A fire in a three story multiple family apartment building injured four City of Chicago (IL) firefighters when an interior stairway collapsed during firefighting operations.
The building was constructed in 1927 and consisted of 5456 square feet of space with 3-5 apartment units. Built of masonry wall construction with a wood floor joist system, the fire was reported at 8:43 a.m., in the Type III classified occupancy.
Street View Pre-Fire
The fire began as a basement fire that travelled up two floors, eventually compromising an upper stairway which resulted in compromise and collapsed injuring four Chicago firefighters.
The inherent characteristics of the building and the manner of fire travel and impingement are apparent contributors to the event.
Aerial- Alpha; Goggle Maps
CFD Fireground Operations: Photo Tim Olk
The four firefighters sustained injures during operations when the internal stairwell connecting the second and third floors gave way.
The mayday was transmitted, and a 211 Plan 1 at approximately 09:00 hrs., seventeen minutes into the operation according to published reports issued by Deputy District Chief Lynda Turner. Following the mayday and firefighter removals, defensive operations were initiated.
Two of the firefighters sustained smoke inhalation and two firefighters minor injuries, according to Fire Department officials.
On March 14, 2001 the Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department lost firefighter Brett Tarver at the Southwest Supermarket fire.
Remembering Brett Tarver and the Lessons Learned
In that event, it was 5:00 in the afternoon, the grocery store was full of people and fire was extending through the building. Phoenix E14 was assigned to the interior of the structure to complete the search, get any people out, and attempt to confine the rapidly spreading fire to the rear of the structure.
Shortly after completing their primary search of the building the Captain decided it was time to get out. Tarver and the other members of Engine 14 were exiting the building when Tarver and his partner got lost.
Here’s a link to a previous post on Buildingsonfire.com that provides insights and report links that are as pertainent today, as they were in 2001.
Take the time to read the Phoenix Report as well as the NIOSH Report.
Rapid Intervention Team: Are You Ready? Mar 1, 2007 FireEngineering.com By Robert L. Gray; HERE If you were assigned to be a member of a rapid intervention team (RIT) during your next structure fire-or had to command a fireground rescue as a chief officer-are you confident that you would be up to the task of successfully responding to a firefighter Mayday?
The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
The program provides participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics include:
Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.
Safety – Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).
U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study (1979-2001)
This study was conducted in an effort to stop firefighter fatalities caused by smoke inhalation, burns, and traumatic injuries attributable to disorientation. It focused on 17 incidents occurring between 1979 and 2001 in which disorientation played a major part in 23 firefighter fatalities.
Remembrance:Pittsburgh(PA) Bureau of Fire- Post Fire Collapse and Double LODD
NIOSH Report F2004-17: Career battalion chief and career master fire fighter die and twenty-nine career fire fighters are injured during a five alarm church fire -Pennsylvania.
On March 13, 2004, a 55-year-old male career Battalion Chief (Victim #1) and a 51-year-old male career master fire fighter (Victim #2) were fatally injured during a structural collapse at a church fire. Victim #1 was acting as the Incident Safety Officer and Victim #2 was performing overhaul, extinguishing remaining hot spots inside the church vestibule when the bell tower collapsed on them and numerous other fire fighters. Twenty-three fire fighters injured during the collapse were transported to area hospitals. A backdraft occurred earlier in the incident that injured an additional six fire fighters. The collapse victims were extricated from the church vestibule several hours after the collapse. The victims were pronounced dead at the scene.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should
ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations
establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations
ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone
train fire fighters to recognize conditions that forewarn of a backdraft
ensure consistent use of personal alert safety system (PASS) devices during overhaul operations
ensure that pre-incident planning is performed on structures containing unique features such as bell towers
ensure that Incident Commanders conduct a risk-versus-gain analysis prior to committing fire fighters to an interior operation, and continue to assess risk-versus-gain throughout the operation including overhaul
develop standard operating guidelines (SOGs) to assign additional safety officers during complex incidents
provide interior attack crews with thermal imaging cameras
Additionally,
municipalities should enforce current building codes to improve the safety of occupants and fire fighters
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that an assessment of the stability and safety of the structure is conducted before entering fire and water-damaged structures for overhaul operations.
Discussion: Due to the destructive powers of fire, most structures that have been involved in fires are structurally weakened. In this incident, the structural integrity of the bell tower was weakened by a fire of several hours duration, the addition of thousands of gallons of water, and possibly the destructive effect of the backdraft. Analysis of the exterior of the structure should be performed continuously while conducting interior operations. Similarly, before overhaul operations are begun, the structure should be determined safe to work in by the IC and a designated Safety Officer. If necessary, the IC should seek the help of qualified structural experts or other competent persons to assess the need for the removal of dangerously weakened construction, or should make provisions for shoring up load-bearing walls, floors, ceilings, roofs, or as in this case, the bell tower.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should establish and monitor a collapse zone to ensure that no activities take place within this area during overhaul operations.
Discussion: During fire operations, two rules exist about structural collapse: (1) the potential for structural failure always exists during and after a fire, and (2) a collapse danger zone must be established. A defensive attack was declared within an hour after fire suppression activities began. Part of a defensive strategy is establishing and moving fire fighters outside of the collapse zone.
A collapse zone is an area around and away from a structure in which debris might land if a structure fails. Immediate safety precautions must be taken if factors indicate the potential for a building collapse. All persons operating inside the structure must be evacuated immediately and a collapse zone should be established around the perimeter. The collapse zone area should be equal to the height of the building plus an additional allowance for debris scatter and at a minimum should be equal to 1½ times the height of the building. For example, since the bell tower was 115 feet high, the collapse zone boundary should be established at least 173 feet away from the church. Once a collapse zone has been established, the area should be clearly marked and monitored, to make certain that no fire fighters enter the danger zone.
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander establishes the command post outside of the collapse zone.
In this incident, command suffered a serious lapse after the Incident Commander and several company officers were injured in the collapse. The command post from which the IC manages the fireground must be located in an area outside of the collapse zone. The IC must ensure that the command post is protected from danger so that an effective command structure is maintained throughout the incident.1, 5
March 10, 1941: The Strand Theater Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Brockton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapsed, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters.
Check out the comprehensive past post fromCommandSafety.com from 2011
A five -alarm fire on Sunday March 10, 2013 resulted in several firefighters nearly losing their lives, when a resulting backdraft or smoke explosion rapidly occurred during fire suppression operations in a mixed use occupancy building in Harrison, New Jersey.
Street View: What are the Building Profile Indicators that are obvious to you? Photo screen capture from Google Maps
According to published reports, the rapidly extending fire likely started in the kitchen of a Mexican restaurant on the 600 block of Frank E. Rogers Avenue before it quickly spread and engulfed the entire building, and the adjacent exposure.
Reported information states Investigators have stated this is the second time a fire has broken out in the restaurant.
Reading the Building and Maintaining focused Situational Awareness is Mission Critical. What do you see in this street view and what impact would it have on operations? Google Maps image capture
Fire Department officials have initially classified this as a backdraft as first published in the media. “The unfortunate thing with a back-draft is that initially there’s heavy smoke in the building,” said Captain Robert Gillen of the Harrison Fire Department, “all you need is an entrance of more oxygen and there’s a massive explosion.” Two of the firefighters had more extensive injuries than the other three.
A series of video screen captures has been developed to clearly depict the sequence of events that were apparent as the smoke conditions between the fire building and exposure occupancy rapidly and in a quick succession of seconds went from showing normal fire suppression operational smoke profiling to what would become a backdraft [like] explosion or smoke explosion affecting numerous operating interior and fireground companies.
Sequenced images of rapid changing smoke conditions and resulting explosion: Note there are conflicting interpretations as to this being a Backdraft or Smoke Explosion- Provided by Buildingonfire.com from video capture
The need to maintain concise and focused situational awareness during all phases and stages of fireground operations is imperative to identify conditions when subtle or rapidly changing situations and environments may present an opportunity to communicate and react accordingly.
It’s readily apparent that the rapidness of the smoke changes and pressures that can be seen dramatically sequenced into the explosion stage with little chance to initiate actions.
It should be noted that the brief series of frames in the video can not fully ascetain if this is truly a backdraft explosion or a smoke explosion. There are sublte differences in the intiating fire dynamics and sequence of events interior events.
The importance of understanding the building, the occupancy risk and the manner in which fire and the products of combustion typically travel within similar or unique occupancies and the manner in which commanders and officers monitor and maintain keen situ-awareness.
Recognizing fire behavior indicators and monitoring fire dynamics within the fire compartment and building envelope and the impact of fire suppression actions and intervention and external environmental factors require frequent monitoring and peridic status reports to maintain fluid and continuous assessment of conditions that may influence the conduct of operations.
This event continues to reinforce the need to never allow complacency creep to occur regardless how predictable or unchanging the commonality of the operations are being undertaken or conducted, in similar fashion to past successes in comparable occupancies and structures.
Check out the link and Follow-up discussion from Chief Ed Hartin (link HERE)
Reading the Fire
Before watching the video (or watching it again if you have already seen it), download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet. Using the pre-fire photo (figure 1) and observations during the video, identify key B-SHAF indicators that may have pointed to potential for extreme fire behavior in this incident.
Important! Keep in mind that there is a significant difference between focusing on the B-SAHF indicators in this context and observing them on the fireground. Here you know that an explosion will occur, so we have primed the pump so you can focus (and are not distracted by other activity).
Backdraft or Smoke Explosion
While smoke explosion and backdraft are often confused, there are fairly straightforward differences between these two extreme fire behavior phenomena. A smoke explosion involves ignition of pre-mixed fuel (smoke) and air that is within its flammable range and does not require mixing with air (increased ventilation) for ignition and deflagration. A backdraft on the other hand, requires a higher concentration of fuel that requires mixing with air (increased ventilation) in order for it to ignite and deflagration to occur. While the explanation is simple, it may be considerably more difficult to differentiate these two phenomena on the fireground as both involve explosive combustion.
Did you observe any indicators of potential backdraft prior to the explosion?
Do you think that this was a backdraft?
What leads you to the conclusion that this was or was not a backdraft?
If you do not think this was a backdraft, what might have been the cause of the explosion?
For more information in Backdraft, Smoke Explosion, and other explosive phenomena on the fireground, see:
Fireground Operations, View from Alpha-Bravo Corner street side. Photo by Billy McNeel.
Residential Fire in Prince George’s County (MD) Injures Seven Firefighters: Wind Driven Conditions Suspected
Apparent wind driven condition contributed to rapidly escalating fire conditions resulting in extreme fire behavior during initial fire suppression operations being coordinated at a single family residential dwelling (SFD) fire Friday night February 24th in Riverdale, MD. At 9:11 p.m. firefighters responded to a house fire in the 6404 57th Avenue, according to published reports and the new release from Prince George’s County (MD) Firefighters.
PGFD companies arrived to find a one-story with basement, single-family home with fire on both levels. A review of public records indicates the SFD was built in 1967 of dimensioned wood frame construction consisting of a single story with a full basement with 780 square feet of occupied floor space. The house foot print was approximately 30 feet x 26 feet and had a low profile gable roof. A review of building (birdseye view) aerial images suggests that a moderate grade change from the Alpha division to the Charlie division is apparent with walk-in basement access.
Street View A-D. Screencapture Googlemaps
Firefighters initiated an interior attack from the Alpha Division when an apparent sudden rush of air fanned by high winds entered from the rear of the house (Delta Division), either from a door or window being opened or broken out, the news release said.
The rapid influx of air from the sustained winds into the interior room compartments combined with the already progressing fire conditions creating a “fire ball’ within the structure’s interior rooms where companies were operating engulfing the firefighters. Firefighters tried to escape and commanders immediately called for an EMS Task Force and Fire Task Force.
A review of internet published archival weather data for the general area (Riverdale/College Park, MD) during the period of 20:55 hrs. and 21:15 hrs., recorded wind speeds of 13.8 – 20.7 MPH with wind gusts of 27.6 – 36.8 MPH. gusts of MPH. (wunderground.com HERE)
At this time two firefighters, Bladensburg Volunteer Fire Fighters Ethan Sorrell and Kevin O’Toole remain in critical condition at Washington Hospital Center. A third fire fighter, Riverdale Volunteer, Michael McLary also remains hospitalized for injuries. Four other injured fire fighters, three from Riverdale and one from College Park, were released and sent home last night according to the latest reports.
A 4-view video of one of the wind driven fire experiments conducted where the wind control curtain is deployed. The video is 4 times real time. WDF Curtain Deploy (486 MB)
An 8-view video of experiment number five conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of a WCD on a wind driven fire. The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 5-Oct View (450MB)
An 8-view video of experiment number eight conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of externally applied water, solid stream and fog stream, at 160 gpm. The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 8- Oct View (419MB)
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them. Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire. This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building. In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure. This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway. The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented? Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening. If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants. NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions. There are many questions regarding wind driven fires. For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures? Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires. In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings. All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set. All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player. NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
From Statter911: Here’s what Chief Bashoor told The Washington Post’s J. Freedom du Lac about the fire:
Strong winds were gusting out of the west at the time — “up to 40, 45 mph,” said the chief. They were blowing directly at — and into — the burning basement, which had a west-facing door.
“As soon as the guys opened the front door and advanced, it blew from the basement, up the steps and right out the front door,” Bashoor said. “It was like a blowtorch coming up the steps and out the door.”
The entire incident — “from the time they were in the door until they were burned” — took eight seconds, the chief said.
The firefighters inside the house “did everything they were trained to do,” he said, but they were essentially defenseless.
“Without that wind, the hot air and gases would have been venting out of the rear of the house,” he said. “The current of air essentially produced a chimney right up the steps and out the front door.”
The Chief of the Department directed the Department Safety Officer to conduct a Safety Investigation of this incident. The primary purpose of the investigation was to identify and analyze the contributing factors that led to the incident as well as to create situational awareness to prevent future occurrences. The main objective of the Team’s investigation and subsequent report was to discover the key factor that led to the fatal outcome of two Firefighters. The SFFD report contains the findings and recommendations to help prevent Firefighter injuries or fatalities in the future.
In analyzing and recording these events, the Investigation Team acknowledges and respects that members confronted a challenging situation. On‐scene personnel reacted quickly to the changing conditions at this incident. We request that every person who reads this report show respect, appreciation and consideration for all personnel who responded to this incident.
As is a common industry practice, for this report Lieutenant Vincent Perez was referred to as Victim 1 and Firefighter Paramedic Anthony Valerio was referred to as Victim 2, with the exception of the Rescue Events Section.
Excerpt from Chief of Department’s Letter
“On Thursday, June 2, 2011 at 10:45 a.m., the San Francisco Fire Department responded to Box 8155, at 133 Berkeley Way. What was seemingly a routine working fire in a single family residence quickly transformed into a fierce and unrelenting incident with ultimately tragic results.
