Ten Minutes in the Street: “Rubbish Fire- Fill the Box”
Ten Minutes in the Street with Christopher Naum
This special weekend edition of Ten Minutes in the Street TM is being offered on CommandSafety.com and is taking advantage of a training video produced by the LAFD in 2009 that involved a basis initial dispatch to a report of a rubbish fire that escalates into two structure fires and resulted in multiple alarm operations.
Take the opportunity to view the video clip and stop at various hold points to discuss and dialog operational considerations and issues affecting strategic command level management as well as tactical company level operational and safety issues.
Ten Minutes in the Street Weekend Edition
Consider operational factors that would affect your organization profile and resources. Take the time to entertain open dialog and discussions in a group setting. Deliberate and debate the operational issues, roles and responsibilities, safety considerations, as well as tactical deployment demands and incident priorities.
This version of “On the Fireground” uses live fire footage and talking points to illustrate some lessons learned at a recent fire incident in South Los Angeles.
The Albuquerque Fire Department seeks to improve operations from past performance
Four firefighters with the Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department were injured during operations at a three-alarm fire that injured raged through the Royal Crown Apartment Complex in southeast Albuquerque on Friday February 4, 2011.
The injured firefighters were among four who fell through the floor from the second story to the first while searching for residents of the, according to the Albuquerque Fire Department. Both suffered leg injuries, one had minor burn, and they were treated and released from University of New Mexico Hospital a few hours later, an AFD spokesperson said.
According to published reports at the time of the event, the first alarm came in at 3 p.m. bringing personnel and apparatus to the three-story building at 4801 Gibson SE. First units on the scene reported heavy smoke and flames on the north side of the building.
A crew from AFD Engine 13 entered the building and during a search rescued two uninjured residents from one apartment and also save a cat.
At 3:40 p.m. Incident command transitioned to a defense operations to fight the fire from outside the building. The third alarm was transmitted due to the projected heavy fuel load in the large complex.
Overall 75 fire personnel responded and operated at the alarm.
The fire is believed to have started behind a washing machine in the first-floor laundry room. An electric cause is suspected, but AFD said the exact cause is still under investigation.
The three-story multiple occupancy apartment complex was built in 1976 and housed 47 apartment units in 31,896 square feet of space.
In the months since the fire, the Albuquerque Fire Department has conducted a critique and post incident assessment of the operations, mayday and close-calls and overall performance of the department. As reported in the media video leading into this article, the department has taken the results of that post incident assessment and has developed training being delivered to al personnel to increase future operational performance, efficiencies and to reduce the likely hood of a similar event from occurring.
According to the Fire Department, they were playing catch-up from the early advancing stages of the incident and experienced difficulty in being able to make strategic strides to get ahead of the escalating incident severity, magnitude and rapid development.
The unexpected events leading to the multiple maydays and firefighter injuries challenged incident command and operations and could have resulted in possible multiple firefighter LODDs versus the close-call, near-miss events that subsequently lead towards the efforts to undertake critical review of the incident and operations.
Some Insights and Learning’s from the Incident included that have resulted in enhancements;
Communications
Situational Awareness
Calling the Mayday
Radio Communications
Distractions and Error Prevention
Accountability
Command Response to Mayday Events
Communications Mayday Alerts
It is imperative that all departments initiate at the least a formal or informal post incident critique or review. This may be at the company or station level or escalated to a more formal department level assessment and review based upon the incident parameters and conditions.
The initiation and development of post incident analysis or assessment can be more involving and complex, with the commitment of personnel, resources and time but the benefits derived from such a review will contribute highly to the continued development and improvement of any organization.
There are a number of recent after action, post incident or assessments reports that have been published and have been reviewed and discussed here on CommandSafety.com.
Take the time to review your incidents and runs at the company, station or battalion level. These reviews will identify and address low threshold, latent or emerging conditions before they escalate into apparent or root cause conditions that may contribute to significant adverse events and incidents.
The Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s self-critical review of this event has identified short comings at a number of levels that they are working to improve.
As they state in the video report, the outcome of this event could have been a lot worse than the injuries sustained and the resultant near-misses. The focus on improvements and enhancements within the functional areas of Calling the Mayday, Rapid Intervention and Mayday Communications and Operations is commendable and aligns with this year’s theme for Safety, Health and Survival Week.
The 2011 Safety Week theme is; Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.
Previous Safety Week announcement and details; HERE.
We’ll post under a separate article details on the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program soon.
This year’s Safety Week will focus on delivering the online IAFF Fire Ground Survival (FGS) awareness training course to all fire departments. The program is the most comprehensive survival skills and MAYDAY prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Additional planning tools and resources will be available on the Safety Week website.
The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics covered include:
Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.
Keep watching the website and the IAFC’s Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn pages for continuing updates to this year’s program and planning resources.
Additionally, look for a comprehensive series of articles, activities, insights, downloads, podcasts, video clips and resources that will be posted each day of Safety, Health and Survival Week here on Commandsafety.com,Thecompanyofficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com.
Announcements and campaign materials will begin posting in Mid-May.
We will be offering a special series of live shows nightly on Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com and blogtalkradio during the week of June 19-25, 2011 addressing key issues with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders.
This will be an exceptional opportunity to listen in, call in and participate actively in the week’ theme of Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.
These shows will be mission critical. Stay Tuned for more upcoming information.
