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The Bowstring Truss

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The Bow String Truss

The Bowstring Truss:
There’s a tremendous lack of understanding in the American Fire Service as to what accurately defines and comprises a Heavy Timber Bowstring Truss and the Operational and Safety Precautions that must be recognized, implemented and trained on, in order to achieve and maintain operational excellence, company integrity and firefighter safety on the fireground.

All bowstring trusses are not created equal and do not share the same characteristics when found in a building and occupancy.

They may have the same shape, but shape alone does not define the bowstring truss.
Based on the type, design, construction, materials, age, span, spacing, configuration, occupancy and application there are vast differences AND similarities.

There are significant differences in terminology when referring to them and tactics that should be employed on the fireground- and yes there are prominent differences between east coast and west coast types and tactics.

The Bowstring Truss- They are not All the Same

Do you know what they are?

I’m working on an article series for a major fire service publication with on-line accompaniments that will provide uniformity and clarity on the subject and the much needed continuity so were’ talking the same language.For the mean time let me offer the following terms that some of you may be familiar with – in your world. Here are some Bowstring Type Truss terms:

  • The Heavy Timber Bowstring Truss,
  • Arch-Rib Bowstring Truss,
  • Laminate Cord Bowstring Truss,
  • Lattice Bowstring Truss,
  • Easybow Truss,
  • Mack Truss,
  • Summerbell Bowstring Truss,
  • Mono-chord Bowstring Truss
  • Duo-Chord Bowstring Truss,
  • Segmental Multi-Cord Bowstring Truss,
  • Tension Rod Bowstring Truss,
  • Bowstring Arch Truss,
  • Bowstring K-Truss,
  • Split-Ring Bowstring Truss…..to name a few.

We’ll be posting lots more on this on CommandSafety.com as well as expanded coverage on Buildingsonfire.com …. Stay Tuned

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Identifying, Establishing and Managing Collapse Zones

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Vacant Structure Fire-Three Alarm, Type III Construction

Identifying, Establishing and Managing Collapse Zones

I mentioned in a recent post about on-going research and recommendations being developed for a significant report.

A notable issue that seems to resonate and surface on a reoccurring bais is the identification, establishment and management of collapse zones.
Building type, construction systems and materials, initiating, apparent or contributIng factors have an influence on collapse zone management (CZM).
Perimeter wall compromise and collapse of Type III and IV buildings continue to represent the leading types of collapse that contribute to significant firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.
 
The ability to Read the Building, identify obvious and subtle features, conditions and indicators leading to collapse or compromise or the management and control of post collapse conditions is imperative.
 
Another critical operational factor is managing collapse zones and restricting access with consideration for degraded building conditions and the potential for multiple secondary collapse.
  • Are you up to speed with criteria for recognizing pre and post collapse indicators?
  • Do you have SOP/SOGs for collapse OPS?
 Collapse Zones
At a minimum:
Establish and maintain at a minimim a perimeter Collapse Management Zone (CMZ) of 1.5 x the building height.

Based on building type, height, materials of construction and type of projected collapse type – the potential for materials to travel beyond the CMZ is probable and should be assessed.

Safety Officers MUST maintain control to restrict access and to ensure companies are aware of potential for secondary collapse of compromised building features, assemblies or materials.

Maintain an acute high level of Situational Awareness, know your surroundings and don’t get tunnel vision on your task assignment.

Managing Collapse Zones

Great footage from Birmingham, AL at a three-alarm fire in a vacant building at 1811 1st Avene North with the peel away collapse of the upper wall on the Delta Division. Screenshot of collapse below with video link…

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Ready, Set, Go…

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Ready, Set, Go…

Before Making Entry, while in the street;

  • Has someone completed or assigned reconned a 360 of the building?
  • Have you looked at the Building and its Profile?
  • Made a Rapid Risk Assessment?
  • Assessed the Building’s Anatomy?
  • Considered the Compartment?
  • Considered the Fire Dynamics?
  • Assessed the Predictability of Performance?
  • Scanned for Situational Awareness?
  • Considered the MELT? (Most Error Likely Tactic)
  • Looked your partner in the Eye- and knew what needed to be done..
  • …and are Combat Ready to Deploy?

…Forty-five seconds to observe, process and implement

 

 

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A Delicate Balance

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A Delicate Balance

 

Light Weight construction has given way to Engineered Structural Systems (ESS) which in today’s evolving fireground, have an even more extensive array of performance, operational and integrity issues that affect a building’s performance under fire conditions.To unequivocally state that nothing has changed in buildings, occupancies, fire flow delivery rates and demands for increased proficiencies of our firefighters, company and command officers is absurd, ignorant and dangerous.