When we answered the call to a career in the Fire Service and took our Oath of Allegiance, we were aware of the inherent danger of our occupation. Despite this awareness, we do not expect to encounter a line of duty death of a brother or sister, especially not in our very own Department. The profound loss of Lieutenant Vincent Perez and Firefighter/Paramedic Anthony Valerio has left an indelible impression in our hearts and will forever be remembered in the annals of SFFD history.
Even as we mourned our fallen brothers in the early days after the tragedy, our Department began the painful and difficult, but necessary, steps of a Line of Duty Death investigation. We were resolute in understanding what occurred during those fateful minutes and compelled to uncover any recommendations for improvement that may arise to future operations so that their passing will not have been in vain. For over six months, the Investigative Team worked tirelessly, scrutinizing every piece of evidence in order to produce a comprehensive report.”
SFFD
Joanne Hayes‐White
Chief of Department
Executive Summary and Report Excerpt
On June 2, 2011 at 10:45 hours, the San Francisco Fire Department was dispatched to a report of a fire in the building at 133 Berkeley Way in the City’s Diamond Heights neighborhood. The first unit arriving on the scene, Engine 26, observed light smoke showing from the garage of the 4 story (2 above grade, 2 below grade) wood framed building, detached on the Bravo side.
Aerial from the Charlie Side
An aggressive interior fire attack was initiated through the front door, which is on a level between the ground level and second floor. After investigating the garage (ground level), Engine 24, the second Engine on the scene, led a small line through the garage to the interior door to back up the first Company. Battalion 9 was assigned Fire Attack by Battalion 6, who had assumed Command. Battalion 9 entered the fire building and, after conferring face to face with Engine 26 on the first floor (ground level), concluded that the fire was below them.
Alpha Side Operations
Battalion 9 exited the building and proceeded to the Bravo side to check for an entrance leading directly to the fire floor. Engine 11 led a large line wye to the driveway with the intention of leading a 1 ¾ inch line through the garage. They were redirected by Battalion 6 to make their lead down the Bravo side of the building to Sublevel 1 (one floor below grade) to assist Battalion 9. The Division Chief, upon arrival, assumed Command. He assigned Battalion 6 to Division 3 (ground floor).
Truck 15 was assigned Roof Division. Truck 11 split their crew, two members to the roof and three members to search and ventilate the top floor of the fire building. The Rescue Squad was ordered to conduct a search. Two members initially attempted to make entry through the garage but, due to extreme heat conditions, redeployed and entered through Sublevel 1 on the Bravo side.
The other two members of the Rescue Squad made entry through the front door, were pushed back by the heat and then made a successful second effort and conducted a search of the top floor.
In the course of fireground operations, members of several Companies came upon the stricken members on the first level and removed them from the building. All possible efforts were employed to revive the members and they were transported to San Francisco General Hospital (SFGH). One member (Victim 1) succumbed to his injuries that day and the second member (Victim 2) succumbed to his injuries two days later. Two other Firefighters were treated at SFGH for various injuries and released that day.
The Medical Examiner determined the cause of death for both members was due to complications from external and internal thermal injuries. Both victims suffered burns to 40% of their body surface. This fire was determined to be accidental by the SFFD Fire Investigative Unit. The fire originated on Sublevel 1, on the West side of the family room, near the large floor to ceiling windows. The ignition was a non‐specific electrical sequence in the electrical wiring or appliance (handheld vacuum cleaner) in this area.
There was a delay in reporting the fire due to the occupants’ attempting to extinguish it on their own. (SFFD Fire Investigation Report 11‐0500532)
The investigation identified that the failing of the window on Sublevel 1, located near the seat of the fire and directly across the stairwell leading to the ground floor, led to the extreme fire behavior which ultimately caused the death of two Firefighters. This fire was in a stage of deprived oxygen when the window failed, causing a rapid extreme high heat event to occur. The extreme heat followed the natural flow path up the interior stairs where Victims 1 and 2 were located.
The Safety Investigation Team found no conclusive evidence that the members were exposed to direct flame impingement during this rapid extreme heat event. However,
Victims 1 and 2 received varying degree of burns up to 40% of their body. The investigation concluded that this was caused by the rapid extreme heat conditions that radiated through their Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to their bodies. These temperatures exceed the ability for human survival regardless of PPE.
The PPE was inspected and evaluated by NIOSH and the manufacturer. Both reviewing parties concluded that the PPE performed to its specifications and design. The manufacturer concluded that the PPE was exposed to temperatures in the range of 550‐ 700°F. These extreme temperatures were short in duration which caused limited damage to the outer shell of the PPE.
The Safety Investigation Team noticed severe heat damage to the portable radios remote speaker/microphones on Victims 1 and 2 and had the radios tested. The testing indicated that the remote speaker/microphones failed to operate correctly due to heat damage. The Safety Investigation Team was not able to determine, after testing, exactly when the remote speaker/microphones failed. The investigation has shown that multiple attempts were made to contact Engine 26 with no response.
The investigation also found that no radio transmissions of distress were received from Victims 1 or 2. Command and Control of any incident in the San Francisco Fire Department is acquired and maintained through the use of the Incident Command System (ICS).
The Incident Command System provides the tools for clear objectives, a single action plan, clear and acknowledged communications, and accountability for all members assigned to an incident. At this incident, some of the components of Incident Command System that were not followed include:
Single action plan
Fireground Accountability
From these findings, this report makes recommendations for several areas of the Department, including:
Training
Equipment
Policy Development
Policy Enforcement
The Safety Investigation Team gathered and analyzed many facts and conducted interviews of members directly involved in this incident. The Team identified several factors that occurred that contributed to the deaths at this incident.
These factors include:
Extreme heat conditions accelerated by the failure of a window on the fire floor.
Layout of building
Excessive live fuel load which contributed to the growth of the fire
Conclusion
This incident appeared from the onset to be a routine “room and contents” fire that the SFFD encounters on a regular basis. As the Companies were performing standard fireground operations, the incident rapidly deteriorated due to a hostile fire event. The failure of a window in the fire room allowed fresh oxygen to enter the room, providing a fire that was deprived of one of the key elements of combustion to rapidly intensify.
Due to the growth of the fire, the room flashed, causing extreme and rapid heat conditions which traveled up the interior stairs (the flow path) to the location which our members were operating. Our members were caught in this high heat, causing the injuries that ultimately claimed their lives.
Due to this fire event, other Companies attempting to conduct fireground support operations were prevented from making entry into the structure from street level (through garage) to back up Engine 26. These Companies were forced to regroup and find an alternate point of entry. In the process of doing so, crews made entry from the Bravo side directly into the fire room and extinguished the fire. This allowed members to make entry from above which led to the discovery and rescue of our members.
These events happened in a time frame of less than fourteen minutes.
During the course of this investigation, the Safety Investigation Team recognized that no matter how experienced or properly prepared we are, we must always approach all incidents with the utmost awareness.
This incident showed that a simple failure of a piece of glass/window caused unforeseeable and fatal consequences.
We, as a Department, need to gain further knowledge and understanding of the following:
Having Situational Awareness prior to taking action, this would include the ongoing process when conditions change
How Risk Management must be used when making all decisions
Limitations of the PPE (turnouts, SCBA, and equipment)
Building construction, including layout and how fire/smoke will
move within the structure
Ventilation practices and how they affect fire conditions
Importance of Communications for all members operating on the scene
Companies must use strict discipline when assigned task/locations
PreviousCommandSafety Coverage from 2011, HERE, HERE and HERE
The mission of the Fire Department is to protect the lives and property of the people of San Francisco from fires, natural disasters, and hazardous materials incidents; to save lives by providing emergency medical services; to prevent fires through prevention and education programs; and to provide a work environment that values health, wellness and cultural diversity and is free of harassment and discrimination.
Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.
As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.
NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.
During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”
The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.
The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.
This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE. NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE
Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170
Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse
Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building.
Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement.
The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.
The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.
There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.
This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.
Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.
For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.
The Worcester Six;
Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine
On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
From last year’s posting and links here at CommandSafety.com: HERE
Los Angeles Firefighters Battle Major Emergency at Townhouses Under Construction
Under-construction building fire forces dozens of evacuations
Six Townhouses Under Construction Photo, Onscene.TV
Townhouses Under Construction Aerial Screen capture from CBSLA.com
Operational Divisions with Exposures (Pre-Construction) Bing Maps
A townhouse complex under construction caught fire on November 10, 2011, in the Brentwood neighborhood of Los Angeles (CA). The six-unit, wood-framed complex was in its construction phase, where at least two of the units were fully involved in fire upon arrival of LAFD companies. Four of those six structures were severely damaged as a result of the construction stage and the degree of open wood frame construction resulting in rapid flame spread and extension to a nearby residential buildings.
According to published reports, the Los Angeles Fire Department was called at 3:37 a.m. to 12315 Gorham Avenue which resulted in a major emergency alarm classification decared and resulted in the dispatch and deployment of over 160 firefighters to the site. First arriving companies found a large townhome development with “heavy fire showing.”
Largely due to an aggressive fire attack by the LAFD, the footprint of this blaze was kept in-check and fully extinguished in one hour and 39 minutes. Fortunately, there were no injuries to any civilians or Firefighting personnel.
Additionally, five adjacent structures were evacuated for precaution. Two of those structures- one, a small apartment complex and the other, a single family dwelling, did sustain significant fire damage. As many as 10 families were displaced from those two occupancies.
Following further investigation, the LAFD stated it believed the fire was intentionally set.
Construction Site Operational Considerations (not inclusive)
Pre-Fire Plan Large Construction Projects
Understand the various Phases to a Construction Project and how they affect fire operations
Identify and train for nonconventional Strategic and Tactical operational actions
Ensure predetermined multiple alarm resources are identified and greater alarms are established
Train your Company and Command Officers to address Construction site fires
Maintain an appropriate risk profile balance with operational needs with personnel safety foremost
Clearly establish multiple Safety Offices and establish geographical resources within the incident management system for reconnaissance, communications, and oversight and focused safety monitoring
Know you water supply and system capabilities and limitations
Determine fire flow needs based upon construction phases, as these change over time as the building goes up. Match fire flow demands with resource availability (time of day gaps etc.)
Identify exposures (Physical structures and Civilians) and ensure they are calculated into the incident action plan at the right before there are identified needs or concerns
Companies shall maintain a conservative safety posture; this is not the time for overly aggressive firefighting, it is the time for smart firefighting that can be highly efficient
Always consider collapse zones: partial or complete. Stay out of them!
Respect the wind; it’s not going to help you
Consider current and projected weather conditions in your operational and tactical plans and assignments
Did I already say: Pre-fire Planning?
Be calculated in the placement of your apparatus, especially in larger scale incidents that are defined under greater geographical divisions
The fire usually consumes the available fuel load rapidly; going from a Huge fire, to one that is sometimes much more manageable; just watch and control your exposures and degree of fire extension. Don’t help to make the fire even bigger through ineffective and dysfunctional command and control
Anticipate, Project, Plan and Engage
Respect the Fire: it’s not going to play by the regular rules of combat fire suppression and engagement as in finished and enclosed structures and buildings.
Photo: Firefighters hose down smoldering embers after a large fire gutted a townhouse complex under construction in Brentwood. Credit: Al Seib / Los Angeles Times
In response to numerous requests from our recent posting; Commercials- Got Fire? Anticipate Collapse briefing post (HERE). We have developed and produced a comprehensive download in PDF format of the entire article that can be used for training, distribution and discussions.
Click on the image above and download the PDF file and use accordingly or download HERE
There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.
You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations at commercial building fires.
Commercial Fire and Collapse
Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments.
It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.
A recent video clip making its way around the cyber fireground clearly depicted a very close-call and resulting near miss event to four firefighters at a four alarm fire involving a commercial building that housed an established insulation manufacturer and installation contractor.
The video shows within a very compressed time frame, the progression of rapidly deteriorating interior conditions, the adverse affects on the building’s structural systems and the results from the loss of load transfers that lead to a catastrophic wall collapse narrowly missing the crew of firefighters who were operating a hand line in the vicinity of an exterior overhead door. Fortunately the injuries sustained to the firefighters were minor in nature; however the consequences and results from this collapse could have been far different and significantly more severe.
Following a series of repeated viewings of the video clip and with each successive viewing, it became readily apparent that there was a lot more to these images of the collapse and the cursory focus on the resulting near miss event. Closer examination of the video clip and the still frames brought to light some obvious conditions and indicators that easily become lost in the rapidity of the sequence of the collapse; which really has the true story to be told.
It’s the mechanism and sequence of the collapse, the dynamics of the building’s performance and the building indicators that provide a training opportunity in further examining key factors, presenting insights that could be a focus for operational and command personnel at future incidents with common parameters and gaining some mental models in recognition-primed decision making that contribute to the naturalistic decision-making process.
If you know what to be looking for, then when you see it, you may be able to anticipate, project and implement in rapid succession appropriate measures dictated by the incident.
Four Alarm Commercial Building Fire with Collapse: Fire Photo by Ben Goldberry
In an effort to promote additional insights and bring forward these fundamental observations and experienced-based presumptions extended from these and other news video images, still photographs, additional reporting research and examination, and a review of other published media resources; the following observations presented in this overview brief are being conveyed to increase firefighter, company and command level awareness of key collapse indicators such as those present at this commercial fire and to further the concept of adaptive fireground management principles and increase awareness of fundamental building performance indicators and principles to help you increase your intuitive observations skills and translate them into proactive operational actions on the fireground-before an adverse condition occurs.[ i.e., being five steps ahead of the fire conditions].
Although this briefing makes use of the images and conditions depicted in the video clip and encountered by the fire department evident in the images; the susequent commentary and insights provided are not meant to provide direct or indirect opinions, renderings, criticism or censure towards the conduct of operations or the management of the incident by the respective department and it’s firefighting, command and support personnel who operated at the actual fire and experienced this near miss event first-hand.
We are grateful that the events of this alarm precluded anything worst occurring given the potential seriousness of the prevailing incident conditions and commend the fire department and it’s firefighters that provide these exceptional services each and every day to the citizens they serve and to the community they protect, in mitigating this serious fire; safely and successfully.
This incident and the resulting near-miss captured by the videographer provides the Fire Service with an exceptional opportunity given today’s far reaching capabilities of eMedia, this web site and direct and indirect readers, links, tweets, likes, reposting’s, uploads, downloads and sharing an opportunity to share the consequences of an extreme close-call and learn from it in a positive and constructive manner, so that firefighters, company officers, commanders and support personnel can better predict with knowledge, insight and at times intuition a better understanding of buildings and the structures and occupancies we operate within on the fireground.
