Was working on an LODD report and came across a past notable incident that occurred over 32 years ago, that should be recognized, for many of you that may not of heard or read about it previous to this.
Here’s an intro and a link to the LAFD January 28, 1981 incident;
On January 28, 1981, at 3:33 a.m, a full alarm assignment was dispatched to Cugees Restaurant,5300 Lankershim Boulevard, in the North Hollywood area.
Firefighters found heavy smoke with some fire showing in the interior of the restaurant.
Because a back draft explosion was a distinct possibility and because the smoke had to be cleared in order to begin a meaningful fire attack, ventilation procedures were begun on the roof.
Four members of Truck 60 were cutting a hole near the center of the roof when, without warning, it began to sink beneath their feet. One firefighter described the sensation as similar to standing on the deck of a rapidly listing ship. As the roof sank, it fell at a steep angle, slowly and agonizingly pulling Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor to his death.
In Memory of Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor Truck Company 60 B Platoon
Appointed July 22, 1973
Died January 28, 1981
Died of burns in roof collapse at arson fire.
Cugee’s Restaurant
5300 Lankershim Boulevard
Light Weight construction has given way to Engineered Structural Systems (ESS) which in today’s evolving fireground, have an even more extensive array of performance, operational and integrity issues that affect a building’s performance under fire conditions.To unequivocally state that nothing has changed in buildings, occupancies, fire flow delivery rates and demands for increased proficiencies of our firefighters, company and command officers is absurd, ignorant and dangerous.
“It’s a lot more than just Stretching the Line…and going in….”
Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety…so we can do our job—and that’s firefighting .Another classic illustration by Paul Combs.
If you’re planning on heading to the Fire Department Instructors Conference, FDIC in Indianapolis please consider making time to attend our classroom session. We’ll make sure we have a seat waiting for you. There’s a tremendous selection of offerings, check out the program listings HERE. If you’re not able to make the class, make sure you contact me if you’d like to chat, I’ll be there the entire week and would love to talk shop and share insights. Take a look at the FDIC site HERE for a complete listing of programs, offerings and activities. It’s an incredible experience and a must for all levels of experience and organizational affiliation.
Adaptive Fireground Strategies for Today’s Occupancies
Adaptive Fireground Strategies for Today’s Occupancies
Combat fire suppression and field operations are being impacted on a variety of levels with demands for increasing adaptability, expanding risk management, and modified tactical protocols. The focus in on the five fundamental core relationships of building construction, risk management, firefighter behaviors, incident operations, and situational safety. Firefighters, officers, and commanders will benefit from the latest insights into emerging fireground tactical theory for effective combat operations, operational excellence, and firefighter safety offered in this session.
Remembrance:Pittsburgh(PA) Bureau of Fire- Post Fire Collapse and Double LODD
NIOSH Report F2004-17: Career battalion chief and career master fire fighter die and twenty-nine career fire fighters are injured during a five alarm church fire -Pennsylvania.
On March 13, 2004, a 55-year-old male career Battalion Chief (Victim #1) and a 51-year-old male career master fire fighter (Victim #2) were fatally injured during a structural collapse at a church fire. Victim #1 was acting as the Incident Safety Officer and Victim #2 was performing overhaul, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. Twenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were pronounced dead at the scene.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should
ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations
establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations
ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone
train fire fighters to recognize conditions that forewarn of a backdraft
ensure consistent use of personal alert safety system (PASS) devices during overhaul operations
ensure that pre-incident planning is performed on structures containing unique features such as bell towers
ensure that Incident Commanders conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing fire fighters to an interior operation, and continue to assess risk-versus-gain throughout the operation including overhaul
develop standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to assign additional safety officers during complex incidents
provide interior attack crews with thermal imaging cameras
Additionally,
municipalities should enforce current building codes to improve the safety of occupants and fire fighters
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations.
Discussion: Due to the destructive powers of fire, most structures that have been involved in fires are structurally weakened. In this incident, the structural integrity of the bell tower was weakened by a fire of several hours duration, the addition of thousands of gallons of water, and possibly the destructive effect of the backdraft. Analysis of the exterior of the structure should be performed continuously while conducting interior operations. Similarly, before overhaul operations are begun, the structure should be determined safe to work in by the IC and a designated Safety Officer. If necessary, the IC should seek the help of qualified structural experts or other competent persons to assess the need for the removal of dangerously weakened construction, or should make provisions for shoring up load-bearing walls, floors, ceilings, roofs, or as in this case, the bell tower.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations.
Discussion: During fire operations, two rules exist about structural collapse: (1) the potential for structural failure always exists during and after a fire, and (2) a collapse danger zone must be established. A defensive attack was declared within an hour after fire suppression activities began. Part of a defensive strategy is establishing and moving fire fighters outside of the collapse zone.
A collapse zone is an area around and away from a structure in which debris might land if a structure fails. Immediate safety precautions must be taken if factors indicate the potential for a building collapse. All persons operating inside the structure must be evacuated immediately and a collapse zone should be established around the perimeter. The collapse zone area should be equal to the height of the building plus an additional allowance for debris scatter and at a minimum should be equal to 1½ times the height of the building. For example, since the bell tower was 115 feet high, the collapse zone boundary should be established at least 173 feet away from the church. Once a collapse zone has been established, the area should be clearly marked and monitored, to make certain that no fire fighters enter the danger zone.
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone.
In this incident, command suffered a serious lapse after the Incident Commander and several company officers were injured in the collapse. The command post from which the IC manages the fireground must be located in an area outside of the collapse zone. The IC must ensure that the command post is protected from danger so that an effective command structure is maintained throughout the incident.1, 5
March 10, 1941: The Strand Theater Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Brockton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapsed, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters.
Check out the comprehensive past post fromCommandSafety.com from 2011
Taking it the Streets: Reading the Building
Here’s a simple view from the Alpha street side. I’ll give you the options as to what you’re arrive on or as…Reading the Building requires numerous layers of knowledge and skill based attributes to develop the perspective to “read your buildings” differently.
Reading the Building: Occupancy Type and Occupancy Risk?
Arriving companies and personnel at a structure fire need to be able to rapidly and accurately identify key elements of a building, process that data based upon a widening field of variables present on today’s evolving fireground and implement timely actions that address prioritized actions requiring intervention.
Deterministic fireground models for size-up and suppression have to give way to a more expandable stochastic model of assessment. Key to this is having a broad and well developed foundation of building knowledge.
Let’s identify the building type, age, key features based on its profile, inherent characteristics, projected performance, roof system, perimeter walls, hazards, risks..etc. What is the Occupancy Type and Occupancy Risk?
There is a wealth of information you can talk about-IF you know what to look for. Start the dialog. I’ll post interior views in 48 hours.
I’ve cross posted to allow for some robust discussions. Don’t forget to Like us on Facebook.
Can you Read this building correctly? Or will your view have an adverse affect on operations if you misjudged or just didn’t know or care…just because ” you wanted to just stretch in and do the job-right?”
New for 2013: Reading the Building: Predictive Profiling for the Modern Fireground. An engaging and interactive Training Seminar addressing the Challenges of Today’s Evolving Fireground.
Been in the field lately looking at your buildings under construction? Here’s a new look at a common Engineered Structural Support (ESS) system.
Here’s today’s Taking it to the Streets session; Take a look at this Engineered Structural Support (ESS) system. There are two critical component systems depicted here in this photo- can you tell what they are? Take a close look at the ESS T…russ components. They are nothing new, but they do cause a stir when they make their way back into main stream fire service discussions as firefighters and officers “rediscover” these type of systems, their use, presence and operational risk and profiling.
So let’s start the dialog:
Can you name the type of ESS Truss, the inherent characteristics, design and function | typical applications | risks and operational concerns.
What impact will fire impingement have on the ESS assembly in either foor or roof systems?
How can you identify these assemblies and building characteristics unpon arrival?
What fireground strategies and tactics would you employ upon arrival at an occupancy with this type of ESS?
Don’t forget to look at the second system component that I mentioned earlier;
Can you identify it? Its relationship to the other system and other inherent performance issues?
Lots to talk about, look at and share. Any street stories to share-please post. I’ve got a few more in this series to post after we get some dialog and insights….
We’ve cross posted this on our BuildingsonfireFacebook page (HERE), if you haven’t checked it out, please follow the link, there’s been some great discussions and insights being shared from around the country…
Don’t forget to spread the word about Buildingsonfire.com \ CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire on FB…send the links along and like….Dont forget about CommandSafety on Twitter and Buildingsonfire on twitter also.
On December 3, 1999, a five-alarm fire at the Worcester Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. building claimed the lives of six brave firefighters who responded to the call. These six heros, The Worcester 6, sacrificed their lives to try and rescue two individuals who were believed to be trapped inside the inferno. May the Worcester 6 always be remembered; “Fallen Heroes Never Forgotten.”
Take a moment to check out the latest links on Facebook with Buildingsonfire. Timely and quick links to areas of interests related to Building Construction for the Fire Service, Emerging Firefighting Operations Theory and Command Risk Management for Operational Excellence and Firefighter Safety. Please Pass the link along to increase our reach…
The mission of Buildingsonfire on Facebook is simple; to provide a single consolidated source and repository of information relevant to the Art and Science of Firefighting integral to Building Construction, Firefighting, Command Risk and Firefighter Safety.
Advancing Training, Knowledge, Skill Development and Safety Focus for the Fire Service, and Supporting the NFFF Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives & EGH program
Buildingsonfire.comThe authoritative and informational site that provides leading insights on fire service issues related to Building Construction for the Fire Service, Emerging Firefighting Operations Theory and Command Risk Management for Operational Excellence and Firefighter Safety. Buildingsonfire.com provides a single consolidated source and repository of information relevant to the Art and Science of Firefighting integral to Building Construction, Architecture, Fire Dynamics, Engineering, Training and Firefighter Safety through Operational Excellence.
Buildingsonfire on Facebook continues to promote and highlights many of the prominent blogs that are part of the FireEMS Blog family and many, many more resources, publications, news media and reference sites and posts that should be on your radar screen.
It’s all about Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety, so everyone can go home.
Understanding the distinctiveness of your first-due, mutual aid or greater-alarm response area requires constant vigilance and continuous observations. Building knowledge equals firefighter safety. Photo By CJ Naum
When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operations (good and bad) give us experience that defines and determines how we assess, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm. The “art and science of firefighting” is predicated on a fundamental understanding of how fire affects a building and its occupants and the manner in which the fire service engages when called on to combat a structure fire.
We have certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined, predictable manner:
That the building will react and perform under assumptions of past performance and outcomes
That fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable duration
That the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy or structural system
That we can safely and effectively mitigate a fire in any given building type and occupancy
That we will have the time to conduct the required tasks identified to be of importance based on identified or assumed indicators
That the building will conform to the rules of firefighting engagement
Times have changed
Today’s incident demands on the fireground are unlike those of even the recent past. This means incident commanders, commanding and company officers and firefighters alike must have increased technical knowledge of building construction with a heightened sensitivity of fire behavior and fire dynamics, a focus on operational structural stability of the compartment and building envelope and considerations related to occupancy risk versus the occupancy type. Understanding the building – its complexities in terms of anatomy, structural systems, materials, configuration, design, layout, systems, methods of construction, engineering and inherent features, limitations, challenges and risks – is fundamental for operational excellence on the fireground and firefighter safety.
There is an immediate need for emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their knowledge and insights of modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy and the building that accounts for presumptive fire behavior.
We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built on decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in current training programs and academy instruction.
We must maintain a balance with learning about old and new building construction. A renewed focus on Type III, Ordinary /Protected construction and Type IV Heavy Timber must be incorporated within initial, in-service and periodic training and drills. Recent firefighter LODD events in these building types reinforces this need and gap. Photo By CJ Naum
Increasing company and command officer competencies in Building Anatomy, structural systems and how buildings are built and affected by fire behavior is fundamental to effective fireground operations. Interdependent structural components are evident for wall, floor and support assemblies in this Type IV occupancy. Do you know the inherent collapse potential of these buildings? Photo by CJ Naum
We have assumed that the routiness or successes of past operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel. Photo By CJ Naum
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement. Photo by CJ Naum
Executing tactical plans based on faulty or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after-action accounts and firefighter line-of-duty-death reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement Incident Action Plans (IAPs).
The demands of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel in situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations.
Managing Risk
“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for smart aggressive fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at risk. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die; it’s that simple, it’s that obvious.”
Those are the words of Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret.) of the Hackensack, NJ, Fire Department on the 20th anniversary of the Hackensack Ford dealership fire that killed five firefighters in 1988. Without understanding building-occupancy relationships and integrating fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety-conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies, you are derelict and negligent and everyone may not be going home. Empirical insights and test data must be integrated in emerging fire suppression models and improved firefighting theory.
It’s Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type; Changes in building size and floor area, compartment volume and interconnectivity, fire load packages, methods and materials in construction and structural support systems create specific risk profiles and demands in what used to be common Occupancy types. A report of a fire in a residential occupancy will have different risks and operational requirements if the house is a 1500 SF Bungalow, a 2500 SF old Decker/Flat or a 4000 SF Engineered system house. Photo By CJ Naum
Conclusion
Our world has evolved. Technological and sociological demands create a continuing element of change in the built environment and our infrastructure. With these changes and demands come the need to assess these vulnerabilities, hazards and threats with effective and dynamic risk management and competent command and control.
These changes influence the way we do business in the street, the interface-up close and personal with the buildings in your community and equate to the risks and hazards you and your personnel will be confronted with and the level of safety afforded them during incident operations.
Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities.
If the fire service can significantly increase proficiencies in building knowledge and equate that to other fundamental operational aspects in structural fire operations, then there would be a direct enhancement to firefighter safety, through injury and LODD reduction, operational efficiency and operational excellence. If we understand buildings, occupancies and construction, and balance this with our understanding of fire dynamics and orchestrate it with appropriate strategies, tactics and command management, then we made the new safety equation work; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S). It’s all about the Anatomy of Buildings on fire.
The Probability of Adverse Consequences (PAC) must be recognized in all buildings with continuous and focused risk assessment during all phases and task assignments. This single building and occupancy exemplifies an Integrated Hybrid Building (IHB) type that incorporates Type III Ordinary construction with an engineered wood I-beam roof assembly on the lower street level and Type II non-combustible construction on the upper floors. This would require different IAP’s and tactical deployment in the event of a fire. Photo by CJ Naum
Get out on to your streets and into the field and look at how the buildings are being constructed in your jurisdiction. Understanding how they are built and what the inherent dangers are, coupled with accurate pre-fire planning data will provide mission critical information when engaged in combat fire suppression operations. The anatomy of the building is fundamental to corresponding firefighting operations. Photo by CJ Naum
Understanding Buildings, Performance & Fire Operations
There is an acute corollary of technical knowledge and inter reliance on occupancies, construction, strategy, tactics, risk, safety, physics, engineering and fire suppression theory…FACT!
