June 17, 2001

Remembering  FDNY Father’s Day Fire-June 17, 2001

The relative calm of a quiet Sunday, Father’s Day, June 17th , 2001 was broken at 14:19 hours with a phone call to the FDNY Queens Central Office reporting a fire at 12-22 Astoria Blvd, in the Astoria Section of Queens, New York. For almost 80 years, the Long Island General Supply store has been a fixture in the Long Island City section of Queens serving local contractors and residents with all of their hardware needs. Unfortunately, that included propane tanks and other flammable liquids.

Two structures were involved in this incident. Both buildings were interconnected on the first floors as well as the cellars.

• Both structures were built prior to 1930 of ordinary (Type III) construction, and were two stories in height, each with a full cellar.

• Building 1 measured 2035 square feet and was triangular in shape. • Building 2 measured 1102 square feet and was rectangular in shape.

• Building 1 and Building 2 shared a common or party wall and were interconnected on the first floor and the cellar.

Building to building access in the cellar was through a fire door.

The fire door was blocked open to allow free movement between the cellars which were used for storage.

The hardware stored occupied the first floor and cellars of both buildings. Building 1 had two apartments on the second floor.

Building 2 had an office and storage space on the second floor. Note: A third uninvolved building was attached to the west side of Building 2.

The flat roof system sheathing consisted of 5/8-inch plywood covered by felt paper and rubber roof membrane. The foundation was constructed out of stone and mortar. The support system was a combination of steel masonry posts/lolly columns and wooden support beams.

FDNY Units arrived within 5 minutes of the dispatch and gave the signal for a working fire. Fire fighters were making good progress but at 14:48 hours something went terribly wrong. Witnesses on the scene report hearing a small explosion followed by a huge blast. The shock wave from the blast blew d own every fire fighter on the street and knocked down the exposure 1 wall onto the sidewalk, right on top of fire fighters venting the building.

As members started sifting through the rubble, the chief ordered a second alarm followed almost immediately by a fourth alarm when a radio transmission was received from FF Brian Fahey from Rescue 4. He was in the basement under tons of collapsed material.

“I’m trapped in the basement by the stairs. Come get me.” This was a battle cry to everyone on the scene. Every capable member frantically began removing debris to try and get to Brian and the others. The chief ordered more help. Numerous special calls were made.

There were 144 pieces of apparatus at the scene: 46 engines, 33 ladders, 16 battalion chiefs, 2 deputy chiefs, all 5 rescues, 7 squads, and many more. In fact, with the exception of the fire boats, the JFK hose wagon, the Decon unit, and the thawing units, every type of special unit was at the scene.

Even with the vast resources of the Department, the task took several hours. The members that were on the sidewalk were quickly recovered. • Fire fighters Harry Ford (R4) and John Downing (L163) were removed in traumatic arrest and brought to Elmhurst Hospital were they succumbed from their injuries. • Back at the scene members still were trying to get to Brian while others were trying to put out the smoky fire. The battle went through the afternoon and into the evening. • The fire was being fueled by some of the flammables in the building. • After about four hours they finally reached the basement, but again, it was too late. FDNY Firefighter Brian died in the Line-of-duty.

Subsequent investigations revealed that two local kids were in the rear yard of the building when unbeknownst to them they knocked over a can of gasoline. The gasoline ran under the rear door, into the basement eventually finding an ignition source in the form of the water heater.

When the water heater kicked in, it ignited the gasoline. As fire fighters began working in the building the fire caused the explosion of a large propane tank illegally stored in the basement. The resulting blast leveled the building and caused what will be forever known as the worst Father’s Day in FDNY’s history. (Excerpt of the event description published in www.fdnewyork.com).

The supreme sacrifice was made that day by;

• FDNY Firefighter Harry S. Ford, Rescue Co.4

• FDNY Firefighter Brain D. Fahey, Rescue Co. 4

• FDNY Firefighter John Downing, Ladder Co. 163

Take the time to read the NIOSH Report, and learn the lessons from that event

References

• NIOSH Report F2001-23, HERE
• FD NEWYORK, HERE
•  Steve Spak, Photos, HERE
• The Late, FDNY Firefighter Andy Fredrick’s Account, HERE
• Online Service Accounts and Coverage, HERE

The building was constructed in 1927 and consisted of 5456 square feet of space with 3-5 apartment units. Built of masonry wall construction with a wood floor joist system, the fire was reported at 8:43 a.m., in the Type III classified occupancy.

Street View Pre-Fire

The fire began as a basement fire that travelled up two floors, eventually compromising an upper stairway which resulted in compromise and collapsed injuring four Chicago firefighters.