There are numerous inherent indicators present at every incident scene we operate at that. As is in this near miss event and building collapse; it’s sometimes the subtle things that need to gain the attention of operationg companies and personnel and the ability to rapidly process, recognize and react.
Remember this: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
As a generality; it’s important to note that given heavy fire involvement in a structure (got fire), adaptive fireground management considerations would promote conservative considerations to anticipate and expect collapse (degraded or compromise; limited or catastrophic).
In the case of fires in commercial occupancies and buildings with;
Large Square footage/Floor areas
Significant fire loads
Large open structural system spans lacking compartmentation,
Unprotected steel components and assemblies
No Sprinkler Systems
Omitted, compromised or degraded passive or active protective or suppression systems
Significant openings along the exterior building envelope
Significant opening on the roof enclosure
Deep seated fires or rapidly escalating and extending fires
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations.
Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. Its alot more than that, with far greater consequences that may be very unforgiving.
Aerial Plan of Building and Collapse Area A-B
The Building
The fire incident involved a single story commercial building occupying approximately 32, 200 square feet of area on a multiple building site with proximal exposures. Manufacturing, warehousing and offices comprised the building’s operational use. An aerial plan view shows the geographical building scene divisions and the location and relationship of the Alpha- Bravo Side collapse zones that affected operations and resulted in the close-call and firefighter near-miss. The proximity of exposures, physical layout and orientation can be further assessed.
A review of public documents and records, incident reports and various media resources provided the following insights;
Overview Details
Alpha Street Side View- Adapted from Google Streetmaps
The view of the alpha street side identifies the building front facade, its main office entrance (center between dual overhead doors on the left and right). Pronounced on the alpha side facade is the presence of four (4) equally spaced overhead (OH) doors that provide direct access into the building’s interior. The subsequent collapse area is depicted at the A-B corner with special attention drawn to relationship of the wall plane and OH door proximity.
The relationship and this wall surface ( area square footage) and the presence of the OH door opening to the wall/ roof interface area that subsequently became compromised and collapsed is critical in further understanding the mechanism of the collapse sequence and also the positive effect it had on the survivability of the firefighters who were within the collapse zone at the time of the wall failure.
Don’t Always Stress the Corners
It’s been a common practice and fundamental fireground consideration to define the corner of a typical building as having safety considerations and prominence in the context of ladder company operations, laddering and roof work and in the placement of personnel and positioning of fireground operations.
Corner Building Operational considerations have included, but limited to;
Provides a potentially safe(er) area of operational refuge
Provides a location to safely position ground ladders for roof access/egress
Provides a location that has a potential higher degree of assurance for maintaining structural integrity in the event of a collapse condition of an outer wall
Will not fail in a catastrophic or monolithic manner due to the postulated presence of structural members on the vicinity of either the wall enclosure and/or the roofing structural system and assemblies
The design and construction configuration and orientation of the ninety degree angle of the building’s outer wall envelope (at the corner) provides predicated inherent structural stability
The typical type of structural or envelope construction may have a resulting ninety degree building corner having a more robust resistance to collapse and compromise due to the various types of enclosure systems (methods and materials) and assemblies and needed stability per engineering principles
In this instance (as shown in the Alpha side street view), the presence of the large overhead door in close proximity to the corner wall intersection and transition ( A-B side), actually makes this position, fireground proximity and travel paths highly prone to early and complete collapse potential in the event of a loss of the wall-roof component or assembly integrity or in the load bearing/transfer capabilities of the wall-roof assembly.
The presence and identification of a corner configuration similar to this in a commercial structure should result in a higher degree of considerations and risk assessment when formulation and deploying operational assignments and in the placement of personnel for task assignments in this proximity.
This operational area should be considered as a candidate for designation as a collapse zone based upon projected or defined operational considerations, incident conditions and predictive building characteristics, systems, materials and fire dynamics and conditions.
Alpha-Bravo Corner of Subsequent Collapse Aerial View
The view from the Alpha-Bravo Corner shows the collapse zones at grade and the affected area size.
As noted in the preceding narrative, the presence of the overhead door opening along the perimeter wall enclosure and outer envelope creates a risk area that would require monitoring, periodic reconnaissance and assessment during subsequent operations to determine structural stability and potential adverse conditions.
The proximity of the opening in relationship to the corner wall, roof support and structural span of the opening results in a very delicate balance of forces, loads, reliance and dependence that must be maintained for structural integrity and equilibrium.
The entire perimeter of the alpha side could be considered for a restricted collapse zone just in terms of wall opening alone sans the degree of actual or projected interior fire impingement or fire involvement.
Take some time to view the video clip a few times over before proceeding to the next sequence of fame images.
This videographer of this video was Aaron Dohring. (all rights reserved)
Aerial Overhead view of the building perimeter walls along the four divisions ( A-D) with the A-B corner that subsequently experienced the wall-roof compromise and resulting collapse.
The A-B corner and the affected ground areas around the collapse zone. Considerations for a collapse zone area on the A-B corner would have resulted in a minimum distance of twenty five (25) feet from the building base for all operations within this area. The collapse zone on the Bravo side extends into the exposure building due to its close proximity.
Always consider the building envelope materials of construction and systems present on the building. The use of concrete masonry units (CMU) is common, as is the use of pre-cast concrete and cast-in place and tilt-up concrete construction panels.
Variations in collapse dynamics and mechanisms of collapse may result in sizable increases in collapse zone distances from the building base with consideration for monolithic or partial wall collapse as well as safety considerations for bounce and travel over long distances of modular assembly building pieces ( i.e. concrete blocks, brick venner or material chunks).
We have not discussed collapse considerations for other building envelope systems such as metal panelized systems since these have entirely different collapse considerations and profiling, not applicable to this incident and assessment insights. The same is true when considering operating and collapse considerations at commercial buildings with ordinary construction or heavy timber systems (Type or Class III and IV). These to have different rules of predictive building performance and collapse safety considerations.
Typical Interior
The interior of the building included unprotected steel components and assemblies consisting of steel columns, beams and open web steel joists. These common and conventional structural support systems provided large free clear spans, common for typical warehouse and commercial occupancies. The presence and operability of functional fire suppression sprinkler system coupled with passive and active protective devices and compartmentation can help support proactive and aggressive fire suppression efforts in those conditions that have appropriate risk determinations and balanced risk-gain benefits.
The presence of unprotected steel components ( Truss, column, structural beams etc. ) and assemblies requires an understanding of the effects of flame and heat impingement, rate of heat release and fire dynamics, potential for movement and displacement of structural components and effect on assemblies, systems and connections and the effect on structural stability, integrity and building load transfers and displacement that all can adversely affect building performance, integrity and collapse potential
Typical Structural System and Components
Interior View with Steel Columns, Open Web Steel bar Joists and Beams
Typical Open Web Steel Bar Joists w Metal Roof Deck
Large clear spans provided by the open web steel bar joists allowed for considerable free floor space typical of commercial warehouse occupancies.
Note the use of what appears to be combustible wood storage and staging areas that could have could potentially contribute towards increased fire intensity, extension and further contribute towards adverse affects on the unprotected structural steel components and assemblies.
Alpha Side Collapse Area Details: OH Door Pre-Collapse Insights
Pre-Collapse Operations on Alpha side with personnel in close proximty to the building perimeter
Pre-Collapse view of Operations on the Alpha side with personnel in close proximity, (within [a] collapse zone) to the building perimeter. It is evident that the degree of interior fire extension and involvement presumes a cautious deployment and placement of personnel in safe operational areas. When operating in such close proximity to the building wall and envelope, it becomes increasingly challenging for company officers and company personnel to monitor overall building performance indicators that may be prevalent or dominant from a view point further away from the building.
Fire extension, smoke conditions, component or assembly movement or displacement may be readily defined and identified from a vantage point away from the building, requiring additional independent operational assignments within the division if resources allow. Otherwise, officers are encouraged to get a big picture view and increase their span of vision of the building and progressing fire conditions and building performance
The pre-collapse frame image above identifies the building roof line in relationship to the ground operations, smoke conditions and also the directional flow of the elevated master stream [upper right corner]. The initial stage of the wall compromise and collapse can be seen in the Bravo wall pulling away. When watching the video, pay close attention first to the stream direction and flow and them at the location and movement of the wall, which is followed in rapid succession with the full wall collapse.
T
Close examination of the initial video frames shows the rapid displacement of the portion of the Bravo wall and outward collapse towards the B-Exposure (alleyway) Refer to the Aerial Plan for orientation. The A-B Collapse is progressing from the Bravo side to the Alpha side as loads are being transferred in rapid progression with further collapse expected.
The frame image above shows the bravo wall failing outward with the resulting loss in structural support of the roofing deck assembly.
Rapid fire migration and extension is evident after the wall section collapse with increased flames visible. In the video, one firefighter quickly recognizes the imminent collapse and reacts.
A significant section of wall area is present at the A-B side and progressing from the building corner to the left jamb of the overhead (OH) door. This area and the area directly above the OH door opening is calculated to weigh over 20,000 lbs.
The early identification and establishment of collapse zone(s) is mission critical especially at commercial buildings due to the considerations for rapidly changing operational conditions that may be a result of or influenced by the following;
lack of knowledge or understanding of the building’s construction, systems and characteristics
lack of adequate resources, skills and or capabilities for selected phase operations
fire loading, combustibles, flammables and other products
Last of or loss of compartmentation
fire and protective systems failures or inoperability
unapproved alterations, additions and renovations to the building, systems and occupancy
transitions for offensive to defensive operational phases, which at times may results in operating position postures too close to the building
failure to recognize situational factors that will drive appropriate operational phasing and task deployments
lack of building performance knowledge
not considering occupancy risk versus treating the building/fire relationship based upon occupancy type
not recognizing key collapse indicators and failing to implement timely actions [proactively versus reactionary]
being four steps behind the fire conditions evident instead of implementing adaptive fire ground management insights [five steps ahead of the evident fire]
use precise coordination when placing elevated masterstreams into operations with ground personnel operating within close quarters
understand the effects of master streams on the integrity of building features, assemblies and components
The image frame above shows personnel operating within an imminent collapse zone directing hand lines into the interior fire area. Further examination of the video frames clearly shows one firefighter quickly recognizing that a collapse is occurring and attempts to alert the other personnel to retreat. Simultaneously to the collapse progression, the crew immediately retreats away from the collapsing wall and falling building materials.
Within the span of four seconds, the wall compromise occurs and collapses on the ground at the A-B corner and immediate area on the alpha side. The slightly monolithic manner in which the wall plane first peels away and progressively collapsed is interesting for a CMU wall. Possibly due to the outward collapse of the Bravo wall, followed by the rapid succession of failure of the roof-wall connection interface resulted in an transitional downward force that pushed the alpha side wall outward allowing gravity to work its force
When operating in close proximity to a heavily involved forward interior condition [exterior position] it is important to maintain focused situational awareness and either directly maintain or delegate responsibilities for observations of fire and smoke progress and conditions while monitoring key functional building performance indicators and collapse pre-cursors.
Additionally, always re-evaluate the effectiveness of deployed and operational hose lines, streams and in water application to ensure they are adequate for the degree of fire suppression being undertaken and the corresponding fire flow requirements. Don’t just assume, determine with validity. [ Refer to Tactical Entertainment]
Obscured by the rapidly defining smoke which is a result of the developing and extending collapse, the frame image 04 below depicts the beginning of the compromise and collapse sequence commencing as a result of the Bravo wall compromise and collapse sequence at the B-A corner that will subsequently peel towards the Alpha side and continue up to the outermost jamb of the overhead door.
Pay particular attention to the first three to four seconds of the video clip and review the video clip over a few times; looking at the operating elevated master stream that is clearly visible and operating from the upper right part of the screen through the smoke plume; follow the direct orientation and stream flowing directly towards the bravo wall plane, and presumed penetrating into/through the roof deck or impacting through the metal roof deck and wall-roof assembly area at the upper roof edge.
Image 04
Frame image 04 depicts the rapidly deteriorating conditions that are evident as the collapse sequence continues and the overhead door jamb (left) buckling and adjacent wall failing by way of an outward curl or peel away commencing from the upper (left image) A-B corner at the roof line and then peeling and failing from upper left to right.
Image 05
The leading edge of the outward collapsing wall plane ( yellow dotted line) is failing with the greatest material concentration occurring at the A-B edge outward. Fortunately the presence and location of the overhead door opening lessened the amount and location of wall material ( concrete masonry units-CMU) and contributed to a void area being present and not fully impacting the firefighters who were operating within this collapse zone.
In other words, had this been a solid full wall collapse likelihood for significant firefighter injury would have resulted.
The affects of wall/roof compromise should be of focused consideration and monitoring when managing incidents of this size and magnitude in similar occupancies and building features. Flame and heat impingment can and will affect the structural integrity of lintels spans, beams and truss connects along roof lines and connections. Look for signs of impingment, degradation or compromise. watch for signs of probable inward/outward or curtain wall collapse.
Image 06
The remaining images, frames 06 and 07 depict the location of the firefighters to the wall collapse, the relationship to the wall and roof system and the degree of wall area that became compromised and collapsed.
Image 07
This brief video clip and these accompanying briefing insights provided a tremendous opportunity to examine in a non-critical manner an actual near miss collapse event and operational discernments that provide a focused training an awareness opportunity.
When given the time to analyze and assess, some things become so apparent and self-revealing that we might prematurely say why didn’t someone pick up that or those conditions while conducting operations at [an] incident. It is dependent on a wide variety of factors, conditions and parameters that are difficult at times to identify and harder yet to fully identify as common or contributing factors, errors or omissions.
It’s not always that easy; but contradictory – some time it really is (or should be) that easy.
Some things on the fireground may not be prone to being so readily identifiable or recognized.
It all depends what you’re looking for and whether you have the necessary insights, knowledge and skill sets. Incident priorities, demands, situational focus, awareness or disconnect all may have a part in how and incident is managed and mitigated.
It goes back directly on knowing what to look for and when; at what type of building with which type of occupancy and under what stage or stages of fire development and combat operations or engagement you might be in. It complex, it takes time and experience and learning’s.
There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.
You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.
Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page
On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.
Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.
Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.
Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.
The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.
Building Construction Insights
Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”
Fire Building Construction:
7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.
Collapse Building Construction:
6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street
Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011
Building Alteration
(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.
(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.
(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.
The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.
It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.
The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.
The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001.
FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank
Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.
DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18
From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html
Three Franklin (OH) firefighters were caught in what has been determined to be a smoke explosion at a structure fire involving a restaurant occupancy in what appears to be a building of Type III construction that published reports indicated was built in 1892.
