forum, just the desire to learn and expand you knowledge, skills and abilities in order to better yourself, create new insights, while sharing your experience and perspectives to help you and others in the street in making the right call; so everyone has the opportunity of going home. Access the Series on Buildingsonfire.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com Don’t forget to access CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com . Buildingsonfire is also on Facebook.
Ten Minutes in the Street; Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due, HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street; “But it’s only a Garage..!”,HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street: “I Hear Ya Knockin’, But Nobody’s Home”
Fire in Syracuse: Four firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978
April 9th marks the 35th anniversary of the 701 University Ave. fire that claimed the lives of four Syracuse (NY) firefighters in 1978 while conducting search & rescue and suppression operations at an apartment building on the Syracuse University Campus, in Syracuse, New York.
The fire began when one of the tenants lit a candle in a styrofoam wig stand and left it unattended. At 00:46 hours on Sunday April 9, 1978, an alarm of fire was transmitted for a reported building fire at 701 University Avenue on the campus of Syracuse University.
The Victorian style house was a three story building constructed of wood balloon framing and was built circa 1898. The house had been converted into ten (10) apartments that were occupied by SU students. The gross area of each of the three floors was approx. 1,750 sq. ft., with a predominate rectangular footprint shape measuring 69 ft. x 35 ft. The third floor apartments only had access via a stairway in the rear, down a long narrow corridor that measured only 33 inches wide.
Post Fire View of Building from Bravo Side. Photo CJ Naum, 1978
The building had inherent vertical and horizontal concealed spaces indicative of balloon frame style construction along with additional concealed spaces in the third floor ceiling area. A partial automatic sprinkler system had been installed in the building in order to comply with a 1952 State of New York law. This system provided protection to the basement, means of egress, a storage area and a portion of the concealed space above the third floor.
The fire originated in a second floor apartment, and then spread into the combustible concealed space above the third floor ceiling. Approximately sixteen minutes into fireground operations the first indications of firefighting personnel being in distress were received. The first call to the Alarm center was made at 0045:17 hrs., with the first-due engine arriving at 0048:05 and first water applied at 0051 (est).
The four SFD fire fighters, Frank Porpiglio Jr., Stanley Duda, Michael Petragnani, and Robert Schuler, who were assigned to the Squad and Rescue Companies, entered the house to conduct a primary search of the premises for SU students thought to be trapped in the house.
While operating on the third floor inside, a scalding steam caused by triggered sprinklers prevented the four firefighters from escaping, and they eventually depleted their air supply and suffocated to death. The firefighters were operating with full PPE that was complaint at that time ( 1978) and were utilizing state-of-the art SCBA in the form of the new 4.5 SCBA systems. All the tenants had escaped safely before the fire fighters had entered the house. The fire was subsequently investigated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) at the request of the City of Syracuse and NFPA Report No. LS-3 was published.
Syracuse Post Standard Front Page April 10, 1978
Killed in the Line of Duty on April 9th, 1978:
Syracuse (NY) Fire Department
FF Michael Petragnani, Age 27. ~ Rescue Company – appointed 8/20/1973
FF Frank Porpiglio Jr., Age 24. ~ Squad Company – appointed 8/20/1973
FF Robert Shuler, Age 31. ~ Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973
FF Stanley Duda, Age 34. ~ Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973
Remembrance, Honor, Courage and Sacrifice
Never Forgotten
Post Fire View, East Adams Street and University Ave. Photo: CJ Naum, 1978
Martin J. Whitman School of Management stands today at the corner, Photo CJ Naum, 2013
Memorial Plaque placed in 2005 in the Martin J. Whitman School of Management located on the site of 1978 fire. Photo: CJ NAum, 2013
Remembering the Sacrafice: Capt. Broxterman and FF Schira
On Friday, April 4, 2008 at 06:13:02 hours, what began as a routine response for Colerain Township Fire and EMS Engine 102 to investigate a fire alarm activation at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane, Colerain Township, Ohio resulted in the deaths of Colerain Township Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira.
Upon their arrival at the scene of the two-story wood framed, residential building working fire conditions existed in the basement. The initial attack team consisted of Broxterman, Schira, and one other firefighter. The team advanced a 1¾-inch attack hose line through the interior of the building for fire control.
