A fire in a three story multiple family apartment building injured four City of Chicago (IL) firefighters when an interior stairway collapsed during firefighting operations.
The building was constructed in 1927 and consisted of 5456 square feet of space with 3-5 apartment units. Built of masonry wall construction with a wood floor joist system, the fire was reported at 8:43 a.m., in the Type III classified occupancy.
Street View Pre-Fire
The fire began as a basement fire that travelled up two floors, eventually compromising an upper stairway which resulted in compromise and collapsed injuring four Chicago firefighters.
The inherent characteristics of the building and the manner of fire travel and impingement are apparent contributors to the event.
Aerial- Alpha; Goggle Maps
CFD Fireground Operations: Photo Tim Olk
The four firefighters sustained injures during operations when the internal stairwell connecting the second and third floors gave way.
The mayday was transmitted, and a 211 Plan 1 at approximately 09:00 hrs., seventeen minutes into the operation according to published reports issued by Deputy District Chief Lynda Turner. Following the mayday and firefighter removals, defensive operations were initiated.
Two of the firefighters sustained smoke inhalation and two firefighters minor injuries, according to Fire Department officials.
A large warehouse fire in a 211,000 SF complex resulted from from a transformer explosion this morning at the Wix Distribution Center in Gastonia, NC. The building complex was a former textile mill and was built in 1917.
Published report indicate that more than 60 firefighters operated at the scene to control the fire.
It was reported that Fire Chief Phillip Welch stated firefighters started fighting the fires inside the building after the transformer explosion occurred, but it quickly got out of control.“There was an aggressive attack inside, but just because of the storage fight, we were not able to overcome that nor was the sprinkler system,” Welch said.
How prepared is your department for a large scale fire in a large footprint warehouse?
Have you completed pre-fire plans, walk through tours and table top exercises for the key at risk buildings or complexes?
Do you know what the sustained water flow requirements might be for a heavily or fully involved complex or building?
Practices and honed your skills on establishing and managing a complex, multi-operatonal period incident?
Have you looked at creating box alarms or pre-arranged greater alarm response and resource requests?
Have you trained with the departments, jurisdictions and companies that might respond?
Do you have strategies and tactics identified and have you trained on them for operations in large scale buildings? Don’t implment and treat the incident like you would a residential or small commercial fire….
Respect the building and predict with conservative decision-making
Manage and expect compromise and collapse, rapid fire extention and operational challenges to fixed suppression systems and protectivies
Don’t over extend companies while attmtping to operate in the interior: These are typcially closed building ( lack of immedate exiting capabilties) with a special need for air management and accountability and access control.
The Predictability of Building Performance must take into consideration that in the context of today’s fire ground, buildings and fire dynamics, small changes on initial compartment or structure conditions may often produce and result in large-scale or magnitude changes that affect the long term outcome of the incident.
We have assumed that the routiness or successes of past operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past construction systems, occupancies and building types; therefore the risk assessment and size-up process, and resulting strategies and tactics must adapt to address these evolving rules of combat structural fire engagement that challenge anecdotal practices and methodologies.
Today’s evolving fireground demands greater adaptive insights and management with an amplified understanding of buildings, occupancy risk profiling (ORP) and building anatomy by all operating companies on the fireground; demanding greater skill sets and knowledge of building construction, architecture, engineering, fire dynamics and fire suppression methodologies.
The equation for success rests directly on Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
Don’t be complacent based on alarm type, building or occupancy type…expect fire, be prepared and understand the predictability of building performance. It should not be a surprise upon arrival of the first-due.
Some Training Aide Links from past Ten Minutes in the Streets
Ten Minutesin the Street A Buildingsonfire.com SeriesExecutive Producer: Christopher Naum, SFPE Ten Minutes in the Street; bringing you insightful and provoking street scenarios for the discriminating and perspective Firefighter, Company Officer and Commander; where you make the call. You don’t have to have any special rank to participate in this interactive forum, just the desire to learn and expand you knowledge, skills and abilities in order to better yourself, create new insights, while sharing your experience and perspectives to help you and others in the street in making the right call; so everyone has the opportunity of going home. Access the Series on Buildingsonfire.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com Don’t forget to access CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com . Buildingsonfire is also on Facebook.
Ten Minutes in the Street; Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due, HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street; “But it’s only a Garage..!”,HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street: “I Hear Ya Knockin’, But Nobody’s Home”
Fire in Syracuse: Four firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978
April 9th marks the 35th anniversary of the 701 University Ave. fire that claimed the lives of four Syracuse (NY) firefighters in 1978 while conducting search & rescue and suppression operations at an apartment building on the Syracuse University Campus, in Syracuse, New York.
The fire began when one of the tenants lit a candle in a styrofoam wig stand and left it unattended. At 00:46 hours on Sunday April 9, 1978, an alarm of fire was transmitted for a reported building fire at 701 University Avenue on the campus of Syracuse University.
The Victorian style house was a three story building constructed of wood balloon framing and was built circa 1898. The house had been converted into ten (10) apartments that were occupied by SU students. The gross area of each of the three floors was approx. 1,750 sq. ft., with a predominate rectangular footprint shape measuring 69 ft. x 35 ft. The third floor apartments only had access via a stairway in the rear, down a long narrow corridor that measured only 33 inches wide.
Post Fire View of Building from Bravo Side. Photo CJ Naum, 1978
The building had inherent vertical and horizontal concealed spaces indicative of balloon frame style construction along with additional concealed spaces in the third floor ceiling area. A partial automatic sprinkler system had been installed in the building in order to comply with a 1952 State of New York law. This system provided protection to the basement, means of egress, a storage area and a portion of the concealed space above the third floor.
The fire originated in a second floor apartment, and then spread into the combustible concealed space above the third floor ceiling. Approximately sixteen minutes into fireground operations the first indications of firefighting personnel being in distress were received. The first call to the Alarm center was made at 0045:17 hrs., with the first-due engine arriving at 0048:05 and first water applied at 0051 (est).
The four SFD fire fighters, Frank Porpiglio Jr., Stanley Duda, Michael Petragnani, and Robert Schuler, who were assigned to the Squad and Rescue Companies, entered the house to conduct a primary search of the premises for SU students thought to be trapped in the house.
While operating on the third floor inside, a scalding steam caused by triggered sprinklers prevented the four firefighters from escaping, and they eventually depleted their air supply and suffocated to death. The firefighters were operating with full PPE that was complaint at that time ( 1978) and were utilizing state-of-the art SCBA in the form of the new 4.5 SCBA systems. All the tenants had escaped safely before the fire fighters had entered the house. The fire was subsequently investigated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) at the request of the City of Syracuse and NFPA Report No. LS-3 was published.
Syracuse Post Standard Front Page April 10, 1978
Killed in the Line of Duty on April 9th, 1978:
Syracuse (NY) Fire Department
FF Michael Petragnani, Age 27. ~ Rescue Company – appointed 8/20/1973
FF Frank Porpiglio Jr., Age 24. ~ Squad Company – appointed 8/20/1973
FF Robert Shuler, Age 31. ~ Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973
FF Stanley Duda, Age 34. ~ Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973
Remembrance, Honor, Courage and Sacrifice
Never Forgotten
Post Fire View, East Adams Street and University Ave. Photo: CJ Naum, 1978
Martin J. Whitman School of Management stands today at the corner, Photo CJ Naum, 2013
Memorial Plaque placed in 2005 in the Martin J. Whitman School of Management located on the site of 1978 fire. Photo: CJ NAum, 2013
Remembering the Sacrafice: Capt. Broxterman and FF Schira
On Friday, April 4, 2008 at 06:13:02 hours, what began as a routine response for Colerain Township Fire and EMS Engine 102 to investigate a fire alarm activation at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane, Colerain Township, Ohio resulted in the deaths of Colerain Township Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira.
Upon their arrival at the scene of the two-story wood framed, residential building working fire conditions existed in the basement. The initial attack team consisted of Broxterman, Schira, and one other firefighter. The team advanced a 1¾-inch attack hose line through the interior of the building for fire control.
Even though, they were provided with some of the most technologically advanced protective clothing for structural firefighting and self-contained breathing apparatus, it appeared that Broxterman and Schira were overwhelmed by severe fire conditions in the basement.
During their attempt to evacuate the building, the main-level family room flooring system in which the two were traveling on collapsed into the basement trapping the firefighters. Eleven minutes elapsed from time of arrival to the catastrophic chain of events.
This is one of those distinctive reports that has influential and critical operational, training and preparedness elements embedded throughout the report.
It’s apparent there continues to be common threads shared by this event from 2008 and other events and incidents in the past five years where a single of multiple firefighters have lost their lives due to similarities in the apparent and common cause deficiencies and short comings identified.
All company and command officers should read and comprehend the lessons learned. Then, take these new found insights and see what the gaps are at the personal level (yours or those you supervise) as well as the shift, group, station, battalion, division or department as a whole.
If there are gaps, then identify a way to implement timely changes as necessary so there are No History Repeating (HRE) events.
The importance of Reading the Building, taking the time to complete the three sixty and being combat ready and “expecting fire”.
Remember their sacrifice, so we can learn.
Past Post on CommandSafety.com with Report Narrative and Incident DetailsHERE
The following factors were believed to have directly contributed to the deaths of Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira:
A delayed arrival at the incident scene that allowed the fire to progress significantly;
A failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices; and
A failure to abide by fundamental firefighter self-rescue and survival concepts
Although the aforementioned factors were believed to have directly contributed to their deaths, they might have been prevented if:
Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident;
Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators;
The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
timely manner relative to the incident;
Personnel assigned to Engine 102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their first-due response area;
A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis
was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations;
Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural
firefighting existed within the department;
The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time;
The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions;
Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.
References
Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Web Site HERE
Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths April, 2010 Full Report HERE
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
There’s a tremendous lack of understanding in the American Fire Service as to what accurately defines and comprises a Heavy Timber Bowstring Truss and the Operational and Safety Precautions that must be recognized, implemented and trained on, in order to achieve and maintain operational excellence, company integrity and firefighter safety on the fireground.
All bowstring trusses are not created equal and do not share the same characteristics when found in a building and occupancy.
They may have the same shape, but shape alone does not define the bowstring truss.
Based on the type, design, construction, materials, age, span, spacing, configuration, occupancy and application there are vast differences AND similarities.
There are significant differences in terminology when referring to them and tactics that should be employed on the fireground- and yes there are prominent differences between east coast and west coast types and tactics.
The Bowstring Truss- They are not All the Same
Do you know what they are?
I’m working on an article series for a major fire service publication with on-line accompaniments that will provide uniformity and clarity on the subject and the much needed continuity so were’ talking the same language.For the mean time let me offer the following terms that some of you may be familiar with – in your world. Here are some Bowstring Type Truss terms:
The Heavy Timber Bowstring Truss,
Arch-Rib Bowstring Truss,
Laminate Cord Bowstring Truss,
Lattice Bowstring Truss,
Easybow Truss,
Mack Truss,
Summerbell Bowstring Truss,
Mono-chord Bowstring Truss
Duo-Chord Bowstring Truss,
Segmental Multi-Cord Bowstring Truss,
Tension Rod Bowstring Truss,
Bowstring Arch Truss,
Bowstring K-Truss,
Split-Ring Bowstring Truss…..to name a few.
