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Fire in Syracuse: Four Firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978

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The 701 University Ave Fire- 1978

 

Fire in Syracuse: Four firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978

April 9th marks the 35th anniversary of the 701 University Ave. fire that claimed the lives of four Syracuse (NY) firefighters in 1978 while conducting search & rescue and suppression operations at an apartment building on the Syracuse University Campus, in Syracuse, New York.  

 

The fire began when one of the tenants lit a candle in a styrofoam wig stand and left it unattended. At 00:46 hours on Sunday April 9, 1978, an alarm of fire was transmitted for a reported building fire at 701 University Avenue on the campus of Syracuse University.

The Victorian style house was a three story building constructed of wood balloon framing and was built circa 1898. The house had been converted into ten (10) apartments that were occupied by SU students. The gross area of each of the three floors was approx. 1,750 sq. ft., with a predominate rectangular footprint shape measuring 69 ft. x 35 ft.  The third floor apartments only had access via a stairway in the rear, down a long narrow corridor that measured only 33 inches wide.

Post Fire View of Building from Bravo Side. Photo CJ Naum, 1978

 

The building had inherent vertical and horizontal concealed spaces indicative of balloon frame style construction along with additional concealed spaces in the third floor ceiling area. A partial automatic sprinkler system had been installed in the building in order to comply with a 1952 State of New York law. This system provided protection to the basement, means of egress, a storage area and a portion of the concealed space above the third floor.

The fire originated in a second floor apartment, and then spread into the combustible concealed space above the third floor ceiling. Approximately sixteen minutes into fireground operations the first indications of firefighting personnel being in distress were received.  The first call to the Alarm center was made at 0045:17 hrs., with the first-due engine arriving at 0048:05 and first water applied at 0051 (est).

 

The four SFD fire fighters, Frank Porpiglio Jr., Stanley Duda, Michael Petragnani, and Robert Schuler, who were assigned to the Squad and Rescue Companies, entered the house to conduct a primary search of the premises for SU students thought to be trapped in the house.

While operating on the third floor inside, a scalding steam caused by triggered sprinklers prevented the four firefighters from escaping, and they eventually depleted their air supply and suffocated to death. The firefighters were operating with full PPE that was complaint at that time ( 1978) and were utilizing state-of-the art SCBA in the form of the new 4.5 SCBA systems.   All the tenants had escaped safely before the fire fighters had entered the house. The fire was subsequently investigated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) at the request of the City of Syracuse and NFPA Report No. LS-3 was published.  

 

Syracuse Post Standard Front Page April 10, 1978

 

Killed in the Line of Duty on April 9th, 1978:

Syracuse (NY) Fire Department

  • FF Michael Petragnani, Age 27.   ~  Rescue Company – appointed 8/20/1973
  • FF Frank Porpiglio Jr., Age 24.   ~  Squad Company – appointed 8/20/1973
  • FF Robert Shuler, Age 31.  ~  Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973
  • FF Stanley Duda, Age 34.   ~  Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973 

 

Remembrance, Honor, Courage and Sacrifice

Never Forgotten

 

 

 

Post Fire View, East Adams Street and University Ave. Photo: CJ Naum, 1978

 

Martin J. Whitman School of Management stands today at the corner, Photo CJ Naum, 2013

Memorial Plaque placed in 2005 in the Martin J. Whitman School of Management located on the site of 1978 fire. Photo: CJ NAum, 2013

 

Remembrance 1978-2013 SFD Rescue ~ Squad

 

 

High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year

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High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year
  

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is reporting that in 2005-2009, there were an average of 15,700 reported structure fires in high-rise buildings per year with an associated $235 million in direct property damage.

The report, “High-Rise Building Fires,” (PDF, 499 KB) cites apartments, hotels, offices, and facilities that care for sick as accounting for roughly half of all high-rise fires. Structure fires in these four property classes resulted in $99 million in direct property damage per year.

There is a downward trend in high-rise fires. In the last few decades, a range of special provisions have migrated into the codes and standards for tall buildings.

Other findings from the report:

  • In 2005-2009, high-rise fires claimed the lives of 53 civilians and injured 546 others, per year.
  • The risks of fire, fire death, and direct property damage due to fire tend to be lower in high-rise buildings than in shorter buildings of the same property use.
  • An estimated three percent of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.
  • Usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings of the same property use.Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story.  The risk of a fire is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

 In 2005-2009, an estimated 15,700 reported high-rise structure fires per year resulted in associated losses of 53 civilian deaths, 546 civilian injuries, and $235 million in direct property damage per year. An estimated 2.6% of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.

