Archives for buildings

The Predictability of Building Performance must take into consideration that in the context of today’s fire ground, buildings and fire dynamics, small changes on initial compartment or structure conditions may often produce and result in large-scale or magnitude changes that affect the long term outcome of the incident.

We have assumed that the routiness or successes of past operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past construction systems, occupancies and building types; therefore the risk assessment and size-up process, and resulting strategies and tactics must adapt to address these evolving rules of combat structural fire engagement that challenge anecdotal practices and methodologies.

Today’s evolving fireground demands greater adaptive insights and management with an amplified understanding of buildings, occupancy risk profiling (ORP) and building anatomy by all operating companies on the fireground; demanding greater skill sets and knowledge of building construction, architecture, engineering, fire dynamics and fire suppression methodologies.

The equation for success rests directly on Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Don’t be complacent based on alarm type, building or occupancy type…expect fire, be prepared and understand the predictability of building performance. It should not be a surprise upon arrival of the first-due.

Don’t forget to LIKE Buildingsonfire on FaceBook and follow CommandSafety on Twitter

Some Training Aide Links from past Ten Minutes in the Streets

Ten Minutesin the Street A Buildingsonfire.com SeriesExecutive Producer: Christopher Naum, SFPE Ten Minutes in the Street; bringing you insightful and provoking street scenarios for the discriminating and perspective Firefighter, Company Officer and Commander; where you make the call. You don’t have to have any special rank to participate in this interactive forum, just the desire to learn and expand you knowledge, skills and abilities in order to better yourself, create new insights, while sharing your experience and perspectives to help you and others in the street in making the right call; so everyone has the opportunity of going home. Access the Series on Buildingsonfire.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com Don’t forget to access CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com . Buildingsonfire is also on Facebook.

Ten Minutes in the Street; Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due, HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street; “But it’s only a Garage..!”, HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street: “I Hear Ya Knockin’, But Nobody’s Home”
http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-i?q=forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-i
http://commandsafety.com/2010/11/ten-minutes-in-the-street-%e2%80%9ca-little-smoke-showin/
Box 2752..Reported Fire in an Occupied Apartment Above Sammy’s Liquors
http://my.firefighternation.com/group/buildingconstructionfirefightersafety/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an-1
The First-Due: Well Involved http://thecompanyofficer.com/2011/08/25/ten-minutes-in-the-street-the-first-due/
Ten Minutes in the Street: “Three For One”
http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-449?q=forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-449
http://commandsafety.com/2011/08/tabletop-training-for-the-weekend-rubbish-fire/
Ten Minutes in the Street: On-scene, with Engine 21, Second Alarm…
http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-13
Ten Minutes in the Street: “Dispatch to Chief..You’ve got Two Working Fires…”
http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-14
http://thecompanyofficer.com/2011/08/13/ten-minutes-in-the-street-report-of-smoke-in-the-area/
Strip Stores: http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-5
Ten Minutes in the Street: The Triple Decker with Fire in the Attic: http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-the-2?q=forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-the-2
Laundry: http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/first-due-arriving-with-a
Ten Minutes in the Street: Read “through” the Smoke, HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street; Pipin’ Hot First Due..30 Minutes or Less, HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street; “Here’s lookin’ at You”, HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street: Fire on the Number Two Floor-Doubtful
http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-fire
Townhouse: http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-fire-1
Ten Minutes in the Street: Report of Smoke in the Area
Ten Minutes in the Street: Buildings Under Construction; FIRE
Ten Minutes in the Street Scenario: On-scene, with Engine Company 13…..
Ten Minutes in the Street: The Triple Decker with Fire in the Attic
Ten Minutes in the Street: Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due

Posted by Christopher Naum on April 13, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, decision-making, fire suppression, firefighter, firefighting-operations, fires, first-due, Taking it to the Streets, Uncategorized • Tagged: building construction, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, construction and occupancies, fire dynamics, firefighting, fireground, first-due, Occupancy Risk Profiling, Predictability of Building Performance, risk profile, size-up, strategies, Ten Minutes in the Street, Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios, thecompanyofficer.com

San Francisco FD Berkeley Way Double LODD Report Issued: Routine Fire….

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Charlie Side Fire View

The Chief of the Department directed the Department Safety Officer to conduct a Safety Investigation of this incident. The primary purpose of the investigation was to identify and analyze the contributing factors that led to the incident as well as to create situational awareness to prevent future occurrences. The main objective of the Team’s investigation and subsequent report was to discover the key factor that led to the fatal outcome of two Firefighters. The SFFD report contains the findings and recommendations to help prevent Firefighter injuries or fatalities in the future.

In analyzing and recording these events, the Investigation Team acknowledges and respects that members confronted a challenging situation. On‐scene personnel reacted quickly to the changing conditions at this incident. We request that every person who reads this report show respect, appreciation and consideration for all personnel who responded to this incident.

As is a common industry practice, for this report Lieutenant Vincent Perez was referred to as Victim 1 and Firefighter Paramedic Anthony Valerio was referred to as Victim 2, with the exception of the Rescue Events Section.

Excerpt from Chief of Department’s Letter

“On Thursday, June 2, 2011 at 10:45 a.m., the San Francisco Fire Department responded to Box 8155, at 133 Berkeley Way. What was seemingly a routine working fire in a single family residence quickly transformed into a fierce and unrelenting incident with ultimately tragic results.

When we answered the call to a career in the Fire Service and took our Oath of Allegiance, we were aware of the inherent danger of our occupation. Despite this awareness, we do not expect to encounter a line of duty death of a brother or sister, especially not in our very own Department. The profound loss of Lieutenant Vincent Perez and Firefighter/Paramedic Anthony Valerio has left an indelible impression in our hearts and will forever be remembered in the annals of SFFD history.

Even as we mourned our fallen brothers in the early days after the tragedy, our Department began the painful and difficult, but necessary, steps of a Line of Duty Death investigation. We were resolute in understanding what occurred during those fateful minutes and compelled to uncover any recommendations for improvement that may arise to future operations so that their passing will not have been in vain. For over six months, the Investigative Team worked tirelessly, scrutinizing every piece of evidence in order to produce a comprehensive report.”

: SFFD

Joanne Hayes‐White

Chief of Department

Executive Summary and Report Excerpt

On June 2, 2011 at 10:45 hours, the San Francisco Fire Department was dispatched to a report of a fire in the building at 133 Berkeley Way in the City’s Diamond Heights neighborhood. The first unit arriving on the scene, Engine 26, observed light smoke showing from the garage of the 4 story (2 above grade, 2 below grade) wood framed building, detached on the Bravo side.

: Aerial from the Charlie Side

An aggressive interior fire attack was initiated through the front door, which is on a level between the ground level and second floor. After investigating the garage (ground level), Engine 24, the second Engine on the scene, led a small line through the garage to the interior door to back up the first Company. Battalion 9 was assigned Fire Attack by Battalion 6, who had assumed Command. Battalion 9 entered the fire building and, after conferring face to face with Engine 26 on the first floor (ground level), concluded that the fire was below them.

: Alpha Side Operations

Battalion 9 exited the building and proceeded to the Bravo side to check for an entrance leading directly to the fire floor. Engine 11 led a large line wye to the driveway with the intention of leading a 1 ¾ inch line through the garage. They were redirected by Battalion 6 to make their lead down the Bravo side of the building to Sublevel 1 (one floor below grade) to assist Battalion 9. The Division Chief, upon arrival, assumed Command. He assigned Battalion 6 to Division 3 (ground floor).

Truck 15 was assigned Roof Division. Truck 11 split their crew, two members to the roof and three members to search and ventilate the top floor of the fire building. The Rescue Squad was ordered to conduct a search. Two members initially attempted to make entry through the garage but, due to extreme heat conditions, redeployed and entered through Sublevel 1 on the Bravo side.

The other two members of the Rescue Squad made entry through the front door, were pushed back by the heat and then made a successful second effort and conducted a search of the top floor.

In the course of fireground operations, members of several Companies came upon the stricken members on the first level and removed them from the building. All possible efforts were employed to revive the members and they were transported to San Francisco General Hospital (SFGH). One member (Victim 1) succumbed to his injuries that day and the second member (Victim 2) succumbed to his injuries two days later. Two other Firefighters were treated at SFGH for various injuries and released that day.

The Medical Examiner determined the cause of death for both members was due to complications from external and internal thermal injuries. Both victims suffered burns to 40% of their body surface. This fire was determined to be accidental by the SFFD Fire Investigative Unit. The fire originated on Sublevel 1, on the West side of the family room, near the large floor to ceiling windows. The ignition was a non‐specific electrical sequence in the electrical wiring or appliance (handheld vacuum cleaner) in this area.

There was a delay in reporting the fire due to the occupants’ attempting to extinguish it on their own. (SFFD Fire Investigation Report 11‐0500532)

The investigation identified that the failing of the window on Sublevel 1, located near the seat of the fire and directly across the stairwell leading to the ground floor, led to the extreme fire behavior which ultimately caused the death of two Firefighters. This fire was in a stage of deprived oxygen when the window failed, causing a rapid extreme high heat event to occur. The extreme heat followed the natural flow path up the interior stairs where Victims 1 and 2 were located.