There are Fundamental Domains that can be applied
There is a direct empirical correlation that provides quantitative & qualitative performance indicators and command gauges that can be utilized for risk assessment and strategic & tactical operational decision-making.
Think about the following;
Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
Take a tour of your response area, district or community. Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that will affect and influence your future incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory, vent path studies and fire suppression theory.
Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type and align your operations and deployments to match those risks. It’s much more than just the Five Fundamental Building Types of the past.
Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling.
Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of conducting time sensitive tactical fire service operations
Think about Adaptive Fireground Management and Command Resiliency
Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going to about that gap?
Understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
Start knowing your buildings-intimately; it’s the key to effective firefighting
Understand the buildings and occupancies not only in your jurisdiction, first or second-due areas, but also in those areas that you may be called upon to respond to for greater alarms or mutual aid. Remember Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
Understand and improve upon your skill set levels and those of your company, battalion, division, department or region.
Keep apprised of different types of building materials and construction used in your community.
The operative question is this: “What do you “really” know about the buildings in your district?”
As you drive about your response district, coming back from an alarm, heading to the firehouse tonight or running errands around your community, take a good look around. Ask yourself a simple question; “How well do you know the buildings, structures and occupancies in your response jurisdiction?”
Be honest, do you really understand how those “older residential” structures were built and understand how fire travels and impacts your fireground operations?
Are your aware of the newest features of engineered structural support systems being constructed within that new set of homes going up in your second-due area?
Are you aware, that vacant office building is being converted into a light manufacturing and assembly business?
How about those unoccupied store fronts and businesses that have recently closed up due to the tough economic times…. any special hazards or operational concerns to your company should you get a dispatch to respond?
Have the senior members of your station or department shared their stories of operations and incidents at various buildings around your district or community?
Did you listen to them, or were you quick to dismiss those “old war stories”. There’s a wealth of “pre-planning’ nuggets hidden in those stories. Take the time to listen, remember or postulate
Take a good look around….think about any given building, the one across the street that you’re looking at while you waited for the traffic light to change; Think about a fire in that same building.
Do you really understand how it will truly perform under combat structural fire conditions?
What’s the building’s collapse profile?
How much operational time will you have? Will you need?
What’s the fire load package size?
What are your concerns for rapid fire extension, extreme fire behavior and vent path issues that may affect firefighter safety?
What dynamic risk assessment factors will you have to deal with?
How safe is it for you to engage in interior operations upon your arrival?
How can this building, its occupancy and structural system hurt, my team, my company, my firefighters, my department, me?
Never assume the same rules of structural fire engagement can be applied to all buildings without constant risk assessment, recon and situational awareness. Strategies and tactics must remain fluid. This single story commercial occupancy looked like a basic renovated Type III building from the street. An exposed (minimal design) interior accompanied by a non-conventional bow string truss support system and a raftered roof deck are ingredients for catastrophe for the unsuspecting Engine or Truck Companies. Photo by CJ Naum
Keep an eye in the rear view mirror; learning from the wisdom and knowledge from where you’ve been, what you’ve done and all your past experiences and practice; but at the same time focusing on the road before you with keen attentiveness on situational awareness, anticipating error-likely conditions and balanced risk assessment and operational management in both your strategic and tactical deployments.
Ensure you’re glancing occasionally in your rear view mirror to monitor where you’ve been, while driving your initiatives, programs, processes and actions forward. Above all, maintain the courage to be safe and know and understand your buildings, occupancies and your company’s capabilities.
Operations at 30 Dowling Circle 01.19.2011 Box 11-09
Mark Gray Falkenhan had dedicated his life to serving others. He perished in the line of duty on January 19, 2011 while performing search and rescue operations at a multi-alarm apartment fire in Hillendale, Baltimore County (Maryland). He was 43 years old.
On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 . Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.
During these operations, FF Falkenhan and his partner became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. The second firefighter was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.
FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.
The Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department published the Line of Duty Death Investgation Report of the 30 Dowling Circle Fire recently. The report was written by a Line of Duty Death Investigation Team comprised of departmental members, including representatives of the local firefighters’ union and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association.
Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department web site HERE
The following is and executive narrative of the final report (PDF) on the apartment fire where Volunteer Firefighter Mark Falkenhan sustained fatal injuries. The entire report can be downloaded HERE .
The Baltimore Sun newspaper published an editorial about the death of Firefighter Falkenhan that is required reading; HERE . An excerpt from the editorial reads as follows:
FF Mark Falkenhan
The word “hero” gets used too often to describe the most pedestrian of admirable behaviors, from the star quarterback who marches his team for a winning score to the kid who finds a missing wallet and turns it in. But exceptional bravery, special ability, exceptional deeds and noble qualities — those are what define an authentic hero, and Mr. Falkenhan lacked for none of them.
It was not by accidental circumstance or naiveté that he ended up on the third story of that Hillendale apartment complex in the midst of a fire, searching for missing residents. He knew the risks as well as anyone could. But his selfless desire to help others drove him forward into the flames.
That’s what made him exceptional. That’s why his legacy is important. That’s why the community is in his debt.
Incident Executive Summary
On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 (for purposes of this report, Mark will be referred to as FF Falkenhan). Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter (FF # 2) from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.
During these operations, FF Falkenhan and FF # 2 became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. FF # 2 was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued. FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.
Baltimore County Fire Department Standard Operating Procedures, Personnel #16, requires a team to be formed, a detailed investigation to be conducted and a report produced for any incident involving a line of duty life threatening injury or death. The team’s objective is to thoroughly analyze and document all the events leading to the injury or death and to make recommendations aimed at preventing similar occurrences in the future. At a minimum, a Division Chief, the Department’s Health and Safety Officer, a member from the Fire Investigation Division, an IAFF Local 1311 union representative, and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association Vice President of Operations (when a volunteer member is involved) is required (see Acknowledgements section for actual team make-up).
The investigating team examined any and all data available, including independent analysis of the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), turnout gear and autopsy report. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) produced a fire model to assist with evaluating fire behavior. Multiple site inspections were conducted. Extensive interviews were conducted by the team which also attended those conducted by investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Photographic and audio transcripts were also thoroughly analyzed. A comprehensive timeline of events was developed. All information used to make decisions regarding recommendations was corroborated by at least two sources.
In fairness to those units involved in this incident, the investigating team had the advantage of examining this incident over the period of several months. Furthermore, given the size and nature of the event, and the fact that arriving crews were met with serious fire conditions and several residents trapped and in immediate danger, all personnel should be commended for their efforts for performing several rescues which prevented an even greater tragedy.
The team did not identify a particular primary reason for FF Falkenhan’s death.
What were identified were many secondary issues involving but not limited to crew integrity, incident command, strategy and tactics, and communications.
These issues are identified and discussed, and recommendations are made in appropriate sections of the report, as well as in a consolidated format in the Report Appendix.
Some of the issues identified in this report may require some type of change to current practices, policies, procedures or equipment. Most, however, do not. Specifically, the analysis and recommendations regarding Incident Command and Strategy and Tactics show that if current policies and procedures are adhered to, the opportunity for catastrophic problems may be reduced.
Mark Falkenhan was a well-respected and experienced firefighter.
He died performing his duties during a very complex incident with severe fire conditions and unique fire behavior coupled with the immediate need to perform multiple rescues of victims in imminent danger.
It would be easy if one particular failure of the system could be identified as the cause of this tragedy.
We could fix it and move on. Unfortunately it is not that simple.
No incident is “routine”. Mark’s death and this report reinforce that fact.
Incident Summary
On Wednesday, January 19, 2011 at 1816 hours, a call was received at the Baltimore County 911 Center from a female occupant at 30 Dowling Circle in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County. The caller stated that her stove was on fire and the fire was spreading to the surrounding cabinets. Fire box 11-09 was dispatched by Baltimore County Fire Dispatch (Dispatch) at 1818 hours consisting of four engine companies, two truck companies, a floodlight unit, and a battalion chief. All units responded on Talkgroup 1-2.
The location, approximately one mile from the first dispatched engine company, is a three story garden-type apartment complex, with brick construction and a composite shingle, truss supported roof. The fire building contained a total of six apartments divided by a common enclosed stairway in the center with one apartment on the left and one to the right of the stairs.
Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta will be used to designate the clockwise geographic locations of the structure, beginning with Alpha on the address side of the building . Entry is gained through the front split-level stairwell by a common entrance door with individual doors leading to each apartment. Each apartment consists of two bedrooms, a kitchen, bathroom, and a living/dining area. There are sliding doors leading to either a wood joist deck/balcony on the second and third floor apartments, or a concrete patio on the first floor apartments. Utilities consist of gas service to the furnace and hot water heaters located in a utility closet in each apartment, with electric service to the remainder of the appliances, including the stove. Interior walls of the apartments are drywall over wood stud construction.
Floor coverings consist of carpeting over tile and concrete on the terrace/first floor. The second and third floor coverings consist of carpeting covering hardwood floors with a plywood subfloor. Interior doors are hollow wood construction. The door to the common hallway is of solid wood construction. The sliding doors to the deck/patio area are glass.
Building Construction
The development and construction of the Towson Crossing Apartments began in the early 1980’s. The buildings are rated in the existing building code for occupancy as Residential 2 (R2). The building code would describe the construction type as Type III. This construction type includes those buildings where the exterior walls are of non-combustible materials and the interior building elements are of any material permitted by the building code.
Building Construction and Features
The subject apartment building, 30 Dowling Circle, is a three story, middle of the group, apartment building constructed on a reinforced concrete slab. The Alpha and Charlie exterior walls are wood framed construction with brick veneer attached by brick ties. The Bravo and Delta exterior walls are block masonry construction and separate adjoining apartment buildings. The interior partition walls consist of wooden 2″x4″ wall studs covered with sheetrock. Paper faced insulation is found between the exterior walls, ceilings and party-walls that separate the apartments.
The apartment building contains six individual apartment units, which are approximately 1000 square feet in size per apartment unit. Two separate units are located on each floor and consist of two bedrooms, a living area, a dining area, a kitchen, and a bathroom. A utility closet is located in each of the living areas. The closet is located along the Alpha wall, and contains the water heater and furnace.
The building is not equipped with an automatic fire suppression system. Smoke detectors were noted; however, it is unknown if they were operational at the time of the fire. A fire extinguisher was noted on the landing between the second and third floor levels of the building.
Topography
From side Alpha the building has two and a half stories above grade while side Charlie is three stories above grade.
The first floor of the building is approximately five feet below ground level with a 20 foot set back from the apartment building parking lot. Side Charlie of the building is at ground level but slopes upward approximately 8 feet with a set-back of 110 feet from the rear alley.
Roof
The roof is constructed of a lightweight truss assembly consisting of 2″x6″ stringers connected by gusset plates. The truss assembly is covered with 5/8 inch plywood and asphalt shingles.
Floor and Ceiling
The floor assembly consists of 2×10 inch floor joists covered by plywood, wooden tongue and groove planking and finished with carpet. The joists run from Alpha to Charlie and are supported by the interior bearing walls. The kitchen floors in all of the units are covered with vinyl tile.
The ceilings throughout the building are sheetrock nailed to the floor joists of the apartment above with the exception of the third level in which the sheetrock is nailed to the roof joists.
Balconies
The balconies are located on side Charlie of the building. The balconies located on levels two and three consist of 5/4″ deck boards over 2″x10″ wooden joists. The joists are cantilevered off of the floor/ceiling assemblies of levels one and two. The first floor balconies are made of concrete and are at ground level. All balconies are accessible through a single pane sliding glass door located in each apartment.
Incident Overview
The first arriving engine, E-11, was staffed with a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. Upon arrival at 1820 hours, the Captain gave a brief initial report describing a three story garden apartment with smoke showing from side Alpha: “The Captain of E-11 will have Command and we are initiating an aggressive interior attack with a 1 ¾” hand line”. Command also instructed the second due engine to bring him a supply line from the hydrant.
A female resident (victim # 1) appeared in a third floor apartment window, Alpha/Bravo side (Apt. B-1), yelled for assistance, and threatened to jump. Smoke or fire was visible from any of the third floor windows. At 1823 hours, Command advised Dispatch that he had a rescue and that he was establishing Limited Command. Fire Dispatch was in the process of upgrading the response profile to an apartment fire with rescue when the responding Battalion Chief requested that the fire box be upgraded to a fire rescue box. While the Firefighter and Lieutenant prepared for entry into the building, the Captain and Driver/Operator extended a ladder to the 3rd floor apartment window and rescued the resident. The first attempt by the Firefighter and Lieutenant to make entry into the side Alpha entrance was unsuccessful due to the extreme heat and smoke conditions.
Initial Arrival Conditions
The second due engine, E-10, arrived at 1823 with staffing of a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. At 1823, E-10’s crew brought a 4″ supply line to E-11 from the hydrant at Deanwood Rd. and Dowling Circle and assisted the first-in crew with fire attack.
The Captain from E-10 conferred with Command and was instructed to advance a second 1 ¾” hand line.
The window to the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2) was removed, and the second 1 ¾” line was advanced to the building by the crew of E-10.
Fire attack was initiated through the removed window. At 1827, Command requested a second alarm.
At this time, heat and smoke conditions just inside the front door improved enough to allow the Firefighter and Lieutenant from E-11 to make entry through the front door and into the stairwell. There they encountered heavy, thick black
smoke and high heat conditions coming up the stairs from the terrace level apartment. The Lieutenant reported that the doorway to the first floor apartment was orange with fire and he had to fight his way through heavy heat and smoke conditions to attack the fire in the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2). Entry was made approximately 3 feet into the doorway when the Firefighter’s low air alarm began to sound, and he exited the building. A member from E-10’s crew replaced the Firefighter from E-11 on the hose line.
At the same time, the Captain from E-11 proceeded to the rear of the structure to complete his initial 360 degree size up. He noted that there was fire emanating from the open sliding doors on the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2), extending to the balcony above. E-1, staffed by a Captain, Driver/Operator, and two Firefighters arrived and completed the hookup of the supply line that had been laid to the hydrant by E-10. The rest of Engine 1’s crew grabbed tools and an extension ladder and reported to the Charlie side of the building.
Personnel stated that at this point fire conditions seemed to improve, suggesting that crews were making progress extinguishing the fire. (The first arriving attack crew reported that they were able to see apparatus lights through the sliding doors on Charlie side, which indicated to them that smoke and fire conditions were improving.)
Truck 1, a tiller unit staffed by a Lieutenant, two Driver/Operators, and a Firefighter, arrived on side Alpha and immediately began search and rescue operations. Windows on the second floor Alpha/Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2) were vented and ladders were thrown to gain access. T-8 arrived at the alley on side Charlie. E-1 extended a ground ladder to the third floor balcony on the Charlie/Bravo side of the structure (Apt. B-1), and made access to the apartment to search for additional victims.
They noted fire venting from the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2) out of the sliding glass doors progressing upwards towards the balcony on the second floor. Upon entering the apartment, they conducted a primary search and noted minimal heat with light smoke conditions.
The crew accessed the hallway via the apartment entry door and noticed an increase in the temperature and the amount of smoke.