Even though, they were provided with some of the most technologically advanced protective clothing for structural firefighting and self-contained breathing apparatus, it appeared that Broxterman and Schira were overwhelmed by severe fire conditions in the basement.
During their attempt to evacuate the building, the main-level family room flooring system in which the two were traveling on collapsed into the basement trapping the firefighters. Eleven minutes elapsed from time of arrival to the catastrophic chain of events.
This is one of those distinctive reports that has influential and critical operational, training and preparedness elements embedded throughout the report.
It’s apparent there continues to be common threads shared by this event from 2008 and other events and incidents in the past five years where a single of multiple firefighters have lost their lives due to similarities in the apparent and common cause deficiencies and short comings identified.
All company and command officers should read and comprehend the lessons learned. Then, take these new found insights and see what the gaps are at the personal level (yours or those you supervise) as well as the shift, group, station, battalion, division or department as a whole.
If there are gaps, then identify a way to implement timely changes as necessary so there are No History Repeating (HRE) events.
The importance of Reading the Building, taking the time to complete the three sixty and being combat ready and “expecting fire”.
Remember their sacrifice, so we can learn.
Past Post on CommandSafety.com with Report Narrative and Incident DetailsHERE
The following factors were believed to have directly contributed to the deaths of Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira:
A delayed arrival at the incident scene that allowed the fire to progress significantly;
A failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices; and
A failure to abide by fundamental firefighter self-rescue and survival concepts
Although the aforementioned factors were believed to have directly contributed to their deaths, they might have been prevented if:
Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident;
Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators;
The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
timely manner relative to the incident;
Personnel assigned to Engine 102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their first-due response area;
A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis
was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations;
Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural
firefighting existed within the department;
The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time;
The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions;
Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.
References
Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Web Site HERE
Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths April, 2010 Full Report HERE
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
Was working on an LODD report and came across a past notable incident that occurred over 32 years ago, that should be recognized, for many of you that may not of heard or read about it previous to this.
Here’s an intro and a link to the LAFD January 28, 1981 incident;
On January 28, 1981, at 3:33 a.m, a full alarm assignment was dispatched to Cugees Restaurant,5300 Lankershim Boulevard, in the North Hollywood area.
Firefighters found heavy smoke with some fire showing in the interior of the restaurant.
Because a back draft explosion was a distinct possibility and because the smoke had to be cleared in order to begin a meaningful fire attack, ventilation procedures were begun on the roof.
Four members of Truck 60 were cutting a hole near the center of the roof when, without warning, it began to sink beneath their feet. One firefighter described the sensation as similar to standing on the deck of a rapidly listing ship. As the roof sank, it fell at a steep angle, slowly and agonizingly pulling Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor to his death.
In Memory of Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor Truck Company 60 B Platoon
Appointed July 22, 1973
Died January 28, 1981
Died of burns in roof collapse at arson fire.
Cugee’s Restaurant
5300 Lankershim Boulevard
There’s a tremendous lack of understanding in the American Fire Service as to what accurately defines and comprises a Heavy Timber Bowstring Truss and the Operational and Safety Precautions that must be recognized, implemented and trained on, in order to achieve and maintain operational excellence, company integrity and firefighter safety on the fireground.
All bowstring trusses are not created equal and do not share the same characteristics when found in a building and occupancy.
They may have the same shape, but shape alone does not define the bowstring truss.
Based on the type, design, construction, materials, age, span, spacing, configuration, occupancy and application there are vast differences AND similarities.
There are significant differences in terminology when referring to them and tactics that should be employed on the fireground- and yes there are prominent differences between east coast and west coast types and tactics.
The Bowstring Truss- They are not All the Same
Do you know what they are?
I’m working on an article series for a major fire service publication with on-line accompaniments that will provide uniformity and clarity on the subject and the much needed continuity so were’ talking the same language.For the mean time let me offer the following terms that some of you may be familiar with – in your world. Here are some Bowstring Type Truss terms:
The Heavy Timber Bowstring Truss,
Arch-Rib Bowstring Truss,
Laminate Cord Bowstring Truss,
Lattice Bowstring Truss,
Easybow Truss,
Mack Truss,
Summerbell Bowstring Truss,
Mono-chord Bowstring Truss
Duo-Chord Bowstring Truss,
Segmental Multi-Cord Bowstring Truss,
Tension Rod Bowstring Truss,
Bowstring Arch Truss,
Bowstring K-Truss,
Split-Ring Bowstring Truss…..to name a few.