We’ll be posting lots more on this on CommandSafety.com as well as expanded coverage on Buildingsonfire.com …. Stay Tuned
Vacant Structure Fire-Three Alarm, Type III Construction
Identifying, Establishing and Managing Collapse Zones
I mentioned in a recent post about on-going research and recommendations being developed for a significant report.
A notable issue that seems to resonate and surface on a reoccurring bais is the identification, establishment and management of collapse zones.
Building type, construction systems and materials, initiating, apparent or contributIng factors have an influence on collapse zone management (CZM).
Perimeter wall compromise and collapse of Type III and IV buildings continue to represent the leading types of collapse that contribute to significant firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.
The ability to Read the Building, identify obvious and subtle features, conditions and indicators leading to collapse or compromise or the management and control of post collapse conditions is imperative.
Another critical operational factor is managing collapse zones and restricting access with consideration for degraded building conditions and the potential for multiple secondary collapse.
Are you up to speed with criteria for recognizing pre and post collapse indicators?
Do you have SOP/SOGs for collapse OPS?
Collapse Zones At a minimum:
Establish and maintain at a minimim a perimeter Collapse Management Zone (CMZ) of 1.5 x the building height.
Based on building type, height, materials of construction and type of projected collapse type – the potential for materials to travel beyond the CMZ is probable and should be assessed.
Safety Officers MUST maintain control to restrict access and to ensure companies are aware of potential for secondary collapse of compromised building features, assemblies or materials.
Maintain an acute high level of Situational Awareness, know your surroundings and don’t get tunnel vision on your task assignment.
Managing Collapse Zones
Great footage from Birmingham, AL at a three-alarm fire in a vacant building at 1811 1st Avene North with the peel away collapse of the upper wall on the Delta Division. Screenshot of collapse below with video link…
Light Weight construction has given way to Engineered Structural Systems (ESS) which in today’s evolving fireground, have an even more extensive array of performance, operational and integrity issues that affect a building’s performance under fire conditions.To unequivocally state that nothing has changed in buildings, occupancies, fire flow delivery rates and demands for increased proficiencies of our firefighters, company and command officers is absurd, ignorant and dangerous.
“It’s a lot more than just Stretching the Line…and going in….”
Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety…so we can do our job—and that’s firefighting .Another classic illustration by Paul Combs.
Remembrance:Pittsburgh(PA) Bureau of Fire- Post Fire Collapse and Double LODD
NIOSH Report F2004-17: Career battalion chief and career master fire fighter die and twenty-nine career fire fighters are injured during a five alarm church fire -Pennsylvania.
On March 13, 2004, a 55-year-old male career Battalion Chief (Victim #1) and a 51-year-old male career master fire fighter (Victim #2) were fatally injured during a structural collapse at a church fire. Victim #1 was acting as the Incident Safety Officer and Victim #2 was performing overhaul, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. Twenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were pronounced dead at the scene.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should
ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations
establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations
ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone
train fire fighters to recognize conditions that forewarn of a backdraft
ensure consistent use of personal alert safety system (PASS) devices during overhaul operations
ensure that pre-incident planning is performed on structures containing unique features such as bell towers
ensure that Incident Commanders conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing fire fighters to an interior operation, and continue to assess risk-versus-gain throughout the operation including overhaul
develop standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to assign additional safety officers during complex incidents
provide interior attack crews with thermal imaging cameras
Additionally,
municipalities should enforce current building codes to improve the safety of occupants and fire fighters
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations.
Discussion: Due to the destructive powers of fire, most structures that have been involved in fires are structurally weakened. In this incident, the structural integrity of the bell tower was weakened by a fire of several hours duration, the addition of thousands of gallons of water, and possibly the destructive effect of the backdraft. Analysis of the exterior of the structure should be performed continuously while conducting interior operations. Similarly, before overhaul operations are begun, the structure should be determined safe to work in by the IC and a designated Safety Officer. If necessary, the IC should seek the help of qualified structural experts or other competent persons to assess the need for the removal of dangerously weakened construction, or should make provisions for shoring up load-bearing walls, floors, ceilings, roofs, or as in this case, the bell tower.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations.
Discussion: During fire operations, two rules exist about structural collapse: (1) the potential for structural failure always exists during and after a fire, and (2) a collapse danger zone must be established. A defensive attack was declared within an hour after fire suppression activities began. Part of a defensive strategy is establishing and moving fire fighters outside of the collapse zone.
A collapse zone is an area around and away from a structure in which debris might land if a structure fails. Immediate safety precautions must be taken if factors indicate the potential for a building collapse. All persons operating inside the structure must be evacuated immediately and a collapse zone should be established around the perimeter. The collapse zone area should be equal to the height of the building plus an additional allowance for debris scatter and at a minimum should be equal to 1½ times the height of the building. For example, since the bell tower was 115 feet high, the collapse zone boundary should be established at least 173 feet away from the church. Once a collapse zone has been established, the area should be clearly marked and monitored, to make certain that no fire fighters enter the danger zone.
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone.
In this incident, command suffered a serious lapse after the Incident Commander and several company officers were injured in the collapse. The command post from which the IC manages the fireground must be located in an area outside of the collapse zone. The IC must ensure that the command post is protected from danger so that an effective command structure is maintained throughout the incident.1, 5
March 10, 1941: The Strand Theater Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Brockton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapsed, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters.
Check out the comprehensive past post fromCommandSafety.com from 2011
Taking it the Streets: Reading the Building
Here’s a simple view from the Alpha street side. I’ll give you the options as to what you’re arrive on or as…Reading the Building requires numerous layers of knowledge and skill based attributes to develop the perspective to “read your buildings” differently.
Reading the Building: Occupancy Type and Occupancy Risk?
Arriving companies and personnel at a structure fire need to be able to rapidly and accurately identify key elements of a building, process that data based upon a widening field of variables present on today’s evolving fireground and implement timely actions that address prioritized actions requiring intervention.
Deterministic fireground models for size-up and suppression have to give way to a more expandable stochastic model of assessment. Key to this is having a broad and well developed foundation of building knowledge.
Let’s identify the building type, age, key features based on its profile, inherent characteristics, projected performance, roof system, perimeter walls, hazards, risks..etc. What is the Occupancy Type and Occupancy Risk?
There is a wealth of information you can talk about-IF you know what to look for. Start the dialog. I’ll post interior views in 48 hours.
I’ve cross posted to allow for some robust discussions. Don’t forget to Like us on Facebook.
Can you Read this building correctly? Or will your view have an adverse affect on operations if you misjudged or just didn’t know or care…just because ” you wanted to just stretch in and do the job-right?”
New for 2013: Reading the Building: Predictive Profiling for the Modern Fireground. An engaging and interactive Training Seminar addressing the Challenges of Today’s Evolving Fireground.
On December 3, 1999, a five-alarm fire at the Worcester Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. building claimed the lives of six brave firefighters who responded to the call. These six heros, The Worcester 6, sacrificed their lives to try and rescue two individuals who were believed to be trapped inside the inferno. May the Worcester 6 always be remembered; “Fallen Heroes Never Forgotten.”
Memorial dedicated in East Boston (MA) honoring Six Boston firefighters who made the supreme sacrifice while battling a fire in 1942.
Bagpipes echoed through Maverick Square Thursday at the conclusion of a ceremony dedicating a memorial to six Boston firefighters who died 70 years ago.
Six Boston Firefighters were killed in the line of duty as a result of the collapse, all of whom were conducting operations and working on the second floor with hose lines.
The 1942 Luongo’s Restaurant Fire and Collapse in East Boston; Six Boston Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths
Boston Fire Department Box 6153 Five Alarm November 15,1942
Boston Fire Department Box 6153 Five Alarm November 15,1942
A multiple alarm fire and collapse 70 years ago resulting in six Boston Firefighter LODDs was overshadowed by the Coconut Grove Fire which occurred 13 days later. Here’ the story and legacy.
The 1942 Luongo’s Restaurant Fire and Collapse in East Boston; Six Boston Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths
During the early morning hours of Sunday November 15, 1942, a still alarm followed by box alarm 6153 was received for a fire at 4-6 Henry Street located in the Old Armory Building at Maverick Square in East Boston (MA). The address was for a report of fire in the Luongo’s Restaurant. A fire broke out in the rear of Luongo’s Restaurant on the first floor at about 2:26 a.m. The Boston Fire- District #1 report stated the fire originated in the rear kitchen ceiling.
November 16, 1942 New York Times:
The following is a description of the fire from the November 16, 1942 New York Times: “The fire, starting from a fireless cooker in the cafe on the ground floor at Henry Street and Maverick Square, suddenly swept through the building.
The firemen who were killed had just entered a restaurant on the second floor with a line of hose. As the flames ate through the cross timbers the wall collapsed with a roar, burying two men on the stairs and crushing the three others manning the hose. That part of the wall which fell outward felled about forty firemen standing on the Henry Street side of the building beside the new $20,000 ladder truck, which was buried under the wreckage. At the same, a hot air explosion blew a half dozen firemen across Henry Street.”
The Building
The Luongo’s Restaurant was housed in what was called the Armory Building a five and one half story Type III Building of ordinary construction (Brick and joist) consisting of masonry bearing walls with approximate dimensions of 35 feet width x 60 feet depth x 65 foot height. The ensuing fire would spread to the exposure building at 10 Henry Street a three story 20 ft. X 40 ft. x 40 ft type III (brick and joist) structure.
Courtesy of the Boston Public Library, Leslie Jones Collection.
Fire and Collapse
Upon arrival of the first alarm companies, the fire initially was commanded by Fire Captain Amsler, Ladder Co. 2. District Chief Crowley rapidly assumed command upon his arrival and directed initial fire suppression activities of the companies to interior operations and quickly ordered a second alarm at 03:04hours.
Command was subsequently transferred to Deputy Chief Louis Stickel who ordered a third alarm struck due to fire extension twenty minutes later.
Suppression, ventilation and rescue operations were conducted with the fire under control when at 04:15 hours with without warning, it was reported the 3rd, 4th and 5th floors began to collapse with the brick masonry wall on the Henry Street side collapsing outward into the street. Ladder Company 8, a new 125 ft. aerial ladder, the largest in the United States at the time was buried in the timber and brick rubble and collapse pile. It was reported that as many of 43 firefighters in the street were injured as a result of the collapse.
Search, Rescue and Recovery Efforts
The arrival of Chief of Department Samuel Pope ordered fourth and fifth alarms. This brought Engine Companies 40, 9, 5, 11, 50, 8, 32, 6, 39, 3, 33, 12, 13, 38, 21, 35, 37, 20, 16, 10, 42, 51, 19; Ladder Companies 2, 31, 21, 8 and 3.
First Alarm: 02:27 hrs.
Second Alarm: 03:05 hrs.
Third Alarm: 03:24 hrs.
Fourth Alarm: 04:20 hrs.
Fifth Alarm: 04:35 hrs.
With both extensive interior and exterior collapse conditions with numerous trapped and injured firefighters, rescue efforts and medical assistance was being rendered by all fire service, military, hospital and civilian resources. Local Coast Guardsman were deployed to support the massive search and rescue efforts.
Rescue and Recovery
Six Boston Firefighters were killed in the line of duty as a result of the collapse, all of whom were conducting operations and working on the second floor with hose lines.
