Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse

Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building.

Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement.

The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.  

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

• Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
• Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
• Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
• Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
• Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
• Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
• Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
• Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
• Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
• Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
• Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
• Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.

The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.

There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.

This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

• USFA Report; HERE
• NFPA Summary; HERE
• NFPA Report Order; HERE 
• Issues related to recent trends in floor collapse incidents, HERE

Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.   

For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.   

The Worcester Six;   

• Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
• Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
• Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
• Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
• Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
• Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine

On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.   

• From last year’s posting and links here at CommandSafety.com: HERE
• • Take at look at The Worcester Telegram & Gazette which has an archived webpage; http://www.telegram.com/static/fire/video.html
  • Derelict buildings marked after Mass. LODDs
  • Haunting memories spurred Mass. chief to positive action
  • Special 10 Year Anniversary Coverage HERE
  • NIOSH REPORT HERE
  • USFA REPORT HERE

Los Angeles Firefighters Battle Major Emergency at Townhouses Under Construction

Under-construction building fire forces dozens of evacuations

Six Townhouses Under Construction Photo, Onscene.TV

Townhouses Under Construction Aerial Screen capture from CBSLA.com

Operational Divisions with Exposures (Pre-Construction) Bing Maps

A townhouse complex under construction caught fire on November 10, 2011, in the Brentwood neighborhood of Los Angeles (CA).  The six-unit, wood-framed complex was in its construction phase, where at least two of the units were fully involved in fire upon arrival of LAFD companies. Four of those six structures were severely damaged as a result of the construction stage and the degree of open wood frame construction resulting in rapid flame spread and extension to a nearby residential buildings.

According to published reports, the Los Angeles Fire Department was called at 3:37 a.m.  to 12315 Gorham Avenue which resulted in a major emergency alarm classification decared and resulted in the dispatch and deployment of over 160 firefighters to the site. First arriving companies found a large townhome development with “heavy fire showing.”

Largely due to an aggressive fire attack by the LAFD, the footprint of this blaze was kept in-check and fully extinguished in one hour and 39 minutes. Fortunately, there were no injuries to any civilians or Firefighting personnel.

Additionally, five adjacent structures were evacuated for precaution. Two of those structures- one, a small apartment complex and the other, a single family dwelling, did sustain significant fire damage. As many as 10 families were displaced from those two occupancies.

Following further investigation, the LAFD stated it believed the fire was intentionally set. 

According to LAFD.Blogspot.com the following  companies were dispatched with Units: E19 RA19 E237 E37 T37 RA37 EM9 BC9 E59 E261 T61 E26 E292 T92 E71 E269 T69 E62 E263 T63 E43 DC3 SQ21 EM14 BC18 BC10 BC4 BC11 BC14 T88 E288 E88 UR88 RA88 RA827 BC5 E63 H6 RA59 RA92 RA71 EM11 E290 AR2 E94 E226 T26 E93 E210 T10 E15 T66 E266 RT59 EA2 EA1 E229 T29 E203 T3 E233 T33 E68 RA17 RA909 RA867 EM17 AR9 AR17 AR11 AR3 T29 E229 T94 E294 E3 E12

Construction Site Operational Considerations (not inclusive)

• Pre-Fire Plan Large Construction Projects
• Understand the various Phases to a Construction Project and how they affect fire operations
• Identify and train for nonconventional Strategic and Tactical operational actions
• Ensure predetermined multiple alarm resources are identified and greater alarms are established
• Train your Company and Command Officers to address Construction site fires
• Maintain an appropriate risk profile balance with operational needs with personnel safety foremost
• Clearly establish multiple Safety Offices and establish geographical resources within the incident management system for reconnaissance, communications, and oversight and focused safety monitoring
• Know you water supply and system capabilities and limitations
• Determine fire flow needs based upon construction phases, as these change over time as the building goes up. Match fire flow demands with resource availability (time of day gaps etc.)
• Identify exposures (Physical structures and Civilians) and ensure they are calculated into the incident action plan at the right before there are identified needs or concerns
• Companies shall maintain a conservative safety posture; this is not the time for overly aggressive firefighting, it is the time for smart firefighting that can be highly efficient
• Always consider collapse zones: partial or complete. Stay out of them!
• Respect the wind; it’s not going to help you
• Consider current and projected weather conditions in your operational and tactical plans and assignments
• Did I already say: Pre-fire Planning?
• Be calculated in the placement of your apparatus, especially in larger scale incidents that are defined under greater geographical divisions
• The fire usually consumes the available fuel load rapidly; going from a Huge fire, to one that is sometimes much more manageable; just watch and control your exposures and degree of fire extension.  Don’t help to make the fire even bigger through ineffective and dysfunctional command and control
• Anticipate, Project, Plan and Engage
• Respect the Fire: it’s not going to play by the regular rules of combat fire suppression and engagement as in finished and enclosed structures and buildings.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

Photo: Firefighters hose down smoldering embers after a large fire gutted a townhouse complex under construction in Brentwood. Credit: Al Seib / Los Angeles Times

Additional Links

• Refer to Construction Site Fire: Three Alarm Fire: Apartment Complex under Construction ignites October, 2011 LA County (FD) CA HERE
• http://lafd.blogspot.com/2011/11/major-emergency-blaze-at-brentwood.html
• http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/133606123.html
• http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/fire-destroys-townhouse-construction-in-brentwood.html
• Bing Mapping, HERE
• http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-brentwood-apartment-fire,0,2381645.story
• http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/10-families-displaced-in-brentwood-blaze.html

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

Commercials and Collapse Awareness

In response to numerous requests from our recent posting; Commercials- Got Fire? Anticipate Collapse briefing post (HERE). We have developed and produced a comprehensive download in PDF format of the entire article that can be used for training, distribution and discussions.

 Click on the image above and download the PDF file and use accordingly  or download HERE

 There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.

You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations at commercial building fires.

Commercial Fire and Collapse

Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments.

It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.

Got Fire?……Anticipate Collapse..

A recent video clip making its way around the cyber fireground clearly depicted a very close-call and resulting near miss event to four firefighters at a four alarm fire involving a commercial building that housed an established insulation manufacturer and installation contractor.

The video shows within a very compressed time frame, the progression of rapidly deteriorating interior conditions, the adverse affects on the building’s structural systems and the results from the loss of load transfers that lead to a catastrophic wall collapse  narrowly missing the crew of firefighters who were operating a hand line in the vicinity of an exterior overhead door. Fortunately the injuries sustained to the firefighters were minor in nature; however the consequences and results from this collapse could have been far different and significantly more severe.

Following a series of repeated viewings of the video clip and with each successive viewing, it became readily apparent that there was a lot more to these images of the collapse and the cursory focus on the resulting near miss event. Closer examination of the video clip and the still frames brought to light some obvious conditions and indicators that easily become lost in the rapidity of the sequence of the collapse; which really has the true story to be told.

It’s the mechanism and sequence of the collapse, the dynamics of the building’s performance and the building indicators that provide a training opportunity in further examining key factors, presenting insights that could be a focus for operational and command personnel at future incidents with common parameters and gaining some mental models in recognition-primed decision making that contribute to the naturalistic decision-making process.

If you know what to be looking for, then when you see it, you may be able to anticipate, project and implement in rapid succession appropriate measures dictated by the incident.