We’ll be posting lots more on this on CommandSafety.com as well as expanded coverage on Buildingsonfire.com …. Stay Tuned
Vacant Structure Fire-Three Alarm, Type III Construction
Identifying, Establishing and Managing Collapse Zones
I mentioned in a recent post about on-going research and recommendations being developed for a significant report.
A notable issue that seems to resonate and surface on a reoccurring bais is the identification, establishment and management of collapse zones.
Building type, construction systems and materials, initiating, apparent or contributIng factors have an influence on collapse zone management (CZM).
Perimeter wall compromise and collapse of Type III and IV buildings continue to represent the leading types of collapse that contribute to significant firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.
The ability to Read the Building, identify obvious and subtle features, conditions and indicators leading to collapse or compromise or the management and control of post collapse conditions is imperative.
Another critical operational factor is managing collapse zones and restricting access with consideration for degraded building conditions and the potential for multiple secondary collapse.
Are you up to speed with criteria for recognizing pre and post collapse indicators?
Do you have SOP/SOGs for collapse OPS?
Collapse Zones At a minimum:
Establish and maintain at a minimim a perimeter Collapse Management Zone (CMZ) of 1.5 x the building height.
Based on building type, height, materials of construction and type of projected collapse type – the potential for materials to travel beyond the CMZ is probable and should be assessed.
Safety Officers MUST maintain control to restrict access and to ensure companies are aware of potential for secondary collapse of compromised building features, assemblies or materials.
Maintain an acute high level of Situational Awareness, know your surroundings and don’t get tunnel vision on your task assignment.
Managing Collapse Zones
Great footage from Birmingham, AL at a three-alarm fire in a vacant building at 1811 1st Avene North with the peel away collapse of the upper wall on the Delta Division. Screenshot of collapse below with video link…
Light Weight construction has given way to Engineered Structural Systems (ESS) which in today’s evolving fireground, have an even more extensive array of performance, operational and integrity issues that affect a building’s performance under fire conditions.To unequivocally state that nothing has changed in buildings, occupancies, fire flow delivery rates and demands for increased proficiencies of our firefighters, company and command officers is absurd, ignorant and dangerous.
“It’s a lot more than just Stretching the Line…and going in….”
Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety…so we can do our job—and that’s firefighting .Another classic illustration by Paul Combs.
If you’re planning on heading to the Fire Department Instructors Conference, FDIC in Indianapolis please consider making time to attend our classroom session. We’ll make sure we have a seat waiting for you. There’s a tremendous selection of offerings, check out the program listings HERE. If you’re not able to make the class, make sure you contact me if you’d like to chat, I’ll be there the entire week and would love to talk shop and share insights. Take a look at the FDIC site HERE for a complete listing of programs, offerings and activities. It’s an incredible experience and a must for all levels of experience and organizational affiliation.
Adaptive Fireground Strategies for Today’s Occupancies
Adaptive Fireground Strategies for Today’s Occupancies
Combat fire suppression and field operations are being impacted on a variety of levels with demands for increasing adaptability, expanding risk management, and modified tactical protocols. The focus in on the five fundamental core relationships of building construction, risk management, firefighter behaviors, incident operations, and situational safety. Firefighters, officers, and commanders will benefit from the latest insights into emerging fireground tactical theory for effective combat operations, operational excellence, and firefighter safety offered in this session.
On March 14, 2001 the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department lost firefighter Brett Tarver at the Southwest Supermarket fire.
Remembering Brett Tarver and the Lessons Learned
In that event, it was 5:00 in the afternoon, the grocery store was full of people and fire was extending through the building. Phoenix E14 was assigned to the interior of the structure to complete the search, get any people out, and attempt to confine the rapidly spreading fire to the rear of the structure.
Shortly after completing their primary search of the building the Captain decided it was time to get out. Tarver and the other members of Engine 14 were exiting the building when Tarver and his partner got lost.
Here’s a link to a previous post on Buildingsonfire.com that provides insights and report links that are as pertainent today, as they were in 2001.