The Safety Investigation Team found no conclusive evidence that the members were exposed to direct flame impingement during this rapid extreme heat event. However,

Victims 1 and 2 received varying degree of burns up to 40% of their body. The investigation concluded that this was caused by the rapid extreme heat conditions that radiated through their Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to their bodies. These temperatures exceed the ability for human survival regardless of PPE.

The PPE was inspected and evaluated by NIOSH and the manufacturer. Both reviewing parties concluded that the PPE performed to its specifications and design. The manufacturer concluded that the PPE was exposed to temperatures in the range of 550‐ 700°F. These extreme temperatures were short in duration which caused limited damage to the outer shell of the PPE.

The Safety Investigation Team noticed severe heat damage to the portable radios remote speaker/microphones on Victims 1 and 2 and had the radios tested. The testing indicated that the remote speaker/microphones failed to operate correctly due to heat damage. The Safety Investigation Team was not able to determine, after testing, exactly when the remote speaker/microphones failed. The investigation has shown that multiple attempts were made to contact Engine 26 with no response.

The investigation also found that no radio transmissions of distress were received from Victims 1 or 2. Command and Control of any incident in the San Francisco Fire Department is acquired and maintained through the use of the Incident Command System (ICS).

The Incident Command System provides the tools for clear objectives, a single action plan, clear and acknowledged communications, and accountability for all members assigned to an incident. At this incident, some of the components of Incident Command System that were not followed include:

Single action plan
Fireground Accountability

From these findings, this report makes recommendations for several areas of the Department, including:

Training
Equipment
Policy Development
Policy Enforcement

The Safety Investigation Team gathered and analyzed many facts and conducted interviews of members directly involved in this incident. The Team identified several factors that occurred that contributed to the deaths at this incident.

These factors include:

Extreme heat conditions accelerated by the failure of a window on the fire floor.
Layout of building
Excessive live fuel load which contributed to the growth of the fire

Conclusion

This incident appeared from the onset to be a routine “room and contents” fire that the SFFD encounters on a regular basis. As the Companies were performing standard fireground operations, the incident rapidly deteriorated due to a hostile fire event. The failure of a window in the fire room allowed fresh oxygen to enter the room, providing a fire that was deprived of one of the key elements of combustion to rapidly intensify.

Due to the growth of the fire, the room flashed, causing extreme and rapid heat conditions which traveled up the interior stairs (the flow path) to the location which our members were operating. Our members were caught in this high heat, causing the injuries that ultimately claimed their lives.

Due to this fire event, other Companies attempting to conduct fireground support operations were prevented from making entry into the structure from street level (through garage) to back up Engine 26. These Companies were forced to regroup and find an alternate point of entry. In the process of doing so, crews made entry from the Bravo side directly into the fire room and extinguished the fire. This allowed members to make entry from above which led to the discovery and rescue of our members.

These events happened in a time frame of less than fourteen minutes.

During the course of this investigation, the Safety Investigation Team recognized that no matter how experienced or properly prepared we are, we must always approach all incidents with the utmost awareness.

This incident showed that a simple failure of a piece of glass/window caused unforeseeable and fatal consequences.

We, as a Department, need to gain further knowledge and understanding of the following:

Having Situational Awareness prior to taking action, this would include the ongoing process when conditions change
How Risk Management must be used when making all decisions
Limitations of the PPE (turnouts, SCBA, and equipment)
Building construction, including layout and how fire/smoke will
move within the structure
Ventilation practices and how they affect fire conditions
Importance of Communications for all members operating on the scene
Companies must use strict discipline when assigned task/locations

Previous CommandSafety Coverage from 2011, HERE, HERE and HERE

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

Other Links;

San Francisco Chronical; S.F. firefighter dies, second fighting for life; Article and Photos HERE

Previous Posting on CommandSafety.com HERE
More Incident Scene Photos HERE
More Incident Info, HERE and HERE
Slide show HERE
STATTer911: San Francisco firefighter dead & another critically injured. Reported flashover at house fire.

Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE and HERE.

SFFD Report PDF, HERE

SFFD Web Link, HERE

SFFD Mission

The mission of the Fire Department is to protect the lives and property of the people of San Francisco from fires, natural disasters, and hazardous materials incidents; to save lives by providing emergency medical services; to prevent fires through prevention and education programs; and to provide a work environment that values health, wellness and cultural diversity and is free of harassment and discrimination.

IN TRIBUTE TO
OUR FALLEN HEROES

Alpha Side

STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION

Site overview: Steep downhill slope adjacent to Glen Canyon

Date of Construction: 1975

Building overview:

Attached garage located in the front of the house. Main structure is 2 stories above grade and 2 stories below grade

Type of Construction:

Four story, Type 5 wood framed, single family home, detached on three sides
Approximate square footage: 4,000 sq ft.
Four stories of living space
- First Floor (Ground floor): garage, 3 bedrooms, 2 bathrooms
- Second floor: dining room, living room, kitchen, bathroom and family room
- Sublevel 1: large family room (origin of fire), mechanical room, bathroom, bedroom, balcony, side entrance on Bravo side
- Sublevel 2: enclosed finished storage area, bathroom (no windows)

Construction features:

Roof type: Flat roof, bitumen roofing membrane, normal dimensional lumber
Exterior: siding T1-11 plywood, 5/8”
Interior: drywall over normal insulated framing

Note: Fire origin room had decorative plywood veneer panels over drywall

Steel I beams wrapped in drywall were used as structural supports

Note: Fire origin room had a steel I beam that spanned horizontally from Bravo to Delta side

Rear of structure had extensive use of glass to capture views, including windows and sliding doors
Second floor and Sublevel 1 (fire origin) had large balconies
Flooring consisted of tile, carpet and sheet vinyl throughout the house
Dual glazed windows throughout, installed in 2003
Ground level had a two car garage with access to residence

Note: Two large vehicles occupying garage at time of fire

Main entrance was accessed by ascending a flight of stairs adjacent to the garage

Note: Main entrance stairs led to an interior landing which allowed access to top floor (5 stairs up) or grade level (7 stairs down)

Sublevel 1 had an access door from the exterior Bravo side along with access from interior stairs
Sublevel 2 had access door from exterior Bravo side. (no interior access)

Note: Access through the Bravo side was difficult due to unfinished terrain and poor housekeeping

Posted by Christopher Naum on February 24, 2012 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, construction, Fatalities, firefighting, firefighting-operations, floors, LODD, major-incidents, Mayday • Tagged: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, combat fire suppression, commandsafety.com, Diamond Heights section, engine company operations, extreme fire behavior, fire behavior, fire dynamics, Fire Fighting, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, Fireground accountability, Fireground Incident Command, fires, Flashover, flashover lodd, Incident Command, LODD, LODD • Tagged: Building, Lt Vincent Perez, Mayday, operations, residential occupancy, RIC, RIT, San Francisco FD, San Francisco FD Berkeley Way Double LODD Report, San Francisco FD LODD June 2011, SFFD, SFFDBerkeley Way Safety Investigation Report Line of Duty Deaths, standard fireground operations, Sub-Level Firefighting, tactics

Building-Occupancy Relationships and Firefighting

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Knowledge and proficiencies related to building construction are formulative to all strategic, tactical and task level assignments.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, the compartment, occupancy risk, fire dynamics and fire behavior, fluid situational awareness and risk analysis, the art and science of aggressive and smart firefighting with well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies; You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

What do you think? Where do you fit in?

New Strategic Thinking for Today’s Evolving Fireground and Challenges…..

Posted by Christopher Naum on February 16, 2012 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, compentencies, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations • Tagged: "firefighter safety", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, commandsafety.com, company officer, compentencies, construction, fire behavior, Fire Department SOP, fire supression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations • Tagged: "firefighter safety", Fireground Risk Assessment, fires, occupancy type, Rules of Combat Fire Engagement, size-up, Tactical Entertainment, Tactical Fire Assignments, tactics

Situational Awareness: Wall Collapse Near Miss

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UK Firefighter Narrowly Escapes Wall Collapse
Collapse captured on dash cam shows Greater Manchester (UK) Fire and Rescue Service close call

This was recently posted on Firefighternation.com and depicts a a video clip that captures a dramatic near miss of a colleague who could have been killed when a house collapsed today released footage of the incident. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service said the incident in Littleborough, Rochdale, in September 2010 was being released as part of health and safety training for its staff and other fire and rescue services in the UK.

The dramatic footage, caught by a CCTV camera on a fire engine attending the scene, shows a fire fighter narrowly escaping death or serious injury as the front of a derelict terrace house collapsed, almost on top of him. The firefighter seems hardly fazed by the close call.

County Fire Officer and Chief Executive Steve McGuirk said the footage provided terrifying viewing for the service, who would use it as a training example to ensure crew were more aware of the dangers.