The trends in high-rise fires and associated losses (inflation-adjusted for property damage) are clearly down, but the sharp post-1998 reduction appears to be mostly due to the change to NFIRS Version 5.0, which is shifting estimates to lower levels that also appear to be more accurate.

Four property classes account for roughly half of high-rise fires: apartments, hotels, facilities that care for the sick, and offices. In 2005-2009, in these four property classes combined, there were 7,800 reported high-rise structure fires per year and associated losses of 30 civilian deaths, 352 civilian injuries, and $99 million in direct property damage per year. The property damage average is inflated by the influence of one 2008 hotel fire, whose $100 million loss projected to nearly $40 million a year in the analysis.

The report emphasizes these four property classes.

Some other property uses – such as stores and restaurants – may represent only a single floor in a tall building primarily devoted to other uses. Some property uses – such as grain elevators and factories – can be as tall as a high-rise building but without a large number of separate floors or stories.

  • For these reasons, the four property use groups listed above define most of the buildings we think of as high-rise buildings, and their fires come closest to defining what we think of as the high-rise building fire problem.
  • By most measures of loss, the risks of fire and of associated fire loss are lower in highrise buildings than in other buildings of the same property loss.
  • This statement applies to risk of fire, civilian fire deaths, civilian fire injuries, and direct property damage due to fire, relative to housing units, for apartments, and risk of fire for hotels, offices, and facilities that care for the sick.

The usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings, for each property use group. Even so, considering the extensive requirements in NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, for fire and life safety features in both new and existing high-rise buildings, it seems clear that there are still major gaps, particularly in adoption and enforcement of the provisions requiring retrofit of automatic sprinkler systems and other life safety systems in existing high-rise buildings. NFPA 1®,Fire Code, has sprinkler retrofit requirements.

This has implications for public officials and ordinary citizens in any city. Public officials should make sure that the latest editions of NFPA 1®, Fire Code, and NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, are in place and that the codes they have are supported by effective code enforcement provisions, including plan review and inspection processes, both for new construction and for continued supervision of code compliance in existing buildings.

The public can take responsibility for their own safety by insisting that their public officials take these steps. As in so many areas of fire safety, we know what to do, but we still need to do it.

The trend had been toward a smaller share of fires being reported each year as occurring in buildings with fire-resistive construction, both for high-rise and other buildings, with the decline being most dramatic in facilities that care for the sick.

  • This statistical decline could reflect any or all of the following:
  • (a) a shift in construction between the two types permitted by codes, from Type I (442 or 332) construction, which is coded as fire-resistive, to Type II (222) construction, which is coded as protected non-combustible;
  • (b) a shift to acceptable alternative designs using more sprinklers and less fire-resistive construction; or
  • (c) enough success in containing fires that a rising fraction never are reported to fire departments, because the fires are caught and controlled so early by occupants.

 Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The fraction of 2005-

2009 high-rise fires that began on the 7th floor or higher was 32% for apartments, 22% for hotels and motels, 21% for facilities that care for the sick, and 39% for office buildings. The risk of a fire start is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

  • High-rise apartments have a slightly larger share of their fires originating in means of egress than do their shorter counterparts (4% vs. 3%).
  • The same is true of hotels (7% vs. 5%) and facilities that care for the sick (6% vs. 4%).
  • In offices (4% vs. 6%), the differences in percentages are in the opposite direction, which means that high-rise buildings in those properties have a smaller share of their fires originating in means of egress.
  • In all four property classes, the differences are so small that one can say there is no evidence that high-rise buildings have a bigger problem with fires starting in means of egress.

 

NFPA FACT SHEET

 

 

  • More information on Solomon’s NFPA session and the conference can be found at www.nfpa.org/FLSCONF.
  • NFPA Report Download, HERE

1980 MGM Grand Hotel Fire-Thirty Years Ago

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Thirty years ago on the morning of November 21, 1980, 85 people died and more than 700 were injured as a result of a fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. This was the second largest life-loss hotel fire in United States history. It was determined during the investigation that the fire originated in the wall soffit of the side stand in the Deli, one of five restaurants located on the casino level. The investigators concluded that several factors contributed to the cause of the fire but the primary source of ignition was an electrical ground fault. 