Supreme Sacrifice in the Line of Duty:
Hoseman John F. Foley, Engine Company 3
57 years of age | 30 year veteran
Hoseman Edward F. Macomber, Engine Company 12
47 years of age | 24 year veteran
Hoseman Peter F. McMorrow, Engine Company 50
45 years of age | 19 year veteran
Hoseman Francis J. Degan, Engine Company 3
24 years of age | 15 month veteran
Ladderman Daniel E. McGuire, Ladder Company 2
44 years of age | 19 year veteran
Hoseman Malachi F. Reddington, Engine Company 33
48 years of age | 19 year veteran
Post Requiem
The Department’s 125 foot “jinx” aerial ladder, reported to be the largest in the nation at that time, was standing beside the falling wall on Henry Street. It was buried in the wreckage. The ladder was originally purchased by the City of Somerville. They found upon delivery that it was too big for their firehouse. Boston bought it. The truck had a series of problems. (additional Story on the 1941 American La France 125′ metal aerial By William Noonan,HERE) Apparatus Info – See Bostonfirehistory.org HERE
Boston Ladder 8 1941 ALF 125 ft. Aerail Ladder Shop#207. Photo Courtesy BostonFireHistory.org
There was some speculation that due to the long ladder and wide bed, the large ladder might have caused the wall collapse. This theory was later ruled out. In fact, some of the firefighters who were on the ladder at the time of the collapse, credit the ladder bed with saving their lives. When the granite and debris began falling, they lay down in the bed and the rubble slid down over them to the street.
Many felt that this was the end to the ladder. But, it was repaired and returned to service in South Boston as Ladder 19. Tragedy would continue to haunt this piece of apparatus. On December 3, 1947, Ladder 19 was out of service conducting tests on its brakes when it overturned and rolled. Provisional Firefighter Joseph B. Sullivan, on the job for less than six months, was killed. The Department took the truck out of service and scrapped
Individuals Remembered
As with many of these incidents, the men involved came from different backgrounds and circumstances that put them on that second floor that fateful night.
Edward Macomber was the father of eight children and considered to be one of the best firefighters in the department according to his superior officers. He was a member of the department for 28 years, and had been injured while on duty more than seven times.
Francis Degan, at age 24 was one of the youngest members of the Boston Fire Department at the time. He had been on the job only 19 months prior to November 15th. His officers thought that the young fireman was well on his way to becoming an officer. Young Degan took great pride in being a firefighter and realized his life’s ambition when he was appointed to the department to follow in the footsteps of his father, who was attached to Ladder Company 1.
John Foley, a hoseman on Engine Company 3, had been a member of the department for more than 30 years. He was planning to retire in a short time. In a tragic case of irony , Firefighter Foley should have been on a day off at the time of the fire, but had changed his schedule in order to get some time off later.
World War 1 veteran Pete McMorrow was a bachelor member of Engine Company 50 and was loved by many of the school children of Charlestown. He had served in the Navy in the first war and was telling his closest pals that he might just be going back to serve again. At age 46, he had carried the colors of the Boston Fireman’s Post #94, American Legion, through downtown Boston. While trapped in the debris for eleven hours, McMorrow’s fellow company members crawled into the space where he lay to tell him to hang on and they’d get him out soon. Throughout the early morning and into the next day the rescue efforts continued. However, when they were finally able to get to McMorrow, it was too late.
This fire and the subsequent six firefighter line of duty deaths were overshadowed by the Cocoanut Grove Fire which occurred only 13 days later on November 28, 1942.
Memorial, Dedication, and Reception
On Thursday November 15, 2012 the East Boston Neighborhood Health Center and theBoston Fire Department will be conducting aMemorial, Dedication, and Reception in Recognition of the 70th Anniversary of the Luongo Fire at Maverick Square, East Boston.
The event is scheduled from 12:00 pm to 2:00 pm at 20 Maverick Square, Boston, MA.
Video: Former Boston Fire Commissioner Paul Christian shares the story of the little-known Luongo fire as well as that of the 8-alarm Thanksgiving Day Fire of 1889. November has been a tragic month in Boston’s fire history. On November 15, 1942, a fire started in the back room of the Luongo Restaurant.
Collapse Scene from Maverick Square
Boston Fire Department 125 ft. Aerial Ladder on Henry Street Side
Fire Department Journal Luongo Restaurant Fire, HERE
Memorial Dedication
Aerial Image of current property block in East Boston (MA). Bing Maps Image
Historical Note: Three and a half story high, with granite faced and brick exterior walls, the interior wooden joisted building at the corner of Henry Street and Maverick Square in 1942 was one of the oldest buildings in East Boston. It was typical of mid 19th century Boston commercial construction. In accounts of the fire it is frequently referred to as “Old Armory Hall”. “Armory Hall” is the name by which it was known in the early years of the 20th century. That building however never was actually an armory as such. There once was an armory in East Boston. It was located at the corner of Maverick and Bremen Streets in a wooden building that preceded the still standing brick Overseers of the Public Welfare Building. The building in which the “Luongo Fire” occurred was built sometime before 1858. It was known originally as “Ritchie Hall” likely from the name of its owner.
Armory Hall Building is to the left of Photo – Circa 1910
The Command Institute’s Buildings on Fire Training Series
PROGRAM OFFERINGS
The Command Institute announces the 2013 Buildingsonfire training, seminar and lecture series.
These program offerings and deliveries are part of the Buildingsonfire.com Series of Training Programs designed and developed to support the continuing professional and operational development of the American Fire Service in meeting the challenges of the today’s evolving fireground. These programs are presented and facilitated by Chief Christopher J. Naum, SFPE.
Adaptive Management for Today’s Evolving Fireground
Firefighting and Incident Command Management is the essence of the Fire Service; it is formulative to our rich history but at the same time is being impacted by numerous internal and external influences reflective of social and economic climate, values and challenges. The Art and Science of Firefighting and the quest to achieve operational excellence while maintaining Firefighter Safety suggests our future success rests with our ability to create a new adaptive operational model to meet the demands of today’s fires and the evolving fireground of tomorrow.
Today’s Evolving Fireground: Are You Ready to Make the Necessary Changes?
Today’s fireground and structure fires are different from those of recent past; empirical research and data, new insights and emerging dialog is identifying an emerging fireground with new demands. Energizing insights with provoking perspectives asking if as Leaders you’re ready to make the necessary changes
Command Resiliency and Tactical Patience for Operational Excellence
Energizing insights on the needs for preparedness, resiliency and patience to effectively address the evolving fireground and increasing demands associated with incidents while attaining operational excellence and increasing firefighter safety.
The Company and Command Officer in 2013 and Beyond
A thought provoking discussion on the increasing demands for today’s emerging, practicing or future Company and Command Officer and a challenge on how to meet tomorrows demands today through self-determination and personal accountability.
Tactical Renaissance and the New Rules ofEngagement
Today’s buildings and occupancies present challenging fires that are redefined strategic and tactical fireground operations and are changing the rules of engagement in structural fire incidents. An intuitive proclamation on the emerging Tactical Renaissance directed at today’s Emerging or Practicing Company and Command Officers.
The Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement 2013
What has today’s fireground evolved into when we talk about combat fire suppression and engagement? Has it remained constant-Has it changed? Do we continue to operate utilizing time proven methodologies or are we prepared to identify new adaptive methodologies and practices? What is the New Doctrine and are we ready to accept it?
What’s on YOUR Radar Screen? Meeting the New Operational Demands
There are a lot of things going on in the Fire Service today, the need to filter through to the key issues that affect all organizations and personnel is imperative. An affirmation of what should be on the radar screen of today’s emerging, practicing or future Company and Command Officers.
Fireground Leadership for Company& Command Officers
Today’s fire ground presents new found challenges that are redefined strategic and tactical fire operations and are testing past practices in structural firefighting and incident management. An open and frank discussion on what will be defining attributes and traits of the emerging fire officer and commander influenced by new strategic, tactical and operational modeling.
New Conference Training Curriculums
Adaptive Fireground Management for Company and Command Officers
Fireground Leadership for Company & Command Officers
Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
Five Star Command & Fire Fighter Safety
The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & Tactics
Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting Operations
Command Institute’s Fire Ground Leadership Series
Target Training Curricula Audience
Command Officers
Company Grade Officers
Training Officers
Fire Service Instructors
Safety Offices
Firefighters
Training Curriculums Descriptions
Adaptive Fireground Management for Company and Command Officers This program presents insights into emerging concepts and methodologies related to the unique challenges during combat structural fire engagement that require new strategic, tactical and operational modeling due to extreme fire behavior, building construction and occupancy risk.
The principles of Adaptive Fire Ground Management (AFM) will be presented along with integrated discussions on Predictive Risk Management, Command Resiliency, Tactical Patience and integration of Five-Star CommandTM theories and model will be presented. Integrated into the program will be the latest insights into emerging fire ground tactical theory, suppression needs for effective combat operations and methodologies for operational excellence and firefighter safety. This is an interactive and thought provoking program that challenges conventional fire service paradigms and explores leading edge theories and fire service discussion points from across the American Fire Service profession.
Fireground Leadership for Company& Command Officers Today’s fire ground presents new found challenges that are redefined strategic and tactical fire operations and are testing past practices in structural firefighting and incident management.
This program will present insights into emerging concepts and methodologies related to today’s unique challenges for combat structural fire engagement requiring new strategic, tactical and operational modeling due to extreme fire behavior, building construction and occupancy risk and the need for new training and operational requirements for firefighters, company and command officers.
The program will provide insights into the new Rules of Engagement, Redefining Tactical Operations, The Company and Command Officer in 2013 and Beyond, Integrating Safety into Aggressive Firefighting, Predictive Risk Management, Command Compression and Tactical Patience, Training for Tomorrow’s Fires, Adaptive Management for today’s Evolving Fireground, Achieving Operational Excellence and integrating Five-Star CommandTM theories. Incorporating the lasted testing and research findings on vent path theory, extreme fire behavior, structural system integrity, wind driven fire theory and fire suppression and incident management theory the program will also integrate extensive case studies and interactive exercises and group discussions.
Reading the Building; Predictive Occupancy Profiling Today’s buildings and occupancies continue to present unique challenges to command and operating companies during combat structural fire engagement.
Building and occupancy profiling, identifying occupancy risk versus occupancy type, emerging construction methods, features, systems and components coupled with the increasing commonality of extreme fire behavior and the increased fire load package require new skill sets in reading the building and implementing predictive occupancy profiling for firefighters, company and command officers. Focusing on a wide variety of residential, commercial and multiple occupancy dwellings, the program will present leading insights on improved building size-up, risk assessment and determining and implementing appropriate tactical operations for today’s evolving fireground challenges, operations and incident management.
Fire Star CommandTM and Firefighter SafetyThe challenges of today’s evolving fireground require shifting the fire service’s paradigms; evolving the safety culture of the fire services and the way we do business in the streets. These paradigm shifts require redefining firefighting methodologies and training focus for combat structural fire engagement and incident operations.