The inherent characteristics of the building and the manner of fire travel and impingement are apparent contributors to the event.

Aerial- Alpha; Goggle Maps

CFD Fireground Operations: Photo Tim Olk

The four firefighters sustained injures during operations when the internal stairwell connecting the second and third floors gave way.

The mayday was transmitted, and a  211 Plan 1 at approximately 09:00 hrs., seventeen minutes into the operation according to published reports issued by Deputy District Chief Lynda Turner.  Following the mayday and firefighter removals, defensive operations were initiated.

Two of the firefighters sustained smoke inhalation and two firefighters minor injuries, according to Fire Department officials.

Published report indicate that more than 60 firefighters operated at the scene to control the fire.

It was reported that  Fire Chief Phillip Welch stated firefighters started fighting the fires inside the building after the transformer explosion occurred, but it quickly got out of control.“There was an aggressive attack inside, but just because of the storage fight, we were not able to overcome that nor was the sprinkler system,” Welch said.

Aerial View, BING Map Capture

•  http://triad.news14.com/content/local_news/692892/firefighters-continue-to-fight-wix-filters-storage-facility-fire-in-gastonia
• http://www.wsoctv.com/news/news/local/fire-crews-battle-blaze-gastonia-warehouse-saturda/nXLYB/
• http://www.gastongazette.com/firefighters-battle-huge-warehouse-blaze-1.126325

Considerations and Thoughts

• How prepared is your department for a large scale fire in a large footprint warehouse?
• Have you completed pre-fire plans, walk through tours and table top exercises for the key at risk buildings or complexes?
• Do you know what the sustained water flow requirements might be for a heavily or fully involved complex or building?
• Practices and honed your skills on establishing and managing  a complex, multi-operatonal period incident?
• Have you looked at creating box alarms or pre-arranged greater alarm response and resource requests?
• Have you trained with the departments, jurisdictions and companies that might respond?
• Do you have strategies and tactics identified and have you trained on them for operations in large scale buildings?  Don’t implment and treat the incident like you would a residential or small commercial fire….
• Respect the building and predict with conservative decision-making
• Manage and expect compromise and collapse, rapid fire extention and operational challenges to fixed suppression systems and protectivies
• Don’t over extend companies while attmtping to operate in the interior: These are typcially closed building ( lack of immedate exiting capabilties) with a special need for air management and accountability and access control.

Viewer-submitted video of Gastonia warehouse fire

Lucas Jackson / Reuters/REUTERS

FDNY Bronx 66-33-2224 Third Alarm at 225 E 149th Street;

A three-alarm blaze tore through a South Bronx building on Saturday morning — leaving at least 37  people, including a child, hurt, according to published reports. The fire started on the fifth floor of the 27-story E. 149th St. building near Park Ave. about o7:40 a.m. More than 135 firefighters were operating. News media is reporting taht the fire was under control in a two hour time span.  Fire officials say 37 people suffered injuries as a result of a three-alarm fire Saturday morning at a 27-story building in the Bronx.

From NYC Fire Wire on Facebook

There are almost 500 apartments in the building, along with more than 20 stores. Video Clip and FDNY Interview HERE

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Aerial of Complex, BING Maps

Google Street Maps Image Capure

Links:

•  NY1.com Video: http://www.ny1.com/content/top_stories/180393/three-alarm-fire-in-bronx-building-injures-37–fdny-says
• http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/south-bronx-fire-injures-16-including-child-article-1.1315732
• http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/bronx/firefighters_battling_bronx_blaze_ug68PLaU6h5neUQd1AQCnJ
• http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/bronx/firefighters_battling_bronx_blaze_ug68PLaU6h5neUQd1AQCnJ
• http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/04/13/at-least-10-injured-in-bronx-high-rise-fire/
• http://adf.ly/1436612/banner/http://retroskinz.blogspot.com/2013/04/cbs-new-york-news-at-least-10-injured.html

Today’s evolving fireground demands greater adaptive insights and management with an amplified understanding of buildings, occupancy risk profiling (ORP) and building anatomy by all operating companies on the fireground; demanding greater skill sets and knowledge of building construction, architecture, engineering, fire dynamics and fire suppression methodologies.

The equation for success rests directly on Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Don’t be complacent based on alarm type, building or occupancy type…expect fire, be prepared and understand the predictability of building performance. It should not be a surprise upon arrival of the first-due.