He added: “The footage is unbelievable. Our crew and the police are diligently attending this incident, where a derelict property is on fire. But who could have predicted the front of the house would collapse in this way. It is frighteningly close and this fire fighter could so easily have been killed. It’s a powerful example of how our fire fighters put themselves at risk each and every day to keep people across Greater Manchester safe.”

The footage will now form part of the service’s operational assurance processes and used to make fire fighters aware of the potential risks of similar incidents.

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service has 41 stations across the 10 boroughs of the county and attended approximately 50,000 incidents involving fire and collisions on roads and motorways, and other emergencies, last year.

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Services Link HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on June 7, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, close-call, Collapse • Tagged: "firefighter safety", Brick wall collapse, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Building Constrution for the Fire Service Chris Naum, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Collapse training, commandsafety.com, compromise, fireground, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Services, Situational Awarness, UK, Wall collapse, Wall Collapse Near Miss, wall system

Prevention of Disproportionate Structural Collapse

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Many U.S. buildings are vulnerable to extreme loads that may cause partial or total collapse. Modern structures have a limited reserve capacity to accommodate abnormal loads. There is no accepted science-base or design practice to maintain overall structural robustness within a multi-hazard context that considers both design loads and abnormal loads. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is an agency of the U.S. Commerce Department, has initiated a new project will address the development of procedures and computational methodologies for assessment of overall structural robustness and will provide the measurement science needs for the development of performance-based provisions in U.S. codes and standards for disproportionate collapse resistance that will ensure improved robustness of building structures.

The term “disproportionate collapse” is defined as the spread of an initial local failure from element to element resulting in the collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part of it.

Since the terrorist attacks on the WTC towers and the Pentagon, owners of major U.S. buildings including the federal government (the largest single owner of buildings in the U.S.) have emphasized disproportionate collapse resistance as one of the design requirements (see, e.g., Senate Committee Report 107-57). Currently, GSA, DoD, and DoS require that their buildings be designed and evaluated for disproportionate collapse potential. The NIST WTC Towers Investigation (NIST NCSTAR 1, Recommendation 1) calls for the development of consensus-based codes and standards for disproportionate collapse mitigation, and was reiterated in the investigation of the fire-induced disproportionate collapse of WTC 7 (NIST NCSTAR 1A).

There are no metrics to compare the overall system-level performance of structures, making it impossible to compare and quantify the safety performance of different types of structural systems. There is no accepted science-base or design practice to maintain overall structural robustness within a multi-hazard context that considers both design loads and abnormal loads. Critical measurement science capabilities that are lacking include;

(1) system-level structural models capable of estimating the reserve capacity of building structures and assessing disproportionate collapse resistance,

(2) measures of structural robustness, and

(3) proven and cost-effective methods to mitigate disproportionate collapse.

The behavior of structural systems near their ultimate limit states is not well understood, and simulating this behavior depends on the availability of accurate structural models. Development of accurate models to predict reserve capacity of structural systems and allow the quantification of robustness, in turn, depends on the availability of validated models of members and connections. At the present time, experimental data on the behavior of connections undergoing disproportionate collapse are lacking. In addition, detailed modeling of a complete structural system to failure is often beyond the capability of existing tools. Reduced models of connections that capture the predominant behaviors and failure modes are needed for cost effective assessment of structural robustness and disproportionate collapse potential.

While the measurement science needs identified above have not been solved, organizations in the U.S. such as NIST, ERDC, DTRA, and GSA as well as few universities in Belgium, England, and Japan have conducted limited testing of full and scaled models of steel subassemblies. No concrete subassemblies have been tested anywhere. Over the past few years, organizations such as NIST and a few private sector companies under contract to federal agencies have made some progress in the modeling of subassemblies; both at the detailed and reduced models levels. However, measurement science needs such as metrics for structural system robustness, system-level computational tools, and agreed-upon methods for disproportionate collapse mitigation have not been developed.

This project will provide the measurement science needs for the development of performance-based provisions in U.S. codes and standards for disproportionate collapse resistance that will ensure resilience of building structures and as a result improve life safety and thereby improving the quality of life. Furthermore, the project is part of the “Measurement Science for Structural Performance under Multi-Hazards” program within EL’s strategic goal on “Measurement Science for Disaster Resilient Structures and Communities”. EL is well positioned to address the needs outlined in this project because of its long history in investigating structural failures and the capabilities built over the years in analyzing the failures of complex multi-story structures using state of the art computational tools.

What is the new technical idea? A key focus of the project is to develop system-level performance metrics to quantify the robustness of building structures. Robustness is a key structural property that is related to disproportionate collapse resistance. Both structural redundancy and integrity are key factors that influence the robustness of the structure. These factors must be quantified to express the robustness in a meaningful and measurable manner. The assessment of the degree of structural redundancy for redistribution of loads and structural integrity for system continuity requires simulation of structural behavior under various local failure scenarios. Realistic and efficient simulations require the development and use of advanced and experimentally validated modeling methodologies to examine the structural system performance. Both traditional and new design concepts will be evaluated to determine the relative merits of various structural systems in resisting disproportionate collapse. The project will examine collapse limit states of structural systems to quantify the reserve capacity of various structural systems, through a combination of push-down and push-over analyses. The project will also develop design and retrofit methodologies that take explicit advantage of the synergies associated with mitigating disproportionate collapse under multiple hazards to enhance overall efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The required work depends heavily on the use of advanced and detailed structural models to evaluate the nonlinear behavior of structural systems in post ultimate capacity limit states. With today’s high-performance computational tools, it is feasible to predict structural response due to abnormal dynamic loads. Complementary to the analytical evaluation of structures, the project will review and make use of the knowledge gained from controlled demolition technology. Through decades of experience, the demolition community has developed detailed knowledge about the collapse behavior of structural systems.

The recommendations from a national workshop formed the basis for a coordinated national plan for problem-focused research on mitigation of disproportionate collapse of buildings. The project proposes to develop metrics to quantify the robustness of various structural systems to assess their disproportionate collapse potential. These metrics will be based on experimentally validated computational models of structural systems incorporating the predominant behaviors and failure modes of components and connections. Such models can also be used by design professionals in design for disproportionate collapse resistance. A key component in the development and evaluation of robustness metrics will be a series of push-down and push-over analyses to assess the reserve capacity of a variety of structures with different systems and materials. The project will develop performance objectives, acceptance criteria, and evaluation methods for both new and existing structures, which will be used to develop guidance documents and pre-standards for design and rehabilitation of structures to mitigate disproportionate collapse.

The NIST project will produce the following outcomes:

1. Best Practices Guide for design of new buildings and rehabilitation of existing buildings (Complete).

2. Computational methodologies to evaluate the disproportionate collapse potential of building structures for practicing engineers based on the following work:

Experimental:

(a) testing of full-scale subsystems to validate detailed computer models.

(b) testing of 3-D multi-story frames to validate reduced 3-D computer models.

Computational:

(a) development of reduced 3-D models of various structural systems.

(b) comparative assessment of reserve capacities of various structural systems.

(c) evaluation of structural systems capable of resisting disproportionate collapse.

3. Guidelines for assessing disproportionate collapse vulnerability, including both rapid and comprehensive evaluation guides.

4. Comprehensive guidelines for design of new buildings to resist disproportionate collapse.

5. Comprehensive guidelines for retrofit of existing buildings to resist disproportionate collapse.

6. Pre-standards for design of new buildings and retrofit of existing buildings to resist disproportionate collapse.

FY 2010 the projects overview:

Development of 3-D structural models of 10-story reinforced concrete shear wall and precast concrete buildings.
Evaluation of reserve capacity and development of structural robustness metrics for various structural systems.
Evaluation and comparison of disproportionate collapse vulnerability of various steel and reinforced concrete structural systems.
Design and testing of precast concrete beam-column assemblies.

Major Accomplishments:

Recent Results:

Impact

Best Practices Guide (NISTIR 7396) adopted by ASCE 7-10 Standard as part of the commentary section on General Structural Integrity.

Outcomes

Developed experimentally validated 3D models of steel frame buildings for assessment of reserve capacity and vulnerability to disproportionate collapse (Journal publication being developed).
Developed experimentally validated 3D models of reinforced concrete frame buildings for assessment of reserve capacity and vulnerability to disproportionate collapse (Journal publication being developed).
Published “Best Practices for Reducing the Potential for Progressive Collapse in Buildings-NISTIR 7396.”

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) http://www.nist.gov/index.html

Posted by Christopher Naum on November 4, 2010 • Filed under: Architectural Design, assemblies, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Codes, Collapse, construction, Engineered, failures, firefighting-operations, major-incidents, NIST • Tagged: building construction, buildings, Christopher Naum, Collapse, collapse resistance, commandsafety.com, design loads and abnormal loads., disproportionate collapse, disproportionate collapse mitigation, disproportionate collapse resistance, failure scenarios, local failure, Modern structures, multi-hazard context, Prevention of Disproportionate Structural Collapse, reserve capacity of building structures, reserve capacity of structures, structural robustness, structural systems, The National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Commerce Department

Thursday 9pm ET: “We Have a Situation; Are You Aware?”