Franklin (OH) FD Lt. Kyle Lovelace and firefighters Quincy Pearson and Brad Brown were caught in a smoke explosion while conducting interior fire suppression operations at which time conditions deteriorated and a smoke explosion occurred. Simultaneous with the recognition that something was not good; the crew immediately began to retreat when they were caught in the explosion. All of them luckily made it out unscathed.
According to published reports, “They reverted back to their training and did what they needed to do to get out,” according to Fire Chief Jonathan Westendorf . “We have a flashover simulator and we spend a good amount time talking about it each year.”
Reports have indicated Lt. Lovelace stated that when they arrived on the scene, he noticed smoke coming from left side of the building above the second floor and thought that it may be an attic fire.
They attempted to gain entry through the front door, but before they opened it they noticed a crack in the window and decided to gain entry through the rear. Lt. Lovelace, FF Pearson and FF Brown entered an alley covered by an awning connecting to freestanding structures. Westendorf later said his guys were fortunate to be in that location because they were isolated from the brunt of the blast.
The crew advanced about 25 feet when FF Pearson, who was on the nozzle, saw wisps of smoke and began to feel extreme heat.
Lt. Lovelace used a thermal imaging camera to locate where the heat was coming from, but right before he could tell Person, he started yelling at him to get out. They made it about 20 feet when the thick black smoke started banking down on them. As Lovelace exited under the awning, conditions quickly worsened and the smoke explosion occurred. Video of blast HERE
Links for complete reporting insights and details;
In this week's issue of the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss ReportingSystem's Report of the Week (ROTW) an informative focus was provided on near-miss reports related to ceiling collapse. We're posting the ROTW alert in it's entirety below and are expanding upon this discussion to include materials previously posted on Buildingsonfire.com from the posts that surrounded the LAFD LODD of Firefighter Glenn L. Allen who was killed in the line of duty as a result of being trapped beneath rubble when the roof and ceiling collapsed during a blaze at a 12,000-square-foot mansion in the Hollywood Hills on Feb. 17, 2011. (HERE and HERE)
Included in that reporting was expanded information on gypsum wall board ceiling systems. If you don't know about the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System and the Report of the Week (ROTW) follow these links HERE , HERE and HERE. More importantly, get involved and post some of your current OR past near-miss experiences and close calls, so the fire service can learn and everyone can go home. www.firefighternearmiss.com. Check out the extensive resources and materials avaiable on the site to support your training and operational needs.
The collapse of a ceiling is one of the more disorienting situations a firefighter can face. Sixty near-miss reports are returned when the keyword "ceiling collapse" is typed into the text box on www.firefighternearmiss.com. Each of these accounts provides lessons on the value of heightened situational awareness, correct use of PPE, rigorous training, and recognizing the effect of fire on building materials. The National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System'ss Report of the Week (ROTW) featured report this week, 11-025, recounts one example.
"Our station was dispatched for a residential structure fire and we responded with two engines and four on-duty personnel… The near-miss happened about 30 minutes into the fire and there were two hoselines in place. One hoseline was on the second floor and one hoseline was on the first floor. Most of the fire was extinguished and overhaul was in progress. There were three members of my crew pulling ceiling to reach hot spots. The lieutenant stated to be careful because the floor above was moving when pulling down on overhead material. The firefighter and the lieutenant continued to pull down the ceiling. This is when the second floor collapsed down into the first floor and the room that we were in…"
The overhead world of a fire scene is fraught with hazards. Many of the hazards we can dispassionately discuss at the kitchen table, but seem to overlook when we are engaged in firefighting. Electrical wiring, telecommunication cables, structural support systems and storage are all elements hidden behind the drywall. Whether you are looking up at a ceiling that covers an attic or an upper floor, shoving your hook through the drywall is usually a benign act that simply pulls down a section of sheetrock to expose the hidden area above. However, it can also be a catastrophic act that brings down an entrapment hazard that has you fighting for survival.
Once you have read the entire account of 11-025, and the related reports, consider the following:
Before ceiling pulling begins, is there an assessment of the structural stability and review of what might be behind the drywall before the first piece is removed?
Do you and your crews observe best practices when pulling ceilings (i.e., starting at the doorway and working into the room, noting the location of structural members through visual notation of nails, "shadowing" or "ghosting" of studs, etc.) before pulling ceilings?
Do you consider limiting the number of personnel in a room when ceilings and walls are being pulled?
Who is responsible for ensuring utilities have been controlled before pulling ceilings and walls? How is utility control documented and confirmed before ceiling pulling begins?
What is the likelihood that the space above the ceiling you are pulling is being used for storage? If storage is noted, can you determine what effect pulling down the ceiling will have on the structural members resisting the weight of the storage?
Overhaul activities occur during a transitional time in the firefighting process. The adrenaline and effort of the fire attack begins to fade, but there is still enough pent up energy that some members of the crews are propelled from one action to another without an assessment of conditions. The thinking officer and crew make periodic assessments, or benchmarks, to ensure the incident reality still matches the company's perception.
Have you escaped a ceiling collapse due to exceptional vigilance? Have you ever gotten caught in a ceiling collapse? Submit your report to www.firefighternearmiss.com today so everyone goes home tomorrow.
Note: The questions posed above from the NFFNMRS-ROTW by the reviewers are designed to generate discussion and thought in the name of promoting firefighter safety. They are not intended to pass judgment on the actions and performance of individuals in the reports.
The recent events in Los Angeles and the line of duty death of veteran LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen who died Friday from injuries he sustained when a ceiling collapsed on him in a house fire late Wednesday night in the Hollywood Hills again gives us pause to reflect on the demands and hazards present at all fire suppression operations in buildings on fire. The past two months have borne consist reports of floor, roof, wall and ceiling collapses leading to firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.
Incident event coverage from this past week HERE, HERE and HERE
The importance of maintaining heightened situational awareness, identifying and monitoring suspected or inherent building construction hazards coupled with inherent occupancy risk factors, and aligning those with strategic objectives, incident actions plans and tactical deployment operations. Building Knowledge equating to firefighter safety is still a driving principle that is formulative to all firefighting operations in buildings, occupancies and structures. Let’s take this opportunity to gain some insights into the material that compromises nearly all wall and ceiling membrane systems and assemblies in nearly all buildings, occupancies and structures; that is gypsum board components.
I’ve included a number of video clips that center on our discussion, as the videos center on the operation parameters at this extremely large (floor area/square footage) residential occupancy. Most clips have good coverage of the structure and firefighting efforts. Take a few moments to review these clips before you proceed;
Gypsum board is the generic name for a family of panel-type products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges.
In 1888, Augustine Sackett used plaster of Paris sandwiched between several layers of paper to produce what would eventually become "Sackett Board," the original gypsum board. By the 1950s, many innovations in gypsum board technology had been developed, including the listing of many fire-resistance rated designs, rounded edges, specialized nails, curved partitions, studless partitions, sound control systems, lightweight gypsum lath, plaster, and gypsum board systems that fueled a boom period for the use of gypsum products in both the residential and commercial construction industries.
By 1955, an estimated 50 percent of new homes were built using gypsum wallboard. Lightweight gypsum board systems permitted the use of lightweight steel in steel framed buildings, which enabled the widespread growth of high-rise residential and commercial construction during the 1960s and 1970s.
Today gypsum board, along with a variety of other gypsum panel products, continues to serve as a preferred building material in both residential and commercial construction for interior walls and ceilings, exterior sheathing, fire-resistant partitions and membranes, and liner material for elevator shafts and stairwells. These properties make gypsum board well suited for building and space types requiring cost-effectiveness as well as fire resistiveness and maintainability.
Gypsum board is often called drywall, wallboard, or plasterboard and differs from products such as plywood, hardboard, and fiberboard, because of its noncombustible core. It is designed to provide a monolithic surface when joints and fastener heads are covered with a joint treatment system.
Gypsum is a mineral found in sedimentary rock formations in a crystalline form known as calcium sulfate dehydrate. One hundred pounds of gypsum rock contains approximately 21 pounds (or 10 quarts) of chemically combined water. Gypsum rock is mined or quarried and then crushed. The crushed rock is then ground into a fine powder and heated to about 350 degrees F, driving off three fourths of the chemically combined water in a process called calcining. The calcined gypsum (or hemihydrate) is then used as the base for gypsum plaster, gypsum board and other gypsum products.
To produce gypsum board, the calcined gypsum is mixed with water and additives to form a slurry which is fed between continuous layers of paper on a board machine. As the board moves down a conveyer line, the calcium sulfate recrystallizes or rehydrates, reverting to its original rock state. The paper becomes chemically and mechanically bonded to the core. The board is then cut to length and conveyed through dryers to remove any free moisture.
Gypsum manufacturers also rely increasingly on “synthetic” gypsum as an effective alternative to natural gypsum ore. Synthetic gypsum is a byproduct primarily from the desulfurization of the flue gases in fossil-fueled power plants. Gypsum board is an excellent fire resistive material. It is the most commonly used interior finish where fire resistance classifications are required. Its noncombustible core contains chemically combined water which, under high heat, is slowly released as steam, effectively retarding heat transfer. Even after complete calcination, when all the water has been released, it continues to act as a heat insulating barrier. In addition, tests conducted in accordance with ASTM E 84 show that gypsum board has a low flame spread index and smoke density index. When installed in combination with other materials it serves to effectively protect building elements from fire for prescribed time periods.
Developed through modern technology as a result of specific requirements, gypsum board is mainly used as the surface layer of interior walls and ceilings; as a base for ceramic, plastic, and metal tile; for exterior soffits; for elevator and other shaft enclosures; as area separation walls between occupancies; and to provide fire protection to structural elements. Most gypsum board is available with aluminum foil backing which provides an effective vapor retarder for exterior walls when applied with the foil surface against the framing.
Standard size gypsum boards are 4ft. wide and 8, 10, 12, or 14 ft. long. The width is compatible with the standard framing of studs or joists spaced 16 in. and 24 in. on center. Some thicknesses and types of gypsum board are also produced as a standard 54 in. width material. Other lengths and widths are available as special order materials.
Depending on thickness and type of gypsum board, the weight can vary from 2 – 4 lbs./ per square foot
A typical 4 ft. x 8 ft. sheet of 5/8-in gypsum board can weigh 96 lbs.
A 4ft. x 12ft. sheet can weigh upwards of 150 lbs.
In large span designs with attachments varying from 16 inches on center to 24 inches on center with z-strips or resilient channels attached to the structural members; these ceiling panels and assemblies can fail and collapse in a monolithic manner creating a significant safety concern to operating companies below.
As an example a 12ft x 12ft. monolithic assembly collapse ( single layer-gypsum board only) could have a collapse weight of 500 lbs.
Add the weight of compromised and attached structural members components, fixtures and insulation and the absorption of added water into the gypsum board from hose streams the combined weight of the collapse area may increase to 800-1000 lbs. Increase the size of the collapse area and the weight impacting operating companies is significant.
The various thicknesses of gypsum board available in regular, type X, improved type X and pre-decorated board are as follows:
¼-in. A low cost gypsum board used as a base in a multi-layer application for improving sound control, or to cover existing walls and ceilings in remodeling.
5/16-in. A gypsum board used in manufactured housing.
3/8-in. A gypsum board principally applied in a double-layer system over wood framing and as a face layer in repair or remodeling.
½-in. Generally used as a single-layer wall and ceiling material in residential work and in double-layer systems for greater sound and fire ratings.
5/8-in. Used in quality single-layer and double-layer wall systems. The greater thickness provides additional fire resistance, higher rigidity, and better impact resistance.
¾-in. Used in a similar manner to 5/8-in.
1 in. Used in interior partitions, shaft walls, stairwells, chaseways, area separation walls and corridor ceilings. Manufactured only in 24 in. wide panels and usually installed as an integral part of a system.
Depending on the type and the use, gypsum board is manufactured with a tapered, square, beveled, rounded, or tongue and groove edge. Some gypsum board types may incorporate a combination of different edge types. The fire resistance of gypsum board can be described using three distinct terms: regular core, type ‘X’ core and improved type ‘X’ core.
Regular core gypsum board is made of a noncombustible core material composed mainly of gypsum. Although it does not have the specially enhanced fire-resistive properties of type ‘X’, regular core gypsum board affords a degree of natural fire resistance.
In the 1940s different gypsum board formulations were investigated to increase the naturally occurring fire resistance of regular core gypsum board. A new product was eventually introduced that clearly demonstrated “eXtra” fire resistance, hence the name “type X.” The basic components of type ‘X’ that give it a superior fire resistance are gypsum, glass fibers, and vermiculite.
In the 1960s, further modifications were made to the original successful type ‘X’ formulations of gypsum board used in some systems – particularly ceiling systems – without compromising the fire-resistive qualities. The new product demonstrates additional fire resistance over type ‘X’ core, and thus the term “improved type X” was coined. Gypsum board products make up the predominant portion of a family of materials identified as gypsum panel products. Gypsum panel products are defined as sheet materials consisting essentially of gypsum. They can be faced with paper or another material, or may be unfaced. Gypsum board, glass-faced sheathing materials with a gypsum core and unfaced gypsum-based products are all considered to be gypsum panel products. Technically, gypsum board is defined as the generic name for a family of sheet products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges. In recent years the family of gypsum-based panel materials has grown to include panel products other than those with the familiar paper facers. A number of specialized gypsum panel products and gypsum boards have been developed for specific uses which include:
Gypsum Wallboard for interior walls and ceilings
Gypsum Ceiling Board for interior ceilings
Type X Gypsum Board for fire-resistance-rated building systems
Fiber Reinforced Gypsum Panels for interior and exterior walls, ceilings, and tile base
Gypsum Sheathing for exterior walls and roof systems
Glass Mat Gypsum Substrate for use as sheathing on exterior walls and ceilings
Gypsum Soffit Board for use on exterior soffits and ceilings
Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
Glass Mat Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
Gypsum Backing Board for use as a base for multi-ply systems
Gypsum Lath for use as a base for gypsum plaster
Gypsum Plaster Base for use as a base for veneer plaster
Gypsum Shaft Liner Board for shaft, stairway, and duct enclosures
Pre-decorated Gypsum Board for accent walls, office and movable partitions
Foil backed gypsum board for use as a vapor retardent
Identified by their technically correct names, gypsum board products are as follows:Gypsum Wallboard is produced primarily for use as an interior surfacing for buildings. It is the most often used commodity gypsum board and annually accounts for over 50 percent of all the gypsum board manufactured and sold in North America. Gypsum wallboard has a manila-colored face paper and is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.
Gypsum Ceiling Board is an interior surfacing material with the same physical appearance as gypsum wallboard. Gypsum ceiling board is manufactured as a ½-inch thick material; it is designed for application on interior ceilings, primarily those intended to receive a water-based texture finish. It has a sag resistance equal to 5/8-inch thick gypsum wallboard.