Be Self-Critical and a Learning Organization
In the meantime think about your operations; are you self-critical and a learning organization seeking to identify gaps or areas for improvement?
There is a lot that can be learned from our daily responses and operations, whether they be that single company response or that multiple alarm incident.
All it takes is the recognition to see things for what they are and your may not be as good as you think and the understanding and desire to identify those conditions and improve .
Addtional Resources, videos and images related to the Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s operations at the Royal Crown Apartment Complex
Building Construction and Systems Training for Commanders, Company Officers & Firefighters
New for 2011
An intense and concentrated series of programs examining trends and methods in building construction for the fire service with an emphasize on construction and occupancy risk assessment, structural and construction systems, and their direct relationship on structural combat firefighting operations, firefighter survivability and the command decision-making process. Understand building systems and occupancy performance under fire conditions is mission critical with new and emerging technical information and data that is redefining tactical and operational models and firefighting protocols with new rules of engagement.
Firefighters and Officers will gain a new understanding of inherent construction features and hazards that directly influence effective risk management and decisive strategic and tactical considerations with a focus on key construction features, inherent occupancy profiles that will influence strategic, tactical and task level operations and crucial assembly systems affected by fire dynamics, extreme fire behavior and combat fire suppression operations.
These programs & seminars examine crucial considerations for Reading the Building, Occupancy Risk Profiling, Adaptive Fireground Management, Tactical Patience, Predicative Occupancy Performance and Construction Resiliency correlating building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked.
2011 Training Program Offerings
Building Construction for the Company and Command Officer
Tactical Patience and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement
The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & Tactics
Building Construction and Tactical Operations
Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
The Doctrine of Combat Fire Operations 2011
Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting
Tactical Renaissance:Building Construction & Tactical Excellence
Extreme Fire Behavior & Fireground Operations
Tactical Entertainment and Firefighter Safety
Occupancy Risk Profiling and Firefighting Strategy & Tactics
Keynotes, Lectures, Special Presentations & Programs Available
Other Building Construction, Command, Tactics and Fire Fighter Safety and Operations programs Available
Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse PDF Training Aid
The recent post titled: Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse has been receiving a considerable amount of attention as the post makes its way throughout the fire service eMedia sites, links, likes, shares and commentary circles, with over 6,000 views in the past 24 hours on various sites.
It furthers the premise that I have advocated my entire career and that is the fire service continues to recognize the need for increased knowledge, training, insights and skill sets related to building construction and its diametric relationship to firefighter, command risk management and operational safety.
And that we need to learn from each and every incident response,operation and run….Let’s continue to gain learnings and insights from not only this event, but from the vast resources of published LODD investigations, after-action reports, case studies, near-miss events and close-calls; for each has a lesson that we can use on our next call.
In order to provide support for continuing training and insight opportunities, I’ve developed a PDF download of the Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse article in its entirety.
A power point program will be forthcoming to accompany both media items.
Fire suppression operations on Alpha side prior to collapse. Firefighter is seen in the immediate collapse zone
The NIOSH Fire fighter Investigation and Prevention Program, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports recently released Report # F2009-12 for a Near-Miss event that seriously injured a firefighter wih significant learnings; HERE
Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
On May 21, 2009, a 36-year-old male career fire fighter was seriously injured while operating in a non-designated collapse zone of a commercial structure when an overhang of a bowstring truss roof system collapsed and struck him. The first arriving company officer reported a working fire in a single story Type II warehouse.
The officer looked under a steel roll-up door that was raised approximately three feet off of the ground and saw heavy fire towards the rear of the structure from floor to ceiling. Per department procedures, the first arriving companies went into a “Fast Attack” mode. Crews attempted but were unable to enter the structure because the steel roll-up door wasn’t functioning and the man door was heavily secured.
The department’s Deputy Chief arrived on the scene 9 minutes after the initial crew and determined that the fire should be fought defensively, however, this command was not relayed over the radio or verified with all crews. A crew was operating a 2 ½-inch handline just outside the structure approximately 20 minutes after the first apparatus arrived when the overhang collapsed and trapped the nozzleman.
Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include:
scene management and risk analysis,
a well-involved fire in a structure with hazardous construction features, and
fire fighters operating within a potential collapse area.
STRUCTURE
The building was constructed in 1954 and was a single-story warehouse of Type IV construction. The dimensions of the building were 110 feet deep by 50 feet wide, covering approximately 5,500 square feet. The height of the building was approximately 20 feet. The occupancy use of the building was commercial and it operated as a warehouse. The building’s structural system consisted of masonry block bearing walls with four heavy timber wood bowstring trusses for a roof system.
The heavy timber wood trusses had a 50-foot clear span to the bearing walls and were located 19 feet 9 inches on center. The heavy timber wood truss assemblies were 48 feet 7 inches in depth and were constructed of 4-inch x 6-inch timber cords and webs connected with bolt fasteners with a metal splice plate and bolt configuration at the bottom chord span. Solid 2-inch x 10-inch wood purlins located on 24-inch centering spanned perpendicular to the truss assembly with a ¾-inch plywood roofing deck. The roofing system assembly was exposed and did not have a membrane or other passive fire protection features.
Aerial view of Building
Structural stability to the heavy timber truss units was provided by 2-inch x 6-inch wood cross bracing in conjunction with the stability provided by the wood purlins and plywood deck roofing membrane. The structure contained six skylights that were 3 feet by 6 feet .
