Fireground Operations, View from Alpha-Bravo Corner street side. Photo by Billy McNeel.

Residential Fire in Prince George’s County (MD) Injures Seven Firefighters: Wind Driven Conditions Suspected  

Apparent wind driven condition contributed to rapidly escalating fire conditions resulting in extreme fire behavior during initial fire suppression operations being coordinated at a single family residential dwelling (SFD) fire Friday night February 24^th in Riverdale, MD. At 9:11 p.m. firefighters responded to a house fire in the 6404 57th Avenue, according to published reports and the new release from Prince George’s County (MD) Firefighters.

PGFD companies arrived to find a one-story with basement, single-family home with fire on both levels. A review of public records indicates the SFD was built in 1967 of dimensioned wood frame construction consisting of a single story with a full basement with 780 square feet of occupied floor space.  The house foot print was approximately 30 feet x 26 feet and had a low profile gable roof. A review of building (birdseye view) aerial images suggests that a moderate grade change from the Alpha division to the Charlie division is apparent with  walk-in basement access.

Street View A-D. Screencapture Googlemaps

Firefighters initiated an interior attack from the Alpha Division when an apparent sudden rush of air fanned by high winds entered from the rear of the house (Delta Division), either from a door or window being opened or broken out, the news release said.

The rapid influx of air from the sustained winds into the interior room compartments combined with the already progressing fire conditions creating a “fire ball’ within the structure’s interior rooms where companies were operating engulfing the firefighters. Firefighters tried to escape and commanders immediately called for an EMS Task Force and Fire Task Force.

A review of internet published archival weather data for the general area (Riverdale/College Park, MD) during the period of 20:55 hrs. and 21:15 hrs., recorded wind speeds of 13.8 – 20.7 MPH with wind gusts of 27.6 – 36.8 MPH. gusts of  MPH. (wunderground.com HERE)

At this time two firefighters, Bladensburg Volunteer Fire Fighters Ethan Sorrell and Kevin O’Toole remain in critical condition at Washington Hospital Center.  A third fire fighter, Riverdale Volunteer, Michael McLary also remains hospitalized for injuries.  Four other injured fire fighters, three from Riverdale and one from College Park, were released and sent home last night according to the latest reports.

 Other Media Links:

• http://www.wjla.com/articles/2012/02/pgfd-7-firefighters-injured-in-riverdale-residential-fire-73022.html
• http://statter911.com/2012/02/25/latest-from-pgfd-bladensburg-vfd-firefighters-ethan-sorrell-kevin-otoole-both-in-critical-condition-with-burns/
• ScanMD.org Audio: HERE
• http://wusa9.com/news/article/192817/158/7-Firefighters-Injured-In-Riverdale-House-Fire
• http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/02/25/seven-pg-county-firefighters-seriously-injured-battling-blaze/
• http://www.myfoxdc.com/dpp/news/local/firefighters-injured-while-battling-blaze-in-prince-georges-county-022412

For more insights and information on Wind Driven Fire Conditions, incidents, research and lessons learned, here are a few mission critical links;

•  Wind Driven Fire Articles on CommandSafety.com, HERE

Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report-Remembrance and Learning’s HERE

• Resources and Report
• LODD Report Fact Sheet (23.9kb)
• LODD Investigative Report (9.16 mb)
• LODD Report Presentation (6.65 mb)
• LODD Report Basic House Model (Section 1) (1.87 mb)
• LODD Report Fire Model (Section 3) (5.16 mb)
• LODD Flashover Chart (60 kb)
• Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE
• NIOSH LODD REPORT: Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire – Virginia, HERE
• Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD 2007; Is This on Your Radar Screen?

• Looking Back at The Cherry Road Townhouse Fire, Double LODD; DCFD 1999

• Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House in Texas, 2009

• Wind Driven Mansion Fire
• Heavy Fire in 10,000 Square Foot Huntingtown (MD) Mega Mansion Injuring 9 Firefighters
• A video of one of the wind driven fire experiments showing the pulsing flames out of the window. Pulsing Fire(83 MB)
• A video of one of the wind driven fire experiments showing the deployment of a Wind Control Device (WCD). WCD Deployment. (40 MB)
• A 4-view video of one of the wind driven fire experiments on the 7th floor. Governor’s Island Wind Driven Fire (368 MB)
• A 4-view video of one of the wind driven fire experiments conducted where the wind control curtain is deployed. The video is 4 times real time. WDF Curtain Deploy (486 MB)
• An 8-view video of experiment number five conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of a WCD on a wind driven fire.  The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 5-Oct View (450MB)
• An 8-view video of experiment number eight conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of externally applied water, solid stream and fog stream, at 160 gpm.  The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 8- Oct View (419MB)
• NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
• A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
• Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
• Reference Data HERE

• NIST Wind Driven Fire Study
  • Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
  • What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented?  Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening.  If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants.  NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
  • This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions.  There are many questions regarding wind driven fires.  For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures?  Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires.  In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
  • Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
  • A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings.  All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set.  All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player.  NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
  • NIST References HERE and HERE

  NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments

  • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
  • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
  • Reference Data HERE

Updated 02/26/2012

From Statter911: Here’s what Chief Bashoor told The Washington Post’s J. Freedom du Lac about the fire:

Strong winds were gusting out of the west at the time — “up to 40, 45 mph,” said the chief. They were blowing directly at — and into — the burning basement, which had a west-facing door.

