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Wind Driven Fires

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Wind Driven Fires

Wind blowing into the broken window of a room on fire can turn a “routine room and contents fire” into a floor-to-ceiling firestorm. Historically, this has led to a significant number of firefighter fatalities and injuries, particularly in high-rise buildings where the fire must be fought from the interior of the structure.

Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House in Texas, 2009

On April 12, 2009, a fire in a one-story ranch home in Texas claimed the lives of two fire fighters.  (NIOSH REPORT HERE) Sustained high winds occurred during the incident.  The winds caused a rapid change in the dynamics of the fire after the failure of a large section of glass in the rear of the house. 

Wind Driven Fire in Home, Texas, 2009. Aerial view of damage to the structure. Photo credit: Houston Fire Department.

Wind Driven Fire in Home, Texas, 2009. Aerial view of damage to the structure. Photo credit: Houston Fire Department.

NIST performed computer simulations of the fire using the Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS)  and Smokeview, a visualization tool, to provide insight on the fire development and thermal conditions that may have existed in the residence during the fire.

The FDS simulation that best represents the witnessed fire conditions indicates that the fire that spread throughout the attic and first floor developed a wind driven flow with temperatures in excess of 260 °C (500 °F) between the den and front door.  The critical event in this fire was the creation of a wind-driven flow path between the upwind side of the structure and the exit point on the downwind side of the structure, the front door.  The flow path was created by the failure of a large span of windows in the den, in the rear of the structure.  Floor-to-ceiling temperatures rapidly increased in the flow path where multiple crews were performing interior operations.  In a simulation that excluded wind, the flow path was not created, and the thermal environment surrounding the location of interior operations was improved.

Still image from FDS Simulation.

Still image from FDS simulation.  Temperatures at 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor throughout the house 10 s after solarium failure. Image credit: NIST.

Wind has been recognized as a contributing factor to fire spread in wildland fires and large-area conflagrations and wildland fire fighters are trained to account for the wind in their tactics.  While structural fire departments have recognized the impact of wind on fires, in general, the standard operating guidelines for structural fire fighting have not changed to address the hazards created by a wind driven fire inside a structure.  The results of the “no-wind” and “wind” fire simulations demonstrate how wind conditions can rapidly change the thermal environment from tenable to untenable for fire fighters working in a single-story residential structure fire.

The simulation results emphasize the importance of including wind conditions in the scene size-up before beginning and while performing fire fighting operations and adjusting tactics based on the wind conditions.  These results are in agreement with NIST studies conducted to examine wind driven fire conditions in high-rise structures.

LESSONS  LEARNED

Based on the analysis of this fire incident and results from previous studies, adjusting fire fighting tactics to account for wind conditions in structural fire fighting is critical to enhancing the safety and the effectiveness of fire fighters.  Previous studies demonstrated that applying water from the exterior, into the upwind side of the structure can have a significant impact on controlling the fire prior to beginning interior operations.  It should be made clear that in a wind-driven fire, it is most important to use the wind to your advantage and attack the fire from the upwind side of the structure, especially if the upwind side is the burned side.  Interior operations need to be aware of potentially rapidly changing conditions.

See full report, Simulation of the Dynamics of a Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House – Texas (NIST TN 1729, January 2012)

F2009-11 Apr 12, 2009 Career probationary fire fighter and captain die as a result of rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire – Texas PDF Adobe PDF file
SIMULATION VIDEO
With Wind (WMV, 48 MB)
Without Wind (WMV, 35 MB)
 
From NIST Fire.gov site-  http://www.nist.gov/fire/wdf.cfm
 
From the NIOSH REPORT

Career Probationary Fire Fighter and Captain Die as a Result of Rapid Fire Progression in a Wind-Driven Residential Structure Fire – Texas

SUMMARY

Shortly after midnight on Sunday, April 12, 2009, a 30-year old male career probationary fire fighter and a 50-year old male career captain were killed when they were trapped by rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire. The victims were members of the first arriving company and initiated fast attack offensive interior operations through the front entrance. Less than six minutes after arriving on-scene, the victims became disoriented as high winds pushed the rapidly growing fire through the den and living room areas where interior crews were operating. Seven other fire fighters were driven from the structure but the two victims were unable to escape. Rescue operations were immediately initiated but had to be suspended as conditions deteriorated. The victims were located and removed from the structure approximately 40 minutes after they arrived on location.

Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: an inadequate size-up prior to committing to tactical operations; lack of understanding of fire behavior and fire dynamics; fire in a void space burning in a ventilation controlled regime; high winds; uncoordinated tactical operations, in particular fire control and tactical ventilation; failure to protect the means of egress with a backup hose line; inadequate fireground communications; and failure to react appropriately to deteriorating conditions.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • ensure that an adequate initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene is conducted before beginning interior fire fighting operations
  • ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior (such as smoke color, velocity, density, visible fire, heat)
  • ensure that fire fighters are trained to recognize the potential impact of windy conditions on fire behavior and implement appropriate tactics to mitigate the potential hazards of wind-driven fire
  • ensure that fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively apply ventilation and fire control tactics in a coordinated manner
  • ensure that fire fighters and officers understand the capabilities and limitations of thermal imaging cameras (TIC) and that a TIC is used as part of the size-up process
  • ensure that fire fighters are trained to check for fire in overhead voids upon entry and as charged hoselines are advanced
  • develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to insure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday
  • ensure fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures
  • ensure all fire fighters on the fire ground are equipped with radios capable of communicating with the Incident Commander and Dispatch

Additionally, research and standard setting organizations should:

  • conduct research to more fully characterize the thermal performance of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece lens materials and other personal protective equipment (PPE) components to ensure SCBA and PPE provide an appropriate level of protection.
  • Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation could have specifically prevented the fatalities, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments:
  • ensure that all fire fighters recognize the capabilities and limitations of their personal protective equipment when operating in high temperature environments.

FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.1998

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FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.1998

Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at  fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly.  At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.

As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.

NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.

During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”

The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.

The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.

This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE.  NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

Remembering Brackenridge 1991 Floor Collapse and LODD

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Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse

Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building.

Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement.

The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.  

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

  • Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
  • Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
  • Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
  • Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
  • Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
  • Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
  • Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
  • Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
  • Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
  • Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
  • Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
  • Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.

The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.

There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.

This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

  • USFA Report; HERE
  • NFPA Summary; HERE
  • NFPA Report Order; HERE 
  • Issues related to recent trends in floor collapse incidents, HERE

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

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Remembering

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

Buffalo Box 191

As Buffalo (NY) firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III Ordinary and Type IV Heavy Timber construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically.

The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5′s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1′s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32′s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.

Previously posted on Thecompanyofficer.com HERE

The Same Mistakes: Newspaper Reports Common Issues Affecting Fire Operations

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Firefighters rush into a burning commercial building with too-small hoses and insufficient water. The commander can’t reach them because the captain forgot his radio. Backup crews aren’t sure where to go or what to do. Confusion reigns as the building’s truss roof collapses in an explosion of flames.

This reads like the playbook from the deadly Sofa Super Store fire in June 2007, but it’s not. These dangerous missteps occurred at a March 1 blaze on Daniel Island, according to an internal report obtained by The Post and Courier.

photo

Photo by Andy Paras

This blaze at an office building on Daniel Island on March 1 of this year has led to the demotion of a Charleston fire captain and controversy within the ranks.

They occurred despite nearly four years of intensive and expensive efforts to instill a culture of safety in the Charleston Fire Department.

What’s more, the commander in charge that day — a man repeatedly faulted in the in-house review of the blaze — was recently promoted to a top position in the department. And that’s causing some dissension in the ranks.

City fire officials stand behind their promotion of Troy Williams to battalion chief, and they said the portion of the draft report that leaked to the newspaper is incomplete, unfair, unofficial and riddled with inaccuracies.

Fire Chief Thomas Carr acknowledged problems at the fire, which gutted a two-story office building at 899 Island Park Drive. That’s why he authorized a six-member committee of firefighters to conduct what’s known as a critical incident review. But Carr said he rejected the resulting draft report when it landed on his desk six weeks ago because it had errors and failed to live up to its intended purpose, which is to be an educational tool, not an instrument for blame.

The 12-page portion obtained by the The Post Courier newspaper describes “major” violations of policy and assigns blame for those mistakes. It raises questions about the handling of the blaze, the effectiveness of the training firefighters have received and the integrity of the promotion process.

It also highlights the continuing conflict between the department’s hard-charging past and its new, risk-sensitive methods.

  • For the Complete Full version Article: The Post and Courier HERE
  • SConfire HERE
  • Draft Fire Report-Read more: Fire report

High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year

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High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year
  

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is reporting that in 2005-2009, there were an average of 15,700 reported structure fires in high-rise buildings per year with an associated $235 million in direct property damage.

The report, “High-Rise Building Fires,” (PDF, 499 KB) cites apartments, hotels, offices, and facilities that care for sick as accounting for roughly half of all high-rise fires. Structure fires in these four property classes resulted in $99 million in direct property damage per year.

There is a downward trend in high-rise fires. In the last few decades, a range of special provisions have migrated into the codes and standards for tall buildings.

Other findings from the report:

  • In 2005-2009, high-rise fires claimed the lives of 53 civilians and injured 546 others, per year.
  • The risks of fire, fire death, and direct property damage due to fire tend to be lower in high-rise buildings than in shorter buildings of the same property use.
  • An estimated three percent of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.
  • Usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings of the same property use.Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story.  The risk of a fire is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

 In 2005-2009, an estimated 15,700 reported high-rise structure fires per year resulted in associated losses of 53 civilian deaths, 546 civilian injuries, and $235 million in direct property damage per year. An estimated 2.6% of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.

The trends in high-rise fires and associated losses (inflation-adjusted for property damage) are clearly down, but the sharp post-1998 reduction appears to be mostly due to the change to NFIRS Version 5.0, which is shifting estimates to lower levels that also appear to be more accurate.

Four property classes account for roughly half of high-rise fires: apartments, hotels, facilities that care for the sick, and offices. In 2005-2009, in these four property classes combined, there were 7,800 reported high-rise structure fires per year and associated losses of 30 civilian deaths, 352 civilian injuries, and $99 million in direct property damage per year. The property damage average is inflated by the influence of one 2008 hotel fire, whose $100 million loss projected to nearly $40 million a year in the analysis.

The report emphasizes these four property classes.

Some other property uses – such as stores and restaurants – may represent only a single floor in a tall building primarily devoted to other uses. Some property uses – such as grain elevators and factories – can be as tall as a high-rise building but without a large number of separate floors or stories.

  • For these reasons, the four property use groups listed above define most of the buildings we think of as high-rise buildings, and their fires come closest to defining what we think of as the high-rise building fire problem.
  • By most measures of loss, the risks of fire and of associated fire loss are lower in highrise buildings than in other buildings of the same property loss.
  • This statement applies to risk of fire, civilian fire deaths, civilian fire injuries, and direct property damage due to fire, relative to housing units, for apartments, and risk of fire for hotels, offices, and facilities that care for the sick.

The usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings, for each property use group. Even so, considering the extensive requirements in NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, for fire and life safety features in both new and existing high-rise buildings, it seems clear that there are still major gaps, particularly in adoption and enforcement of the provisions requiring retrofit of automatic sprinkler systems and other life safety systems in existing high-rise buildings. NFPA 1®,Fire Code, has sprinkler retrofit requirements.

This has implications for public officials and ordinary citizens in any city. Public officials should make sure that the latest editions of NFPA 1®, Fire Code, and NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, are in place and that the codes they have are supported by effective code enforcement provisions, including plan review and inspection processes, both for new construction and for continued supervision of code compliance in existing buildings.

The public can take responsibility for their own safety by insisting that their public officials take these steps. As in so many areas of fire safety, we know what to do, but we still need to do it.

The trend had been toward a smaller share of fires being reported each year as occurring in buildings with fire-resistive construction, both for high-rise and other buildings, with the decline being most dramatic in facilities that care for the sick.

  • This statistical decline could reflect any or all of the following:
  • (a) a shift in construction between the two types permitted by codes, from Type I (442 or 332) construction, which is coded as fire-resistive, to Type II (222) construction, which is coded as protected non-combustible;
  • (b) a shift to acceptable alternative designs using more sprinklers and less fire-resistive construction; or
  • (c) enough success in containing fires that a rising fraction never are reported to fire departments, because the fires are caught and controlled so early by occupants.

 Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The fraction of 2005-

2009 high-rise fires that began on the 7th floor or higher was 32% for apartments, 22% for hotels and motels, 21% for facilities that care for the sick, and 39% for office buildings. The risk of a fire start is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

  • High-rise apartments have a slightly larger share of their fires originating in means of egress than do their shorter counterparts (4% vs. 3%).
  • The same is true of hotels (7% vs. 5%) and facilities that care for the sick (6% vs. 4%).
  • In offices (4% vs. 6%), the differences in percentages are in the opposite direction, which means that high-rise buildings in those properties have a smaller share of their fires originating in means of egress.
  • In all four property classes, the differences are so small that one can say there is no evidence that high-rise buildings have a bigger problem with fires starting in means of egress.