This program will present the concepts and methodologies of Five Star CommandTM and the five (5) fundamental core relationships of; Building Construction, Risk Management, Firefighter Behaviors, Incident Operations and Situational Safety. The concept of Five Star CommandTM will present these five fundamental core elements along with the five points of excellence within each domain that provide an intelligent and safe approach towards unified fireground safety, risk reduction, operational superiority and company integrity and the template for focused training and curriculum development for today’s evolving fireground. The program presents a new concept towards an integrate approach to enhanced incident operations at structure fires adding values towards an improved fire service safety culture. Presenting emerging and timely insights affecting a wide latitude of audience interests, experience levels and relevancy to work assignments in the areas of incident fireground operations from strategic, tactical and task levels of operations, the presentation concepts, methodologies and materials have relevancy to all operational levels of the fire service. The Five Star CommandTM model integrates with the emerging methodologies incorporating Adaptive Fireground Management concepts.
The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & TacticsThe explosive increase in Engineered Structural Systems (ESS) and their utilization in nearly all forms of current building construction and occupancies have created demands for redefining command decision-making and fire suppression tactics that must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. This program will examine materials, methods and crucial assembly systems affected by fire dynamics, fire behavior and tactical and task level operations for firefighter safety and combat survival, integrating relevant fire ground case studies and incident overviews.
Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.
Due to the resulting increase design and use of Engineered Structural Systems (ESS), and their use in nearly all facets of new construction and alterations and renovations, command and company officers need to increase their understanding of the engineering and design principles associated with these systems, their application and use in various building types and occupancies and the impact of these systems under fire conditions during incident operations. Current conventional strategies and tactics and decision-making are proving to be ineffective and unsafe requiring a different perspective toward redefined operations and dynamic risk assessment.
The program will address timely issues related to Engineered structural systems, testing and technical data from large scale testing and studies; integrate operational elements related to fire dynamics and fire behavior and the effects on command and company officer dynamic risk assessment, situational awareness, decision-making and correlation to aggressive/ measured tactical deployment. The program will integrate inherent building construction and occupancy profiling with performance indicators and newly defined tactical protocols that address the newest concepts and methodologies of strategic and tactical fire suppression theory based upon the most current technical data. Case studies and events will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety. The fast paced program will utilize extensive multimedia materials, interactive activities and case study review activities. The program will review a wide variety of ESS, including floor, wall and roofing systems, enclosure and modified support systems, new technology wood and synthetic products, alternate building systems and incorporate data from the latest analytical studies, tests and research in the areas of ESS and firefighting safety.
Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting OperationsThis program will present the new rules of structural fire engagement and provide insights into integrated command and operational risk management, tactical safety and tactical protocols based upon occupancy risks versus occupancy type.
Presenting insights on building and occupancy profiling, emerging construction methods, features, systems and components coupled with the increasing commonality of extreme fire behavior and the increased fire load package require new skill sets in reading the building and implementing predictive occupancy profiling and appropriate tactics for firefighters, company and command officers. Integrating extensive case studies, history repeating event, the latest testing and research findings on vent path theory, fire behavior, structural system integrity, wind driven fire theory and fire suppression theory will complement interactive exercises and group discussions.
These programs represent three distinctive and interrelated training programs that are essential and mission critical in today’s fire ground context and demands. Building upon emerging research, fundamental firefighting principles, values and doctrines, these programs present new and original theories, suggested new methodologies and provide insights on the latest developments for operational excellence, fire fighter safety and incident mitigation
Command Institute’s Fire Ground Leadership Series
CI Fire Ground Leadership for Company Officers (Silver Series)
CI Fire Ground Leadership for Command Officers (Gold Series)
The Command Institute’s Premier Fire Ground Leadership Series are training programs designed and directed towards emerging, new or practicing Company Officers or Command Officers.
Each training program consists of new curricula subject material selected and implemented to provide the Company or Command Officer with new insights, cutting edge methodologies, insights, awareness and skill development in functional areas of importance that affect fire ground operations. The programs will incorporate the defining elements discussed in the FSC section and will integrate and assimilate technology and media into a rewarding training experience.
Topics include the IAFC Rules of Engagement, Extreme Fire Behavior, Building Construction, Occupancy Risk Profiling, Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Crew Resource Management, Five Star Command, Tactical Determination in today’s Occupancies, Survivability Profiling, Emerging Strategic and Tactical Models, Command Resiliency and Tactical Patience, Command Compression, Tactical Entertainment, Adaptive Fireground Management, Predicative Theory of Buildings, NIOSH LODD and Near Miss Reports Case Study Analysis, Interactive Activities and Simulation, Operational Safety, Firefighter Survivability, Tactical Operations with limited Staffing/ Resources, Engineered & Light Weight Construction Considerations, and Operational Safety, and more.
The programs are designed to be sequential, providing a reoccurring opportunity for returnees in subsequent years to take the next level program, or can be standalone delivery programs. A single day refresher class program would be available after a run-in period for program graduates, providing a value added curriculum program with continuity versus termination for subsequent semester offerings. Integration of Blog content and other media support to provide full, 360 integration and training may be available.
A single day, eight hour Seminar version is available w limited content for the conference program
8 Hour (Single Day Seminar overview program)
CI Fire Ground Leadership for Company Officers (Silver Series)
12 hour (Two Day Program) Available as a sponsored program in 201
CI Fire Ground Leadership for Command Officers (Gold Series)
12 hour (Two Day Program) Available as a sponsored program in 2013
Additional Concurrent Seminar Program Offerings
Tactical Operations and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement 2013 Today’s buildings and occupancies present challenges that have redefined strategic and tactical fireground operations and have changed the rules of engagement in structural fire incidents. This program will present the new rules of structural fire engagement and provide insights into integrated command and operational risk management, tactical safety and tactical protocols based upon occupancy risks and reading a building and the new IAFC Rules of Engagement.
Today’s Evolving Fireground: Are You Ready to Make the Necessary Changes? Today’s fireground and structure fires are different from those of the recent past; empirical research and data, new insights and emerging theories and dialog are identifying an emerging new fireground with new operational demands; strategically, tactically, mentally and physically. Energizing insights with provoking perspectives asking if you’re ready to make the necessary changes.
The Company and Command Officer in 2013 and Beyond A thought provoking presentation and interactive discussion on the increasing demands for today’s emerging, practicing or future Company and Command Officers and the challenge on how to meet tomorrows demands today through self-determination and personal accountability. A look at the emerging fireground in 2013 and beyond will be examined and how that translates to the increased needs for advanced training, skill sets and operational models.
Redefining Combat Fire Engagement for the Company and Command Officer This program will present insights into emerging concepts and methodologies related to the unique challenges during combat structural fire engagement that require new strategic, tactical and operational modeling due to extreme fire behavior, building construction and occupancy risk. Predictive Risk Management, Command Compression, Tactical Patience and Five-Star CommandTM theories will be presented. Integrated into the program will be the latest insights into emerging fire ground tactical theory, suppression needs for effective combat operations and methodologies for operational excellence and firefighter safety.
The Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement 2013 Combat fire suppression and field operations are being impacted on a variety of levels with demands for increased integration of firefighter safety, expanding risk management; modified tactical protocols and new skill sets for fire service personnel. Addressing the five fundamental core relationships of building construction, risk management, firefighter behaviors, incident operations and situational safety, this program will present where the fire service is heading in 2013 and beyond.
Please note all of these programs are available for delivery as a full day seminar program that can be sponsored and delivered on a state-wide, regional or local delivery basis. Multi-deliveries across a state wide system thru the Firefighter or Fire Chiefs’ Association/sponsorship are available at competitive delivery costs.
All programs incorporate rich multimedia, exceptional graphics and stimulating visuals that combine the appeal of the visually stimulating images while integrating content that provides the latest in research, data, insights, information and methodologies.
These programs have been designed and developed to incorporate the latest training delivery concepts and methodologies while integrating current and emerging technology, social media platforms, eMedia and internet based content management systems and material in order to provide unparalleled fire service curricula, training and education, The Command Institute has been actively researching, developing and promoting such training program and content since 1987.
We all share a common bond that is defined by who we are and that is; firefighters. We are also defined by our families and loved ones and by the paths our fire service careers have or will be charted; have given us; and where they may lead us in the years ahead. Each of us has had a journey in our lives in the years since the day of September 11th, 2001.
What defines you as a Firefighter, Fire Officer, Fire Chief, Commander or in many of your other roles: both on and off the fireground: Today and in the Future?
What are or will be the testament and virtues of your contributions and service to the Brotherhood of the Fire Service as defined by the sacrifices of 9|11 and the Bonds of Family?
September 11, 2002 ~ September 10, 2011
Excerpts from the Last Homily of Father Mychal Judge FDNY Chaplain, at Mass for Firefighters: Sept. 10, 2001:
You do what God has called you to do. You get on that rig, you go out and do the job. No matter how big the call, no matter how small, you have no idea of what God is calling you to do, but God needs you. He needs me. He needs all of us.God needs us to keep supporting each other, to be kind to each other, to love each other…
We love this job, we all do. What a blessing it is! It’s a difficult, difficult job, but God calls you to do it, and indeed, He gives you a love for it so that a difficult job will be well done.
Isn’t God wonderful?! Isn’t He good to you, to each one of you, and to me? Turn to God each day — put your faith, your trust, your hope and your life in His hands.
He’ll take care of you, and you’ll have a good life. And this firehouse will be a great blessing to this neighborhood and to this city. Amen.
A Memorial Wall listing the names of 64 FDNY members who died in the last 11 years due to World Trade Center-related illnesses is present at FDNY Headquarters (HERE)
The inscription on the Memorial Wall reads, “DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE WHO BRAVELY SERVED THIS DEPARTMENT PROTECTING LIFE AND PROPERTY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN THE RESCUE AND RECOVERY EFFORT AT MANHATTAN BOX 5-5-8087 WORLD TRADE CENTER.”