The overall integrity and structural stability of this type of structural support and roofing system is contingent upon all components maintaining their connections and load bearing or load transferring capacity.
The A-side was a non-load bearing wall that showed the traditional arched roof profile that is consistent with bowstring roof construction. The A-side wall also consisted of what appeared to be an overhanging or cantilevered façade that was covered by stucco. The overhang was part of the original construction that tied back into the bowstring truss system. The fire building was integrated into a block of commercial occupancies so that only the A-side was accessible for interior fire fighting activities.
The B-side exposure of the building was adjacent to a parking lot and was of masonry construction without any windows or doors. The C-side and D-side exposures were of similar size and construction and shared party walls between their respective sides. A pre-plan had not been completed for this structure.
Similar Interior Construction Features
At the time of the fire, the building was used as a place to grow marijuana illegally. The man door was heavily barricaded and a false wall was constructed to shield the operations from the exterior when the roll-up door was lifted. The electric service was severed and rerouted to circumvent the electric meter in order to conceal the operations.
TRAINING and EXPERIENCE
The state requires all career fire fighters to complete training equivalent to NFPA, 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, Fire Fighter 1. The department provides up to 17 months of training to certify fire fighters to NFPA Fire Fighter 1 and 2 qualifications, and a one year probationary period of supervised training for department fire fighter certification. The additional training during this probationary time focuses on driver training, pump operations, aerial ladder operations, and specialized equipment training.
Alpha Side
Injured Fire Fighter
The injured fire fighter had more than six years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training on topics such as: live fire training, rapid intervention crew (RIC) procedures, and hazardous materials.
Initial Incident Commander (IC)
The first due company officer had more than 15 years of experience with the department. Six of those years were as a fire fighter, seven years as a cross-trained paramedic, and 18 months as a lieutenant in an acting and permanent appointment at the time of the incident. The initial IC had completed the department provided five four-day sessions on critical fireground topics that were required for newly appointed lieutenants. This training included the following topics: building construction, incident management system (IMS), size-up, company operations, and rapid intervention company (RIC) operations.
Incident Commander (IC)
The IC had more than 30 years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training in topics such as: health and safety 1, 2, 3 & 4; fire command; fire instructor; fire investigation; fire management; fire officer; fire prevention; incident command; incident safety officer; and RIC procedures.
Incident Safety Officer (ISO)
The battalion chief who was assigned as the ISO for this incident had more than 20 years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training in topics such as: health and safety 1,2,3,and 4; fire command; fire instructor; RIC procedures; hazardous materials; heavy rescue 1 and 2; training officer development; wildland training; and emergency vehicle operations.
INVESTIGATION INSIGHTS
At 0446 hours central dispatch received an alarm for a reported structure fire with fire and smoke showing at a commercial occupancy. Engine 42 (E42) was the first apparatus on the scene at 0449 hours and the officer reported on the radio a working fire in a single story Type II warehouse. Note: The classification of Type II was incorrect. This building was a Type IV construction due to the heavy timber bowstring trusses.
The E42 Lieutenant and a fire fighter ran to a steel garage roll-up door that was raised approximately three feet off of the ground on the left of the A-side wall. The E42 Lieutenant looked under the door and saw heavy fire towards the rear of the structure from floor to ceiling. The E42 Lieutenant and the fire fighter attempted to raise the door but could not due to the door being dislodged from its track. Note: The door frame had been compromised by the fire and the tracks were not attached to the wall. They immediately went to a man door to the right of the A-side. It was locked and had heavy security bars. The E42 Lieutenant called Battalion Chief 6 for a truck company to perform forcible entry.
The E42 Lieutenant ordered the crew to prepare the multiversal, which is a master stream appliance that can be used on the ground, and 2 ½-inch handlines to attempt to attack the fire through the roll-up door. Note: Per department policy, all first arriving companies and officers go to work in a “fast attack” mode. At approximately 0452 hours Engine 32 (E32) and Engine 17 (E17) pulled onto the road leading to the structure within a block from the structure.
Both the E32 and E17 officers immediately radioed dispatch and requested a second alarm due to the heavy fire self-venting from the roof of the structure. E32 proceeded to the front of the structure, dropped off two 3-inch supply lines for E42, and went to hook up to a hydrant to supply E42. E32 used a 10-foot section of 3-inch supply line to hook up to one side of the hydrant. They used another 50-foot section of 3-inch supply line to hook up to the other side of the hydrant.
During this same time, at approximately 0452 hours, BC6 arrived on the scene, called to ensure a second alarm, and conducted a size-up of the front of the building and the operations taking place. A division chief arrived on the scene at 0453 hours, assumed incident command (IC), and ordered BC6 to protect Exposure D. The E17 officer and fire fighters [including the injured fire fighter (IFF)] walked up to the front of the structure and saw the E42 and E32 crews attempting to deploy the multiversal and two 2 ½-inch handlines off of E42. Note: The crews were having difficulty due to having to assemble the three 50-foot sections of 2 ½-handlines from a bag stored on top of each apparatus. The crew also removed the multiversal from on top of E42 and placed it on the ground for operation.