 

NFPA FACT SHEET

 

 

  • More information on Solomon’s NFPA session and the conference can be found at www.nfpa.org/FLSCONF.
  • NFPA Report Download, HERE

USFA Releases 2010 Fire Estimate Summary Series

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2010 Fire Series

U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) issued the 2010 Fire Estimate Summary Series which presents basic information on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in USFA’s National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). The data summary series was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with the American public, fire departments, and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.

Direct Links to the USFA:

Information from the USFA web site, HERE

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Estimates

Fire Estimate Summaries present basic data on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in the U.S. Fire Administration’s (USFA’s) National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). Each Fire Estimate Summary addresses the size of the specific fire or fire-related issue and highlights important trends in the data.1

Residential Building Estimates

Definition of Residential Building


A structure is a constructed item of which a building is one type.

The term residential structure commonly refers to buildings where people live. To coincide with this concept, the definition of a residential structure fire includes only those fires confined to an enclosed building or fixed portable or mobile structure with a residential property use.

Such fires are referred to as residential buildings to distinguish these buildings from other structures on residential properties that may include fences, sheds, and other uninhabitable structures.

  • Residential buildings include, but are not limited to one- or two-family dwellings, multifamily dwellings, manufactured housing, boarding houses or residential hotels, commercial hotels, college dormitories, and sorority/fraternity houses.

Fire Estimate Summaries of Residential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)


Residential Building Fires (2006-2010)

Year Fires Deaths Injuries Dollar Loss
2006 392,700 2,490 12,550 7,188,000,000
2007 390,300 2,765 13,525 7,527,000,000
2008 378,200 2,650 13,100 8,124,100,000
2009 356,200 2,480 12,600 7,378,800,000
2010 362,100 2,555 13,275 6,646,900,000

Residential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)

Cause Definitions

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Nonresidential Building Estimates

Definition of Nonresidential Building
Nonresidential buildings are a subset of nonresidential structures and refer to buildings on nonresidential properties. Buildings include enclosed structures, subway terminals, underground buildings, and fixed portable or mobile structures.

  • The term nonresidential buildings refers to those nonresidential structures that are enclosed.
  • Nonresidential buildings include assembly, eating and drinking establishments, educational facilities, stores, offices, basic industry, manufacturing, storage, detached garages, outside properties, and other nonpermanent residential buildings.
  • The term nonresidential also includes institutional properties such as prisons, nursing homes, juvenile care facilities, and hospitals, though many people may reside there for short (or long) durations of time.

Fire Estimate Summaries of Nonresidential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)


Nonresidential Building Fires (2006-2010)

Year Fires Deaths Injuries Dollar Loss
2006 98,900 75 1,350 2,536,100,000
2007 103,000 90 1,275 3,015,900,000
2008 97,100 100 1,250 3,496,300,000
2009 89,200 90 1,500 2,804,700,000
2010 84,900 80 1,375 2,400,700,000

Nonresidential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)

Cause Definitions

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1 Fire Estimate Summaries are based on the USFA’s national estimates methodology. The USFA is committed to providing the best and most current information on the United States’ fire problem and, as a result, continually examines its data and methodology. Because of this commitment, changes to data collection strategies and estimate methodologies occur, causing estimates to change slightly over time. Previous estimates on specific issues (or similar issues) may have been a result of different methodologies or data definitions used and may not be directly comparable to current estimates.


Related Topics

Links of Interest

Click charts below to enlarge.

Residential Building Fire Trends: Fires & Deaths

Residential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 Residential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Deaths

Residential Building Fire Trends: Injuries & Dollar Loss

Residential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Injuries Residential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Dollar Loss

Residential Building Fires: Causes Of Fires & Deaths

Leading Causes of Residential Building Fires 2006-2010 Leading Causes of Residential Building Fires 2006-2010 - Deaths

Residential Building Fires: Causes Of Injuries & Dollar Loss

Leading Causes of Residential Building Fires 2006-2010 - Injuries Leading Causes of Residential Building Fires 2006-2010 - Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends: Fires & Deaths

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 Nonresidential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Deaths

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends: Injuries & Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Injuries Nonresidential Building Fire Trends 2006-2010 - Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fires: Causes Of Fires & Dollar Loss

SFFD Diamond Heights LODD Safety Violations

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State investigators have cited the San Francisco Fire Department for “serious” worker safety violations in the deaths of two firefighters killed battling a Diamond Heights house fire in June. Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE  and HERE.

 Firefighters lost track of Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, after they went into the four-level home at 133 Berkeley Way on June 2 and failed to respond quickly to the men’s last radio communication, investigators with the state Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health said in a report issued Monday.

In recommending that the Fire Department be fined $21,000, the state investigators also said the department had violated state rules requiring that two firefighters be designated outside to assist any two firefighters who venture into a life-threatening environment.

Only one firefighter from Perez and Valerio’s engine company – the first on the scene – was available to come to their help during the blaze, the investigation found.

The state also cited the Fire Department for an incident – evidently before the fatal flareup – in which an unidentified battalion chief ventured into the burning building alone, without keeping in contact with Perez and Valerio. That was also deemed a serious violation of safety rules.

“These are serious in that they had protocols in place, but they weren’t following them,” said Erika Monterroza, spokeswoman for the worker safety agency. “There’s no question that a lack of communications was a big issue here. The investigator found there was a breakdown there.”

Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White said the department would appeal the findings. She said state officials have told her commanders that the violations fell short of finding the department’s actions responsible for the two firefighters’ deaths. “None of the citations involved a direct cause of the line-of-duty deaths,” Hayes-White said. Monterroza confirmed that, saying the exact circumstances of the firefighters’ deaths could not be determined.

Valerio, Perez and a third member of Engine Company 26 in Diamond Heights were the first firefighters to arrive at the mid-morning blaze, which started when a sparking electrical outlet set curtains on fire.

The third firefighter manned the pumper hose while Valerio and Perez went inside to fight the fire, but the safety regulations require a fourth firefighter to be available outside to assist.

A scene commander, identified by firefighters as Battalion Chief Thomas Abbott, ordered a crew from Engine Company 24 to back up Valerio and Perez inside the building. For several minutes, however, scene commanders tried to find the Engine 26 firefighters, without success.

There was an unspecified gap between that last communication and any effort by firefighters to respond over the radio or track down the men, the state investigation found.

The reports goes on to state that Hayes-White said the department’s investigative report – still in draft form – concluded that the fire had melted one of the firefighters’ microphone cords, cutting off communications. She said any delay in firefighters’ response would be addressed in the final report.

Firefighters ultimately found Perez and Valerio in a landing area and carried the injured men outside. Perez was pronounced dead at San Francisco General Hospital, and Valerio died there two days later.

The state probe also faulted the actions of the unnamed battalion chief who went into the building “alone and also did not remain in contact with the firefighters who were inside.”

Hayes-White said the battalion chief had gone inside only briefly, had seen Perez and Valerio alive and had never been out of other firefighters’ view.

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/02/BANQ1M7JBO.DTL#ixzz1fUEug7hu

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

 

Remembrance: Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse Fire and the Worcester Six

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Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.   

For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.   

The Worcester Six;   

  • Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
  • Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
  • Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
  • Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
  • Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
  • Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine

   

On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.   

   

Bridging The Gap: Fire Safety and Green Buildings Guide

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Bridging The Gap: Fire Safety and Green Buildings Guide

A Fire and Safety Building Guide to Green Construction

The National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) has released its fire and building safety guide to green construction called “Bridging the Gap: Fire Safety and Green Buildings.” This guide identifies some of the key areas where rapidly growing green building construction issues coincide with building and fire safety needs.

“This guide will give both the fire service and the green construction community a reference point for developing buildings and sites that are not only environmentally sound, but also continue to meet fire safety needs,” said NASFM President Alan Shuman. “This will provide a much-needed reference on issues that impact the life safety of building occupants, emergency responders and the larger community.”

Included are topical areas such as Site Selection and Use, Building Envelope and Design Attributes, and Building Systems and Alternative Power Sources. A key feature of the guide is a series of checklists focusing on plan reviews for commercial and residential occupancies. This document is meant as an introductory guide for fire chiefs and firefighters, building and fire code enforcement officials, architects and anyone involved in building design, plan reviews and construction.

Click here to download a copy of the guide, which was developed for NASFM by Jim Tidwell of Tidwell Code Consulting, with Jack Murphy, as part of a larger program under a Department of Homeland Security Fire Prevention and Safety Grant.

Direct Link:  http://www.firemarshals.org/programs/green-buildings-fire-safety-project/guide/

http://www.firemarshals.org/

 

Los Angeles Firefighters Battle Major Emergency at Townhouses Under construction

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Los Angeles Firefighters Battle Major Emergency at Townhouses Under Construction

Under-construction building fire forces dozens of evacuations

 

Six Townhouses Under Construction Photo, Onscene.TV

Townhouses Under Construction Aerial Screen capture from CBSLA.com

 

Operational Divisions with Exposures (Pre-Construction) Bing Maps


 

A townhouse complex under construction caught fire on November 10, 2011, in the Brentwood neighborhood of Los Angeles (CA).  The six-unit, wood-framed complex was in its construction phase, where at least two of the units were fully involved in fire upon arrival of LAFD companies. Four of those six structures were severely damaged as a result of the construction stage and the degree of open wood frame construction resulting in rapid flame spread and extension to a nearby residential buildings.

According to published reports, the Los Angeles Fire Department was called at 3:37 a.m.  to 12315 Gorham Avenue which resulted in a major emergency alarm classification decared and resulted in the dispatch and deployment of over 160 firefighters to the site. First arriving companies found a large townhome development with “heavy fire showing.”

Largely due to an aggressive fire attack by the LAFD, the footprint of this blaze was kept in-check and fully extinguished in one hour and 39 minutes. Fortunately, there were no injuries to any civilians or Firefighting personnel.

Additionally, five adjacent structures were evacuated for precaution. Two of those structures- one, a small apartment complex and the other, a single family dwelling, did sustain significant fire damage. As many as 10 families were displaced from those two occupancies.

Following further investigation, the LAFD stated it believed the fire was intentionally set. 

According to LAFD.Blogspot.com the following  companies were dispatched with Units: E19 RA19 E237 E37 T37 RA37 EM9 BC9 E59 E261 T61 E26 E292 T92 E71 E269 T69 E62 E263 T63 E43 DC3 SQ21 EM14 BC18 BC10 BC4 BC11 BC14 T88 E288 E88 UR88 RA88 RA827 BC5 E63 H6 RA59 RA92 RA71 EM11 E290 AR2 E94 E226 T26 E93 E210 T10 E15 T66 E266 RT59 EA2 EA1 E229 T29 E203 T3 E233 T33 E68 RA17 RA909 RA867 EM17 AR9 AR17 AR11 AR3 T29 E229 T94 E294 E3 E12

Construction Site Operational Considerations (not inclusive)

  • Pre-Fire Plan Large Construction Projects
  • Understand the various Phases to a Construction Project and how they affect fire operations
  • Identify and train for nonconventional Strategic and Tactical operational actions
  • Ensure predetermined multiple alarm resources are identified and greater alarms are established
  • Train your Company and Command Officers to address Construction site fires
  • Maintain an appropriate risk profile balance with operational needs with personnel safety foremost
  • Clearly establish multiple Safety Offices and establish geographical resources within the incident management system for reconnaissance, communications, and oversight and focused safety monitoring
  • Know you water supply and system capabilities and limitations
  • Determine fire flow needs based upon construction phases, as these change over time as the building goes up. Match fire flow demands with resource availability (time of day gaps etc.)
  • Identify exposures (Physical structures and Civilians) and ensure they are calculated into the incident action plan at the right before there are identified needs or concerns
  • Companies shall maintain a conservative safety posture; this is not the time for overly aggressive firefighting, it is the time for smart firefighting that can be highly efficient
  • Always consider collapse zones: partial or complete. Stay out of them!
  • Respect the wind; it’s not going to help you
  • Consider current and projected weather conditions in your operational and tactical plans and assignments
  • Did I already say: Pre-fire Planning?
  • Be calculated in the placement of your apparatus, especially in larger scale incidents that are defined under greater geographical divisions
  • The fire usually consumes the available fuel load rapidly; going from a Huge fire, to one that is sometimes much more manageable; just watch and control your exposures and degree of fire extension.  Don’t help to make the fire even bigger through ineffective and dysfunctional command and control
  • Anticipate, Project, Plan and Engage
  • Respect the Fire: it’s not going to play by the regular rules of combat fire suppression and engagement as in finished and enclosed structures and buildings.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

 

Photo: Firefighters hose down smoldering embers after a large fire gutted a townhouse complex under construction in Brentwood. Credit: Al Seib / Los Angeles Times

 

Additional Links

 

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

FDNY: Building Collapse Claims Life Of 1 Of 5 Workers Rescued

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Robert Mecea/Associated Press

 
 A five-story building under construction suddenly came down on Monday afternoon in Brooklyn, New York. Three workers became trapped under the rubble after the top two floors fell onto the third, sending it all crashing to the ground, officials said. Published reports indicate that the likelihood of  the weight of the concrete caused the 3rd floor to collapse onto the 2nd floor, resulting in a catastrophic and sequential progressive floor collapse.
 