The names included: (updated for 2012)
Firefighter Robert W. Dillon, Engine Co. 153
Firefighter Vanclive A. Johnson, Ladder Co. 135
Firefighter Russell C. Brinkworth, Ladder Co. 135
Firefighter Edward V. Tietjen, Ladder Co. 48
Firefighter Walter Voight, Ladder Co. 144
Battalion Chief Kevin R. Byrnes, Battalion 7
Firefighter Stephen M. Johnson, Ladder Co. 25
Lieutenant Richard M. Burke, Engine Co. 97
Firefighter Michael Sofia, Engine Co. 165
Firefighter Joseph P. Costello, Battalion Co. 58
Firefighter William R. O’Connor, Ladder Co. 84
Lieutenant Reinaldo Natal, Field Communications Unit
Paramedic Deborah Reeve, EMS Station 20
Fire Marshal William Wilson, Jr., Manhattan Base
Lieutenant Thomas J. Hodges, Engine Co. 313
Firefighter Robert J. Wieber, Engine Co. 262
Lieutenant Joseph P. Colleluori, Jr., Engine Co. 324
Firefighter Michael J. Shagi, Engine Co. 74
Firefighter William R. St. George, Batallion Special Operations Command
Firefighter Raymond W. Hauber, Engine Co. 284
EMS Lieutenant Brian Ellicott, EMS Dispatch
Firefighter William E. Moreau, Engine Co. 166
Lieutenant John P. Murray, Engine Co. 165
Firefighter Sean M. McCarthy, Engine Co. 280
Firefighter Bruce M. Foss, Ladder Co. 108
Firefighter Jacques W. Paultre, Engine Co. 50
Firefighter Kevin M. Delano, Sr., Ladder Co. 142
Lieutenant Vincent J. Tancredi, II, Ladder Co. 47
Paramedic Clyde F. Sealey, Bureau of Health Services
Firefighter Timothy G. Lockwood, Engine Co. 275
Firefighter Edward F. Reilly, Jr., Ladder Co. 160
Firefighter John F. McNamara, Engine Co. 234
Lieutenant Thomas G. Roberts, Ladder Co. 40
Captain Kevin J. Cassidy, Engine Co. 320
Firefighter Joan R. Daley, Engine Co. 63
Firefighter Richard A. Manetta, Ladder Co. 156
Lieutenant Peter J. Farrenkopf, Marine Co. 6
Battalion Chief John J. Vaughan, Battalion Co. 3
Firefighter Robert A. Ford, Engine Co. 284
Paramedic Carene A. Brown, EMS Bureau of Training
Firefighter James J. Ryan, Ladder Co. 167
Lieutenant Robert M. Hess, Ladder Co. 76
EMT Freddie Rosario, EMS Station 4
Lieutenant Harry Wanamaker, Jr., Marine Co. 1
Supv. Commun. Electrician Philip J. Berger, Outside Plant Operations
Firefighter Vincent J. Albanese, Ladder Co. 38
Firefighter John P. Sullivan, Jr., Ladder Co. 34
Firefighter Roy W. Chelsen, Engine Co. 28
Firefighter John F. O’Neill, Ladder Co. 52
Lieutenant Randy J. Wiebicke, Ladder Co. 1
Firefighter Brian C. Malloy, Ladder Co. 80
Lieutenant John A. Garcia, Ladder Co. 5
Firefighter Anthony J. Nuccio, Ladder Co. 175
Fire Marshal Steven C. Mosiello, Chief of Department’s Office
To commemorate the anniversary of 9/11, NOVA presented an epic story of engineering, innovation, and the perseverance of the human spirit. With extraordinary access granted by The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, “Engineering Ground Zero” follows the five-year construction of One World Trade Center (1 WTC) and the National September 11 Memorial & Museum. This is an encore presentation originally aired on 09/07/2011.
NOVA captures the behind-the-scenes struggle of architects and engineers to make the buildings safe and highly secure under the pressures of a tight schedule, the demands of practical office space and efficient “green” architecture, and the public’s expectations of a fitting site for national remembrance. The program features interviews with 1 WTC architect David Childs; Chris Ward, the Port Authority’s executive director; Mayor Michael Bloomberg, chairman of the 9/11 Memorial Foundation; and Michael Arad, the man behind the breakthrough concept for the 9/11 Memorial.
Operations at 30 Dowling Circle 01.19.2011 Box 11-09
Mark Gray Falkenhan had dedicated his life to serving others. He perished in the line of duty on January 19, 2011 while performing search and rescue operations at a multi-alarm apartment fire in Hillendale, Baltimore County (Maryland). He was 43 years old.
On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 . Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.
During these operations, FF Falkenhan and his partner became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. The second firefighter was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.
FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.
The Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department published the Line of Duty Death Investgation Report of the 30 Dowling Circle Fire recently. The report was written by a Line of Duty Death Investigation Team comprised of departmental members, including representatives of the local firefighters’ union and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association.
Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department web site HERE
The following is and executive narrative of the final report (PDF) on the apartment fire where Volunteer Firefighter Mark Falkenhan sustained fatal injuries. The entire report can be downloaded HERE .
The Baltimore Sun newspaper published an editorial about the death of Firefighter Falkenhan that is required reading; HERE . An excerpt from the editorial reads as follows:
FF Mark Falkenhan
The word “hero” gets used too often to describe the most pedestrian of admirable behaviors, from the star quarterback who marches his team for a winning score to the kid who finds a missing wallet and turns it in. But exceptional bravery, special ability, exceptional deeds and noble qualities — those are what define an authentic hero, and Mr. Falkenhan lacked for none of them.
It was not by accidental circumstance or naiveté that he ended up on the third story of that Hillendale apartment complex in the midst of a fire, searching for missing residents. He knew the risks as well as anyone could. But his selfless desire to help others drove him forward into the flames.
That’s what made him exceptional. That’s why his legacy is important. That’s why the community is in his debt.
Incident Executive Summary
On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 (for purposes of this report, Mark will be referred to as FF Falkenhan). Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter (FF # 2) from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.
During these operations, FF Falkenhan and FF # 2 became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. FF # 2 was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued. FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.
Baltimore County Fire Department Standard Operating Procedures, Personnel #16, requires a team to be formed, a detailed investigation to be conducted and a report produced for any incident involving a line of duty life threatening injury or death. The team’s objective is to thoroughly analyze and document all the events leading to the injury or death and to make recommendations aimed at preventing similar occurrences in the future. At a minimum, a Division Chief, the Department’s Health and Safety Officer, a member from the Fire Investigation Division, an IAFF Local 1311 union representative, and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association Vice President of Operations (when a volunteer member is involved) is required (see Acknowledgements section for actual team make-up).
The investigating team examined any and all data available, including independent analysis of the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), turnout gear and autopsy report. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) produced a fire model to assist with evaluating fire behavior. Multiple site inspections were conducted. Extensive interviews were conducted by the team which also attended those conducted by investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Photographic and audio transcripts were also thoroughly analyzed. A comprehensive timeline of events was developed. All information used to make decisions regarding recommendations was corroborated by at least two sources.
In fairness to those units involved in this incident, the investigating team had the advantage of examining this incident over the period of several months. Furthermore, given the size and nature of the event, and the fact that arriving crews were met with serious fire conditions and several residents trapped and in immediate danger, all personnel should be commended for their efforts for performing several rescues which prevented an even greater tragedy.
The team did not identify a particular primary reason for FF Falkenhan’s death.
What were identified were many secondary issues involving but not limited to crew integrity, incident command, strategy and tactics, and communications.
These issues are identified and discussed, and recommendations are made in appropriate sections of the report, as well as in a consolidated format in the Report Appendix.
Some of the issues identified in this report may require some type of change to current practices, policies, procedures or equipment. Most, however, do not. Specifically, the analysis and recommendations regarding Incident Command and Strategy and Tactics show that if current policies and procedures are adhered to, the opportunity for catastrophic problems may be reduced.
Mark Falkenhan was a well-respected and experienced firefighter.
He died performing his duties during a very complex incident with severe fire conditions and unique fire behavior coupled with the immediate need to perform multiple rescues of victims in imminent danger.
It would be easy if one particular failure of the system could be identified as the cause of this tragedy.
We could fix it and move on. Unfortunately it is not that simple.
No incident is “routine”. Mark’s death and this report reinforce that fact.
Incident Summary
On Wednesday, January 19, 2011 at 1816 hours, a call was received at the Baltimore County 911 Center from a female occupant at 30 Dowling Circle in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County. The caller stated that her stove was on fire and the fire was spreading to the surrounding cabinets. Fire box 11-09 was dispatched by Baltimore County Fire Dispatch (Dispatch) at 1818 hours consisting of four engine companies, two truck companies, a floodlight unit, and a battalion chief. All units responded on Talkgroup 1-2.
The location, approximately one mile from the first dispatched engine company, is a three story garden-type apartment complex, with brick construction and a composite shingle, truss supported roof. The fire building contained a total of six apartments divided by a common enclosed stairway in the center with one apartment on the left and one to the right of the stairs.
Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta will be used to designate the clockwise geographic locations of the structure, beginning with Alpha on the address side of the building . Entry is gained through the front split-level stairwell by a common entrance door with individual doors leading to each apartment. Each apartment consists of two bedrooms, a kitchen, bathroom, and a living/dining area. There are sliding doors leading to either a wood joist deck/balcony on the second and third floor apartments, or a concrete patio on the first floor apartments. Utilities consist of gas service to the furnace and hot water heaters located in a utility closet in each apartment, with electric service to the remainder of the appliances, including the stove. Interior walls of the apartments are drywall over wood stud construction.
Floor coverings consist of carpeting over tile and concrete on the terrace/first floor. The second and third floor coverings consist of carpeting covering hardwood floors with a plywood subfloor. Interior doors are hollow wood construction. The door to the common hallway is of solid wood construction. The sliding doors to the deck/patio area are glass.
Building Construction
The development and construction of the Towson Crossing Apartments began in the early 1980’s. The buildings are rated in the existing building code for occupancy as Residential 2 (R2). The building code would describe the construction type as Type III. This construction type includes those buildings where the exterior walls are of non-combustible materials and the interior building elements are of any material permitted by the building code.
Building Construction and Features
The subject apartment building, 30 Dowling Circle, is a three story, middle of the group, apartment building constructed on a reinforced concrete slab. The Alpha and Charlie exterior walls are wood framed construction with brick veneer attached by brick ties. The Bravo and Delta exterior walls are block masonry construction and separate adjoining apartment buildings. The interior partition walls consist of wooden 2″x4″ wall studs covered with sheetrock. Paper faced insulation is found between the exterior walls, ceilings and party-walls that separate the apartments.
The apartment building contains six individual apartment units, which are approximately 1000 square feet in size per apartment unit. Two separate units are located on each floor and consist of two bedrooms, a living area, a dining area, a kitchen, and a bathroom. A utility closet is located in each of the living areas. The closet is located along the Alpha wall, and contains the water heater and furnace.
The building is not equipped with an automatic fire suppression system. Smoke detectors were noted; however, it is unknown if they were operational at the time of the fire. A fire extinguisher was noted on the landing between the second and third floor levels of the building.
Topography
From side Alpha the building has two and a half stories above grade while side Charlie is three stories above grade.
The first floor of the building is approximately five feet below ground level with a 20 foot set back from the apartment building parking lot. Side Charlie of the building is at ground level but slopes upward approximately 8 feet with a set-back of 110 feet from the rear alley.
Roof
The roof is constructed of a lightweight truss assembly consisting of 2″x6″ stringers connected by gusset plates. The truss assembly is covered with 5/8 inch plywood and asphalt shingles.
Floor and Ceiling
The floor assembly consists of 2×10 inch floor joists covered by plywood, wooden tongue and groove planking and finished with carpet. The joists run from Alpha to Charlie and are supported by the interior bearing walls. The kitchen floors in all of the units are covered with vinyl tile.
The ceilings throughout the building are sheetrock nailed to the floor joists of the apartment above with the exception of the third level in which the sheetrock is nailed to the roof joists.
Balconies
The balconies are located on side Charlie of the building. The balconies located on levels two and three consist of 5/4″ deck boards over 2″x10″ wooden joists. The joists are cantilevered off of the floor/ceiling assemblies of levels one and two. The first floor balconies are made of concrete and are at ground level. All balconies are accessible through a single pane sliding glass door located in each apartment.
Incident Overview
The first arriving engine, E-11, was staffed with a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. Upon arrival at 1820 hours, the Captain gave a brief initial report describing a three story garden apartment with smoke showing from side Alpha: “The Captain of E-11 will have Command and we are initiating an aggressive interior attack with a 1 ¾” hand line”. Command also instructed the second due engine to bring him a supply line from the hydrant.