Once the fire ignited, it quickly traveled to the ceiling and the giant air-circulation system above the casino. In the casino, flames fed on flammable furnishings, including wall coverings, PVC piping, glue, fixtures, and even the mirrors on the walls, which were made of plastic.  

The fire burned undetected for hours until it flashed over just after 7 a.m. and began spreading at a rate of 19 feet (5.8 meters) per second through the casino. As fire companies and firefighters were arriving, according to published reports, an estimated one-million-cubic-foot wall of flames was rushing through the casino, melting slot machines and sending a cyanide-laced cloud of killer smoke pouring upward.  

The investigation determined that the rapid fire spread was due to a series of installation and building design flaws. A wire at the point of fire origin that had been improperly grounded could’ve been discovered had the area been inspected. A compressor wasn’t properly installed. A piece of copper wasn’t insulated correctly. A fire alarm never sounded. A stairwell that was a crucial escape route filled with smoke. The laundry chutes failed to seal and defects existed in the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems. All of these factors contributed to the spread of smoke.  

Photo: AP/World Wide

This fire provided a wake-up call for the industry to improve fire safety standards in hotels around the country. As a result, hotels today are safer than ever.  

  • About 5,000 people were in the resort when the blaze started to burn in earnest.
  • Many were trapped in their rooms, in the corridors, and in stairwells, and most of the victims died at the scene or in Las Vegas Valley hospitals.
  • Another handful of victims succumbed to fire-related injuries within a year.
  • Fourteen firefighters were hospitalized, most suffering from smoke inhalation.
  • According to the newspapers reports, NFPA’s Fire Investigation Manager, David Demers, concluded that “with sprinklers, it would have been a one or two sprinkler fire, and we would never have heard about it.”
  • An employee cutting through the closed Deli on the way to work was the first to see the fire. The worker, not identified by name in the fire investigation report, called security, then tried to put it out. The worker wasn’t trained and the proper equipment wasn’t there, the NFPA investigation said.
  • A visiting firefighter from Illinois breakfasting in an adjacent coffee shop also tried to help a security guard find an extinguisher to put out the electrical fire, but they couldn’t locate one.
  • A flame front moved into the casino, where the fire gained speed and strength, fueled by more flammable materials, including the highly flammable adhesive used to attach ceiling tiles.
  • Again, sprinklers would have put the fire out there.
  • Without them, within minutes, the fireball tore through the casino, blowing out the doors leading to the valet area.
  • Soon, killer smoke rose through the 26-floor high-rise tower via ventilation ducts.
  • While the lack of sprinklers was a major factor contributing to the severity of the MGM fire, it’s not that simple. Blame also has to be given to code violations, design flaws, installation errors, and materials that made the fire worse.
  • The fire alarms didn’t sound because they were manual and nobody pulled them. However, the disaster might have been worse if the alarms had prompted more people to rush into smoke-filled hallways.
  • Despite the discovery of 83 building code violations, nobody was ever charged criminally with any wrongdoing

 To make matters worse, fire marshals had insisted sprinklers be installed in the casino during the building’s construction in 1972, but the hotel refused to pay for the $192,000 system, and a Clark County building official sided with the resort. Authorities later said the sprinkler system could have prevented the disaster at the hotel, which is now Bally’s Las Vegas Hilton Casino Resort. The fallout was $223 million in legal settlements, in addition to the lives lost.   

  • Construction of the 26-story MGM Grand Hotel and Casino (currently Bally’s) started in 1972 and it opened in December of 1973.
  • There were 2,078 rooms at the hotel and the total area of the hotel and casino was approximately two million square feet.
  • Fire sprinkler systems were not installed in the high-rise hotel, the casino (approximately 380 by 1200 feet, or 450,000 square feet), and the restaurant areas.
  • Only partial fire sprinkler protection was provided for limited areas (arcade, showrooms and convention areas) on the ground level.
  • Where the sprinklers had been installed, they clearly worked. But sprinklers weren’t anywhere near where the fire broke out behind a wall near a serving station at The Deli that Friday morning about 7:10 a.m.
  • The Deli had received an exemption for sprinklers because it was supposed to be a 24-hour restaurant. It was assumed someone would always be there to put out a fire.
  • But then the hours changed and The Deli wasn’t open all the time. It was closed when the fire erupted.
  • The fire, caused by an electrical ground-fault, smoldered for hours before breaking through the wall.