Four Alarm Commercial Building Fire with Collapse: Fire Photo by Ben Goldberry

In an effort to promote additional insights and bring forward these fundamental observations and experienced-based presumptions extended from these and other news video images, still photographs, additional reporting research and examination, and a review of other published media resources; the following observations presented in this overview brief are being conveyed to increase firefighter, company and command level awareness of key collapse indicators such as those present at this commercial fire  and to further the concept of adaptive fireground management principles and increase awareness of fundamental building performance indicators and principles to help you increase your intuitive observations skills and translate them into proactive operational actions on the fireground-before an adverse condition occurs.[ i.e., being five steps ahead of the fire conditions].

Although this briefing makes use of the images and conditions depicted in the video clip and encountered by the fire department evident in the images; the susequent commentary and  insights provided are not meant to provide  direct or indirect opinions, renderings, criticism or censure  towards the conduct of operations or the management of the incident by the respective department and it’s firefighting, command and support personnel who operated at the actual fire and experienced this near miss event first-hand.

We are grateful that the events of this alarm precluded anything worst occurring given the potential seriousness of the prevailing  incident conditions and commend the  fire department and it’s firefighters that provide these exceptional services each and every day to the citizens they serve and to the community they protect, in mitigating this serious fire; safely and successfully.

This incident and the resulting near-miss captured by the videographer provides the Fire Service with an exceptional opportunity given today’s far reaching capabilities of eMedia, this web site and direct and indirect readers, links, tweets, likes, reposting’s, uploads, downloads and sharing  an opportunity to share the consequences of an extreme close-call and learn from it in a positive and constructive manner, so that firefighters, company officers, commanders and support personnel can better predict with knowledge, insight and at times intuition a better understanding of buildings and the structures and occupancies we operate within on the fireground.  

There are numerous inherent indicators present at every incident scene we operate at that. As is in this near miss event and building collapse; it’s sometimes the subtle things that need to gain the attention of operationg companies and personnel and the ability to rapidly process, recognize and react.

 Remember this: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

As a generality; it’s important to note that given heavy fire involvement in a structure (got fire), adaptive fireground management considerations would promote conservative considerations to anticipate and expect collapse (degraded or compromise; limited or catastrophic).

In the case of fires in commercial occupancies and buildings with;

• Large Square footage/Floor areas
• Significant fire loads
• Large open structural system spans lacking compartmentation, 
• Unprotected steel components and assemblies 
• No Sprinkler Systems
• Omitted, compromised or degraded passive or active protective  or suppression systems
• Significant openings along the exterior building envelope
• Significant opening on the roof enclosure
• Deep seated fires or rapidly escalating and extending fires

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. 

Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. Its alot more than that, with far greater consequences that may be very unforgiving.

Aerial Plan of Building and Collapse Area A-B

The Building

The fire incident involved a single story commercial building occupying approximately 32, 200 square feet of area on a multiple building site with proximal exposures.  Manufacturing, warehousing and offices comprised the building’s operational use.  An aerial plan view shows the geographical building scene divisions and the location and relationship of the Alpha- Bravo Side collapse zones that affected operations and resulted in the close-call and firefighter near-miss. The proximity of exposures, physical layout and orientation can be further assessed.

 A review of public documents and records, incident reports and various media resources  provided the following insights;

Overview Details

Alpha Street Side View- Adapted from Google Streetmaps

The view of the alpha street side identifies the building front facade, its main office entrance (center between dual overhead doors on the left and right). Pronounced on the alpha side facade is the presence of four (4) equally spaced overhead (OH) doors that provide direct access into the building’s interior. The subsequent collapse area is depicted at the A-B corner with special attention drawn to relationship of the wall plane and OH door proximity.

The relationship and this wall surface ( area square footage) and the presence of the OH door opening to the wall/ roof interface area that subsequently became compromised and collapsed is critical in further understanding the mechanism of the collapse sequence and also the positive effect it had on the survivability of the firefighters who were within the collapse zone at the time of the wall failure.

Don’t Always Stress the Corners

It’s been a common practice and fundamental fireground consideration to define the corner of a typical building as having safety considerations and prominence in the context of ladder company operations, laddering and roof work and in the placement of personnel and positioning of fireground operations.

Corner Building Operational considerations have included, but limited to;

• Provides a potentially safe(er) area of operational refuge
• Provides a location to safely position ground ladders for roof access/egress
• Provides a location that has a potential  higher degree of assurance for maintaining structural integrity in the event of a collapse condition of an outer wall
• Will not fail in a catastrophic or monolithic manner due to the postulated presence of structural members on the vicinity of either the wall enclosure and/or the roofing structural system and assemblies
• The design and construction configuration and orientation of the ninety degree angle of the building’s outer wall envelope (at the corner)  provides predicated inherent structural stability
• The  typical type of structural or envelope construction may have a resulting  ninety degree building corner having a more robust resistance to collapse and compromise due to the various types of enclosure systems (methods and materials) and assemblies and needed stability per engineering principles

In this instance (as shown in the Alpha side street view),  the presence of the large overhead door in close proximity to the corner wall intersection and transition ( A-B side), actually makes this position, fireground proximity and travel paths highly prone to early and complete collapse potential in the event of a loss of the wall-roof component or assembly integrity or in the load bearing/transfer capabilities of the wall-roof assembly. 

• The presence and identification of a corner configuration similar to this in a commercial structure should result in a higher degree of considerations and risk assessment when formulation and deploying operational assignments and in the placement of personnel for task assignments in this proximity.
• This operational area should be considered as a candidate for designation as a collapse zone based upon projected or defined operational considerations, incident conditions and predictive building characteristics, systems, materials and fire dynamics and conditions.  

Alpha-Bravo Corner of Subsequent Collapse Aerial View

• The entire perimeter of the alpha side could be considered for a restricted collapse zone just in terms of wall opening alone sans the degree of actual or projected interior fire impingement or fire involvement.

 Aerial Overhead view of the building perimeter walls along the four divisions ( A-D) with the A-B corner that subsequently experienced the wall-roof compromise and resulting collapse.

 The A-B corner and the affected ground areas around the collapse zone. Considerations for a collapse zone area on the A-B corner would have resulted in a minimum distance of twenty five (25) feet from the building base for all operations within this area. The collapse zone on the Bravo side extends into the exposure building due to its close proximity.

Always consider the building envelope materials of construction and systems present on the building. The use of concrete masonry units (CMU) is common, as is the use of pre-cast concrete and cast-in place and tilt-up concrete construction panels.

Variations in collapse dynamics and mechanisms of collapse may result in sizable increases in collapse zone distances from the building base with consideration for monolithic or partial wall collapse as well as safety considerations for bounce and travel over long distances of modular assembly building pieces ( i.e. concrete blocks, brick venner or material chunks).

We have not discussed collapse considerations for other building envelope systems such as metal panelized systems since these have entirely different collapse considerations and profiling, not applicable to this incident and assessment insights. The same is true when considering operating and collapse considerations at commercial buildings with ordinary construction or heavy timber systems (Type or Class III and IV). These to have different rules of predictive building performance and collapse safety considerations.

Typical Interior

Typical Structural System and Components

Interior View with Steel Columns, Open Web Steel bar Joists and Beams

 

 

Typical Open Web Steel Bar Joists w Metal Roof Deck

 

 

Large clear spans provided by the open web steel bar joists allowed for considerable free floor space typical of commercial warehouse occupancies.