Predecorated Gypsum Board has a decorative surface which does not require further treatment. The surfaces may be coated or painted, printed, textured, or have a film – such as vinyl wallcovering – applied. It is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.
Water-resistant Gypsum Board is a gypsum board designed for use on walls primarily as a base for the application of ceramic or plastic tile. It is readily identified by its green-tinted face paper and is commonly referred to as “Greenboard.” It has a water-resistant core and a water-repellent face and back paper; it is generally installed in bath, kitchen, and laundry areas.
Gypsum Backing Board, Gypsum Coreboard, and Gypsum Shaftliner Panel are all designed to be used as base materials in multi-layer, solid and semi-solid, and shaftwall systems. Gypsum backing board is used as a base layer for other gypsum board materials in systems or as a base for dry claddings such as acoustic tile. Gypsum coreboard and gypsum shaftliner are manufactured with a type X core, using a specific edge configuration to facilitate installation into specialized stud systems and a type X core.
Exterior Gypsum Soffit Board is designed for use on the underside of eaves, canopies, carports, soffits, and other horizontal exterior surfaces that are indirectly exposed to the weather. It has water-repellent face and back paper and is more sag-resistant than regular wallboard. Exterior gypsum soffit board can be manufactured with a type X core and typically has a light brown face paper.
Gypsum Sheathing Board is used as a backing under exterior siding or cladding. It has a water-repellent face and back paper and can be manufactured with a water-resistant core. Depending on the thickness of the board, gypsum sheathing board is manufactured with either a square or a tongue-and-groove edge and a fire-resistive core. It generally has a brown or light black face paper.
Gypsum Base for Veneer Plaster has a distinctive blue-tinted face paper that is treated to facilitate the adhesion of thin coats of hard, high strength gypsum veneer plaster. It is produced in sheets that are the same width as gypsum wallboard and can be manufactured with a fire-resistive core. Application of Gypsum Board
A wide variety of gypsum board application methods are available to meet virtually any need in building design and construction. Gypsum board is applied in either single-layer or multi-layer systems to achieve specific fire or sound ratings. Gypsum board is applied over wood or steel framing or furring. It is also applied to masonry or concrete surfaces, either laminated directly or attached to wood furring strips or steel furring channels. Gypsum board ceilings can be directly attached to joists or trusses or attached to furring or grid systems suspended below structural members. Gypsum board is generally attached to the framing with nails, screws, or staples. Although nails are commonly used in wood frame construction, screws are often preferred because they are applied with automatic screw guns, have excellent holding power, and reduce the possibility of nail pops. A combination of nails and screws may also be used, with nails along edges and screws in the field. Staples are used because they are economical and can be quickly applied with staple guns; however, the use of staples should be limited to the base-layer in multi-layer systems or to gypsum sheathing on wood framing. Gypsum board wall and ceiling surfaces are typically decorated with paint, texture, wallpaper, tile, or paneling. When pre-decorated gypsum board is used, joints are generally covered with matching molding or battens; no additional finishing or decoration is necessary. Single-Layer Application
Single-layer gypsum board applications are the most common in light commercial and in residential construction.
These systems rely on one layer of gypsum board attached to framing or furring.
Although single-layer gypsum board systems are generally adequate to meet most minimum requirements for fire resistance and sound control, multi-layer systems are preferred for higher quality construction and to upgrade beyond the "bare minimums" of many code requirements.
Multi-Layer Application
Multi-layer systems have two or more layers of gypsum board and are used to meet higher sound and fire resistance requirements or to enhance these comfort and safety qualities beyond minimum code requirements.
They also provide better surface quality because face layers can often be laminated over base layers eliminating many or all of the fasteners in the face layer. In addition, face-layer joints are stronger by virtue of the continuous backing provided by the base layers.
Nail pops and ridging are less frequent and imperfectly aligned framing has less effect on the quality of the finished surface.
GYPSUM BOARD TYPICAL MECHANICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES (GA-235-10) A common misconception is that there are just two basic types of drywall—regular and type X—and beyond this difference, drywall products from various manufacturers are about the same. However, laboratory fire tests by United States Gypsum Company and various independent testing organizations provide strong evidence that there are significant fire-performance differences between drywall products from various manufacturers. It is well known in the construction industry that the single most important characteristic of gypsum drywall is its fire resistance. This is provided by the principal raw material used in its manufacture, CaSO4- 2H2O (gypsum). As the chemical formula shows, gypsum contains chemically combined water (about 50% by volume). When gypsum drywall panels are exposed to fire, the heat converts a portion of the combined water to steam. The heat energy that converts water to steam is thus used up, keeping the opposite side of the gypsum panel cool as long as there is water left in the gypsum, or until the gypsum panel is breached.
In the case of regular gypsum panels, as the water is driven off by heat, the reduction in volume within the gypsum causes large cracks to form, eventually causing the panel to fail.
In a special fire test designed to demonstrate the relative performance of different types of gypsum cores (described later in this section), it was shown that in a fire with a temperature of 1,850ºF, a 5/8" thickness of regular-core gypsum panels would fail in this manner in 10 to 15 minutes.
Type X gypsum panels, such as Sheetrock brand Firecode gypsum panels, have glass fibers mixed with the gypsum to reinforce the core of the panels.
These fibers have the effect of reducing the extent of and size of the cracks that form as the water is driven off, thereby extending the length of time the gypsum panel can resist the heat without failure.
Fire test results indicate that the same thickness of the type X gypsum drywall exposed to the same temperature (1,850ºF) will last 45 to 60 minutes.
USG has developed a third-generation gypsum drywall product called Sheetrock brand Firecode C gypsum panels that provides even greater resistance to the heat of fire. The core of Firecode C contains more glass fibers than type X—but also a shrinkage-compensating additive, a form of vermiculite that expands in the presence of heat at about the same rate as the gypsum in the core shrinks (from loss of water). Thus the core becomes highly stable in the presence of fire and remains intact even after the combined water is driven off. Tests have shown that this third-generation product resisted the fire for more than two hours, as compared to 45 to 60 minutes for the type X, and 10 to 15minutes for the regular panel under the same test conditions.
In a future posting we’ll discuss the issues facing the fire service related to the newest generation of impact resistant gypsum board that will restrict or preclude entirely our ability to breach walls in residential or commercial occupancies. Here are some links and Spec Sheets to look at in advance, HERE , HERE, HERE and HERE
References and Links Summarizing the many different types of gypsum board used in the industry, this quick reference gives typical uses of, and the ASTM and CSA standards for, each type. Also included is the appropriate industry standard designation for the installation of each type of gypsum board, along with the sizes and thicknesses generally available. Download
APPLICATION OF GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-253-07)
This publication describes the industry's latest recommendations for handling, storing, and installing gypsum sheathing under a variety of conditions. A must for anyone hanging gypsum sheathing or involved in EIFS work. Download
FIRE-RESISTANT GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-254-07)
This publication describes the advantages, recommended uses, limitations, and properties of gypsum sheathing in exterior walls.
Reference guide of construction procedures for gypsum drywall, cement board, veneer plaster and conventional plaster.
Trade Associations and other Organizations
Association of the Wall and Ceiling Industry (AWCI)—Provides services and undertake activities that enhance the members' ability to operate a successful business. AWCI represents acoustics systems, ceiling systems, drywall systems, exterior insulation and finishing systems, fireproofing, flooring systems, insulation, and stucco contractors, suppliers and manufacturers, and allied trades.
ASTM International (ASTM)—Provides a global forum for the development and publication of voluntary consensus standards for materials, products, systems, and services. In over 130 varied industry areas, ASTM standards serve as the basis for manufacturing, procurement, and regulatory activities. Provides standards that are accepted and used in research and development, product testing, quality systems, and commercial transactions around the globe.
Ceilings and Interior Systems Construction Association (CISCA)—Association for the advancement interior commercial construction, providing education, technical guidance and related resources. CISCA membership includes over 600 of the leading contractors, distributors, manufacturers and independent manufacturer's representatives worldwide.
Gypsum Association (GA)—Founded in 1930, GA promotes the use of gypsum while advancing the development, growth, and general welfare of the gypsum industry in the United States and Canada on behalf of its member companies.
ICC Evaluation Service (ICC-ES)—Provides technical evaluations of building products, components, methods, and materials and issues reports on code compliance to building regulators, contractors, specifiers, architects, engineers, and the public.
Relevant Codes and Standards
Guide Specifications
Department of Defense (DoD) Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS)
NIOSH LODD Report Released on Fire and Collapse Which Killed Two Chicago Firefighters F2010-38 Two Career Fire Fighters Die and 19 Injured in Roof Collapse during Rubbish Fire at an Abandoned Commercial Structure – Illinois
NIOSH Executive Summary
On December 22, 2010, a 47-year-old male (Victim # 1) and a 34-year old male (Victim # 2), both career fire fighters, died when the roof collapsed during suppression operations at a rubbish fire in an abandoned and unsecured commercial structure. The bowstring truss roof collapsed at the rear of the 84-year old structure approximately 16 minutes after the initial companies arrived on-scene and within minutes after the Incident Commander reported that the fire was under control. The structure, the former site of a commercial laundry, had been abandoned for over 5 years and city officials had previously cited the building owners for the deteriorated condition of the structure and ordered the owner to either repair or demolish the structure. The victims were members of the first alarm assignment and were working inside the structure. A total of 19 other fire fighters were hurt during the collapse.
Contributing Factors
Lack of a vacant / hazardous building marking program within the city
Vacant / hazardous building information not part of automatic dispatch system
Dilapidated condition of the structure
Dispatch occurred during shift change resulting in fragmented crews
Weather conditions including snow accumulation on roof and frozen water hydrants
Not all fire fighters equipped with radios.
Key Recommendations
Identify and mark buildings that present hazards to fire fighters and the public
Use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially abandoned or vacant unsecured structures
Train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
Provide battalion chiefs with a staff assistant or chief's aide to help manage information and communication
Provide all fire fighters with radios and train them on their proper use
Develop, train on, and enforce the use of standard operating procedures that specifically address operations in abandoned and vacant structures
NIOSH Recommendations
Recommendation #1: Fire departments and city building departments should work together to identify and mark buildings that present hazards to fire fighters and the public.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially abandoned or vacant unsecured structures.
Recommendation # 3: Fire departments should train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates.
Recommendation # 4: Fire departments should consider providing battalion chiefs with a staff assistant or chief's aide to help manage information and communication.
Recommendation # 5: Fire departments should provide all fire fighters with radios and train them on their proper use.
Recommendation # 6: Fire departments should develop, train on and enforce the use of standard operating procedures that specifically address operations in abandoned and vacant structures.
Recommendation # 7: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to ensure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday.
Recommendation # 8: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
Recommendation # 9: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures.
Recommendation #10: Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters are trained in and understand the hazards associated with bowstring truss construction.
The tragic events in the City of Chicago on Wednesday December 22, 2010, when Chicago Firefighter Edward J. Stringer – Engine Co.63 and Firefighter/EMT Corey D. Ankum, Truck Co.34 were killed in the line of duty while operating at a structure fire in an abandoned one-story brick building in the 1700 block of East 75th Street on the City’s South side, exemplifies the demands, challenges and sacrifice that come with responsibilities, duty and sworn obligation that distinguishes the honorable profession of being a firefighter.
The fire was first reported at about 06:48 hours during the night and day tour shift change, with companies arriving at 06:52 hours reporting moderate fire in the buildings northeast corner. The single story commercial structure was vacant, however it was readily known that squatters were known to seek shelter in the abandoned structure especially give the harsh weather being experienced in the city. The fire was quickly contained at approximately 07:00 hours according to published reports, and radio communications, with coordinated suppression, search and rescue and ventilation operations being conduction by companied both within the interior and on the roof.
During all operations involving actual or suspected Bowstring Truss Roofing Support Systems Command and Company Officers should be sensitive to risk assessment indicators related to both fire induced conditions as well as environmental and age induced factors.
Pre-plan your buildings look at the construction, components, features and condition of the building; there is a tremendous amount of information out there. Understand and comprehend what to look for, what it is that you’re looking at and more importantly make sure the information is retrievable for on-scene application and that the information is utilized when formulating IAP and in the dynamic risk assessment process
During Dynamic Risk Assessment, special attention should be focused on Predicated Building Performance common to identified building systems, features and structural systems that are based upon Occupancy Performance and NOT Occupancy Type.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report examining the characteristics of fires in vacant residential buildings. The report, Vacant Residential Building Fires, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and provides useful insights and recommendations. Link HERE
When developing incident action plans and operational assignments at incidents involving possible Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures, command and company officers shall implement a formulative risk -benefit assessment consistent with departmental procedures, policies and expectations.
Be knowledgable of operational factors and considerations related to operations at Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures; HERE and HERE
Read the Newest NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters at Structure Fires, HERE
Start considering building; age, deterioration, environmental impacts and influences in your IAP and tactical considerations, we at times forget to consider these performance indicators effectively during initial or sustained operations.
Learn more about Building Construction, Occupancy Profiling, Reading a Building, Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type and always consider Tactical Patience.
Increase your knowledge on Structural Collapse indicators especially for buildings of masonry construction in both Type III and Type IV construction.
There is a Predictability of Performance in all Buildings and Occupancies with Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural Systems; Know what they are.
Understand what to look for in Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural System integrity related to; Age and Deterioration, Gravity, Cross Grain Shrinkage, Wood Defects that are self-evident in chords and web members, Upper Chord Buckling, Lower Chord splitting or failure points, web splitting or pull-outs, multiple roofing systems or membranes, multiple void spaces, compromised bearing walls or pilasters, compromised or degraded bearing points or truss ends.
Learn to identify masonry wall features and what they mean towards tactical operations
In smaller single story occupancies; any loss of structural integrity of a single truss component would likely cause the compromise or collapse of adjacent truss components and connective decking planks due to the interdependence and connectivity of the roofing support (trusses), purlins, rafters and roofing planks and outer membrane system.
Typically the failure of one bowstring truss span will compromise or cause the collapse of each adjacent truss to either side of the original affected truss causing the failure of a sizeable roof area.
Companies operating on such affected roof area areas are subject to high risk and vulnerability should the roof area fail. Refer to the incident conditions and structural collapse from the Waldbaum’s Collapse, FDNY August 2, 1978. Go to the incident overview at Commandsafety.comHERE.
In smaller square foot commercial occupancies that have shallow depth bowstring truss components and both limited spans (less than 100 linear feet clear span) and number of trusses (six or less) the likelihood of a catastrophic roof collapse should be considered highly predicable in all incident action plans and during incident status monitoring.
The loss of load bearing and load transfer capabilities at these wall connections can contribute towards failure and collapse conditions. The end connections points (end cap or end shoe) of a bowstring truss are critical towards maintain truss performance and structural integrity.