The IFF took the nozzle of one of the 2 ½-inch handlines and was backed up by an E17 fire fighter. Two additional fire fighters manned the other 2 ½-inch handline and were protecting the D-exposure by shooting water onto the roof from over 20 feet away from the structure. The E17 officer and E17 fire fighter operated the multiversal over 20 feet back from the roll-up door and attempted to shoot water through the opening where the door had pulled away from the wall. The E17 officer noticed that both handlines were ineffective and he went to check on the IFF. The IFF’s handline stream was ricocheting off of the man door and the four windows above it.
The L7 crew had assembled handtools on the ground in front of the Command Post. The E17 officer took a saw to the man door in an attempt to open it so that the handline could be effective. He quickly determined that the saw would not work due to the door being so heavily protected. Battalion Chief 09 arrived on the scene at 0500 hours and was designated by the IC as the Incident Safety Officer (ISO) at approximately 0504 hours. He instructed the E17 officer to attempt to open the door with a rabbit tool; the E17 officer informed the ISO he wasn’t sure where the truck company kept it. Immediately after, BC6 ordered the E17 officer to take his saw to the roll-up door and cut an opening for access.
He cut a three foot by six foot hole in the door and was attempting to cut across the door when he was tapped on the shoulder by the Deputy Chief which he assumed meant he was to quit. During this time, BC6 had received orders from the Deputy Chief to pull everyone back from the front of the building and to ensure that no one went inside. Note: According to interviews conducted by NIOSH investigators, this is the first time that anyone on the scene communicated the need to go defensive to the initial arriving officers. It was reported to the NIOSH investigators that every officer who reported to the command post was given face-to-face directions that the fire was defensive and that no one was to enter the building. This tactical decision was not relayed over the radio.
BC6 ordered the crews from E42 and E17 to set up and direct a master stream into the hole through the roll-up door from a distance. The crews fought fire from a distance with the master stream for several minutes. The IFF and the E17 fire fighter continued to fight fire with the handline moving from the roll-up door to the man door several times. Note: This crew, along with many other members that were interviewed, reported not receiving any orders regarding a defensive operation.
BC6 noticed that the fire had compromised an electrical weather head and that the power lines were going to come down soon. He turned to order crews to vacate the area where the power lines would possibly fall when he heard a large crash. He turned back and saw that the roof overhang had fallen onto the sidewalk. The collapse trapped the IFF who was operating the handline into the windows along with the E17 fire fighter. Members immediately rushed to the scene to rescue the trapped fire fighter.
The IC ordered BC6 to command the rescue crew and complete a personnel accountability report (PAR) for the fireground.
A full PAR was completed and the trapped fire fighter was removed and transported to a local hospital.
Collapse into the street on Alpha Side
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
ensure that they have consistent policies and training on an incident management system
develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning fire fighting operations
ensure that the first due company officer establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in firefighting efforts
implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that define a defensive strategy
ensure that policies are followed to establish and monitor a collapse zone when conditions indicate the potential for structural collapse
train all fire fighting personnel on building construction and the risks and hazards related to structural collapse
conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics
NIOSH RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that they have consistent policies and training on an incident management system.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning fire fighting operations
Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that the first due company officer establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in firefighting efforts.
Recommendation #5: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures that define defensive fire fighting operations.
Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that policies are followed to establish and monitor a collapse zone when conditions indicate the potential for structural collapse.
Recommendation #7: Fire departments should train all fire fighting personnel in building construction and in the risks and hazards related to structural collapse.
Recommendation #8: Fire departments should conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
Discussion: NFPA 1620 Standard for Pre-Incident Planning, states “The purpose of this document shall be to develop pre-incident plans to assist responding personnel in effectively managing emergencies for the protection of occupants, responding personnel, property, and the environment.” A pre-incident plan identifies deviations from normal operations and can be complex and formal, or simply a notation about a particular problem such as the presence of flammable liquids, explosive hazards, modifications to structural building components, or structural damage from a previous fire.
Building characteristics including type (or more importantly risk) of construction, materials used, occupancy, fuel load, roof and floor design, and unusual or distinguishing characteristics should be recorded, shared with other departments who provide mutual aid, and if possible, entered into the dispatcher’s computer so that the information is readily available if an incident is reported at the noted address.
Since many fire departments have tens and hundreds of thousands of structures within their jurisdiction, it is a challenge to establish an effective preplanning system. Priority should be given to those having elevated or unusual fire hazards and life safety considerations.
One tool for fire departments to use in assessing their risks for structures within their jurisdictions is the mnemonic, BECOME SAFE: (HERE)
Building
Evaluation
Construction/occupancy
Operational hazards
Manage time and elements
Engagement
Situational awareness
Assessment and risk analysis
Fire behavior and effects
Evaluate and execute
BECOME SAFE by CJ Naum
In this incident, the presence of the bowstring truss presented an elevated life safety consideration in the event of a fire. A thorough building inspection and pre-incident plan for a single-story, bowstring truss occupancy in this area could have potentially identified the hazards typically associated with this type of construction such as: ceiling voids, fuel loads, non-permitted renovations, roof construction, HVAC location, and exit locations. Evaluating the construction features and layout of the structure allows the fire department the opportunity to determine a response protocol for the specific identified hazards and to develop fireground strategies and tactics (ventilation strategies, avenues of fire spread, proper attack line selection, etc.) before an incident occurs.
The construction features of occupancy (bowstring truss), possible commercial fuel loads and access restrictions suggested large volumes of water would be necessary to fight a major fire at the site. A more complete pre-planning process, involving individual fire companies within their response territory could have noted this information which may have aided the IC in developing a safer and more effective offensive or defensive strategy. In order to facilitate open communication, fire department personnel and building code officials should be cross-trained on each-others’ duties and responsibilities.