A female resident (victim # 1) appeared in a third floor apartment window, Alpha/Bravo side (Apt. B-1), yelled for assistance, and threatened to jump. Smoke or fire was visible from any of the third floor windows. At 1823 hours, Command advised Dispatch that he had a rescue and that he was establishing Limited Command. Fire Dispatch was in the process of upgrading the response profile to an apartment fire with rescue when the responding Battalion Chief requested that the fire box be upgraded to a fire rescue box. While the Firefighter and Lieutenant prepared for entry into the building, the Captain and Driver/Operator extended a ladder to the 3rd floor apartment window and rescued the resident. The first attempt by the Firefighter and Lieutenant to make entry into the side Alpha entrance was unsuccessful due to the extreme heat and smoke conditions.
Initial Arrival Conditions
The second due engine, E-10, arrived at 1823 with staffing of a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. At 1823, E-10’s crew brought a 4″ supply line to E-11 from the hydrant at Deanwood Rd. and Dowling Circle and assisted the first-in crew with fire attack.
The Captain from E-10 conferred with Command and was instructed to advance a second 1 ¾” hand line.
The window to the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2) was removed, and the second 1 ¾” line was advanced to the building by the crew of E-10.
Fire attack was initiated through the removed window. At 1827, Command requested a second alarm.
At this time, heat and smoke conditions just inside the front door improved enough to allow the Firefighter and Lieutenant from E-11 to make entry through the front door and into the stairwell. There they encountered heavy, thick black
smoke and high heat conditions coming up the stairs from the terrace level apartment. The Lieutenant reported that the doorway to the first floor apartment was orange with fire and he had to fight his way through heavy heat and smoke conditions to attack the fire in the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2). Entry was made approximately 3 feet into the doorway when the Firefighter’s low air alarm began to sound, and he exited the building. A member from E-10’s crew replaced the Firefighter from E-11 on the hose line.
At the same time, the Captain from E-11 proceeded to the rear of the structure to complete his initial 360 degree size up. He noted that there was fire emanating from the open sliding doors on the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2), extending to the balcony above. E-1, staffed by a Captain, Driver/Operator, and two Firefighters arrived and completed the hookup of the supply line that had been laid to the hydrant by E-10. The rest of Engine 1’s crew grabbed tools and an extension ladder and reported to the Charlie side of the building.
Personnel stated that at this point fire conditions seemed to improve, suggesting that crews were making progress extinguishing the fire. (The first arriving attack crew reported that they were able to see apparatus lights through the sliding doors on Charlie side, which indicated to them that smoke and fire conditions were improving.)
Truck 1, a tiller unit staffed by a Lieutenant, two Driver/Operators, and a Firefighter, arrived on side Alpha and immediately began search and rescue operations. Windows on the second floor Alpha/Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2) were vented and ladders were thrown to gain access. T-8 arrived at the alley on side Charlie. E-1 extended a ground ladder to the third floor balcony on the Charlie/Bravo side of the structure (Apt. B-1), and made access to the apartment to search for additional victims.
They noted fire venting from the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2) out of the sliding glass doors progressing upwards towards the balcony on the second floor. Upon entering the apartment, they conducted a primary search and noted minimal heat with light smoke conditions.
The crew accessed the hallway via the apartment entry door and noticed an increase in the temperature and the amount of smoke.
They immediately closed the door and exited the apartment via the ground ladder.
Upon exiting the apartment, E-1’s crew observed E-292 on the scene with a hand line extending into the apartment of origin, (first floor, Charlie/Delta side, Apt. T-2). The officer on E-1 noted white smoke coming from the unit.
Having already laid a supply line from the intersection of the alley and Deanwood Road, E-292’s crew extended a 1 ¾” hand line into the apartment of origin. Moderate fire conditions with zero visibility were encountered, and they reported feeling a great deal of heat on their knees as they crawled through the apartment.
The Lieutenant and the Firefighter from Truck-1 entered Apartment A-2 via a second floor bedroom window (Alpha/Delta side) and began a search for additional victims. As they traversed the living room area they found an unconscious male resident (victim #2). At 1836 hours, the Lieutenant notified Command via an urgent transmission that a victim had been located and they needed assistance with evacuation. The Lieutenant and Firefighter noted a small fire in the rear corner near the victim as they exited the room. The crew returned to the bedroom from which they had entered and closed the door behind them. Victim #2 was then evacuated from the apartment via a ground ladder through the bedroom window, and transferred to EMS personnel on side Alpha.
Preflashover conditions Alpha Side 18:37 hours
At 1831 hours, Squad 303, a unit staffed by a Driver/Operator, Firefighter Falkenhan (acting Officer in Charge), and 3 other Firefighters had arrived at the Alpha side of the building. Firefighter Falkenhan and two crew members grabbed their tools and immediately entered the building. One Firefighter (Firefighter #1) proceeded to the terrace floor apartment to assist crews with fire attack. Firefighter Falkenhan and the other Firefighter (Firefighter #2) proceeded to the second floor
Bravo side apartment (Apt. A-1) to search for additional victims. They forced the door to the second floor apartment and conducted their search. Finding no one, they reported to Command that they had encountered high heat in the apartment and at 1838 hours, inquired as to which apartment victim #2 had been found. Firefighter Falkenhan advised Command that he and his fellow Firefighter were proceeding to the third floor to continue their search.
At 1840 hours, Battalion Chief 11 (BC-11) arrived on the scene, performed a face-to-face pass on with the Captain on Engine 11, and assumed Command. BC-11 initially observed limited smoke conditions, indicating to him that crews had made progress in extinguishing the fire.
18:41 hours
Meanwhile, the Lieutenant and Firefighter from T-8 entered the second floor apartment that S-303 had just searched (Apt. A-1, second floor, Bravo side). They proceeded through the apartment and went across the hallway to Apartment A-2 where Truck-1 had just made their rescue (second floor, Delta side).
The Lieutenant noted smoky conditions, and saw that the sliding doors to the rear of the apartment were open, and saw a small fire in the rear of the apartment to the left of the open doors. On their way back to their point of entry, T-8’s crew discovered an unconscious female victim (victim #3). At 1837 hours, T-8 attempted to reach Command via radio and was covered by inaudible radio traffic. Dispatch was able to receive the radio transmission from T-8, and advised Command that another victim had been located on the second floor.
At this point, the crew from S-303 had completed their search of the third floor Bravo side apartment (Apt. B-1).
Firefighter Falkenhan and Firefighter #2 were able to look out of the sliding doors on side Charlie down to the first floor apartment, Apt. T-2 (Charlie/Delta side) and could see fire.
Smoke conditions on the third floor were light enough to walk upright in a somewhat crouched position.
The crew returned to the hallway, forced open the door to the third floor Charlie/Delta side apartment, Apt. B-2, and made entry.
Firefighter #2 walked down the hallway to the bedroom on the right while Firefighter Falkenhan searched to the left. After checking the bedroom, Firefighter #2 stated that he heard something behind him and turned to see fire in the hallway.
As the crew from S-303 searched the third floor Delta side apartment (Apt. B-2), The Lieutenant and Firefighter from T-8 were attempting to remove victim #3 from the second floor Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2). As they prepared to move their patient, fire conditions changed suddenly.
The Lieutenant from T-8 observed fire, “…rolling over our heads and out of the apartment door.” An immediate increase in heat conditions was noted. Upon exiting the apartment, T-8’s crew described a “tunnel of fire” coming out of the apartment and into the hallway. At 1841 hours, a radio transmission was made by an unknown source that heavy fire was observed in the hallway through a window at the stairwell landing.
At the same time, (1841) one minute after his arrival, Battalion Chief-11 (Command) noted heavy black smoke coming from the building and observed a “flash” through a second floor window. Command immediately ordered an evacuation of the building. Dispatch sounded the evacuation tones over the radio, and repeated the order to evacuate. Engines on the scene sounded their air horns to indicate that the order to evacuate had been given.
Firefighter #2 from S-303 reported hearing the engines on the fire ground sound their air horns, indicating to him that he needed to leave the building. Smoke conditions in the apartment had changed to thick black smoke, and the fire intensified, blocking his means of egress from the bedroom.
Realizing that he needed to get out of the apartment quickly, Firefighter#2 crawled to a window on the Alpha side of the bedroom and signaled Firefighters below with his hand light to move a ladder to the window. Crews immediately moved the ladder, and at 1841, Firefighter#2 dove headfirst out of the window and down the ladder, where he was assisted by crews working on the exterior of the building.
At 1841, Firefighter Falkenhan declared, “Emergency” on his radio, and repeated the same seven seconds later.
Command immediately queried S-303 for his location and the transmission “I’m down to the floor, heavy fire” was heard. At 1842 hours, Dispatch sounded emergency tones and restricted the Talkgroup to communications only between S-303 and Command.
Seconds later Firefighter Falkenhan again keyed up his portable radio and advised “…trapped on the 3rd floor, heavy fire on the Alpha/Bravo.”
Fourteen seconds later he advised “I hear crew members, the third, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY.”
Command notified Dispatch, “We have a MAYDAY” and was interrupted by a transmission from Firefighter Falkenhan, “urgent.”
Command made several attempts to contact Falkenhan to ascertain his location and determine resources needed (Location Unit Name Assignment Resources) for rescue.
Upon hearing the MAYDAY, crews on side Charlie threw multiple ladders to the third floor balcony to assist with rescue.
Heavy heat, smoke, and fire conditions made rescue difficult, but Firefighter Falkenhan was located and removed from the apartment via the balcony to the extended aerial ladder from T-8. He was unconscious and unresponsive at this time. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued enroute to the hospital. Firefighter Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.
Consolidated List of Recommendations
Crew Integrity
1. Company officers shall ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times by all personnel operating in an IDLH environment. 2. No personnel shall operate in an IDLH environment without a portable radio.
MAYDAY
1. If possible, the firefighter should activate his/her Emergency button on the portable radio. 2. Once personnel have called a MAYDAY and provided the information needed (LUNAR), they will activate their PASS Device manually and intermittently.
Incident Command
1. Tactical Operations Manual 07 allows Incident Commanders the flexibility to adapt to fast-moving and complex incidents. When re-assuming command, the IC must be identified (verbally through Fire Dispatch) to allow units involved and responding to know who is in command.
2. Incident Commanders must understand that an early initial 360° would give the IC the information needed to develop effective strategy and tactics for incident mitigation.
3. Additional arriving units must give the IC an updated report on fire conditions when noticeably different than those announced in the Brief Initial Report.
4. Arriving units should prompt the IC to assign them supervision of a division when conditions warrant such action.
5. The IC must ensure that all division and group supervisors are properly deployed and verbalize same on the radio for Dispatch and units involved on the incident.
6. Reinforce the importance of the ICS and its functional components for all officers.
7. Ensure a manageable span-of-control is maintained throughout the incident.
8. Evaluate the efficiency of command and control as incidents escalate.
9. A Rapid Intervention Team is a vitally important part of the ICS and its assignment should not be overlooked.
Strategy and Tactics
1. Use caution when passing a hydrant that is in your direction of travel and close to the fire building in an attempt to get a closer one.
2. Consider having the initial backup line proceeding into the same point of entry as the initial crew operating in the IDLH environment. Doing this allows for the line to also aid in protecting the common stairwell (i.e. fire extension/protection for egress). Deploy a third line if needed into another point of access.