Note the use of what appears to be combustible wood storage and staging areas that could have could potentially contribute towards increased fire intensity, extension and further contribute towards adverse affects on the unprotected structural steel components and assemblies.

 

Alpha Side Collapse Area Details: OH Door Pre-Collapse Insights

 

 

 

Pre-Collapse Operations on Alpha side with personnel in close proximty to the building perimeter

 

Pre-Collapse view of Operations on the Alpha side with personnel in close proximity, (within [a] collapse zone) to the building perimeter. It is evident that the degree of interior fire extension and involvement presumes a cautious deployment and placement of personnel in safe operational areas. When operating in such close proximity to the building wall and envelope, it becomes increasingly challenging for company officers and company personnel to monitor overall building performance indicators that may be prevalent or dominant from a view point further away from the building. 

Fire extension, smoke conditions, component or assembly movement or displacement may be readily defined and identified from a vantage point away from the building, requiring additional independent  operational assignments within the division if resources allow.   Otherwise, officers are encouraged to get a big picture view and increase their span of vision of the building and progressing fire conditions and building performance

 

 

 

 

The pre-collapse frame image above identifies the building roof line in relationship to the ground operations, smoke conditions and also the directional flow of the elevated master stream [upper right corner]. The initial  stage of the wall compromise and collapse can be seen in the Bravo wall pulling away. When watching the video, pay close attention first to the stream direction and flow and them at the location and movement of the wall, which is followed in rapid succession with the full wall collapse.

T

 

Close examination of the initial video frames shows the rapid displacement of the portion of the Bravo wall and outward collapse towards the B-Exposure (alleyway) Refer to the Aerial Plan for orientation. The A-B Collapse is progressing from the Bravo side to the Alpha side as loads are being transferred in rapid progression with further collapse expected.

The frame image above shows the bravo wall failing outward with the resulting loss in structural support of the roofing deck assembly.

Rapid fire migration and extension is evident after the wall section collapse with increased flames visible. In the video, one firefighter quickly recognizes the imminent collapse and reacts.

A significant section of wall area is present at the A-B side and progressing from the building corner to the left jamb of the overhead (OH) door. This area and the area directly above the OH door opening is calculated to weigh over 20,000 lbs. 

The early identification and establishment of collapse zone(s) is mission critical especially at commercial buildings due to the considerations for rapidly changing operational conditions that may be a result of or influenced by the following;

• lack of knowledge or understanding of the building’s construction, systems and characteristics
• lack of adequate resources, skills and or capabilities for selected phase operations
• fire loading, combustibles, flammables and other products
• Last of or loss of compartmentation
• fire and protective systems failures or inoperability
• unapproved alterations, additions and renovations to the building, systems and occupancy
• transitions for offensive to defensive operational phases, which at times may results in operating position postures too close to the building
• failure to recognize situational factors that will drive appropriate operational phasing and task deployments
• lack of building performance knowledge
• not considering occupancy risk versus treating the building/fire relationship based upon occupancy type
• not recognizing key collapse indicators and failing to implement timely actions [proactively versus reactionary]
• being four steps behind the fire conditions evident instead of implementing adaptive fire ground management insights [five steps ahead of the evident fire]
• use precise coordination when placing elevated masterstreams into operations with ground personnel operating within close quarters
• understand the effects of master streams on the integrity of building features, assemblies and components

 

 

 

 

 

The image frame above shows personnel operating within an imminent collapse zone directing hand lines into the interior fire area. Further examination of the video  frames clearly shows one firefighter quickly recognizing that a collapse is occurring and attempts to alert the other personnel to retreat. Simultaneously to the collapse progression, the crew immediately retreats away from the collapsing wall and falling building materials.

 

Within the span of four seconds, the wall compromise occurs and collapses on the ground at the A-B corner and immediate area on the alpha side.  The slightly monolithic manner in which the wall plane first peels away and progressively collapsed is interesting for a CMU wall. Possibly due to the outward collapse of the Bravo wall, followed by the rapid succession of failure of the roof-wall connection interface resulted in an transitional downward force that pushed the alpha side wall outward allowing gravity to work its force

 

When operating in close proximity to a heavily involved forward interior condition [exterior position] it is important to maintain focused situational awareness and either directly maintain or delegate responsibilities for observations of fire and smoke progress and conditions while monitoring key functional building performance indicators and collapse pre-cursors. 

 

Additionally, always re-evaluate the effectiveness of deployed and operational hose lines, streams and in water application to ensure they are adequate for the degree of fire suppression being undertaken and the corresponding fire flow requirements. Don’t just assume, determine with validity. [ Refer to Tactical Entertainment]  

 

Obscured by the rapidly defining smoke which is a result of the developing and extending collapse, the frame image 04 below depicts the beginning of the compromise and collapse sequence commencing as a result of the Bravo wall compromise and collapse sequence at the B-A corner that will subsequently peel towards the Alpha side and continue up to the outermost jamb of the overhead door.

 

Pay particular attention to the first three to four seconds of the video clip and review the video clip over a few times;  looking at the operating elevated master stream that is clearly visible and operating from the upper right part of the screen through the smoke plume; follow the direct orientation and stream flowing directly towards the bravo wall plane,  and presumed penetrating into/through the roof deck or impacting through the metal roof deck and wall-roof assembly area at the upper roof edge.

 

 

Image 04

 

 Frame image 04 depicts the rapidly deteriorating conditions that are evident as the collapse sequence continues and the overhead door jamb (left) buckling and adjacent wall failing by way of an outward curl or peel away commencing from the upper (left image) A-B corner at the roof line and then peeling and failing from upper left to right.

 

 

Image 05

 

 

The leading edge of the outward collapsing wall plane ( yellow dotted line) is failing with the greatest material concentration occurring at the A-B edge outward. Fortunately the presence and location of the overhead door opening  lessened the amount and location of wall material ( concrete masonry units-CMU) and contributed to a void area being present and not fully impacting the firefighters who were operating within this collapse zone.

 

In other words, had this been a solid full wall collapse likelihood for significant firefighter injury would have resulted. 

 

The affects of wall/roof compromise should be of focused consideration and monitoring when managing incidents of this size and magnitude in similar occupancies and building features.  Flame and heat  impingment can and will affect the structural integrity of lintels spans, beams and truss connects along roof lines and connections. Look for signs of impingment, degradation or compromise. watch for signs of probable inward/outward or curtain wall collapse.

 

 

 

Image 06

 

The remaining images, frames 06 and 07 depict the location of the firefighters to the wall collapse, the relationship to the wall and roof system and the degree of wall area that became compromised and collapsed.

 

Image 07

 

This brief video clip and these accompanying briefing insights provided a tremendous opportunity to examine in a non-critical manner an actual near miss collapse event and  operational discernments that provide a focused training an awareness opportunity.

When given the time to analyze and assess, some things become so apparent and self-revealing that we might prematurely say why didn’t someone pick up that or those conditions while conducting operations at [an] incident.  It is dependent on a wide variety of factors, conditions and parameters that are difficult at times to identify and harder yet to fully identify as common or contributing factors, errors or omissions.

It’s not always that easy; but contradictory – some time it really is (or should be) that easy.

Some things on the fireground may not be prone to being so readily identifiable or recognized.

It all depends what you’re looking for and whether you have the necessary insights, knowledge and skill sets. Incident priorities, demands, situational focus, awareness or disconnect all may have a part in how and incident is managed and mitigated.