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: Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

Check out Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum on Firefighter NetCast.com this Thursday night August 19th at 9pm ET with a live online radio call-in show addressing the most current issues affecting the Fire Service.

This month Christopher Naum’s guests include Battalion Chief Matt Tobia with the Anne Arundel County, MD Fire Department, a metropolitan combination Fire / Rescue / EMS agency in Suburban Baltimore, MD and Battalion Chief Greg W. Collier, Mount Laurel Fire Department, NJ and NFFF/EGH Region II Advocate discussing the emerging and prevailing issues related to situational awareness on the fireground and incident scene and its relationship to firefighter safety or operational integrity. The show is titled; “We Have a Situation; Are you Aware?”

Go to www.FirefighterNetCast.com to listen and participate live, with a national and international audience of firefighters, officers and commanders from rural heartlands of Oklahoma to the suburbs of Chicago and the urban streets of DC. Or download the program later in the week for later use. Check out the premiere show with featured guests Chief Billy Hayes (DCFD) and Chief Doug Cline (High Point FD, NC).

Also, if you haven’t taken the time, check out the latest on the FireEMS Blogs Community at CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com. Taking it to the Streets is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production

The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio…

Taking it to the Streets

With Christopher Naum

A New Monthly Radio Talkshow on FireFighter Netcast.com

A Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighter Netcast.com Production

Advancing FireFighter Safety and Operational Intergrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 17, 2010 • Filed under: "Situational Awareness" assessment, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, decision-making, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, risk-based assessment, Safety Culture, size-up • Tagged: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, Anne Arundel County, Blogtalkradio, buildings, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, Dynamic Risk Assessment, Firefighter Netcast.com, Greg Collier, Health and Survival Section, IAFC Safety, Matt Tobia, MD Fire Department, Mount Laural FD NJ, risk, Situational Awarness

Executing Effective Tactical Plans

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When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

Posted by Christopher Naum on January 24, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, assemblies, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, construction, decision-making, dynamics, Engineered Structural Systems, fire behavior, occupancies, risk-based assessment, size-up, strategies, tactics • Tagged: buildings, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, construction, Engineered Structural Systems, engineered systems, ESS, IAP, performance, Predict, risk, tactics

Urban Search and Rescue Insights

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Urban search-and-rescue (US&R) involves the location, rescue (extrication), and initial medical stabilization of victims trapped in confined spaces. Structural collapse is most often the cause of victims being trapped, but victims may also be trapped in transportation accidents, mines and collapsed trenches. Urban search-and-rescue is considered a “multi-hazard” discipline, as it may be needed for a variety of emergencies or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms and tornadoes, floods, dam failures, technological accidents, terrorist activities, and hazardous materials releases. The events may be slow in developing, as in the case of hurricanes, or sudden, as in the case of earthquakes.

In the event of a National disater of event, FEMA deploys the three closest task forces within six hours of notification, and additional teams as necessary. The role of these task forces is to support state and local emergency responders’ efforts to locate victims and manage recovery operations. Each task force consists of two 31-person teams, four canines, and a comprehensive equipment cache. US&R task force members work in four areas of specialization: search, to find victims trapped after a disaster; rescue, which includes safely digging victims out of tons of collapsed concrete and metal; technical, made up of structural specialists who make rescues safe for the rescuers; and medical, which cares for the victims before and after a rescue.

In addition to search-and-rescue support, FEMA provides hands-on training in search-and-rescue techniques and equipment, technical assistance to local communities, and in some cases federal grants to help communities better prepare for urban search-and-rescue operations. The bottom line in urban search-and-rescue – someday lives may be saved because of the skills these rescuers gain. These first responders consistently go to the front lines when America needs them most. We should be proud to have them as a part of our community. Not only are these first responders a national resource that can be deployed to a major disaster or structural collapse anywhere in the country. They are also the local firefighters and paramedics who answer when you call 911 at home in your local community.

Profile of a Rescue

National Response Plan: Under the National Response Plan, US&R teams will provide urban search and rescue and life-saving assistance following major domestic incidents.

Emergency Support Function Resources

US&R History

In the early 1980s, the Fairfax County Fire & Rescue and Metro-Dade County Fire Department created elite search-and-rescue (US&R) teams trained for rescue operations in collapsed buildings. Working with the United States State Department and Office of Foreign Disaster Aid, these teams provided vital search-and-rescue support for catastrophic earthquakes in Mexico City, the Philippines and Armenia. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established the National Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Response System in 1989 as a framework for structuring local emergency services personnel into integrated disaster response task forces. In 1991, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) incorporated this concept into the Federal Response Plan (now the National Response Plan), sponsoring 25 national urban search-and-rescue task forces. Events such as the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, the Northridge earthquake, the Kansas grain elevator explosion in 1998 and earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999 underscore the need for highly skilled teams to rescue trapped victims.

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 thrust FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams into the spotlight. Their important work transfixed a world and brought a surge of gratitude and support. Today there are 28 national task forces staffed and equipped to conduct round-the-clock search-and-rescue operations following earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, aircraft accidents, hazardous materials spills and catastrophic structure collapses. These task forces, complete with necessary tools and equipment, and required skills and techniques, can be deployed by FEMA for the rescue of victims of structural collapse.

Refer to the FEMA Web Site for expanded information from which this preceding excerpt was posted from.

FEMA USAR Task Force System Team Web sites, HERE

Google Earth Before and After Aerial Images of Haiti Extent of Damage, HERE

FEMA USAR Task Force Teams

RESCUE OPERATIONS STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Search and rescue operations in the urban disaster environment require the close interaction of all task force elements (search, rescue, medical and technical personnel) for safe and successful victim extrications. Once one or more entrapped live victims have been located, rescue extrication, coupled with appropriate medical treatment and victim removal operations, must be conducted in an organized and safe manner. This outlines current tactical considerations and general strategies that constitute a foundation for productive rescue operations. Task force supervisory personnel must tailor the strategy and tactics to fit the general situation and specific problems encountered.

It is incumbent on the Task Force Leader (TFL) and task force supervisory personnel to implement coordinated search tactics and strategy, collect and collate related information, and develop an effective overall rescue plan of action.

Standardized rescue strategy and tactics will promote the following:

Effective management and coordination of rescue operations.
Better task force resource utilization and coordination.
Proper integration of all task force disciplines (i.e., medical, hazardous materials, and structures specialists, etc.) in the rescue operations.
The incorporation of assistance from entities outside the task force.
Simultaneous, multiple-site rescue operations.
Standardize training and increase efficiency within the task force prior to deployment and during mission operation.
Increase safety for all task force members involved in rescue operations.
Provide around-the-clock (24-hour) operations.
Organized and rapid victim extrication.

The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the office within USAID responsible for facilitating and coordinating U.S. Government emergency assistance overseas. As part of USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), OFDA provides humanitarian assistance to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the social and economic impact of humanitarian emergencies worldwide. USAID Fact Sheet on the Haiti Earthquake, HERE

As reported on January 13th, the USAID reported the following:

USAID/OFDA has deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (USAID/DART) to Haiti—comprising up to 17 members—and activated a Washington D.C.-based Response Management Team to support the USAID/DART. The USAID/DART will assess humanitarian needs and coordinate assistance with the U.S. Embassy in Port-au- Prince, the international community, and the Government of Haiti (GoH). Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team, and four support staff had arrived in Port-au-Prince. As of 1615 hours local time on January 13, seven members of the USAID/DART, the 72-member Fairfax County composed of approximately 72 personnel, 6 search and rescue canines, and up to 48 tons of rescue equipment, are also deploying to Haiti. USAID/OFDA expects to support up to two additional heavy USAR teams from Florida. USAID/OFDA has also authorized the deployment of a three-person Americas Support Team (AST) to Haiti. The AST, staffed by additional Fairfax County USAR members and funded by USAID/OFDA, will supplement the U.N. Disaster Assessment Country (UNDAC) team in Haiti. In addition, both the Fairfax County and Los Angeles County Fire Departments are seconding staff members to directly support the UNDAC team. Two USAID/OFDA-supported heavy USAR teams from Fairfax County, VA, and Los Angeles County, CA.

Check out the Firegeezer’s latest Updates on Virginia Task Force 1 from Fairfax County Team Deployment, Here and Dave STATter’s911 coverage update on USAR Team rescue ops in Haiti, HERE

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Excerpts taken from the USAR Response Systems Operations Manual

Haiti Collapse Magnitude

The most effective rescue strategy should blend all viable tactical capabilities into a logical plan of operation. The general strategic considerations are outlined as follows:

Rescue Team Composition: A task force rescue team is comprised of four, 6-person rescue squads. Two Rescue Team Managers are assigned to provide continuous supervision for the rescue team. A squad is composed of a Rescue Squad Officer and five Rescue Specialists.