They immediately closed the door and exited the apartment via the ground ladder.
Upon exiting the apartment, E-1’s crew observed E-292 on the scene with a hand line extending into the apartment of origin, (first floor, Charlie/Delta side, Apt. T-2). The officer on E-1 noted white smoke coming from the unit.
Having already laid a supply line from the intersection of the alley and Deanwood Road, E-292’s crew extended a 1 ¾” hand line into the apartment of origin. Moderate fire conditions with zero visibility were encountered, and they reported feeling a great deal of heat on their knees as they crawled through the apartment.
The Lieutenant and the Firefighter from Truck-1 entered Apartment A-2 via a second floor bedroom window (Alpha/Delta side) and began a search for additional victims. As they traversed the living room area they found an unconscious male resident (victim #2). At 1836 hours, the Lieutenant notified Command via an urgent transmission that a victim had been located and they needed assistance with evacuation. The Lieutenant and Firefighter noted a small fire in the rear corner near the victim as they exited the room. The crew returned to the bedroom from which they had entered and closed the door behind them. Victim #2 was then evacuated from the apartment via a ground ladder through the bedroom window, and transferred to EMS personnel on side Alpha.
Preflashover conditions Alpha Side 18:37 hours
At 1831 hours, Squad 303, a unit staffed by a Driver/Operator, Firefighter Falkenhan (acting Officer in Charge), and 3 other Firefighters had arrived at the Alpha side of the building. Firefighter Falkenhan and two crew members grabbed their tools and immediately entered the building. One Firefighter (Firefighter #1) proceeded to the terrace floor apartment to assist crews with fire attack. Firefighter Falkenhan and the other Firefighter (Firefighter #2) proceeded to the second floor
Bravo side apartment (Apt. A-1) to search for additional victims. They forced the door to the second floor apartment and conducted their search. Finding no one, they reported to Command that they had encountered high heat in the apartment and at 1838 hours, inquired as to which apartment victim #2 had been found. Firefighter Falkenhan advised Command that he and his fellow Firefighter were proceeding to the third floor to continue their search.
At 1840 hours, Battalion Chief 11 (BC-11) arrived on the scene, performed a face-to-face pass on with the Captain on Engine 11, and assumed Command. BC-11 initially observed limited smoke conditions, indicating to him that crews had made progress in extinguishing the fire.
18:41 hours
Meanwhile, the Lieutenant and Firefighter from T-8 entered the second floor apartment that S-303 had just searched (Apt. A-1, second floor, Bravo side). They proceeded through the apartment and went across the hallway to Apartment A-2 where Truck-1 had just made their rescue (second floor, Delta side).
The Lieutenant noted smoky conditions, and saw that the sliding doors to the rear of the apartment were open, and saw a small fire in the rear of the apartment to the left of the open doors. On their way back to their point of entry, T-8’s crew discovered an unconscious female victim (victim #3). At 1837 hours, T-8 attempted to reach Command via radio and was covered by inaudible radio traffic. Dispatch was able to receive the radio transmission from T-8, and advised Command that another victim had been located on the second floor.
At this point, the crew from S-303 had completed their search of the third floor Bravo side apartment (Apt. B-1).
Firefighter Falkenhan and Firefighter #2 were able to look out of the sliding doors on side Charlie down to the first floor apartment, Apt. T-2 (Charlie/Delta side) and could see fire.
Smoke conditions on the third floor were light enough to walk upright in a somewhat crouched position.
The crew returned to the hallway, forced open the door to the third floor Charlie/Delta side apartment, Apt. B-2, and made entry.
Firefighter #2 walked down the hallway to the bedroom on the right while Firefighter Falkenhan searched to the left. After checking the bedroom, Firefighter #2 stated that he heard something behind him and turned to see fire in the hallway.
As the crew from S-303 searched the third floor Delta side apartment (Apt. B-2), The Lieutenant and Firefighter from T-8 were attempting to remove victim #3 from the second floor Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2). As they prepared to move their patient, fire conditions changed suddenly.
The Lieutenant from T-8 observed fire, “…rolling over our heads and out of the apartment door.” An immediate increase in heat conditions was noted. Upon exiting the apartment, T-8’s crew described a “tunnel of fire” coming out of the apartment and into the hallway. At 1841 hours, a radio transmission was made by an unknown source that heavy fire was observed in the hallway through a window at the stairwell landing.
At the same time, (1841) one minute after his arrival, Battalion Chief-11 (Command) noted heavy black smoke coming from the building and observed a “flash” through a second floor window. Command immediately ordered an evacuation of the building. Dispatch sounded the evacuation tones over the radio, and repeated the order to evacuate. Engines on the scene sounded their air horns to indicate that the order to evacuate had been given.
Firefighter #2 from S-303 reported hearing the engines on the fire ground sound their air horns, indicating to him that he needed to leave the building. Smoke conditions in the apartment had changed to thick black smoke, and the fire intensified, blocking his means of egress from the bedroom.
Realizing that he needed to get out of the apartment quickly, Firefighter#2 crawled to a window on the Alpha side of the bedroom and signaled Firefighters below with his hand light to move a ladder to the window. Crews immediately moved the ladder, and at 1841, Firefighter#2 dove headfirst out of the window and down the ladder, where he was assisted by crews working on the exterior of the building.
At 1841, Firefighter Falkenhan declared, “Emergency” on his radio, and repeated the same seven seconds later.
Command immediately queried S-303 for his location and the transmission “I’m down to the floor, heavy fire” was heard. At 1842 hours, Dispatch sounded emergency tones and restricted the Talkgroup to communications only between S-303 and Command.
Seconds later Firefighter Falkenhan again keyed up his portable radio and advised “…trapped on the 3rd floor, heavy fire on the Alpha/Bravo.”
Fourteen seconds later he advised “I hear crew members, the third, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY.”
Command notified Dispatch, “We have a MAYDAY” and was interrupted by a transmission from Firefighter Falkenhan, “urgent.”
Command made several attempts to contact Falkenhan to ascertain his location and determine resources needed (Location Unit Name Assignment Resources) for rescue.
Upon hearing the MAYDAY, crews on side Charlie threw multiple ladders to the third floor balcony to assist with rescue.
Heavy heat, smoke, and fire conditions made rescue difficult, but Firefighter Falkenhan was located and removed from the apartment via the balcony to the extended aerial ladder from T-8. He was unconscious and unresponsive at this time. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued enroute to the hospital. Firefighter Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.
Consolidated List of Recommendations
Crew Integrity
1. Company officers shall ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times by all personnel operating in an IDLH environment. 2. No personnel shall operate in an IDLH environment without a portable radio.
MAYDAY
1. If possible, the firefighter should activate his/her Emergency button on the portable radio. 2. Once personnel have called a MAYDAY and provided the information needed (LUNAR), they will activate their PASS Device manually and intermittently.
Incident Command
1. Tactical Operations Manual 07 allows Incident Commanders the flexibility to adapt to fast-moving and complex incidents. When re-assuming command, the IC must be identified (verbally through Fire Dispatch) to allow units involved and responding to know who is in command.
2. Incident Commanders must understand that an early initial 360° would give the IC the information needed to develop effective strategy and tactics for incident mitigation.
3. Additional arriving units must give the IC an updated report on fire conditions when noticeably different than those announced in the Brief Initial Report.
4. Arriving units should prompt the IC to assign them supervision of a division when conditions warrant such action.
5. The IC must ensure that all division and group supervisors are properly deployed and verbalize same on the radio for Dispatch and units involved on the incident.
6. Reinforce the importance of the ICS and its functional components for all officers.
7. Ensure a manageable span-of-control is maintained throughout the incident.
8. Evaluate the efficiency of command and control as incidents escalate.
9. A Rapid Intervention Team is a vitally important part of the ICS and its assignment should not be overlooked.
Strategy and Tactics
1. Use caution when passing a hydrant that is in your direction of travel and close to the fire building in an attempt to get a closer one.
2. Consider having the initial backup line proceeding into the same point of entry as the initial crew operating in the IDLH environment. Doing this allows for the line to also aid in protecting the common stairwell (i.e. fire extension/protection for egress). Deploy a third line if needed into another point of access.
3. Consider dialing nozzles up to higher gallons per minute for large structures such as apartment buildings.
4. Consider utilizing a 2-1/2″ attack line for fire attack.
5. The current SOP should be modified to state that when the initial Incident Commander feels that the incident has stabilized to a point where there is no longer a need for him/her to be directly involved with incident operations, a notification through Dispatch shall be made to inform crews on and en route to the scene.
6. The Department should develop training to ensure that Incident Commanders relay changes in modes of operations.
7. Consider attacking fires from other sides of the structure that are on grade.
8. Consider the use of “door control” for protection during search and rescue and exposure protection
9. When deviations to initial orders are made, they must be communicated to Command.
10. IC should consider setting up a division supervisor with the first arriving officer to balance his/her span-of-control early into the incident.
11. Command should initiate group and division supervisors early into an incident and use them to reduce his/her span-of-control. Communicate Conditions, Actions, Needs (CAN) reports early and often.
12. When units are the initial crews deployed to a geographic location, consideration should be given to “prompt” Command to make them a division supervisor (in the absence of direction from Command).
13. Units should request resources, or supply their own as necessary to support the operations that they are undertaking.
14. When given a division assignment, “step back” to take in the overall picture and communicate progress reports to Command.
15. Be clear and concise when setting up division assignments.
16. Utilize the division supervisors for incident operations once assigned.
17. Training on effective use of interior doors to control fire spread should be promoted throughout the department.
18. Consider removing common stairwell windows earlier in fire ground operations when appropriate.
19. While performing operations above the fire, notify Command of changing conditions and immediately request resources to support your function.
20. Set up a command post as early as possible to aid in deploying and accounting for resources as they arrive on the fire ground.
21. Notify Command when entering an IDLH.
22. Request resources to support functions.
23. Set up divisions and groups early to aid in managing the strategic priorities.
24. Be clear in communicating strategy and tactics to companies involved in operations.
25. Command should make it a priority to deploy attack lines on all floors to support the operations of crews working in the area.
Communications
1. A rubberized cover for the radio speaker microphone should be tested by communications and field personnel. This device will cover the push-to-talk (PTT) button and will increase the pressure required for activation. If proved effective, this cover will decrease the likelihood of an accidental activation of the PTT button during vigorous fire ground activity.
2. Continuing study should occur to evaluate methods to control inadvertent radio interference from all units (on the scene, responding, or monitoring) during incident operations. Review PTT logs to identify sources of communications interference.
3. As a result of the investigation, PTT log files will now be saved for 25 days.
4. Fire Communications and field personnel will develop and distribute a mandatory training program outlining proper radio procedures including the importance of radio discipline, MAYDAY procedures, and the procedure for establishing a Command restricted talk group during critical operations.
5. All personnel engaged in operations in an environment immediately dangerous to life and health shall carry a portable radio.
6. The aforementioned mandatory training program shall stress the importance of giving regular updates to Command regarding the extent and location of the fire and other pertinent information.
The Chief of the Department directed the Department Safety Officer to conduct a Safety Investigation of this incident. The primary purpose of the investigation was to identify and analyze the contributing factors that led to the incident as well as to create situational awareness to prevent future occurrences. The main objective of the Team’s investigation and subsequent report was to discover the key factor that led to the fatal outcome of two Firefighters. The SFFD report contains the findings and recommendations to help prevent Firefighter injuries or fatalities in the future.
In analyzing and recording these events, the Investigation Team acknowledges and respects that members confronted a challenging situation. On‐scene personnel reacted quickly to the changing conditions at this incident. We request that every person who reads this report show respect, appreciation and consideration for all personnel who responded to this incident.
As is a common industry practice, for this report Lieutenant Vincent Perez was referred to as Victim 1 and Firefighter Paramedic Anthony Valerio was referred to as Victim 2, with the exception of the Rescue Events Section.
Excerpt from Chief of Department’s Letter
“On Thursday, June 2, 2011 at 10:45 a.m., the San Francisco Fire Department responded to Box 8155, at 133 Berkeley Way. What was seemingly a routine working fire in a single family residence quickly transformed into a fierce and unrelenting incident with ultimately tragic results.
When we answered the call to a career in the Fire Service and took our Oath of Allegiance, we were aware of the inherent danger of our occupation. Despite this awareness, we do not expect to encounter a line of duty death of a brother or sister, especially not in our very own Department. The profound loss of Lieutenant Vincent Perez and Firefighter/Paramedic Anthony Valerio has left an indelible impression in our hearts and will forever be remembered in the annals of SFFD history.
Even as we mourned our fallen brothers in the early days after the tragedy, our Department began the painful and difficult, but necessary, steps of a Line of Duty Death investigation. We were resolute in understanding what occurred during those fateful minutes and compelled to uncover any recommendations for improvement that may arise to future operations so that their passing will not have been in vain. For over six months, the Investigative Team worked tirelessly, scrutinizing every piece of evidence in order to produce a comprehensive report.”
SFFD
Joanne Hayes‐White
Chief of Department
Executive Summary and Report Excerpt
On June 2, 2011 at 10:45 hours, the San Francisco Fire Department was dispatched to a report of a fire in the building at 133 Berkeley Way in the City’s Diamond Heights neighborhood. The first unit arriving on the scene, Engine 26, observed light smoke showing from the garage of the 4 story (2 above grade, 2 below grade) wood framed building, detached on the Bravo side.
Aerial from the Charlie Side
An aggressive interior fire attack was initiated through the front door, which is on a level between the ground level and second floor. After investigating the garage (ground level), Engine 24, the second Engine on the scene, led a small line through the garage to the interior door to back up the first Company. Battalion 9 was assigned Fire Attack by Battalion 6, who had assumed Command. Battalion 9 entered the fire building and, after conferring face to face with Engine 26 on the first floor (ground level), concluded that the fire was below them.
Alpha Side Operations
Battalion 9 exited the building and proceeded to the Bravo side to check for an entrance leading directly to the fire floor. Engine 11 led a large line wye to the driveway with the intention of leading a 1 ¾ inch line through the garage. They were redirected by Battalion 6 to make their lead down the Bravo side of the building to Sublevel 1 (one floor below grade) to assist Battalion 9. The Division Chief, upon arrival, assumed Command. He assigned Battalion 6 to Division 3 (ground floor).
Truck 15 was assigned Roof Division. Truck 11 split their crew, two members to the roof and three members to search and ventilate the top floor of the fire building. The Rescue Squad was ordered to conduct a search. Two members initially attempted to make entry through the garage but, due to extreme heat conditions, redeployed and entered through Sublevel 1 on the Bravo side.
The other two members of the Rescue Squad made entry through the front door, were pushed back by the heat and then made a successful second effort and conducted a search of the top floor.
In the course of fireground operations, members of several Companies came upon the stricken members on the first level and removed them from the building. All possible efforts were employed to revive the members and they were transported to San Francisco General Hospital (SFGH). One member (Victim 1) succumbed to his injuries that day and the second member (Victim 2) succumbed to his injuries two days later. Two other Firefighters were treated at SFGH for various injuries and released that day.