It goes back directly on knowing what to look for and when; at what type of building with which type of occupancy and under what stage or stages of fire development and combat operations or engagement you might be in. It complex, it takes time and experience and learning’s.

There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.

You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.

Links:

•  http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20111031/LOCAL07/310319957

Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page

On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.

Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.

Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.

Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.

The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.

Building Construction Insights

• Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
• Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”

Fire Building Construction:

• 7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
• The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
• The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.

Collapse Building Construction:

• 6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
• The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
• The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street
  

  Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011

Building Alteration

(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.

(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.

(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.

 The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.

It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.

The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.

The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001. 
 

FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank

Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.

• DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
• BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
• Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
• Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
• Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
• Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
• Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
• Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
• Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
• Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
• Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
• Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18

From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html

• NYFD.com Insights and Photos HERE
• FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary, HERE

• FDNY – Remembering the “23rd Street Fire” October 17, 1966, Facebook Page, HERE

• Personal Account: http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/box598.pdf

• http://ephemeralnewyork.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/the-second-worst-fire-in-new-york-city-history/

• http://www.fdnye16l7.com/History/23rdstreetfire.html

•  New York Times (2006): Oct. 17, 1966, When 12 Firemen Died HERE

• http://firehistory.org/2011/02/october-17th-1966-new-york-ny-23rd-street-fire/

• The Site Today, HERE and HERE

A wreath is laid at the new plaque honoring the 12 FDNY members killed at the 23rd Street fire on Oct. 17, 1966. © FDNY Photo Unit.

FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary

 Three Franklin (OH) firefighters were caught in what has been determined to be a smoke explosion at a structure fire involving a restaurant occupancy in what appears to be a building of Type III construction that published reports indicated was built in 1892.

Franklin (OH) FD Lt. Kyle Lovelace and firefighters Quincy Pearson and Brad Brown were caught in a smoke explosion while conducting interior fire suppression operations at which time conditions deteriorated and a smoke explosion occurred. Simultaneous with the recognition that something was not good; the crew immediately began to retreat when they were caught in the explosion. All of them luckily made it out unscathed.

According to published reports, “They reverted back to their training and did what they needed to do to get out,” according to Fire Chief Jonathan Westendorf . “We have a flashover simulator and we spend a good amount time talking about it each year.”

Reports have indicated Lt. Lovelace stated that when they arrived on the scene, he noticed smoke coming from left side of the building above the second floor and thought that it may be an attic fire.

They attempted to gain entry through the front door, but before they opened it they noticed a crack in the window and decided to gain entry through the rear. Lt. Lovelace, FF Pearson and FF Brown entered an alley covered by an awning connecting to freestanding structures. Westendorf  later said his guys were fortunate to be in that location because they were isolated from the brunt of the blast.

The crew advanced about 25 feet when FF Pearson, who was on the nozzle, saw wisps of smoke and began to feel extreme heat.

Lt. Lovelace used a thermal imaging camera to locate where the heat was coming from, but right before he could tell Person, he started yelling at him to get out. They made it about 20 feet when the thick black smoke started banking down on them. As Lovelace exited under the awning, conditions quickly worsened and the smoke explosion occurred. Video of blast HERE

Links for complete reporting insights and details;

• http://www.newsnet5.com/dpp/news/backdraft-explosion-puts-ohio-firefighters-in-danger
• Ohio Firefighters Narrowly Escape Smoke Explosion
•  http://www.middletownjournal.com/news/middletown-news/fire-destroys-restaurant-in-downtown-franklin-1263107.html
• http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/44806177/ns/local_news-cincinnati_oh/t/firefighter-veterans-experience-saved-us-backdraft/
• http://www.firefighterclosecalls.com/news/fullstory/newsid/146829

• Flashover Simulator Training Helped Ohio Crew Survive

Photo by Nick Graham Middletown Journal

Alpha side from the Street, Image Capture from Google Street Maps

 

Aerial Image along South Main Street of the Building

Screenshot from video as smoke explosion occurs

In this week's issue of the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System's Report of the Week (ROTW) an informative focus was provided on near-miss reports related to ceiling collapse. We're posting the ROTW alert in it's entirety below and are expanding upon this discussion to include materials previously posted on Buildingsonfire.com from the posts that surrounded the LAFD LODD of Firefighter Glenn L. Allen  who was killed in the line of duty as a result of being trapped beneath rubble when the roof and ceiling collapsed during a blaze at a 12,000-square-foot  mansion in the Hollywood Hills on Feb. 17, 2011. (HERE and HERE)

Included in that reporting was expanded information on gypsum wall board ceiling systems. If you don't know about the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System and the Report of the Week (ROTW) follow these links HERE , HERE and HERE. More importantly, get involved and post some of your current OR past near-miss experiences and close calls, so the fire service can learn and everyone can go home. www.firefighternearmiss.com. Check out the extensive resources and materials avaiable on the site to support your training and operational needs.

Near-Miss Report of the Week

From the NMRS & ROTW;

The collapse of a ceiling is one of the more disorienting situations a firefighter can face. Sixty near-miss reports are returned when the keyword "ceiling collapse" is typed into the text box on www.firefighternearmiss.com. Each of these accounts provides lessons on the value of heightened situational awareness, correct use of PPE, rigorous training, and recognizing the effect of fire on building materials. The National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System'ss Report of the Week (ROTW) featured report this week, 11-025, recounts one example.

"Our station was dispatched for a residential structure fire and we responded with two engines and four on-duty personnel… The near-miss happened about 30 minutes into the fire and there were two hoselines in place. One hoseline was on the second floor and one hoseline was on the first floor. Most of the fire was extinguished and overhaul was in progress. There were three members of my crew pulling ceiling to reach hot spots. The lieutenant stated to be careful because the floor above was moving when pulling down on overhead material. The firefighter and the lieutenant continued to pull down the ceiling. This is when the second floor collapsed down into the first floor and the room that we were in…"  

The overhead world of a fire scene is fraught with hazards. Many of the hazards we can dispassionately discuss at the kitchen table, but seem to overlook when we are engaged in firefighting. Electrical wiring, telecommunication cables, structural support systems and storage are all elements hidden behind the drywall. Whether you are looking up at a ceiling that covers an attic or an upper floor, shoving your hook through the drywall is usually a benign act that simply pulls down a section of sheetrock to expose the hidden area above. However, it can also be a catastrophic act that brings down an entrapment hazard that has you fighting for survival.

Once you have read the entire account of 11-025, and the related reports, consider the following: 

1. Before ceiling pulling begins, is there an assessment of the structural stability and review of what might be behind the drywall before the first piece is removed?
2. Do you and your crews observe best practices when pulling ceilings (i.e., starting at the doorway and working into the room, noting the location of structural members through visual notation of nails, "shadowing" or "ghosting" of studs, etc.) before pulling ceilings?
3. Do you consider limiting the number of personnel in a room when ceilings and walls are being pulled?
4. Who is responsible for ensuring utilities have been controlled before pulling ceilings and walls? How is utility control documented and confirmed before ceiling pulling begins?
5. What is the likelihood that the space above the ceiling you are pulling is being used for storage? If storage is noted, can you determine what effect pulling down the ceiling will have on the structural members resisting the weight of the storage?

Overhaul activities occur during a transitional time in the firefighting process. The adrenaline and effort of the fire attack begins to fade, but there is still enough pent up energy that some members of the crews are propelled from one action to another without an assessment of conditions. The thinking officer and crew make periodic assessments, or benchmarks, to ensure the incident reality still matches the company's perception.