Take the time to read the Phoenix Report as well as the NIOSH Report.
Rapid Intervention Team: Are You Ready? Mar 1, 2007 FireEngineering.com By Robert L. Gray; HERE If you were assigned to be a member of a rapid intervention team (RIT) during your next structure fire-or had to command a fireground rescue as a chief officer-are you confident that you would be up to the task of successfully responding to a firefighter Mayday?
The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
The program provides participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics include:
Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.
Safety – Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).
U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study (1979-2001)
This study was conducted in an effort to stop firefighter fatalities caused by smoke inhalation, burns, and traumatic injuries attributable to disorientation. It focused on 17 incidents occurring between 1979 and 2001 in which disorientation played a major part in 23 firefighter fatalities.
Remembrance:Pittsburgh(PA) Bureau of Fire- Post Fire Collapse and Double LODD
NIOSH Report F2004-17: Career battalion chief and career master fire fighter die and twenty-nine career fire fighters are injured during a five alarm church fire -Pennsylvania.
On March 13, 2004, a 55-year-old male career Battalion Chief (Victim #1) and a 51-year-old male career master fire fighter (Victim #2) were fatally injured during a structural collapse at a church fire. Victim #1 was acting as the Incident Safety Officer and Victim #2 was performing overhaul, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. Twenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were pronounced dead at the scene.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should
ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations
establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations
ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone
train fire fighters to recognize conditions that forewarn of a backdraft
ensure consistent use of personal alert safety system (PASS) devices during overhaul operations
ensure that pre-incident planning is performed on structures containing unique features such as bell towers
ensure that Incident Commanders conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing fire fighters to an interior operation, and continue to assess risk-versus-gain throughout the operation including overhaul
develop standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to assign additional safety officers during complex incidents
provide interior attack crews with thermal imaging cameras
Additionally,
municipalities should enforce current building codes to improve the safety of occupants and fire fighters
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations.
Discussion: Due to the destructive powers of fire, most structures that have been involved in fires are structurally weakened. In this incident, the structural integrity of the bell tower was weakened by a fire of several hours duration, the addition of thousands of gallons of water, and possibly the destructive effect of the backdraft. Analysis of the exterior of the structure should be performed continuously while conducting interior operations. Similarly, before overhaul operations are begun, the structure should be determined safe to work in by the IC and a designated Safety Officer. If necessary, the IC should seek the help of qualified structural experts or other competent persons to assess the need for the removal of dangerously weakened construction, or should make provisions for shoring up load-bearing walls, floors, ceilings, roofs, or as in this case, the bell tower.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations.
Discussion: During fire operations, two rules exist about structural collapse: (1) the potential for structural failure always exists during and after a fire, and (2) a collapse danger zone must be established. A defensive attack was declared within an hour after fire suppression activities began. Part of a defensive strategy is establishing and moving fire fighters outside of the collapse zone.
A collapse zone is an area around and away from a structure in which debris might land if a structure fails. Immediate safety precautions must be taken if factors indicate the potential for a building collapse. All persons operating inside the structure must be evacuated immediately and a collapse zone should be established around the perimeter. The collapse zone area should be equal to the height of the building plus an additional allowance for debris scatter and at a minimum should be equal to 1½ times the height of the building. For example, since the bell tower was 115 feet high, the collapse zone boundary should be established at least 173 feet away from the church. Once a collapse zone has been established, the area should be clearly marked and monitored, to make certain that no fire fighters enter the danger zone.
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone.
In this incident, command suffered a serious lapse after the Incident Commander and several company officers were injured in the collapse. The command post from which the IC manages the fireground must be located in an area outside of the collapse zone. The IC must ensure that the command post is protected from danger so that an effective command structure is maintained throughout the incident.1, 5
March 10, 1941: The Strand Theater Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Brockton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapsed, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters.
Check out the comprehensive past post fromCommandSafety.com from 2011
A five -alarm fire on Sunday March 10, 2013 resulted in several firefighters nearly losing their lives, when a resulting backdraft or smoke explosion rapidly occurred during fire suppression operations in a mixed use occupancy building in Harrison, New Jersey.
Street View: What are the Building Profile Indicators that are obvious to you? Photo screen capture from Google Maps
According to published reports, the rapidly extending fire likely started in the kitchen of a Mexican restaurant on the 600 block of Frank E. Rogers Avenue before it quickly spread and engulfed the entire building, and the adjacent exposure.