Fire fighters should have a basic understanding of what a code violation is and how to report them during a pre-plan, and building code inspectors should have a basic understanding of fire fighter safety issues during their inspections. The relay of this information could be used to facilitate dynamic risk management and enhanced command and control.
See Report Insights related to Bowstring Truss Roof Operations on the FDNY Waldbaum’s Fire August 1978;HERE
Wednesday Night’s Program has been postponed due to Emergent Server issues at BlogTalkRadio.
The Program has been rescheduled for Thursday November 4th at 9:00pm EDT
Turn Out to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”
If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.
The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued. Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.
Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention? Join the live broadcast on Thursday night November 4th at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.
For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
For a Rockin’ Hot Time, Tune in this coming Wednesday night to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement”.
Joining Christopher Naum will be Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department, Deputy Chief John Sullivan, Worcester (MA) Fire Department, along with Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA. We will be discussing the emerging Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement. Don’t miss out for what will certainly be an insightful look at what the fire ground is transitioning to in 2010 and beyond. Join the live broadcast on Wednesday night September 22nd at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.
In the weeks ahead we’ll be publishing a six month schedule of upcoming guests and topics along within integrating post production podcast resources, training aides and supplemental reference links to make both the live broadcast program and downloads value added.
Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.
Check out the IAFC Safety Health & Survival Section HERE and the newly published Rules of Engagement
For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries. As part of that effort the Safety, Health and Survival Section has developed “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground. These rules are available in a poster which can be downloaded or ordered from http://fireservicebooks.com
The International Society of Fire Service Instructors is proud to announce the release of “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.” The program is a train-the trainer package that combines the latest research on light weight building construction from National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), Underwriters Laboratories(UL), Michigan State University, The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and the Chicago Fire Department into a single resource tailored for company-level instruction.
The program was made possible through a Prevention & Research Grant from the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program and the Department of Homeland Security. The ISFSI partnered with Eastern Kentucky University’s Fire & Safety Engineering Technology Program to analyze line of duty deaths between 1997 and 2009 to study the impact that lightweight construction has had on firefighters and firefighting operations.
The DVD included in the program package contains all of the instructional resources necessary to provide quality training on this important topic. A wide variety of support materials are included to provide the user a deep understanding of the challenges with modern building construction techniques. Instructors can tailor the program to meet the needs of their audience, including a 2-hour brief up to a week-long program.
The program will be distributed to all members of the ISFSI as a free member benefit. The ISFSI has also partnered with the Safety & Health Section of the IAFC to provide a copy to each of its members. ISFSI President, Eddie Buchanan, was on hand at the Safety & Health Section Meeting at FRI to personally deliver Chief Billy Goldfeder his copy as chair of the section. All members should expect their copy to arrive in their mailboxes over the next week.
“I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to the ISFSI members and staff who worked so hard to bring this product to firefighters across America and the globe. It is truly a lifesaving program and a fantastic use of grant funds. It is critical that this package get into the hands of every instructor and fire officer to ensure they are educated and prepared to handle the real risk that looms out there on the next call,” said President Buchanan.
Check out the International Society of Fire Service Instructor’s (ISFSI) web site HERE.
Not a member? Take the time to sign up and get connected.
Check out Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum on Firefighter NetCast.com this Thursday night August 19th at 9pm ET with a live online radio call-in show addressing the most current issues affecting the Fire Service.
This month Christopher Naum’s guests include Battalion Chief Matt Tobia with the Anne Arundel County, MD Fire Department, a metropolitan combination Fire / Rescue / EMS agency in Suburban Baltimore, MD and Battalion Chief Greg W. Collier, Mount Laurel Fire Department, NJ and NFFF/EGH Region II Advocate discussing the emerging and prevailing issues related to situational awareness on the fireground and incident scene and its relationship to firefighter safety or operational integrity. The show is titled; “We Have a Situation; Are you Aware?”
Go to www.FirefighterNetCast.com to listen and participate live, with a national and international audience of firefighters, officers and commanders from rural heartlands of Oklahoma to the suburbs of Chicago and the urban streets of DC. Or download the program later in the week for later use. Check out the premiere show with featured guests Chief Billy Hayes (DCFD) and Chief Doug Cline (High Point FD, NC).
Also, if you haven’t taken the time, check out the latest on the FireEMS Blogs Community at CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com. Taking it to the Streets is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production
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Taking it to the Streets
With Christopher Naum
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A Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighter Netcast.com Production
Advancing FireFighter Safety and Operational Intergrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.
The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program has released the investigation report of the line of duty deaths of two career FDNY firefighters during a 2007 seven-alarm high-rise fire in the former Deutsche Bank building undergoing deconstruction and asbestos abatement.
On August 18, 2007, two FDNY firefighters; Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo lost thier lives while operating at this incident. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations. FDNY Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran and FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, became trapped in the maze-like conditions of a high-rise building undergoing deconstruction. The building’s standpipe system had been disconnected during the deconstruction and the partitions constructed for asbestos abatement prohibited fire fighters from getting water to the seat of the fire. An hour into the incident, the fire department was able to supply water by running an external hoseline up the side of the structure. Soon after the victims began to operate their hoseline, they ran out of air. The victims suffered severe smoke inhalation and were transported to a metropolitan hospital in cardiac arrest where they succumbed to their injuries.