Related Reports- Topical Relation: Ceiling Collapse
05-553
06-292
07-889
08-305
09-465
10-847

Have you escaped a ceiling collapse due to exceptional vigilance? Have you ever gotten caught in a ceiling collapse? Submit your report to www.firefighternearmiss.com today so everyone goes home tomorrow.

Note: The questions posed above from the NFFNMRS-ROTW by the reviewers are designed to generate discussion and thought in the name of promoting firefighter safety. They are not intended to pass judgment on the actions and performance of individuals in the reports.

The Following is reposted from Buildingsonfire.com ;  ( The LAFD LODD link is HERE)

Gypsum Board Ceiling Systems and Firefigher Safety

The recent events in Los Angeles and the line of duty death of veteran LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen who died Friday from injuries he sustained when a ceiling collapsed on him in a house fire late Wednesday night in the Hollywood Hills again gives us pause to reflect on the demands and hazards present at all fire suppression operations in buildings on fire. The past two months have borne consist reports of floor, roof, wall and ceiling collapses leading to firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.

• Incident event coverage from this past week HERE, HERE and HERE

The importance of maintaining heightened situational awareness, identifying and monitoring suspected or inherent building construction hazards coupled with inherent occupancy risk factors, and aligning those with strategic objectives, incident actions plans and tactical deployment operations. Building Knowledge equating to firefighter safety is still a driving principle that is formulative to all firefighting operations in buildings, occupancies and structures. Let’s take this opportunity to gain some insights into the material that compromises nearly all wall and ceiling membrane systems and assemblies in nearly all buildings, occupancies and structures; that is gypsum board components.

I’ve included a number of video clips that center on our discussion, as the videos center on the operation parameters at this extremely large (floor area/square footage) residential occupancy. Most clips have good coverage of the structure and firefighting efforts. Take a few moments to review these clips before you proceed;

Gypsum board is the generic name for a family of panel-type products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges.

In 1888, Augustine Sackett used plaster of Paris sandwiched between several layers of paper to produce what would eventually become "Sackett Board," the original gypsum board. By the 1950s, many innovations in gypsum board technology had been developed, including the listing of many fire-resistance rated designs, rounded edges, specialized nails, curved partitions, studless partitions, sound control systems, lightweight gypsum lath, plaster, and gypsum board systems that fueled a boom period for the use of gypsum products in both the residential and commercial construction industries.

By 1955, an estimated 50 percent of new homes were built using gypsum wallboard. Lightweight gypsum board systems permitted the use of lightweight steel in steel framed buildings, which enabled the widespread growth of high-rise residential and commercial construction during the 1960s and 1970s.

Today gypsum board, along with a variety of other gypsum panel products, continues to serve as a preferred building material in both residential and commercial construction for interior walls and ceilings, exterior sheathing, fire-resistant partitions and membranes, and liner material for elevator shafts and stairwells. These properties make gypsum board well suited for building and space types requiring cost-effectiveness as well as fire resistiveness and maintainability.

Gypsum board is often called drywall, wallboard, or plasterboard and differs from products such as plywood, hardboard, and fiberboard, because of its noncombustible core. It is designed to provide a monolithic surface when joints and fastener heads are covered with a joint treatment system.

Gypsum is a mineral found in sedimentary rock formations in a crystalline form known as calcium sulfate dehydrate. One hundred pounds of gypsum rock contains approximately 21 pounds (or 10 quarts) of chemically combined water. Gypsum rock is mined or quarried and then crushed. The crushed rock is then ground into a fine powder and heated to about 350 degrees F, driving off three fourths of the chemically combined water in a process called calcining. The calcined gypsum (or hemihydrate) is then used as the base for gypsum plaster, gypsum board and other gypsum products.

To produce gypsum board, the calcined gypsum is mixed with water and additives to form a slurry which is fed between continuous layers of paper on a board machine. As the board moves down a conveyer line, the calcium sulfate recrystallizes or rehydrates, reverting to its original rock state. The paper becomes chemically and mechanically bonded to the core. The board is then cut to length and conveyed through dryers to remove any free moisture.

Gypsum manufacturers also rely increasingly on “synthetic” gypsum as an effective alternative to natural gypsum ore. Synthetic gypsum is a byproduct primarily from the desulfurization of the flue gases in fossil-fueled power plants. Gypsum board is an excellent fire resistive material. It is the most commonly used interior finish where fire resistance classifications are required. Its noncombustible core contains chemically combined water which, under high heat, is slowly released as steam, effectively retarding heat transfer. Even after complete calcination, when all the water has been released, it continues to act as a heat insulating barrier. In addition, tests conducted in accordance with ASTM E 84 show that gypsum board has a low flame spread index and smoke density index. When installed in combination with other materials it serves to effectively protect building elements from fire for prescribed time periods.

Developed through modern technology as a result of specific requirements, gypsum board is mainly used as the surface layer of interior walls and ceilings; as a base for ceramic, plastic, and metal tile; for exterior soffits; for elevator and other shaft enclosures; as area separation walls between occupancies; and to provide fire protection to structural elements. Most gypsum board is available with aluminum foil backing which provides an effective vapor retarder for exterior walls when applied with the foil surface against the framing.

Standard size gypsum boards are 4ft. wide and 8, 10, 12, or 14 ft. long. The width is compatible with the standard framing of studs or joists spaced 16 in. and 24 in. on center. Some thicknesses and types of gypsum board are also produced as a standard 54 in. width material. Other lengths and widths are available as special order materials.

• Depending on thickness and type of gypsum board, the weight can vary from 2 – 4 lbs./ per square foot
• A typical 4 ft. x 8 ft. sheet of 5/8-in gypsum board can weigh 96 lbs.
• A 4ft. x 12ft. sheet can weigh upwards of 150 lbs.
• In large span designs with attachments varying from 16 inches on center to 24 inches on center with z-strips or resilient channels attached to the structural members; these ceiling panels and assemblies can fail and collapse in a monolithic manner creating a significant safety concern to operating companies below.
• As an example a 12ft x 12ft. monolithic assembly collapse ( single layer-gypsum board only) could have a collapse weight of 500 lbs.
• Add the weight of compromised and attached structural members components, fixtures and insulation and the absorption of added water into the gypsum board from hose streams the combined weight of the collapse area may increase to 800-1000 lbs. Increase the size of the collapse area and the weight impacting operating companies is significant.

The various thicknesses of gypsum board available in regular, type X, improved type X and pre-decorated board are as follows:

• ¼-in. A low cost gypsum board used as a base in a multi-layer application for improving sound control, or to cover existing walls and ceilings in remodeling.
• 5/16-in. A gypsum board used in manufactured housing.
• 3/8-in. A gypsum board principally applied in a double-layer system over wood framing and as a face layer in repair or remodeling.
• ½-in. Generally used as a single-layer wall and ceiling material in residential work and in double-layer systems for greater sound and fire ratings.
• 5/8-in. Used in quality single-layer and double-layer wall systems. The greater thickness provides additional fire resistance, higher rigidity, and better impact resistance.
• ¾-in. Used in a similar manner to 5/8-in.
• 1 in. Used in interior partitions, shaft walls, stairwells, chaseways, area separation walls and corridor ceilings. Manufactured only in 24 in. wide panels and usually installed as an integral part of a system.