“It’s a lot more than just Stretching the Line…and going in….”

 
Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety…so we can do our job—and that’s firefighting .Another classic illustration by Paul Combs.

Another classic illustration by Paul Combs

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Adaptive Fireground Strategies for Today’s Occupancies at FDIC

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If you’re planning on heading to the Fire Department Instructors Conference, FDIC in Indianapolis please consider making time to attend our classroom session. We’ll make sure we have a seat waiting for you. There’s a tremendous selection of offerings, check out the program listings HERE.  If you’re not able to make the class, make sure you contact me if you’d like to chat, I’ll be there the entire week and would love to talk shop and share insights. Take a look at the FDIC site HERE for a complete listing of programs, offerings and activities. It’s an incredible experience and a must for all levels of experience and organizational affiliation. 

Check out all the Classroom Sessions, Pre-Conference Workshops and Hands-On Training Classes and Register Today!

It’s where Leaders come to Train.

Adaptive Fireground Strategies for Today’s Occupancies

Adaptive Fireground Strategies for Today’s Occupancies

Combat fire suppression and field operations are being impacted on a variety of levels with demands for increasing adaptability, expanding risk management, and modified tactical protocols. The focus in on the five fundamental core relationships of building construction, risk management, firefighter behaviors, incident operations, and situational safety. Firefighters, officers, and commanders will benefit from the latest insights into emerging fireground tactical theory for effective combat operations, operational excellence, and firefighter safety offered in this session.  

  •  Wabash West Room 120-122
  • Thursday, April 25, 2013, 1:30 PM-3:15 PM

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Mayday and Rapid Intervention Realities: The Phoenix Perspective

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On March 14, 2001 the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department lost firefighter Brett Tarver at the Southwest Supermarket fire.

Remembering Brett Tarver and the Lessons Learned

In that event, it was 5:00 in the afternoon, the grocery store was full of people and fire was extending through the building. Phoenix E14 was assigned to the interior of the structure to complete the search, get any people out, and attempt to confine the rapidly spreading fire to the rear of the structure.

Shortly after completing their primary search of the building the Captain decided it was time to get out. Tarver and the other members of Engine 14 were exiting the building when Tarver and his partner got lost.

Here’s a link to a previous post on Buildingsonfire.com that provides insights and report links that are as pertainent today, as they were in 2001.

Take the time to read the Phoenix Report as well as the NIOSH Report.

Firefighter Fatality Report – Southwest Supermarket, Phoenix, AZ
PFD full report on the LODD of Firefighter Brett Tarver. Report contains extensive analysis of fire ground operations, may-day and lessons learned.

Firefighter Brett Tarver, PFD

References and Supplemental Resources; 

 
The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens. 

For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

The program provides participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics include:

  • Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
  • Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
  • Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
  • Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
  • Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.
SOPs/SOGsRules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting (pdf)

Risk Management

General Order: Two-In, Two-Out Compliance, Rapid Intervention Team, and Firefighter Survival

Emergency Evacuation
This policy identifies a standard system for the emergency evacuation of personnel at an emergency incident or training exercise.

Fire and Rescue Departments of Northern Virginia – Rapid Intervention Team Command and Operational Procedures
A collaborative RIT manual developed by fire and rescue departments in Northern Virginia. Promotes interoperability between multiple fire agencies.

Lost or Trapped Firefighters
This policy identifies the required actions for the search and rescue of lost or trapped firefighter(s).

Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a Biological Threat
Local and world events have placed the nation’s emergency service at the forefront of homeland defense. The service must be aware that terrorists, both foreign and domestic, are continually testing the homeland defense system.

Safety – Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).

Safety – Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)
This policy establishes the department’s criteria and procedures for Rapid Intervention Teams.

Accident Reports

Firefighter Fatality Report – Southwest Supermarket, Phoenix, AZ
PFD full report on the LODD of Firefighter Brett Tarver. Report contains extensive analysis of fire ground operations, may-day and lessons learned.

NFPA Fire Investigation Report of 1995 Pittsburgh Fire
This report describes the investigation of a fire which killed three firefighters in 1995.

NIOSH LOD Report
This report recounts a residential basement fire that claimed the life of a career lieutenant in Pennsylvania.

Training & Drill Topics

Technical Rescue resources

Analysis of Structural Firefighter Fatality Database (pdf)

Hazelton Firefighter caught in Flashover
PowerPoint presentation

Firefighter Survival Training

Rapid Intervention Crew Standard Operating Guidelines
Provided by the Town of Menasha Fire Department

Standardized Actions of a Lost/Disoriented Firefighter

Understanding Fireground LODDS
A fresh perspective on an old problem.