   

  • According to NFPA’s final investigation report , several major factors contributed to the large loss of life in this fire. Among them was the rapid fire and smoke development in the casino in the early stages of the fire due, in part, to the lack of sprinklers and adequate fire barriers.
  • The fire generated massive amounts of smoke that spread up the hotel’s 23-story high-rise tower through unprotected vertical seismic joints and elevator hoistways and the substandard interior stair enclosures and exit passages.
  • In addition, the hotel’s heating, ventilating, and air conditioning continued to operate during the fire, pushing smoke throughout the high-rise.
  • Investigators found no evidence that the hotel had executed an emergency plan or sounded an evacuation alarm signal. Nor was there any evidence of manual fire alarm pull stations in the natural escape path in the casino.
  • The number and capacity of the exits from the casino were deficient, and the travel distances from certain areas of the casino to the exits were too long.
  • Finally, there was no automatic means of recalling the elevators to the main floor during the fire to prevent people from boarding them. Ten of the MGM Grand victims were found in the hotel’s elevators.
  • As a result of this fire, NFPA Life Safety Code® requirements for stairwell re-entry onto building floors if the exit stair enclosure becomes untenable were changed to include three options.
  • Stairwell doors must now remain unlocked on the inside of the stairwell so that people can get from the stairwell back to guest room floor.
  • Or they may be locked, but they must automatically unlock when the building’s fire alarm system activates.
  • Or hotels may use selected re-entry, in which there may be no more than four intervening floors between unlocked doors and signs must be provided to direct occupants to the floors with unlocked doors

Graphic by Mike Johnson.

  On the night of February 10, 1981, just 90 days after the devastating MGM Grand fire, an arson fire started at the Las Vegas Hilton, which at the time was being retrofitted with modern fire safety equipment. Firefighters, using the knowledge they had learned from the MGM fire, used local television networks to notify people to stay in their rooms and not go out to the halls and stairwells. Because of the lessons learned, only eight people died in this fire compared with the 84 people who died in the MGM Grand fire 

   

   

Reference Links: HERE, HERE, HERE , HERE and HERE   

Clark County (NV) Fire Department Report: HERE and Link to FD Page HERE   

NFPA Summary Report, HERE and HERE  and Article Link HERE 

NFPA Looking back at the MGM Fire, HERE   

RELATED NFPA INFORMATION
 NFPA Investigation Report: Las Vegas MGM Grand Fire  

 U.S. Hotel Fire Incident With 10 Or More Fatalities (PDF, 17KB)
 Additional Hotel/Motel Safety Information and Statistics
 Looking Back: The MGM Grand Hotel Fire (NFPA Journal, May/June 2010)
 NFPA remembers the 1980 MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas (NFPA Journal, March/April 2001) 

Las Vegas Review Journal Media Research: Here   

USFA Topical Fire Report Series; Hotel and Motel Fires, HERE 

Lessons from the Past: MGM Grand Fire on Firehouse.com, HERE   

Las Vegas and Nevada history as told by those who lived it- The MGM Fire 1980. This six part series was broadcast in 2000 and produced by KNPR’s Tim Anderson with support from the Nevada Humanities Committee. HERE   

These links from the Las Vegas Review Journal Media covered the 25th Anniversary of the event;   

IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER
IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Disaster didn’t have to be
IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Officer recalls eerie scene at burned hotel   

MGM Grand Fire Photos, HERE   

Current Data from the USFA:  

  • An estimated 3,900 hotel and motel fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 15 deaths, 150 injuries, and $76 million in property loss.
  • Hotel and motel fires are considered part of the residential fire problem. However, they comprise only approximately 1 percent of residential building fires.
  • Half of hotel and motel fires are small, confined fires.
  • Cooking is the leading cause of hotel and motel fires (46 percent). Almost all hotel and motel cooking fires are small, confined fires (97 percent).
  • Eighteen percent of non-confined hotel and motel fires extend beyond the room of origin. The leading causes of these larger fires are electrical malfunctions (24 percent), intentionally set fires (15 percent), and fires caused by open flames (12 percent). In contrast, 42 percent of all non-confined residential building fires extend beyond the room of origin.
  • While bedrooms are the primary origin of non-confined fires (23 percent), when confined cooking fires are considered, the kitchen or other cooking area is the most prevalent area of fire origin.
  • Hotel and motel fires are more prevalent in the cooler months due to increases in heating fires and peak in February (9 percent).