“As soon as the guys opened the front door and advanced, it blew from the basement, up the steps and right out the front door,” Bashoor said. “It was like a blowtorch coming up the steps and out the door.”

The entire incident — “from the time they were in the door until they were burned” — took eight seconds, the chief said.

The firefighters inside the house “did everything they were trained to do,” he said, but they were essentially defenseless.

“Without that wind, the hot air and gases would have been venting out of the rear of the house,” he said. “The current of air essentially produced a chimney right up the steps and out the front door.”

Charlie Side Fire View

In analyzing and recording these events, the Investigation Team acknowledges and respects that members confronted a challenging situation. On‐scene personnel reacted quickly to the changing conditions at this incident. We request that every person who reads this report show respect, appreciation and consideration for all personnel who responded to this incident.

As is a common industry practice, for this report Lieutenant Vincent Perez was referred to as Victim 1 and Firefighter Paramedic Anthony Valerio was referred to as Victim 2, with the exception of the Rescue Events Section.

 Excerpt from Chief of Department’s Letter

“On Thursday, June 2, 2011 at 10:45 a.m., the San Francisco Fire Department responded to Box 8155, at 133 Berkeley Way. What was seemingly a routine working fire in a single family residence quickly transformed into a fierce and unrelenting incident with ultimately tragic results.

When we answered the call to a career in the Fire Service and took our Oath of Allegiance, we were aware of the inherent danger of our occupation. Despite this awareness, we do not expect to encounter a line of duty death of a brother or sister, especially not in our very own Department. The profound loss of Lieutenant Vincent Perez and Firefighter/Paramedic Anthony Valerio has left an indelible impression in our hearts and will forever be remembered in the annals of SFFD history.

Even as we mourned our fallen brothers in the early days after the tragedy, our Department began the painful and difficult, but necessary, steps of a Line of Duty Death investigation. We were resolute in understanding what occurred during those fateful minutes and compelled to uncover any recommendations for improvement that may arise to future operations so that their passing will not have been in vain. For over six months, the Investigative Team worked tirelessly, scrutinizing every piece of evidence in order to produce a comprehensive report.”

Joanne Hayes‐White

Chief of Department

Executive Summary and Report Excerpt

On June 2, 2011 at 10:45 hours, the San Francisco Fire Department was dispatched to a report of a fire in the building at 133 Berkeley Way in the City’s Diamond  Heights neighborhood. The first unit arriving on the scene, Engine 26, observed light smoke showing from the garage of the 4 story (2 above grade, 2 below grade) wood framed building, detached on the Bravo side.

An aggressive interior fire attack was initiated through the front door, which is on a level between the ground level and second floor. After investigating the garage (ground level), Engine 24, the second Engine on the scene, led a small line through the garage to the interior door to back up the first Company. Battalion 9 was assigned Fire Attack by Battalion 6, who had assumed Command. Battalion 9 entered the fire building and, after conferring face to face with Engine 26 on the first floor (ground level), concluded that the fire was below them.

Battalion 9 exited the building and proceeded to the Bravo side to check for an entrance leading directly to the fire floor. Engine 11 led a large line wye to the driveway with the intention of leading a 1 ¾ inch line through the garage. They were redirected by Battalion 6 to make their lead down the Bravo side of the building to Sublevel 1 (one floor below grade) to assist Battalion 9. The Division Chief, upon arrival, assumed Command. He assigned Battalion 6 to Division 3 (ground floor).

Truck 15 was assigned Roof Division. Truck 11 split their crew, two members to the roof and three members to search and ventilate the top floor of the fire building. The Rescue Squad was ordered to conduct a search. Two members initially attempted to make entry through the garage but, due to extreme heat conditions, redeployed and entered through Sublevel 1 on the Bravo side.

The other two members of the Rescue Squad made entry through the front door, were pushed back by the heat and then made a successful second effort and conducted a search of the top floor.

In the course of fireground operations, members of several Companies came upon the stricken members on the first level and removed them from the building. All possible efforts were employed to revive the members and they were transported to San Francisco General Hospital (SFGH). One member (Victim 1) succumbed to his injuries that day and the second member (Victim 2) succumbed to his injuries two days later. Two other Firefighters were treated at SFGH for various injuries and released that day.

The Medical Examiner determined the cause of death for both members was due to complications from external and internal thermal injuries. Both victims suffered burns to 40% of their body surface. This fire was determined to be accidental by the SFFD Fire Investigative Unit. The fire originated on Sublevel 1, on the West side of the family room, near the large floor to ceiling windows. The ignition was a non‐specific electrical sequence in the electrical wiring or appliance (handheld vacuum cleaner) in this area.

There was a delay in reporting the fire due to the occupants’ attempting to extinguish it on their own. (SFFD Fire Investigation Report 11‐0500532)

The investigation identified that the failing of the window on Sublevel 1, located near the seat of the fire and directly across the stairwell leading to the ground floor, led to the extreme fire behavior which ultimately caused the death of two Firefighters. This fire was in a stage of deprived oxygen when the window failed, causing a rapid extreme high heat event to occur. The extreme heat followed the natural flow path up the interior stairs where Victims 1 and 2 were located.

The Safety Investigation Team found no conclusive evidence that the members were exposed to direct flame impingement during this rapid extreme heat event. However,

Victims 1 and 2 received varying degree of burns up to 40% of their body. The investigation concluded that this was caused by the rapid extreme heat conditions that radiated through their Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to their bodies. These temperatures exceed the ability for human survival regardless of PPE.