The Medical Examiner determined the cause of death for both members was due to complications from external and internal thermal injuries. Both victims suffered burns to 40% of their body surface. This fire was determined to be accidental by the SFFD Fire Investigative Unit. The fire originated on Sublevel 1, on the West side of the family room, near the large floor to ceiling windows. The ignition was a non‐specific electrical sequence in the electrical wiring or appliance (handheld vacuum cleaner) in this area.
There was a delay in reporting the fire due to the occupants’ attempting to extinguish it on their own. (SFFD Fire Investigation Report 11‐0500532)
The investigation identified that the failing of the window on Sublevel 1, located near the seat of the fire and directly across the stairwell leading to the ground floor, led to the extreme fire behavior which ultimately caused the death of two Firefighters. This fire was in a stage of deprived oxygen when the window failed, causing a rapid extreme high heat event to occur. The extreme heat followed the natural flow path up the interior stairs where Victims 1 and 2 were located.
The Safety Investigation Team found no conclusive evidence that the members were exposed to direct flame impingement during this rapid extreme heat event. However,
Victims 1 and 2 received varying degree of burns up to 40% of their body. The investigation concluded that this was caused by the rapid extreme heat conditions that radiated through their Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to their bodies. These temperatures exceed the ability for human survival regardless of PPE.
The PPE was inspected and evaluated by NIOSH and the manufacturer. Both reviewing parties concluded that the PPE performed to its specifications and design. The manufacturer concluded that the PPE was exposed to temperatures in the range of 550‐ 700°F. These extreme temperatures were short in duration which caused limited damage to the outer shell of the PPE.
The Safety Investigation Team noticed severe heat damage to the portable radios remote speaker/microphones on Victims 1 and 2 and had the radios tested. The testing indicated that the remote speaker/microphones failed to operate correctly due to heat damage. The Safety Investigation Team was not able to determine, after testing, exactly when the remote speaker/microphones failed. The investigation has shown that multiple attempts were made to contact Engine 26 with no response.
The investigation also found that no radio transmissions of distress were received from Victims 1 or 2. Command and Control of any incident in the San Francisco Fire Department is acquired and maintained through the use of the Incident Command System (ICS).
The Incident Command System provides the tools for clear objectives, a single action plan, clear and acknowledged communications, and accountability for all members assigned to an incident. At this incident, some of the components of Incident Command System that were not followed include:
Single action plan
Fireground Accountability
From these findings, this report makes recommendations for several areas of the Department, including:
Training
Equipment
Policy Development
Policy Enforcement
The Safety Investigation Team gathered and analyzed many facts and conducted interviews of members directly involved in this incident. The Team identified several factors that occurred that contributed to the deaths at this incident.
These factors include:
Extreme heat conditions accelerated by the failure of a window on the fire floor.
Layout of building
Excessive live fuel load which contributed to the growth of the fire
Conclusion
This incident appeared from the onset to be a routine “room and contents” fire that the SFFD encounters on a regular basis. As the Companies were performing standard fireground operations, the incident rapidly deteriorated due to a hostile fire event. The failure of a window in the fire room allowed fresh oxygen to enter the room, providing a fire that was deprived of one of the key elements of combustion to rapidly intensify.
Due to the growth of the fire, the room flashed, causing extreme and rapid heat conditions which traveled up the interior stairs (the flow path) to the location which our members were operating. Our members were caught in this high heat, causing the injuries that ultimately claimed their lives.
Due to this fire event, other Companies attempting to conduct fireground support operations were prevented from making entry into the structure from street level (through garage) to back up Engine 26. These Companies were forced to regroup and find an alternate point of entry. In the process of doing so, crews made entry from the Bravo side directly into the fire room and extinguished the fire. This allowed members to make entry from above which led to the discovery and rescue of our members.
These events happened in a time frame of less than fourteen minutes.
During the course of this investigation, the Safety Investigation Team recognized that no matter how experienced or properly prepared we are, we must always approach all incidents with the utmost awareness.
This incident showed that a simple failure of a piece of glass/window caused unforeseeable and fatal consequences.
We, as a Department, need to gain further knowledge and understanding of the following:
Having Situational Awareness prior to taking action, this would include the ongoing process when conditions change
How Risk Management must be used when making all decisions
Limitations of the PPE (turnouts, SCBA, and equipment)
Building construction, including layout and how fire/smoke will
move within the structure
Ventilation practices and how they affect fire conditions
Importance of Communications for all members operating on the scene
Companies must use strict discipline when assigned task/locations
PreviousCommandSafety Coverage from 2011, HERE, HERE and HERE
The mission of the Fire Department is to protect the lives and property of the people of San Francisco from fires, natural disasters, and hazardous materials incidents; to save lives by providing emergency medical services; to prevent fires through prevention and education programs; and to provide a work environment that values health, wellness and cultural diversity and is free of harassment and discrimination.
One Meridian Plaza Fire 1991, Provided Photo Source Not Known, All rights reserved
On what began as an uneventful Saturday night twenty-one years ago, a fire on the 22nd floor of the 38-story Meridian Bank Building, also known as One Meridian Plaza, was reported to the Philadelphia Fire Department on February 23, 1991 at approximately 2040 hours and went on to burned for more than 19 hours.
The fire caused three firefighter fatalities (LODD) and injuries to 24 firefighters.
PFD Line of Duty Deaths:
Captain David P. Holcombe, age 52
Firefighter Phyllis McAllister, age 43
Firefighter James A. Chappell, age 29
The 12-alarms brought 51 engine companies, 15 ladder companies, 11 specialized units, and over 300 firefighters to the scene. It was one of the largest high-rise office building fire in modern American history –completely consuming eight floors of the building –and was controlled only when it reached a floor that was protected by automatic sprinklers.
The Fire Department arrived to find a well-developed fire on the 22nd floor, with fire dropping down to the 21st floor through a set of convenience stairs.
Heavy smoke had already entered the stairways and the floors immediately above the 22nd.
Fire attack was hampered by a complete failure of the building’s electrical system and by inadequate water pressure, caused in part by improperly set pressure reducing valves on standpipe hose outlets.
For a detailed accounting, diagrams and links, click over to Buildingsonfire.com HERE
Knowledge and proficiencies related to building construction are formulative to all strategic, tactical and task level assignments.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, the compartment, occupancy risk, fire dynamics and fire behavior, fluid situational awareness and risk analysis, the art and science of aggressive and smart firefighting with well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies; You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.
What do you think? Where do you fit in?
New Strategic Thinking for Today’s Evolving Fireground and Challenges…..
Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.
For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.
The Worcester Six;
Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine
On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
From last year’s posting and links here at CommandSafety.com: HERE
In response to numerous requests from our recent posting; Commercials- Got Fire? Anticipate Collapse briefing post (HERE). We have developed and produced a comprehensive download in PDF format of the entire article that can be used for training, distribution and discussions.
Click on the image above and download the PDF file and use accordingly or download HERE
There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.
You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations at commercial building fires.
Commercial Fire and Collapse
Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments.
It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.
A recent video clip making its way around the cyber fireground clearly depicted a very close-call and resulting near miss event to four firefighters at a four alarm fire involving a commercial building that housed an established insulation manufacturer and installation contractor.
The video shows within a very compressed time frame, the progression of rapidly deteriorating interior conditions, the adverse affects on the building’s structural systems and the results from the loss of load transfers that lead to a catastrophic wall collapse narrowly missing the crew of firefighters who were operating a hand line in the vicinity of an exterior overhead door. Fortunately the injuries sustained to the firefighters were minor in nature; however the consequences and results from this collapse could have been far different and significantly more severe.
Following a series of repeated viewings of the video clip and with each successive viewing, it became readily apparent that there was a lot more to these images of the collapse and the cursory focus on the resulting near miss event. Closer examination of the video clip and the still frames brought to light some obvious conditions and indicators that easily become lost in the rapidity of the sequence of the collapse; which really has the true story to be told.
It’s the mechanism and sequence of the collapse, the dynamics of the building’s performance and the building indicators that provide a training opportunity in further examining key factors, presenting insights that could be a focus for operational and command personnel at future incidents with common parameters and gaining some mental models in recognition-primed decision making that contribute to the naturalistic decision-making process.
If you know what to be looking for, then when you see it, you may be able to anticipate, project and implement in rapid succession appropriate measures dictated by the incident.
Four Alarm Commercial Building Fire with Collapse: Fire Photo by Ben Goldberry
In an effort to promote additional insights and bring forward these fundamental observations and experienced-based presumptions extended from these and other news video images, still photographs, additional reporting research and examination, and a review of other published media resources; the following observations presented in this overview brief are being conveyed to increase firefighter, company and command level awareness of key collapse indicators such as those present at this commercial fire and to further the concept of adaptive fireground management principles and increase awareness of fundamental building performance indicators and principles to help you increase your intuitive observations skills and translate them into proactive operational actions on the fireground-before an adverse condition occurs.[ i.e., being five steps ahead of the fire conditions].
Although this briefing makes use of the images and conditions depicted in the video clip and encountered by the fire department evident in the images; the susequent commentary and insights provided are not meant to provide direct or indirect opinions, renderings, criticism or censure towards the conduct of operations or the management of the incident by the respective department and it’s firefighting, command and support personnel who operated at the actual fire and experienced this near miss event first-hand.
We are grateful that the events of this alarm precluded anything worst occurring given the potential seriousness of the prevailing incident conditions and commend the fire department and it’s firefighters that provide these exceptional services each and every day to the citizens they serve and to the community they protect, in mitigating this serious fire; safely and successfully.
This incident and the resulting near-miss captured by the videographer provides the Fire Service with an exceptional opportunity given today’s far reaching capabilities of eMedia, this web site and direct and indirect readers, links, tweets, likes, reposting’s, uploads, downloads and sharing an opportunity to share the consequences of an extreme close-call and learn from it in a positive and constructive manner, so that firefighters, company officers, commanders and support personnel can better predict with knowledge, insight and at times intuition a better understanding of buildings and the structures and occupancies we operate within on the fireground.
There are numerous inherent indicators present at every incident scene we operate at that. As is in this near miss event and building collapse; it’s sometimes the subtle things that need to gain the attention of operationg companies and personnel and the ability to rapidly process, recognize and react.
Remember this: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
As a generality; it’s important to note that given heavy fire involvement in a structure (got fire), adaptive fireground management considerations would promote conservative considerations to anticipate and expect collapse (degraded or compromise; limited or catastrophic).
In the case of fires in commercial occupancies and buildings with;
Large Square footage/Floor areas
Significant fire loads
Large open structural system spans lacking compartmentation,
Unprotected steel components and assemblies
No Sprinkler Systems
Omitted, compromised or degraded passive or active protective or suppression systems
Significant openings along the exterior building envelope
Significant opening on the roof enclosure
Deep seated fires or rapidly escalating and extending fires
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations.
Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. Its alot more than that, with far greater consequences that may be very unforgiving.
Aerial Plan of Building and Collapse Area A-B
The Building
The fire incident involved a single story commercial building occupying approximately 32, 200 square feet of area on a multiple building site with proximal exposures. Manufacturing, warehousing and offices comprised the building’s operational use. An aerial plan view shows the geographical building scene divisions and the location and relationship of the Alpha- Bravo Side collapse zones that affected operations and resulted in the close-call and firefighter near-miss. The proximity of exposures, physical layout and orientation can be further assessed.
A review of public documents and records, incident reports and various media resources provided the following insights;
Overview Details
Alpha Street Side View- Adapted from Google Streetmaps
The view of the alpha street side identifies the building front facade, its main office entrance (center between dual overhead doors on the left and right). Pronounced on the alpha side facade is the presence of four (4) equally spaced overhead (OH) doors that provide direct access into the building’s interior. The subsequent collapse area is depicted at the A-B corner with special attention drawn to relationship of the wall plane and OH door proximity.
The relationship and this wall surface ( area square footage) and the presence of the OH door opening to the wall/ roof interface area that subsequently became compromised and collapsed is critical in further understanding the mechanism of the collapse sequence and also the positive effect it had on the survivability of the firefighters who were within the collapse zone at the time of the wall failure.
Don’t Always Stress the Corners
It’s been a common practice and fundamental fireground consideration to define the corner of a typical building as having safety considerations and prominence in the context of ladder company operations, laddering and roof work and in the placement of personnel and positioning of fireground operations.
Corner Building Operational considerations have included, but limited to;
Provides a potentially safe(er) area of operational refuge
Provides a location to safely position ground ladders for roof access/egress
Provides a location that has a potential higher degree of assurance for maintaining structural integrity in the event of a collapse condition of an outer wall
Will not fail in a catastrophic or monolithic manner due to the postulated presence of structural members on the vicinity of either the wall enclosure and/or the roofing structural system and assemblies
The design and construction configuration and orientation of the ninety degree angle of the building’s outer wall envelope (at the corner) provides predicated inherent structural stability
The typical type of structural or envelope construction may have a resulting ninety degree building corner having a more robust resistance to collapse and compromise due to the various types of enclosure systems (methods and materials) and assemblies and needed stability per engineering principles
In this instance (as shown in the Alpha side street view), the presence of the large overhead door in close proximity to the corner wall intersection and transition ( A-B side), actually makes this position, fireground proximity and travel paths highly prone to early and complete collapse potential in the event of a loss of the wall-roof component or assembly integrity or in the load bearing/transfer capabilities of the wall-roof assembly.
The presence and identification of a corner configuration similar to this in a commercial structure should result in a higher degree of considerations and risk assessment when formulation and deploying operational assignments and in the placement of personnel for task assignments in this proximity.
This operational area should be considered as a candidate for designation as a collapse zone based upon projected or defined operational considerations, incident conditions and predictive building characteristics, systems, materials and fire dynamics and conditions.
Alpha-Bravo Corner of Subsequent Collapse Aerial View
The view from the Alpha-Bravo Corner shows the collapse zones at grade and the affected area size.
As noted in the preceding narrative, the presence of the overhead door opening along the perimeter wall enclosure and outer envelope creates a risk area that would require monitoring, periodic reconnaissance and assessment during subsequent operations to determine structural stability and potential adverse conditions.
The proximity of the opening in relationship to the corner wall, roof support and structural span of the opening results in a very delicate balance of forces, loads, reliance and dependence that must be maintained for structural integrity and equilibrium.
The entire perimeter of the alpha side could be considered for a restricted collapse zone just in terms of wall opening alone sans the degree of actual or projected interior fire impingement or fire involvement.
Take some time to view the video clip a few times over before proceeding to the next sequence of fame images.
This videographer of this video was Aaron Dohring. (all rights reserved)
Aerial Overhead view of the building perimeter walls along the four divisions ( A-D) with the A-B corner that subsequently experienced the wall-roof compromise and resulting collapse.
The A-B corner and the affected ground areas around the collapse zone. Considerations for a collapse zone area on the A-B corner would have resulted in a minimum distance of twenty five (25) feet from the building base for all operations within this area. The collapse zone on the Bravo side extends into the exposure building due to its close proximity.
