Firefighters rush into a burning commercial building with too-small hoses and insufficient water. The commander can’t reach them because the captain forgot his radio. Backup crews aren’t sure where to go or what to do. Confusion reigns as the building’s truss roof collapses in an explosion of flames.

This reads like the playbook from the deadly Sofa Super Store fire in June 2007, but it’s not. These dangerous missteps occurred at a March 1 blaze on Daniel Island, according to an internal report obtained by The Post and Courier.

They occurred despite nearly four years of intensive and expensive efforts to instill a culture of safety in the Charleston Fire Department.

What’s more, the commander in charge that day — a man repeatedly faulted in the in-house review of the blaze — was recently promoted to a top position in the department. And that’s causing some dissension in the ranks.

City fire officials stand behind their promotion of Troy Williams to battalion chief, and they said the portion of the draft report that leaked to the newspaper is incomplete, unfair, unofficial and riddled with inaccuracies.

Fire Chief Thomas Carr acknowledged problems at the fire, which gutted a two-story office building at 899 Island Park Drive. That’s why he authorized a six-member committee of firefighters to conduct what’s known as a critical incident review. But Carr said he rejected the resulting draft report when it landed on his desk six weeks ago because it had errors and failed to live up to its intended purpose, which is to be an educational tool, not an instrument for blame.

The 12-page portion obtained by the The Post Courier newspaper describes “major” violations of policy and assigns blame for those mistakes. It raises questions about the handling of the blaze, the effectiveness of the training firefighters have received and the integrity of the promotion process.

It also highlights the continuing conflict between the department’s hard-charging past and its new, risk-sensitive methods.

• For the Complete Full version Article: The Post and Courier HERE
• SConfire HERE
• Draft Fire Report-Read more: Fire report

The Second National Fire Service Research Agenda Symposium

A new report identifies seven critical areas where more research is needed to further reduce the number of firefighters killed or injured in the line of duty. These priorities were developed during the Second National Fire Service Research Agenda Symposium sponsored by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF).

Download the 2011 Report:  May 20 – 22, 2011 – 2nd Research Agenda Symposium

More than 70 representatives from a broad range of fire service-related organizations met over two days at the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland. Their goal, to update the current Research Agenda, a guide for research projects within the fire service. In doing so the following seven areas were identified as research priorities: Community Risk Reduction; Wildland Firefighting; Data Collection; Technology and Fire Service Science; Firefighter Health and Wellness; Emergency Service Delivery; and Tools and Equipment.

More than 70 representatives from a broad range of fire service-related organizations participated

The 2nd National Fire Service Research Agenda

The Second National Fire Service Research Agenda Symposium was conducted on May 20 -22, 2011 and was also hosted by NFFF at the NFA campus in Emmitsburg, MD. The project was funded by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation. The purpose of the second Symposium was to produce an updated edition of the Research Agenda, based on current relevancy, as a guide for future research efforts. Following the model that had been established six years earlier, more than 70 individuals, representing a diverse range of interests participated in the 2011 Symposium.

The participants (who represented 55 different organizations) were asked to self-determine where they would best be able to lend the greatest expertise and guidance, selecting among seven different discussion groups.

Each group was assigned a range of subject matter as their primary area to focus upon; however, it was recognized that the individual domains were broad and the boundaries could not be precisely defined. The groups were encouraged to approach their task with a broad perspective and to seek broad consensus as opposed to narrowly defined priorities. Each group produced a set of recommendations that were reported back to the full assembly for further discussion.

The research areas and the facilitators assigned to each research domain are listed below. The facilitators were chosen based upon their reputations as leaders in their respective areas. They provided leadership for discussion within their groups, and wrote the reports. Kevin Roche of the Phoenix Fire Department was the general facilitator.

• Community Risk Reduction (Vickie Pritchett, Shane Ray)
• Wildland Firefighting (Stan Gibson, Nelson Bryner)
• Data Collection (Lori Moore-Merrell, DrPH)
• Technology & Fire Service Science (Gavin Horn, PhD, Daniel Madrzykowski)
• Firefighter Health and Wellness (Murrey Loflin, Sara Jahnke, PhD)
• Emergency Service Delivery (Christopher Naum, Victor Stagnaro)
• Tools and Equipment (Bruce Varner, Robert Tutterow)

Participants were divided into discussion groups based on their expertise within one of the seven areas to develop specific research recommendations for each of the topics. Out of this process came 41 recommendations for potential investigation projects.

“The first Research Agenda Symposium was an outcome of Firefighter Life Safety Initiative #7 which directly links a national research agenda and data collection system to firefighter safety,” said Ronald J. Siarnicki, executive director of the NFFF. “The second symposium was convened to assess the changes and advances that had occurred within the fire service over the previous six year and identify new needs and priorities for potential study.”

The updated Research Agenda is intended to provide a reference source and a starting point on where to direct efforts and funding.

The Symposium planning team asked each group to develop a maximum of ten recommendations for presentation to the plenary session on Sunday morning. The groups were also asked to keep their recommendations broad enough so they could be approached from a number of research perspectives and to include the rationale for recommending those particular subjects as research priorities. This proved to be an efficient process reflecting the high level of expertise represented in each group.

The Sunday session began with a discussion of grant programs and funding sources, led by AFG Branch Chief Cathie Patterson. The recommendations of the seven discussion groups were then presented by the respective facilitators for discussion by the full assembly. All of the 41 recommendations that were presented to the plenary session are included in the 2011 Research Agenda report.

The 2011 edition incorporates one significant departure from the 2005 Research Agenda report; the overall ranking of projects on a Priority 1-2-3 scale was omitted and only the priorities established within the individual discussion groups are included. This decision reflects a consensus of the assembled participants that it is extremely difficult and probably unrealistic to apply this type of prioritization process across such a wide range of subject areas.