The loss of truss axial orientation, resultant excessive deflection, loss of integrity of chord/ web geometry and connection points can lead to failure mechanisms and a cascading effect due to transferring of loads and possible overstressing and directly lead to subsequent failures.
It should be noted that fire service personnel should have a high degree of respect for the danger and susceptible risk imposed by compromised or failing bearing and non-load bearing walls.
Collapse zones must be established and access controlled based upon physical incident scene layout, access and proximal exposure structures.
All fire service personnel should have awareness level training and an understanding of recognizing collapse indicators for buildings of masonry construction and tactical safety considerations
Company and Command Officers must have a higher level of knowledge and training to be able to recognize subtle or obvious construction, conditions or indicators that will affect IAP, strategic, tactical or task assignments and be able to act upon those indicators with immediacy and urgency as conditions and risk dictate.
The Collapse Zone should be at a minimum be equal to the full height of the exterior masonry wall face and also take into consideration additional distance due building material momentum, bounce and toss due to individual bricks, steel lintels and other components and materials acting as projectiles and traveling distances greater than the defined “collapse zone”.
National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Operational Safety Considerations at Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies PowerPoint Program developed by Christopher Naum, HERE
Do you know what to look for upon arrival?
What Building features and factors will affect your operations?
Program Screenshot
The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics covered include:
Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.
There are some discussions emanating and emerging regarding the Medical Center Fire in Asheville, NC that claimed the life of a highly regarded Captain and injured numerous firefighters. Emerging reports are discussing water supply, standpipe operability and integrity and deployment delays affecting fire behavior, growth, intensive and operational risks during the time in which water was attempting to be delivered to hand lines extended on the fire floor of the Medical Center.
See coverage HERE on CommandSafety.com and HERE at the Asheville Citizens-Times.com today. Direct link HERE
The following links have been compiled that provide a variety of insights and perspectives on operations conducted with standpipe systems.
FDNY F2007-37 Two career fire fighters die following a seven-alarm fire in a high-rise building undergoing simultaneous deconstruction and asbestos abatement – New York (2007)
Houston: North Loop East Fire Report; FF Mayday and thee civiliand Killed, HERE (2007)
Texas: F2001-33 High-rise apartment fire claims the life of one career fire fighter (captain) and injures another career fire fighter (captain) – Texas (2001)
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: One Meridian Plaza Fire, USFA Report, HERE (1999)
Video Clip recorded live by Fire Department Network News TV (FDNNTV) at the 50th IAFF Fire Fighter Convention in San Diego, CA on August 23, 2010.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, also known as NIOSH, is a federal agency that is part of the Centers for Disease Control. NIOSH has a mission of generating new knowledge in the occupational safety and health field and to transfer that knowledge into practice for the advancement of workers, including firefighters and emergency responders.
In 1998, the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) requested that Congress fund NIOSH to start a firefighter safety initiative called the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. “We investigate fatalities to learn from the mistakes the others made and to try to prevent future fatalities and injuries from occurring in similar events,” stated Project Officer Tim Merinar with the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. According to NIOSH, the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program has made over 1,000 recommendations arising from over 300 investigations since its inception in 1998.
Merinar claimed that some do not fully understand who NIOSH is and what their goals are, often being confused with OSHA. However, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is not an enforcement agency, they are a research and education agency. Merinar added, “We’re not looking to find fault or place blame on the fire departments or the individual firefighters in the incidents.”
As soon as possible after an incident, a NIOSH investigator will meet with the fire department. “Oftentimes, we have to explain who we are, why we’re there, what we’re trying to accomplish,” added Merinar. NIOSH investigates as many firefighter fatalities as possible involving structure fires, deaths from cardiovascular disease, as well as deaths during non-fireground incidents.
NIOSH offers many different publications to firefighters, including their newest one about risk management at structure fires. This literature is distributed to the fire service free of charge. Another publication offered to firefighters deals with floor joists and the risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. “They work very well for the construction industry, but when they’re exposed to fire they also fail very rapidly. Which leads to early building collapses,” explained Merinar. “Many firefighters have been injured and killed in these collapses.”
NIOSH FFFIPP
Trends such as this uncovered during their investigations and spread to the fire service, could help prevent future deaths. Another trend found several years ago by NIOSH involved PASS devices not sounding on firefighters who died. According to Merinar, NIOSH worked with the National Fire Protection Association to have the standard changed to make the PASS devices more reliable and more effective for firefighters. Currently, they are working with the NFPA on the thermal degradation characteristics of face piece lenses.
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program
For more information on the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, incident reports or fire fighter publications, visit www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/.
Stakeholder Comment on the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP)-2011
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is seeking stakeholder input on the progress and future directions of the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP). Since its initiation in 1998, NIOSH has sought public input to help plan and direct the goals and objectives of the FFFIPP. NIOSH received public comments on the FFFIPP in 1998, March 2006, and November 2008. NIOSH is again seeking input on the progress and future directions of the FFFIPP to ensure that the program is meeting the needs and expectations of the U.S. fire service and to identify ways in which the program can improve its impact on the safety and health of fire fighters across the United States. NIOSH will compile and consider all comments received and use them in making decisions on how to proceed with the FFFIPP.
There are several resources that may be useful to individuals and groups who would like to comment on the FFFIPP:
The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Progress (FFFIPP) Report and Proposed Future Directions – 2011. This document includes specific topics for stakeholder input.
The Strategic Plan for the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program that was finalized in 2009 after public input.
The FFFIPP web site that includes an overview of the FFFIPP, fatality investigation reports and other publications.
Related Dockets
NIOSH Docket number 063NIOSH Docket number 063-A
——————————————————————————–
Public Comment Period
Written comments on the document will be accepted through July 29, 2011 in accordance with the instructions below. All material submitted to NIOSH should reference Docket Number NIOSH-063-B. All electronic comments should be formatted as Microsoft Word documents and make reference to docket number NIOSH-063-B.
Comments will be accepted until 5:00 p.m. EDT on July 29, 2011
To submit comments, please use one of these options:
Send NIOSH comments using this online form
Send comments by email.
Fax comments to the NIOSH Docket Office: 513-533-8285
Send by Mail to:
NIOSH Mailstop: C-34
Robert A. Taft Lab.
4676 Columbia Parkway
Cincinnati, Ohio 45226
All information received in response to this notice will be available for public examination and copying at the …
NIOSH Docket Office
4676 Columbia Parkway, Room 111
Cincinnati, Ohio 45226.
A complete electronic docket containing all comments submitted will be available on the NIOSH docket home page, and comments will be available in writing by request. NIOSH includes all comments received without change in the docket, including any personal information provided.
Contact persons for technical information
Paul Moore
Chief, Fatality Investigations Team
NIOSH/CDC
1095 Willowdale Road
Mailstop H-1808
Morgantown, WV 26505
304/285-6016
Recent NIOSH Fire Fighter Safety Publications
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Operating Modified Excess/Surplus Vehicles
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2011-125
Fire fighters may be at risk for crash-related injuries while operating excess and other surplus vehicles that have been modified for fire service use. Fire departments with limited resources often craft fire apparatus out of excess/surplus military and other vehicles as an affordable alternative to purchasing new or used apparatus. NIOSH urges fire departments to take precautions and actions to minimize the hazards and risks to fire fighters when using modified excess/surplus vehicles.
Evaluation of Chemical and Particle Exposures During Vehicle Fire Suppression Training (2010) (56 pages, 4.85 MB)
Health Hazard Evaluation Report, HETA 2008-0241-3113
In September 2008 and July 2009, NIOSH researchers collected area and personal breathing zone air samples during a Health Hazard Evaluation (HHE) to evaluate firefighters’ exposures to airborne chemicals during vehicle fire suppression training. Several hazardous chemicals were found on the area samples, including respiratory toxicants and potential carcinogens. Of the chemicals measured in the personal breathing zones, levels of formaldehyde, carbon monoxide, and isocyanates were near or above short term exposure limits or ceiling limits. In addition, the number of particles and mass of the particles in the air increased during knockdown and remained elevated throughout the fire overhaul. Based on this evaluation, the levels of gases and particles released during vehicle fires have the potential to cause acute health effects to firefighters who do not wear self-contained breathing apparatus.
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2010-153
Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures. These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
Preventing Exposures to Bloodborne Pathogens among Paramedics
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2010-139
Patient care puts paramedics at risk of exposure to blood. These exposures carry the risk of infection from bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes AIDS. A national survey of 2,664 paramedics contributed new information about their risk of exposure to blood and identified opportunities to control exposures and prevent infections.
NIOSH Workplace Solutions—Preventing Deaths and Injuries to Fire Fighters During Live-Fire Training in Acquired Structures
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-102
Fire fighters are subjected to many hazards when participating in live-fire training. Training facilities with approved burn buildings should be used for live-fire training whenever possible. However, when acquired structures are used for live-fire training, NIOSH strongly recommends that fire departments follow the national consensus guidelines in NFPA 1403, standard on live-fire training evolutions [NFPA 2002a] to reduce the risk of injury and death. These guidelines are summarized in the recommendations in this document.
Radio Communication
The past few decades have seen major advancements in the communication industry. These advancements have improved radio frequency spectrum efficiency, but also have added complexity to the expansion of existing systems and the design of new systems. The U.S. Fire Administration in conjunction with the International Association of Fire Fighters has released the report Voice Radio Communications Guide for the Fire Service 3.85 MB (77 pages) This report is designed to help fire service leaders and members understand new communication and radio system issues in order to remain informed players in the process.
Current Status, Knowledge Gaps, and Research Needs Pertaining to Firefighter Radio Communication Systems
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) commissioned this study to identify and address specific deficiencies in firefighter radio communications and to identify technologies that may address these deficiencies. Specifically to be addressed were current and emerging technologies that improve, or hold promise to improve, firefighter radio communications and provide firefighter location in structures.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology, Building and Fire Research Laboratory publication “Testing of Portable Radios in a Fire Fighting Environment” 265 KB (24 pages)
focuses on the thermal environment that radios would be expected to withstand while being used in structural fire fighting operations. Current NFPA standards for radios are reviewed and recommendations for establishing performance standards are presented. The need for providing additional protection from the thermal environment is documented.
Fire vented through the roof. Note: NIOSH investigators believe this photo shows conditions very close to the time that the Mayday was called for Victim #2 by FF4. Wind was pushing the smoke plume from right to left. (Photo courtesy of Keith Muratori.)
Bridgeport (CT) fire officials’ failure on nearly ever level led to the line-of-duty deaths of two firefighters battling a fire in a residential occupancy in Bridgeport, CT on July 24, 2010.
Among the findings of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) released Wednesday:
the deputy fire chief and his assistant at the scene of the Elmwood Street fire were having a discussion about whether they heard a mayday call from the two fallen firefighters instead of taking immediate action to rescue them.
The report also stated firefighters failed to immediately treat one of the firefighters who managed to make it to relative safety before collapsing.
Officials also did not properly managed firefighters’ air supplies — both firefighter’s air cylinders were empty when they were found, the report stated.
The department’s incident safety officer, who is required to be on scene for assistance in a fire also did not arrive more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch.
Lt. Steven Velasquez and Firefighter Michel Baik were on the third-floor of the wood-frame home at 41 Elmwood Ave. checking for hot spots and making sure there were no people in the smoldering blaze. Then trouble hit. The two sent mayday signals back to dispatch. Within minutes, the fire department’s rapid intervention team found the pair on the floor, unconscious, and gave them CPR. The two men could not be revived.
On July 24, 2010, a 40-year-old male career fire lieutenant and a 49-year-old male career fire fighter were found unresponsive at a residential structure fire. The victims and two additional crew members were tasked with conducting a primary search for civilians and fire extension on the 3rd floor of a multifamily residential structure. The fire had been extinguished on the 2nd floor upon their entry into the structure.
While pulling walls and the ceiling on the 3rd floor, smoke and heat conditions changed rapidly. The first firefighter transmitted a Mayday (audibly under duress) that was not acknowledged or acted upon. Minutes later the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the 3rd floor. As a fire fighter exited the 3rd floor, the lieutenant was discovered unconscious and not breathing, sitting on the stairs to the 3rd floor.
Approximately 7 minutes later, the second firefighter was discovered on the 3rd floor in thick, black smoke conditions. Both victims were removed by the rapid intervention team (RIT) and other fire fighters who assisted them. Both victims were pronounced dead at local hospitals.
Contributing Factors
Failure to effectively monitor and respond to Mayday transmissions
Less than effective Mayday procedures and training
Inadequate air management
Removal and/or dislodgement of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
Incident safety officer (ISO) and rapid intervention team (RIT) not readily available on scene
Possible underlying medical condition(s) (coronary artery disease)
Command, control, and accountability.
Aerial View of House and Exposures
Key Recommendations
Ensure that radio transmissions are effectively monitored and quickly acted upon, especially when a Mayday is called
Ensure that Mayday training program(s) and department procedures adequately prepare fire fighters to call a Mayday
Train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their SCBA
Ensure that fire fighters use their SCBA during all stages of a fire and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures
Ensure that a separate incident safety officer (ISO), independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire with the initial dispatch
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is readily available and prepared to respond to fire fighter emergencies
Consider adopting a comprehensive wellness and fitness program, provide annual medical evaluations consistent with NFPA standards, and perform annual physical performance (physical ability) evaluations for all fire fighters.
Timeline
This timeline is provided to set out, to the extent possible, the sequence of events according to recorded and intelligible radio transmissions. Two channels were used during this incident: the main dispatch channel and channel 2 (fireground). Times are approximate and were obtained from review of the dispatch records, witness interviews, photographs of the scene, and other available information. Times have been rounded to the nearest minute. NIOSH investigators have attempted to include all intelligible radio transmissions, but some may be missing. This timeline is not intended, nor should it be used, as a formal record of events.
1544 Hours E3 and L5 dispatched to a report of an elevator rescue.
1546 Hours While en route, E3 contacted the dispatcher on the main dispatch channel and advised them they needed to redirect all companies to a possible house fire.
1547 Hours L5 copied E3‘s transmission on the main dispatch channel and redirected to the possible house fire. E3 advised the dispatcher, on the main dispatch channel, that they had a fire on the 2nd floor and that they did not have a hydrant. Note: It is unclear whether E3 established command, but L5 arrived just after E3 and established command.