Reported information states Investigators have stated this is the second time a fire has broken out in the restaurant.
Reading the Building and Maintaining focused Situational Awareness is Mission Critical. What do you see in this street view and what impact would it have on operations? Google Maps image capture
Fire Department officials have initially classified this as a backdraft as first published in the media. “The unfortunate thing with a back-draft is that initially there’s heavy smoke in the building,” said Captain Robert Gillen of the Harrison Fire Department, “all you need is an entrance of more oxygen and there’s a massive explosion.” Two of the firefighters had more extensive injuries than the other three.
A series of video screen captures has been developed to clearly depict the sequence of events that were apparent as the smoke conditions between the fire building and exposure occupancy rapidly and in a quick succession of seconds went from showing normal fire suppression operational smoke profiling to what would become a backdraft [like] explosion or smoke explosion affecting numerous operating interior and fireground companies.
Sequenced images of rapid changing smoke conditions and resulting explosion: Note there are conflicting interpretations as to this being a Backdraft or Smoke Explosion- Provided by Buildingonfire.com from video capture
The need to maintain concise and focused situational awareness during all phases and stages of fireground operations is imperative to identify conditions when subtle or rapidly changing situations and environments may present an opportunity to communicate and react accordingly.
It’s readily apparent that the rapidness of the smoke changes and pressures that can be seen dramatically sequenced into the explosion stage with little chance to initiate actions.
It should be noted that the brief series of frames in the video can not fully ascetain if this is truly a backdraft explosion or a smoke explosion. There are sublte differences in the intiating fire dynamics and sequence of events interior events.
The importance of understanding the building, the occupancy risk and the manner in which fire and the products of combustion typically travel within similar or unique occupancies and the manner in which commanders and officers monitor and maintain keen situ-awareness.
Recognizing fire behavior indicators and monitoring fire dynamics within the fire compartment and building envelope and the impact of fire suppression actions and intervention and external environmental factors require frequent monitoring and peridic status reports to maintain fluid and continuous assessment of conditions that may influence the conduct of operations.
This event continues to reinforce the need to never allow complacency creep to occur regardless how predictable or unchanging the commonality of the operations are being undertaken or conducted, in similar fashion to past successes in comparable occupancies and structures.
Check out the link and Follow-up discussion from Chief Ed Hartin (link HERE)
Reading the Fire
Before watching the video (or watching it again if you have already seen it), download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet. Using the pre-fire photo (figure 1) and observations during the video, identify key B-SHAF indicators that may have pointed to potential for extreme fire behavior in this incident.
Important! Keep in mind that there is a significant difference between focusing on the B-SAHF indicators in this context and observing them on the fireground. Here you know that an explosion will occur, so we have primed the pump so you can focus (and are not distracted by other activity).
Backdraft or Smoke Explosion
While smoke explosion and backdraft are often confused, there are fairly straightforward differences between these two extreme fire behavior phenomena. A smoke explosion involves ignition of pre-mixed fuel (smoke) and air that is within its flammable range and does not require mixing with air (increased ventilation) for ignition and deflagration. A backdraft on the other hand, requires a higher concentration of fuel that requires mixing with air (increased ventilation) in order for it to ignite and deflagration to occur. While the explanation is simple, it may be considerably more difficult to differentiate these two phenomena on the fireground as both involve explosive combustion.
Did you observe any indicators of potential backdraft prior to the explosion?
Do you think that this was a backdraft?
What leads you to the conclusion that this was or was not a backdraft?
If you do not think this was a backdraft, what might have been the cause of the explosion?
For more information in Backdraft, Smoke Explosion, and other explosive phenomena on the fireground, see:
The continuing importance of fire research and the strive to understand fire and its relationship to buildings, systems and firefighting operations is challenging long held beliefs and anecdotal basis; encouraging stimulating debate and discussions- resulting in thought provoking and insightful theories, positions statements and a time of retrospect and critical self-examination that will influence numerous facets of the fire service profession.
It’s not about NOT fighting fires, but rather fighting fires smarter.
Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.