Depending on the type and the use, gypsum board is manufactured with a tapered, square, beveled, rounded, or tongue and groove edge. Some gypsum board types may incorporate a combination of different edge types. The fire resistance of gypsum board can be described using three distinct terms: regular core, type ‘X’ core and improved type ‘X’ core.

Regular core gypsum board is made of a noncombustible core material composed mainly of gypsum. Although it does not have the specially enhanced fire-resistive properties of type ‘X’, regular core gypsum board affords a degree of natural fire resistance.

In the 1940s different gypsum board formulations were investigated to increase the naturally occurring fire resistance of regular core gypsum board. A new product was eventually introduced that clearly demonstrated “eXtra” fire resistance, hence the name “type X.” The basic components of type ‘X’ that give it a superior fire resistance are gypsum, glass fibers, and vermiculite.

In the 1960s, further modifications were made to the original successful type ‘X’ formulations of gypsum board used in some systems – particularly ceiling systems – without compromising the fire-resistive qualities. The new product demonstrates additional fire resistance over type ‘X’ core, and thus the term “improved type X” was coined. Gypsum board products make up the predominant portion of a family of materials identified as gypsum panel products. Gypsum panel products are defined as sheet materials consisting essentially of gypsum. They can be faced with paper or another material, or may be unfaced. Gypsum board, glass-faced sheathing materials with a gypsum core and unfaced gypsum-based products are all considered to be gypsum panel products. Technically, gypsum board is defined as the generic name for a family of sheet products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges. In recent years the family of gypsum-based panel materials has grown to include panel products other than those with the familiar paper facers. A number of specialized gypsum panel products and gypsum boards have been developed for specific uses which include:

• Gypsum Wallboard for interior walls and ceilings
• Gypsum Ceiling Board for interior ceilings
• Type X Gypsum Board for fire-resistance-rated building systems
• Fiber Reinforced Gypsum Panels for interior and exterior walls, ceilings, and tile base
• Gypsum Sheathing for exterior walls and roof systems
• Glass Mat Gypsum Substrate for use as sheathing on exterior walls and ceilings
• Gypsum Soffit Board for use on exterior soffits and ceilings
• Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
• Glass Mat Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
• Gypsum Backing Board for use as a base for multi-ply systems
• Gypsum Lath for use as a base for gypsum plaster
• Gypsum Plaster Base for use as a base for veneer plaster
• Gypsum Shaft Liner Board for shaft, stairway, and duct enclosures
• Pre-decorated Gypsum Board for accent walls, office and movable partitions
• Foil backed gypsum board for use as a vapor retardent

Identified by their technically correct names, gypsum board products are as follows: Gypsum Wallboard is produced primarily for use as an interior surfacing for buildings. It is the most often used commodity gypsum board and annually accounts for over 50 percent of all the gypsum board manufactured and sold in North America. Gypsum wallboard has a manila-colored face paper and is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.

Gypsum Ceiling Board is an interior surfacing material with the same physical appearance as gypsum wallboard. Gypsum ceiling board is manufactured as a ½-inch thick material; it is designed for application on interior ceilings, primarily those intended to receive a water-based texture finish. It has a sag resistance equal to 5/8-inch thick gypsum wallboard.

Predecorated Gypsum Board has a decorative surface which does not require further treatment. The surfaces may be coated or painted, printed, textured, or have a film – such as vinyl wallcovering – applied. It is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.

Water-resistant Gypsum Board is a gypsum board designed for use on walls primarily as a base for the application of ceramic or plastic tile. It is readily identified by its green-tinted face paper and is commonly referred to as “Greenboard.” It has a water-resistant core and a water-repellent face and back paper; it is generally installed in bath, kitchen, and laundry areas.

Gypsum Backing Board, Gypsum Coreboard, and Gypsum Shaftliner Panel are all designed to be used as base materials in multi-layer, solid and semi-solid, and shaftwall systems. Gypsum backing board is used as a base layer for other gypsum board materials in systems or as a base for dry claddings such as acoustic tile. Gypsum coreboard and gypsum shaftliner are manufactured with a type X core, using a specific edge configuration to facilitate installation into specialized stud systems and a type X core.

Exterior Gypsum Soffit Board is designed for use on the underside of eaves, canopies, carports, soffits, and other horizontal exterior surfaces that are indirectly exposed to the weather. It has water-repellent face and back paper and is more sag-resistant than regular wallboard. Exterior gypsum soffit board can be manufactured with a type X core and typically has a light brown face paper.

Gypsum Sheathing Board is used as a backing under exterior siding or cladding. It has a water-repellent face and back paper and can be manufactured with a water-resistant core. Depending on the thickness of the board, gypsum sheathing board is manufactured with either a square or a tongue-and-groove edge and a fire-resistive core. It generally has a brown or light black face paper.

Gypsum Base for Veneer Plaster has a distinctive blue-tinted face paper that is treated to facilitate the adhesion of thin coats of hard, high strength gypsum veneer plaster. It is produced in sheets that are the same width as gypsum wallboard and can be manufactured with a fire-resistive core. Application of Gypsum Board

A wide variety of gypsum board application methods are available to meet virtually any need in building design and construction. Gypsum board is applied in either single-layer or multi-layer systems to achieve specific fire or sound ratings. Gypsum board is applied over wood or steel framing or furring. It is also applied to masonry or concrete surfaces, either laminated directly or attached to wood furring strips or steel furring channels. Gypsum board ceilings can be directly attached to joists or trusses or attached to furring or grid systems suspended below structural members. Gypsum board is generally attached to the framing with nails, screws, or staples. Although nails are commonly used in wood frame construction, screws are often preferred because they are applied with automatic screw guns, have excellent holding power, and reduce the possibility of nail pops. A combination of nails and screws may also be used, with nails along edges and screws in the field. Staples are used because they are economical and can be quickly applied with staple guns; however, the use of staples should be limited to the base-layer in multi-layer systems or to gypsum sheathing on wood framing. Gypsum board wall and ceiling surfaces are typically decorated with paint, texture, wallpaper, tile, or paneling. When pre-decorated gypsum board is used, joints are generally covered with matching molding or battens; no additional finishing or decoration is necessary. Single-Layer Application

• Single-layer gypsum board applications are the most common in light commercial and in residential construction.
• These systems rely on one layer of gypsum board attached to framing or furring.
• Although single-layer gypsum board systems are generally adequate to meet most minimum requirements for fire resistance and sound control, multi-layer systems are preferred for higher quality construction and to upgrade beyond the "bare minimums" of many code requirements.

Multi-Layer Application

• Multi-layer systems have two or more layers of gypsum board and are used to meet higher sound and fire resistance requirements or to enhance these comfort and safety qualities beyond minimum code requirements.
• They also provide better surface quality because face layers can often be laminated over base layers eliminating many or all of the fasteners in the face layer. In addition, face-layer joints are stronger by virtue of the continuous backing provided by the base layers.
• Nail pops and ridging are less frequent and imperfectly aligned framing has less effect on the quality of the finished surface.