1548 Hours E3, E4, E1, E7 as RIT, L11, L5, R5, and B1 were dispatched on the main dispatch channel to the house fire.
1549 Hours L5 arrived on scene and their officer stated over the main dispatch channel, ―2½-story wood frame with heavy fire coming from the 2nd floor, Alpha/Bravo side, L5 is now command.‖
1550 Hours E7 en route.
1551-1552 Hours E4 arrived on scene and laid a supply line in from the hydrant. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer (initial arriving IC) advised the dispatcher that the bulk of the fire was knocked down by E3 and the primary search was in progress. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised L11 and E7 which way they should approach the scene. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer requested an ambulance for an injured fire fighter (ankle injury). Over the main dispatch channel, B1 advised the dispatcher that he was on scene, and he confirmed the first report of heavy fire with the bulk of the fire knocked down. B1 then took command of the incident.
1553 Hours L11 arrived on scene. E1 took an additional hydrant. A7116 dispatched to the incident for an injured fire fighter. Note: Dispatch of A7116 was not part of the initial fire assignment. The 9-1-1 center contacted the EMS dispatch center via landline to request an ambulance for the injured fire fighter on scene after the request from the L5 officer.
1554 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the BA advised the dispatcher that the command post would be in front of the fire building and tag collection would be at the command post. On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 to charge the second hoseline. E7 (RIT) arrived on scene.
1555 Hours On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 again to charge the second hoseline. Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested the dispatcher to have the safety officer respond to the incident. IC checked on the status of the ambulance. Fire dispatch advised the IC that the ambulance was en route.
1556 Hours E3 advised the IC (on the main dispatch channel) that he needed hooks on the 2nd floor in the room of origin; the IC acknowledged the request. Over the main dispatch channel, IC advised all companies, ―Channel 2 fireground, channel 2 fireground.‖ Note: Up to this point, companies on scene were operating on the main dispatch and channel 2. Fire dispatch assigned fireground operations to channel 2 for the incident.
1557-1558 Hours IC called L11 on channel 2. IC (on the main dispatch channel) confirmed with the dispatcher who was RIT (which was E7) on scene and advised them that their equipment was available at the command post. Victim#1 acknowledged the IC‘s request for L11 on channel 2, but the IC did not respond. E3 officer, who incorrectly identified himself as ―E4,‖ called command on channel 2 and stated they had a slight extension into the A/B corner. Note: He was working overtime the day of the incident at the station that houses E3 and E4, which is also his normal duty station. The IC copied the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2 and asked him if he had enough hooks available; the E3 officer stated he did. A7116 arrived on scene.
1559 Hours E3 officer on channel 2 advised the IC that they needed a hoseline to the 3rd floor because they could not reach it (fire extension) from the 2nd floor. The IC acknowledged the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2. The IC, on channel 2, advised Victim #1 that E1 was bringing a hoseline to the 3rd floor. Victim #1 acknowledged the IC‘s transmission on channel 2 and advised, ―A primary is in progress, which is negative; and, they are still checking for extension.‖ The IC acknowledged Victim #1‘s transmission.
1600 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the ISO advised the dispatcher that he was responding (from home). A7116 contacted EMS dispatch requesting a single ambulance to standby at the incident per the IC. A7110 dispatched and en route to fire to standby. On channel 2, the IC (at the command post) advised the E4 officer that he could see fire extending up the A/B corner. Note: NIOSH investigators were not sure if this transmission was meant for the E4 officer or the officer from E3 who identified himself as E4. At 1559 hours, the E3 officer advised the IC of the extension to the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the E4 officer advised the IC that he was working on getting a line up to the 3rd floor.
1601 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised the IC that the ISO and DC were responding. On channel 2, the L5 officer contacted ―L5-Alpha‖ (believed to be L5‘s aerial ladder) to assist in the bucket; L5-Alpha acknowledged the transmission.
1602-1603 Hours On channel 2, the IC contacted the L5 officer to verify whether he thought he could make the roof with L5. On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, ―…line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
The IC called the L11 officer (Victim #1) on channel 2 (no response).
1615 Hours On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to all companies on the 3rd floor, vacate the 3rd floor; I repeat, command to L11 and E1, vacate the 3rd floor.‖
1616-1619 Hours (2nd Mayday Call) The IC attempted to contact L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The IC, on channel 2, then stated, ―Command to E1.‖ (1616.50 hours) On channel 2, FF2 stated, ―Mayday, Mayday…Rescue 5 Bravo command we have a downed fire fighter rear steps. Mayday-Mayday-Mayday fire fighter down rear steps, 2nd floor.‖ IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11‖ (no response). Note: An apparatus air horn is heard sounding in the background of this transmission. FF2 on channel 2 stated, ―Rescue 5 Bravo command, Rescue 5 Bravo command we need help 2nd floor, send the RIT, we need fresh bodies.‖ Note: No audio transmissions or emergency tones are heard on channel 2 or the main dispatch channel advising that the Mayday call had been acknowledged. DC contacted the IC on channel 2 to have him send the RIT to the rear stairs; the IC acknowledged. Note: The RIT may have already been advancing up the rear stairs, but they ran into difficulty accessing the 2nd floor landing off the rear stairs because a charged hoseline was against the closed door. Dispatch attempted to contact command on channel 2 (no response). The IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The DC contacted the IC requesting the ambulance on scene to come to the rear of the house. Victim #1 was extricated out the rear of the house.
1620 Hours A7110 began medical care for the downed fire fighter (Victim #1). Over the main dispatch channel, the BA requested an advanced life support ambulance to the fire scene. A7126 was dispatched to intercept A7110 at the fire scene to provide advanced life support. (~1620.35 Hours) The following transmission is heard on channel 2, ―…Ladder 11 ‗mayday‘ (very quick transmission)…Ladder 11 (unintelligible word(s)).‖ Note: The dispatch caller ID for this radio is designated as “L-11 FF3,” which was assigned to the fire fighter (designated as FF4 for this report) who later finds Victim #2 (see below 1624 hours). FF4 had not found Victim #2 at the time of this transmission. On channel 2, FF4 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11 can‖ (no response). Note: “Ladder 11 can” was Victim #2’s designation that shift.
1621 Hours A7126 en route to fire scene.
1622 Hours On channel 2, the ISO advised the IC that the fire fighter (Victim #1) was removed and they needed to do a roll call for everyone on scene. On channel 2, the IC advised all company officers that the ―incident is taking a PAR‖ (personnel accountability report). Officers began calling in their respective PARs.
1624 Hours (3rd and 4th Mayday Calls) FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Mayday-Mayday, I have a fire fighter trapped on the 3rd floor, Mayday-Mayday-Mayday 3rd floor.‖ Note: This Mayday is for Victim #2. A PASS device is heard alarming during FF4‘s transmission. On channel 2, the IC stated, ―This is command to all companies, vacate the building, I report, command to all companies, vacate the building.‖ FF4 on channel 2 stated again, ―Mayday-Mayday-Mayday, I‘ve got another fire fighter down, another one, 3rd floor, hurry!‖
1625 Hours Over channel 2, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones. Note: It is unknown why the evacuation tones were sounded instead of the Mayday tones. Their evacuation tone is an alternating, high-low sound, similar to a European siren. Their Mayday tone is a rapid, high to low pitch, chirping sound. This was dispatch’s first acknowledgement of a Mayday over the radio. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on channel 2. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones as well. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on the main dispatch channel.
1626 Hours The IC contacted the DC on channel 2. DC acknowledged with no further traffic from the IC. The IC on channel 2 again advised all companies to vacate the building. The dispatcher then activated the emergency tones on channel 2 and the main dispatch channel, and stated, ―All companies per command vacate the building, all companies vacate the building.‖
1627 Hours The ISO contacted the IC on channel 2 and stated, ―We need to make contact with that Mayday, we need more information, we have not heard from them since the initial call.‖ On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to company declaring a Mayday; I repeat, command to the company declaring a Mayday sound off, sound off.‖ A fire fighter from the RIT advised the IC on channel 2 that they were moving the fire fighter off the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the dispatcher advised the IC that the Mayday call was for the 3rd floor. A7126 arrived at the fire scene.
1628 Hours RIT advised the IC that they have the fire fighter (Victim #2) on the 3rd floor and will be bringing him down the rear stairs from the 3rd floor.
1630 Hours A7110 en route to the hospital with Victim #1 without assistance from A7126.
1632 Hours ISO asked for a progress report from the RIT on the Mayday. RIT replied, ―Coming down…3rd floor.‖ ISO asked RIT to repeat their traffic. A radio was keyed, but there was no transmission.
1634 Hours RIT personnel advised the IC that they had the fire fighter (Victim #2) down to the 2nd floor landing.
1640 Hours A7110 arrived at local hospital with Victim #1.
1643 Hours A7126 began medical care on second downed fire fighter (Victim #2). Note: This time was taken from Victim #2’s patient care report and may not be accurate.
1703 Hours A7126 arrived at local hospital with Victim #2.
Fire Behavior
The room and contents fire was determined to have originated in a bedroom on the 2nd floor, A/B corner; it was quickly knocked down by E3 (see Photo 2). It is believed that the fire got into the eves when it was lapping out the A/B corner windows, and then spread within the large void spaces in the ceiling and walls of the 3rd floor. The fire was situated toward the A/B corner of the 3rd floor, but the open void areas allowed smoke to accumulate within the ceilings and walls before they were opened.
Operating on the 3rd floor at varying times were members from L5, R5, L11, E4, and E7. Initially, light-to-moderate smoke conditions were observed on the 3rd floor, depending on how close fire fighters were to the A-side of the 3rd floor. Fire fighters recalled the 3rd floor being very hot. TICs used by different individuals on the 3rd floor showed the room to be hot on the A-side and ceiling. Windows on the A-, B-, and D-sides were opened, allowing most of the smoke to self ventilate. Light smoke remained within the 3rd floor, with good visibility.
Extension was checked around A- and B-side baseboards. Some fire fighters recall Victim #1 telling them the fire was in the ceiling and possibly the walls, and to not open those areas until a hoseline was in place. Even after providing horizontal ventilation on the 3rd floor, smoke conditions worsened, banking down to fire fighters‘ chin levels and becoming denser.
While waiting for the hoseline, L5 members were reassigned by the IC to ventilate the roof to provide additional relief to the 3rd floor. The IC reported to NIOSH investigators that he ordered the roof vented because he saw smoke pushing out the B-side windows. Personnel from E4 advanced the charged hoseline to the 3rd floor, allowing the ceilings and walls to be opened. A mixture of thick, brown/black smoke quickly filled the room, reducing visibility.
Initial conditions observed when the BC arrived on scene at approximately 1551 hours. Note: Fire was under control on the 2nd floor and fire fighters were checking for extension. White-to-gray smoke can be seen flowing in the direction of right to left from the gables. The A-side window on the 3rd floor had been opened for ventilation (unsure at what stage of the fire or by whom).
Structure
Built in the early 1900s, the two-and-half-story house (see Photo 1) was purchased approximately 4 years prior to the incident as a multifamily rental occupancy. One family lived in the 1st floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.); a second family lived in the 2nd floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.) and the owner occupied the finished half-story or attic space (approx. 700 sq. ft.). The house also contained an unfinished basement (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.).
The common front entrance contained access to the 1st floor apartment and a private stairwell, located at the A/D corner of the house, which provided access to the 2nd floor apartment. The house also had a single rear-entry door that provided access to a stairwell that led up to the owner‘s apartment and had landings to access all the apartments from the rear. According to the owner of the house, smoke detectors were installed within the house about a year prior to the incident. These smoke detectors were installed in every bedroom, in each hallway, and in the stairwells.
The house did not have an installed sprinkler system and had been inspected in accordance with Department of Housing and Urban Development Section 8a guidelines, according to the homeowner. The house was Type V wood frame construction, but, during the initial stages of the fire, was presumed by arriving fire fighters to be balloon-framed due to the era when it was constructed. State fire investigators were able to confirm Type V construction after closer inspection.
The Office of the State Fire Marshal‘s building code compliance inspection showed that the house did not meet certain Connecticut Fire Safety Code requirements for this type of structure. NIOSH investigators do not believe that these non-compliance issues contributed to the deaths of the two fire fighters.
Published reports are being stating that the least senior of three construction officials in the Deutsche Bank manslaughter trial was acquitted of all charges today — after telling jurors that he had no idea the giant pipe he helped remove from the basement had anything to do with providing water to firefighters.
A construction foreman charged with the deaths of two firefighters in the Deutsche Bank building blaze was acquitted of all charges. Salvatore DePaola was cleared by a Manhattan jury of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide on the eighth day of deliberations.
According to reports published in a number of NYC newspapers; “It’s a happy day and a sad day,” said DePaola. “We’ve still got two firefighters that are deceased.” Firefighters Robert Beddia, 33, and Joe Graffagnino, 53 perished after they raced into the burning Ground Zero tower in 2007.
Prosecutors argued that DePaola, who works for the John Galt Corporation, and two of his colleagues should have known a key firefighting pipe had been cut. Salvatore DePaola, 56, of Staten Island, broke into tears as he was found not guilty of manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges in the August, 2007, smoke inhalation deaths of firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino.
“I had no idea it was a standpipe,” DePaola insisted of the primary physical evidence in the case — a 42-foot section of pipe that all three defendants were accused of intentionally disregarding and discarding after it crashed to the ground from the basement ceiling nine months before the fire.
The jury is still deliberating in the case of DePaola’s colleague, site safety manager Jeffrey Melofchik.
AP Photo Deutsche Bank office building Fire in New York
Jurors have yet to reach a verdict on identical manslaughter and endangerment charges against their remaining defendant, Jeffrey Melofchik, 48, who worked as site safety manager for the demolition’s general contractor, Bovis Lend Lease. They will continue their deliberations tomorrow.
A third defendant, project asbestos abatement director, Mitchel Alvo, 58, has opted for a non-jury verdict; Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Rena Uviller has not said when she will render that decision.
As to who he thought should have been prosecuted in the defendants’ stead, De Paola — whose own son is a firefighter at Engine 160 in Staten Island — made a reference to “lieutenants” with the FDNY before his lawyer advised him to remain silent on that issue, given that deliberations are continuing.
Today was the seventh full day of deliberations in the three-month-long trial.
An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of the PPT programon Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites
Preparing for the Mayday Event; Not a matter of IF, But a Question of When… Are you ready? Are you Prepared?
As the official Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011 begins to wind down, in many stations around the country this weekend is dedicated to training, drills and evolutions dedicated toward the many facets and functional elements that focus upon Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.
The Safety Planning and Resource Aid and Guide published by the IAFC and IAFF (HERE) and the direct link here 2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries provided resources and planning templates and suggested training and activities to support the focus and emphasis on fire ground survival, increased focus on firefighter operations and mayday elements crucial to company integrity, firefighter safety and operational excellence.
Being ready for a mayday (mentally and physically), self-rescue and self-survival training and methodologies are mission critical when engaging in structural firefighting operations. Proficiencies, capabilities, rigor, demeanor and performance must be orchestrated in a manner that requires optimum execution of required actions and engagements to enable a successful outcome to a reported single or multiple mayday calls.