The Art and Science of Fire Fighting – Buildingsonfire
Taking it the Streets: Reading the Building
Here’s a simple view from the Alpha street side. I’ll give you the options as to what you’re arrive on or as…Reading the Building requires numerous layers of knowledge and skill based attributes to develop the perspective to “read your buildings” differently.
Reading the Building: Occupancy Type and Occupancy Risk?
Arriving companies and personnel at a structure fire need to be able to rapidly and accurately identify key elements of a building, process that data based upon a widening field of variables present on today’s evolving fireground and implement timely actions that address prioritized actions requiring intervention.
Deterministic fireground models for size-up and suppression have to give way to a more expandable stochastic model of assessment. Key to this is having a broad and well developed foundation of building knowledge.
Let’s identify the building type, age, key features based on its profile, inherent characteristics, projected performance, roof system, perimeter walls, hazards, risks..etc. What is the Occupancy Type and Occupancy Risk?
There is a wealth of information you can talk about-IF you know what to look for. Start the dialog. I’ll post interior views in 48 hours.
I’ve cross posted to allow for some robust discussions. Don’t forget to Like us on Facebook.
Can you Read this building correctly? Or will your view have an adverse affect on operations if you misjudged or just didn’t know or care…just because ” you wanted to just stretch in and do the job-right?”
New for 2013: Reading the Building: Predictive Profiling for the Modern Fireground. An engaging and interactive Training Seminar addressing the Challenges of Today’s Evolving Fireground.
Been in the field lately looking at your buildings under construction? Here’s a new look at a common Engineered Structural Support (ESS) system.
Here’s today’s Taking it to the Streets session; Take a look at this Engineered Structural Support (ESS) system. There are two critical component systems depicted here in this photo- can you tell what they are? Take a close look at the ESS T…russ components. They are nothing new, but they do cause a stir when they make their way back into main stream fire service discussions as firefighters and officers “rediscover” these type of systems, their use, presence and operational risk and profiling.
So let’s start the dialog:
Can you name the type of ESS Truss, the inherent characteristics, design and function | typical applications | risks and operational concerns.
What impact will fire impingement have on the ESS assembly in either foor or roof systems?
How can you identify these assemblies and building characteristics unpon arrival?
What fireground strategies and tactics would you employ upon arrival at an occupancy with this type of ESS?
Don’t forget to look at the second system component that I mentioned earlier;
Can you identify it? Its relationship to the other system and other inherent performance issues?
Lots to talk about, look at and share. Any street stories to share-please post. I’ve got a few more in this series to post after we get some dialog and insights….
We’ve cross posted this on our BuildingsonfireFacebook page (HERE), if you haven’t checked it out, please follow the link, there’s been some great discussions and insights being shared from around the country…
Don’t forget to spread the word about Buildingsonfire.com \ CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire on FB…send the links along and like….Dont forget about CommandSafety on Twitter and Buildingsonfire on twitter also.
To award the Medal of Freedom to the 4 Firefighters who were ambushed in
West Webster New York on Christmas Eve 2012
On December 24th 2012 4 West Webster Firefighters responded to a call of a vehicle/house fire. As they arrived they were ambushed by a lone gunman. Lt. Mike Chiapperini and Firefighter Tomasz Kaczowka were killed on scene. Firefighters Joseph Hofsetter and Theodore Scardino both received life altering injuries which will require months of rehabilitation. These brave men were volunteers answered the call for assistance at 5:30 in the morning.
These brave men were ambushed by a coward. For their sacrifices, their willingness to help their fellow man they all should be honored with the Medal of Freedom.
Theodore Scardino
Joseph Hofstetter
Photo Credit: Smoke is Showing Fireground Photography
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The Webster, New York community prepares for Monday’s funeral of fallen firefighter Tomasz Kaczowka, West Webster Fire Department (NY).
On Monday, the community will come together again to honor Firefighter Tomasz Kaczowka, 19, who was shot and killed at the site of a house fire on Lake Road in Webster. He was one of two firefighters killed in the Christmas Eve shootings in Webster, when a gunman set his house ablaze and fired on responding firefighters. Lt. Mike Chiapperini, the second of the two firefighters killed in action on Christmas Eve in Webster was layed to rest on Sunday with full honors.