Bally's Las Vegas, formerly the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino today

Residential Fire Sprinklers: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH FOR COMMUNITIES

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Residential Fire Sprinklers: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH FOR COMMUNITIES

Residential Fire Sprinklers…A Step-By-Step Approach for Communities (Second Edition) – National Fire Sprinkler Association and International Association of Fire Chiefs – has developed and published a comprehensive  guide  for all stakeholders, from the citizen to the fire chief and from the homebuilder to the elected official, with an interest in improving fire protection in their community. There are a lot of great examples of communities who have been successful in adopting fire sprinkler requirements; this guide expresses some of their tactics to success.

The Guide has been developed by the National Fire Sprinkler Association in cooperation with the International Association of Fire Chiefs to assist you as a local Authority Having Jurisdiction and/or as a community advocate. You can meet the challenge and minimize the loss of life and property to fire in your community through the planning and implementation of a comprehensive residential fire sprinkler program.

The Guide essentially consists of six sections intended to systematically support the process of developing, adopting, and defending a residential fire sprinkler requirements.

  • Section 1 – Policy Decision: Are You Ready?
  • Section 2 – Building Partnerships: Mobilizing the Stakeholders
  • Section 3 – Planning and Research: Choosing the Path
  • Section 4 – Presentation and Adoption: Making it Happen
  • Section 5 – Customer Service and Support
  • Section 6 – Never Let Your Guard Down

While these sections focus on the residential dwelling segment of the current fire sprinkler market and technology, the concepts described in each of these sections may be found to be helpful in addressing similar issues with other types of occupancies for which fire sprinkler ordinances are appropriate. The most effective means of reducing community risk is achieved when current fire and building codes are adopted and enforced as well as all buildings, residential included, are protected with fire sprinklers.

 The Guide will also discuss the collection and use of statistical data and show how it can be used effectively to reflect issues specific to your community. The outline, which helps to focus on the use of a Blue-Ribbon Task Force (working group),may be useful in opening lines of communication between the agency and its “stakeholders” and “unexpected messengers” who will be impacted by the adoption of the residential fire sprinkler requirements. These types of working groups can often resolve problems before they become a political issue.

And finally, the Guide defines some materials that should be obtained, so that the information collected can be “user friendly” and effective throughout the process. Also incorporated in this Guide is a list of other resources, which may be helpful in the planning, research, analysis, or other phases of the process. The National Fire Sprinkler Association and the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and their staff and membership stand united and committed to assisting you in this undertaking.

The resources referenced in the guide are as comprehensive as exists when it comes to fire sprinklers in all new construction, especially residential fire sprinklers. With a majority of the fire deaths in the United States occurring in residential buildings, and billions of dollars in fire loss attributed to the direct and indirect costs associated with residential fires, it is time for state and local fire and building officials to seek the solutions to this national tragedy.

The people who use this guide will play different roles in the process to improve quality of life in the community through fire protection improvements. The amount of time spent to ensure a safer future for the community will vary depending on the role in the community. The authors strongly recommend that regardless of the role, everyone involved should make the commitment to read this guide as a minimum. Each section of this guide contains information important to each stakeholder in the process. As you read through it, pay particular attention to the parts directly related to your role, also look for the other perspectives in relation to yours. Taking this action will help to ensure the outcome focuses on the citizen and the quality of life of the community.

You can find a wealth of reference and technical information at the National Fire Sprinkler Association web site HERE and download the Residential Fire Sprinklers…A Step-By-Step Approach for Communities (Second Edition) Guide HERE

NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements

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Major factors contributing to a rapid spread of fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., on June 18, 2007, included large open spaces with furniture providing high fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows and a lack of sprinklers, according to a draft report released for public comment today by the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The fire trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter fatalities in a single event since 9/11.

Based on its findings, the NIST technical study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes.1 If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented.

“Furniture stores typically have large amounts of combustible material and represent a significant fire hazard,” said NIST study leader Nelson Bryner. “Model building codes should require both new and existing furniture stores to have automatic sprinklers, especially if those stores include large, open display areas.”

Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet). Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.

Using a state-of-the-art computer model to simulate the fire, the study team found that the addition of automatic sprinklers inside the loading dock could have significantly slowed the fire (which began just outside the dock area), prevented it from spreading beyond the dock, and eventually, extinguished it completely. The model also showed that sprinklers on the loading dock likely would have maintained what firefighters call tenability conditions, the ability for individuals in a fire event to escape unassisted.

Factors identified as contributing to the fire’s progress include: (1) the high fuel loads—especially furniture—present throughout the building; (2) the lack of sprinklers throughout the Sofa Super Store; (3) the open floor plan of the facility; (4) the hidden build-up of combustible smoke and gases in the area between the drop ceiling and the roof of the main showroom; (5) the non-fire-activated roll-up door that was open between the loading dock and the holding area; (6) the four fire-activated roll-up doors (out of seven) that activated but did not close during the fire; (7) the metal walls in the warehouse and west showroom that allowed heat from the fire to ignite items next to the walls; and (8) the breaking of windows at the front of the store that supplied air to the fire.

NIST’s team of experts traveled to Charleston to gather data within 36 hours of the Sofa Super Store fire. Using these data and other information collected in the following months (such as building design documents, records, plans, video and photographic data, radio transmissions, interviews with emergency responders, and informal discussions with store employees), the NIST study team developed its computer model to simulate and analyze the characteristics of the fire, including fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, and the operation of active and passive fire protection systems.

Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:

  • The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
  • During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
  • The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
  • The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
  • When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
  • The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
  • Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.

The complete draft report is available online at http://www.nist/gov/el

NIST welcomes comments on the draft report and its recommendations. To be considered for the final report, comments must be received by noon EST on Dec. 2, 2010. Comments may be submitted via e-mail to firesafety@nist.gov; fax to (301) 975-4052; or mail to the attention of NIST Technical Study: Sofa Super Store, NIST, 100 Bureau Dr., Stop 8660, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8660.

Once the final report is published, NIST will work with the appropriate committees of the International Code Council (ICC) on using the study’s recommendations to improve provisions in model building and fire codes. NIST also will work with the major organizations representing state and local governments—including building and fire officials—and firefighters to encourage them to seriously consider its recommendations.

Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire

1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised.

2.   Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address:

a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.

3.  Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031.

4.  Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision:

a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).

5.  Comprehensive Risk Management Plans:  NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to:

a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.

6.  Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities: 

a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground.

7.  Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are:

a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires.

8.  Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are:

a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service. 

9.  Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective.

10.  Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to:

a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations.

11.  Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies.

NIST has more than 40 years of experience conducting building and fire safety studies and researching the aftermath of disasters and failures. By understanding the technical causes for such incidents and making the information available to the public, NIST scientists and engineers strive to improve the safety of buildings, their occupants and emergency responders. NIST’s technical building failure and fire studies do not address fault.

  • Volume I: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
  • Volume II: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
    (Note: The reports are presented in .pdf. To read these files, you can download Adobe Acrobat Reader free.)
  • Statement to the Media Delivered at NIST Charleston Fire Study Press Briefing, Oct. 28, 2010, by Nelson Bryner, Lead, Study Team
  • PowerPoint Presentation Accompanying Statement at Press Briefing
  • Video B-Roll on the NIST Charleston Fire Study (mp4)
  • Graphic Showing Floor Plan of Charleston Sofa Super Store
  • Graphic Showing Smoke and Fire Movement at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Temperature Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Oxygen Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Shopping Center Explosion: Fluid Risk Assessment

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    NIOSH recently released it’s report on the Penn-Mar Shopping Center Explosion that occured on May 7, 2008 in Prince George’s County, Maryland. Report Copy HERE. A number of mission critial lessons and insights can be gained regarding initial response, command management, operational safety, tactical deployment and effective situational awareness and dynamic risk assessment through an unstable progressing incident. Here are some of the insights and specifics.

    At 12:54 PM on Thursday, May 7, 2009, Prince George’s County Firefighter/Medics were dispatched to respond to the Penn-Mar Shopping Center, a large 1-story strip mall, in the 3400 Block of Donnell Drive in Forestville and arrived at 12:59 PM.  First arriving crews initiated an investigation into a strong odor of natural gas inside the businesses.  Firefighters evacuated 5 of the 6 stores that were in the area of the odor, a sixth store was vacant. 