Always consider the building envelope materials of construction and systems present on the building. The use of concrete masonry units (CMU) is common, as is the use of pre-cast concrete and cast-in place and tilt-up concrete construction panels.
Variations in collapse dynamics and mechanisms of collapse may result in sizable increases in collapse zone distances from the building base with consideration for monolithic or partial wall collapse as well as safety considerations for bounce and travel over long distances of modular assembly building pieces ( i.e. concrete blocks, brick venner or material chunks).
We have not discussed collapse considerations for other building envelope systems such as metal panelized systems since these have entirely different collapse considerations and profiling, not applicable to this incident and assessment insights. The same is true when considering operating and collapse considerations at commercial buildings with ordinary construction or heavy timber systems (Type or Class III and IV). These to have different rules of predictive building performance and collapse safety considerations.
Typical Interior
The interior of the building included unprotected steel components and assemblies consisting of steel columns, beams and open web steel joists. These common and conventional structural support systems provided large free clear spans, common for typical warehouse and commercial occupancies. The presence and operability of functional fire suppression sprinkler system coupled with passive and active protective devices and compartmentation can help support proactive and aggressive fire suppression efforts in those conditions that have appropriate risk determinations and balanced risk-gain benefits.
The presence of unprotected steel components ( Truss, column, structural beams etc. ) and assemblies requires an understanding of the effects of flame and heat impingement, rate of heat release and fire dynamics, potential for movement and displacement of structural components and effect on assemblies, systems and connections and the effect on structural stability, integrity and building load transfers and displacement that all can adversely affect building performance, integrity and collapse potential
Typical Structural System and Components
Interior View with Steel Columns, Open Web Steel bar Joists and Beams
Typical Open Web Steel Bar Joists w Metal Roof Deck
Large clear spans provided by the open web steel bar joists allowed for considerable free floor space typical of commercial warehouse occupancies.
Note the use of what appears to be combustible wood storage and staging areas that could have could potentially contribute towards increased fire intensity, extension and further contribute towards adverse affects on the unprotected structural steel components and assemblies.
Alpha Side Collapse Area Details: OH Door Pre-Collapse Insights
Pre-Collapse Operations on Alpha side with personnel in close proximty to the building perimeter
Pre-Collapse view of Operations on the Alpha side with personnel in close proximity, (within [a] collapse zone) to the building perimeter. It is evident that the degree of interior fire extension and involvement presumes a cautious deployment and placement of personnel in safe operational areas. When operating in such close proximity to the building wall and envelope, it becomes increasingly challenging for company officers and company personnel to monitor overall building performance indicators that may be prevalent or dominant from a view point further away from the building.
Fire extension, smoke conditions, component or assembly movement or displacement may be readily defined and identified from a vantage point away from the building, requiring additional independent operational assignments within the division if resources allow. Otherwise, officers are encouraged to get a big picture view and increase their span of vision of the building and progressing fire conditions and building performance
The pre-collapse frame image above identifies the building roof line in relationship to the ground operations, smoke conditions and also the directional flow of the elevated master stream [upper right corner]. The initial stage of the wall compromise and collapse can be seen in the Bravo wall pulling away. When watching the video, pay close attention first to the stream direction and flow and them at the location and movement of the wall, which is followed in rapid succession with the full wall collapse.
T
Close examination of the initial video frames shows the rapid displacement of the portion of the Bravo wall and outward collapse towards the B-Exposure (alleyway) Refer to the Aerial Plan for orientation. The A-B Collapse is progressing from the Bravo side to the Alpha side as loads are being transferred in rapid progression with further collapse expected.
The frame image above shows the bravo wall failing outward with the resulting loss in structural support of the roofing deck assembly.
Rapid fire migration and extension is evident after the wall section collapse with increased flames visible. In the video, one firefighter quickly recognizes the imminent collapse and reacts.
A significant section of wall area is present at the A-B side and progressing from the building corner to the left jamb of the overhead (OH) door. This area and the area directly above the OH door opening is calculated to weigh over 20,000 lbs.
The early identification and establishment of collapse zone(s) is mission critical especially at commercial buildings due to the considerations for rapidly changing operational conditions that may be a result of or influenced by the following;
lack of knowledge or understanding of the building’s construction, systems and characteristics
lack of adequate resources, skills and or capabilities for selected phase operations
fire loading, combustibles, flammables and other products
Last of or loss of compartmentation
fire and protective systems failures or inoperability
unapproved alterations, additions and renovations to the building, systems and occupancy
transitions for offensive to defensive operational phases, which at times may results in operating position postures too close to the building
failure to recognize situational factors that will drive appropriate operational phasing and task deployments
lack of building performance knowledge
not considering occupancy risk versus treating the building/fire relationship based upon occupancy type
not recognizing key collapse indicators and failing to implement timely actions [proactively versus reactionary]
being four steps behind the fire conditions evident instead of implementing adaptive fire ground management insights [five steps ahead of the evident fire]
use precise coordination when placing elevated masterstreams into operations with ground personnel operating within close quarters
understand the effects of master streams on the integrity of building features, assemblies and components
The image frame above shows personnel operating within an imminent collapse zone directing hand lines into the interior fire area. Further examination of the video frames clearly shows one firefighter quickly recognizing that a collapse is occurring and attempts to alert the other personnel to retreat. Simultaneously to the collapse progression, the crew immediately retreats away from the collapsing wall and falling building materials.
Within the span of four seconds, the wall compromise occurs and collapses on the ground at the A-B corner and immediate area on the alpha side. The slightly monolithic manner in which the wall plane first peels away and progressively collapsed is interesting for a CMU wall. Possibly due to the outward collapse of the Bravo wall, followed by the rapid succession of failure of the roof-wall connection interface resulted in an transitional downward force that pushed the alpha side wall outward allowing gravity to work its force
When operating in close proximity to a heavily involved forward interior condition [exterior position] it is important to maintain focused situational awareness and either directly maintain or delegate responsibilities for observations of fire and smoke progress and conditions while monitoring key functional building performance indicators and collapse pre-cursors.
Additionally, always re-evaluate the effectiveness of deployed and operational hose lines, streams and in water application to ensure they are adequate for the degree of fire suppression being undertaken and the corresponding fire flow requirements. Don’t just assume, determine with validity. [ Refer to Tactical Entertainment]
Obscured by the rapidly defining smoke which is a result of the developing and extending collapse, the frame image 04 below depicts the beginning of the compromise and collapse sequence commencing as a result of the Bravo wall compromise and collapse sequence at the B-A corner that will subsequently peel towards the Alpha side and continue up to the outermost jamb of the overhead door.
Pay particular attention to the first three to four seconds of the video clip and review the video clip over a few times; looking at the operating elevated master stream that is clearly visible and operating from the upper right part of the screen through the smoke plume; follow the direct orientation and stream flowing directly towards the bravo wall plane, and presumed penetrating into/through the roof deck or impacting through the metal roof deck and wall-roof assembly area at the upper roof edge.
Image 04
Frame image 04 depicts the rapidly deteriorating conditions that are evident as the collapse sequence continues and the overhead door jamb (left) buckling and adjacent wall failing by way of an outward curl or peel away commencing from the upper (left image) A-B corner at the roof line and then peeling and failing from upper left to right.
Image 05
The leading edge of the outward collapsing wall plane ( yellow dotted line) is failing with the greatest material concentration occurring at the A-B edge outward. Fortunately the presence and location of the overhead door opening lessened the amount and location of wall material ( concrete masonry units-CMU) and contributed to a void area being present and not fully impacting the firefighters who were operating within this collapse zone.
In other words, had this been a solid full wall collapse likelihood for significant firefighter injury would have resulted.
The affects of wall/roof compromise should be of focused consideration and monitoring when managing incidents of this size and magnitude in similar occupancies and building features. Flame and heat impingment can and will affect the structural integrity of lintels spans, beams and truss connects along roof lines and connections. Look for signs of impingment, degradation or compromise. watch for signs of probable inward/outward or curtain wall collapse.
Image 06
The remaining images, frames 06 and 07 depict the location of the firefighters to the wall collapse, the relationship to the wall and roof system and the degree of wall area that became compromised and collapsed.
Image 07
This brief video clip and these accompanying briefing insights provided a tremendous opportunity to examine in a non-critical manner an actual near miss collapse event and operational discernments that provide a focused training an awareness opportunity.
When given the time to analyze and assess, some things become so apparent and self-revealing that we might prematurely say why didn’t someone pick up that or those conditions while conducting operations at [an] incident. It is dependent on a wide variety of factors, conditions and parameters that are difficult at times to identify and harder yet to fully identify as common or contributing factors, errors or omissions.
It’s not always that easy; but contradictory – some time it really is (or should be) that easy.
Some things on the fireground may not be prone to being so readily identifiable or recognized.
It all depends what you’re looking for and whether you have the necessary insights, knowledge and skill sets. Incident priorities, demands, situational focus, awareness or disconnect all may have a part in how and incident is managed and mitigated.
It goes back directly on knowing what to look for and when; at what type of building with which type of occupancy and under what stage or stages of fire development and combat operations or engagement you might be in. It complex, it takes time and experience and learning’s.
There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.
You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.
An image from a NIST computer model shows temperature levels during the 2007 Charleston Sofa Super Store fire. Dark blue is ambient temperature; bright red is about 800 degrees C (1500 degrees F). Credit: NIST
Fire Modeling Software
These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Fire Research Division at the NIST. The list of programs is divided into two broad categories below: currently-supported software and archival (unsupported) software. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.
Current Software
These models are being actively developed and supported by the laboratory. Details of the software, including download, development, and support information are included on the individual web pages for each model.
FDS (Fire Dynamics Simulator) is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of fire-driven fluid flow. The software solves numerically a form of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally-driven flow, with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires.
These models are included largely for reference or historical interest and span several decades of development of computational tools in fire research at NIST. As such, they are largely unsupported due to the age of the software.
ALOFT-FTTM (A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain) is a computer based model to predict the downwind distribution of smoke particulate and combustion products from large outdoor fires. It solves the fundamental fluid dynamic equations for the smoke plume and its surroundings with flat terrain. The program contains a graphical user interface for input and output and a user modifiable database of fuel and smoke emission parameters. The output can be displayed as downwind, crosswind and vertical smoke concentration contours. Information on using the program is available with on-line help commands in the program.
ASCOS (Analysis of Smoke Control Systems) is a program for steady air flow analysis of smoke control systems. This program can analyze any smoke control system that produces pressure differences with the intent of limiting smoke movement in building fire situations. The program is also capable of modeling the stack effect created in taller buildings during extreme temperature conditions. The program input consists of the outside and building temperatures, a description of the building flow network and the flows produced by the ventilation or smoke control system. The output consists of the steady state pressures and flows throughout the building. Another newer program, CONTAM, may be more appropriate to some applications than ASCOS.
ASET-B (Available Safe Egress Time – BASIC) is a program for calculating the temperature and position of the hot smoke layer in a single room with closed doors and windows. ASET-B is a compact easy to run program which solves the same equations as ASET. The required program inputs are a heat loss fraction, the height of the fire, the room ceiling height, the room floor area, the maximum time for the simulation, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the temperature and thickness of the hot smoke layer as a function of time.
ASMET (Atria Smoke Management Engineering Tools) consists of a set of equations and a zone fire model for analysis of smoke management systems for large spaces such as atria, shopping malls, arcades, sports arenas, exhibition halls and airplane hangers. ASMET is written in C++ language. For program documentation and a description of the input data, the user should refer to NISTIR 5516, Klote, J. H., Method of Predicting Smoke Movement in Atria with Application to Smoke Management, NIST.
BREAK1 (Berkeley Algorithm for Breaking Window Glass in a Compartment Fire) is a program which calculates the temperature history of a glass window exposed to user described fire conditions. The calculations are stopped when the glass breaks. The inputs required are the glass thermal conductivity, thermal diffusivity, absorption length, breaking stress, Young’s modulus, thermal coefficient of linear expansion, thickness, emissivity, shading thickness, half-width of window, the ambient temperature, numerical parameters and the time histories of flame radiation from the fire, hot layer temperature and emissivity, and heat transfer coefficients. The outputs are temperature history of the glass normal to the glass surface, and the window breakage time.
CCFM (Consolidated Compartment Fire Model version VENTS) is a two-layer zone-type compartment fire model computer code. It simulates conditions due to user-specified fires in a multi-room, multi-level facility. The required inputs are a description of room geometry and vent characteristics (up to 9 rooms, 20 vents), initial state of the inside and outside environment, and fire energy release rates as a functions of time (up to 20 fires). If simulation of concentrations of products of combustion is desired, then product release rates must also be specified (up to three products). Vents can be simple openings between adjacent spaces (natural vents) or fan/duct forced ventilation systems between arbitrary pairs of spaces (forced vents). For forced vents, flow rates and direction can be user-specified or included in the simulation by accounting for user-specified fan and duct characteristics. Wind and stack effects can be taken into account. The program outputs for each room are pressure at the floor, layer interface height, upper/lower layer temperature and (optionally) product concentrations.
DETACT-QS and DETACT-T2
DETACT-QS (DETector ACTuation – Quasi Steady) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature heat detectors and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire. DETACT-QS assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the height of the ceiling above the fuel, the distance of the thermal device from the axis of the fire, the actuation temperature of the thermal device, the response time index (RTI) for the device, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the ceiling gas temperature and the device temperature both as a function of time and the time required for device actuation. DETACT-T2 (DETector ACTuation – Time squared) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature and rate of rise heat detectors, and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire which grows as the square of time. CT-T2 assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the ambient temperature, the response time index (RTI) for the device, the activation and rate of rise temperatures of the device, height of the ceiling above the fuel, the device spacing and the fire growth rate. The program outputs are the time to device activation and the heat release rate at activation.
ELVAC (Elevator Evacuation) is an interactive computer program that estimates the time required to evacuate people from a building with the use of elevators and stairs. It is cautioned that elevators generally are not intended as a means of fire evacuation, and they should not be used during fires. However, it is possible to design elevator systems that for fire emergencies, and ELVAC can be used to evaluate the potential performance of such systems. ELVAC calculates the evacuation time for one group of elevators. If a building has more than one group of elevators, ELVAC can be run on each group separately. Input consists of floor to floor heights, number of people on floors, number of elevators in the group, elevator speed, elevator acceleration, elevator capacity, elevator door type and width, and various inefficiency factors. The output is a table of elevator travel time, round trip time, people moved, and number of round trips for each floor plus the total evacuation time.
FIRDEMND simulates the suppression of post flashover charring and non-charring solid-fuel fires in compartments using water sprays from portable hose-nozzle equipment used by the fire departments. The output of the Fire Demand Model (FDM) shows the extinguishing effects of water spray at various flow rates and droplet sizes. The calculations are based on a heat and mass balance accounting for gas and surface cooling, steam-induced smothering, water-spray induced air entrainment, direct extinguishment of the fire by water and the energy transport via inflow and outflow of heat and products of combustion.