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Some Training Aide Links from past Ten Minutes in the Streets

• Ten Minutes in the Street; Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due, HERE
• Ten Minutes in the Street; “But it’s only a Garage..!”, HERE
• Ten Minutes in the Street: “I Hear Ya Knockin’, But Nobody’s Home”
• http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-i?q=forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-i
• http://commandsafety.com/2010/11/ten-minutes-in-the-street-%e2%80%9ca-little-smoke-showin/
• Box 2752..Reported Fire in an Occupied Apartment Above Sammy’s Liquors
• http://my.firefighternation.com/group/buildingconstructionfirefightersafety/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an-1
• The First-Due: Well Involved http://thecompanyofficer.com/2011/08/25/ten-minutes-in-the-street-the-first-due/
• Ten Minutes in the Street: “Three For One”
• http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-449?q=forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-449
• http://commandsafety.com/2011/08/tabletop-training-for-the-weekend-rubbish-fire/
• Ten Minutes in the Street: On-scene, with Engine 21, Second Alarm…
• http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-13
• Ten Minutes in the Street: “Dispatch to Chief..You’ve got Two Working Fires…”
• http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-14
• http://thecompanyofficer.com/2011/08/13/ten-minutes-in-the-street-report-of-smoke-in-the-area/
• Strip Stores: http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-5
• Ten Minutes in the Street: The Triple Decker with Fire in the Attic: http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-the-2?q=forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-the-2
• Laundry: http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/first-due-arriving-with-a
• Ten Minutes in the Street: Read “through” the Smoke, HERE
• Ten Minutes in the Street; Pipin’ Hot First Due..30 Minutes or Less, HERE
• Ten Minutes in the Street; “Here’s lookin’ at You”, HERE
• Ten Minutes in the Street: Fire on the Number Two Floor-Doubtful
• http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-fire
• Townhouse: http://my.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/ten-minutes-in-the-street-fire-1
• Ten Minutes in the Street: Report of Smoke in the Area
• Ten Minutes in the Street: Buildings Under Construction; FIRE
•  Ten Minutes in the Street Scenario: On-scene, with Engine Company 13…..
• Ten Minutes in the Street: The Triple Decker with Fire in the Attic
• Ten Minutes in the Street: Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due

The 701 University Ave Fire- 1978

Fire in Syracuse: Four firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978

April 9^th marks the 35^th anniversary of the 701 University Ave. fire that claimed the lives of four Syracuse (NY) firefighters in 1978 while conducting search & rescue and suppression operations at an apartment building on the Syracuse University Campus, in Syracuse, New York.  

The fire began when one of the tenants lit a candle in a styrofoam wig stand and left it unattended. At 00:46 hours on Sunday April 9, 1978, an alarm of fire was transmitted for a reported building fire at 701 University Avenue on the campus of Syracuse University.

The Victorian style house was a three story building constructed of wood balloon framing and was built circa 1898. The house had been converted into ten (10) apartments that were occupied by SU students. The gross area of each of the three floors was approx. 1,750 sq. ft., with a predominate rectangular footprint shape measuring 69 ft. x 35 ft.  The third floor apartments only had access via a stairway in the rear, down a long narrow corridor that measured only 33 inches wide.

Post Fire View of Building from Bravo Side. Photo CJ Naum, 1978

The building had inherent vertical and horizontal concealed spaces indicative of balloon frame style construction along with additional concealed spaces in the third floor ceiling area. A partial automatic sprinkler system had been installed in the building in order to comply with a 1952 State of New York law. This system provided protection to the basement, means of egress, a storage area and a portion of the concealed space above the third floor.

The fire originated in a second floor apartment, and then spread into the combustible concealed space above the third floor ceiling. Approximately sixteen minutes into fireground operations the first indications of firefighting personnel being in distress were received.  The first call to the Alarm center was made at 0045:17 hrs., with the first-due engine arriving at 0048:05 and first water applied at 0051 (est).

The four SFD fire fighters, Frank Porpiglio Jr., Stanley Duda, Michael Petragnani, and Robert Schuler, who were assigned to the Squad and Rescue Companies, entered the house to conduct a primary search of the premises for SU students thought to be trapped in the house.

While operating on the third floor inside, a scalding steam caused by triggered sprinklers prevented the four firefighters from escaping, and they eventually depleted their air supply and suffocated to death. The firefighters were operating with full PPE that was complaint at that time ( 1978) and were utilizing state-of-the art SCBA in the form of the new 4.5 SCBA systems.   All the tenants had escaped safely before the fire fighters had entered the house. The fire was subsequently investigated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) at the request of the City of Syracuse and NFPA Report No. LS-3 was published.  