    • Forty-five people were evacuated from the 5 stores and firefighters then started ventilation efforts and called for assistance of the Washington Gas Company.  Firefighters discovered natural gas bubbling up from the ground on the exterior rear of the vacant store and minutes later reported that there was a fire on the interior. 
    • Within a minute, at about 1:20 PM, a massive explosion occurred. 
    • A MAYDAY call was sounded and additional resources including paramedics and a second alarm of firefighters were summoned to the scene.

    Large plate glass windows blew shattered glass and other debris 60-70 feet into the front parking lot, the roof assembly appeared to have been lifted up and then fell back into place and the rear brick and block wall was completely blown out.  Firefighters were in the direct line of the explosion and suffered burns and injuries from flying debris.  Firefighters were wearing their personal protective gear which is believed to have minimized injuries.  They quickly gathered themselves and checked on other crew members and civilians that may have been injured.  A total of eight firefighters sustained a variety of injuries ranging from lacerations to second degree burns.  Four Firefighters were transported to the Washington Hospital Center Burn Unit where two were treated and released and two were admitted for additional treatment.  While initially transported with serious injuries, the firefighter’s conditions have been upgraded to “good.”  Four other firefighters were transported to other area hospitals and were treated and released.  One civilian, an employee of the Washington Gas Company was also treated and released from an area hospital.  There were no injuries to any of the 45 evacuated civilians. 

     3-18-2010 9-29-48 PM

    A small fire resulted from the explosion that was quickly contained and extinguished.  The investigation so far has determined that the release of natural gas occurred in the vacant store and reached an ignition point that resulted in the explosion.  The Fire/EMS Department’s Technical Rescue Team completed a through secondary post-blast search of the damaged stores confirming that everyone heeded the orders of first arriving firefighters to evacuate.  (Excerpt from PGFD Press Release 05.07.2009)

     3-18-2010 9-09-52 PM

    Building Knowledge

    The south side of the structure was comprised of 10 business spaces (three of which were vacant) in a strip mall designed and constructed as a Type II, noncombustible classification in the 1970s. The section of the commercial structure involved in the incident was comprised of a main 2 story building, which included 2 vacant businesses and a mall office, with an adjoining wing on the right consisting of 6 businesses (1 unoccupied) in a single story with high dropped ceilings, large attic void spaces, and a sprinkler system. In the wing along the C-side were utility rooms housing the electrical circuit panels, sprinkler system controls, and security panels. It was constructed of brick/block and mortar with large plate glass windows on the A-side, block and mortar exterior C and D-side walls, and a block and mortar interior B-side wall adjoining the rest of the structure. The roof was a commercial flat roof consisting of open web, steel bar flat roof trusses covered with corrugated metal “q-deck” with multi-layered plies of bitumen laminated roof felts and topped with a granule-surfaced cap sheet. The open web steel bar roof trusses were connected to a steel beam and column structural assembly system.

    The interior walls separating the businesses were primarily light weight galvanized metal studs covered with a ½ inch gypsum wall board providing tenant separation and compartmentation. The ceiling was a suspended acoustic tile ceiling system which provided a common void space over the business occupied areas of the adjoining right wing. The businesses contained office furniture, partitions, restaurant equipment and supplies, and health and beauty equipment and products.

    NIOSH Report Summary

    On May 7, 2009, two captains, a lieutenant, and five fire fighters were injured during a natural gas explosion at a strip mall in Maryland. At 1254 hours, dispatch reported a natural gas leak inside a business at a strip mall. Five minutes later, the initial responding crew and the incident commander (IC) arrived on scene to find a gas company employee looking for an underground gas leak. Approximately 6 minutes later, a natural gas leak was found near the exterior rear corner of the structure. After 23 minutes on scene, approximately 45 civilians were evacuated from 7 occupied businesses.

    A captain exited the rear door of the business that had called in the natural gas leak and noticed fire along the roof line. Crews in the front and rear of the structure had begun to pull hoselines as another captain was looking out the rear doorway of a middle unoccupied business and noticed the electric meter located on the exterior wall on fire. Anticipating an explosion, he tried to leap out the rear doorway. At the same time, a fire fighter had entered the front door of the unoccupied business, noticed the heavy smell of natural gas, and felt air rush by as the structure exploded. Debris and fire blew out the front, rear, and roof of the structure. The captain who tried to leap out the rear doorway was blown into the rear parking lot and the fire fighter who had entered the front of the structure was blown out the front door and covered with debris. Numerous other fire fighters, primarily near the front of the structure were blown off their feet and hit with debris.