General Resources

Observing Firefighter Performance (pdf)

Emergency Radio Protocol

50 Ways to Save Your Brother (or Sister)
Provided by the South Milwaukee Fire Department.

Fire Chief Magazine article – “No more maydays”
Disorientation Prevention Article

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
This web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other firefighter safety resources.

The Incident Commander’s Response to a “May-Day” Lost Firefighter Incident
A check list of items to consider when handling a may-day incident, provided by Chief Gary Morris, Scottsdale, AZ.

U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study (1979-2001)
This study was conducted in an effort to stop firefighter fatalities caused by smoke inhalation, burns, and traumatic injuries attributable to disorientation. It focused on 17 incidents occurring between 1979 and 2001 in which disorientation played a major part in 23 firefighter fatalities.

USFA – Firefighter Fatality Retrospective Study (1990-2000)
This report identifies trends in mortality and examines relationships among data elements on firefighter fatalites between 1990-2000.

2004 PA Church Fire and Collapse: Situational Awareness and Collapse Zone Management

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Remembrance:Pittsburgh(PA) Bureau of Fire- Post Fire Collapse and Double LODD

NIOSH Report F2004-17:  Career battalion chief and career master fire fighter die and twenty-nine career fire fighters are injured during a five alarm church fire -Pennsylvania.

On March 13, 2004, a 55-year-old male career Battalion Chief (Victim #1) and a 51-year-old male career master fire fighter (Victim #2) were fatally injured during a structural collapse at a church fire. Victim #1 was acting as the Incident Safety Officer and Victim #2 was performing overhaul, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. Twenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were pronounced dead at the scene.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should

  • ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations
  • establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations
  • ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone
  • train fire fighters to recognize conditions that forewarn of a backdraft
  • ensure consistent use of personal alert safety system (PASS) devices during overhaul operations
  • ensure that pre-incident planning is performed on structures containing unique features such as bell towers
  • ensure that Incident Commanders conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing fire fighters to an interior operation, and continue to assess risk-versus-gain throughout the operation including overhaul
  • develop standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to assign additional safety officers during complex incidents
  • provide interior attack crews with thermal imaging cameras

Additionally,

  • municipalities should enforce current building codes to improve the safety of occupants and fire fighters

NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200417.html

Pittsburgh Bureau of Fire: HERE

Pre-Collapse Photo

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations.

Discussion: Due to the destructive powers of fire, most structures that have been involved in fires are structurally weakened. In this incident, the structural integrity of the bell tower was weakened by a fire of several hours duration, the addition of thousands of gallons of water, and possibly the destructive effect of the backdraft. Analysis of the exterior of the structure should be performed continuously while conducting interior operations. Similarly, before overhaul operations are begun, the structure should be determined safe to work in by the IC and a designated Safety Officer. If necessary, the IC should seek the help of qualified structural experts or other competent persons to assess the need for the removal of dangerously weakened construction, or should make provisions for shoring up load-bearing walls, floors, ceilings, roofs, or as in this case, the bell tower.

Recommendation #2: Fire departments should establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations.

Discussion: During fire operations, two rules exist about structural collapse: (1) the potential for structural failure always exists during and after a fire, and (2) a collapse danger zone must be established. A defensive attack was declared within an hour after fire suppression activities began. Part of a defensive strategy is establishing and moving fire fighters outside of the collapse zone.

 A collapse zone is an area around and away from a structure in which debris might land if a structure fails. Immediate safety precautions must be taken if factors indicate the potential for a building collapse. All persons operating inside the structure must be evacuated immediately and a collapse zone should be established around the perimeter. The collapse zone area should be equal to the height of the building plus an additional allowance for debris scatter and at a minimum should be equal to 1½ times the height of the building. For example, since the bell tower was 115 feet high, the collapse zone boundary should be established at least 173 feet away from the church. Once a collapse zone has been established, the area should be clearly marked and monitored, to make certain that no fire fighters enter the danger zone.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone.

In this incident, command suffered a serious lapse after the Incident Commander and several company officers were injured in the collapse. The command post from which the IC manages the fireground must be located in an area outside of the collapse zone. The IC must ensure that the command post is protected from danger so that an effective command structure is maintained throughout the incident.1, 5

Remembering the Strand Theater Fire of 1941

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The Strand Theater | Brockton, MA

March 10, 1941: The Strand Theater Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Brockton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapsed, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters.

Check out the comprehensive past post from CommandSafety.com from 2011

http://commandsafety.com/2011/03/the-strand-theatre-fire-brockton-ma-march-10-1941-13-firefighter-lodd/