GYPSUM BOARD TYPICAL MECHANICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES (GA-235-10) A common misconception is that there are just two basic types of drywall—regular and type X—and beyond this difference, drywall products from various manufacturers are about the same. However, laboratory fire tests by United States Gypsum Company and various independent testing organizations provide strong evidence that there are significant fire-performance differences between drywall products from various manufacturers. It is well known in the construction industry that the single most important characteristic of gypsum drywall is its fire resistance. This is provided by the principal raw material used in its manufacture, CaSO4- 2H2O (gypsum). As the chemical formula shows, gypsum contains chemically combined water (about 50% by volume). When gypsum drywall panels are exposed to fire, the heat converts a portion of the combined water to steam. The heat energy that converts water to steam is thus used up, keeping the opposite side of the gypsum panel cool as long as there is water left in the gypsum, or until the gypsum panel is breached.

• In the case of regular gypsum panels, as the water is driven off by heat, the reduction in volume within the gypsum causes large cracks to form, eventually causing the panel to fail.
• In a special fire test designed to demonstrate the relative performance of different types of gypsum cores (described later in this section), it was shown that in a fire with a temperature of 1,850ºF, a 5/8" thickness of regular-core gypsum panels would fail in this manner in 10 to 15 minutes.
• Type X gypsum panels, such as Sheetrock brand Firecode gypsum panels, have glass fibers mixed with the gypsum to reinforce the core of the panels.
• These fibers have the effect of reducing the extent of and size of the cracks that form as the water is driven off, thereby extending the length of time the gypsum panel can resist the heat without failure.
• Fire test results indicate that the same thickness of the type X gypsum drywall exposed to the same temperature (1,850ºF) will last 45 to 60 minutes.

USG has developed a third-generation gypsum drywall product called Sheetrock brand Firecode C gypsum panels that provides even greater resistance to the heat of fire. The core of Firecode C contains more glass fibers than type X—but also a shrinkage-compensating additive, a form of vermiculite that expands in the presence of heat at about the same rate as the gypsum in the core shrinks (from loss of water). Thus the core becomes highly stable in the presence of fire and remains intact even after the combined water is driven off. Tests have shown that this third-generation product resisted the fire for more than two hours, as compared to 45 to 60 minutes for the type X, and 10 to 15minutes for the regular panel under the same test conditions.

In a future posting we’ll discuss the issues facing the fire service related to the newest generation of impact resistant gypsum board that will restrict or preclude entirely our ability to breach walls in residential or commercial occupancies. Here are some links and Spec Sheets to look at in advance, HERE , HERE, HERE and HERE  

References and Links Summarizing the many different types of gypsum board used in the industry, this quick reference gives typical uses of, and the ASTM and CSA standards for, each type. Also included is the appropriate industry standard designation for the installation of each type of gypsum board, along with the sizes and thicknesses generally available. Download

APPLICATION OF GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-253-07)

This publication describes the industry's latest recommendations for handling, storing, and installing gypsum sheathing under a variety of conditions. A must for anyone hanging gypsum sheathing or involved in EIFS work. Download

FIRE-RESISTANT GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-254-07)

This publication describes the advantages, recommended uses, limitations, and properties of gypsum sheathing in exterior walls.

Download

Gypsum Construction Handbook

• Reference guide of construction procedures for gypsum drywall, cement board, veneer plaster and conventional plaster.

Trade Associations and other Organizations

• Association of the Wall and Ceiling Industry (AWCI)—Provides services and undertake activities that enhance the members' ability to operate a successful business. AWCI represents acoustics systems, ceiling systems, drywall systems, exterior insulation and finishing systems, fireproofing, flooring systems, insulation, and stucco contractors, suppliers and manufacturers, and allied trades.
• ASTM International (ASTM)—Provides a global forum for the development and publication of voluntary consensus standards for materials, products, systems, and services. In over 130 varied industry areas, ASTM standards serve as the basis for manufacturing, procurement, and regulatory activities. Provides standards that are accepted and used in research and development, product testing, quality systems, and commercial transactions around the globe.
• Ceilings and Interior Systems Construction Association (CISCA)—Association for the advancement interior commercial construction, providing education, technical guidance and related resources. CISCA membership includes over 600 of the leading contractors, distributors, manufacturers and independent manufacturer's representatives worldwide.
• Gypsum Association (GA)—Founded in 1930, GA promotes the use of gypsum while advancing the development, growth, and general welfare of the gypsum industry in the United States and Canada on behalf of its member companies.
• ICC Evaluation Service (ICC-ES)—Provides technical evaluations of building products, components, methods, and materials and issues reports on code compliance to building regulators, contractors, specifiers, architects, engineers, and the public.

Relevant Codes and Standards

Guide Specifications

• Department of Defense (DoD) Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS)
  • UFGS 09 23 00 Gypsum Plaster
  • UFGS 09 29 00 Gypsum Board
• Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
  • VA 09 23 00 Gypsum Plastering
  • VA 09 29 00 Gypsum Board
• Green Construction Specs
  • 09250 Gypsum Board
• MasterSpec®
  • 09210 Gypsum Plaster
  • 09215 Gypsum Veneer Plastering
  • 09250 Gypsum Board
  • 09265 Gypsum Board Shaft-Wall Assemblies

NIOSH LODD Report Released on Fire and Collapse Which Killed Two Chicago Firefighters
F2010-38  Two Career Fire Fighters Die and 19 Injured in Roof Collapse during Rubbish Fire at an Abandoned Commercial Structure – Illinois

NIOSH Executive Summary
On December 22, 2010, a 47-year-old male (Victim # 1) and a 34-year old male (Victim # 2), both career fire fighters, died when the roof collapsed during suppression operations at a rubbish fire in an abandoned and unsecured commercial structure. The bowstring truss roof collapsed at the rear of the 84-year old structure approximately 16 minutes after the initial companies arrived on-scene and within minutes after the Incident Commander reported that the fire was under control. The structure, the former site of a commercial laundry, had been abandoned for over 5 years and city officials had previously cited the building owners for the deteriorated condition of the structure and ordered the owner to either repair or demolish the structure. The victims were members of the first alarm assignment and were working inside the structure. A total of 19 other fire fighters were hurt during the collapse.

Contributing Factors

• Lack of a vacant / hazardous building marking program within the city
• Vacant / hazardous building information not part of automatic dispatch system
• Dilapidated condition of the structure
• Dispatch occurred during shift change resulting in fragmented crews
• Weather conditions including snow accumulation on roof and frozen water hydrants
• Not all fire fighters equipped with radios.

Key Recommendations

• Identify and mark buildings that present hazards to fire fighters and the public
• Use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially abandoned or vacant unsecured structures
• Train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
• Provide battalion chiefs with a staff assistant or chief's aide to help manage information and communication
• Provide all fire fighters with radios and train them on their proper use
• Develop, train on, and enforce the use of standard operating procedures that specifically address operations in abandoned and vacant structures

NIOSH Recommendations

• Recommendation #1: Fire departments and city building departments should work together to identify and mark buildings that present hazards to fire fighters and the public.
• Recommendation #2: Fire departments should use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially abandoned or vacant unsecured structures.
• Recommendation # 3: Fire departments should train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates.
• Recommendation # 4: Fire departments should consider providing battalion chiefs with a staff assistant or chief's aide to help manage information and communication.
• Recommendation # 5: Fire departments should provide all fire fighters with radios and train them on their proper use.
• Recommendation # 6: Fire departments should develop, train on and enforce the use of standard operating procedures that specifically address operations in abandoned and vacant structures.
• Recommendation # 7: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to ensure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday.
• Recommendation # 8: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
• Recommendation # 9: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures.
• Recommendation #10: Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters are trained in and understand the hazards associated with bowstring truss construction.