There was also concern that a 1-2-3 prioritization might encourage researchers and funding organizations to limit their attention to only the highest priorities and thus to overlook the lower ranked topics. The participants wanted to emphasize that all of the identified projects merit attention and should be considered on their own merits. After considerable discussion the group voted to set aside the overall 1-2-3 ranking and asked each group identify one project that should be recognized as an immediate concern.

The number one recommendations are:

• Community Risk Reduction: Creation of a community-scale model that evaluates fire prevention and response programs and quantifies their ability to produce a potentially positive outcome. This may include (but is not limited to) data pertaining to: occupancy types and numbers of each, fire prevention, codes adoption, mitigation, response, and recovery.
• Wildland: Development of safe and reliable aircraft operations for suppression and team transportation to reduce Wildland firefighting injuries and fatalities.
• Data Collection: Identification of cultural perception of data collection / Identification of barriers to capture of quality data.
• Technology and Fire Service Science: Development of data, implementation of transfer mechanisms and updating of standards that will enable firefighters to learn the science and utilize the technology required to respond to the changing fire conditions in our modern built environment.
• Health and Wellness: Effectiveness of intervention and screening for health and disease related to firefighter wellness and fitness.
• Service Delivery: Development of a scientifically-based community risk assessment tool.
• Tools and Equipment: Assessment of current PPE (entire ensemble) performance, functionality and related safety features for today’s fire environment.

Ultimately, the 41 recommendations contained in this report should serve as a roadmap for all researchers and applied scientists who are interested in firefighter safety and survivability. These recommendations must not be limited for use as AFG guidance only, but should serve as a guidance tool for all who seek grants within their various disciplines. It is also hoped that with these recommendations in hand, other potential research sponsors can be identified and successfully petitioned.

The Report of the Second National Fire Service Research Agenda Symposium is available through the EveryoneGoesHome.com website.

A comments section has been added to the site to collect recommendations for future research from members of the fire service.

Links:

• National Fire Service Research Agenda Symposium Reports
• June 1 – 3, 2005 – Research Agenda Symposium Report
• May 20 – 22, 2011 – 2nd Research Agenda Symposium

Got Fire?……Anticipate Collapse..

A recent video clip making its way around the cyber fireground clearly depicted a very close-call and resulting near miss event to four firefighters at a four alarm fire involving a commercial building that housed an established insulation manufacturer and installation contractor.

The video shows within a very compressed time frame, the progression of rapidly deteriorating interior conditions, the adverse affects on the building’s structural systems and the results from the loss of load transfers that lead to a catastrophic wall collapse  narrowly missing the crew of firefighters who were operating a hand line in the vicinity of an exterior overhead door. Fortunately the injuries sustained to the firefighters were minor in nature; however the consequences and results from this collapse could have been far different and significantly more severe.

Following a series of repeated viewings of the video clip and with each successive viewing, it became readily apparent that there was a lot more to these images of the collapse and the cursory focus on the resulting near miss event. Closer examination of the video clip and the still frames brought to light some obvious conditions and indicators that easily become lost in the rapidity of the sequence of the collapse; which really has the true story to be told.

It’s the mechanism and sequence of the collapse, the dynamics of the building’s performance and the building indicators that provide a training opportunity in further examining key factors, presenting insights that could be a focus for operational and command personnel at future incidents with common parameters and gaining some mental models in recognition-primed decision making that contribute to the naturalistic decision-making process.

If you know what to be looking for, then when you see it, you may be able to anticipate, project and implement in rapid succession appropriate measures dictated by the incident.

Four Alarm Commercial Building Fire with Collapse: Fire Photo by Ben Goldberry

In an effort to promote additional insights and bring forward these fundamental observations and experienced-based presumptions extended from these and other news video images, still photographs, additional reporting research and examination, and a review of other published media resources; the following observations presented in this overview brief are being conveyed to increase firefighter, company and command level awareness of key collapse indicators such as those present at this commercial fire  and to further the concept of adaptive fireground management principles and increase awareness of fundamental building performance indicators and principles to help you increase your intuitive observations skills and translate them into proactive operational actions on the fireground-before an adverse condition occurs.[ i.e., being five steps ahead of the fire conditions].

Although this briefing makes use of the images and conditions depicted in the video clip and encountered by the fire department evident in the images; the susequent commentary and  insights provided are not meant to provide  direct or indirect opinions, renderings, criticism or censure  towards the conduct of operations or the management of the incident by the respective department and it’s firefighting, command and support personnel who operated at the actual fire and experienced this near miss event first-hand.

We are grateful that the events of this alarm precluded anything worst occurring given the potential seriousness of the prevailing  incident conditions and commend the  fire department and it’s firefighters that provide these exceptional services each and every day to the citizens they serve and to the community they protect, in mitigating this serious fire; safely and successfully.

This incident and the resulting near-miss captured by the videographer provides the Fire Service with an exceptional opportunity given today’s far reaching capabilities of eMedia, this web site and direct and indirect readers, links, tweets, likes, reposting’s, uploads, downloads and sharing  an opportunity to share the consequences of an extreme close-call and learn from it in a positive and constructive manner, so that firefighters, company officers, commanders and support personnel can better predict with knowledge, insight and at times intuition a better understanding of buildings and the structures and occupancies we operate within on the fireground.  

There are numerous inherent indicators present at every incident scene we operate at that. As is in this near miss event and building collapse; it’s sometimes the subtle things that need to gain the attention of operationg companies and personnel and the ability to rapidly process, recognize and react.

 Remember this: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

As a generality; it’s important to note that given heavy fire involvement in a structure (got fire), adaptive fireground management considerations would promote conservative considerations to anticipate and expect collapse (degraded or compromise; limited or catastrophic).