Personnel Deployment: One of the most important strategic considerations for the task force supervisory personnel (the Rescue Team Manager in particular) is the deployment of task force personnel at the start of mission operations. When the task force arrives at the assigned location, it may be best to commit all task force personnel to the initial objectives that must be addressed. This would include Base of Operations (BoO) set-up, search and reconnaissance activities, equipment cache set-up, rescue operations, etc. Depending upon the general conditions present, it may be most appropriate to attempt the following deployment guideline:

As the task force moves into alternating 12-hour operational periods, there should be an overlap of the shifts to allow for briefings and information exchange to promote the continuity of operations. As the operations near the end of the initial 8 to 12-hour time frame, it may be necessary to scale back to handling only one or two simultaneous operations. This reduction in rescue operations is the trade off for allowing sleep rotations for each half of the task force. Deviations from the suggested guideline might be required, depending upon the conditions that are present. There is the possibility that the ongoing size-up and planning information could indicate there being a specific number of viable rescue opportunities that could be accomplished. In that case it may be most appropriate to deploy all task force personnel for a full-scale “blitz” of the planned 24 to 30-hour duration. This would necessitate the full stand down of the task force at the conclusion of this blitz.

Task Force Equipment Cache Management: The overall effectiveness of the task force depends upon the prompt availability of the tools, equipment, and supplies in the task force cache. The organization and management of the cache is important. The equipment cache requires immediate attention once the BoO has been identified. The cache set-up must be addressed before significant rescue operations can be supported. Rescue personnel must be effectively trained in, and adhere to, all procedures related to equipment issue, tracking, and retrieval, as outlined in the Property Accountability and Resource Tracking System. The limited number of specialized tools may require them to be shared between one or more rescue sites during simultaneous operations. It is incumbent upon the task force Logistics Specialists, in conjunction with the Rescue Team Managers and Squad Officers, to coordinate the sharing and movement of these tools between the rescue sites.

Assistance with Search Activities: It may be necessary to assign additional task force personnel to search operations to identify, assess, and prioritize rescue opportunities.

Rescue Site Management and Coordination: Each rescue work site must have one person in charge to maintain unity of command. The Rescue Squad Officer of each rescue squad is responsible for all activities of the assigned rescue site including safety when a single squad operates alone. At large or complex rescue operations that require the commitment of two or more rescue squads to a single operation, the Rescue Team Manager may assume command or assign one of the Rescue Squad Officers to be in charge of the site. A Safety Officer should be identified at each rescue site.

Rescue Site Communications: Communication is fundamental to effective operation of the task force. The task force should be provided with radio channels for command and control, logistics, and tactical operations as needed.

Rescue Site Engagement/Disengagement: A standardized method of engaging and disengaging a rescue site should be followed.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Rescue Integration in Search Activities: Task force rescue personnel may be required to assist the canine and technical search personnel with search and reconnaissance activities. This may include safety assessments at collapse sites, gaining access to voids and other difficult areas, deploying equipment, and conducting physical search operations. Individual void inspections, or combined listening operations may require shoring and stabilization prior to entry. Rescue personnel may be used to staff search and reconnaissance teams. There are specific protocols for Search Strategy and Tactics and Structure Triage, Assessment, and Marking System. These combined operations would be coordinated between the Search Team and Rescue Team Managers, the Rescue Squad Officers, or other appropriate task force personnel.

Rescue Site Management and Coordination: Size-up and site control activities should be completed before rescue operations begin.Once the size-up is completed and the plan of action developed, a short team briefing should be conducted to include safety considerations, structural concerns, hazard identification, and emergency signaling and evacuation procedures. As rescue opportunities are identified, it is important that rescue personnel adhere to a consistent, formalized site management procedure to ensure the safe, effective operation of the rescue squads. The following considerations should be addressed:

Hazard assessment and mitigation. This could include removing trip hazards, boards with exposed nails, shutting off utilities, etc.
A collapse hazard zone (hot zone) should be established and clearly defined along with the operational work area.
All bystanders should be excluded from the operational work area.
An equipment assembly area and cutting workstation should be organized at an advantageous location.

Rescue Site Set-Up: In order to ensure safe and effective rescue operations, the area immediately surrounding the selected work site should be secured. A collapse hazard zone is established for the purpose of controlling all access to the immediate area of the collapse that could be impacted by further building collapse, falling debris, or other dangers. The only individuals allowed within this area are authorized personnel involved in search or extrication of victims. The collapse hazard zone will be identified by an X-type cordon of flagging or rope (criss-crossed) as outlined in protocols for Structural Triage, Assessment, and Marking. When establishing the perimeter of the operational work area, the needs of the following activities must be provided for and properly identified:

Medical treatment area
- Personnel staging area
- Rescue equipment staging area
- Cribbing/shoring working area
- Access/entry routes
- Security and environmental protection.

Inter-discipline Coordination: As the Rescue Team Managers and Squad Officers focus on the appropriate tactics and procedures related to victim extrication, they may also utilize other task force disciplines in the ongoing operations.

Site/Personnel Safety: Safety of the task force personnel is the single most important consideration during mission operations. As a minimum, the following considerations should be addressed for rescue operations:

The safety of personnel operating around collapsed/compromised structures.
Emergency signaling and evacuation procedures.
Hailing devices shall be used to sound the appropriate signals as follows:
Cease Operation/All Quiet 1 long blast (3 seconds)
Evacuate the Area 3 short blasts (1 second each)
Resume Operations 1 long and 1 short blast.
Personnel Rest and Rehabilitation (R&R).
Critical incident stress debriefing or defusing may be required.
Personnel hygiene. Considerations would be the exposure and/or contact with victim body fluids, inhalation or ingestion of dusts and contaminated atmospheres, water, etc., and minor injuries.

Posted by Christopher Naum on January 14, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, buildings, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, Disaster Response, special-operations, Uncategorized, Urban Search and Rescue, USAR • Tagged: buildings, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Collapse Rescue Teams, commandsafety.com, disaster, FEMA USAR Task Force, Haiti Collapse, Haiti Earthquake, international response, Muti-hazards, Response operations, special-operations, Structural failure, Triage, Urban Search & Rescue, USAID, USAR, USAR Collapse Rescue, USAR Tactics, USFDA

It’s more than just Size-Up; Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment

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Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken.

This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident.

Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.

Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.

To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade.

Traditional incident scene size-up is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.

According to a 1998 published TriData study report, “Situational Awareness is one of the most difficult skills to master and is a weakness in the fire community. The report goes on to state that “The culture must change so that [personnel] are observing, thinking, and discussing the situation constantly.” It’s all about implementing effective human performance tools; perceptions versus reality, expectations versus realization, comprehension and forecasting, informed decision-making and calculated and formulated risk.

It’s a whole lot more than just “Size-Up”. What do you think?

Posted by Christopher Naum on January 14, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, behaviors, building construction, command presence, compentencies, courage to be safe, decision-making, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, first-due, incidents, occupancies, pre-planning, risk, risk-based assessment, Risk-preferring, Safety Culture, structure fires • Tagged: buildings, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, commmand, company officer, construction, Dynamic Risk Assessment, environment, fire behavior, fire dynamics, firefighter survival, first-due, incident, occupancies, priorities, risk, Safety, safety & health, Situational Awarness, size-up

Engineered Structural Systems- Hazards

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CNN recently presented an informative piece on the continuing trends in the design and use of engineered structural systems (ESS) . CNN correspondant Gerri Willis provides an informative and insightful look at something the fire service knows all too well. Here’s some additional information for you; According to the Wood Truss Council of America (WTCA), wooden trusses are used in roof systems in more than 60% of all buildings in the United States [SBCMAG 2004]. Truss and related engineered wooden floor systems are also becoming more common. Today, more engineered structures use lighter weight materials, producing …larger spans and clear openings. Trusses can be designed to carry expected loads, be produced economically, be safely handled, and reduce construction costs.

Engineered building components may provide adequate strength under normal loading; but under fire conditions, these truss systems can become weakened and fail, leading to the collapse of roofs, floors, and possibly the entire structure. Truss systems are usually hidden, and fires within truss systems may go unnoticed for long periods of time, resulting in loss of integrity.

Structural design codes often do not factor in this decreased system integrity, as fire degrades the structural members. Fire fighters typically rely on warning signs to indicate imminent truss failure such as roofs and floors that feel spongy or are visibly sagging. Quite often, these warning signs are not good predictors of truss system failures. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) reports that during 1990-2000, structural fires and explosions accounted for 46.1% of all reported fire fighter fatalities (500 of 1,085) [USFA 2002]. Statistics compiled by the WTCA suggest that 4.7% of the total fatalities (108 of 2,286) during 1980-2001 were due to structural collapse [Grundahl 2003b]. Fifteen separate incidents investigated by NIOSH identified at least 20 fatalities and 12 injuries that have occurred from 1998-2003 during fire-fighting operations in buildings containing truss systems.

http://us.cnn.com/video/?/video/living/2009/12/18/willis.new.housing.fire.danger.cnn CNN Reports on ESS Dangers

At least three scenarios can occur in which fire fighters suffer fatalities and injuries while operating at fires involving truss roof and floor systems:
1. While fire fighters are operating above a burning roof or floor truss , they may fall into a fire as the sheathing or the truss system collapses below them.
2. While fire fighters are operating below the roof or floor inside a building with burning truss floor or roof structures , the trusses may collapse onto them.
3. While fire fighters are operating outside a building with burning trusses , the floor or roof trusses may collapse and cause a secondary wall collapse.