By the time the fire was extinguished, 115 fire fighters had suffered a variety of injuries.Key contributing factors to this incident include: delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel, inoperable standpipe and sprinkler system, delay in establishing water supply, inaccurate information about standpipe, unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously, extreme fire behavior, uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor, blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress, maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris, heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented, failure of fire fighters to always don SCBAs inside structure and to replenish air cylinders, communications overwhelmed with numerous Mayday and urgent radio transmissions, and lack of crew integrity.
NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
review and follow existing standard operating procedures on high-rise fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters are not operating in hazardous areas without the protection of a charged hoseline.
be prepared to use alternative water supplies when a building’s standpipe system is compromised or inoperable.
develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating guidelines for risk management during complex high-rise operations.
ensure that crew integrity is maintained during high-rise fire suppression operations.
train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning high-rise structure.
ensure that fire fighters diligently wear their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) when working in environments that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).
train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
use exit locators (both visual and audible) or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit.
conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
encourage building owners and occupants to report emergency situations as soon as possible and provide accurate information to the fire department.
consider additional fire fighter training using a high-rise fire simulator.
Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:
conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters in high-rise structures.
continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communications in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Municipalities should:
ensure that construction and/or demolition is done in accordance with NFPA 241: Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations.
develop a reporting system to inform the fire department of any ongoing, unique building construction activities (such as deconstruction or asbestos abatement) that would adversely affect a fire response.
establish a system for property owners to notify the fire department when fire protection/suppression systems are taken out of service.
An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of the PPT programon Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites
Basement fires in both residential and commercial occupancies are one of the most challenging tactical operations that present numerous risk factors that required the highest degree of situational awareness, training skill sets and continuous incident monitoring and assessment to gauge building structural integrity, fire behavior and crew integrity and performance.
An explosion rocked a Fairdale, Kentucky neighborhood this past weekend while the homeowner was in the process of doing remodeling his basement. A Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Mark Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel.
Fellow firefighters, including his brother-in-law, who was right behind him prior to his fall, were yelling and screaming at Long to hang on. They managed to get a ladder to the basement and it was up to Long to find the strength to get out. He says “I started to try to climb up. I got two, I lost my grip, fell flat into the fire. I was so exhausted.” On his third attempt, he did find the strength and pulled himself up the ladder and out of the flames.
According to published reports a coordinated fire suppression effort was undertaken, with heavy fire involvement extending throughout the house and into the roof area. Interior fire attack was commenced, and as crews began moving across the first floor area above the seat of the fire, the floor subassembly failed causing an isolated collapse and compromise of the structural floor system and sub-floor decking, resulting in Captain Long falling into the basement. The fire originating in the basement was the result of the homeowners’ use of acetone as a floor treatment when the chemical vapors were ignited by the hot water heater causing an explosion and resulting fire.
Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive)
Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner.
Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment
Here are some resources and case studies resulting from operations at floor collapses;
Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know, Here
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
Career Fire Fighter Dies While Exiting Residential Basement Fire – New York, HERE
First-Floor Collapse During Residential Basement Fire Claims the Life of Two Fire Fighters (Career and Volunteer) and Injures a Career Fire Fighter Captain – New York, HERE
Career Engineer Dies and Fire Fighter Injured After Falling Through Floor While Conducting a Primary Search at a Residential Structure Fire – Wisconsin, HERE
Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE
Floor Collapse Claims the Life of One Fire Fighter and Injures Two-California, HERE
After a bit of an extended hiatus on the lecture circuit, Ten Minutes in the Street is returning to the Firefighter Nation Forums with more of what you came to expect with high quality scenarios and thought provoking discussions to get you engaged and thinking: strategically and tactically with a balanced risk approach.
We launch the summer series of Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios during this year’s Safety, Health & Survival Week starting on June 21.
These interactive scenario programs will be featured weekly on the FFN Fire Ground Tactics and FireFighter Safety Forum, HERE
In the mean time, here are some great Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios that we presented, take some time to look these over if you’re new to the content and interactive participation.
Ten Minutes in the Street: Read “through” the Smoke,HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street; “But its only a Garage..!”,HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street; Pipin’ Hot First Due..30 Minutes or Less, HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street; “Here’s lookin’ at You”, HERE
Ten Minutes in the Street; Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due, HERE
Also, take a moment to check out our other activity and postings at Fire EMS Blogs at TheCompanyOfficer.com. You can also follow the latest informational links on Facebook at Buildingsonfire.com
Can you keep a secret? Stay tuned for some great upcoming announcements regarding a new program series that will be brought to you by some very familiar names…..”The Summer Tour is about to begin..”
Risk versus Gain: Operations in Vacant or Abandoned Structures
Fire Fighter LODD after Being Trapped in a Roof Collapse During Overhaul of a Vacant/Abandoned Building. NIOSH recently published a report on a 2008 LODD that occurred in a vacant/ abandoned building. NIOSH Report F2008-0037. The full report is available HERE. Let’s look at some insights and overviews of that report.