In the case of fires in commercial occupancies and buildings with;

• Large Square footage/Floor areas
• Significant fire loads
• Large open structural system spans lacking compartmentation, 
• Unprotected steel components and assemblies 
• No Sprinkler Systems
• Omitted, compromised or degraded passive or active protective  or suppression systems
• Significant openings along the exterior building envelope
• Significant opening on the roof enclosure
• Deep seated fires or rapidly escalating and extending fires

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. 

Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. Its alot more than that, with far greater consequences that may be very unforgiving.

Aerial Plan of Building and Collapse Area A-B

The Building

The fire incident involved a single story commercial building occupying approximately 32, 200 square feet of area on a multiple building site with proximal exposures.  Manufacturing, warehousing and offices comprised the building’s operational use.  An aerial plan view shows the geographical building scene divisions and the location and relationship of the Alpha- Bravo Side collapse zones that affected operations and resulted in the close-call and firefighter near-miss. The proximity of exposures, physical layout and orientation can be further assessed.

 A review of public documents and records, incident reports and various media resources  provided the following insights;

Overview Details

Alpha Street Side View- Adapted from Google Streetmaps

The view of the alpha street side identifies the building front facade, its main office entrance (center between dual overhead doors on the left and right). Pronounced on the alpha side facade is the presence of four (4) equally spaced overhead (OH) doors that provide direct access into the building’s interior. The subsequent collapse area is depicted at the A-B corner with special attention drawn to relationship of the wall plane and OH door proximity.

The relationship and this wall surface ( area square footage) and the presence of the OH door opening to the wall/ roof interface area that subsequently became compromised and collapsed is critical in further understanding the mechanism of the collapse sequence and also the positive effect it had on the survivability of the firefighters who were within the collapse zone at the time of the wall failure.

Don’t Always Stress the Corners

It’s been a common practice and fundamental fireground consideration to define the corner of a typical building as having safety considerations and prominence in the context of ladder company operations, laddering and roof work and in the placement of personnel and positioning of fireground operations.

Corner Building Operational considerations have included, but limited to;

• Provides a potentially safe(er) area of operational refuge
• Provides a location to safely position ground ladders for roof access/egress
• Provides a location that has a potential  higher degree of assurance for maintaining structural integrity in the event of a collapse condition of an outer wall
• Will not fail in a catastrophic or monolithic manner due to the postulated presence of structural members on the vicinity of either the wall enclosure and/or the roofing structural system and assemblies
• The design and construction configuration and orientation of the ninety degree angle of the building’s outer wall envelope (at the corner)  provides predicated inherent structural stability
• The  typical type of structural or envelope construction may have a resulting  ninety degree building corner having a more robust resistance to collapse and compromise due to the various types of enclosure systems (methods and materials) and assemblies and needed stability per engineering principles

In this instance (as shown in the Alpha side street view),  the presence of the large overhead door in close proximity to the corner wall intersection and transition ( A-B side), actually makes this position, fireground proximity and travel paths highly prone to early and complete collapse potential in the event of a loss of the wall-roof component or assembly integrity or in the load bearing/transfer capabilities of the wall-roof assembly. 

• The presence and identification of a corner configuration similar to this in a commercial structure should result in a higher degree of considerations and risk assessment when formulation and deploying operational assignments and in the placement of personnel for task assignments in this proximity.
• This operational area should be considered as a candidate for designation as a collapse zone based upon projected or defined operational considerations, incident conditions and predictive building characteristics, systems, materials and fire dynamics and conditions.  

Alpha-Bravo Corner of Subsequent Collapse Aerial View

• The entire perimeter of the alpha side could be considered for a restricted collapse zone just in terms of wall opening alone sans the degree of actual or projected interior fire impingement or fire involvement.

 Aerial Overhead view of the building perimeter walls along the four divisions ( A-D) with the A-B corner that subsequently experienced the wall-roof compromise and resulting collapse.

 The A-B corner and the affected ground areas around the collapse zone. Considerations for a collapse zone area on the A-B corner would have resulted in a minimum distance of twenty five (25) feet from the building base for all operations within this area. The collapse zone on the Bravo side extends into the exposure building due to its close proximity.

Always consider the building envelope materials of construction and systems present on the building. The use of concrete masonry units (CMU) is common, as is the use of pre-cast concrete and cast-in place and tilt-up concrete construction panels.

Variations in collapse dynamics and mechanisms of collapse may result in sizable increases in collapse zone distances from the building base with consideration for monolithic or partial wall collapse as well as safety considerations for bounce and travel over long distances of modular assembly building pieces ( i.e. concrete blocks, brick venner or material chunks).

We have not discussed collapse considerations for other building envelope systems such as metal panelized systems since these have entirely different collapse considerations and profiling, not applicable to this incident and assessment insights. The same is true when considering operating and collapse considerations at commercial buildings with ordinary construction or heavy timber systems (Type or Class III and IV). These to have different rules of predictive building performance and collapse safety considerations.

Typical Interior

Typical Structural System and Components

Interior View with Steel Columns, Open Web Steel bar Joists and Beams

 

 

Typical Open Web Steel Bar Joists w Metal Roof Deck

 

 

Large clear spans provided by the open web steel bar joists allowed for considerable free floor space typical of commercial warehouse occupancies.

Note the use of what appears to be combustible wood storage and staging areas that could have could potentially contribute towards increased fire intensity, extension and further contribute towards adverse affects on the unprotected structural steel components and assemblies.