The PPE was inspected and evaluated by NIOSH and the manufacturer. Both reviewing parties concluded that the PPE performed to its specifications and design. The manufacturer concluded that the PPE was exposed to temperatures in the range of 550‐ 700°F. These extreme temperatures were short in duration which caused limited damage to the outer shell of the PPE.

The Safety Investigation Team noticed severe heat damage to the portable radios remote speaker/microphones on Victims 1 and 2 and had the radios tested. The testing indicated that the remote speaker/microphones failed to operate correctly due to heat damage. The Safety Investigation Team was not able to determine, after testing, exactly when the remote speaker/microphones failed. The investigation has shown that multiple attempts were made to contact Engine 26 with no response.

The investigation also found that no radio transmissions of distress were received from Victims 1 or 2. Command and Control of any incident in the San Francisco Fire Department is acquired and maintained through the use of the Incident Command System (ICS).

The Incident Command System provides the tools for clear objectives, a single action plan, clear and acknowledged communications, and accountability for all members assigned to an incident. At this incident, some of the components of Incident Command System that were not followed include:

From these findings, this report makes recommendations for several areas of the Department, including:

• Training
• Equipment
• Policy Development
• Policy Enforcement

The Safety Investigation Team gathered and analyzed many facts and conducted interviews of members directly involved in this incident. The Team identified several factors that occurred that contributed to the deaths at this incident.

These factors include:

• Extreme heat conditions accelerated by the failure of a window on the fire floor.
• Layout of building
• Excessive live fuel load which contributed to the growth of the fire

Conclusion

This incident appeared from the onset to be a routine “room and contents” fire that the SFFD encounters on a regular basis. As the Companies were performing standard fireground operations, the incident rapidly deteriorated due to a hostile fire event. The failure of a window in the fire room allowed fresh oxygen to enter the room, providing a fire that was deprived of one of the key elements of combustion to rapidly intensify.

Due to the growth of the fire, the room flashed, causing extreme and rapid heat conditions which traveled up the interior stairs (the flow path) to the location which our members were operating. Our members were caught in this high heat, causing the injuries that ultimately claimed their lives.

Due to this fire event, other Companies attempting to conduct fireground support operations were prevented from making entry into the structure from street level (through garage) to back up Engine 26. These Companies were forced to regroup and find an alternate point of entry. In the process of doing so, crews made entry from the Bravo side directly into the fire room and extinguished the fire. This allowed members to make entry from above which led to the discovery and rescue of our members.

These events happened in a time frame of less than fourteen minutes.

 During the course of this investigation, the Safety Investigation Team recognized that no matter how experienced or properly prepared we are, we must always approach all incidents with the utmost awareness.

This incident showed that a simple failure of a piece of glass/window caused unforeseeable and fatal consequences.

We, as a Department, need to gain further knowledge and understanding of the following:

• Having Situational Awareness prior to taking action, this would include the ongoing process when conditions change
• How Risk Management must be used when making all decisions
• Limitations of the PPE (turnouts, SCBA, and equipment)
• Building construction, including layout and how fire/smoke will
• move within the structure
• Ventilation practices and how they affect fire conditions
• Importance of Communications for all members operating on the scene
• Companies must use strict discipline when assigned task/locations

Previous  CommandSafety Coverage from 2011, HERE, HERE  and HERE

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

• 2nd San Francisco Firefighter Dies After Diamond Heights Fire
• San Francisco FD: The Diamond Heights Fire Updates
• Flags at the NFFF Memorial; SFFD LODD

Other Links;

• San Francisco Chronical; S.F. firefighter dies, second fighting for life; Article and Photos HERE

• Previous Posting on CommandSafety.com HERE
• More Incident Scene Photos HERE
• More Incident Info, HERE and HERE
• Slide show HERE
• STATTer911: San Francisco firefighter dead & another critically injured. Reported flashover at house fire.

Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE  and HERE.

SFFD Report PDF, HERE

SFFD Web Link, HERE

SFFD Mission

The mission of the Fire Department is to protect the lives and property of the people of San Francisco from fires, natural disasters, and hazardous materials incidents; to save lives by providing emergency medical services; to prevent fires through prevention and education programs; and to provide a work environment that values health, wellness and cultural diversity and is free of harassment and discrimination.

IN TRIBUTE TO
OUR FALLEN HEROES
 

Alpha Side

 STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION

Site overview: Steep downhill slope adjacent to Glen Canyon

Date of Construction: 1975

 Building overview:

• Attached garage located in the front of the house. Main structure is 2 stories above grade and 2 stories below grade

 Type of Construction:

• Four story, Type 5 wood framed, single family home, detached on three sides
• Approximate square footage: 4,000 sq ft.
• Four stories of living space
  • First Floor (Ground floor): garage, 3 bedrooms, 2 bathrooms
  • Second floor: dining room, living room, kitchen, bathroom and family room
  • Sublevel 1: large family room (origin of fire), mechanical room, bathroom, bedroom, balcony, side entrance on Bravo side
  • Sublevel 2: enclosed finished storage area, bathroom (no windows)

 Construction features:

• Roof type: Flat roof, bitumen roofing membrane, normal dimensional lumber
• Exterior: siding T1-11 plywood, 5/8”
• Interior: drywall over normal insulated framing
• Note: Fire origin room had decorative plywood veneer panels over drywall
• Steel I beams wrapped in drywall were used as structural supports
• Note: Fire origin room had a steel I beam that spanned horizontally from Bravo to Delta side
• Rear of structure had extensive use of glass to capture views, including windows and sliding doors
• Second floor and Sublevel 1 (fire origin) had large balconies
• Flooring consisted of tile, carpet and sheet vinyl throughout the house
• Dual glazed windows throughout, installed in 2003
• Ground level had a two car garage with access to residence
• Note: Two large vehicles occupying garage at time of fire
• Main entrance was accessed by ascending a flight of stairs adjacent to the garage
• Note: Main entrance stairs led to an interior landing which allowed access to top floor (5 stairs up) or grade level (7 stairs down)
• Sublevel 1 had an access door from the exterior Bravo side along with access from interior stairs
• Sublevel 2 had access door from exterior Bravo side. (no interior access)
• Note: Access through the Bravo side was difficult due to unfinished terrain and poor housekeeping

Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse

Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building.

Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement.

The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.  

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

• Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
• Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
• Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
• Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
• Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
• Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
• Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
• Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
• Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
• Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
• Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
• Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.

The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.

There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.

This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

• USFA Report; HERE
• NFPA Summary; HERE
• NFPA Report Order; HERE 
• Issues related to recent trends in floor collapse incidents, HERE

Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.   

For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.   

The Worcester Six;   

• Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
• Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
• Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
• Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
• Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
• Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine

On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.   

• From last year’s posting and links here at CommandSafety.com: HERE
• • Take at look at The Worcester Telegram & Gazette which has an archived webpage; http://www.telegram.com/static/fire/video.html
  • Derelict buildings marked after Mass. LODDs
  • Haunting memories spurred Mass. chief to positive action
  • Special 10 Year Anniversary Coverage HERE
  • NIOSH REPORT HERE
  • USFA REPORT HERE

Los Angeles Firefighters Battle Major Emergency at Townhouses Under Construction

Under-construction building fire forces dozens of evacuations

Six Townhouses Under Construction Photo, Onscene.TV

Townhouses Under Construction Aerial Screen capture from CBSLA.com

Operational Divisions with Exposures (Pre-Construction) Bing Maps

A townhouse complex under construction caught fire on November 10, 2011, in the Brentwood neighborhood of Los Angeles (CA).  The six-unit, wood-framed complex was in its construction phase, where at least two of the units were fully involved in fire upon arrival of LAFD companies. Four of those six structures were severely damaged as a result of the construction stage and the degree of open wood frame construction resulting in rapid flame spread and extension to a nearby residential buildings.

According to published reports, the Los Angeles Fire Department was called at 3:37 a.m.  to 12315 Gorham Avenue which resulted in a major emergency alarm classification decared and resulted in the dispatch and deployment of over 160 firefighters to the site. First arriving companies found a large townhome development with “heavy fire showing.”

Largely due to an aggressive fire attack by the LAFD, the footprint of this blaze was kept in-check and fully extinguished in one hour and 39 minutes. Fortunately, there were no injuries to any civilians or Firefighting personnel.

Additionally, five adjacent structures were evacuated for precaution. Two of those structures- one, a small apartment complex and the other, a single family dwelling, did sustain significant fire damage. As many as 10 families were displaced from those two occupancies.

Following further investigation, the LAFD stated it believed the fire was intentionally set. 

According to LAFD.Blogspot.com the following  companies were dispatched with Units: E19 RA19 E237 E37 T37 RA37 EM9 BC9 E59 E261 T61 E26 E292 T92 E71 E269 T69 E62 E263 T63 E43 DC3 SQ21 EM14 BC18 BC10 BC4 BC11 BC14 T88 E288 E88 UR88 RA88 RA827 BC5 E63 H6 RA59 RA92 RA71 EM11 E290 AR2 E94 E226 T26 E93 E210 T10 E15 T66 E266 RT59 EA2 EA1 E229 T29 E203 T3 E233 T33 E68 RA17 RA909 RA867 EM17 AR9 AR17 AR11 AR3 T29 E229 T94 E294 E3 E12

Construction Site Operational Considerations (not inclusive)

• Pre-Fire Plan Large Construction Projects
• Understand the various Phases to a Construction Project and how they affect fire operations
• Identify and train for nonconventional Strategic and Tactical operational actions
• Ensure predetermined multiple alarm resources are identified and greater alarms are established
• Train your Company and Command Officers to address Construction site fires
• Maintain an appropriate risk profile balance with operational needs with personnel safety foremost
• Clearly establish multiple Safety Offices and establish geographical resources within the incident management system for reconnaissance, communications, and oversight and focused safety monitoring
• Know you water supply and system capabilities and limitations
• Determine fire flow needs based upon construction phases, as these change over time as the building goes up. Match fire flow demands with resource availability (time of day gaps etc.)
• Identify exposures (Physical structures and Civilians) and ensure they are calculated into the incident action plan at the right before there are identified needs or concerns
• Companies shall maintain a conservative safety posture; this is not the time for overly aggressive firefighting, it is the time for smart firefighting that can be highly efficient
• Always consider collapse zones: partial or complete. Stay out of them!
• Respect the wind; it’s not going to help you
• Consider current and projected weather conditions in your operational and tactical plans and assignments
• Did I already say: Pre-fire Planning?
• Be calculated in the placement of your apparatus, especially in larger scale incidents that are defined under greater geographical divisions
• The fire usually consumes the available fuel load rapidly; going from a Huge fire, to one that is sometimes much more manageable; just watch and control your exposures and degree of fire extension.  Don’t help to make the fire even bigger through ineffective and dysfunctional command and control
• Anticipate, Project, Plan and Engage
• Respect the Fire: it’s not going to play by the regular rules of combat fire suppression and engagement as in finished and enclosed structures and buildings.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