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 28, 2009 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, buildings, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Engineered, Engineered Structural Systems, engineered systems, ESS, failures, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting, floors, hazards, LODD, Lumber, Uncategorized • Tagged: buildings, CNN, CNN Reports, Collapse, construction, engineered structural system, engineered systems, ESS, fire behavior, fire resistance, firefighting, floor, floor systems, Green Bay FD, loading, LODD, new construction, residential, structural anatomy, Truss, UL, Willis

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

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Buffalo Box 191

December 27, 1983 Buffalo, New York Five Firefighter Line-of-Duty Deaths

As Buffalo (NY) firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III ordinary and Type IV heavy timber construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically. The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5′s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1′s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32′s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.

Two civilians were also killed and another 60 to 70 were injured. While operating at the rescue effort, another 19 firefighters were injured. The blast and ensuing fire ignited 14 residences and damaged as many as 130 buildings over a four block area. The explosion occurred when an employee was moving an illegal 500-lb. propane tank with a forklift truck and dropped it, breaking off a valve. The gas leaked out, found an ignition source, and the explosion occurred.

At 20:23 hours, a full assignment was dispatched to North Division & Grosvenor streets. The three engines, two trucks, rescue and 3rd Battalion were responding to a report of a large propane tank leaking in a building. Engine 32 arrived and reported nothing showing, but they were talking to some workmen from the four-story, heavy-timber warehouse (approx. 50′ x 100′). Truck 5, Engine 1 and BC Supple arrived right behind E-32. Thirty-seven seconds after the chief announced his arrival, there was a tremendous explosion. It completely leveled the four-story building. It demolished many buildings on four different blocks. It seriously damaged buildings that were over a half a mile away. The ensuing fireball started buildings burning on a number of streets. A large gothic church on the next block had a huge section ripped out of it as if a great hand carved out the middle. A ten-story housing projects a couple blocks away had every window broken and some had even more damage. Engine 32 and Truck 5′s firehouse, which was a half mile away or so, had all its windows shattered.

Killed in the line of duty were all assigned to Buffalo FD Ladder Company 5;

Firefighter Michael Austin,
Firefighter Michael Catanzaro,
Firefighter Matthew Colpoys,
Firefighter James Lickfield and
Firefighter Anthony Waszkielewicz.

Remember to think about occupancy risk and not occupancy type and the factors related to the occupancy usage and the nature of the call. Nothing is ever routine.

WKBW.com Cached video clip, HERE

Buffalo, NY Propane Gas Explosion, Dec 1983, HERE

Propane blast death affects son of fireman, HERE and HERE

PROPANE EXPLOSION 25th ANNIVERSARY IN BUFFALO,NEW YORK, HERE

New York Times, HERE and HERE

Rememberance, HERE and History Repeating Events, HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 28, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildings, events, explosion, firefighting-operations, fires, first-due, gas leak, hazards, in-the-line-of-duty, lessons, LODD, major-incidents, mass-casualty-incident, occupancies, Remembrance, structure fires, Uncategorized • Tagged: 1983 Propane Explosion, Buffalo FD, building types, buildings, Christopher Naum, Collapse, communications, explosion, HRE, illegal, ladder co., LODD, mass casualty, New York, North Division and Grosvenor, North Division Explosion, occupancy, operations, propane, rememberance, response, risk, situational, size-up, type III, type IV, valve

Predicated Building Performance

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We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system. That may be true for conventional or legacy structures, but what about modern construction and engineered structural systems? Same expectations?…….

What do you think?

There’s a great series of photos depicting initial operations at a small-sized (square foot) single family residential occupancy fire that captures fire and smoke behavior, HERE and HERE

Take at look the at this residential fire and interior attack that injured a number of Maryland Firefighters HERE

Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. NIOSH Report HERE. NIST References HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 18, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Christopher Naum, construction, decision-making, dynamics, high-rise, Highrise, History Repeating Event, NIOSH, occupancies, pre-planning, residential, risk-based assessment, Safety • Tagged: buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, FDNY, fire behavior, fire dynamics, firefighting, Flashover, HRE, NIOSH, observations, occupancies, predictable, risk assessement, Risk assessment, risk profile, Safety, size-up, tactics, Wind Driven

The Job: Doing the Right Thing, At the Right Time, for the Right Reasons

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On Monday August 24th, two Buffalo (NY) Firefighters sustained injuries and died in the line-of-duty (LODD) during the conduct of operations at a two-story Type III (brick and joist) commercial occupancy in Buffalo, New York. The 911 call reported someone may be trapped inside the 1815 Genesee Street occupancy just before 4:00 hours. (more HERE and HERE)

Arriving companies reported a working fire in the basement. Lt. Charles “Chip” McCarthy of Rescue Company 1 was conducting search and rescue operations, when the number one floor collapsed, plunging him into the basement. Firefighter Jonathan Croom of Ladder Company 7 entered the building to search for Lt. McCarthy in response to the Mayday call. The mayday was called a little more than a half-hour into the incident. At about 4:09 AM, Command gave the following report:

“Twenty minutes into 1815 Genesee Street. Two-story ordinary. We are now operating three, inch and three quarter lines. We are doing an aggressive interior search. We still have a report of civilians trapped. We believe they may be in the basement. We are going to hold everybody we have including the two and one.”

Command soon asks for the balance of the second alarm. According to published reports and radio communication transcripts, companies reported difficulty getting into a basement door and deteriorating conditions on the number one floor. Genesee Street Command reported at the thirty-minute mark:

“Thirty minutes into 1815 Genesee Street. Still continuing to operate all hands. We will continue to hold the second alarm.” ( MP3 Communications, HERE)

There’s been a lot of talk of recent regarding the fire service cultural divides. We should take a moment to pause and reflect on the job of firefighting in light of the Buffalo LODD’s and refocus and recognize the job of firefighting has inherent risks, and the job requires us to; Do the Right Thing, at the Right Time, for the Right Reasons.

Lt. Chip McCarthy and Firefighter Jonathan Croom were doing the right thing, when deployed on the primary search and rescue assignment on the first-due, and the subsequent search and rescue on the RIT/mayday assignment. Their sacrifice in the line-of-duty, reflects the honor, courage, protection, fortitude and duty of the fire service.

Operations at buildings of Ordinary and Heavy Timber construction require a clear understanding of their inherent structural features and conditions, and a firm knowledge of structural degradation and compromise resulting from fire suppression operations. Firefighter safety and operational integrity is contingent upon knowing how these buildings perform and may be impacted by structure fires within their occupancies. More information and support training materials HERE and HERE. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 26, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: "firefighter safety", building construction, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, command, occupancies, operations, risk

Firefighting and the Built Environment

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If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner.

This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple, it’s that obvious.

Risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting
Don’t mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference, a big difference! When we address relationships of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and FireFighter Safety with the occupancy and structural environment, all personnel, regardless of rank, need to equate the occupancy risk with strategic and tactical incident action plans. These safely compliment the identified firefighting operation risk, with the projected building risk profile and interface appropriate behavioral characteristics in the task level firefighting activities. Again, equating building, occupancy risk profiles with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management. This is what it’s going to take to truly provide a means for “everyone to go home”.
There are new elements being introduced into the fireground operational formula related to structure fires and the buildings and occupancies that defined them. The axiom of Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S) continues to form the basis for effective operations, for it’s the knowledge of the building and it’s anatomy that defines the level of operational safety and incident success share by all personnel and operating companies at the incident.

Risk based response assignments
The buildings, structures and occupancies that comprise typical response districts pose unique and consistent challenges during structural fire attack. The variety of occupancies and building characteristics establish varying degrees of risk potential, with defined and recognizable strategic and tactical measures to be taken-sometimes uniquely to each occupancy type. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This is based on what I define as; “predictability of performance.”

When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner, that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system.

We used to know with a measured degree of predictability, how our buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. This is what our years of fireground experience provided us, and how we ultimately would predict, assess, plan and implement our incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected. Conventional Construction Structures (CCS) had this “predictably of performance.” You know, that typical residential structure, the 2-1/2 story wood frame, the three story brick and joist type III occupancy, the four story frame multiple occupancy, etc., etc. Unlike Engineered System Structures (ESS) whose predictability is rooted in the fact that they are unpredictable.

The emerging fire service issues affecting buildings, occupancies and structural systems related to ESS is only beginning to take hold a prominent role and level of significance that is long overdue. The fire service has been dealing with the operational issues and line-of-duty deaths related to ESS since the 1980s and now in 2009, we’re finally raising these ESS issues to a dialog point that is influencing firefighter safety, survival and operations.