FDNY companies searched through the pile of concrete, pulling five workers out. Investigators said concrete being poured between the metal pillars buckled the building.
 
The building, at 2929 Brighton Fifth Street, near Neptune Avenue (Brooklyn) fell just before 2:30 p.m. A concrete worker on the site stated according to reports that the collapse happened immediately after concrete from his truck was pumped up onto the second and third floors of the building.
 
Four workers were in the building at the time of the collapse, and one was in front of the building. The one in front refused medical attention.  Firefighters said the framework of the building had been erected, but not much else. Removing the men from the rubble was a delicate and difficult process because of the risk of further collapse. Even after the men were removed, a large piece of corrugated metal hung in front of the building.
 
 

FDNY Twitter Feed

 Additional Links

 

Fire Modeling Software

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An image from a NIST computer model shows temperature levels during the 2007 Charleston Sofa Super Store fire. Dark blue is ambient temperature; bright red is about 800 degrees C (1500 degrees F). Credit: NIST

Fire Modeling Software

These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Fire Research Division at the NIST. The list of programs is divided into two broad categories below: currently-supported software and archival (unsupported) software. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.

Current Software

These models are being actively developed and supported by the laboratory. Details of the software, including download, development, and support information are included on the individual web pages for each model.

  • FDS (Fire Dynamics Simulator) is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of fire-driven fluid flow. The software solves numerically a form of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally-driven flow, with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires.
  • CFAST (Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport) is a two-zone fire model used to calculate the evolving distribution of smoke, fire gases and temperature throughout compartments of a building during a fire.

Archival Software

These models are included largely for reference or historical interest and span several decades of development of computational tools in fire research at NIST. As such, they are largely unsupported due to the age of the software.

  • ALOFT-FTTM (A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain) is a computer based model to predict the downwind distribution of smoke particulate and combustion products from large outdoor fires. It solves the fundamental fluid dynamic equations for the smoke plume and its surroundings with flat terrain. The program contains a graphical user interface for input and output and a user modifiable database of fuel and smoke emission parameters. The output can be displayed as downwind, crosswind and vertical smoke concentration contours. Information on using the program is available with on-line help commands in the program.
  • ASCOS (Analysis of Smoke Control Systems) is a program for steady air flow analysis of smoke control systems. This program can analyze any smoke control system that produces pressure differences with the intent of limiting smoke movement in building fire situations. The program is also capable of modeling the stack effect created in taller buildings during extreme temperature conditions. The program input consists of the outside and building temperatures, a description of the building flow network and the flows produced by the ventilation or smoke control system. The output consists of the steady state pressures and flows throughout the building. Another newer program, CONTAM, may be more appropriate to some applications than ASCOS.
  • ASET-B (Available Safe Egress Time – BASIC) is a program for calculating the temperature and position of the hot smoke layer in a single room with closed doors and windows. ASET-B is a compact easy to run program which solves the same equations as ASET. The required program inputs are a heat loss fraction, the height of the fire, the room ceiling height, the room floor area, the maximum time for the simulation, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the temperature and thickness of the hot smoke layer as a function of time.
  • ASMET (Atria Smoke Management Engineering Tools) consists of a set of equations and a zone fire model for analysis of smoke management systems for large spaces such as atria, shopping malls, arcades, sports arenas, exhibition halls and airplane hangers. ASMET is written in C++ language. For program documentation and a description of the input data, the user should refer to NISTIR 5516, Klote, J. H., Method of Predicting Smoke Movement in Atria with Application to Smoke Management, NIST.
  • BREAK1 (Berkeley Algorithm for Breaking Window Glass in a Compartment Fire) is a program which calculates the temperature history of a glass window exposed to user described fire conditions. The calculations are stopped when the glass breaks. The inputs required are the glass thermal conductivity, thermal diffusivity, absorption length, breaking stress, Young’s modulus, thermal coefficient of linear expansion, thickness, emissivity, shading thickness, half-width of window, the ambient temperature, numerical parameters and the time histories of flame radiation from the fire, hot layer temperature and emissivity, and heat transfer coefficients. The outputs are temperature history of the glass normal to the glass surface, and the window breakage time.
  • CCFM (Consolidated Compartment Fire Model version VENTS) is a two-layer zone-type compartment fire model computer code. It simulates conditions due to user-specified fires in a multi-room, multi-level facility. The required inputs are a description of room geometry and vent characteristics (up to 9 rooms, 20 vents), initial state of the inside and outside environment, and fire energy release rates as a functions of time (up to 20 fires). If simulation of concentrations of products of combustion is desired, then product release rates must also be specified (up to three products). Vents can be simple openings between adjacent spaces (natural vents) or fan/duct forced ventilation systems between arbitrary pairs of spaces (forced vents). For forced vents, flow rates and direction can be user-specified or included in the simulation by accounting for user-specified fan and duct characteristics. Wind and stack effects can be taken into account. The program outputs for each room are pressure at the floor, layer interface height, upper/lower layer temperature and (optionally) product concentrations.
  • DETACT-QS and DETACT-T2
    DETACT-QS (DETector ACTuation – Quasi Steady) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature heat detectors and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire. DETACT-QS assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the height of the ceiling above the fuel, the distance of the thermal device from the axis of the fire, the actuation temperature of the thermal device, the response time index (RTI) for the device, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the ceiling gas temperature and the device temperature both as a function of time and the time required for device actuation. DETACT-T2 (DETector ACTuation – Time squared) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature and rate of rise heat detectors, and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire which grows as the square of time. CT-T2 assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the ambient temperature, the response time index (RTI) for the device, the activation and rate of rise temperatures of the device, height of the ceiling above the fuel, the device spacing and the fire growth rate. The program outputs are the time to device activation and the heat release rate at activation.
  • ELVAC (Elevator Evacuation) is an interactive computer program that estimates the time required to evacuate people from a building with the use of elevators and stairs. It is cautioned that elevators generally are not intended as a means of fire evacuation, and they should not be used during fires. However, it is possible to design elevator systems that for fire emergencies, and ELVAC can be used to evaluate the potential performance of such systems. ELVAC calculates the evacuation time for one group of elevators. If a building has more than one group of elevators, ELVAC can be run on each group separately. Input consists of floor to floor heights, number of people on floors, number of elevators in the group, elevator speed, elevator acceleration, elevator capacity, elevator door type and width, and various inefficiency factors. The output is a table of elevator travel time, round trip time, people moved, and number of round trips for each floor plus the total evacuation time.
  • FIRDEMND simulates the suppression of post flashover charring and non-charring solid-fuel fires in compartments using water sprays from portable hose-nozzle equipment used by the fire departments. The output of the Fire Demand Model (FDM) shows the extinguishing effects of water spray at various flow rates and droplet sizes. The calculations are based on a heat and mass balance accounting for gas and surface cooling, steam-induced smothering, water-spray induced air entrainment, direct extinguishment of the fire by water and the energy transport via inflow and outflow of heat and products of combustion.
  • FIRST (FIRe Simulation Technique) is the direct descendant of the HARVARD V program developed by Howard Emmons and Henri Mitler. The fire may be entered either as a user-specified time-dependent mass loss rate or in terms of fundamental properties of the fuel. In the latter case, the program will predict the fire growth rate by considering the changing oxygen concentration and smoke layer conditions in the room of fire origin. It can also predict the heating and possible ignition of up to three targets. The original fire and targets may also be user specified fires. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the rooms and openings, and the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, walls, burning fuel, and targets. The generation rate of soot must be specified, and the generation rates of other species may be specified as a yield of the pyrolysis rate. Among the program outputs are the temperature and thickness of, and species concentrations in, the hot upper layer and also in the cooler, lower layer in each compartment. Also given are wall surface temperatures, heat transfer rates and mass flow rates. MASBANK is used to create and maintain a data base of materials and their fire properties for use by the FIRST program. MASBANK can accommodate 20 properties for up to 50 materials. The program has the capability to add, delete, change, alphabetize and view the material properties in the data bank. Material properties from MASBANK may be transferred directly into the FIRST program.
  • Jet is a model for the prediction of detector activation and gas temperature in the presence of a smoke layer.
  • FPETool (Software and Documentation) is a set of engineering equations useful in estimating potential fire hazard and the response of the space and fire protection systems to the developing hazard. Version 3.2 incorporates an estimate of smoke conditions developing within a room receiving steady-state smoke leakage from an adjacent space. Estimates of human viability resulting from exposure to developing conditions within the room are calculated based upon the smoke temperature and toxicity.
  • LAVENT is a program developed to simulate the environment and the response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with draft curtains and fusible link operated ceiling vents. The model, used to calculate the heating of the fusible links, includes the effects of the ceiling jet and the upper layer of hot gases beneath the ceiling. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the compartment, the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, the fire elevation, the time dependent energy release rate of the fire, the fire diameter or energy release rate per area of the fire, the ceiling vent area, the fusible link response-time-index (RTI) and fuse temperature, the fusible link positions along the ceiling, the link assignment to each ceiling vent, and the ambient temperature. A maximum of five ceiling vents and ten fusible links are permitted in the compartment. The program outputs are the temperature, mass and height of the hot upper layer, the temperature of each link, the ceiling jet temperature and velocity at each link, the radial temperature distribution along the interior surface of the ceiling, the radial distribution of the heat flux to the interior and exterior surfaces of the ceiling, the fuse time of each link, and the vent area that has been opened.GRAPH is a graphics program which runs in conjunction with LAVENT. The results for LAVENT are sent to the data file, GRAPH.OUT, after each prescribed time step. GRAPH then allows the user to choose two sets of variables to be plotted on the screen and has the additional capability of hardcopy output.

Direct Link to NIST: http://www.nist.gov/el/fire_protection/buildings/fire-modeling-programs.cfm

These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Building and Fire Research Laboratory. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.

  • ALOFT-FTTM- A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain
  • ASCOS- Analysis of Smoke Control Systems
  • ASET-B- Available Safe Egree Time – BASIC
  • ASMET- Atria Smoke Management Engineering Tools
  • BREAK1- Berkeley Algorithm for Breaking Window Glass in a Compartment Fire
  • CCFM- Consolidated Compartment Fire Model version VENTS
  • CFAST- Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport Model
  • DETACT-QS- Detector Actuation – Quasi Steady
  • DETACT-T2- Detector Actuation – Time squared
  • ELVAC- Elevator Evacuation
  • FASTLite- A collection of procedures which builds on the core routines of FIREFORM and the computer model CFAST to provide engineering calculations of various fire phenomena,
  • FIRDEMND- Handheld Hosestream Suppression Model
  • FIRST- FIRe Simulation Technique
  • FPETool- Fire Protection Engineering Tools (equations and fire simulation scenarios)
  • Jet- A Model for the Prediction of Detector Activation and Gas Temperature in the Presence of a Smoke Layer
  • LAVENT- Response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with curtains and ceiling vents
  • NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator and Smokeview – The NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator predicts smoke and/or air flow movement caused by fire, wind, ventilation systems etc. Smokeview visualizes the predictions generated by NIST FDS.

Using Fire Models to Understand Fire Behavior NIST’s fire modeling capabilities can help firefighters understand and predict fire conditions, HERE

FDNY: The 23 Street Collapse October 17,1966 Box 55 598

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Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page

On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.

Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.

Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.

Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.

The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.

Building Construction Insights

  • Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
  • Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”

Fire Building Construction:

  • 7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
  • The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
  • The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.

Collapse Building Construction:

  • 6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
  • The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
  • The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street

    Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011

 

Building Alteration

(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.

(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.

(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.

 The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.

It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.

The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.

The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001. 
 

FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank

Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.

  • DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
  • BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
  • Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
  • Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
  • Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
  • Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
  • Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
  • Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
  • Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
  • Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
  • Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
  • Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18

 

From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html

 

 

A wreath is laid at the new plaque honoring the 12 FDNY members killed at the 23rd Street fire on Oct. 17, 1966. © FDNY Photo Unit.

FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary

Training for the Evolving Fireground

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Check out the new promo video for 2012 from Buildingsonfire.com

Buildingsonfire.com and the Command Institute’s

2012 Training Curriculums and Offerings

Building Construction and Systems Training for

Commanders, Company Officers and Firefighters

  • Building Construction for the Company  and Command Officer
  • The Rules of Combat Fire Engagement & Tactical Operations 
  • Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
  • Reading the Building; Size-up and Tactical Risk
  • The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction &  Tactics
  • Building Construction and Tactical Operations
  • Adaptive Fireground Management
  • The Anatomy of Buildingsonfire 2012 NEW
  • Five Star Command & Fire Fighter Safety
  • The Doctrine of Combat Fire Operations 2012 NEW
  • Adaptive Strategies and Tactical Patience NEW
  • Predictive Management of Today’s Fireground NEW
  • Fireground Leadership  for Company & Command Officers
  • Extreme Fire Behavior & Fireground Operations NEW
  • Firefighter Safety  and Tactical Entertainment
  • Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting Operations
  • Tactical Renaissance:  Building Construction & Tactical Excellence
  • Occupancy Risk Profiling and Firefighting Strategy & Tactics NEW
  • Command Institute’s Fire Ground Leadership Series NEW
  • CI Fire Ground Leadership for Company Officers (Silver Series) NEW
  • CI Fire Ground Leadership for Company Officers (Gold Series) NEW
  • Operational Safety at Buildings of Ordinary & HT Construction
  • Operational Safety at Residential Occupancies
  • Operational Safety at Commercial & Big Box Occupancies
  • Operational Safety at Garden Apartment & Townhouses
  • Operational Safety at Buildings under Construction
  • Keynotes ,Lectures, Special Presentations & Programs Available
  • Other Building Construction , Command, Tactics, Fire Fighter Safety and Operations programs available
  • Contact us with your special or site specific needs

 Download the NEW 2012 Buildingsonfire PDF  Listing: 2012 Buildingsonfire.com Training Brochure Building Construction and Systems Training for Commanders, Company Officers and Firefighers

We’ll be presenting two of our distinguished programs at the Liberty Fire and Leadership Training Conference in November

Make your plans to attend the newest premiere training conference, offering the latests in integrated eMedia, interactive classroom and hands-on training, education and networking? The Buildingsonfire.com family ( consistings of CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com, Taking it to the Streets Radio and Buildingsonfire.com) will be presenting two cutting edge and timely programs at both the Liberty  Fire and Leadership Training Conference on  November 4-6, 2011 in King of Prussia, PA

November 4 – 6, 2011 | King of Prussia, PA

Tactical Ops and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement

This session will present the new rules of combat structural fire engagement and provide insights into integrated command and operational risk management, tactical safety and tactical protocols based on occupancy risks versus occupancy type. Building and occupancy profiling requires knowledge of emerging construction methods, features, systems and components. Coupled with the increasing commonality of extreme fire behavior and the increased fire load package, these factors require new skill sets in reading the building and implementing predictive occupancy profiling to determine appropriate tactics for firefighters, company and command officers.

The class will examine case studies, history-repeating events, the latest testing and research findings on vent path theory, fire behavior, structural system integrity, wind driven fire theory and fire suppression theory, and engage students through interactive exercises and group discussions.

Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling

Presented by Christopher J. Naum
Chief of Training, Command Institute, DC

Today’s buildings and occupancies continue to present unique challenges to command and operating companies during combat structural fire engagement. Building and occupancy profiling, identifying occupancy risk versus occupancy type, emerging construction methods, features, systems and components coupled with the increasing commonality of extreme fire behavior and the increased fire load package require new skill sets in reading the building and implementing predictive occupancy profiling for firefighters, company and command officers. Integral to the presentation will be detailed discussions on building and structural system placarding methods and labeling programs.

Fire Loss in the United States 2010 report from the NFPA

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NFPA 2010 Report and Analysis

The NFPA recently released its report on Fire Loss in the United States During 2010. According to the report, public fire departments responded to 1,331,500 fires last year, a decrease of 1.3 percent from the year before.

U.S. fire departments responded to an estimated 1,331,500 fires. These fires resulted in 3,120 civilian fire fatalities, 17,720 civilian fire injuries and an estimated $11,593,000,000 in direct property loss. There was a civilian fire death every 169 minutes and a civilian fire injury every 30 minutes in 2010. Home fires caused 2,640, or 85%, of the civilian fire deaths. Fires accounted for five percent of the 28,205,000 total calls. Eight percent of the calls were false alarms; sixty-six percent of the calls were for aid such as EMS.

In 2010, public fire departments responded to 1,331,500 fires in the United States, according to estimates based on data NFPA received from fire departments responding to its 2010 National Fire Experience Survey. This represents a slight decrease of 1.3 percent from the previous year and is the lowest since NFPA started using its current survey methodology in 1977 – 78.

An estimated 482,000 structure fires were reported to fire departments in 2010, an increase of 0.3 percent, or virtually no change from the year before. For the period from 1977 to 2010, inclusive, the number of structure fires peaked in 1977 when 1,098,000 structure fires occurred. The number of structure fires then decreased steadily, particularly in the 1980s, to 688,000 by the end of 1989, for an overall decrease of 37.3 percent from 1977. Since 1989, structure fires again decreased steadily for an overall decrease of 24.7 percent to 517,500 by the end of 1998. They stayed in the 505,000 to 530,500 range from 1999 to 2008, before dropping to 480,500 in 2009, and increasing in 2010.

Of the 2010 structure fires, 384,000 were residential fires, accounting for 79.7 percent of all structure fires, an increase of 1.9 percent from the year before. Of these residential structure fires, 279,000 occurred in one- and two-family homes, accounting for 57.9 percent of structure fires. Another 90,500 occurred in apartments, accounting for 18.8 percent of all structure fires.

NFPA 2010 Overview

 

For nonresidential structure fires, some property types showed notable changes. In public assembly occupancies, such fires decreased 17.2 percent to 12,000. In stores and offices, they increased 9.1 percent to 18,000. And in special structure properties, they dropped 11.1 percent to 20,000.

2010 Report Overview

  • 1,331,500 fires were responded to by public fire departments, a decrease of 1.3 percent from the year before.
  • 482,000 fires occurred in structures, an increase of 0.3 percent from 2009.
  • 384,000 fires, or 80 percent of all structure fires, occurred in residential properties.
  • 215,500 fires occurred in vehicles, a decrease of 1.6 percent from the year before.
  • 634,000 fires occurred in outside properties, a decrease of 2.3 percent from 2009.

CIVILIAN FIRE DEATHS

  •  3,120 civilian fire deaths occurred in 2010, an increase of 3.7 percent from 2009.
  • About 85 percent of all fire deaths occurred in the home.
  • 2,640 civilian fire deaths occurred in the home, an increase of 2.9 percent from 2009.
  • 285 civilians died in highway vehicle fires.
  • 90 civilians died in nonresidential structure fires.

 CIVILIAN FIRE INJURIES

  •  17,720 civilian fire injuries occurred in 2010, an increase of 3.9 percent from the year before.
  • 13,800 of all civilian injuries occurred in residential properties, while 1,620 occurred in non-residential structure fires.

 PROPERTY DAMAGE

  •  An estimated $11.6 billion in property damage occurred as a result of fire in 2010, a decrease of 7.5 percent from 2009.
  • $9.7 billion of property damage occurred in structure fires.
  • $7.1 billion of property loss occurred in residential properties.

 INTENTIONALLY SET FIRES

  •  An estimated 27,500 intentionally set structure fires occurred in 2010, an increase of 3.8 percent from 2009.
  • Intentionally set fires in structures resulted in 200 civilian deaths, an increase of 17.7 percent from the year before.
  • Intentionally set structure fires also resulted in $585,000,000 in property loss, a decrease of 14.5 percent from 2009.
  • 14,000 intentionally set vehicle fires occurred, a decrease of 6.7 percent from the year before, and caused $89,000,000 in property damage, a decrease of 17.6 percent.

 

Estimate of Fires by Type in the United States (1977-2010) NFPA Statistics

Reflections of 9|11; You do what God has called you to do. You get on that rig, you go out and do the job

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FDNY Father Mychal Judge

Excerpts from the Last Homily of Father Mychal Judge FDNY Chaplain, at Mass for Firefighters: Sept. 10, 2001:

You do what God has called you to do. You get on that rig, you go out and do the job. No matter how big the call, no matter how small, you have no idea of what God is calling you to do, but God needs you. He needs me. He needs all of us.

God needs us to keep supporting each other, to be kind to each other, to love each other…

We love this job, we all do. What a blessing it is! It’s a difficult, difficult job, but God calls you to do it, and indeed, He gives you a love for it so that a difficult job will be well done.

Isn’t God wonderful?! Isn’t He good to you, to each one of you, and to me? Turn to God each day — put your faith, your trust, your hope and your life in His hands.

He’ll take care of you, and you’ll have a good life. And this firehouse will be a great blessing to this neighborhood and to this city. Amen.

See full text of Mychal’s Last Homily here

Blessed John Paul II offered the day after the events of September 11th, 2001, at his weekly audience of Sept. 12, 2001:

“Yesterday was a dark day in the history of humanity, a terrible affront to human dignity. After receiving the news, I followed with intense concern the developing situation, with heartfelt prayers to the Lord. How is it possible to commit acts of such savage cruelty? The human heart has depths from which schemes of unheard-of ferocity sometimes emerge, capable of destroying in a moment the normal daily life of a people. But faith comes to our aid at these times when words seem to fail. Christ’s word is the only one that can give a response to the questions which trouble our spirit. Even if the forces of darkness appear to prevail, those who believe in God know that evil and death do not have the final say. Christian hope is based on this truth; at this time our prayerful trust draws strength from it.”

Read more: http://www.ncregister.com/blog/remembering-9-11/#ixzz1XbSah6Gg

Reflections of 9|11

Like so many of us, the events of 9|11 have transcended time in a way that makes the events of that day, and the weeks and months that have now  turned into years still feel like yesterday in so many ways. 

As the increased focus and attention on the 10th anniversary of 9|11 drew near and escalated into the remembrance, recollections and reminders of what 9|11 was ten years ago; and still is today and in the future of our nation’s history and heritage.  Each of us has stories, recollections and emotions related to 9|11. Many were directly involved to a degree that all of us certainly desired and to so many who never wished for it. The streaming consciousness of recollections and emotions never seemed to be too far below the surface or recessed in the back of your mind;  but have now become discernible with palpable presence.

Each of us in the fire and emergency services carry with us direct or indirect reminders of 9|11; its history, legacy and the accounts and events that manifest themselves into what our place in time, at that time were and are.

Whether we were at Ground Zero physically on 9|11 or there in the ensuing months and years after or emotionally connected in some way; to this day we each have our remembrances that have made us who we are today and that will stay with us forever.

To many of our brothers, the survivors of 9|11; who worked relentlessly at Ground Zero for months that seamlessly flowed into one another, they endured the effects of those days of days well into the next year. The effects of 9|11 continue to this day to impact the fire service, the firehouses, and the families and loved ones. We are only beginning to recognize the extent of what lies in the years ahead for those who gave so much of themselves in the years that have comprised this past decade.

Last night my family and I attended a special mass service that reflected upon this the tenth anniversary of September 11th, 2001. During the prayers and the service, I began to think of so many personal friends; of those who would be called brothers in the tradition of our fire service – all victims of 9|11.

These were firefighters that I had the privilege and honor of knowing over many, many years, of working with directly in various capacities on state and national level projects, tasks forces or committees, of having the opportunity to run alarms in the various boroughs of New York City back in the day while taking in tours and ride-alongs with their company and the house. There are certainly lots of tremendous memories of those simple days pre- 9|11 and certainly in the recollections and in the tears of the post 9|11 days, certainly up to today.

Each of us has had a journey in our lives in the ten years since that day of September 11th, 2001. We all share a common bond that is defined by who we are and that is; firefighters. We are also defined by our families and loved ones and by the paths these past ten years have given us; and where they may lead us in the years ahead.

 

September 11, 2002 ~ September 10, 2011

  

As Father Mychal Judge stated; You do what God has called you to do. You get on that rig, you go out and do the job. No matter how big the call, no matter how small, you have no idea of what God is calling you to do, but God needs you. He needs me. He needs all of us. God needs us to keep supporting each other, to be kind to each other, to love each other…

We love this job, we all do. What a blessing it is! It’s a difficult, difficult job, but God calls you to do it, and indeed, He gives you a love for it so that a difficult job will be well done.  

  • The First Step or our Journey ( first written and published in September, 2001) HERE

We are brothers; we share a rich tradition, of duty, honor, courage, fortitude and family. Let us take pause today and each and every day hence to truly honor the sacrifices made on that day in 2001 and to honor the memories of those we knew and those that were part of the bond of the firefighting brotherhood that defines the American Fire Service. It’s not something you do, It’s something you are; Firefighters.  

Remembrance 2011

 

In Remembrance of my brother firefighters, who made the ultimate sacrifice; who I had the privilege of knowing;  

Battalion Chief Ray Downey, FDNY

Battalion Chief Ray Downey, FDNY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 Patrol Officer George Howard, PAPD, ESU and Vol. FF, LI, NY

Patrol Officer George Howard, PAPD ESU

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

Andy Frederick, FDNY

Andy Frederick, FDNY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

      

Christopher Blackwell, FDNY

Christopher Blackwell, FDNY

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9|11 Honor and Remembrance: Ten Year Anniversary

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2001-2011

For many of us, the events of September 11th, 2001 will forever be etched into our minds and hearts. The magnitude and severity of the sacrifices made that day by the FDNY as well as the NYPD, EMS and PAPD and numerous other first responders uphold the tradition, beliefs, values and ideals that the Fire, Rescue, EMS and Law Enforcement professions embrace. The tragic loss of lives, the promise of the future; the unfulfilled opportunities and contributions that were yet to be recognized or made by many of those killed and the subsequent loss of completing life’s journey with their families, loved ones and comrades further magnifies the senselessness and grief many of us share to this day.