Photo: Firefighters hose down smoldering embers after a large fire gutted a townhouse complex under construction in Brentwood. Credit: Al Seib / Los Angeles Times

Additional Links

• Refer to Construction Site Fire: Three Alarm Fire: Apartment Complex under Construction ignites October, 2011 LA County (FD) CA HERE
• http://lafd.blogspot.com/2011/11/major-emergency-blaze-at-brentwood.html
• http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/133606123.html
• http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/fire-destroys-townhouse-construction-in-brentwood.html
• Bing Mapping, HERE
• http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-brentwood-apartment-fire,0,2381645.story
• http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/10-families-displaced-in-brentwood-blaze.html

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

Commercials and Collapse Awareness

In response to numerous requests from our recent posting; Commercials- Got Fire? Anticipate Collapse briefing post (HERE). We have developed and produced a comprehensive download in PDF format of the entire article that can be used for training, distribution and discussions.

 Click on the image above and download the PDF file and use accordingly  or download HERE

 There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.

You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations at commercial building fires.

Commercial Fire and Collapse

Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments.

It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.

Got Fire?……Anticipate Collapse..

A recent video clip making its way around the cyber fireground clearly depicted a very close-call and resulting near miss event to four firefighters at a four alarm fire involving a commercial building that housed an established insulation manufacturer and installation contractor.

The video shows within a very compressed time frame, the progression of rapidly deteriorating interior conditions, the adverse affects on the building’s structural systems and the results from the loss of load transfers that lead to a catastrophic wall collapse  narrowly missing the crew of firefighters who were operating a hand line in the vicinity of an exterior overhead door. Fortunately the injuries sustained to the firefighters were minor in nature; however the consequences and results from this collapse could have been far different and significantly more severe.

Following a series of repeated viewings of the video clip and with each successive viewing, it became readily apparent that there was a lot more to these images of the collapse and the cursory focus on the resulting near miss event. Closer examination of the video clip and the still frames brought to light some obvious conditions and indicators that easily become lost in the rapidity of the sequence of the collapse; which really has the true story to be told.

It’s the mechanism and sequence of the collapse, the dynamics of the building’s performance and the building indicators that provide a training opportunity in further examining key factors, presenting insights that could be a focus for operational and command personnel at future incidents with common parameters and gaining some mental models in recognition-primed decision making that contribute to the naturalistic decision-making process.

If you know what to be looking for, then when you see it, you may be able to anticipate, project and implement in rapid succession appropriate measures dictated by the incident.

Four Alarm Commercial Building Fire with Collapse: Fire Photo by Ben Goldberry

In an effort to promote additional insights and bring forward these fundamental observations and experienced-based presumptions extended from these and other news video images, still photographs, additional reporting research and examination, and a review of other published media resources; the following observations presented in this overview brief are being conveyed to increase firefighter, company and command level awareness of key collapse indicators such as those present at this commercial fire  and to further the concept of adaptive fireground management principles and increase awareness of fundamental building performance indicators and principles to help you increase your intuitive observations skills and translate them into proactive operational actions on the fireground-before an adverse condition occurs.[ i.e., being five steps ahead of the fire conditions].

Although this briefing makes use of the images and conditions depicted in the video clip and encountered by the fire department evident in the images; the susequent commentary and  insights provided are not meant to provide  direct or indirect opinions, renderings, criticism or censure  towards the conduct of operations or the management of the incident by the respective department and it’s firefighting, command and support personnel who operated at the actual fire and experienced this near miss event first-hand.

We are grateful that the events of this alarm precluded anything worst occurring given the potential seriousness of the prevailing  incident conditions and commend the  fire department and it’s firefighters that provide these exceptional services each and every day to the citizens they serve and to the community they protect, in mitigating this serious fire; safely and successfully.

This incident and the resulting near-miss captured by the videographer provides the Fire Service with an exceptional opportunity given today’s far reaching capabilities of eMedia, this web site and direct and indirect readers, links, tweets, likes, reposting’s, uploads, downloads and sharing  an opportunity to share the consequences of an extreme close-call and learn from it in a positive and constructive manner, so that firefighters, company officers, commanders and support personnel can better predict with knowledge, insight and at times intuition a better understanding of buildings and the structures and occupancies we operate within on the fireground.  

There are numerous inherent indicators present at every incident scene we operate at that. As is in this near miss event and building collapse; it’s sometimes the subtle things that need to gain the attention of operationg companies and personnel and the ability to rapidly process, recognize and react.

 Remember this: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

As a generality; it’s important to note that given heavy fire involvement in a structure (got fire), adaptive fireground management considerations would promote conservative considerations to anticipate and expect collapse (degraded or compromise; limited or catastrophic).

In the case of fires in commercial occupancies and buildings with;

• Large Square footage/Floor areas
• Significant fire loads
• Large open structural system spans lacking compartmentation, 
• Unprotected steel components and assemblies 
• No Sprinkler Systems
• Omitted, compromised or degraded passive or active protective  or suppression systems
• Significant openings along the exterior building envelope
• Significant opening on the roof enclosure
• Deep seated fires or rapidly escalating and extending fires

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. 

Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. Its alot more than that, with far greater consequences that may be very unforgiving.

Aerial Plan of Building and Collapse Area A-B

The Building

The fire incident involved a single story commercial building occupying approximately 32, 200 square feet of area on a multiple building site with proximal exposures.  Manufacturing, warehousing and offices comprised the building’s operational use.  An aerial plan view shows the geographical building scene divisions and the location and relationship of the Alpha- Bravo Side collapse zones that affected operations and resulted in the close-call and firefighter near-miss. The proximity of exposures, physical layout and orientation can be further assessed.

 A review of public documents and records, incident reports and various media resources  provided the following insights;

Overview Details

Alpha Street Side View- Adapted from Google Streetmaps

The view of the alpha street side identifies the building front facade, its main office entrance (center between dual overhead doors on the left and right). Pronounced on the alpha side facade is the presence of four (4) equally spaced overhead (OH) doors that provide direct access into the building’s interior. The subsequent collapse area is depicted at the A-B corner with special attention drawn to relationship of the wall plane and OH door proximity.

The relationship and this wall surface ( area square footage) and the presence of the OH door opening to the wall/ roof interface area that subsequently became compromised and collapsed is critical in further understanding the mechanism of the collapse sequence and also the positive effect it had on the survivability of the firefighters who were within the collapse zone at the time of the wall failure.

Don’t Always Stress the Corners

It’s been a common practice and fundamental fireground consideration to define the corner of a typical building as having safety considerations and prominence in the context of ladder company operations, laddering and roof work and in the placement of personnel and positioning of fireground operations.

Corner Building Operational considerations have included, but limited to;

• Provides a potentially safe(er) area of operational refuge
• Provides a location to safely position ground ladders for roof access/egress
• Provides a location that has a potential  higher degree of assurance for maintaining structural integrity in the event of a collapse condition of an outer wall
• Will not fail in a catastrophic or monolithic manner due to the postulated presence of structural members on the vicinity of either the wall enclosure and/or the roofing structural system and assemblies
• The design and construction configuration and orientation of the ninety degree angle of the building’s outer wall envelope (at the corner)  provides predicated inherent structural stability
• The  typical type of structural or envelope construction may have a resulting  ninety degree building corner having a more robust resistance to collapse and compromise due to the various types of enclosure systems (methods and materials) and assemblies and needed stability per engineering principles

In this instance (as shown in the Alpha side street view),  the presence of the large overhead door in close proximity to the corner wall intersection and transition ( A-B side), actually makes this position, fireground proximity and travel paths highly prone to early and complete collapse potential in the event of a loss of the wall-roof component or assembly integrity or in the load bearing/transfer capabilities of the wall-roof assembly. 

• The presence and identification of a corner configuration similar to this in a commercial structure should result in a higher degree of considerations and risk assessment when formulation and deploying operational assignments and in the placement of personnel for task assignments in this proximity.
• This operational area should be considered as a candidate for designation as a collapse zone based upon projected or defined operational considerations, incident conditions and predictive building characteristics, systems, materials and fire dynamics and conditions.  

Alpha-Bravo Corner of Subsequent Collapse Aerial View

• The entire perimeter of the alpha side could be considered for a restricted collapse zone just in terms of wall opening alone sans the degree of actual or projected interior fire impingement or fire involvement.

 Aerial Overhead view of the building perimeter walls along the four divisions ( A-D) with the A-B corner that subsequently experienced the wall-roof compromise and resulting collapse.

 The A-B corner and the affected ground areas around the collapse zone. Considerations for a collapse zone area on the A-B corner would have resulted in a minimum distance of twenty five (25) feet from the building base for all operations within this area. The collapse zone on the Bravo side extends into the exposure building due to its close proximity.

Always consider the building envelope materials of construction and systems present on the building. The use of concrete masonry units (CMU) is common, as is the use of pre-cast concrete and cast-in place and tilt-up concrete construction panels.

Variations in collapse dynamics and mechanisms of collapse may result in sizable increases in collapse zone distances from the building base with consideration for monolithic or partial wall collapse as well as safety considerations for bounce and travel over long distances of modular assembly building pieces ( i.e. concrete blocks, brick venner or material chunks).

We have not discussed collapse considerations for other building envelope systems such as metal panelized systems since these have entirely different collapse considerations and profiling, not applicable to this incident and assessment insights. The same is true when considering operating and collapse considerations at commercial buildings with ordinary construction or heavy timber systems (Type or Class III and IV). These to have different rules of predictive building performance and collapse safety considerations.

Typical Interior

Typical Structural System and Components

Interior View with Steel Columns, Open Web Steel bar Joists and Beams

 

 

Typical Open Web Steel Bar Joists w Metal Roof Deck

 

 

Large clear spans provided by the open web steel bar joists allowed for considerable free floor space typical of commercial warehouse occupancies.

Note the use of what appears to be combustible wood storage and staging areas that could have could potentially contribute towards increased fire intensity, extension and further contribute towards adverse affects on the unprotected structural steel components and assemblies.

 

Alpha Side Collapse Area Details: OH Door Pre-Collapse Insights

 

 

 

Pre-Collapse Operations on Alpha side with personnel in close proximty to the building perimeter

 

Pre-Collapse view of Operations on the Alpha side with personnel in close proximity, (within [a] collapse zone) to the building perimeter. It is evident that the degree of interior fire extension and involvement presumes a cautious deployment and placement of personnel in safe operational areas. When operating in such close proximity to the building wall and envelope, it becomes increasingly challenging for company officers and company personnel to monitor overall building performance indicators that may be prevalent or dominant from a view point further away from the building. 