 

Alpha Side Collapse Area Details: OH Door Pre-Collapse Insights

 

 

 

Pre-Collapse Operations on Alpha side with personnel in close proximty to the building perimeter

 

Pre-Collapse view of Operations on the Alpha side with personnel in close proximity, (within [a] collapse zone) to the building perimeter. It is evident that the degree of interior fire extension and involvement presumes a cautious deployment and placement of personnel in safe operational areas. When operating in such close proximity to the building wall and envelope, it becomes increasingly challenging for company officers and company personnel to monitor overall building performance indicators that may be prevalent or dominant from a view point further away from the building. 

Fire extension, smoke conditions, component or assembly movement or displacement may be readily defined and identified from a vantage point away from the building, requiring additional independent  operational assignments within the division if resources allow.   Otherwise, officers are encouraged to get a big picture view and increase their span of vision of the building and progressing fire conditions and building performance

 

 

 

 

The pre-collapse frame image above identifies the building roof line in relationship to the ground operations, smoke conditions and also the directional flow of the elevated master stream [upper right corner]. The initial  stage of the wall compromise and collapse can be seen in the Bravo wall pulling away. When watching the video, pay close attention first to the stream direction and flow and them at the location and movement of the wall, which is followed in rapid succession with the full wall collapse.

T

 

Close examination of the initial video frames shows the rapid displacement of the portion of the Bravo wall and outward collapse towards the B-Exposure (alleyway) Refer to the Aerial Plan for orientation. The A-B Collapse is progressing from the Bravo side to the Alpha side as loads are being transferred in rapid progression with further collapse expected.

The frame image above shows the bravo wall failing outward with the resulting loss in structural support of the roofing deck assembly.

Rapid fire migration and extension is evident after the wall section collapse with increased flames visible. In the video, one firefighter quickly recognizes the imminent collapse and reacts.

A significant section of wall area is present at the A-B side and progressing from the building corner to the left jamb of the overhead (OH) door. This area and the area directly above the OH door opening is calculated to weigh over 20,000 lbs. 

The early identification and establishment of collapse zone(s) is mission critical especially at commercial buildings due to the considerations for rapidly changing operational conditions that may be a result of or influenced by the following;

• lack of knowledge or understanding of the building’s construction, systems and characteristics
• lack of adequate resources, skills and or capabilities for selected phase operations
• fire loading, combustibles, flammables and other products
• Last of or loss of compartmentation
• fire and protective systems failures or inoperability
• unapproved alterations, additions and renovations to the building, systems and occupancy
• transitions for offensive to defensive operational phases, which at times may results in operating position postures too close to the building
• failure to recognize situational factors that will drive appropriate operational phasing and task deployments
• lack of building performance knowledge
• not considering occupancy risk versus treating the building/fire relationship based upon occupancy type
• not recognizing key collapse indicators and failing to implement timely actions [proactively versus reactionary]
• being four steps behind the fire conditions evident instead of implementing adaptive fire ground management insights [five steps ahead of the evident fire]
• use precise coordination when placing elevated masterstreams into operations with ground personnel operating within close quarters
• understand the effects of master streams on the integrity of building features, assemblies and components

 

 

 

 

 

The image frame above shows personnel operating within an imminent collapse zone directing hand lines into the interior fire area. Further examination of the video  frames clearly shows one firefighter quickly recognizing that a collapse is occurring and attempts to alert the other personnel to retreat. Simultaneously to the collapse progression, the crew immediately retreats away from the collapsing wall and falling building materials.

 

Within the span of four seconds, the wall compromise occurs and collapses on the ground at the A-B corner and immediate area on the alpha side.  The slightly monolithic manner in which the wall plane first peels away and progressively collapsed is interesting for a CMU wall. Possibly due to the outward collapse of the Bravo wall, followed by the rapid succession of failure of the roof-wall connection interface resulted in an transitional downward force that pushed the alpha side wall outward allowing gravity to work its force

 

When operating in close proximity to a heavily involved forward interior condition [exterior position] it is important to maintain focused situational awareness and either directly maintain or delegate responsibilities for observations of fire and smoke progress and conditions while monitoring key functional building performance indicators and collapse pre-cursors. 

 

Additionally, always re-evaluate the effectiveness of deployed and operational hose lines, streams and in water application to ensure they are adequate for the degree of fire suppression being undertaken and the corresponding fire flow requirements. Don’t just assume, determine with validity. [ Refer to Tactical Entertainment]  

 

Obscured by the rapidly defining smoke which is a result of the developing and extending collapse, the frame image 04 below depicts the beginning of the compromise and collapse sequence commencing as a result of the Bravo wall compromise and collapse sequence at the B-A corner that will subsequently peel towards the Alpha side and continue up to the outermost jamb of the overhead door.

 

Pay particular attention to the first three to four seconds of the video clip and review the video clip over a few times;  looking at the operating elevated master stream that is clearly visible and operating from the upper right part of the screen through the smoke plume; follow the direct orientation and stream flowing directly towards the bravo wall plane,  and presumed penetrating into/through the roof deck or impacting through the metal roof deck and wall-roof assembly area at the upper roof edge.

 

 

Image 04

 

 Frame image 04 depicts the rapidly deteriorating conditions that are evident as the collapse sequence continues and the overhead door jamb (left) buckling and adjacent wall failing by way of an outward curl or peel away commencing from the upper (left image) A-B corner at the roof line and then peeling and failing from upper left to right.

 

 

Image 05

 

 

The leading edge of the outward collapsing wall plane ( yellow dotted line) is failing with the greatest material concentration occurring at the A-B edge outward. Fortunately the presence and location of the overhead door opening  lessened the amount and location of wall material ( concrete masonry units-CMU) and contributed to a void area being present and not fully impacting the firefighters who were operating within this collapse zone.

 

In other words, had this been a solid full wall collapse likelihood for significant firefighter injury would have resulted. 