FDNY Assistant Chief Gerard Barbara , the Citywide Tour Commander on the morning of September 11th whose image was profoundly captured standing in the street within the shadow of the twin towers moments before the first collapse provides a poignant reminder of our sworn duty, obligation and responsibilities as firefighters, and the honor of our proud tradition that compells us to do what we do each and every day, on the job.

Screen Capture from NY Daily News Site. FDNY Assistant Chief Gerard Barbara, City Wide Tour Commander in the shadows of the Towers prior to the first tower collapse. Click on the image to go to the NY Daily News Site for the full image

 http://911anniversary.nydailynews.com/911-attacks-102-minutes-changed-world

I’m reposting an article that I had written within the subsequent days of September 11th, 2001  that was published shortly thereafter. It’s difficult to put into perspective and think that ten years have passed, when it seems like only yesterday. Each and everyone of us can recall the vivid emotions and sentiments that were present in such a raw manner on that day and in the days and weeks that followed. And how, now at the ten year anniversary we can reflected on where we’ve been in our own personal journeys, and what the last ten years have given us and what it has done to the fire service in that time frame.

There have been changes, both positive and negative; but change none the less. Each of us has grown older, hopefully wiser and broadened our perspective on the job, who we are, our families and loved ones and remembrance for those we lost on 9|11 and in the preceeding ten years.

This is why we must remember, this is why we must never forget.

The First Steps of Our Journey

(originally written and published September, 2001)

Honor and Remembrance 2001-2011

Tuesday September 11th (2001) began unremarkably like many others. I began my instructional delivery of a course of instruction on Incident Command Management for Structural Collapse Rescue Operations as part of the National Fire Academy’s field delivery programs in Ft. Myers, Florida. The class was comprised of Special Operations Battalion Chiefs, Command and Line Officers from throughout the region. As we began our discussion on the needs for urban search and rescue preparedness and its relationship to strategic incident command management and tactical company level capabilities, the Ft. Myers Chief of Department came into the classroom and directed us immediately to the station day room. The time was 08:55 hours, and so began our journey.

The class immediately became transfixed upon the televised images streaming before us. The live coverage of the evolving sequence of events, the fire and emergency services responses and the devastation inflicted both in New York City and later in Washington, D.C., and the realization that this was a terrorist attack. For the next three hours we watched in disbelief the unfolding events in New York City at the World Trade Center, each of us fully realizing the magnitude and severity of the incident and the impact inflicted upon the fire, rescue, ems and law enforcement personnel operating at the scene.

The transmission of Manhattan Box 55-8087 to the World Trade Center Towers brought New York City’s Bravest and Finest. We witnessed the evolving events of the initial high-rise fires in WTC Tower #1, the vivid images of the second aircraft impacting WTC Tower #2 and shortly thereafter, the horrendous collapse of both towers.

We watched in silence, fully cognizant of the potential toll the resulting collapses could have on the operating personnel and civilians alike. Following numerous telephone calls home and to my fire station, with the impending arrangements and planning being undertaken for our fire department’s possible deployment to NYC, I began a twenty-two hour trek back home. The journey back was consumed with the constant reports filtering through the radio speakers of the ever increasing descriptions of the magnitude and levels of destruction at what has become known as Ground Zero.

The turnpikes I traveled were filled with the passing images of the initial public outpouring of emotions to the day’s tragic events. Lone individuals on overpasses and bridges, waving our nation’s flag. The flags drawn to half staff throughout the communities I passed through and the electronic message boards along the highway, with words of condolence and encouragement in this time of national grief. Still in my Fire Academy shirt with the embroidered words of the NFA and Structural Collapse, I was recognized as a firefighter and approached by numerous people along my route back who questioned the events of the day, who were seeking some sense of understanding for what was becoming recognized as a significant loss of life to unaccounted for fire, rescue, law enforcement and civilians.

There were the unsolicited words of thanks expressed by people at gas pumps and rest areas up the entire east coast, who acknowledged my fire service affiliation and connected to what they may have seen or heard in terms of the of the missing F.D.N.Y. firefighters and N.Y.P.D. law enforcement officers. This level of acknowledgement, seemed so strange, when any other time, we seem to blend into the back ground of everyday life. All for having a fire service emblem on.

During my travel back to Syracuse, New York I listened to every report, every update and the ever increasing numbers of potential missing on the radio. Well after midnight I ran into a colleague of mine at a gas station, an Assistant Fire Chief from the Metro Dade Fire & Rescue Department, Florida who, along with four other urban search and rescue specialists were making their way to Washington, D.C. as part of the deployed FEMA USAR Task Force Team from South Florida. We shared in our grief over the immediate notification at a mayoral press briefing that our close friend FDNY Battalion Chief Ray Downey was identified as one of three chief FDNY Officers who died during the tower collapses.

We also shared in our grief in the initial reports of the over forty FDNY fire, rescue and support companies unaccounted for as a result of the fire suppression, rescue and collapse efforts. The continuing ride gave way to the thoughts and concerns of many of my friends within the FDNY. Were they on shift, are they accounted for, are they safe? I thought about everything that we have tried to prepare for, the years of developing our national urban search and rescue task force system, collapse-rescue training, terrorism preparedness and the images of the WTC events of the morning. I thought deeply of my twenty-six years of fire service involvement, my brother & sister firefighters, and again- the fate of my FDNY brothers and sisters in New York City.

Subsequently in the days that followed, I became glued to the live televised images from Ground Zero and ever increasing reports of the search and rescue efforts deployed at the incident scene. As I watched alone into the early morning hours the images pouring across my television screen or at the fire station with my brother and sister firefighters, I began to contemplate the journey that lay ahead for our nation’s fire and emergency services. We will be forever changed by the events of 9-11. The most recent accounts have identified over three hundred thirty seven confirmed or unaccounted for firefighters, twenty-three law enforcement officers and over five thousand four hundred missing civilians. Rescue efforts remain the focus, with the realization that the probability of live rescues diminishes with each passing hour as the first week of Herculean efforts draws to a close.

The fabric that binds us within the fire and emergency services, the true bonds of brother and sisterhood in this proudest of professions can not be more poignantly depicted than the image of the three brother FDNY firefighters raising the American flag amidst the mountains of rubble and debris where once stood the World Trade Center. Each and every one of us understands the undertakings during the initial stages of operations at the WTC. We, the fire and emergency service providers protect the heart and soul of our respective communities. We understand the risks and challenges affecting our commitment to protect life and property and to meet those challenges armed with our training, preparedness and tools of our trade. We are the first ones in and the last ones out. The challenges ahead will be immense as the rescue efforts at Ground Zero evolve into the recovery mode of operation, and the continued efforts to bring home- back to quarters these missing firefighters.

In the days, weeks and months ahead, we will be witness to ever changing events in this continuing journey. We will share in the pain, grief and emotions that have become so deeply rooted inside of all of us in the course of these events in NYC and in our nations’ capital. For those who provided direct or support service to the events at the WTC, and those who may yet be called upon to render aide in the weeks and months ahead, each of us understands the calling and we also understand the pain. For each and everyone firefighter, rescue and ems provider would, if they could, would be side by side with those working at Ground Zero.

We must remain vigilant to our own community’s risk potential for future events and incidents and must strive to reduce the gap between our capabilities and those identified deficiencies. We must plan and train for the worst, for it’s not a matter of IF , it’s just a matter of WHEN. Our nation’s fire and emergency services have begun a journey, one that no one could have imagined, yet one that each will meet head- on. Remain safe, stay strong, and meet the challenges of your next alarm, with faith and the foundation of principles that have made our fire services what they are. We are all part of a brotherhood, we share a common belief and mission-we know our duty, we are firefighters, and will answere the call. (Original written and publication; September, 2001)

Waiting for the bell and the next alarm

Remember and honor the sacrifices of September 1th, 2001 and the continuing sacrifices that are being made today by those fire, law enforcement and emergency services workers, support personnel and civilians that worked the recovery efforts at Ground Zero in the weeks and months afterwards who are dying or are afflicted by the lingering effects of exposures at the site and the area.

Remember the surviving families of those lost, remember the firefighters; who they were and remember who we are, and what we do each and every day in the streets of America. May We Never Forget.

Honor and Remembrance 343…the 2,164 civilians and others who lost their lives at the WTC Towers One and Two and let us remember the 184 civilians, military and other personnel from the Pentagon and the 40 civilians and crew from United Flight 93 and Shanksville 

Honor and Remembrance...in the streets each day; Photographer unknown

FDNY 9|11 Memorial Page with Links to each of the 343 Firefighters, HERE

FDNY Video 9|11 Video Tribute, HERE

William Feehan
 
William Feehan
First Deputy
Commissioner

 

Memorial Wall
Peter J. Ganci
 
Peter J. Ganci
Chief of
Department

 

                               From the FDNY Memorial 9|11 Web page HERE
Click here to go to the Chief's Memorial. Click here to go to the Chaplain's Memorial. Click here to go to the Captain's Memorial. Click here to go to the Lieutenant's Memorial. Click here to go to the Fire Marshal's Memorial. Click here to go to the Firefighter's Memorial. Click here to go to the Paramedic's Memorial.
Click here to view the Funeral & Memorial Services.

 

FDNY 343 Remembrance

The 343 FDNY Firefighters killed on September 11, 2001 during operations at the World Trade Center

This list originally compiled  by Don Van Holt, NYFD.com

FDNY 343

 

A Memorial Wall listing the names of 55 FDNY members who died in the last 10 years due to World Trade Center-related illnesses was unveiled at FDNY Headquarters on Sept. 8. (HERE)

The inscription on the Memorial Wall reads, “DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE WHO BRAVELY SERVED THIS DEPARTMENT PROTECTING LIFE AND PROPERTY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN THE RESCUE AND RECOVERY EFFORT AT MANHATTAN BOX 5-5-8087 WORLD TRADE CENTER.”

The names included:

Firefighter Robert W. Dillon, Engine Co. 153

Firefighter Vanclive A. Johnson, Ladder Co. 135

Firefighter Russell C. Brinkworth, Ladder Co. 135

Firefighter Edward V. Tietjen, Ladder Co. 48

Firefighter Walter Voight, Ladder Co. 144

Battalion Chief Kevin R. Byrnes, Battalion 7

Firefighter Stephen M. Johnson, Ladder Co. 25

Lieutenant Richard M. Burke, Engine Co. 97

Firefighter Michael Sofia, Engine Co. 165

Firefighter Joseph P. Costello, Battalion Co. 58

Firefighter William R. O’Connor, Ladder Co. 84

Lieutenant Reinaldo Natal, Field Communications Unit

Paramedic Deborah Reeve, EMS Station 20

Fire Marshal William Wilson, Jr., Manhattan Base

Lieutenant Thomas J. Hodges, Engine Co. 313

Firefighter Robert J. Wieber, Engine Co. 262

Lieutenant Joseph P. Colleluori, Jr., Engine Co. 324

Firefighter Michael J. Shagi, Engine Co. 74

Firefighter William R. St. George, Batallion Special Operations Command

Firefighter Raymond W. Hauber, Engine Co. 284

EMS Lieutenant Brian Ellicott, EMS Dispatch

Firefighter William E. Moreau, Engine Co. 166

Lieutenant John P. Murray, Engine Co. 165

Firefighter Sean M. McCarthy, Engine Co. 280

Firefighter Bruce M. Foss, Ladder Co. 108

Firefighter Jacques W. Paultre, Engine Co. 50

Firefighter Kevin M. Delano, Sr., Ladder Co. 142

Lieutenant Vincent J. Tancredi, II, Ladder Co. 47

Paramedic Clyde F. Sealey, Bureau of Health Services

Firefighter Timothy G. Lockwood, Engine Co. 275

Firefighter Edward F. Reilly, Jr., Ladder Co. 160

Firefighter John F. McNamara, Engine Co. 234

Lieutenant Thomas G. Roberts, Ladder Co. 40

Captain Kevin J. Cassidy, Engine Co. 320

Firefighter Joan R. Daley, Engine Co. 63

Firefighter Richard A. Manetta, Ladder Co. 156

Lieutenant Peter J. Farrenkopf, Marine Co. 6

Battalion Chief John J. Vaughan, Battalion Co. 3

Firefighter Robert A. Ford, Engine Co. 284

Paramedic Carene A. Brown, EMS Bureau of Training

Firefighter James J. Ryan, Ladder Co. 167

Lieutenant Robert M. Hess, Ladder Co. 76

EMT Freddie Rosario, EMS Station 4

Lieutenant Harry Wanamaker, Jr., Marine Co. 1

Supv. Commun. Electrician Philip J. Berger, Outside Plant Operations

Firefighter Vincent J. Albanese, Ladder Co. 38

Firefighter John P. Sullivan, Jr., Ladder Co. 34

Firefighter Roy W. Chelsen, Engine Co. 28

Firefighter John F. O’Neill, Ladder Co. 52

Lieutenant Randy J. Wiebicke, Ladder Co. 1

Firefighter Brian C. Malloy, Ladder Co. 80

Lieutenant John A. Garcia, Ladder Co. 5

Firefighter Anthony J. Nuccio, Ladder Co. 175

Fire Marshal Steven C. Mosiello, Chief of Department’s Office

Firefighter Carl Capobianco, Ladder Co. 87

Remembrance of 9|11, The First-due; Honor, Courage, Duty and Fortitude

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FDNY 343

Remembrance: Honor, Courage, Duty, Fortitude

FDNY: 343 Firefighters | NYPD: 23 Officers | PAPD: 37 Officers

Chicago Fire Fighters Battle 3 Alarm Apartment Fire on the City’s North Side

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Laura Thome Photo

Chicago Firefighters battled an (3-11) extra-alarm blaze saturday afternoon in the Lakeview neighborhood on the City’s  North Side.