The funeral will be at 10:00am at St. Stanislaus Church on Hudson Avenue. News10NBC will have live coverage of the funeral, and will also stream it on WHEC.com. He had been a firefighter for just under a year, after spending three years in the department’s Explorer program for adolescents interested in the program. He also worked as a 911 dispatcher.
His obituary described him: “Whether it was through working the overnight shift as an emergency dispatch operator for the City of Rochester, or waking up at all hours of the night to attend various emergencies, this selfless young man devoted every spare ounce of his effort and courage to help those who needed it, right to the end. Everyone’s ‘little brother’ died doing what he loved.”
Kaczowka, the youngest firefighter in the department and close friend of Chiapperini, was on duty that morning to help relieve older members of the West Webster Fire Department, so those with families could have the holiday off.
Firefighter Tomasz Marian Kaczowka, West Webster (NY) Fire Deparrtment
Tomasz Marian Kaczowka, at the age of 19, passed away in the line of duty with his mentor and close friend, Lt. Michael “Chip” Chiapperini on December 24, 2012.
Tomasz was born May 16, 1993 in Rochester, NY to Janina and Marian Kaczowka. He attended Webster Thomas High School, graduating in 2011.
After high school, Tomasz committed his life to Civil Service through several avenues. Whether it was through working the overnight shift as an emergency dispatch operator for the City of Rochester, or waking up all hours of the night to attend various emergencies, this selfless young man devoted every spare ounce of his effort and courage to help those who needed it, right to the end. Everyone’s “little brother” died doing what he loved.
He is survived by his mother and father, Janina and Marian; along with his older twin brothers, Dariusz and Greg; grandparents, Mieczyslaw and Stanislawa Lysik; aunts, Alicia (Wladek) Wojtowicz and Teresa Lysik; uncle, Stefan (Jolanta) Lysik; and loving aunts, uncles, cousins and friends in Rochester and Poland, and the extended family at West Webster Fire Department.
Calling hour services from Saturday. Photo by CJ Naum
Lieutenant Mike Chiapperini, one of the heroes who died during the tragedy in Webster on Christmas Eve is being laid to rest Sunday. To watch live stream of the funeral from WHEC.com, click here…
Paying Respect to the our Fallen Brothers. Calling Services from Saturday in West Webster, New York. Photo by CJ Naum
Calling Services from Saturday in West Webster, New York. Photo by CJ Naum
Calling Services from Saturday in West Webster, New York. Photo by CJ Naum
Thousands of fellow firefighters and police officers, along with community members, family and friends have filled Webster Schroeder High School to remember this fallen hero.
Mike Chiapperini was a volunteer firefighter for the West Webster Fire Department for 25 years. He was also a past chief for the department. His service to his community didn’t stop there, also serving Webster as a police officer for nearly 20 years.
Lieutenant Chiapperini rose through the ranks with the department, serving as a dispatcher, then as a patrol officer and was promoted to lieutenant two years ago.
He is survived by his wife, Kimberly, son, Nicholas, and two daughters, Kacie and Kylie.
Firefighter Brian Carroll reflects on the 2011 Arlington Street Fire and Cold Storage Fire of 1999.
Firefighter Brian Carroll was trapped in the basement of 49 Arlington St. after the second-floor of the three-decker collapsed underneath him and his partner on Rescue 1. He thought his close friend was OK. Firefighter Carroll lay trapped and didn’t learn until after he was freed that Firefighter Davies had died.
“What happened to my brother, the three-decker collapsed in a way no one could predict,” Robert Davies said. “Certainly I think it serves as a lesson going forward, and even if it saves one life going forward, then at least something good came out of it.”
Firefighter Davies, who was 43 when he died, has a son, Jon D. Davies Jr., in the department now as a firefighter.
From the Worcester Telegram & Gazette; A cruel month for Worcester firefighters HERE
NIOSH REPORT Career Fire Fighter Dies and Another is Injured Following Structure Collapse at a Triple Decker Residential Fire – Massachusetts:HERE
On December 3, 1999, a five-alarm fire at the Worcester Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. building claimed the lives of six brave firefighters who responded to the call. These six heros, The Worcester 6, sacrificed their lives to try and rescue two individuals who were believed to be trapped inside the inferno. May the Worcester 6 always be remembered; “Fallen Heroes Never Forgotten.”
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum. On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com. A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production. Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.