3. Consider dialing nozzles up to higher gallons per minute for large structures such as apartment buildings.
4. Consider utilizing a 2-1/2″ attack line for fire attack.
5. The current SOP should be modified to state that when the initial Incident Commander feels that the incident has stabilized to a point where there is no longer a need for him/her to be directly involved with incident operations, a notification through Dispatch shall be made to inform crews on and en route to the scene.
6. The Department should develop training to ensure that Incident Commanders relay changes in modes of operations.
7. Consider attacking fires from other sides of the structure that are on grade.
8. Consider the use of “door control” for protection during search and rescue and exposure protection
9. When deviations to initial orders are made, they must be communicated to Command.
10. IC should consider setting up a division supervisor with the first arriving officer to balance his/her span-of-control early into the incident.
11. Command should initiate group and division supervisors early into an incident and use them to reduce his/her span-of-control. Communicate Conditions, Actions, Needs (CAN) reports early and often.
12. When units are the initial crews deployed to a geographic location, consideration should be given to “prompt” Command to make them a division supervisor (in the absence of direction from Command).
13. Units should request resources, or supply their own as necessary to support the operations that they are undertaking.
14. When given a division assignment, “step back” to take in the overall picture and communicate progress reports to Command.
15. Be clear and concise when setting up division assignments.
16. Utilize the division supervisors for incident operations once assigned.
17. Training on effective use of interior doors to control fire spread should be promoted throughout the department.
18. Consider removing common stairwell windows earlier in fire ground operations when appropriate.
19. While performing operations above the fire, notify Command of changing conditions and immediately request resources to support your function.
20. Set up a command post as early as possible to aid in deploying and accounting for resources as they arrive on the fire ground.
21. Notify Command when entering an IDLH.
22. Request resources to support functions.
23. Set up divisions and groups early to aid in managing the strategic priorities.
24. Be clear in communicating strategy and tactics to companies involved in operations.
25. Command should make it a priority to deploy attack lines on all floors to support the operations of crews working in the area.
Communications
1. A rubberized cover for the radio speaker microphone should be tested by communications and field personnel. This device will cover the push-to-talk (PTT) button and will increase the pressure required for activation. If proved effective, this cover will decrease the likelihood of an accidental activation of the PTT button during vigorous fire ground activity.
2. Continuing study should occur to evaluate methods to control inadvertent radio interference from all units (on the scene, responding, or monitoring) during incident operations. Review PTT logs to identify sources of communications interference.
3. As a result of the investigation, PTT log files will now be saved for 25 days.
4. Fire Communications and field personnel will develop and distribute a mandatory training program outlining proper radio procedures including the importance of radio discipline, MAYDAY procedures, and the procedure for establishing a Command restricted talk group during critical operations.
5. All personnel engaged in operations in an environment immediately dangerous to life and health shall carry a portable radio.
6. The aforementioned mandatory training program shall stress the importance of giving regular updates to Command regarding the extent and location of the fire and other pertinent information.
USFA Releases Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010) Report “Other unintentionally set, careless” actions and “smoking” are the leading causes
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report today examining the characteristics of civilian fire fatalities in residential buildings. The report, Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010) was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is based on 2008 to 2010 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).
According to the report:
Ninety-two percent of all civilian fatalities in residential building fires involve thermal burns and smoke inhalation.
The leading specific location where civilian fire fatalities occur in residential buildings is the bedroom (55 percent).
Fifty percent of civilian fire fatalities in residential buildings occur between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. This period also accounts for 47 percent of fatal fires.
Thirty-six percent of fire victims in residential buildings were trying to escape at the time of their deaths; an additional 35 percent were sleeping.
“Other unintentionally set, careless” actions and “smoking” (each accounting for 16 percent) are the leading causes of fatal residential building fires.
Approximately 44 percent of civilian fatalities in residential building fires are between the ages of 40 and 69.
Thirteen percent of the fire fatalities in residential buildings were less than 10 years old.
Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010) is part of the Topical Fire Report Series. Topical reports explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS.
Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.
This report provides a statistical overview of fires in the United States and is designed to equip the fire service and others with information that motivates corrective action, sets priorities, targets specific fire programs, serves as a model for State and local analyses of fire data, and provides a baseline for evaluating programs.
In case you missed these or are first to see these now, informative information on Structural Collapse previously issued by NIST. This supplements the continuing research and effort by UL, NIST and numerous other academic and research institutions. From Fire.gov. http://www.nist.gov/fire/collapse.cfm
Structural Collapse Fire Tests: Single Story, Wood Frame Structures
A series of fire tests was conducted in Phoenix, Arizona to collect data for a project examining the feasibility of predicting structural collapse. The fire test scenario was selected as part of a training video being prepared by the Phoenix, Arizona Fire Department. Multiple fires were started in each structure to facilitate collapse; the fires were not intended to test the fire endurance of the structures. Four structures with different roof constructions were used for the fire tests. Temperatures were measured as a function of time in four locations within each structure. Furniture items were placed in the front and back of each structure to simulate living room and bedroom areas. The living room and bedroom areas of each structure were ignited simultaneously using electric matches. Peak temperatures obtained during the tests ranged from approximately 800 °C (1500 °F) to 1000 °C (1800 °F). The roof of each structure collapsed approximately 17 minutes after ignition. In addition to the full scale tests, the plywood and oriented strand board (OSB) roofing materials were tested using a cone calorimeter to characterize the fire properties of the materials.
Structural Collapse Fire Tests: Single Story, Ordinary Construction Warehouse
Two fire tests were conducted in a warehouse located in Phoenix, Arizona to develop data for evaluation of a methodology for predicting structural collapse. A firewall was constructed to divide the warehouse into two fire compartments. Temperatures were measured as a function of time in three locations during the first test and in two locations during the second test. In addition, the volume fraction of carbon monoxide was measured at selected locations during each test. Stacks of wood pallets were used as the primary fuel source and were ignited using paper and an electric match. Some combustible debris and the building structural elements provided the remainder of the fuel load. Peak temperatures obtained at different elevations ranged from approximately 300 °C (570 °F) to 800 °C (1470 °F). Peak carbon monoxide volume fraction reached 4 % in the first test and 5 % during the second test. The roof of the front half of the structure burned through approximately 18 min after ignition of the fire for the first test. The roof of the back half of the structure burned through about 15 min after the start of the second test.
Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002
Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
A field-based monitoring technique that utilizes measurements of fire-induced vibration was developed and first demonstrated under a previously funded research effort. This report details the findings of the ensuing 3-year endeavor in which significant improvements were made to both field-test and analysis procedures. A real-time monitoring tool has been developed and numerous full-scale burn tests on a variety of structures have been completed. A significant contribution of the research stems from the use of system stability theory to aid in the interpretation of the field measurements. The techniques described in this report can be used to monitor burning structures and to provide visual indicators that track changes in structural stability.
The Chief of the Department directed the Department Safety Officer to conduct a Safety Investigation of this incident. The primary purpose of the investigation was to identify and analyze the contributing factors that led to the incident as well as to create situational awareness to prevent future occurrences. The main objective of the Team’s investigation and subsequent report was to discover the key factor that led to the fatal outcome of two Firefighters. The SFFD report contains the findings and recommendations to help prevent Firefighter injuries or fatalities in the future.
In analyzing and recording these events, the Investigation Team acknowledges and respects that members confronted a challenging situation. On‐scene personnel reacted quickly to the changing conditions at this incident. We request that every person who reads this report show respect, appreciation and consideration for all personnel who responded to this incident.
As is a common industry practice, for this report Lieutenant Vincent Perez was referred to as Victim 1 and Firefighter Paramedic Anthony Valerio was referred to as Victim 2, with the exception of the Rescue Events Section.
Excerpt from Chief of Department’s Letter
“On Thursday, June 2, 2011 at 10:45 a.m., the San Francisco Fire Department responded to Box 8155, at 133 Berkeley Way. What was seemingly a routine working fire in a single family residence quickly transformed into a fierce and unrelenting incident with ultimately tragic results.
When we answered the call to a career in the Fire Service and took our Oath of Allegiance, we were aware of the inherent danger of our occupation. Despite this awareness, we do not expect to encounter a line of duty death of a brother or sister, especially not in our very own Department. The profound loss of Lieutenant Vincent Perez and Firefighter/Paramedic Anthony Valerio has left an indelible impression in our hearts and will forever be remembered in the annals of SFFD history.
Even as we mourned our fallen brothers in the early days after the tragedy, our Department began the painful and difficult, but necessary, steps of a Line of Duty Death investigation. We were resolute in understanding what occurred during those fateful minutes and compelled to uncover any recommendations for improvement that may arise to future operations so that their passing will not have been in vain. For over six months, the Investigative Team worked tirelessly, scrutinizing every piece of evidence in order to produce a comprehensive report.”
SFFD
Joanne Hayes‐White
Chief of Department
Executive Summary and Report Excerpt
On June 2, 2011 at 10:45 hours, the San Francisco Fire Department was dispatched to a report of a fire in the building at 133 Berkeley Way in the City’s Diamond Heights neighborhood. The first unit arriving on the scene, Engine 26, observed light smoke showing from the garage of the 4 story (2 above grade, 2 below grade) wood framed building, detached on the Bravo side.
Aerial from the Charlie Side
An aggressive interior fire attack was initiated through the front door, which is on a level between the ground level and second floor. After investigating the garage (ground level), Engine 24, the second Engine on the scene, led a small line through the garage to the interior door to back up the first Company. Battalion 9 was assigned Fire Attack by Battalion 6, who had assumed Command. Battalion 9 entered the fire building and, after conferring face to face with Engine 26 on the first floor (ground level), concluded that the fire was below them.
Alpha Side Operations
Battalion 9 exited the building and proceeded to the Bravo side to check for an entrance leading directly to the fire floor. Engine 11 led a large line wye to the driveway with the intention of leading a 1 ¾ inch line through the garage. They were redirected by Battalion 6 to make their lead down the Bravo side of the building to Sublevel 1 (one floor below grade) to assist Battalion 9. The Division Chief, upon arrival, assumed Command. He assigned Battalion 6 to Division 3 (ground floor).
Truck 15 was assigned Roof Division. Truck 11 split their crew, two members to the roof and three members to search and ventilate the top floor of the fire building. The Rescue Squad was ordered to conduct a search. Two members initially attempted to make entry through the garage but, due to extreme heat conditions, redeployed and entered through Sublevel 1 on the Bravo side.
The other two members of the Rescue Squad made entry through the front door, were pushed back by the heat and then made a successful second effort and conducted a search of the top floor.
In the course of fireground operations, members of several Companies came upon the stricken members on the first level and removed them from the building. All possible efforts were employed to revive the members and they were transported to San Francisco General Hospital (SFGH). One member (Victim 1) succumbed to his injuries that day and the second member (Victim 2) succumbed to his injuries two days later. Two other Firefighters were treated at SFGH for various injuries and released that day.
The Medical Examiner determined the cause of death for both members was due to complications from external and internal thermal injuries. Both victims suffered burns to 40% of their body surface. This fire was determined to be accidental by the SFFD Fire Investigative Unit. The fire originated on Sublevel 1, on the West side of the family room, near the large floor to ceiling windows. The ignition was a non‐specific electrical sequence in the electrical wiring or appliance (handheld vacuum cleaner) in this area.