 

The affects of wall/roof compromise should be of focused consideration and monitoring when managing incidents of this size and magnitude in similar occupancies and building features.  Flame and heat  impingment can and will affect the structural integrity of lintels spans, beams and truss connects along roof lines and connections. Look for signs of impingment, degradation or compromise. watch for signs of probable inward/outward or curtain wall collapse.

 

 

 

Image 06

 

The remaining images, frames 06 and 07 depict the location of the firefighters to the wall collapse, the relationship to the wall and roof system and the degree of wall area that became compromised and collapsed.

 

Image 07

 

This brief video clip and these accompanying briefing insights provided a tremendous opportunity to examine in a non-critical manner an actual near miss collapse event and  operational discernments that provide a focused training an awareness opportunity.

When given the time to analyze and assess, some things become so apparent and self-revealing that we might prematurely say why didn’t someone pick up that or those conditions while conducting operations at [an] incident.  It is dependent on a wide variety of factors, conditions and parameters that are difficult at times to identify and harder yet to fully identify as common or contributing factors, errors or omissions.

It’s not always that easy; but contradictory – some time it really is (or should be) that easy.

Some things on the fireground may not be prone to being so readily identifiable or recognized.

It all depends what you’re looking for and whether you have the necessary insights, knowledge and skill sets. Incident priorities, demands, situational focus, awareness or disconnect all may have a part in how and incident is managed and mitigated.

It goes back directly on knowing what to look for and when; at what type of building with which type of occupancy and under what stage or stages of fire development and combat operations or engagement you might be in. It complex, it takes time and experience and learning’s.

There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.

You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.

Links:

•  http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20111031/LOCAL07/310319957

According to the recently published NFPA Research Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2010; In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977.

• Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, continued to account for the largest number of fatalities.
• More than half of the deaths resulted from overexertion, stress and related medical issues.
• Of the 39 deaths in this category, 34 were classified as sudden cardiac deaths (usually heart attacks) and five were due to strokes or brain aneurysm.

• Download the NFPA 2010 FF LODD PFD Report, HERE
• NFPA Web Site Link, HERE

2010 Experience

In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977. The average number of deaths annually over the past 10 years is 95.

Figure 1 shows firefighter deaths for the years 1977 through 2010, excluding the 340 firefighter deaths at the World Trade Center in 2001.

Of the 72 firefighters who died while on duty in 2010, 44 were volunteer firefighters, 25 were career firefighters, two were employees of state land management agencies, and one was a member of a prison inmate crew.

In 2010, there were four double-fatality incidents. Two firefighters died in a vehicle crash while returning from a training weekend, two died in an apparatus crash while responding to a structure fire and four firefighters were killed during interior operations at two structure fires. More details are presented throughout the report.

Analyses in the NFPA Research Report examine the types of duty associated with firefighter deaths, the cause and nature of fatal injuries to firefighters, and the ages of the firefighters who died. They highlight deaths in intentionally-set fires and in motor vehicle-related incidents.

Finally, the NFPA study presents summaries of individual incidents that illustrate important concerns in firefighter safety.

The victims include members of local career and volunteer fire departments; seasonal, full-time and contract employees of state and federal agencies who have fire suppression responsibilities as part of their job description; prison inmates serving on firefighting crews; military personnel performing assigned fire suppression activities; civilian firefighters working at military installations; and members of industrial fire brigades. Fatal injuries and illnesses are included even in cases where death is considerably delayed.

When the injury and the death occur in different years, the incident is counted in the year of the injury.

The NFPA recognizes that a comprehensive study of on-duty firefighter fatalities would include chronic illnesses (such as cancer or heart disease) that prove fatal and that arise from occupational factors. In practice, there is no mechanism for identifying fatalities that are due to illnesses that develop over long periods of time. This creates an incomplete picture when comparing occupational illnesses to other factors as causes of firefighter deaths. This is recognized as a gap the size of which cannot be identified at this time because of limitations in tracking the exposure of firefighters to toxic environments and substances and the potential long-term effects of such exposures.

The NFPA also recognizes that other organizations report numbers of duty-related firefighter fatalities using different, more expansive, definitions that include deaths that occurred when the victims were off-duty. (See, for example, the USFA and National Fallen Firefighters Memorial websites.*)

Readers comparing reported losses should carefully consider the definitions and inclusion criteria used in any study.

Type of Duty

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 72 deaths by type of duty. The largest share of deaths occurred while firefighters were operating on the fire ground (21 deaths).

This total is well below the average 32 deaths per year on the fire ground over the past 10 years, and less than a third the average of 69 deaths per year in the first 10 years of this study (1977 through 1986). The low number of fire ground deaths in 2010 is not only because of the small number of multiple-fatality fire incidents – the number of fire incidents resulting in firefighter deaths in 2010 was the lowest recorded, with 19 fatal fires, compared to an average of 28 annually in the previous 10 years. Fourteen of the 21 fire ground deaths occurred at 12 structure fires. Deaths in structure fires are discussed in more detail later in this report. There were seven deaths at seven wildland-related incidents.

 There were no firefighter deaths at vehicle fires in 2010.

• Twelve of the 21 fire ground victims were career firefighters, eight were volunteer firefighters and one was a firefighter with a state land management agency.
• The average number of career firefighter deaths on the fire ground over the past 10 years is 12 deaths per year, while the average for volunteer firefighters is 16 deaths per year.
• An additional four or more deaths of state or federal wildland management agency personnel, on average, occur on wildland fires each year.

 Eighteen firefighters died while responding to or returning from emergency calls. It is important to note that deaths in this category are not necessarily the result of crashes. Twelve of the deaths were due to sudden cardiac events or stroke, five occurred in four collisions or rollovers and one firefighter was crushed between two fire department vehicles as one was backed into the station. All 18 victims were volunteer firefighters. All crashes and sudden cardiac deaths are discussed in more detail later.