    An uninjured captain issued a Mayday, followed by the IC ordering evacuation tones and a personnel accountability report. Crews began to look for the captain who was blown out the rear doorway. He had walked around the side to the front of the structure, and radioed his location to command. Fire fighters began moving injured personnel to ambulances staged in the front parking lot. Eight fire fighters and a gas company employee were transported to local hospitals. The injuries ranged from third degree burns to an ankle sprain.

    Key contributing factors identified in this investigation included: insufficient execution of the fire department’s updated standard operating guidelines (SOGs) on incidents involving flammable gas, e.g., apparatus and fire fighters operating in a flammable area (hot zone); the accumulation of natural gas in the structure’s void spaces; unmitigated ignition source; insufficient combustible gas monitoring equipment usage and training; and, ineffective ventilation techniques.

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should

    • ensure that standard operating guidelines for natural gas leaks are understood and followed
    • contact utility companies (natural gas and electric) immediately to cut external supply/power to structures when gas leaks are suspected
    • ensure gas monitoring equipment is adequately maintained and fire fighters are routinely trained on proper use
    • ensure ventilation techniques are conducted after ignition sources are mitigated
    • ensure that rapid intervention teams are staged at the onset of an incident
    • ensure that collapse/explosion control zones are established when dealing with a potential explosion hazard

    Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations would have prevented these injuries, they are being provided as a reminder of good safety practices.

    • provide manual personal alert safety system (PASS) or tracking devices to locate potentially missing fire fighters when SCBA are not utilized
    • ensure standard operating guidelines for communications are understood by dispatch
    • ensure adequate staffing for emergency medical services and rapid intervention teams (RITs)
    • ensure training is evaluated for rank and skill levels across the combination department personnel

    Contributing Incident Factors

    Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately led to the injuries of eight fire fighters:

    • Insufficient execution of the fire department’s updated standard operating guideline on incidents involving flammable gas, e.g., apparatus and fire fighters operating in a flammable area (hot zone).
    • The accumulation of natural gas in the structure’s void spaces.
    • An unmitigated ignition source.
    • Insufficient combustible gas monitoring equipment usage and training
    • Ineffective ventilation techniques.

    Building Knowledge=Fire Fighter Safety

    When was the last time you and your company took a good look around some of your commercial shopping centers, strip centers, malls and business retail complexes? There is a wealth of mission critical information to be gained by conducting a basis walk through and looking at some key construction, configuration, layout and access and utilities features.

    Take note of the structural systems that comprise the roof assemblies and the wall and supporting interface. Identify the basic volume of the commercial spaces paying close attention to the common tenant storage, storerooms, access and transfer loading dock and delivery areas.  Focus and take note of the fire loading and its expected degree of fire behavior and intensity. Check out the condition and operability of the fixed suppression systems and the integrity of fire barriers and separations.

    There’s so much “free” data and information to be gained by going “shopping”; all of which will transcend and can be retrieved at such time a response materializes at that location in the future. If you can, capture the pertinent information into your pre-fire planning data base and make sure you discuss and share your observations, postulated strategies and tactics around the kitchen table or as a table top exercise or better yet in the form of an on-site drill or multi-company training exercise.

    Be prepared for the unexpected and always use extreme caution and heightened situational awareness and fluid risk assessment and reconnaissance processing to stay atop of any undefined and evolving incident. Do not allow the potential lack of severity; of what may have all the indications of an unremarkable/uneventful and common call run such as a gas odor investigation or a natural gas leak cause your companies to have less than a high level of alert, focus and attentive accretions through all phases and deployments of the incident. Don’t become complacent.

    In addition, take a look at some information relate to another tragic incident response to a reported gas leak that occurred in December, 1983 that lead to five fire fighter LODD’s in Buffalo, New York. HERE

    Archived Report From STATter911, from May, 2009 HERE and recent 2010 update HERE with fireground Audio

    Prince George’s County (MD) Fire Press Release from May 7, 2009, HERE

    Slide Show from WUSA9.com HERE 

    BING mapping Images, HERE