There was a delay in reporting the fire due to the occupants’ attempting to extinguish it on their own. (SFFD Fire Investigation Report 11‐0500532)
The investigation identified that the failing of the window on Sublevel 1, located near the seat of the fire and directly across the stairwell leading to the ground floor, led to the extreme fire behavior which ultimately caused the death of two Firefighters. This fire was in a stage of deprived oxygen when the window failed, causing a rapid extreme high heat event to occur. The extreme heat followed the natural flow path up the interior stairs where Victims 1 and 2 were located.
The Safety Investigation Team found no conclusive evidence that the members were exposed to direct flame impingement during this rapid extreme heat event. However,
Victims 1 and 2 received varying degree of burns up to 40% of their body. The investigation concluded that this was caused by the rapid extreme heat conditions that radiated through their Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to their bodies. These temperatures exceed the ability for human survival regardless of PPE.
The PPE was inspected and evaluated by NIOSH and the manufacturer. Both reviewing parties concluded that the PPE performed to its specifications and design. The manufacturer concluded that the PPE was exposed to temperatures in the range of 550‐ 700°F. These extreme temperatures were short in duration which caused limited damage to the outer shell of the PPE.
The Safety Investigation Team noticed severe heat damage to the portable radios remote speaker/microphones on Victims 1 and 2 and had the radios tested. The testing indicated that the remote speaker/microphones failed to operate correctly due to heat damage. The Safety Investigation Team was not able to determine, after testing, exactly when the remote speaker/microphones failed. The investigation has shown that multiple attempts were made to contact Engine 26 with no response.
The investigation also found that no radio transmissions of distress were received from Victims 1 or 2. Command and Control of any incident in the San Francisco Fire Department is acquired and maintained through the use of the Incident Command System (ICS).
The Incident Command System provides the tools for clear objectives, a single action plan, clear and acknowledged communications, and accountability for all members assigned to an incident. At this incident, some of the components of Incident Command System that were not followed include:
Single action plan
Fireground Accountability
From these findings, this report makes recommendations for several areas of the Department, including:
Training
Equipment
Policy Development
Policy Enforcement
The Safety Investigation Team gathered and analyzed many facts and conducted interviews of members directly involved in this incident. The Team identified several factors that occurred that contributed to the deaths at this incident.
These factors include:
Extreme heat conditions accelerated by the failure of a window on the fire floor.
Layout of building
Excessive live fuel load which contributed to the growth of the fire
Conclusion
This incident appeared from the onset to be a routine “room and contents” fire that the SFFD encounters on a regular basis. As the Companies were performing standard fireground operations, the incident rapidly deteriorated due to a hostile fire event. The failure of a window in the fire room allowed fresh oxygen to enter the room, providing a fire that was deprived of one of the key elements of combustion to rapidly intensify.
Due to the growth of the fire, the room flashed, causing extreme and rapid heat conditions which traveled up the interior stairs (the flow path) to the location which our members were operating. Our members were caught in this high heat, causing the injuries that ultimately claimed their lives.
Due to this fire event, other Companies attempting to conduct fireground support operations were prevented from making entry into the structure from street level (through garage) to back up Engine 26. These Companies were forced to regroup and find an alternate point of entry. In the process of doing so, crews made entry from the Bravo side directly into the fire room and extinguished the fire. This allowed members to make entry from above which led to the discovery and rescue of our members.
These events happened in a time frame of less than fourteen minutes.
During the course of this investigation, the Safety Investigation Team recognized that no matter how experienced or properly prepared we are, we must always approach all incidents with the utmost awareness.
This incident showed that a simple failure of a piece of glass/window caused unforeseeable and fatal consequences.
We, as a Department, need to gain further knowledge and understanding of the following:
Having Situational Awareness prior to taking action, this would include the ongoing process when conditions change
How Risk Management must be used when making all decisions
Limitations of the PPE (turnouts, SCBA, and equipment)
Building construction, including layout and how fire/smoke will
move within the structure
Ventilation practices and how they affect fire conditions
Importance of Communications for all members operating on the scene
Companies must use strict discipline when assigned task/locations
PreviousCommandSafety Coverage from 2011, HERE, HERE and HERE
The mission of the Fire Department is to protect the lives and property of the people of San Francisco from fires, natural disasters, and hazardous materials incidents; to save lives by providing emergency medical services; to prevent fires through prevention and education programs; and to provide a work environment that values health, wellness and cultural diversity and is free of harassment and discrimination.
One Meridian Plaza Fire 1991, Provided Photo Source Not Known, All rights reserved
On what began as an uneventful Saturday night twenty-one years ago, a fire on the 22nd floor of the 38-story Meridian Bank Building, also known as One Meridian Plaza, was reported to the Philadelphia Fire Department on February 23, 1991 at approximately 2040 hours and went on to burned for more than 19 hours.
The fire caused three firefighter fatalities (LODD) and injuries to 24 firefighters.
PFD Line of Duty Deaths:
Captain David P. Holcombe, age 52
Firefighter Phyllis McAllister, age 43
Firefighter James A. Chappell, age 29
The 12-alarms brought 51 engine companies, 15 ladder companies, 11 specialized units, and over 300 firefighters to the scene. It was one of the largest high-rise office building fire in modern American history –completely consuming eight floors of the building –and was controlled only when it reached a floor that was protected by automatic sprinklers.
The Fire Department arrived to find a well-developed fire on the 22nd floor, with fire dropping down to the 21st floor through a set of convenience stairs.
Heavy smoke had already entered the stairways and the floors immediately above the 22nd.
Fire attack was hampered by a complete failure of the building’s electrical system and by inadequate water pressure, caused in part by improperly set pressure reducing valves on standpipe hose outlets.
For a detailed accounting, diagrams and links, click over to Buildingsonfire.com HERE
Knowledge and proficiencies related to building construction are formulative to all strategic, tactical and task level assignments.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, the compartment, occupancy risk, fire dynamics and fire behavior, fluid situational awareness and risk analysis, the art and science of aggressive and smart firefighting with well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies; You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.
What do you think? Where do you fit in?
New Strategic Thinking for Today’s Evolving Fireground and Challenges…..
Wind blowing into the broken window of a room on fire can turn a “routine room and contents fire” into a floor-to-ceiling firestorm. Historically, this has led to a significant number of firefighter fatalities and injuries, particularly in high-rise buildings where the fire must be fought from the interior of the structure.
Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House in Texas, 2009
On April 12, 2009, a fire in a one-story ranch home in Texas claimed the lives of two fire fighters. (NIOSH REPORT HERE) Sustained high winds occurred during the incident. The winds caused a rapid change in the dynamics of the fire after the failure of a large section of glass in the rear of the house.
Wind Driven Fire in Home, Texas, 2009. Aerial view of damage to the structure. Photo credit: Houston Fire Department.
NIST performed computer simulations of the fire using the Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) and Smokeview, a visualization tool, to provide insight on the fire development and thermal conditions that may have existed in the residence during the fire.
The FDS simulation that best represents the witnessed fire conditions indicates that the fire that spread throughout the attic and first floor developed a wind driven flow with temperatures in excess of 260 °C (500 °F) between the den and front door. The critical event in this fire was the creation of a wind-driven flow path between the upwind side of the structure and the exit point on the downwind side of the structure, the front door. The flow path was created by the failure of a large span of windows in the den, in the rear of the structure. Floor-to-ceiling temperatures rapidly increased in the flow path where multiple crews were performing interior operations. In a simulation that excluded wind, the flow path was not created, and the thermal environment surrounding the location of interior operations was improved.
Still image from FDS simulation. Temperatures at 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor throughout the house 10 s after solarium failure. Image credit: NIST.
Wind has been recognized as a contributing factor to fire spread in wildland fires and large-area conflagrations and wildland fire fighters are trained to account for the wind in their tactics. While structural fire departments have recognized the impact of wind on fires, in general, the standard operating guidelines for structural fire fighting have not changed to address the hazards created by a wind driven fire inside a structure. The results of the “no-wind” and “wind” fire simulations demonstrate how wind conditions can rapidly change the thermal environment from tenable to untenable for fire fighters working in a single-story residential structure fire.
The simulation results emphasize the importance of including wind conditions in the scene size-up before beginning and while performing fire fighting operations and adjusting tactics based on the wind conditions. These results are in agreement with NIST studies conducted to examine wind driven fire conditions in high-rise structures.
LESSONS LEARNED
Based on the analysis of this fire incident and results from previous studies, adjusting fire fighting tactics to account for wind conditions in structural fire fighting is critical to enhancing the safety and the effectiveness of fire fighters. Previous studies demonstrated that applying water from the exterior, into the upwind side of the structure can have a significant impact on controlling the fire prior to beginning interior operations. It should be made clear that in a wind-driven fire, it is most important to use the wind to your advantage and attack the fire from the upwind side of the structure, especially if the upwind side is the burned side. Interior operations need to be aware of potentially rapidly changing conditions.
Career Probationary Fire Fighter and Captain Die as a Result of Rapid Fire Progression in a Wind-Driven Residential Structure Fire – Texas
SUMMARY
Shortly after midnight on Sunday, April 12, 2009, a 30-year old male career probationary fire fighter and a 50-year old male career captain were killed when they were trapped by rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire. The victims were members of the first arriving company and initiated fast attack offensive interior operations through the front entrance. Less than six minutes after arriving on-scene, the victims became disoriented as high winds pushed the rapidly growing fire through the den and living room areas where interior crews were operating. Seven other fire fighters were driven from the structure but the two victims were unable to escape. Rescue operations were immediately initiated but had to be suspended as conditions deteriorated. The victims were located and removed from the structure approximately 40 minutes after they arrived on location.
Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: an inadequate size-up prior to committing to tactical operations; lack of understanding of fire behavior and fire dynamics; fire in a void space burning in a ventilation controlled regime; high winds; uncoordinated tactical operations, in particular fire control and tactical ventilation; failure to protect the means of egress with a backup hose line; inadequate fireground communications; and failure to react appropriately to deteriorating conditions.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
ensure that an adequate initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene is conducted before beginning interior fire fighting operations
ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior (such as smoke color, velocity, density, visible fire, heat)
ensure that fire fighters are trained to recognize the potential impact of windy conditions on fire behavior and implement appropriate tactics to mitigate the potential hazards of wind-driven fire
ensure that fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively apply ventilation and fire control tactics in a coordinated manner
ensure that fire fighters and officers understand the capabilities and limitations of thermal imaging cameras (TIC) and that a TIC is used as part of the size-up process
ensure that fire fighters are trained to check for fire in overhead voids upon entry and as charged hoselines are advanced
develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to insure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday
ensure fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures
ensure all fire fighters on the fire ground are equipped with radios capable of communicating with the Incident Commander and Dispatch
Additionally, research and standard setting organizations should:
conduct research to more fully characterize the thermal performance of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece lens materials and other personal protective equipment (PPE) components to ensure SCBA and PPE provide an appropriate level of protection.
Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation could have specifically prevented the fatalities, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments:
ensure that all fire fighters recognize the capabilities and limitations of their personal protective equipment when operating in high temperature environments.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
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Fire in the United States Fifteenth Edition (2003-2007)