The extra alarm was called around 14:00 h0urs for a building on the 800 block of West Cornelia Avenue, bringing more than 100 CFD firefighters to the scene, according to preliminary information from Fire Media Affairs and reports publishedon Chicagoland media outlets.

About 15:00 hours the alarm was raised to a 3-11 alarm, and added an Emergency Medical Services Plan 1 mostly as a precaution, according to published erports.

 At least one firefighter was checked over because of the extreme heat, but there were no immediate reports of other injuries, he said.

The fire has affected at least two buildings, including one 3-story courtyard apartment building.

 

View more videos at: http://www.nbcchicago.com.

 

 

ALSO: Earlier Fire sends several firefighters in for Heat Exhaustion; HERE

Chicago Attic Fire: Firefighter Maydays, Four Injured UPDATED

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Eric Clark for the Chicago Tribune / August 25, 2011

Four Chicago firefighters have been injured while battling a fire in the city’s West Englewood neighborhood Thursday night according to news media outlets. The fire was located within a 1-1/2 story wood frame residential occupancy in which fire suppression operations were underway.

Fire companies operating within the attic area with attack lines operating, experienced rapidly degrading conditions in which published reports indicated the “room lit up” suggesting a possible flashover condition. It was reported that vertical ventilation had been completed on the gable style roof and that coordinated company operations were well established both on the number one floor, within the attic and on exterior support operations.

Research indicates the house was built in 1905 and has 990 square feet of space. Constructed of balloon wood framing, the 1-1/2 story single family residential occupancy is typical of this vintage style housing.

Division Alpha Street Side (Google Maps)

 

Aerial of House and Exposures (Google Maps)

A series of links and videos are attached;

UPDATED:Fire commissioner credits quick rescue: ‘It’s a matter of seconds ‘

Chicago’s fire commissioner credited the quick response of rescuers after firefighters were hit by a flash of flames while working in the attic of a home in theWest Englewood neighborhood. “It’s a matter of seconds before we would have had a different outcome,” Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff said at Loyola University Hospital, where two of the four firefighters injured in the blaze remained hospitalized.

As reported by the Chicago Tribune (HERE) The fire started in the basement of a 1 1/2-story home in the 7000 block of South Justine Street and spread through the walls to the attic, Hoff said. As firefighters ventilated the roof and worked to extinguish the blaze, they were not aware of fire burning inside the walls behind them, Hoff said. Flames suddenly “lit up on them,” he said. “This is an example of how extremely dangerous and unpredictable this job is,” said Tom Ryan, president of Chicago Firefighters Union Local 2. “There is no such thing as a routine fire.”

The two firefighters still hospitalized are a 52-year-old captain who suffered burns to his ears and back of the neck; and a 31-year-old firefighter with burns to his left hand and forehead. They suffered the burns when their masks were knocked loose as they tried to escape, Hoff said. Both are from Engine 54 and are stable, Hoff said.
 
A third firefighter who was taken to Loyola was released early this morning, and a fourth taken to Mount Sinai Hospital Thursday night. Fire Officials credited the Fire Department’s five-person rapid intervention team — which is routinely called to fires — for responding so quickly.

View more videos at: http://nbcchicago.com.


 

 

Construction Insights for Typical Gabled Roof Attic with enclosed knee wall voids (typical examples)   Occupied or Storage Attic Space Enclosure

 
 
 
 

Typical Enclosed Attic Voids and Kneewalls

 

 

 

 

 

The New Fire Ground and the First-Due

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Join in on Wednesday August 17th at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

This edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM the program will be looking at the New Fire Ground and the First-Due

Joining the program will be two special guests: Divison Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) providing a great opportunity to listen to perspectives from coast to coast and the heartland.

Join in on what is certainly going to be an insightful look and discussion of the New Fire Ground and the issues affecting the First-Due Officer and Command…

Both Divison Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) are speakers at the Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference brought to you by Go Forward Training and coming to the St. Charles/St.Louis, Missouri metro area on October 21-23. 2011. I also have the honor of lecturing and presenting two programs, one of which one will be co-presented with my good friend and colleague Lt. John Shafer. (The GreenMaltese.com HERE)

  • Conference Direct Link HERE.
  • Go Forward Training HERE

Incorporating and facilitating the latest training delivery concepts and methodologies and integrating current and emerging technology, social media platforms, eMedia and internet based content management material in order to provide unparalleled fire service curricula, training and education, The Command Institute, Buildingsonfire.com and Fire Fighternetcast.com will be integrating content across a number of platforms to provide you with supportive information and training that will ultimately integrate with the direct training deliveries at the conference.

This segment of Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com is the first step in achieving that goal and process. Look for more integrated materials, exercises and eMedia on CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing developing concepts, methodologies and operational perspectives affecting today’s emerging and evolving fire ground and the new considerations for the First-Due with Christopher Naum and fire service leaders, Division Chief Ed Hadfield and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann.

Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a 36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and the distinguished leading national authority on building construction and fire ground operations. Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2011 All Rights Reserved

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

  • Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening August 17th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
  • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

Gypsum Board Ceiling Systems, Ceiling Collapse and Firefighter Safety

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In this week's issue of the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System's Report of the Week (ROTW) an informative focus was provided on near-miss reports related to ceiling collapse. We're posting the ROTW alert in it's entirety below and are expanding upon this discussion to include materials previously posted on Buildingsonfire.com from the posts that surrounded the LAFD LODD of Firefighter Glenn L. Allen  who was killed in the line of duty as a result of being trapped beneath rubble when the roof and ceiling collapsed during a blaze at a 12,000-square-foot  mansion in the Hollywood Hills on Feb. 17, 2011. (HERE and HERE)

Included in that reporting was expanded information on gypsum wall board ceiling systems. If you don't know about the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System and the Report of the Week (ROTW) follow these links HERE , HERE and HERE. More importantly, get involved and post some of your current OR past near-miss experiences and close calls, so the fire service can learn and everyone can go home. www.firefighternearmiss.com. Check out the extensive resources and materials avaiable on the site to support your training and operational needs.

Near-Miss Report of the Week

From the NMRS & ROTW;

The collapse of a ceiling is one of the more disorienting situations a firefighter can face. Sixty near-miss reports are returned when the keyword "ceiling collapse" is typed into the text box on www.firefighternearmiss.com. Each of these accounts provides lessons on the value of heightened situational awareness, correct use of PPE, rigorous training, and recognizing the effect of fire on building materials. The National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System'ss Report of the Week (ROTW) featured report this week, 11-025, recounts one example.

"Our station was dispatched for a residential structure fire and we responded with two engines and four on-duty personnel… The near-miss happened about 30 minutes into the fire and there were two hoselines in place. One hoseline was on the second floor and one hoseline was on the first floor. Most of the fire was extinguished and overhaul was in progress. There were three members of my crew pulling ceiling to reach hot spots. The lieutenant stated to be careful because the floor above was moving when pulling down on overhead material. The firefighter and the lieutenant continued to pull down the ceiling. This is when the second floor collapsed down into the first floor and the room that we were in…"  

The overhead world of a fire scene is fraught with hazards. Many of the hazards we can dispassionately discuss at the kitchen table, but seem to overlook when we are engaged in firefighting. Electrical wiring, telecommunication cables, structural support systems and storage are all elements hidden behind the drywall. Whether you are looking up at a ceiling that covers an attic or an upper floor, shoving your hook through the drywall is usually a benign act that simply pulls down a section of sheetrock to expose the hidden area above. However, it can also be a catastrophic act that brings down an entrapment hazard that has you fighting for survival.

Once you have read the entire account of 11-025, and the related reports, consider the following: 

  1. Before ceiling pulling begins, is there an assessment of the structural stability and review of what might be behind the drywall before the first piece is removed?
  2. Do you and your crews observe best practices when pulling ceilings (i.e., starting at the doorway and working into the room, noting the location of structural members through visual notation of nails, "shadowing" or "ghosting" of studs, etc.) before pulling ceilings?
  3. Do you consider limiting the number of personnel in a room when ceilings and walls are being pulled?
  4. Who is responsible for ensuring utilities have been controlled before pulling ceilings and walls? How is utility control documented and confirmed before ceiling pulling begins?
  5. What is the likelihood that the space above the ceiling you are pulling is being used for storage? If storage is noted, can you determine what effect pulling down the ceiling will have on the structural members resisting the weight of the storage?

Overhaul activities occur during a transitional time in the firefighting process. The adrenaline and effort of the fire attack begins to fade, but there is still enough pent up energy that some members of the crews are propelled from one action to another without an assessment of conditions. The thinking officer and crew make periodic assessments, or benchmarks, to ensure the incident reality still matches the company's perception.

Related Reports- Topical Relation: Ceiling Collapse
05-553
06-292
07-889
08-305
09-465
10-847

Have you escaped a ceiling collapse due to exceptional vigilance? Have you ever gotten caught in a ceiling collapse? Submit your report to www.firefighternearmiss.com today so everyone goes home tomorrow.

Note: The questions posed above from the NFFNMRS-ROTW by the reviewers are designed to generate discussion and thought in the name of promoting firefighter safety. They are not intended to pass judgment on the actions and performance of individuals in the reports.

 

The Following is reposted from Buildingsonfire.com ( The LAFD LODD link is HERE)

 

Gypsum Board Ceiling Systems and Firefigher Safety

 

The recent events in Los Angeles and the line of duty death of veteran LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen who died Friday from injuries he sustained when a ceiling collapsed on him in a house fire late Wednesday night in the Hollywood Hills again gives us pause to reflect on the demands and hazards present at all fire suppression operations in buildings on fire. The past two months have borne consist reports of floor, roof, wall and ceiling collapses leading to firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.

  • Incident event coverage from this past week HERE, HERE and HERE

The importance of maintaining heightened situational awareness, identifying and monitoring suspected or inherent building construction hazards coupled with inherent occupancy risk factors, and aligning those with strategic objectives, incident actions plans and tactical deployment operations. Building Knowledge equating to firefighter safety is still a driving principle that is formulative to all firefighting operations in buildings, occupancies and structures. Let’s take this opportunity to gain some insights into the material that compromises nearly all wall and ceiling membrane systems and assemblies in nearly all buildings, occupancies and structures; that is gypsum board components.

I’ve included a number of video clips that center on our discussion, as the videos center on the operation parameters at this extremely large (floor area/square footage) residential occupancy. Most clips have good coverage of the structure and firefighting efforts. Take a few moments to review these clips before you proceed;




Gypsum board is the generic name for a family of panel-type products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges.

In 1888, Augustine Sackett used plaster of Paris sandwiched between several layers of paper to produce what would eventually become "Sackett Board," the original gypsum board. By the 1950s, many innovations in gypsum board technology had been developed, including the listing of many fire-resistance rated designs, rounded edges, specialized nails, curved partitions, studless partitions, sound control systems, lightweight gypsum lath, plaster, and gypsum board systems that fueled a boom period for the use of gypsum products in both the residential and commercial construction industries.

By 1955, an estimated 50 percent of new homes were built using gypsum wallboard. Lightweight gypsum board systems permitted the use of lightweight steel in steel framed buildings, which enabled the widespread growth of high-rise residential and commercial construction during the 1960s and 1970s.

Today gypsum board, along with a variety of other gypsum panel products, continues to serve as a preferred building material in both residential and commercial construction for interior walls and ceilings, exterior sheathing, fire-resistant partitions and membranes, and liner material for elevator shafts and stairwells. These properties make gypsum board well suited for building and space types requiring cost-effectiveness as well as fire resistiveness and maintainability.

Gypsum board is often called drywall, wallboard, or plasterboard and differs from products such as plywood, hardboard, and fiberboard, because of its noncombustible core. It is designed to provide a monolithic surface when joints and fastener heads are covered with a joint treatment system.

Gypsum is a mineral found in sedimentary rock formations in a crystalline form known as calcium sulfate dehydrate. One hundred pounds of gypsum rock contains approximately 21 pounds (or 10 quarts) of chemically combined water. Gypsum rock is mined or quarried and then crushed. The crushed rock is then ground into a fine powder and heated to about 350 degrees F, driving off three fourths of the chemically combined water in a process called calcining. The calcined gypsum (or hemihydrate) is then used as the base for gypsum plaster, gypsum board and other gypsum products.