Report Summary
On November 15, 2008, a 38-year-old male fire fighter died after being crushed by a roof collapse in a vacant/abandoned building. Fire fighters initially used a defensive fire attack to extinguish much of the fire showing from the second-floor windows on arrival. After the initial knockdown, fire crews entered the second floor to perform overhaul operations. During overhaul, the roof collapsed with several fire fighters still inside, on the second floor. The victim and two other fire fighters were trapped under a section of the roof. Crews were able to rescue two fire fighters (who self-extricated), but could not immediately find the victim. After cutting through roofing materials, the victim was located by fire fighters, unconscious and unresponsive.
He was removed from the structure and transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: dilapidated building conditions, incendiary fire originating in the unprotected structural roof members, inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing to interior operations involving a vacant/abandoned structure, inadequate accountability system, lack of a safety officer, an inadequate maintenance program for self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and a poorly maintained and likely inoperable personal alert safety systems (PASS), ineffective strategies for the prevention of and the remediation of vacant/abandoned structures and arson prevention.
Inherent Construction Issues
This incident occurred in a vacant unsecured residential structure which had experienced a previous fire approximately one year prior to this incident. During interviews with NIOSH investigators, fire fighters reported large amounts of fire showing from all windows on the second floor on arrival. Fire fighters also reported that the roof had burned through on the Side B/C and one fire fighter reported he could see the sky while ascending the interior stairs to perform overhaul. It is not known if the roof conditions were communicated to the incident commander before fire fighters were assigned to operate on the roof. The fire fighters were unaware of the conditions such as the exposed roof assembly, possible removal of rafter connectors (collar beams), and the use of a flammable liquid in the structural members of the roof and second floor attic area. The roof assembly (being unprotected) was directly involved as part of the fuel in this fire.
The large dormer on the A-side presents an identifiable inherent risk factor (due to the potential for structural compromise or failure) when found on 1.5 story bungalow style residential structure due to the integral manner in which the dormer structure, i.e., roof rafters, dormer framing and roofing boards along with the functionality of the ridge beam must function in order to retain structural integrity under fire conditions. The dormer may be actually supported at the upper end directly onto the roofing boards, which in turn are supported by the perpendicular roof rafters. This creates a potential area for pronounced degradation when exposed to direct or indirect flame impingement creating an area prone to early structural compromise and eventual failure.
Although the initial defensive strategy in fighting the fire was successful in knocking down the fire, the incident commander may have benefited from a continuous risk-versus-gain analysis before allowing crews to operate on interior during overhaul. The first arriving officer reported that he performed a walk around prior to allowing crews to enter the structure and the building appeared intact, but he would not have known of the alterations to the interior roof system and the removal of critical structural members. Interior condition and roof condition reports might have revealed the burned-through area of the roof, and tactics could have been altered to keep fire fighters off the roof and out of the structure.
Report Recommendations included;
Ensure that the incident commander conducts a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing to interior operations in vacant/abandoned structures and continues the assessment throughout the operations
Ensure SOPs are developed for fighting fires in vacant/abandoned buildings
Ensure that the incident commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire
Ensure that a respiratory protection program is in place to provide for the selection, care, maintenance, and use of respiratory protection equipment, including PASS devices.
Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:
Develop strategies for the prevention of and the remediation of vacant/abandoned structures and for arson prevention.
Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations could have prevented this fatality, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments:
Ensure that an EMS unit is on scene and available for fire fighter emergency care at working structure fires
Develop inspection criteria to ensure that all protective ensembles meet the requirements of NFPA 1851, Standard on Selection, Care, and Maintenance of Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting
Be aware of programs that provide assistance in obtaining alternative funding, such as grant funding, to replace or purchase fire equipment that can support critical fire department operations.
Vacant or Unoccupied: Tactical Risk and Safety
I’ve commented on this subject a few times. We seem to do a lot of things at times out of common practice and repetition, you know; “We’ve always done it that way….” syndrome. There’s a resonating theme that is making its way around the fire service dealing with going to a defensive tactical posture at vacant or unoccupied structure fires.
This command posture leads to limiting interior operating engagement, while promoting a high degree of risk management. With that being said, there are also plenty of opinions on these types of policies as such, since this type of tactical effort may be contrary to the local “culture and traditions” of the responding agencies and may be a hard pill to swallow, since we’re in the job of “ fighting ALL fires..” Please refresh your memories on a past post on Tactical Entertainment HERE and HERE
Here are some basic definitions to keep us all on the same playing field;
Vacant; refers to a building that is not currently in use, but which could be used in the future. The term “vacant” could apply to a property that is for sale or rent, undergoing renovations, or empty of contents in the period between the departure of one tenant and the arrival of another tenant. A vacant building has inherent property value, even though it does not contain valuable contents or human occupants.
Unoccupied; generally refers to a building that is not occupied by any persons at the time an incident occurs. An unoccupied building could be used by a business that is temporarily closed (i.e. overnight or for a weekend). The term unoccupied could also apply to a building that is routinely or periodically occupied; however the occupants are not present at the time an incident occurs. A residential structure could be temporarily unoccupied because the residents are at work or on vacation. A building that is temporarily unoccupied has inherent property value as well as valuable contents.
Here’s a formulative question;
As a responding company, you arrive at the scene of a vacant or unoccupied structure. The building’s construction features and systems have inherent risk associated with the occupancy, (as is the case with nearly all of our structures and occupancies).
Your company determines that you’re going to go defensive, even though you probably could make a reasonably safe entry and engage in interior structural fire suppression.