Eleven deaths occurred during training activities. Two firefighters died when their personal vehicle crashed while they were returning from a training weekend. Four firefighters collapsed and died of sudden cardiac events after training exercises and one died during unsupervised physical fitness activities. One suffered a stroke after a weekly training meeting at the station, one suffered a brain aneurysm after hose loading training, one died after being exposed to smoke at a wildland live fire training exercise, and one hit his elbow during training and died of necrotizing fasciitis (also known as flesh-eating disease).

Five firefighters died at non-fire emergencies, including two at the scene of motor vehicle crashes (one victim was struck by a vehicle and the other suffered sudden cardiac death), one drowned during a swift water rescue, one died after clearing downed trees after a storm and one was asphyxiated while attempting to rescue a worker from a manhole without SCBA and before the oxygen levels were tested.

The remaining 17 firefighters died while involved in a variety of non-emergency-related on-duty activities. These activities included normal administrative or station duties (11 deaths), fire station construction projects (two deaths), vehicle maintenance (one death), driving to check on a wildland fire the previous day (one death), and a work project in a wildland area (one death). One firefighter died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound while on-duty.

Report Authors

Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2010
Rita F. Fahy, Paul R. LeBlanc and Joseph L. Molis, June 2011. 33 pages.
Overall statistics on line-of-duty firefighter fatalities in 2010, including non-incident-related deaths. Includes patterns, trends, career vs. volunteer comparisons, and brief narratives on selected incidents. 

Abstract: In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S.  This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977. Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, continued to account for the largest number of fatalities. More than half of the deaths resulted from overexertion, stress and related medical issues. Of the 39 deaths in this category, 34 were classified as sudden cardiac deaths (usually heart attacks) and five were due to strokes or brain aneurysm. 
 

Download this report. (PDF, 151 KB)
 See older versions of this report.

Woonsocket mill fire courtesy Matt Gregiore Providence Fire Video

A 112-year-old building, once the home of the Woonsocket Rubber Co., a firm that made decoy tanks for the D-Day invasion in World War II and later manufactured Keds sneakers, was destroyed Tuesday night by a spectacular fire. Smoke from the blaze could be seen as far away as Providence.Fire Chief Gary Lataille said 10 to 15 departments from Rhode Island and Massachusetts were called in to help battle the seven-alarm blaze. While the fiire appeared to be small at first, according to Mayor Leo T. Fontaine, the fire quickly spread to engulf the 180,000-square-foot mill structure.Lataille said that with the river bordering one side of the complex, and a huge parking lot bordering another, he determined early that the best strategy was to contain the fire so it would not spread to houses along River Street and to let it burn completely to the ground

.

• Live Feed HERE: http://www.wpri.com/generic/news/live_stream
• Fox 25 News Boston, Live Feed; http://www.myfoxboston.com/generic/video/live_chat/fox-25-news-live-video-myfoxboston-generic-98
• Photos, HERE  
• http://www2.turnto10.com/news/2011/jun/07/10/crew-working-mill-fire-woonsocket-ar-526085/

Aerial Overview

• According to tax records, the factory was built in 1889 and is more than 217,000 square feet. It was sold to real estate company Fairmount LLC in Decemeber 2010 for $310,000.
• The assessed value of the building and land is more than $900,000 according to tax records.
• The building, known as Alice Mills, has been vacant since 2009 and is a very historic Woonsocket landmark. 

Aerial View

• More Photos; HERE   http://interactives.wpri.com/photomojo/gallery/470/1/woonsocket-mill-fire/woonsocket-mill-fire/
• History of Alice Mills: HERE  http://www.wpri.com/dpp/news/local_news/blackstone/history-of-the-famous–alice-mills-in-woonsocket
• Marshal: welding torch caused mill fire Heat from a welding torch probably caused the massive fire that destroyed the Alice Mills in Woonsocket, the state fire marshal said Wednesday, Also HERE
• Residual heat from a blow torch used by a contractor is believed to have sparked the fire Tuesday evening.  The building owner told investigators that the contractor was using that blow torch for some plumbing work inside the building.
• More than 125 firefighters from as many as 15 different departments in Rhode Island and Massachusetts assisted in knocking down the blaze at the former Alice Mills Rubber Manufacturing Plant in Woonsocket.
• http://www.wpri.com/dpp/news/local_news/blackstone/history-of-the-famous–alice-mills-in-woonsocket

Building Construction and Systems Training for Commanders, Company Officers & Firefighters

New for 2011

An intense and concentrated  series of programs examining trends and methods in building construction for the fire service with an emphasize on construction and  occupancy risk assessment, structural and construction systems, and their direct relationship on structural combat firefighting operations, firefighter survivability and the command decision-making process. Understand building systems and occupancy performance under fire conditions is mission critical with new and emerging technical information and data that is redefining tactical and operational models and firefighting protocols with new rules of engagement.

 Firefighters and Officers will gain a new understanding of inherent construction features and hazards that directly influence effective risk management and decisive strategic and tactical considerations with a focus on key construction features, inherent occupancy profiles that will influence strategic, tactical and task level operations and crucial assembly systems affected by fire dynamics, extreme fire behavior and combat fire suppression operations.

These programs & seminars examine crucial considerations for Reading the Building, Occupancy Risk Profiling, Adaptive Fireground Management, Tactical Patience, Predicative Occupancy Performance and Construction Resiliency correlating building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked.