FULL NIOSH LODD REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS, HERE

The tragic events in the City of Chicago on Wednesday December 22, 2010, when Chicago Firefighter Edward J. Stringer – Engine Co.63 and Firefighter/EMT Corey D. Ankum, Truck Co.34 were killed in the line of duty while operating at a structure fire in an abandoned one-story brick building in the 1700 block of East 75th Street on the City’s South side, exemplifies the demands, challenges and sacrifice that come with responsibilities, duty and sworn obligation  that distinguishes the honorable profession of being a firefighter.     

The fire was first reported at about 06:48 hours during the night and day tour shift change, with companies arriving at 06:52 hours reporting moderate fire in the  buildings northeast corner. The single story commercial structure was vacant, however it was readily known that squatters were known to seek shelter in the abandoned structure especially give the harsh weather being experienced in the city. The fire was quickly contained at approximately 07:00 hours according to published reports, and radio communications, with coordinated suppression, search and rescue and ventilation operations being conduction by companied both within the interior and on the roof. 

Other Operational Safety Insights and Considerations from CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com

• During all operations involving actual or suspected Bowstring Truss Roofing Support Systems Command and Company Officers should be sensitive to risk assessment indicators related to both fire induced conditions as well as environmental and age induced factors.
• Pre-plan your buildings look at the construction, components, features and condition of the building; there is a tremendous amount of information out there. Understand and comprehend what to look for, what it is that you’re looking at and more importantly make sure the information is retrievable for on-scene application and that the information is utilized when formulating IAP and in the dynamic risk assessment process
• During Dynamic Risk Assessment, special attention should be focused on Predicated Building Performance common to identified building systems, features and structural systems that are based upon Occupancy Performance and NOT Occupancy Type.
• The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report examining the characteristics of fires in vacant residential buildings. The report, Vacant Residential Building Fires, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and provides useful insights and recommendations. Link HERE
• When developing incident action plans and operational assignments at incidents involving possible Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures, command and company officers shall implement a formulative risk -benefit assessment consistent with departmental procedures, policies and expectations.
• Be knowledgable of operational factors and considerations related to operations at Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures; HERE and HERE
• Read the Newest NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters at Structure Fires, HERE
• Start considering building; age, deterioration, environmental impacts and influences in your IAP and tactical considerations, we at times forget to consider these performance indicators effectively during initial or sustained operations.
• Learn more about Building Construction, Occupancy Profiling, Reading a Building, Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type and always consider Tactical Patience.
• Increase your knowledge on Structural Collapse indicators especially for buildings of masonry construction in both Type III and Type IV construction.
• There is a Predictability of Performance in all Buildings and Occupancies with Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural Systems; Know what they are.
• Understand what to look for in Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural System integrity related to; Age and Deterioration, Gravity, Cross Grain Shrinkage, Wood Defects that are self-evident in chords and web members, Upper Chord Buckling, Lower Chord splitting or failure points, web splitting or pull-outs, multiple roofing systems or membranes, multiple void spaces, compromised bearing walls or pilasters, compromised or degraded bearing points or truss ends.
• Learn to identify masonry wall features and what they mean towards tactical operations
• In smaller single story occupancies; any loss of structural integrity of a single truss component would likely cause the compromise or collapse of adjacent truss components and connective decking planks due to the interdependence and connectivity of the roofing support (trusses), purlins, rafters and roofing planks and outer membrane system. 
• Typically the failure of one bowstring truss span will compromise or cause the collapse of each adjacent truss to either side of the original affected truss causing the failure of a sizeable roof area.
• Companies operating on such affected roof area areas are subject to high risk and vulnerability should the roof area fail. Refer to the incident conditions and structural collapse from the Waldbaum’s Collapse, FDNY August 2, 1978. Go to the incident overview at Commandsafety.com HERE.
• In smaller square foot commercial occupancies that have shallow depth bowstring truss components and both limited spans (less than 100 linear feet clear span) and number of trusses (six or less) the likelihood of a catastrophic roof collapse should be considered highly predicable in all incident action plans and during incident status monitoring.
• The loss of load bearing and load transfer capabilities at these wall connections can contribute towards failure and collapse conditions. The end connections points (end cap or end shoe) of a bowstring truss are critical towards maintain truss performance and structural integrity.
• The loss of truss axial orientation, resultant excessive deflection, loss of integrity of chord/ web geometry and connection points can lead to failure mechanisms and a cascading effect due to transferring of loads and possible overstressing and directly lead to subsequent failures.
• It should be noted that fire service personnel should have a high degree of respect for the danger and susceptible risk imposed by compromised or failing bearing and non-load bearing walls.
• Collapse zones must be established and access controlled based upon physical incident scene layout, access and proximal exposure structures.
• All fire service personnel should have awareness level training and an understanding of recognizing collapse indicators for buildings of masonry construction and tactical safety considerations
• Company and Command Officers must have a higher level of knowledge and training to be able to recognize subtle or obvious construction, conditions or indicators that will affect IAP, strategic, tactical or task assignments and be able to act upon those indicators with immediacy and urgency as conditions and risk dictate.
• The Collapse Zone should be at a minimum be equal to the full height of the exterior masonry wall face and also take into consideration additional distance due building material momentum, bounce and toss due to individual bricks, steel lintels and other components and materials acting as projectiles and traveling distances greater than the defined “collapse zone”.

From CommandSafety.com' s 2010 postings: Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse and Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse-PDF Download

Some additional Insight Materials for discussion from CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com   

• Operational Safety Training Aide: Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies Training Download from Commandsafety.com
• Lessons Learned: Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report
• San Francisco: Collapse of Bowstring Truss Roof Seriously Injures Fire Fighter
• FDNY: The Waldbaum Fire Collapse FDNY 1978 Remembrance
• Ordinary Construction Floor Collapse: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200923.html
• Brick Parapet Wall Collapse: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200821.html
• Partial Roof Collapse: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200509.html
• Roof Collapse during interior operations: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9617.html
• Trapped during fire suppression operations at a millwork facility: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200807.html
• Don’t forget o research some of the Near Miss Reports on the NFFNMRS: http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
• Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse-PDF Download
• Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse
• Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Days One thru Seven;Training and Preparedness

Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies Training Download 

Note: CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com is in the process of revising and expanding this Training Download.

We hope to have the update published in early September 2011. Watch for posting announcements

Take at Look at this: Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Types

Resources:

• National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Operational Safety Considerations at Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies PowerPoint Program developed by Christopher Naum, HERE  
•  Informational Support  Narrative download, HERE

Do you know what to look for upon arrival?
What Building features and factors will affect your operations?
 

Program Screenshot

The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens. 

For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics covered include:

• Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
• Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
• Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
• Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
• Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

 
 
Take some time to look at the Photos from Tom Olk at http://olkee.smugmug.com/

Chicago Fire Department Funeral Service For Fire Fighter Ed Stringer

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT FUNERAL SERVICES FOR FALLEN FIRE FIGHTER EDWARD STRINGER Engine Co # 63 & Truck Co # 16

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT FUNERAL SERVICE FOR FIREFIGHTER COREY ANKUM FROM ENGINE CO#72 AND TOWER LADDER # 34

Chicago Fire Department 3-11 Alarm Fire W/a EMS Plan 2 And a Mayday For the Roof collapse At The Working Fire