Would there be any repercussions in your station, battalion/district/community or organization if you took this tactic?
What are YOUR personal thoughts on this form of risk management?
It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and traditions that defines the fire service.”- Christopher Naum
The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine coordinated suppression operations in order to identify with; the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations, thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.
Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of Compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.
It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined suppression operations within the modern building construction setting.
We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel. Does your company, your officers, your commanders, your department treat all things as equals when addressing the variables of structural combat fire operations? Is the equation of Occupancy Risk balanced with Occupancy Type? Are inherent structural stability and compromise conditions adequately identified and considered in the evolving progression of an incident action plan? Or do SOP and SOG’s drive the manner in which fire ground strategies and tactics are orchestrated and implemented at the company task level?
How does this fit into your “culture, values and philosophy as a firefighter, officer or commander?”
Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again;
Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting; New Terminology and operational perspectivies to meet today’s challenges….Here’s your introduction to the new lexicon;
Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
Predictive Strategic Process
Tactical Deployment Model
Dynamic Tactical Deployment
Performance Indicators and Street Aides
Fire Dynamics
Resistance
Resilience
Structural Systems
Occupancy Hazard Profiles
The Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement, coming soon with a new persepctive and outlook on firefighting operations…are you going to be ready?
When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.
Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.
We’ve taked about a few things recently such as looking at the big picture related to buildings and occupancies and the functional parameters dealing with size-up and risk assessment. Then there’s the dialog and discussion on the Predictability of Performance related to buildings and occupancies. Back in July I talked about a number of operational considerations realated to firefighter safety at Vacant Structures that built upon a posting on vacant or unoccupied building determinations and the question: is it business as usual?
Over the weekend some lively dialog and discussion was overheard regarding the advantages and disadvantages of working a fire in a vacant or unoccupied structure and the value of such company officer or command level descision-making. It still appears to be a hot button topic (to some) and has its camps of interest and champions on either side of the street. How does your viewpoint fit in? Is it STILL business as usual?
Here are some basic definitions to keep us all on the same playing field;
Vacant;refers to a building that is not currently in use, but which could be used in the future. The term “vacant” could apply to a property that is for sale or rent, undergoing renovations, or empty of contents in the period between the departure of one tenant and the arrival of another tenant. A vacant building has inherent property value, even though it does not contain valuable contents or human occupants.
Unoccupied;generally refers to a building that is not occupied by any persons at the time an incident occurs. An unoccupied building could be used by a business that is temporarily closed (i.e. overnight or for a weekend). The term unoccupied could also apply to a building that is routinely or periodically occupied; however the occupants are not present at the time an incident occurs. A residential structure could be temporarily unoccupied because the residents are at work or on vacation. A building that is temporarily unoccupied has inherent property value as well as valuable contents.
What are your thoughts on the issues related to conducting offensive, tactical operations in vacant or unoccupied structures? Does the level of direpair or dilapidation dictate the call? What are the actual or perceived risks? Does working the job, balance with the the risk, benefits, returns? As the escalating adverse trend continues, and more and more buildings become vacant and unoccupied, now is the time to focus greater attention on adequate risk assessments and effective strategic size-up with firefighter safety considerations remaining clear and distinguished.
There may be a lot of reasons why a vacant building turns into a structure fire, that ultimately involves our services; don’t let that contribute to an undesired injury or worst.
Here are some previously published insights for reconsiderations;
Implement and perform an effective dynamic risk assessment of the incident involving a vacant structure.
Consider an appropriate incident action plan and options for defensive operations, risk versus benefit considerations out weighing offensive interior operations.
Maintain effective and heightened situational awareness at all times
Conduct or delegate a 360 reconn of the affected structure, if the building profile allows
Consider the factors related to presumed Vacant or Unoccupied; and the suggested demands associated with search team deployment, escalating and rapid fire spread, decreased time-to-collapse potential and RIT Team availability, be aware of potential squatters
Vacant residential occupancies constructed within the past ten years are very likely to have engineered structural systems (ESS) that will increase the potential early structural collapse and increase unacceptable risk to firefighter safety.
Resulting time delays in the discovery and reporting of fires in vacant structures increases fire severity and magnitude, increases the potential fire spread and communication to adjacent structures and requires adequate resources and fire flows to combat fire suppression activities.
Conduct pre-incident planning to identify the magnitude of the vacant structures within your jurisdiction and define operational expectations and deployment strategies. It shouldn’t be business as usual. Consider the safety risks to firefighters.
Assume potential for compromised interior conditions resulting from vandalism and intentional destruction of interior walls, floors, Compartmentation and structural system integrity.
Assume rapid fire extension and early structural collapse potential
Identify and establish collapse zone perimeters and maintain them for firefighter safety.
Develop or enhance operating protocols for fire operations for both vacant residential AND commercial properties. Determine acceptable risk profiles and operational modes. Consider the Rules of Engagement.
Be consciously cautious with personnel safety foremost in your IAP and tactical operations; Remember this is vacant structure.
A recent article related to a recently released NIOSH LODD Report from 2006 on a Career Firefighter injured during rapid fire progression in an Abandoned Structure who died six days later in Georgia summarized and recommended that Fire departments, municipalities and organizations like NFPA that set standards should consider developing and implementing a system for identifying and marking unoccupied, vacant or abandoned structures to improve firefighter safety. Take the time to read the report.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum. On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com. A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production. Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.
The 