FIRST (FIRe Simulation Technique) is the direct descendant of the HARVARD V program developed by Howard Emmons and Henri Mitler. The fire may be entered either as a user-specified time-dependent mass loss rate or in terms of fundamental properties of the fuel. In the latter case, the program will predict the fire growth rate by considering the changing oxygen concentration and smoke layer conditions in the room of fire origin. It can also predict the heating and possible ignition of up to three targets. The original fire and targets may also be user specified fires. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the rooms and openings, and the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, walls, burning fuel, and targets. The generation rate of soot must be specified, and the generation rates of other species may be specified as a yield of the pyrolysis rate. Among the program outputs are the temperature and thickness of, and species concentrations in, the hot upper layer and also in the cooler, lower layer in each compartment. Also given are wall surface temperatures, heat transfer rates and mass flow rates. MASBANK is used to create and maintain a data base of materials and their fire properties for use by the FIRST program. MASBANK can accommodate 20 properties for up to 50 materials. The program has the capability to add, delete, change, alphabetize and view the material properties in the data bank. Material properties from MASBANK may be transferred directly into the FIRST program.
Jet is a model for the prediction of detector activation and gas temperature in the presence of a smoke layer.
FPETool (Software and Documentation) is a set of engineering equations useful in estimating potential fire hazard and the response of the space and fire protection systems to the developing hazard. Version 3.2 incorporates an estimate of smoke conditions developing within a room receiving steady-state smoke leakage from an adjacent space. Estimates of human viability resulting from exposure to developing conditions within the room are calculated based upon the smoke temperature and toxicity.
LAVENT is a program developed to simulate the environment and the response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with draft curtains and fusible link operated ceiling vents. The model, used to calculate the heating of the fusible links, includes the effects of the ceiling jet and the upper layer of hot gases beneath the ceiling. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the compartment, the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, the fire elevation, the time dependent energy release rate of the fire, the fire diameter or energy release rate per area of the fire, the ceiling vent area, the fusible link response-time-index (RTI) and fuse temperature, the fusible link positions along the ceiling, the link assignment to each ceiling vent, and the ambient temperature. A maximum of five ceiling vents and ten fusible links are permitted in the compartment. The program outputs are the temperature, mass and height of the hot upper layer, the temperature of each link, the ceiling jet temperature and velocity at each link, the radial temperature distribution along the interior surface of the ceiling, the radial distribution of the heat flux to the interior and exterior surfaces of the ceiling, the fuse time of each link, and the vent area that has been opened.GRAPH is a graphics program which runs in conjunction with LAVENT. The results for LAVENT are sent to the data file, GRAPH.OUT, after each prescribed time step. GRAPH then allows the user to choose two sets of variables to be plotted on the screen and has the additional capability of hardcopy output.
These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Building and Fire Research Laboratory. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.
ALOFT-FTTM- A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain
FASTLite- A collection of procedures which builds on the core routines of FIREFORM and the computer model CFAST to provide engineering calculations of various fire phenomena,
FPETool- Fire Protection Engineering Tools (equations and fire simulation scenarios)
Jet- A Model for the Prediction of Detector Activation and Gas Temperature in the Presence of a Smoke Layer
LAVENT- Response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with curtains and ceiling vents
NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator and Smokeview – The NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator predicts smoke and/or air flow movement caused by fire, wind, ventilation systems etc. Smokeview visualizes the predictions generated by NIST FDS.
Using Fire Models to Understand Fire BehaviorNIST’s fire modeling capabilities can help firefighters understand and predict fire conditions, HERE
Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page
On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.
Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.
Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.
Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.
The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.
Building Construction Insights
Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”
Fire Building Construction:
7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.
Collapse Building Construction:
6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street
Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011
Building Alteration
(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.
(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.
(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.
The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.
It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.
The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.
The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001.
FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank
Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.
DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18
From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html
Take the time to revisit two Firefighter LODD incidents that both occurred in the month of August in 2006 and 2009 respectively. Excerpts from the NIOSH Reports have been included that are part of the NIOSH FIRE FIGHTER FATALITY INVESTIGATION AND PREVENTION PROGRAM (HERE).
Both of these incidents involved a double firefighter line-of-duty death (LODD) and resulted from a floor collapse during the conduct of operations within the fire involved structures. There are numerous lessons learned and recommendations that can be considered and applied in organizations and agencies across the country, both large and small; career or volunteer.
These incidents bring to light the occupancy risks present in some of our most common of building occupancies, and continue to provide the basis for operational considerations and management based upon occupancy risk versus occupancy type. There are numerous operational considerations when addressing fires located in basement or underdeck areas and the subsequent management of those incidents based upon known or assumed building characteristics, occupancy risk and profile, inherent or presumed building stability and potential for structural compromise and the operational risk from isolated or catastrophic of collapse.
Buffalo (NY) Fire Department: August 24, 2009
FDNY: August 27, 2006
Some Other Links related to Floor Collapses and Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE)
Here are some Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) for Operations at Basement Fires that will support fireground operational safety:
Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner.
Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment
REMEMBRANCE
Buffalo (NY) Fire Deparment- August 24, 2009 1815 Genesee Street, Buffalo, NY
Career Lieutenant Dies Following Floor Collapse into Basement Fire and a Career Fire Fighter Dies Attempting to Rescue the Career Lieutenant – New York (REPORT HERE)
The Structure, (pre-fire conditions)
SUMMARY
On August 24, 2009, a 45-year-old male career lieutenant (Victim #1) died following a partial floor collapse into a basement fire, and a 34-year-old male career fire fighter (Victim #2) was fatally injured while attempting to rescue Victim #1. The career fire department was dispatched for “an alarm of fire” with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. Repeated attempts were made to force open this basement door in order to search for trapped civilians, but crews had difficulty gaining access through this door because it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the 1st and 2nd floors with no civilians found.
Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional manpower was sent with special tools to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2. Victim #1 and two fire fighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify all fire fighters had exited a 1st floor deli. Victim #1, following a hoseline into the structure, was well ahead of the other two fire fighters when the 1st floor partially collapsed beneath him. Victim #1 fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire. The other two fire fighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. Victim #1 made several Mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device. Confusion erupted exteriorly on scene when trying to verify who was calling the Mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement. The incident commander was aware that he had crews attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure.
Simultaneously, Victim #2, a member of the fire fighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside Victim #1’s point of entry when the Mayday calls came out. It is believed that Victim #2 knew where Victim #1 was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. Victim #2 grabbed a tool, went on air, and rushed into the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other fire fighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device alarming. Victim #1 was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but Victim #2 was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after Victim #1’s Mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the 1st floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. Victim #1’s PASS device was still alarming. They were pronounced dead on scene. Four fire fighters and one lieutenant suffered minor injuries during the incident. No civilians were discovered within the structure.
Career lieutenant dies following floor collapse into basement fire and a career fire fighter dies attempting to rescue the career lieutenant – New York
Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity not maintained.
NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:
Conduct research into refining existing and developing new technologies to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.
Continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
Fire and Rescue Operations
Incident scene. (Photo courtesy of fire department. From NIOSH REPORT)
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
Discussion: Basement fires can be taxing and test a fire fighter’s knowledge and skill on how to combat it safely and effectively. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.1 They need to be aware of rapid heat buildup, little or no ventilation, limited accessibility, and whether it is a storage place for unknown hazards (e.g., combustibles, hazardous materials, and flammable liquids). Also of concern for fire departments is how to determine how long a fire has gone undetected. Fire fighters should be aware of what is stored on the floor directly above a basement fire, what the finished floor is comprised of (e.g., terrazzo, plywood, tongue-and-groove, tile, etc.), and what the floor structural members are comprised of (e.g., engineered wood floor joists, concrete, or steel). Structural support members may be directly exposed to fire, causing them to weaken and increase the likelihood of an above-floor collapse. Interior crew(s) intending to operate on the floor above a basement fire should limit their operating time, especially if ventilation, suppression, and accessibility are not progressing. The floor’s structural members will continue to weaken as fire and heat intensify. Specifying an exact length of time for how long suppression crew(s) should operate above a basement fire is questionable, and the IC should make that determination by performing a hazard analysis/risk assessment. The fire department did not have an SOP specifically addressing strategies and tactics when combating basement fires. SOPs should be developed to address structural fire fighting operations specific to basement fires, because these types of fires present a complex set of circumstances and following established SOPs will minimize the risk of serious injury to fire fighters.
During this incident, fire fighters were unable to access the basement, unable to ventilate the basement fire, and unaware of the fire load found within the basement. Initially, the department did not cut a hole in the 1st floor apartment or deli and use their Bresnan distributor, in fear of injuring reported trapped civilians. Note: The Bresnan distributor is a type of cellar nozzle used to suppress fire through steam conversion. The use of a cellar nozzle, like a Bresnan distributor, during the initial stages of the basement fire may have assisted in containing the fire and/or allowing better operating conditions for fire fighters to access the basement.2 Attempts were made to flow water on the 1st floor where fire had vented through, but this effort was not successful. Fire fighters should also recognize that fire venting through a floor is a late indication of a weakened floor system.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
Discussion: Among the most important duties of the first officer on the scene is conducting an initial size-up of the incident. A proper size-up begins from the moment the alarm is received, and it continues until the fire is under control. The size-up should also include assessments of risk-versus-gain during incident operations, especially after primary searches have been conducted.2-7 The size-up should include an evaluation of factors such as the fire size and location, length of time the fire has been burning, conditions on arrival, occupancy, fuel load and presence of combustible or hazardous materials, exposures, time of day, and weather conditions. Information on the structure itself should include size, construction type, age, condition (e.g., evidence of deterioration, weathering), evidence of renovations, lightweight construction, loads on roof and walls (e.g., air conditioning units, ventilation ductwork, utility entrances), and available preplan information are all key information that can affect whether an offensive or defensive strategy is employed. The incident commander should be willing to change his strategy and plan based on continued size-ups and risk assessments until the fire is brought under control. Conducting accurate size-ups and receiving interior/exterior status updates is critical to the safety of fire fighters on the incident, rescue/recovery efforts, and overall control of the incident. “The decision to commit interior firefighting personnel should be made on a case-by-case basis with proper risk-benefit decisions being made by the incident commander. The commitment of firefighters’ lives for saving property and an unknown or marginal risk of civilian life must be balanced appropriately.” 8 The fireground is very dynamic, and conditions can either improve or deteriorate based on fire suppression activities, and available resources, and most importantly assessments/size-ups of the incident are necessary to detect a change on the fireground.
During this incident, the fire department was attempting to gain access to reported trapped civilian(s) in a basement. The command post was established at the front of the structure providing views of Side 1 and Side 2. The basement contained heavy smoke and fire and was inaccessible from exterior and interior access doors. The initial IC and the IC who assumed command performed initial size-ups and received radio updates on fire and smoke conditions from personnel working on the incident, but not all interior findings were reported. Crews working in the 1st floor apartment encountered fire venting through the floor on Side 4 as early as 9 minutes after the first apparatus arrived on scene. Ten minutes later, Victim #1 was flowing water on fire that had vented in the corner of Side 3 and Side 4 of the deli. This was the same general area where crews within the 1st floor were working. The only thing separating the apartment and deli was a wall of floor coolers. The basement fire burned uncontrolled for more than 30 minutes while fire fighters continued attempts to gain access to the basement. Incident updates on the radio included transmissions such as “untenable” and “time to get out,” prior to the 1st floor partial collapse. The IC also mistook “water on the fire” as fire fighters actually attacking the basement fire from Side 2. This provided the IC with a false sense of progress on combating the basement fire. Also, during this incident, the IC was at times monitoring multiple radio channels and some additional transmissions may not have been received. Radio transmissions are very important for the IC to hear, acknowledge, and prioritize so that the IC can maintain situational awareness, and accurately and effectively manage and direct fireground operations. A chief’s aid or incident command technician assigned to the IC may have assisted the IC in monitoring the fireground channels and distinguishing key radio traffic and updates. It is reasonable to believe that, as time progressed and basement fire conditions continued to be uncontrolled, that the chances of survival diminished for any potentially trapped civilians exposed to the heat or products of combustion found within the smoke. According to fire investigators with the fire department, only the bodies of Victim #1 and Victim #2 were found within the structure.
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
Discussion: Fire fighters should always work and remain in teams whenever they are operating in a hazardous environment.2 Team integrity depends on team members knowing who is on their team and who is the team leader; staying within visual contact at all times (if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of each other); communicating needs and observations to the team leader; and rotating together for team rehab, team staging, and watching out for each other (e.g., practicing a strong buddy system). Following these basic rules helps prevent serious injury or even death by providing personnel with the added safety net of fellow team members. Teams that enter a hazardous environment together should leave together to ensure that team continuity is maintained. 3
During this incident, raw video captured the FAST working on Side 1 of the structure (same side that Victim #1 had entered) during Victim #1’s “Mayday.” At the same time, Victim #2, assigned to the FAST, was seen pointing at Side 1, donning his SCBA, and entering the structure as other fire fighters were exiting from Side 1. The FAST was activated and ordered to Side 2 where it was believed the “Mayday” transmission came from. Victim #2 went missing following the “Mayday” and his whereabouts were unknown until the recovery of Victim #1. Also, Victim #1 entered the deli not realizing that two of his team members from R1 were not following behind. Not verifying your crew is with you and/or working alone increases the risk to individuals and possibly to others during search and rescue efforts. During interviews, the fire department commented on an increase in “freelancing” following the Mayday.
Photo 6. Interior view of deli following partial floor
collapse and recovery operations. (Photo courtesy of police photographer. From NIOSH REPORT)
Photo 7 . Views of materials stored within basement. (Photos courtesy of police photographer. From NIOSH REPORT)
Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
Discussion: An important aspect of an accountability system is the personnel accountability report (PAR). A PAR is an organized on-scene roll call in which each supervisor reports the status of his crew when requested by the IC or emergency dispatcher.2 The use of an accountability system is recommended by NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program9 and NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System.10 A functional personnel accountability system requires the following:
development of a departmental SOP
training all personnel
strict enforcement during emergency incidents
As the incident escalates, additional staffing and resources may be needed, adding to the burden of tracking personnel. An incident command board should be established at this point with an assigned accountability officer or aide. As a fire escalates and additional fire companies respond, a chief’s aide or accountability officer assists the incident commander with accounting for all fire fighting companies at the fire, at the staging area, and at the rehabilitation area. With an accountability system in place, the incident commander may readily identify the location and time of all fire fighters on the fireground. A properly initiated and enforced accountability system that is consistently integrated into fireground command and control enhances fire fighter safety and survival by helping to ensure a more timely and successful identification and rescue of a disoriented or downed fire fighter. This department has developed and implemented SOPs governing accountability and even assigns an accountability officer to the IC to assist with radio transmissions and PARs.
An accountability officer was assigned to assist the IC during the incident. A PAR was immediately obtained following the rescue attempts for Victim #1. Victim #1 was identified as “missing,” but Victim #2 was incorrectly identified as “accounted for.” Victim #2 was incorrectly “accounted for” during a second separate PAR. Prior to a third PAR, 50 minutes following the floor collapse, Victim #2 could not be visibly accounted for on the fireground and his whereabouts were unknown. Officers need to visually account for their members prior to providing an “all accounted for” to the IC or accountability officer. Quickly being able to account for all personnel at an incident is paramount and can determine how an IC orders search and rescue efforts or other suppression activities.
Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
Discussion: According to NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System, 11 “The incident commander shall have overall authority for management of the incident and the incident commander shall ensure that adequate safety measures are in place.” This shall include overall responsibility for the safety and health of all personnel and for other persons operating within the incident management system. While the incident commander is in overall command at the scene, certain functions must be delegated to ensure adequate scene management is accomplished. 10 According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, 9 “as incidents escalate in size and complexity, the incident commander shall divide the incident into tactical-level management units and assign an incident safety officer (ISO) to assess the incident scene for hazards or potential hazards.” These standards indicate that the incident commander is in overall command at the scene but acknowledge that oversight of all operations is difficult. On-scene fire fighter health and safety is best preserved by delegating the function of safety and health oversight to the ISO. Additionally, the incident commander relies upon fire fighters and the ISO to relay feedback on fireground conditions in order to make timely, informed decisions regarding risk versus gain and offensive-versus-defensive operations. The safety of all personnel on the fireground is directly impacted by clear, concise, and timely communications among mutual aid fire departments, sector command, the ISO, and the incident commander. NFPA 1521 Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer defines the role of the ISO at an incident scene and identifies duties such as recon of the fireground and reporting pertinent information back to the incident commander; ensuring the department’s accountability system is in place and operational; monitoring radio transmissions and identifying barriers to effective communications; and ensuring established safety zones, collapse zones, hot zones, and other designated hazard areas are communicated to all members on scene.11 Larger fire departments may assign one or more full-time staff officers as safety officers who respond to working fires. In smaller departments, every officer should be prepared to function as the ISO when assigned by the incident commander. The presence of a safety officer does not diminish the responsibility of individual fire fighters and fire officers for their own safety and the safety of others. The ISO adds a higher level of attention and expertise to help the fire fighters and fire officers. The ISO must have particular expertise in analyzing safety hazards and must know the particular uses and limitations of protective equipment. 4
During this incident, the designated department ISO was not dispatched until the incident was upgraded to a 2nd alarm because it occurred after the normal duty shift of the ISO. The ISO did not arrive until rescue/recovery operations had begun on breaching the Side 4 wall. The presence of an ISO throughout this incident would have allowed the IC to focus on supervising the incident while the ISO directed safety operations.
Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
Discussion: Fire fighters are tasked at times to operate within environments which pose inhalation hazards (e.g., toxic smoke and oxygen deficiency12), defined by OSHA as immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH). Proper training along with an implemented and enforced policy or procedure will assist fire fighters with proper maintenance, use, and removal of a SCBA. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134 (g)(4)(iii) states, “all employees engaged in interior structural firefighting use SCBAs.”13 During this incident, the medical examiner stated both victims died from inhalation of products of combustion. The medical examiner also indicated that the victims’ COHb levels (a measure of carbon monoxide in the bloodstream) were over 50%. Even if nothing but carbon dioxide, water vapor, and nitrogen were present in the fire products and these were to mix with the air being breathed by a fire fighter, then the oxygen percentage would be reduced below the normal 21%. At 15% oxygen, fire fighters can experience lethargy, poor coordination, and confused thinking. The two principal toxins in smoke—carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide—act to deprive the brain of oxygen, and their effects would be enhanced due to the lower levels of oxygen in the air.14 Both victims were discovered without their facepieces on.
Due to the smoke conditions, both victims would have had to have been on air when entering the structure. It has not been determined why both victims were found without their facepieces on, but NIOSH investigators have theorized the following possibilities:
Victim #1 removed his facepiece to transmit his “Mayday.”
Both victims’ facepieces were unintentionally knocked off when falling into the basement.
The facepieces were removed because they ran out-of-air or other emergency situation.
Emergencies created by, or associated with, SCBAs can be overcome in several ways. Fire departments can develop and implement a comprehensive respiratory protection program15 that includes fire fighter fitness, training, competency, and skill in SCBA and emergency procedures. Firefighters should remember the first rule in any emergency situation, and that is not to panic. Panic causes increased breathing air consumption and inability to focus on emergency procedures. If fire fighters become lost, trapped, or disoriented they need to focus on managing remaining air in their SCBA cylinder until other fire fighters can make a rescue attempt. Removing one’s facepiece in an IDLH atmosphere can immediately expose the respiratory system to a potentially fatal environment, thus incapacitating an individual. Choosing to leave one’s SCBA facepiece on may be the best chance in providing additional time for a fire fighter to be rescued. Fire fighters should follow their department’s SOPs regarding emergency SCBA procedures and emergency communications.
Recommendation #7: Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should conduct research into refining existing and developing new technologies to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.
Discussion: Fire fighter fatalities often are the result of fire fighters becoming lost or disoriented on the fireground. The use of systems for locating lost or disoriented fire fighters could be instrumental in reducing the number of fire fighter deaths on the fireground. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been evaluating the feasibility of real-time fire fighter tracking and locator systems for some time.16,17 Another group researching advanced fire fighter locator and tracking systems is the Maryland Fire Rescue Institute, located at the University of Maryland – College Park.18 Research into refining existing systems and developing new technologies for tracking the movement of fire fighters on the fireground should continue. While it is not clear that the use of this technology in this incident would have prevented the fatalities, such technology could potentially have reduced the search time by aiding rescue teams in pin-pointing the location of the missing fire fighters. This new technology must function properly in the severe fire conditions often encountered during rescue operations.
During the initial stages of the incident, it was not known who was transmitting the Mayday, where exactly they were in the basement, or how they got into the basement. Victim #2 went accounted for approximately 50 minutes before a determination was made that Victim #2 was also missing. It was not until rescue/recovery crews visually located the victims that they accounted for the location of Victim #2. This technology may have assisted the fire department during this incident in more quickly locating Victim #1 and Victim #2.
Of importance, Victim #1’s PASS device was alarming during the Mayday and when he was discovered, but it was reported to NIOSH investigators that Victim #2’s PASS device was never heard. Victim #2’s PASS device was evaluated as part of NIOSH’S NPPTL SCBA inspection. Victim #2’s PASS device failed to function when tested, but after the batteries were replaced within the PASS device, it alarmed appropriately. It has not been determined if the battery life was exhausted prior to Victim #2 going into the structure. It is important to note that the 2007 revision to NFPA 1982 Standard on Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS) includes new heat and flame resistance requirements resulting from documented reports where PASS devices were not heard during fatal fireground incidents. 19 Laboratory testing conducted by NIST determined that exposure to high temperature environments caused the loudness of the tested PASS alarm signal to be reduced. This reduction in loudness can cause the alarm signal to become indistinguishable from background noise at an emergency scene. Initial laboratory testing by NIST highlighted that this sound reduction may begin to occur at temperatures as low as 300°F. Thus the use of PASS devices meeting NFPA 1982, 2007 Edition requirements is highly recommended.
Recommendation #8: Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Discussion: The use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and an SCBA make it difficult to communicate, with or without a radio.20-22 Faced with the difficult task of communicating while wearing a SCBA, fire fighters sometimes momentarily remove their facepieces to transmit a message directly or over a portable radio. Considering the toxic and oxygen-deficient hazards posed by a fire and the resulting products of combustion, removing the SCBA facepiece, even briefly, is a dangerous practice that should be prohibited. Even small exposures to carbon monoxide and other toxic agents present during a fire can affect judgment and decision-making abilities. To facilitate communication, equipment manufacturers have designed facepiece-integrated microphones, intercom systems, throat mikes, and bone conduction mikes worn in the ear or on the forehead.20-22
During this incident, interviewed fire fighters complained of radio transmissions being unintelligible at times or not heard at all. Although NIOSH investigators are not certain why Victim #1 and Victim #2 were found without their facepieces on, one theory is that Victim #1 may have momentarily removed his facepiece to better transmit his Mayday. Fire fighters recall hearing his transmissions as they came across the radio and also emanating clearly from the structure.
Recent testing by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) of portable radios in simulated fire fighting environments has identified that radios are vulnerable to exposures to elevated temperatures. Some degradation of radio performance was measured at elevated temperatures ranging from 100°C to 260°C, with the radios returning to normal function after cooling down. Additional research is needed in this area.16,20 Fire service radios also need to be waterproof as normal fireground conditions dictate that radios are frequently exposed to excessive amounts of water during routine use through exposure to hose streams, overspray, water dripping from overhead, etc.
FDNY- August 27, 2006 Walton and East Mount Eden Avenues, Bronx, NY
Floor Collapse at Commercial Structure Fire Claims the Lives of One Career Lieutenant and One Career Fire Fighter – New York (REPORT HERE)
SUMMARY
On August 27, 2006, a 43-year-old male career Lieutenant (victim #1) and a 25-year-old male fire fighter (victim #2) died after the floor they were operating on collapsed at a commercial structure fire. At approximately 1230 hours, crews were dispatched to a fire. The victims’ engine was dispatched at 1236 hours as an additional unit alarm and arrived on the scene at approximately 1240 hours. At approximately 1251 hours, victim #1, victim #2 and fire fighter #1 advanced a 2 ½-inch hand line through the front of the structure and down an aisle toward the rear of the store. The fire was located in the rear interior of the structure (discount store) that sold a variety of numerous small household commodity items. Approximately three minutes later, the structural members supporting the floor directly below the victims failed. The V-shaped collapse of the floor caused victim #1 and victim #2 to fall into the basement and shelving stocked with merchandise to fall in on top of them. Multiple MAYDAYs were transmitted and the fire fighter assist and search team (FAST) was deployed to the front of the structure where they assisted in the rescue of numerous members who had been operating in the interior of the structure at the time of the collapse. Battalion Chief #1, Lieutenant #1 and fire fighter #1 were freed from the debris. At approximately 1415 hours, victim #1 was removed from the debris in the basement and transported to the hospital. He died the next day as a result of his injuries. At approximately 1435 hours, victim #2 was removed from the basement and transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased as a result of his injuries.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
consider the possibility of a substandard structure when building information is not available from pre-incident plans
consider the live load of water on the structure and go defensive when water load potentially compromises the structural integrity
Additionally, municipalities should:
explore means of coordinating information sharing between building and fire departments to increase safety for fire fighters and civilians
consider conducting inspections on all commercial structures where a change of occupancy has occurred or renovations are known or suspected, giving special attention to non-sprinklered commercial retail structures
RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONS
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should consider the possibility of a substandard structure when building information is not available from pre-incident plans, and implement a defensive strategy when no occupants are at risk.
Discussion:The threat of a collapse of some type (i.e. roof, ceiling, floor or wall) is a possibility in any structural fire due to the effects of fire, water application, age, insects, and alterations. It is a high probability that a fire department is unaware of structural defects caused by age, insects and alterations. To minimize the risk of injury or death to fire fighters during structural operations, the size-up and risk assessment includes many factors, which include: age of the building (deterioration of structural members, evidence of weathering, use of lightweight materials in new construction), occupancy, and renovations or modifications to the building.3,4,5
Pre-incident plans are an effective tool in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to structural collapse. They allow fire departments to determine factors, such as, age of the structure, structural integrity, type of materials used in the structure, and amount of load on the roof that could weaken the supports, etc. However, in numerous cities and towns where buildings number in the hundreds of thousands, fire departments lack the manpower to pre-plan all buildings under their protection. Often fire departments are limited to targeting buildings that have a unique construction or pose a known hazard.
In floor collapses that have occurred, such as those at a New York City drug store (October 17, 1966) and at a Boston hotel (June 17, 1972), there were no warning signs, and no time to act and withdraw fire fighters to safety. At both of these floor collapses, unauthorized alterations on the structure contributed to the structural failure.5
“The potential for structural collapse is one of the most difficult factors to predict during initial size-up and ongoing fire fighting. Structural collapse usually occurs without warning.” 3 When pre-incident plan information on the fire structure is not available, occupants have been evacuated, and evidence of structural deterioration and/or modification cannot be determined, a defensive strategy should be implemented. A defensive strategy would help ensure fire fighter safety and is warranted in structures that lack pre-incident plans, no occupants are at risk, and where the potential for numerous unrecognized hazards exists, such as substandard construction and building deterioration.
Fire departments operating in older businesses and homes should be suspicious of potential alterations and renovations which could result in unsupported loads and unusual voids. These alterations may be hidden by sheetrock (drywall) or flooring and built up flooring which is difficult to detect during inspections and virtually impossible to detect during firefighting operations. The older the structure, the greater the possibility of renovation or remodel.
In this case, there were no current pre-incident plans for the structure; the occupants had evacuated upon the fire department’s arrival, and compromised structural integrity was not immediately evident. Structural alterations had been made to the girders, columns, and floor in order to presumably level and support the floor. A post incident inspection showed 2 x 4 boards being used inappropriately (in orientation and stability) as a floor joist. A cluster of nails were used in lieu of bolts to attach gusset plates to the columns and girders. Sheets of plywood were added to the floor with no structural support around the sheet’s edges nor at 12”, 16” or even 24” intervals in accordance with standard building codes. Subflooring (i.e., plywood, wafer board, etc.) needs to be fastened around the sheet’s edges and at interval spacing (generally every 16 inches, but spacing may vary according to load requirements) to support floor joists. The interior support members of the structure suffered from severe rot at the base of the timber columns.
Recommendation #2 : Fire departments should consider the live load of water on the structure and go defensive when water load potentially compromises the structural integrity.
Discussion: A forensic engineering analysis of the fire building demonstrated that the weight of water added to the building from the fire fighting operations was approximately 50% of the rated structural capacity of the floor.2 As noted previously, however, timbers that supported the ground floor had rotted. Thus, the actual structural capacity of the floor was less than rated. Although the ultimate cause of the collapse was the rotted timbers, the weight of the water applied during the fire fighting operations, in addition to the weight of fire fighters, store merchandise, etc., likely contributed to the collapse. Given the many unknowns during fire fighting operations, including in most incidents the rated capacity of floors, incident commanders need to continuously consider the impact of water weight on structural integrity, and shift to defensive strategies when structural integrity is potentially compromised.
Firefighting operations can drastically increase the live load on the fire building. This can be due to the weight of:
the firefighters with their protective equipment and tools,
A 2 ½ -inch hose-line can deliver approximately 250 gallons of water per minute. 5 This adds about 2,082 pounds per minute into the fire building. If multiple hose-lines are operating, the weight of the water can be tremendous.