The fire service is beginning to fully recognize the merits in adjusting, altering, and changing our strategic and tactical ways of doing business in the streets. It’s becoming self evident in the fire service that it’s no longer acceptable to think that ESS buildings and occupancies will perform in the same manner as CCS buildings and occupancies and that tactics deployed in both CCS and ESS buildings and occupancies will react under similar strategic and tactical plans and tasks. These unique and inherent factors within the ESS profiles must give us a new standard for operational deployment; strategies and tactics that are defined by the risk profile of the building, its engineered structural systems, materials and methods of construction and the fire loading present.

Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environment- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.

Occupancy risk not occupancy type
Many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehensio
n that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies. We assume that the routiness of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predicable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions. Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.

With this being stated, another primary consideration that must be deliberated and changed as it relates to firefighting and the built environment is the long held fire service tradition and practice of Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments being based upon the Occupancy Type. Sending the two Engine Companies and one Truck Company assignment with a Battalion Chief and a RIT team to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure; is not acceptable.

As I previously stated, the rules for structural fire engagement have changed. Structural Fire Alarm Response (resources) Assignments should be based upon the Risk Profile the occupancy has related to Building construction, systems and projected or determined fire loading. Sending the four Engine Companies, two Truck Companies, a manpower Heavy Rescue Company, two additional Battalion Chiefs, a Safety Officer and support staff assignment with the assigned Battalion Chief on the alarm assignment to a reported structure fire in an occupied single family residential structure, that happens to be 5000 square feet in size with ESS components; IS Acceptable.

There is an acute understanding and corollary of technical knowledge and inter reliance on occupancies, construction, strategy, tactics, risk, safety, physics, engineering and fire suppression theory, This is a fact.
Think about the results of the Charleston, S.C., Sofa Super Store (Routley) Report (part one and part two) and the results and recommendations published in the recent NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Report F2007-18 for the June 18, 2007, fire in which nine career firefighters died in rapid fire progression at a commercial furniture showroom.
There are extensive and numerous examples of issues affecting Building Construction, Command Risk Management and FireFighter Safety. The performance of a building, structural systems, occupancy, fire behavior and interaction of firefighters under combat fire suppression operations clearly frames our focus on the building, occupancy and Firefighting and the Built Environment.
Occupancies & Associated Risks
Each occupancy type has inherent risk factors. Are you aware of this fact and do you employ appropriate tactics in your operations to operate effectively and safely?

 Single Family Residential

 Multiple Occupancy

 Multiple Occupancy -Transient

 Multiple Occupancy -Special

 Business

 Mercantile

 Industrial

 Storage

 Assembly

 Institutional

 Miscellaneous

The predictability of performance
Risks & Containment; Firefighting and the Built Environment.
What are your considerations
Beyond the Fire Compartment
Fire Analysis of ESS versus CCS
Exposure to Products of Combustion & affects
Fire Dynamics and predictability of Fire Behavior
Personnel Exposure Risks- Aggressive versus Reckless versus Pro-Active
Structural Degradation, Compromise and collapse
Previous, historical parameters and Building/Structural Performance always provides a postulated measurement to gauge operational tasks and form the basis for the Incident Action Plan.

These parameters must be recognized and integrated

There is a need to integrate performance based incident indicators derived from engineering, physics, fire dynamics, historical and statistical basis
Basic Size-Up is Antiquated for Firefighting and the Built Environment. – Start Thinking in terms of Dynamic Risk Assessment and Command Risk Management
USFA Annual Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the United States “More firefighters using an aggressive interior attack in enclosed structures die more often, in greater numbers, and with greater multiple line-of-duty deaths than those using the same tactical approach in opened structure fires.”

That’s all Folks – It’s Not about Entertainment

When we focus out attention on Building Construction, Command Risk Management and FireFighter Safety and the essence of combat structural fires; Structural firefighting is what it’s all about, is it not? The reason we have such veneration for firefighting and the fire service and all it entails; has a lot to do with going into burning buildings and fighting fire. We enjoy it tremendously; we have fun at, because of who we are and what we do-as firefighters. But, firefighting has its adverse consequences, with all too familiar costs, in the form of injuries, debilitating accidents and line of duty deaths.

As a firefighter, to say that we love firefighting would be an understatement, BUT one issue that we need to address is the fact that there are many individual firefighters, companies and organizations that employ fireground operational practices that promote the “enjoyment and entertainment” of working a good job within the occupancy compartment of a structural fire in the building environment.

Staying too long in the wrong place, operating tactically in an adverse environment with known hazards that do not have value, other than the enjoyment of nozzle time and operating time in the fire.

Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. As Chief Brunacini stated; “We will risk our lives a lot, in a highly calculated and controlled manner, to protect a savable human life; we will risk our lives a little, in a highly calculated and controlled manner, to protect savable property. We will not risk our lives at all to protect lives or property that is already lost.”

If the fire service can significantly increase proficiencies in building knowledge and equate that to other fundamental operational aspect in structural fire operations, then there would be a direct enhancement to firefighter safety, through injury and LODD reduction.

If we understand buildings, occupancies and constructions, and balance this with our understanding of fire dynamics and orchestrate it with appropriate strategies, tactics and command management, then we made the new safety equation work; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S).

Posted by Christopher Naum on June 16, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildings, Christopher Naum, command, LODD, management, risk, Safety Culture, size-up, strategies, structure fires, tactics

Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety

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Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety; three functional domains common to the fire service, each having a profound influence and interdependent relationship to fire operations, safety and incident management. When we talk about structural fires, combat fire suppression and interior operations, the discussions tend to revolve around the issues affecting strategy and tactics, engine, truck and rescue company operations, tactical assignments, task level protocols, methods and operating procedures.

The dynamics of firefighting and the interaction within a structure during combat structural fire engagement has a correlating dependency between command and company officers; between dynamic risk assessment and management, situational awareness, building construction and firefighter survival.

The relationships of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety are interdependent and formulative to all facets of structural fire operations. These three domains and the functional areas that make up these domains must be mastered in order for any significant changes to the continuing adverse trends in firefighter line of duty death and injury rate can be substantially made within the fireground operations setting.

The mantras of building construction A variety of themes and mantras have been prompted to support various initiatives for the past 30 years related to building construction and in the support of firefighter safety improvements.

Some examples include:
Brannigan, “The Building Is the Enemy” (1971)
Dunn, “No Building Is Worth the Life of a Firefighter” (1985)
Brunacini, “We will Risk” Doctrine (1985)
Brennan, “Make the Building Behave” (1995)
IAFC, “Risk Assessment & Rules of Engagement” (2001)
Goldfeder, “Everyone Goes Home” (2001)
NFFF, “Sixteen Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives” (2004)
Naum, “Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety” (2008)

Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S) is the mantra and axiom I began promoting in 2007 and expanded in 2008 that takes into account the true need for the fire service to have a deep seated understanding and technical proficiencies not only in building construction, but the allied functional areas as defined in the core fundamentals.

If the fire service can significantly increase proficiencies in building knowledge and equate that to other fundamental operational aspects in structural fire operations, then there would be a direct enhancement to firefighter safety, through injury and LODD reduction. If we understand buildings, occupancies and constructions, and balance this with our understanding of fire dynamics and orchestrate it with appropriate strategies, tactics and command management, then we made the new safety equation work; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S). We’ll discuss this axiom further in the near future.

Chief Alan Brunacini, in his “We will Risk” Doctrine (1985) wrote, “We will risk our lives a lot, in a highly calculated and controlled manner, to protect a savable human life; we will risk our lives a little, in a highly calculated and controlled manner, to protect savable property. We will not risk our lives at all to protect lives or property that is already lost.” The simplicity of this doctrine prompted a significant change in perspective within the fire service.

Long held beliefs, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics began to be questioned; risk, benefit, safety, survivability, assessment, value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction were being introduced into the fireground operational formula related to structure fires and the buildings and occupancies that defined them.

When coupled with the NFFF Firefighter Life Safety Initiative #3 — Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities — we can optimistically begin to identify with the necessary areas to focus on training, skill development and operational competencies.

Situational awareness and risk assessment Situation Awareness related to Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety is another mission critical element. Situation Awareness (SA) is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.
It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents. Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported.

Situation Awareness involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident scene to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future.

Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in the structural fire suppression and firefighter domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken. This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident at a structural fire.

To the Incident Commander, fire officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, in and around the building structure and understanding the consequences of building, construction, assembly, fire load and fire development and growth is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety.

The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment related to the building and occupancy is a mission critical element in managing structural fires and in the strategic command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. Traditional phased incident scene size-up and monitoring is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.

Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.

According to a 1998 published Tri Data Corporation repor
t, “Situational Awareness is one of the most difficult skills to master and is a weakness in the fire community. The report goes on to state that, “The culture must change so that [personnel] are observing, thinking, and discussing the situation constantly.” It’s all about implementing effective human performance tools; perceptions versus reality, expectations versus realization, comprehension and forecasting, informed decision-making and calculated and formulated risk.

Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.

The defining questions you should be asking yourself are;
What do you know about building construction?
Do you have a knowledge base on fire dynamics and fire behavior?
Are you implementing situational awareness into your operations and assignments?
Are you utilizing appropriate and continuous risk assessment (RA) and analysis?
Do the risk assessment indicators influence your incident action plan AND modify it when needed?
Does firefighter safety come first?

Or does tactical “fireground entertainment” permeate your structural fire operations?

Did anyone tell you the Rules for Structural Fire Suppression and Engagement have changed? Do you comprehend the importance of this statement as it relates to your personal safety, your team, your company and your organization? Think about it.

Posted by Christopher Naum on June 16, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: "Situational Awareness" assessment, buildings, Christopher Naum, Collapse, command, construction, risk, Safety, training

There are NO Routine Calls

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http://www.blogger.com/img/videoplayer.swf?videoUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fvp.video.google.com%2Fvideodownload%3Fversion%3D0%26secureurl%3DqAAAAKXn9zyzXTyW6NoE_4ojujpCcNk–Eka9cj6vL_U3qHanrwscOGzfZuh08OF6qkR6kW9Jc_R_JBEG13KvX92PowsfusPMeTzVF4rVddN4O1uKs1QVKrFdkPgkoA0QnBemSmWWV8LrUvJLYbZzbhQ9cxjlZ9YqtN9YbYoi8FTOYpnb77jcm-FBoAojURgBy1hIluwsqpdNZIMyePaXKPYIKSHrdl0Gl3Ehc4RubOXbBRp%26sigh%3DDmU6f34sLsc9sWYhKeA0EqlRZ2c%26begin%3D0%26len%3D86400000%26docid%3D0&nogvlm=1&thumbnailUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fvideo.google.com%2FThumbnailServer2%3Fapp%3Dblogger%26contentid%3D308c77b1506fe63b%26offsetms%3D5000%26itag%3Dw320%26sigh%3DVXx_5kQaxJGg3jH-_5EcxU7ZQy8&messagesUrl=video.google.com%2FFlashUiStrings.xlb%3Fframe%3Dflashstrings%26hl%3DenThe adage that the fire service has more recently adopted states; “There are no “routine”calls”; referring to the safety consciousness that all responding companies should endeavor to consider when responding to an incident, that all too often appears; upon our arrival to be routine in every sense of the word. Whether it’s an alarm system activation, a report of food on the stove, or a report of a smoke detector alarming, we have a tendency to treat a lot of things as equal an very routine, based upon the periodicity and frequency of the alarm type and the typical inconsequential nature of the incident outcome.

This was far from it on Thursday May 7th, when Prince George’s County, Maryland, Firefighter/Medics were dispatched on a call that no one is soon to forget. Firefighters were alerted to respond to the Penn-Mar Shopping Center, a large 1-story strip mall, in the 3400 Block of Donnell Drive in Forestville and arrived at 12:59 PM.First arriving crews initiated an investigation into a strong odor of natural gas inside the businesses.

Firefighters evacuated 5 of the 6 stores that were in the area of the odor, a sixth store was vacant. Forty-five people were evacuated from the 5 stores and firefighters then started ventilation efforts and called for assistance of the Washington Gas Company.Firefighters discovered natural gas bubbling up from the ground on the exterior rear of the vacant store and minutes later reported that there was a fire on the interior.

Within a minute, at about 1:20 PM, a massive explosion occurred. A MAYDAY call was sounded and additional resources including paramedics and a second alarm assignment.

Go HERE, HERE and HERE for additional photos and incident details. More follow up HERE at STATter911, Map HERE and Audio HERE

The video clearly depicts the unassuming conditions prior to the explosion, which is quickly followed by the explosion and debris flying and subsequent fire ball. Large plate glass windows blew shattered glass and other debris 60-70 feet into the front parking lot, the roof assembly appeared to have been lifted up and then fell back into place and the rear brick and block wall was completely blown out. Firefighters were in the direct line of the explosion and suffered burns and injuries from flying debris.

Firefighters were wearing their personal protective gear which is believed to have minimized injuries. A total of eight firefighters sustained a variety of injuries ranging from lacerations to second degree burns. Four Firefighters were transported to the Washington Hospital Center Burn Unit where two were treated and released and two were admitted for additional treatment.

The lessons here are clear. Use your personal protective equipment effectively; don’t assume the routine nature of a given alarm will always result in a routine outcome. A good safety drill sheet for gas leak OPS from FFClosecalls.com HERE

Use the STAR method- Stop, Think, Act and Review.

Assume, “what’s the worst that can happen?”, and consider the options available to you as an incident command, company officer or as part of an operating team in your dynamic risk assessment and incident action planning. Stay safe out there in the streets today….

Follow-Up Breaking News: Six firefighters and one police officer were injured in an explosion in Providence RI on Saturday May 9th, when a blast happened around 12:30 a.m. on Pavillion Avenue in the city. companies were responding to a car that crashed into the front of an apartment complex. The Providence Fire Department said crews smelled a gas leak when they arrived at the scene of the crash. Just moments after firefighters shut off the gas line, something caused the explosion. One firefighter was thrown into the street and others were hurt when debris fell on top of them.

Posted by Christopher Naum on May 9, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: buildings, Collapse, command, explosion, firefighting, gas leak, IAP, Mayday, PPE, risk, Safety

Take a Good Look Around-This is Your Town

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As you drive about your response district today, coming back from an alarm, heading to the firehouse tonight or running errands around your community this weekend, take a good look around.

Ask your self a simple question; “How well do you know the buildings, structures and occupancies in your response jurisdiction?”Be honest, do you really understand how those “older residential” structures were built and understand how fire travels and impacts your fireground operations?

Are your aware of the newest features of engineered structural support systems being constructed within that new set of homes going up in your second-due area? Are you aware, that vacant office building is being converted into a light manufacturing and assembly business?

How about those unoccupied store fronts and businesses that have recently closed up due to the tough economic times…. any special hazards or operational concerns to your company should you get a dispatch to respond?

Have the senior members of your station or department shared their stories of operations and incidents at various buildings around your district or community? Did you listen to them, or were you quick to dismiss those “old war stories”.

There’s a wealth of “pre-planning’ nuggets hidden in those stories. Take the time to listen, remember or postulate.Take a good look around….think about any given building, the one across the street that you’re looking at while you wait for the traffic light to change; Think about a fire in that same building.

Do you really understand how it will truly perform under combat structural fire conditions? What’s the building’s collapse profile, how much operational time will you have, what dynamic risk assessment factors will you have to deal with, how safe is it for you to engage in interior operations upon your arrival? How can this building, its occupancy and structural system hurt, my team, my company, my firefighters, my department, me?Sometimes things aren’t as obvious as them seem.

You may have responded and operated at numerous incidents at a wide variety of buildings in your response area, or very few; some routine, others maybe more demanding…the question remains, “What do you Really know about your buildings?” Your life may one day depend on what you actually do know or recollect. Take a good look around ….

Posted by Christopher Naum on March 15, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: "pre-fire planning", buildings, Collapse, construction, hazards, Safety

What Do You Really Know about the Buildings in Your District?

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What do you Really know about the buildings in your district? As you drive about your response district today, coming back from an alarm, heading to the firehouse tonight or running errands around your community this weekend, take a good look around.

Ask your self a simple question; “How well do you know the buildings, structures and occupancies in your response jurisdiction?”

Be honest, do you really understand how those “older residential”

structures were built and understand how fire travels and impacts your fireground operations? Are your aware of the newest features of engineered structural support systems being constructed within that new set of homes going up in your second-due area? Are you aware, that vacant office building is being converted into a light manufacturing and assembly business? How about those unoccupied store fronts and businesses that have recently closed up due to the tough economic times…. any special hazards or operational concerns to your company should you get a dispatch to respond? Have the senior members of your station or department shared their stories of operations and incidents at various buildings around your district or community?

Did you listen to them, or were you quick to dismiss those “old war stories”. There’s a wealth of “pre-planning’ nuggets hidden in those stories. Take the time to listen, remember or postulate. Take a good look around….think about any given building, the one across the street that you’re looking at while you wait for the traffic light to change; Think about a fire in that same building. Do you really understand how it will truly perform under combat structural fire conditions? What’s the building’s collapse profile, how much operational time will you have, what dynamic risk assessment factors will you have to deal with, how safe is it for you to engage in interior operations upon your arrival? How can this building, its occupancy and structural system hurt, my team, my company, my firefighters, my department, me?

Sometimes things aren’t as obvious as them seem. You may have responded and operated at numerous incidents at a wide variety of buildings in your response area, or very few; some routine, others maybe more demanding…the question remains, “What do you Really know about your buildings?” Your life may one day depend on what you actually do know or recollect. Take a good look around.

Posted by Christopher Naum on January 30, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: "pre-fire planning", buildings, Christopher Naum, hazards, Naum, occupancies, risk, Safety

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home". Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)

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