Fire extension, smoke conditions, component or assembly movement or displacement may be readily defined and identified from a vantage point away from the building, requiring additional independent  operational assignments within the division if resources allow.   Otherwise, officers are encouraged to get a big picture view and increase their span of vision of the building and progressing fire conditions and building performance

 

 

 

 

The pre-collapse frame image above identifies the building roof line in relationship to the ground operations, smoke conditions and also the directional flow of the elevated master stream [upper right corner]. The initial  stage of the wall compromise and collapse can be seen in the Bravo wall pulling away. When watching the video, pay close attention first to the stream direction and flow and them at the location and movement of the wall, which is followed in rapid succession with the full wall collapse.

T

 

Close examination of the initial video frames shows the rapid displacement of the portion of the Bravo wall and outward collapse towards the B-Exposure (alleyway) Refer to the Aerial Plan for orientation. The A-B Collapse is progressing from the Bravo side to the Alpha side as loads are being transferred in rapid progression with further collapse expected.

The frame image above shows the bravo wall failing outward with the resulting loss in structural support of the roofing deck assembly.

Rapid fire migration and extension is evident after the wall section collapse with increased flames visible. In the video, one firefighter quickly recognizes the imminent collapse and reacts.

A significant section of wall area is present at the A-B side and progressing from the building corner to the left jamb of the overhead (OH) door. This area and the area directly above the OH door opening is calculated to weigh over 20,000 lbs. 

The early identification and establishment of collapse zone(s) is mission critical especially at commercial buildings due to the considerations for rapidly changing operational conditions that may be a result of or influenced by the following;

• lack of knowledge or understanding of the building’s construction, systems and characteristics
• lack of adequate resources, skills and or capabilities for selected phase operations
• fire loading, combustibles, flammables and other products
• Last of or loss of compartmentation
• fire and protective systems failures or inoperability
• unapproved alterations, additions and renovations to the building, systems and occupancy
• transitions for offensive to defensive operational phases, which at times may results in operating position postures too close to the building
• failure to recognize situational factors that will drive appropriate operational phasing and task deployments
• lack of building performance knowledge
• not considering occupancy risk versus treating the building/fire relationship based upon occupancy type
• not recognizing key collapse indicators and failing to implement timely actions [proactively versus reactionary]
• being four steps behind the fire conditions evident instead of implementing adaptive fire ground management insights [five steps ahead of the evident fire]
• use precise coordination when placing elevated masterstreams into operations with ground personnel operating within close quarters
• understand the effects of master streams on the integrity of building features, assemblies and components

 

 

 

 

 

The image frame above shows personnel operating within an imminent collapse zone directing hand lines into the interior fire area. Further examination of the video  frames clearly shows one firefighter quickly recognizing that a collapse is occurring and attempts to alert the other personnel to retreat. Simultaneously to the collapse progression, the crew immediately retreats away from the collapsing wall and falling building materials.

 

Within the span of four seconds, the wall compromise occurs and collapses on the ground at the A-B corner and immediate area on the alpha side.  The slightly monolithic manner in which the wall plane first peels away and progressively collapsed is interesting for a CMU wall. Possibly due to the outward collapse of the Bravo wall, followed by the rapid succession of failure of the roof-wall connection interface resulted in an transitional downward force that pushed the alpha side wall outward allowing gravity to work its force

 

When operating in close proximity to a heavily involved forward interior condition [exterior position] it is important to maintain focused situational awareness and either directly maintain or delegate responsibilities for observations of fire and smoke progress and conditions while monitoring key functional building performance indicators and collapse pre-cursors. 

 

Additionally, always re-evaluate the effectiveness of deployed and operational hose lines, streams and in water application to ensure they are adequate for the degree of fire suppression being undertaken and the corresponding fire flow requirements. Don’t just assume, determine with validity. [ Refer to Tactical Entertainment]  

 

Obscured by the rapidly defining smoke which is a result of the developing and extending collapse, the frame image 04 below depicts the beginning of the compromise and collapse sequence commencing as a result of the Bravo wall compromise and collapse sequence at the B-A corner that will subsequently peel towards the Alpha side and continue up to the outermost jamb of the overhead door.

 

Pay particular attention to the first three to four seconds of the video clip and review the video clip over a few times;  looking at the operating elevated master stream that is clearly visible and operating from the upper right part of the screen through the smoke plume; follow the direct orientation and stream flowing directly towards the bravo wall plane,  and presumed penetrating into/through the roof deck or impacting through the metal roof deck and wall-roof assembly area at the upper roof edge.

 

 

Image 04

 

 Frame image 04 depicts the rapidly deteriorating conditions that are evident as the collapse sequence continues and the overhead door jamb (left) buckling and adjacent wall failing by way of an outward curl or peel away commencing from the upper (left image) A-B corner at the roof line and then peeling and failing from upper left to right.

 

 

Image 05

 

 

The leading edge of the outward collapsing wall plane ( yellow dotted line) is failing with the greatest material concentration occurring at the A-B edge outward. Fortunately the presence and location of the overhead door opening  lessened the amount and location of wall material ( concrete masonry units-CMU) and contributed to a void area being present and not fully impacting the firefighters who were operating within this collapse zone.