When operating in an offensive mode, a buildup of water within a building requires that immediate action be taken to alleviate these conditions. 6 The remedy may be as simple as controlling the excess flow from the hose-line or moving fire debris that is restricting runoff. When using large amounts of water, it is always advisable to provide for drainage when necessary. This can be accomplished any number of ways from chutes with traps to actual holes drilled to provide relief. 6
It must be recognized that at the same time that this additional weight is being introduced into the fire building, the fire and water are weakening the structure. Under these conditions, a defensive strategy is best when no civilians are in the structure. 5
In this case, civilians had evacuated the fire building upon the fire department’s arrival. The structures’ configuration only enabled an initial attack through the front of the structure and down narrow aisle ways to the rear of the structure where the origin of the fire was located. Prior to the collapse, three 2 ½-inch hose-lines (operating 17 minutes, 8 minutes, and 2 minutes, respectively) were flowing water through and into the rear of the structure. The added weight and flow of the water could have contributed to the floor collapse because of the rotted support columns decreasing the timber frame system’s ability to equalize the water load across the floor.
Diagram 2. Shows location of victims on the structure’s floor above the girder that failed. From the NIOSH REPORT
Additionally,
Recommendation #3 : Municipalities should explore means of coordinating information sharing between building and fire departments to increase safety for fire fighters and civilians
Discussion: Information on building construction, renovations, and alterations can help Incident Commanders develop strategies and tactics that effectively fight fires while attending to fire fighter safety. Pre-incident plans are a useful tool for ensuring that fire departments and Incident Commanders have information on building construction and contents to guide decision-making on the fireground. In urban areas with large numbers of existing structures, it may not be feasible to develop pre-incident plans for all or most structures, and for fire departments to regularly revisit structures to update pre-incident plans. Municipal building departments that issue building permits and conduct code inspections may collect, or be in position to collect, information that may be useful to fire departments. Municipalities should consider exploring mechanisms by which building information relevant to fire fighter and civilian safety can be collected and shared between building and fire departments. As one example, building departments could notify fire departments when building permits are issued. This would result in fire departments being aware of these building alterations, and to possibly target these buildings for a pre-incident plan. Priority should be given to sharing such information for targeted hazards identified by fire departments.
Recommendation #4: Municipalities should consider conducting inspections on all commercial structures where a change of occupancy has occurred or renovations are known or suspected, giving special attention to non-sprinklered commercial retail structures
Discussion: Occupancy changes understandably occur with great frequency. However, every effort should be made as new permits are issued to aggressively inspect any occupancy change. It is critical that municipalities assess that any renovations or remodeling meets current codes, and that original and renovated supports are capable of supporting the new occupancies. These building inspections should specifically consider the loading or redistribution of stock to ensure that flooring can handle dead and live loads.
We’ve got an advance look at some of the new training and lecture offerings coming out this fall and for 2012 that will be offered commencing in October for the Buildingsonfire Series produced and offered by the Command Institute and Buildingsonfire.com.
Buildingsonfire -2012 Building Construction and Systems Training for Fire Service Commanders, Company Officers and Fire Fighters
An intense and concentrated series of exceptional training programs examining trends and methods in building construction for the fire service with an emphasize on construction and occupancy risk assessment, structural and construction systems, and their direct relationship on structural combat firefighting operations, firefighter survivability and the command decision-making process. Understand building systems and occupancy performance under fire conditions is mission critical with new and emerging technical information and data that is redefining tactical and operational models and firefighting protocols with new rules of engagement.
Firefighters and Officers will gain a new understanding of inherent construction features and hazards that directly influence effective risk management and decisive strategic and tactical considerations with a focus on key construction features, inherent occupancy profiles that will influence strategic, tactical and task level operations and crucial assembly systems affected by fire dynamics, extreme fire behavior and combat fire suppression operations. These programs & seminars examine crucial considerations for Reading the Building, Occupancy Risk Profiling, Adaptive Fireground Management, Tactical Patience, Predicative Occupancy Performance and Construction Resiliency correlating building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety.
Programs utilize extensive multimedia, interactive activities, case studies and simulations to reinforce course content & subject areas providing exceptional learning opportunities.
New Seminars and Lecture Program Offerings; (Selected Topics)
Building Construction for the Company and Command Officer
The Rules of Combat Fire Engagement & Tactical Operations
Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & Tactics for the Company and Command Officer
Adaptive Fire Ground Management for Command and Company Officers
Building Construction and Tactical Operations
The Anatomy of Buildingsonfire 2012
Five Star Command & Fire Fighter Safety
The Doctrine of Combat Fire Operations 2012
Extreme Fire Behavior & Fireground Operations
Predictive Building and Occupancy Performance
Tactical Entertainment and Firefighter Safety
Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting Operations
Roof Construction for Truck Company Operations
Occupancy Risk Profiling and Firefighting Strategy & Tactics
New Residential Construction and Operational Considerations
Tactical Renaissance: Combat Fire Engagement and the New Fire Ground
The Anatomy of Buildingsonfire; LODD Case Studies and Near Miss Lessons Learned
Building Construction and Operational Safety in Buildings of Ordinary Construction
Building Construction and Tactical Safety in Commercial Buildings
Keynotes ,Lectures, Special Presentations & Programs Available
Other Building Construction , Command, Tactic, Fire Fighter Safety and Operations programs available
Download the Program Announcement for Building Construction for the Fire Service Training Programs HERE
Keynote and General Session Programs that will be available for 2012 include;
Keynote Topics:
The New Adaptive Fire Ground in 2012
Tactical Patience
Buildingsonfire 2012
What’s on YOUR Radar Screen?
Achieving Operational Excellence and Safety
Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment
The Evolving Fireground: Are You Ready for the Changes?
Command Resiliency for Operational Excellence
Tactical Renaissance and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement
Upcoming:
Check out the program presentations we’ll be making at the Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference ( Missouri) and at the Liberty Regional Fire & Leadership Training Conference (PA) this fall.
Take the time to check out the new Training Program Offerings from Go>Forward Training’s Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference, HERE and the Liberty Regional Fire & Leadership Training Conference HERE
Published reports are being stating that the least senior of three construction officials in the Deutsche Bank manslaughter trial was acquitted of all charges today — after telling jurors that he had no idea the giant pipe he helped remove from the basement had anything to do with providing water to firefighters.
A construction foreman charged with the deaths of two firefighters in the Deutsche Bank building blaze was acquitted of all charges. Salvatore DePaola was cleared by a Manhattan jury of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide on the eighth day of deliberations.
According to reports published in a number of NYC newspapers; “It’s a happy day and a sad day,” said DePaola. “We’ve still got two firefighters that are deceased.” Firefighters Robert Beddia, 33, and Joe Graffagnino, 53 perished after they raced into the burning Ground Zero tower in 2007.
Prosecutors argued that DePaola, who works for the John Galt Corporation, and two of his colleagues should have known a key firefighting pipe had been cut. Salvatore DePaola, 56, of Staten Island, broke into tears as he was found not guilty of manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges in the August, 2007, smoke inhalation deaths of firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino.
“I had no idea it was a standpipe,” DePaola insisted of the primary physical evidence in the case — a 42-foot section of pipe that all three defendants were accused of intentionally disregarding and discarding after it crashed to the ground from the basement ceiling nine months before the fire.
The jury is still deliberating in the case of DePaola’s colleague, site safety manager Jeffrey Melofchik.
AP Photo Deutsche Bank office building Fire in New York
Jurors have yet to reach a verdict on identical manslaughter and endangerment charges against their remaining defendant, Jeffrey Melofchik, 48, who worked as site safety manager for the demolition’s general contractor, Bovis Lend Lease. They will continue their deliberations tomorrow.
A third defendant, project asbestos abatement director, Mitchel Alvo, 58, has opted for a non-jury verdict; Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Rena Uviller has not said when she will render that decision.
As to who he thought should have been prosecuted in the defendants’ stead, De Paola — whose own son is a firefighter at Engine 160 in Staten Island — made a reference to “lieutenants” with the FDNY before his lawyer advised him to remain silent on that issue, given that deliberations are continuing.
Today was the seventh full day of deliberations in the three-month-long trial.
An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of the PPT programon Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites
Preparing for the Mayday Event; Not a matter of IF, But a Question of When… Are you ready? Are you Prepared?
As the official Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011 begins to wind down, in many stations around the country this weekend is dedicated to training, drills and evolutions dedicated toward the many facets and functional elements that focus upon Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.
The Safety Planning and Resource Aid and Guide published by the IAFC and IAFF (HERE) and the direct link here 2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries provided resources and planning templates and suggested training and activities to support the focus and emphasis on fire ground survival, increased focus on firefighter operations and mayday elements crucial to company integrity, firefighter safety and operational excellence.
Being ready for a mayday (mentally and physically), self-rescue and self-survival training and methodologies are mission critical when engaging in structural firefighting operations. Proficiencies, capabilities, rigor, demeanor and performance must be orchestrated in a manner that requires optimum execution of required actions and engagements to enable a successful outcome to a reported single or multiple mayday calls.
On a crisp fall day in October, 2009 two fires, both in residential occupancies but over 350 miles apart had similar operational needs, deployment and fire suppression and rescue engagement consistent with modern firefighting practices, methodologies and expectations.
In one, three firefighters become trapped, resulting in a mayday, bailout and resulting LODD of a 16 year fire service veteran. City of Yonkers (NY) Firefighter Patrick Joyce died during the operations at a 3-Alarm fire in a three story residential occupancy while conducting search and rescue operations for reported trapped civilians. Incident overviews; HERE and HERE .
The other structure fire in a residential occupancy in Syracuse, NY, results in a fire fighter mayday and successful RIT extraction that is captured on video. Two structure fires with common elements, each with projected predictable outcomes based upon past fire department operational experiences at similar structures, occupancies and fire conditions and reports; however with two different outcomes.
The program information from The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)which forms a major component of thsis year’s Safety Weeks activities with the focus on comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention programming incorporating incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, with the FGS program objectives aimed to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
Here’s a recap of the Self-Survial Procedure insights from the FGS Chapter 3 Section;
Self-Survival Procedures
FGS Online Program Chapter 3
To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:
First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall.
The following video clip depicting FDNY Rescue Co. 1 operations at a Mayday, and provides some insightful and subtle commentary that should put some things in proper perspective about the job its hazards and the unexpected that can occur in the blink of an eye.
Another exceptional training piece that we are providing again here on CommandSafety.com are the two part video clips provided by TheBravestOnline.com that covers the mayday distress cakk an subsequent RIT extraction of HFD Captain Joel Eric Abbt at a four alarm fire with civilian fatalities in a six story high rise office building on March 28, 2007.
This video along with the information obtained from the FGS program can provide substantial opportunites for training, discussions and dialog. Take the time to watch the HFD vdeo and the elapsed time, communications and actions deployed. This mayday event had a successful outcome due to a variety of factors.
The question is how prepared are you, your firefighters, the officers and commanders? Surviving the fire ground requires a wide variety of skills, knowledge , training and experience.
Training is the foundation from which proficiencies are developed. If your organization has invested in supporting this weeks activities, don’t stop here. There are additional day ahead to take teh momentum gathered from this week and use it to chart a new course of actions and committments for the weeks and months ahead. If you didn’t have the opportunity to engage or involve, its not a missed opportuity- just find the right time and place to have your own safety day of week.
Houston FD Mayday Part 1
Houston FD Mayday Part 2
Other Training and Drill Opportunties
Suggested Considerations include the follow, as well as encouraging Departments to identify and integrate local issues, needs and identified gaps or enhancements that can contribute towards operational excellence and safety integration
Review and Select a Near Miss Event Report from the National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System or the Report of the Week (ROTW) series related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
Review and Select a NIOSH LODD Report from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/
Take out your Rapid Intervention Equipment and review the purpose and function of each piece of equipment. Identify and discuss alternative uses or tools that can be obtained or used in the event of unavailability, malfunction or additional resource needs. Discuss protocols, procedures, safety awareness and operational hazards, expectations and precautions. Inspection the equipment for operability and integrity.
Identify and select a recent departmental or local/regional incident event that was either a near-miss/close-call or transitioned into a mayday event. Discuss and facilitate dialog on lessons learned, gaps, enhancements or operational successes, achievements and positive elements. Identify any factors or elements that were presented in the FGS training series that are applicable to the event, strategies, tactics or operations: can anything be improved or enhanced?
Lead a discussion on how to call and initiate a Mayday. Discuss the factors and insights from FGS Program Chapter 3 Self-Survival Procedures and Chapter 4 Self-Survival Skills.
Select and lead a discussion on a pertinent incident case study from either the list provided or your own selection and discuss the relevancy of the event in terms of mayday operations, fire ground survival, incident outcome and relationship to your Department or agency. What is the relevancy, similarities or differences? Can this event or circumstances occur in your jurisdiction? What can be done to prevent a history repeating event (HRE)?
Review and discuss Roles and Responsibilities for mayday events and operations. How do they match up with your operating procedures, policies and expectations?
Develop and facilitate a table top exercise (TTE) on a mayday event scenario utilizing a building in your first-due or response jurisdiction. Take photographs and integrate into your program. Refer to example of a simple TTE attached or go to Fire Fighternation.com for an example here; http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an
Visit a residential or commercial construction site (with pre-arrival authorization and approvals) and tour the stage of construction, looking critically at the type of construction and structural systems being implemented, materials used, workmanship and signs of deficient or adverse conditions that may affect operational integrity, safety or collapse and compromise once the building is occupied. Discuss issues such as structural integrity, collapse risk, occupancy risk versus occupancy type considerations, avenues for fire travel, effects on fire load package and rate of heat release and projected fire intensity. How would you fire a fire in the occupancy? What will define the strategy and tactics that would be or should be selected and used?
In a controlled setting with or without PPE, Practice calling a mayday with the identified communication attributes defined in the FGS training program. Critique and practice the evolution until the group feels that it is acceptable.
Here are some additional Resource Links to Support your training and drill needs;
Selected References
IAFC: The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety, HERE and HERE
NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE
Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors
Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
Report HERE
NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience
The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE
NIOSH LODD REPORT: Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire – Virginia, HERE
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
Analytical Study Reveals Patterns in U.S Firefighter Fatalities Report
The entire report is available at a nominal fee, HERE;
Journal Reference:
For a detailed summary of the Sofa Super Store study, its findings and recommendations, and links to supporting materials such as graphics and video segments from computer simulations of the fire, go to “NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements” at www.nist.gov/el/fire_research/charleston_102810.cfm.
Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith, David M. DeJoy. Line-of-duty deaths among U.S. firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2011; 43 (3): 1171 DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2010.12.030
University of Georgia (2011, April 14). Comprehensive study reveals patterns in firefighter fatalities. ScienceDaily. Retrieved April 16, 2011, from http://www.sciencedaily.com /releases/2011/04/110412171208.htm
Other Report Links of Interest
Reducing Firefighter Deaths and Injuries: Changes in Concept, Policy, and Practice Contributing Factors in Firefighter Line-of-Duty Deaths in the United States. HERE
This Training Schedule Template utilizes a Three Hour, Thirty minute (3.5) Hour Format integrating Suggested basic Functional Area Topics as a lead-in introduction that can be interchanged based on local needs and incorporates two (2) primary modules of the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS). Please note you can select any modules determined to be of local need or interests. An optional Weekend Session is attached for FGS Chapter 3 and 4 Module Deliveries and a Hands-on Field Exercise Component.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum. On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com. A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production. Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.