To produce gypsum board, the calcined gypsum is mixed with water and additives to form a slurry which is fed between continuous layers of paper on a board machine. As the board moves down a conveyer line, the calcium sulfate recrystallizes or rehydrates, reverting to its original rock state. The paper becomes chemically and mechanically bonded to the core. The board is then cut to length and conveyed through dryers to remove any free moisture.

Gypsum manufacturers also rely increasingly on “synthetic” gypsum as an effective alternative to natural gypsum ore. Synthetic gypsum is a byproduct primarily from the desulfurization of the flue gases in fossil-fueled power plants. Gypsum board is an excellent fire resistive material. It is the most commonly used interior finish where fire resistance classifications are required. Its noncombustible core contains chemically combined water which, under high heat, is slowly released as steam, effectively retarding heat transfer. Even after complete calcination, when all the water has been released, it continues to act as a heat insulating barrier. In addition, tests conducted in accordance with ASTM E 84 show that gypsum board has a low flame spread index and smoke density index. When installed in combination with other materials it serves to effectively protect building elements from fire for prescribed time periods.

Developed through modern technology as a result of specific requirements, gypsum board is mainly used as the surface layer of interior walls and ceilings; as a base for ceramic, plastic, and metal tile; for exterior soffits; for elevator and other shaft enclosures; as area separation walls between occupancies; and to provide fire protection to structural elements. Most gypsum board is available with aluminum foil backing which provides an effective vapor retarder for exterior walls when applied with the foil surface against the framing.

Standard size gypsum boards are 4ft. wide and 8, 10, 12, or 14 ft. long. The width is compatible with the standard framing of studs or joists spaced 16 in. and 24 in. on center. Some thicknesses and types of gypsum board are also produced as a standard 54 in. width material. Other lengths and widths are available as special order materials.

  • Depending on thickness and type of gypsum board, the weight can vary from 2 – 4 lbs./ per square foot
  • A typical 4 ft. x 8 ft. sheet of 5/8-in gypsum board can weigh 96 lbs.
  • A 4ft. x 12ft. sheet can weigh upwards of 150 lbs.
  • In large span designs with attachments varying from 16 inches on center to 24 inches on center with z-strips or resilient channels attached to the structural members; these ceiling panels and assemblies can fail and collapse in a monolithic manner creating a significant safety concern to operating companies below.
  • As an example a 12ft x 12ft. monolithic assembly collapse ( single layer-gypsum board only) could have a collapse weight of 500 lbs.
  • Add the weight of compromised and attached structural members components, fixtures and insulation and the absorption of added water into the gypsum board from hose streams the combined weight of the collapse area may increase to 800-1000 lbs. Increase the size of the collapse area and the weight impacting operating companies is significant.

The various thicknesses of gypsum board available in regular, type X, improved type X and pre-decorated board are as follows:

  • ¼-in. A low cost gypsum board used as a base in a multi-layer application for improving sound control, or to cover existing walls and ceilings in remodeling.
  • 5/16-in. A gypsum board used in manufactured housing.
  • 3/8-in. A gypsum board principally applied in a double-layer system over wood framing and as a face layer in repair or remodeling.
  • ½-in. Generally used as a single-layer wall and ceiling material in residential work and in double-layer systems for greater sound and fire ratings.
  • 5/8-in. Used in quality single-layer and double-layer wall systems. The greater thickness provides additional fire resistance, higher rigidity, and better impact resistance.
  • ¾-in. Used in a similar manner to 5/8-in.
  • 1 in. Used in interior partitions, shaft walls, stairwells, chaseways, area separation walls and corridor ceilings. Manufactured only in 24 in. wide panels and usually installed as an integral part of a system.

Depending on the type and the use, gypsum board is manufactured with a tapered, square, beveled, rounded, or tongue and groove edge. Some gypsum board types may incorporate a combination of different edge types. The fire resistance of gypsum board can be described using three distinct terms: regular core, type ‘X’ core and improved type ‘X’ core.

Regular core gypsum board is made of a noncombustible core material composed mainly of gypsum. Although it does not have the specially enhanced fire-resistive properties of type ‘X’, regular core gypsum board affords a degree of natural fire resistance.

In the 1940s different gypsum board formulations were investigated to increase the naturally occurring fire resistance of regular core gypsum board. A new product was eventually introduced that clearly demonstrated “eXtra” fire resistance, hence the name “type X.” The basic components of type ‘X’ that give it a superior fire resistance are gypsum, glass fibers, and vermiculite.

In the 1960s, further modifications were made to the original successful type ‘X’ formulations of gypsum board used in some systems – particularly ceiling systems – without compromising the fire-resistive qualities. The new product demonstrates additional fire resistance over type ‘X’ core, and thus the term “improved type X” was coined. Gypsum board products make up the predominant portion of a family of materials identified as gypsum panel products. Gypsum panel products are defined as sheet materials consisting essentially of gypsum. They can be faced with paper or another material, or may be unfaced. Gypsum board, glass-faced sheathing materials with a gypsum core and unfaced gypsum-based products are all considered to be gypsum panel products. Technically, gypsum board is defined as the generic name for a family of sheet products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges. In recent years the family of gypsum-based panel materials has grown to include panel products other than those with the familiar paper facers. A number of specialized gypsum panel products and gypsum boards have been developed for specific uses which include:

  • Gypsum Wallboard for interior walls and ceilings
  • Gypsum Ceiling Board for interior ceilings
  • Type X Gypsum Board for fire-resistance-rated building systems
  • Fiber Reinforced Gypsum Panels for interior and exterior walls, ceilings, and tile base
  • Gypsum Sheathing for exterior walls and roof systems
  • Glass Mat Gypsum Substrate for use as sheathing on exterior walls and ceilings
  • Gypsum Soffit Board for use on exterior soffits and ceilings
  • Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
  • Glass Mat Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
  • Gypsum Backing Board for use as a base for multi-ply systems
  • Gypsum Lath for use as a base for gypsum plaster
  • Gypsum Plaster Base for use as a base for veneer plaster
  • Gypsum Shaft Liner Board for shaft, stairway, and duct enclosures
  • Pre-decorated Gypsum Board for accent walls, office and movable partitions
  • Foil backed gypsum board for use as a vapor retardent

Identified by their technically correct names, gypsum board products are as follows: Gypsum Wallboard is produced primarily for use as an interior surfacing for buildings. It is the most often used commodity gypsum board and annually accounts for over 50 percent of all the gypsum board manufactured and sold in North America. Gypsum wallboard has a manila-colored face paper and is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.

Gypsum Ceiling Board is an interior surfacing material with the same physical appearance as gypsum wallboard. Gypsum ceiling board is manufactured as a ½-inch thick material; it is designed for application on interior ceilings, primarily those intended to receive a water-based texture finish. It has a sag resistance equal to 5/8-inch thick gypsum wallboard.

Predecorated Gypsum Board has a decorative surface which does not require further treatment. The surfaces may be coated or painted, printed, textured, or have a film – such as vinyl wallcovering – applied. It is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.

Water-resistant Gypsum Board is a gypsum board designed for use on walls primarily as a base for the application of ceramic or plastic tile. It is readily identified by its green-tinted face paper and is commonly referred to as “Greenboard.” It has a water-resistant core and a water-repellent face and back paper; it is generally installed in bath, kitchen, and laundry areas.

Gypsum Backing Board, Gypsum Coreboard, and Gypsum Shaftliner Panel are all designed to be used as base materials in multi-layer, solid and semi-solid, and shaftwall systems. Gypsum backing board is used as a base layer for other gypsum board materials in systems or as a base for dry claddings such as acoustic tile. Gypsum coreboard and gypsum shaftliner are manufactured with a type X core, using a specific edge configuration to facilitate installation into specialized stud systems and a type X core.

Exterior Gypsum Soffit Board is designed for use on the underside of eaves, canopies, carports, soffits, and other horizontal exterior surfaces that are indirectly exposed to the weather. It has water-repellent face and back paper and is more sag-resistant than regular wallboard. Exterior gypsum soffit board can be manufactured with a type X core and typically has a light brown face paper.

Gypsum Sheathing Board is used as a backing under exterior siding or cladding. It has a water-repellent face and back paper and can be manufactured with a water-resistant core. Depending on the thickness of the board, gypsum sheathing board is manufactured with either a square or a tongue-and-groove edge and a fire-resistive core. It generally has a brown or light black face paper.

Gypsum Base for Veneer Plaster has a distinctive blue-tinted face paper that is treated to facilitate the adhesion of thin coats of hard, high strength gypsum veneer plaster. It is produced in sheets that are the same width as gypsum wallboard and can be manufactured with a fire-resistive core. Application of Gypsum Board

A wide variety of gypsum board application methods are available to meet virtually any need in building design and construction. Gypsum board is applied in either single-layer or multi-layer systems to achieve specific fire or sound ratings. Gypsum board is applied over wood or steel framing or furring. It is also applied to masonry or concrete surfaces, either laminated directly or attached to wood furring strips or steel furring channels. Gypsum board ceilings can be directly attached to joists or trusses or attached to furring or grid systems suspended below structural members. Gypsum board is generally attached to the framing with nails, screws, or staples. Although nails are commonly used in wood frame construction, screws are often preferred because they are applied with automatic screw guns, have excellent holding power, and reduce the possibility of nail pops. A combination of nails and screws may also be used, with nails along edges and screws in the field. Staples are used because they are economical and can be quickly applied with staple guns; however, the use of staples should be limited to the base-layer in multi-layer systems or to gypsum sheathing on wood framing. Gypsum board wall and ceiling surfaces are typically decorated with paint, texture, wallpaper, tile, or paneling. When pre-decorated gypsum board is used, joints are generally covered with matching molding or battens; no additional finishing or decoration is necessary. Single-Layer Application

  • Single-layer gypsum board applications are the most common in light commercial and in residential construction.
  • These systems rely on one layer of gypsum board attached to framing or furring.
  • Although single-layer gypsum board systems are generally adequate to meet most minimum requirements for fire resistance and sound control, multi-layer systems are preferred for higher quality construction and to upgrade beyond the "bare minimums" of many code requirements.

Multi-Layer Application

  • Multi-layer systems have two or more layers of gypsum board and are used to meet higher sound and fire resistance requirements or to enhance these comfort and safety qualities beyond minimum code requirements.
  • They also provide better surface quality because face layers can often be laminated over base layers eliminating many or all of the fasteners in the face layer. In addition, face-layer joints are stronger by virtue of the continuous backing provided by the base layers.
  • Nail pops and ridging are less frequent and imperfectly aligned framing has less effect on the quality of the finished surface.

GYPSUM BOARD TYPICAL MECHANICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES (GA-235-10) A common misconception is that there are just two basic types of drywall—regular and type X—and beyond this difference, drywall products from various manufacturers are about the same. However, laboratory fire tests by United States Gypsum Company and various independent testing organizations provide strong evidence that there are significant fire-performance differences between drywall products from various manufacturers. It is well known in the construction industry that the single most important characteristic of gypsum drywall is its fire resistance. This is provided by the principal raw material used in its manufacture, CaSO4- 2H2O (gypsum). As the chemical formula shows, gypsum contains chemically combined water (about 50% by volume). When gypsum drywall panels are exposed to fire, the heat converts a portion of the combined water to steam. The heat energy that converts water to steam is thus used up, keeping the opposite side of the gypsum panel cool as long as there is water left in the gypsum, or until the gypsum panel is breached.

  • In the case of regular gypsum panels, as the water is driven off by heat, the reduction in volume within the gypsum causes large cracks to form, eventually causing the panel to fail.
  • In a special fire test designed to demonstrate the relative performance of different types of gypsum cores (described later in this section), it was shown that in a fire with a temperature of 1,850ºF, a 5/8" thickness of regular-core gypsum panels would fail in this manner in 10 to 15 minutes.
  • Type X gypsum panels, such as Sheetrock brand Firecode gypsum panels, have glass fibers mixed with the gypsum to reinforce the core of the panels.
  • These fibers have the effect of reducing the extent of and size of the cracks that form as the water is driven off, thereby extending the length of time the gypsum panel can resist the heat without failure.
  • Fire test results indicate that the same thickness of the type X gypsum drywall exposed to the same temperature (1,850ºF) will last 45 to 60 minutes.

USG has developed a third-generation gypsum drywall product called Sheetrock brand Firecode C gypsum panels that provides even greater resistance to the heat of fire. The core of Firecode C contains more glass fibers than type X—but also a shrinkage-compensating additive, a form of vermiculite that expands in the presence of heat at about the same rate as the gypsum in the core shrinks (from loss of water). Thus the core becomes highly stable in the presence of fire and remains intact even after the combined water is driven off. Tests have shown that this third-generation product resisted the fire for more than two hours, as compared to 45 to 60 minutes for the type X, and 10 to 15minutes for the regular panel under the same test conditions.