2011 Training Program Offerings

• Building Construction for the Company and Command Officer
• Tactical Patience and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement
• The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & Tactics
• Building Construction and Tactical Operations
• Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
• The Doctrine of Combat Fire Operations 2011
• Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting
• Tactical Renaissance:  Building Construction & Tactical Excellence
• Extreme Fire Behavior & Fireground Operations
• Tactical Entertainment and Firefighter Safety
• Occupancy Risk Profiling and Firefighting Strategy & Tactics
• Keynotes, Lectures, Special Presentations & Programs Available
• Other Building Construction, Command, Tactics and Fire Fighter Safety and Operations programs Available  
• PDF Program Flyer, Building Construction Training for the Fire Service 2011 
• Buildingsonfire.com
• TheCompanyOfficer.com
• More Here

There have been two fire ground collapse events this week; the first in Gary Indiana on April 5th, the other in Washington DC on April 8th that resulted in a total of eight firefighters being injured. The collapse conditions presented themselves during the course of operations in which suppression or search and rescue operations were being conducted.  Each occupancy and construction type presents unique challenges and risks related to construction, materials, dead load and resiliency when impacted by fire, heat or fire suppression activities.

Maintaining effective and focused situational awareness of developing and progressing fire conditions, position and company assignments, and related monitoring of occupancy risk profile conditions may provide timely insights to changing conditions that may influence the incident action plan, strategies and tactics deployed or implemented. 

As always, when physical conditions allow and there is an uncertainty of building risk profiles, occupancy charactoristics, construction type and fire conditions, a 360 is advised.

Never under estimate the severity of what may transpire when a partial collapse of a roof or ceiling assembly may have on operating companies and personnel. 

• When ever feasible, timely opening up of concealed spaces within the ceiling void, cockloft or truss loft of a roof assembly is imperative to assess the extent of fire, travel and intensity.
• Observations openings within the ceiling membrane (from below) or roof deck (above) allows assessment determination for impingement of structural or support members and systems.
• Use caution and be conservative in the use of Thermal Imaging devices for determining extent and magnitude of fire conditions within the concealed compartment; Refer to test results from the UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions Report and test data, HERE
• When feasible, ensure eitehr dedicated truck/ladder companies or assigned task resources are available to provide coordinated tactical support to interior suppression and search and rescue assignments to manage fire behavior factors with appropriate incident, occupancy and building defined tactical deployments.
• Think about what’s burning above you…it may very well be burning around or ontop of you, if systems, assemblies or components fail.

Three Gary (IN) firefighters were injured when the third floor ceiling of a burning building collapsed on Tuesday April 5th during search and rescue operations. According to published reports their injuries weren’t believed to be life-threatening, but they were taken to a hospital.

Battalion Chief Robert Groszewski stated about 20 firefighters responded to the fire at the site of the former Campbell Friendship House. He says no one was at home when the fire began.

Groszewski says the fire may have begun in a third-floor stairwell.

Other related links;

• WLS: Three Firefighters Injured in Gary Fire
• Chicago Sun-Times: Three Gary Firefighters Injured in Blaze
• Chicago Sun-Times Gallery: Gary Firefighters Injured
• NWI.com: Three Firefighters Injured Battling Blaze

A ceiling collapse during a fire at a three-story building in Gary, Ind., injured three Gary firefighters Tuesday afternoon. (Credit: Gary Post-Tribune)

Aerial View

Aerial Delta Side

Aerial of Charlie Side, Roof and Exposure

The fire and collapse in Washington, DC has resulted in five DCFD firefghter injuries, of which one firefighter is in critical condition following a roof collaspse, entrappment and mayday in an unoccupied single family residential structure during primary search and rescue operations that was known to have homeless people occupy the structure on occassion.  According to various published reports, companies were making entry with pronounced fire conditions when the roof collapsed trapping the operating companies.

Reports from both STATter911.com and DCFD provided the following; DC Fire & EMS Department spokesman Pete Piringer indicated that five firefighters were hurt during a two-alarm house fire at 813 48th Street, NE. The fire was reported around 12:40 this morning. Three of the firefighters were from Rescue Squad 3 and were caught in the collapse of the roof of the one story, wood frame, single family home. At 7:30 AM Piringer reported one firefighter was in critical condition with significant burns, the other three with varying degrees of burns with expected early release.  

View more videos at: http://www.nbcwashington.com.

View more videos at: http://www.nbcwashington.com.

Street Side-Alpha

Aerial View from Bing

For some previous insights on ceiling systems, refer to the Gypsum Board Ceiling Systems and Firefigher Safety post related to the  Los Angeles (CA) FD line of duty death of veteran LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen who died in the line of duties in February 2011 from injuries he sustained when a ceiling collapsed on him in a house fire. (HERE)

There were 85 LODD in the United States in 2010

Provisional 2010 Firefighter Fatality Statistics

The United States Fire Administration (USFA) recently released the Provisional 2010 Firefighter Fatality Statistics.

According to the report there were 85 onduty firefighter fatalities in the United States as a result of incidents that occurred in 2010, a 6 percent decrease from the 90 fatalities reported for 2009.

The 85 fatalities were spread across 31 states.

• Illinois experienced the highest number of fatalities (9).
• In addition to Illinois, only New York (8),
• Ohio (8),
• Pennsylvania (7), and
• Kansas (5) had 5 or more firefighter fatalities.

Heart attacks and strokes were responsible for the deaths of 51 firefighters (60%) in 2010, nearly the same proportion of firefighter deaths from heart attack or stroke (58%) in 2009.

Nine onduty firefighters died in association with wildland fires, about half the number that died in association with wildland fires in 2009 and a third of the 26 such fatalities in 2008.

Forty-eight percent of all firefighter fatalities occurred while performing emergency duties.