Syracuse Post Standard Front Page April 10, 1978

Killed in the Line of Duty on April 9^th, 1978:

Syracuse (NY) Fire Department

• FF Michael Petragnani, Age 27.   ~  Rescue Company – appointed 8/20/1973
• FF Frank Porpiglio Jr., Age 24.   ~  Squad Company – appointed 8/20/1973
• FF Robert Shuler, Age 31.  ~  Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973
• FF Stanley Duda, Age 34.   ~  Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973 

Remembrance, Honor, Courage and Sacrifice

Never Forgotten

Post Fire View, East Adams Street and University Ave. Photo: CJ Naum, 1978

Martin J. Whitman School of Management stands today at the corner, Photo CJ Naum, 2013

Memorial Plaque placed in 2005 in the Martin J. Whitman School of Management located on the site of 1978 fire. Photo: CJ NAum, 2013

Remembrance 1978-2013 SFD Rescue ~ Squad

Remembering the Sacrafice: Capt. Broxterman and FF Schira

On Friday, April 4, 2008 at 06:13:02 hours, what began as a routine response for Colerain Township Fire and EMS Engine 102 to investigate a fire alarm activation at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane, Colerain Township, Ohio resulted in the deaths of Colerain Township Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira.

Upon their arrival at the scene of the two-story wood framed, residential building working fire conditions existed in the basement. The initial attack team consisted of Broxterman, Schira, and one other firefighter. The team advanced a 1¾-inch attack hose line through the interior of the building for fire control.

Even though, they were provided with some of the most technologically advanced protective clothing for structural firefighting and self-contained breathing apparatus, it appeared that Broxterman and Schira were overwhelmed by severe fire conditions in the basement. 

During their attempt to evacuate the building, the main-level family room flooring system in which the two were traveling on collapsed into the basement trapping the firefighters. Eleven minutes elapsed from time of arrival to the catastrophic chain of events.

This is one of those distinctive reports that has influential and critical operational, training and preparedness elements embedded throughout the report. 

It’s apparent there continues to be common threads shared by this event from 2008 and other events and incidents in the past five years where a single of multiple firefighters have lost their lives due to similarities in the apparent and common cause deficiencies and short comings identified.

All company and command officers should read and comprehend the lessons learned. Then, take these new found insights and see what the gaps are at the personal level (yours or those you supervise) as well as the shift, group, station, battalion, division or department as a whole.

If there are gaps, then identify a way to implement timely changes as necessary so there are No History Repeating (HRE) events.

The importance of Reading the Building, taking the time to complete the three sixty and being combat ready and “expecting fire”.

Remember their sacrifice, so we can learn.

• Past Post on CommandSafety.com with Report Narrative and Incident Details HERE

The following factors were believed to have directly contributed to the deaths of Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira:

• A delayed arrival at the incident scene that allowed the fire to progress significantly;
• A failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices; and
• A failure to abide by fundamental firefighter self-rescue and survival concepts

 Although the aforementioned factors were believed to have directly contributed to their deaths, they might have been prevented if:

• Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident;
• Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators;
• The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
• timely manner relative to the incident;
• Personnel assigned to Engine 102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their first-due response area;
• A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis
• was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations;
• Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural
• firefighting existed within the department;
• The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time;
• The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
• Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions;
• Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
• Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.

References

• Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Web Site HERE
• Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths April, 2010 Full Report HERE
• NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
• WLTW.com news report Summary HERE
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NRWm0OnoOPo 
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4oelWuAkmoc 
• https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGB4yKsXOi8 
• http://tinyurl.com/cnwp7e6 

WLTW.com Previous Stories:

• November 18, 2009: Firefighter’s Parents File Wrongful Death Suit
• August 8, 2009: Report On Fatal Colerain Twp. Fire Released
• April 3, 2009: Service Planned For Anniversary Of Firefighter’s Death
• July 11, 2008: Report On Fire That Killed Firefighters Released
• June 28, 2008: Firefighters Hold Benefit For Fallen Friends
• June 12, 2008: Owner Of Home Where 2 Firefighters Died Sentenced On Pot Charges
• May 21, 2008: Firefighter Recalls Fiancee Killed In Colerain Twp. Fire
• May 13, 2008: Burned Home’s Owner Pleads No Contest To Drug Charge
• May 6, 2008: Tri-State Residents Reach Out To Families Of Fallen Firefighters
• April 20, 2008: Deaths Of Firefighters Lead To New Proposed Regulations
• April 18, 2008: Fatal Fire Home’s Owner Indicted On Drug Charge
• April 14, 2008: Prosecutor: Homeowners Won’t Be Charged In Firefighters’ Deaths
• April 11, 2008: Coroner: Fire, Smoke, Heated Air Killed Firefighters
• April 11, 2008: Firefighters Make Emotional Return To Work
• April 10, 2008: Fallen Firefighters Memorialized By Comrades, Family
• April 9, 2008: Sources: Marijuana Growing Operation Found In Burned Home
• April 9, 2008: Firefighters At Visitation For Fallen Comrades Called To Fight Fire
• April 9, 2008: Thousands Attend Colerain Firefighters’ Visitation
• April 8, 2008: Firefighters Pour In, Pay Tribute To Two Of Their Own
• April 8, 2008: Sources: ‘Hidden’ Marijuana Grow Room Found At Fatal Fire Scene
• April 8, 2008: Officials Adjust Fallen Firefighters’ Funeral Procession Plans
• April 8, 2008: Candlelight Vigil Held For Fallen Firefighters
• April 7, 2008: Sources: Plant Containers, Grow Room Found In Burned Home
• April 7, 2008: Blaze That Killed Firefighters Ruled Accidental
• April 7, 2008: Families Of Firefighters Thank Community For Support
• April 7, 2008: Candlelight Vigil Planned For Two Fallen Firefighters

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LAFD January 28, 1981

Was working on an LODD report and came across a past notable incident that occurred over 32 years ago, that should be recognized,  for many of you that may not of heard or read about it previous to this.

Here’s an intro and a link to the LAFD January 28, 1981 incident;

http://lafire.com/lastalarm_file/1981-0728_Taylor/ThomasTaylor.htm

On January 28, 1981, at 3:33 a.m, a full alarm assignment was dispatched to Cugees Restaurant,5300 Lankershim Boulevard, in the North Hollywood area.
Firefighters found heavy smoke with some fire showing in the interior of the restaurant.

Because a back draft explosion was a distinct possibility and because the smoke had to be cleared in order to begin a meaningful fire attack, ventilation procedures were begun on the roof.
Four members of Truck 60 were cutting a hole near the center of the roof when, without warning, it began to sink beneath their feet. One firefighter described the sensation as similar to standing on the deck of a rapidly listing ship. As the roof sank, it fell at a steep angle, slowly and agonizingly pulling Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor to his death.

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Some additional links:

• http://www.szone.us/f79/31-years-ago-today-arson-takes-life-lafds-tom-taylor-70350/
• http://northhollywood.patch.com/articles/what-s-behind-that-firefighter-plaque-on-lankershim-blvd
• http://www.uflac.org/index.cfm?section=1&pagenum=291

In Memory of Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor
Truck Company 60 B Platoon
Appointed July 22, 1973
Died January 28, 1981
Died of burns in roof collapse at arson fire.
Cugee’s Restaurant
5300 Lankershim Boulevard

The Bow String Truss

All bowstring trusses are not created equal and do not share the same characteristics when found in a building and occupancy.

There are significant differences in terminology when referring to them and tactics that should be employed on the fireground- and yes there are prominent differences between east coast and west coast types and tactics.

The Bowstring Truss- They are not All the Same

Do you know what they are?

• The Heavy Timber Bowstring Truss,
• Arch-Rib Bowstring Truss,
• Laminate Cord Bowstring Truss,
• Lattice Bowstring Truss,
• Easybow Truss,
• Mack Truss,
• Summerbell Bowstring Truss,
• Mono-chord Bowstring Truss
• Duo-Chord Bowstring Truss,
• Segmental Multi-Cord Bowstring Truss,
• Tension Rod Bowstring Truss,
• Bowstring Arch Truss,
• Bowstring K-Truss,
• Split-Ring Bowstring Truss…..to name a few.

We’ll be posting lots more on this on CommandSafety.com as well as expanded coverage on Buildingsonfire.com …. Stay Tuned

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Vacant Structure Fire-Three Alarm, Type III Construction

• Are you up to speed with criteria for recognizing pre and post collapse indicators?
• Do you have SOP/SOGs for collapse OPS?

Based on building type, height, materials of construction and type of projected collapse type – the potential for materials to travel beyond the CMZ is probable and should be assessed.

Safety Officers MUST maintain control to restrict access and to ensure companies are aware of potential for secondary collapse of compromised building features, assemblies or materials.

Maintain an acute high level of Situational Awareness, know your surroundings and don’t get tunnel vision on your task assignment.

Managing Collapse Zones

Great footage from Birmingham, AL at a three-alarm fire in a vacant building at 1811 1st Avene North with the peel away collapse of the upper wall on the Delta Division. Screenshot of collapse below with video link…

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