 

In other words, had this been a solid full wall collapse likelihood for significant firefighter injury would have resulted. 

 

The affects of wall/roof compromise should be of focused consideration and monitoring when managing incidents of this size and magnitude in similar occupancies and building features.  Flame and heat  impingment can and will affect the structural integrity of lintels spans, beams and truss connects along roof lines and connections. Look for signs of impingment, degradation or compromise. watch for signs of probable inward/outward or curtain wall collapse.

 

 

 

Image 06

 

The remaining images, frames 06 and 07 depict the location of the firefighters to the wall collapse, the relationship to the wall and roof system and the degree of wall area that became compromised and collapsed.

 

Image 07

 

This brief video clip and these accompanying briefing insights provided a tremendous opportunity to examine in a non-critical manner an actual near miss collapse event and  operational discernments that provide a focused training an awareness opportunity.

When given the time to analyze and assess, some things become so apparent and self-revealing that we might prematurely say why didn’t someone pick up that or those conditions while conducting operations at [an] incident.  It is dependent on a wide variety of factors, conditions and parameters that are difficult at times to identify and harder yet to fully identify as common or contributing factors, errors or omissions.

It’s not always that easy; but contradictory – some time it really is (or should be) that easy.

Some things on the fireground may not be prone to being so readily identifiable or recognized.

It all depends what you’re looking for and whether you have the necessary insights, knowledge and skill sets. Incident priorities, demands, situational focus, awareness or disconnect all may have a part in how and incident is managed and mitigated.

It goes back directly on knowing what to look for and when; at what type of building with which type of occupancy and under what stage or stages of fire development and combat operations or engagement you might be in. It complex, it takes time and experience and learning’s.

There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.

You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.

Links:

•  http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20111031/LOCAL07/310319957

Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page

On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.

Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.

Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.

Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.

The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.

Building Construction Insights

• Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
• Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”

Fire Building Construction:

• 7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
• The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
• The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.

Collapse Building Construction:

• 6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
• The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
• The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street
  

  Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011

Building Alteration

(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.

(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.

(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.

 The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.

It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.

The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.

The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001. 
 

FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank

Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.

• DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
• BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
• Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
• Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
• Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
• Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
• Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
• Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
• Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
• Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
• Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
• Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18

From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html

• NYFD.com Insights and Photos HERE
• FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary, HERE

• FDNY – Remembering the “23rd Street Fire” October 17, 1966, Facebook Page, HERE

• Personal Account: http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/box598.pdf

• http://ephemeralnewyork.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/the-second-worst-fire-in-new-york-city-history/

• http://www.fdnye16l7.com/History/23rdstreetfire.html

•  New York Times (2006): Oct. 17, 1966, When 12 Firemen Died HERE

• http://firehistory.org/2011/02/october-17th-1966-new-york-ny-23rd-street-fire/

• The Site Today, HERE and HERE

A wreath is laid at the new plaque honoring the 12 FDNY members killed at the 23rd Street fire on Oct. 17, 1966. © FDNY Photo Unit.

FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary

 Three Franklin (OH) firefighters were caught in what has been determined to be a smoke explosion at a structure fire involving a restaurant occupancy in what appears to be a building of Type III construction that published reports indicated was built in 1892.

Franklin (OH) FD Lt. Kyle Lovelace and firefighters Quincy Pearson and Brad Brown were caught in a smoke explosion while conducting interior fire suppression operations at which time conditions deteriorated and a smoke explosion occurred. Simultaneous with the recognition that something was not good; the crew immediately began to retreat when they were caught in the explosion. All of them luckily made it out unscathed.

According to published reports, “They reverted back to their training and did what they needed to do to get out,” according to Fire Chief Jonathan Westendorf . “We have a flashover simulator and we spend a good amount time talking about it each year.”

Reports have indicated Lt. Lovelace stated that when they arrived on the scene, he noticed smoke coming from left side of the building above the second floor and thought that it may be an attic fire.

They attempted to gain entry through the front door, but before they opened it they noticed a crack in the window and decided to gain entry through the rear. Lt. Lovelace, FF Pearson and FF Brown entered an alley covered by an awning connecting to freestanding structures. Westendorf  later said his guys were fortunate to be in that location because they were isolated from the brunt of the blast.

The crew advanced about 25 feet when FF Pearson, who was on the nozzle, saw wisps of smoke and began to feel extreme heat.

Lt. Lovelace used a thermal imaging camera to locate where the heat was coming from, but right before he could tell Person, he started yelling at him to get out. They made it about 20 feet when the thick black smoke started banking down on them. As Lovelace exited under the awning, conditions quickly worsened and the smoke explosion occurred. Video of blast HERE

Links for complete reporting insights and details;

• http://www.newsnet5.com/dpp/news/backdraft-explosion-puts-ohio-firefighters-in-danger
• Ohio Firefighters Narrowly Escape Smoke Explosion
•  http://www.middletownjournal.com/news/middletown-news/fire-destroys-restaurant-in-downtown-franklin-1263107.html
• http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/44806177/ns/local_news-cincinnati_oh/t/firefighter-veterans-experience-saved-us-backdraft/
• http://www.firefighterclosecalls.com/news/fullstory/newsid/146829

• Flashover Simulator Training Helped Ohio Crew Survive

Photo by Nick Graham Middletown Journal

Alpha side from the Street, Image Capture from Google Street Maps

 

Aerial Image along South Main Street of the Building

Screenshot from video as smoke explosion occurs