Eleven firefighters died in 2010 as the result of vehicle crashes, down substantially from 16 deaths in 2009, and for the first time since 1999, none the of the deaths involved aircraft. Four firefighters in 2010 died in accidents involving firefighters responding in personal vehicles. Seven firefighter deaths involved fire department apparatus, one of which was a double firefighter fatality incident.

These 2010 firefighter fatality statistics are provisional and may change as the USFA contacts State Fire Marshals to verify the names of firefighters reported to have died onduty during 2010.

The final number of firefighter fatalities will be reported in USFA’s annual firefighter fatality report, expected to be available by July.

• 2010 Firefighter Fatality Provisional Statistics (PDF, 11 Kb) HERE
• 2010 Firefighter Fatality Provisional Statistics (Text, 4 Kb) HERE
• USFA 2010 LODD Fatality Notices, HERE
• USFA 2011 LODD Fatality Notices, HERE

2010 Line of Duty

As Report From the USFA web Site

Links of Interest

Aerial View of Residence

At 2356 hours on Saturday March 19, 2011, the Huntingtown Volunteer Fire Department was alerted for the reported Chimney Fire at 3380 Soper Road in Huntingtown. While en-route, firefighters received information that the owner was trying to extinguish the fire and believed it had spread to the attic. Units alerted were: Chief 6A (Montgomery), Chief 6C (Morris), Safety 6 (McKenny), Lieutenant 6 (Buckler), Engine 62 (Smith), Engine 61 (Gaylor), Squad 6 (Wallace), Tanker 6 (Robison), Brush 6 (Montgomery Jr), Ambulance 68 (Jeffery, M) and Ambulance 69 (Bevard).

Chief 6C arrived to find smoke showing from the second floor eves of a 10,000 square foot mega-mansion. Engine 62 arrived, laying a supply line, advancing the 400′ pre-connect and began pulling the ceiling, at which time; they found fire in the attic spreading rapidly. Within seconds, conditions deteriorated significantly resulting in zero visibility and intense heat. Command immediately ordered evacuation tones. Due to high winds off the river, water supply issues, distance from the fire house, and the size of the structure (10,000 square feet), fire spread rapidly.

Immediately thereafter, the second floor flashed over resulting in nine firefighters being injured, five from Huntingtown Volunteer Fire Department and four from Prince Frederick Volunteer Fire Department. As a result of the unbearable heat, several firefighters took extreme measures such as jumping out of windows and running through walls to evacuate the structure. Chief 6A immediately ordered a Full Second Alarm with two Tankers. Later in the incident, additional units were Special Alarmed to the scene. On scene were several ambulances and medics providing care to the injured firefighters.

Although units from Calvert, Charles, St. Mary’s, Anne Arundel, and Prince Georges were utilized, fire spread in such a rapid manner that the home is considered a total loss.

Two of the Huntingtown firefighters were seriously injured and transported by aviation to Washington Hospital Center. The other seven firefighters were transported to Calvert Memorial Hospital for evaluation and treatment. Subsequently, six of those initially transported to Calvert Memorial, two from Huntingtown and four from Prince Frederick, were transported to Baltimore Shock Trauma and Washington MedStar for follow-up evaluation and treatment for smoke inhalation. All seven firefighters have since been released.

The event narrative was issued through Chief Jonathan Riffe of the Huntington VFD, MD (HERE)

•  Huntington VFD Web Page, HERE
• Photos courtesy of: www.DennisHook.smugmug.com
• More Videos and Narrative from STATter911, HERE

We’ll be posting more information on Extreme Fire Behavior, Vent Paths, Wind Driven Fire Considerations in the next few days.

Do you know what's underneath you as you're making entry?

If you’ve been paying attention to the latest news and on the job reports these past few days, you may have noticed there’s been an emerging trend evident in near miss, close-calls resulting in maydays, RIT deployments and self-rescue resulting from floor compromise and floor collapse. 

As I was doing some research and posting links related to the first one or two events on Buildingsonfire on Facebook, HERE, it became evident that there was an immediate opportunity to get some learning’s and insights out. If you have a chance head over to Facebook and link into Buildingsonfire and check out the incident links posted as well as some immediate report links.

I’ll plan to develop some operational safety and awareness insights related to building construction, floor systems and operational integrity in the next few days. I’ll get a comprehensive list of events and incident parameters compiled and posted also.

In the meantime here are some links I pulled together that you should take the time to read and share with your companies, personnel and staff…..

This seems like a good time to have a ten minute drill on these events as Operating Expeeince (OE) on floor systems and operational safety.

Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE)

• Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know
• Career Engineer Dies and Fire Fighter Injured After Falling Through Floor While Conducting a Primary Search at a Residential Structure Fire – Wisconsin
• Volunteer deputy fire chief dies after falling through floor hole in residential structure during fire attack – Indiana
• A career captain and a part-time fire fighter die in a residential floor collapse – Ohio
• Career fire fighter dies after falling through the floor fighting a structure fire at a local residence – Ohio
• Career lieutenant dies following floor collapse into basement fire and a career fire fighter dies attempting to rescue the career lieutenant – New York
• Floor collapse at commercial structure fire claims the lives of one career lieutenant and one career fire fighter – New York
• First-floor collapse during residential basement fire claims the life of two fire fighters (career and volunteer) and injures a career fire fighter captain – New York
• NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
• NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Structural Collapse (1999)
• Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors 
• CommandSafety.com: Operational Safety at Basement Fires: Close Call
• CommandSafety.com: Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report
• CommandSafety.com: Remembering Brackenridge 1991 Floor Collapse and LODD
• CommandSafety.com: Engineered Structural Systems- Hazards

Here’s some screen shots from Buildingsonfire on Facebook. Go HERE or follow the link at the left column. Join the growing list of 3500 fans with Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Buildingsonfire.com (fully launching in January, 2011)