In a future posting we’ll discuss the issues facing the fire service related to the newest generation of impact resistant gypsum board that will restrict or preclude entirely our ability to breach walls in residential or commercial occupancies. Here are some links and Spec Sheets to look at in advance, HERE , HERE, HERE and HERE  

References and Links Summarizing the many different types of gypsum board used in the industry, this quick reference gives typical uses of, and the ASTM and CSA standards for, each type. Also included is the appropriate industry standard designation for the installation of each type of gypsum board, along with the sizes and thicknesses generally available. Download


APPLICATION OF GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-253-07)

This publication describes the industry's latest recommendations for handling, storing, and installing gypsum sheathing under a variety of conditions. A must for anyone hanging gypsum sheathing or involved in EIFS work. Download

  


FIRE-RESISTANT GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-254-07)

This publication describes the advantages, recommended uses, limitations, and properties of gypsum sheathing in exterior walls.

Download

Gypsum Construction Handbook

  • Reference guide of construction procedures for gypsum drywall, cement board, veneer plaster and conventional plaster.

Trade Associations and other Organizations

  • Association of the Wall and Ceiling Industry (AWCI)—Provides services and undertake activities that enhance the members' ability to operate a successful business. AWCI represents acoustics systems, ceiling systems, drywall systems, exterior insulation and finishing systems, fireproofing, flooring systems, insulation, and stucco contractors, suppliers and manufacturers, and allied trades.
  • ASTM International (ASTM)—Provides a global forum for the development and publication of voluntary consensus standards for materials, products, systems, and services. In over 130 varied industry areas, ASTM standards serve as the basis for manufacturing, procurement, and regulatory activities. Provides standards that are accepted and used in research and development, product testing, quality systems, and commercial transactions around the globe.
  • Ceilings and Interior Systems Construction Association (CISCA)—Association for the advancement interior commercial construction, providing education, technical guidance and related resources. CISCA membership includes over 600 of the leading contractors, distributors, manufacturers and independent manufacturer's representatives worldwide.
  • Gypsum Association (GA)—Founded in 1930, GA promotes the use of gypsum while advancing the development, growth, and general welfare of the gypsum industry in the United States and Canada on behalf of its member companies.
  • ICC Evaluation Service (ICC-ES)—Provides technical evaluations of building products, components, methods, and materials and issues reports on code compliance to building regulators, contractors, specifiers, architects, engineers, and the public.

Relevant Codes and Standards

Guide Specifications

NIOSH LODD Report Released on Fire and Collapse Which Killed Two Chicago Firefighters

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NIOSH LODD Report Released on Fire and Collapse Which Killed Two Chicago Firefighters
F2010-38  Two Career Fire Fighters Die and 19 Injured in Roof Collapse during Rubbish Fire at an Abandoned Commercial Structure – Illinois

NIOSH Executive Summary
On December 22, 2010, a 47-year-old male (Victim # 1) and a 34-year old male (Victim # 2), both career fire fighters, died when the roof collapsed during suppression operations at a rubbish fire in an abandoned and unsecured commercial structure. The bowstring truss roof collapsed at the rear of the 84-year old structure approximately 16 minutes after the initial companies arrived on-scene and within minutes after the Incident Commander reported that the fire was under control. The structure, the former site of a commercial laundry, had been abandoned for over 5 years and city officials had previously cited the building owners for the deteriorated condition of the structure and ordered the owner to either repair or demolish the structure. The victims were members of the first alarm assignment and were working inside the structure. A total of 19 other fire fighters were hurt during the collapse.

Contributing Factors

 

  • Lack of a vacant / hazardous building marking program within the city
  • Vacant / hazardous building information not part of automatic dispatch system
  • Dilapidated condition of the structure
  • Dispatch occurred during shift change resulting in fragmented crews
  • Weather conditions including snow accumulation on roof and frozen water hydrants
  • Not all fire fighters equipped with radios.

Key Recommendations

  • Identify and mark buildings that present hazards to fire fighters and the public
  • Use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially abandoned or vacant unsecured structures
  • Train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
  • Provide battalion chiefs with a staff assistant or chief's aide to help manage information and communication
  • Provide all fire fighters with radios and train them on their proper use
  • Develop, train on, and enforce the use of standard operating procedures that specifically address operations in abandoned and vacant structures

NIOSH Recommendations

  • Recommendation #1: Fire departments and city building departments should work together to identify and mark buildings that present hazards to fire fighters and the public.
  • Recommendation #2: Fire departments should use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially abandoned or vacant unsecured structures.
  • Recommendation # 3: Fire departments should train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates.
  • Recommendation # 4: Fire departments should consider providing battalion chiefs with a staff assistant or chief's aide to help manage information and communication.
  • Recommendation # 5: Fire departments should provide all fire fighters with radios and train them on their proper use.
  • Recommendation # 6: Fire departments should develop, train on and enforce the use of standard operating procedures that specifically address operations in abandoned and vacant structures.
  • Recommendation # 7: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to ensure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday.
  • Recommendation # 8: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
  • Recommendation # 9: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures.
  • Recommendation #10: Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters are trained in and understand the hazards associated with bowstring truss construction.

FULL NIOSH LODD REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS, HERE

 

The tragic events in the City of Chicago on Wednesday December 22, 2010, when Chicago Firefighter Edward J. Stringer – Engine Co.63 and Firefighter/EMT Corey D. Ankum, Truck Co.34 were killed in the line of duty while operating at a structure fire in an abandoned one-story brick building in the 1700 block of East 75th Street on the City’s South side, exemplifies the demands, challenges and sacrifice that come with responsibilities, duty and sworn obligation  that distinguishes the honorable profession of being a firefighter.     

The fire was first reported at about 06:48 hours during the night and day tour shift change, with companies arriving at 06:52 hours reporting moderate fire in the  buildings northeast corner. The single story commercial structure was vacant, however it was readily known that squatters were known to seek shelter in the abandoned structure especially give the harsh weather being experienced in the city. The fire was quickly contained at approximately 07:00 hours according to published reports, and radio communications, with coordinated suppression, search and rescue and ventilation operations being conduction by companied both within the interior and on the roof. 

Other Operational Safety Insights and Considerations from CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com

  • During all operations involving actual or suspected Bowstring Truss Roofing Support Systems Command and Company Officers should be sensitive to risk assessment indicators related to both fire induced conditions as well as environmental and age induced factors.
  • Pre-plan your buildings look at the construction, components, features and condition of the building; there is a tremendous amount of information out there. Understand and comprehend what to look for, what it is that you’re looking at and more importantly make sure the information is retrievable for on-scene application and that the information is utilized when formulating IAP and in the dynamic risk assessment process
  • During Dynamic Risk Assessment, special attention should be focused on Predicated Building Performance common to identified building systems, features and structural systems that are based upon Occupancy Performance and NOT Occupancy Type.
  • The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report examining the characteristics of fires in vacant residential buildings. The report, Vacant Residential Building Fires, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and provides useful insights and recommendations. Link HERE
  • When developing incident action plans and operational assignments at incidents involving possible Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures, command and company officers shall implement a formulative risk -benefit assessment consistent with departmental procedures, policies and expectations.
  • Be knowledgable of operational factors and considerations related to operations at Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures; HERE and HERE
  • Read the Newest NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters at Structure Fires, HERE
  • Start considering building; age, deterioration, environmental impacts and influences in your IAP and tactical considerations, we at times forget to consider these performance indicators effectively during initial or sustained operations.
  • Learn more about Building Construction, Occupancy Profiling, Reading a Building, Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type and always consider Tactical Patience.
  • Increase your knowledge on Structural Collapse indicators especially for buildings of masonry construction in both Type III and Type IV construction.
  • There is a Predictability of Performance in all Buildings and Occupancies with Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural Systems; Know what they are.
  • Understand what to look for in Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural System integrity related to; Age and Deterioration, Gravity, Cross Grain Shrinkage, Wood Defects that are self-evident in chords and web members, Upper Chord Buckling, Lower Chord splitting or failure points, web splitting or pull-outs, multiple roofing systems or membranes, multiple void spaces, compromised bearing walls or pilasters, compromised or degraded bearing points or truss ends.
  • Learn to identify masonry wall features and what they mean towards tactical operations
  • In smaller single story occupancies; any loss of structural integrity of a single truss component would likely cause the compromise or collapse of adjacent truss components and connective decking planks due to the interdependence and connectivity of the roofing support (trusses), purlins, rafters and roofing planks and outer membrane system. 
  • Typically the failure of one bowstring truss span will compromise or cause the collapse of each adjacent truss to either side of the original affected truss causing the failure of a sizeable roof area.
  • Companies operating on such affected roof area areas are subject to high risk and vulnerability should the roof area fail. Refer to the incident conditions and structural collapse from the Waldbaum’s Collapse, FDNY August 2, 1978. Go to the incident overview at Commandsafety.com HERE.
  • In smaller square foot commercial occupancies that have shallow depth bowstring truss components and both limited spans (less than 100 linear feet clear span) and number of trusses (six or less) the likelihood of a catastrophic roof collapse should be considered highly predicable in all incident action plans and during incident status monitoring.
  • The loss of load bearing and load transfer capabilities at these wall connections can contribute towards failure and collapse conditions. The end connections points (end cap or end shoe) of a bowstring truss are critical towards maintain truss performance and structural integrity.
  • The loss of truss axial orientation, resultant excessive deflection, loss of integrity of chord/ web geometry and connection points can lead to failure mechanisms and a cascading effect due to transferring of loads and possible overstressing and directly lead to subsequent failures.
  • It should be noted that fire service personnel should have a high degree of respect for the danger and susceptible risk imposed by compromised or failing bearing and non-load bearing walls.
  • Collapse zones must be established and access controlled based upon physical incident scene layout, access and proximal exposure structures.
  • All fire service personnel should have awareness level training and an understanding of recognizing collapse indicators for buildings of masonry construction and tactical safety considerations
  • Company and Command Officers must have a higher level of knowledge and training to be able to recognize subtle or obvious construction, conditions or indicators that will affect IAP, strategic, tactical or task assignments and be able to act upon those indicators with immediacy and urgency as conditions and risk dictate.
  • The Collapse Zone should be at a minimum be equal to the full height of the exterior masonry wall face and also take into consideration additional distance due building material momentum, bounce and toss due to individual bricks, steel lintels and other components and materials acting as projectiles and traveling distances greater than the defined “collapse zone”.

From CommandSafety.com' s 2010 postings: Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse and Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse-PDF Download

Some additional Insight Materials for discussion from CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com   

Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies Training Download 

Note: CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com is in the process of revising and expanding this Training Download.

We hope to have the update published in early September 2011. Watch for posting announcements

Take at Look at this: Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Types

Resources:

  • National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Operational Safety Considerations at Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies PowerPoint Program developed by Christopher Naum, HERE  
  •  Informational Support  Narrative download, HERE


Do you know what to look for upon arrival?
What Building features and factors will affect your operations?
 

Program Screenshot

 

The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens. 

 

 

 

 

 

For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics covered include:

  • Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
  • Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
  • Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
  • Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
  • Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

 
 
Take some time to look at the Photos from Tom Olk at http://olkee.smugmug.com/

 

Chicago Fire Department Funeral Service For Fire Fighter Ed Stringer

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT FUNERAL SERVICES FOR FALLEN FIRE FIGHTER EDWARD STRINGER Engine Co # 63 & Truck Co # 16 :

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT FUNERAL SERVICES FOR FALLEN FIRE FIGHTER EDWARD STRINGER Engine Co # 63 & Truck Co # 16

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT FUNERAL SERVICE FOR FIREFIGHTER COREY ANKUM FROM ENGINE CO#72 AND TOWER LADDER # 34 :

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT FUNERAL SERVICE FOR FIREFIGHTER COREY ANKUM FROM ENGINE CO#72 AND TOWER LADDER # 34

Chicago Fire Department 3-11 Alarm Fire W/a EMS Plan 2 And a Mayday For the Roof collapse At The Working Fire :

Chicago Fire Department 3-11 Alarm Fire W/a EMS Plan 2 And a Mayday For the Roof collapse At The Working Fire

 

Standpipe Systems and Operational Insights

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The Fire Deparment Connection

 

There are some discussions emanating and emerging regarding the Medical Center Fire in Asheville, NC that claimed the life of a highly regarded Captain and injured numerous firefighters. Emerging reports are discussing water supply, standpipe operability and integrity and deployment delays affecting fire behavior, growth, intensive and operational risks during the time in which water was attempting to be delivered to hand lines extended on the fire floor of the Medical Center.

See coverage HERE on CommandSafety.com and HERE at the Asheville Citizens-Times.com today. Direct link HERE

The following links have been compiled that provide a variety of insights and perspectives on operations conducted with standpipe systems.

Two 1.5-inch attack lines off a gated wye (poor standpipe valve positioning - the second line probably would kink when charged). Technically, a 2.5-inch to 2.5-inch gated wye with reducers is better if a high-volume (2.5-inch) line is suddenly needed. Copyright © 2011 Massey Enterprises, Inc.