On a crisp fall day in October, 2009 two fires, both in residential occupancies but over 350 miles apart had similar operational needs, deployment and fire suppression and rescue engagement consistent with modern firefighting practices, methodologies and expectations.
In one, three firefighters become trapped, resulting in a mayday, bailout and resulting LODD of a 16 year fire service veteran. City of Yonkers (NY) Firefighter Patrick Joyce died during the operations at a 3-Alarm fire in a three story residential occupancy while conducting search and rescue operations for reported trapped civilians. Incident overviews; HERE and HERE .
The other structure fire in a residential occupancy in Syracuse, NY, results in a fire fighter mayday and successful RIT extraction that is captured on video. Two structure fires with common elements, each with projected predictable outcomes based upon past fire department operational experiences at similar structures, occupancies and fire conditions and reports; however with two different outcomes.
The program information from The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)which forms a major component of thsis year’s Safety Weeks activities with the focus on comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention programming incorporating incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, with the FGS program objectives aimed to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
Here’s a recap of the Self-Survial Procedure insights from the FGS Chapter 3 Section;
Self-Survival Procedures
FGS Online Program Chapter 3
To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:
First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall.
The following video clip depicting FDNY Rescue Co. 1 operations at a Mayday, and provides some insightful and subtle commentary that should put some things in proper perspective about the job its hazards and the unexpected that can occur in the blink of an eye.
Another exceptional training piece that we are providing again here on CommandSafety.com are the two part video clips provided by TheBravestOnline.com that covers the mayday distress cakk an subsequent RIT extraction of HFD Captain Joel Eric Abbt at a four alarm fire with civilian fatalities in a six story high rise office building on March 28, 2007.
This video along with the information obtained from the FGS program can provide substantial opportunites for training, discussions and dialog. Take the time to watch the HFD vdeo and the elapsed time, communications and actions deployed. This mayday event had a successful outcome due to a variety of factors.
The question is how prepared are you, your firefighters, the officers and commanders? Surviving the fire ground requires a wide variety of skills, knowledge , training and experience.
Training is the foundation from which proficiencies are developed. If your organization has invested in supporting this weeks activities, don’t stop here. There are additional day ahead to take teh momentum gathered from this week and use it to chart a new course of actions and committments for the weeks and months ahead. If you didn’t have the opportunity to engage or involve, its not a missed opportuity- just find the right time and place to have your own safety day of week.
Houston FD Mayday Part 1
Houston FD Mayday Part 2
Other Training and Drill Opportunties
Suggested Considerations include the follow, as well as encouraging Departments to identify and integrate local issues, needs and identified gaps or enhancements that can contribute towards operational excellence and safety integration
Review and Select a Near Miss Event Report from the National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System or the Report of the Week (ROTW) series related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
Review and Select a NIOSH LODD Report from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/
Take out your Rapid Intervention Equipment and review the purpose and function of each piece of equipment. Identify and discuss alternative uses or tools that can be obtained or used in the event of unavailability, malfunction or additional resource needs. Discuss protocols, procedures, safety awareness and operational hazards, expectations and precautions. Inspection the equipment for operability and integrity.
Identify and select a recent departmental or local/regional incident event that was either a near-miss/close-call or transitioned into a mayday event. Discuss and facilitate dialog on lessons learned, gaps, enhancements or operational successes, achievements and positive elements. Identify any factors or elements that were presented in the FGS training series that are applicable to the event, strategies, tactics or operations: can anything be improved or enhanced?
Lead a discussion on how to call and initiate a Mayday. Discuss the factors and insights from FGS Program Chapter 3 Self-Survival Procedures and Chapter 4 Self-Survival Skills.
Select and lead a discussion on a pertinent incident case study from either the list provided or your own selection and discuss the relevancy of the event in terms of mayday operations, fire ground survival, incident outcome and relationship to your Department or agency. What is the relevancy, similarities or differences? Can this event or circumstances occur in your jurisdiction? What can be done to prevent a history repeating event (HRE)?
Review and discuss Roles and Responsibilities for mayday events and operations. How do they match up with your operating procedures, policies and expectations?
Develop and facilitate a table top exercise (TTE) on a mayday event scenario utilizing a building in your first-due or response jurisdiction. Take photographs and integrate into your program. Refer to example of a simple TTE attached or go to Fire Fighternation.com for an example here; http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an
Visit a residential or commercial construction site (with pre-arrival authorization and approvals) and tour the stage of construction, looking critically at the type of construction and structural systems being implemented, materials used, workmanship and signs of deficient or adverse conditions that may affect operational integrity, safety or collapse and compromise once the building is occupied. Discuss issues such as structural integrity, collapse risk, occupancy risk versus occupancy type considerations, avenues for fire travel, effects on fire load package and rate of heat release and projected fire intensity. How would you fire a fire in the occupancy? What will define the strategy and tactics that would be or should be selected and used?
In a controlled setting with or without PPE, Practice calling a mayday with the identified communication attributes defined in the FGS training program. Critique and practice the evolution until the group feels that it is acceptable.
Here are some additional Resource Links to Support your training and drill needs;
Selected References
IAFC: The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety, HERE and HERE
NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE
Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors
Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
Report HERE
NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience
The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE
NIOSH LODD REPORT: Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire – Virginia, HERE
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
Analytical Study Reveals Patterns in U.S Firefighter Fatalities Report
The entire report is available at a nominal fee, HERE;
Journal Reference:
For a detailed summary of the Sofa Super Store study, its findings and recommendations, and links to supporting materials such as graphics and video segments from computer simulations of the fire, go to “NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements” at www.nist.gov/el/fire_research/charleston_102810.cfm.
Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith, David M. DeJoy. Line-of-duty deaths among U.S. firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2011; 43 (3): 1171 DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2010.12.030
University of Georgia (2011, April 14). Comprehensive study reveals patterns in firefighter fatalities. ScienceDaily. Retrieved April 16, 2011, from http://www.sciencedaily.com /releases/2011/04/110412171208.htm
Other Report Links of Interest
Reducing Firefighter Deaths and Injuries: Changes in Concept, Policy, and Practice Contributing Factors in Firefighter Line-of-Duty Deaths in the United States. HERE
This Training Schedule Template utilizes a Three Hour, Thirty minute (3.5) Hour Format integrating Suggested basic Functional Area Topics as a lead-in introduction that can be interchanged based on local needs and incorporates two (2) primary modules of the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS). Please note you can select any modules determined to be of local need or interests. An optional Weekend Session is attached for FGS Chapter 3 and 4 Module Deliveries and a Hands-on Field Exercise Component.
For those of you that follow or have attended one of my many seminar and lecture program offerings, one program seems very pertinent in both context and content on this, the Sixth Day of Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011 that resonates around the theme and focus of Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.
“From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack-Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety”; in most cases, any discussion of these four landmark incidents in the fire service leads directly to a rich discussion and dialog on a myriad of facets, aspects and issues characteristic of the incidents; the time, the place, the circumstances, the names and faces, the deployment, the operations, the challenges and the tragic outcomes.
The legacies of these iconic events as well as so many others of national prominence and impact; and others with lesser national significance, but having far reaching implications, impacts and power on the regional and local levels continue to shine in the remembrance, honor and memory of those impacted by those events and incidents.
I still find it astonishing during my lecture travels around the country lecturing and presenting these programs on building construction and fireground operations, that when those in attendance were posed with a simple question; “What do the Walbaum’s Fire and Hackensack fire share in common?”, the response at times was less than stellar, or at best difficult to solicit let alone convey the commonalities.
The more seasoned and experienced veterans (translation; older firefighters) when present, were able to convey some information on the subject – Some, with a firm and reflected understanding of the question and its ramifications, others not so much. But yet, the true essence of the basic incident particulars and the lessons learned in most cases failed to be fully conveyed. It’s sad to state but; we are not remembering the past!
History Repeating Events-Integrate into your Training
Are the fire service legacies of the past and the lessons learned from those incidents and the sacrifices that were made transcending time? Or are they lost in the immediacy of day to day challenges, issues and operations.
Or are these events, lessons and operations issues dismissed and disregarded as a result of their “time and place” not being relevant to “today’s” operations and modern fire service advancements or lack the relevancy to local organizations, operations, make-up and risks. Is it just a “Big City” issue or is it a failure to comprehend the commonality of the event parameters and distill those lessons learned and operations into the essence that is formulative of all of our organizations and operations?
Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness, has a multitude of facets, features and functional elements. I spoke of some of these commonalities in a previous post this week on Day Two (HERE).
I’ve spoken on numerous occasions about History Repeating Events (HRE), and the common themes related to fire fighter line-of-duty deaths, close-calls, near-misses, maydays and incident operations that had less than desirable outcomes or performance.
These History Repeating Events and incidents on a wide variation of scale, outcome and operations have common issues, apparent and contributing causes and operational factors that share legacy issues that the fire service at times fails to identify, relate to and implement. In other words, (we) fail a times to learn from the past or we make a deliberate choice to ignore those lessons and the apparent similarities and prevailing fireground indicators due to other internal or external influences, pressures, authority, beliefs, values or viewpoints.
What are we Learning? What are we Applying?
We make choices and we determine our direction, path and destiny. Officers, Commanders, Companies fail to connect with situational factors, parallels and signs that have the full potential to direct the incident towards favorable or disastrous conclusions. The Job isn’t as fatalistic as we sometimes make it out to be.
The prevailing topical areas being addressed this year during Safety week have focused on the mayday component of an incident operation and have included:
Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.
There’s ample opportunity this week or in the weeks ahead to do some insightful research or cull some information on the four legacy events we discussed earlier;
Hackensack (NJ) Auto Dealership Fire (1988) HERE and HERE
Worcester (MA) Cold Storage Fire (1999) HERE and HERE
Charleston (SC) Sofa Super Store (2007) HERE and HERE
These have tremendous Legacies for Operational Safety, lessons and a wealth of applications for Safety Week and for training, dialog, discussions, tabletops, skillsets and drill activities throughout the entire year.
Integrate the lessons from these as well as other legacies and HRE into your Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness; training and deliveries. The reality is, we, the present generation of veteran firefighters and officers have the profound obligation and responsibility to recognize the importance of passing along the lessons of the past as well as integrating and playing forward the lessons of our life’s journey throughout our fire service careers; the events of our day and the profound tough lessons and sacrifices learned the hard way. Understand and embrace the shared responsibilities, accountability and requirements that contribute towards Surviving the Fire Ground.
We sometimes need a receptive, sympathetic and compassionate audience that is willing to listen, hear and comprehend the messages conveyed. There needs to be a high degree of empathy related to these past History Repeating Events, the legacies of national, regional and local level prominence. For each event, each and every line of duty death, close-call, near-miss and mayday event has a message and a Legacy of Operational Safety.
Make the time to research, learn and understand the factors of these events, the lessons and opportunities that are borne from each and how they relate to the theme, message and initiatives that make up Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week and beyond.
Do you know what's underneath you as you're making entry?
During the last quarter of 2010 and leading well into the second quarter of 2011 there has been a significant emerging trend developing in basement fires, compromised floor systems and assemblies leading to collapse and numerous near-miss events, close calls and unfortunatly, line of duty deaths during fire operations.
If you’ve been paying attention to the various news and on the job reports these past number of months, you may have noticed the increasing numbers of emerging trend evident in near miss, close-calls resulting in maydays, RIT deployments and self-rescue resulting from floor compromise and floor collapse. The double line of duty deaths of two San Francisco (CA) Fire fighers while operating in a Terraced (Hillside construction) residential occupancy while operating below the base level diaphragm (upper street level access). (HERE)
In December 2010, I was doing some research and posting links related to the first one or two events on Buildingsonfire on Facebook, HERE, it became evident at the time that there was an immediate opportunity to get some learning’s and insights out. If you have a chance head over to Facebook and link into Buildingsonfire and check out the incident links posted as well as some immediate report links. (Demember 2010 time frame)
In a coincidential posting on July 28, 2010, I posted on CommandSafety.com an interesting incident that I came across while preparing for a new post related to a near-miss event that occured in which a Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel after calling a mayday.
This event has all the ingrediants the the 2011 Safety Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground and managing the Mayday. Little did I know that later, in February 2011, while participating in the National FireFighter Near-Miss Reporting System Stakeholders meeting in California, would I have the chance to hear Captain Long’s story first hand, and then also have the opportunity to have him as a guest, sharing his story live on the Taking it to the Streets Radio program in February. (HERE)
Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long’s near-miss and story of survival resonates with this year’s theme of Surviving the Fire Ground- Firefighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness and Managing the Mayday and provides an opportunity to focus on the event in this, Day Five of the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Surival Week activities. The details of Captain Long’s story can be found on the National FireFighter Near Miss Reporting System web site (HERE) as well as in the June 2011 issue of Fire Engineering Magazine titled, Floor Collapse: A Survivors Story. Let me state upfront also the Captain Michael Long will be presenting the accounts of his near miss event and the lessons-learned at IAFC Fire-Rescue International Conference in Atlanta in August (HERE).
On July 25, 2010, Captain Michael Long of the Camp Taylor (Ky.) Fire Protection District fell through the floor of a house during a four-alarm fire and suffered severe burn injuries. On Aug. 30, 2010, Capt. Long submitted a near-miss report based on this event. The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is an anonymous and confidential reporting system; however, Capt. Long wanted to have his name associated with this report so that others would understand the value of sharing near-miss events. What follows is an excerpt from his report and excerpts from a recent phone interview. To read his full report, including an extensive lessons learned section, search by report number for report #10-1072 on the Search Reports page of www.firefighternearmiss.com.
Near Miss Report Event #2010-1072
“I made sure my crew was ready to enter, sounded the floor for stability and then crossedover the threshold, entering the structure. When I was approximately 5 feet inside the structure, I felt the floor start to give way. I turned toward the front door to try to bail out, and at the same time yelled at others to get out, when the floor system collapsed. This was no ordinary collapse. More than two-thirds of the first floor collapsed simultaneously. The living room, dining room, kitchen, bathroom and foyer all fell at once. “When the collapse happened, I was the only one who fell into the basement, right into the heart of the fire. All I could see around me were flames.
I could not see the hole that I had fallen through. I could not see my fellow firefighters above me. All I could see was fire. I began to try to find something to use to climb back up with. Since I did not know what type of collapse had occurred, I just started clawing away at anything as I was trying to climb. During this time, my legs were burning.
Fire was burning up between my boots and my bunker pants. The pain was intense. My deputy chief was trying to put a line on me for protection, but the fire was extremely intense. He was lying on the porch with fire shooting out over his head. He stated he could occasionally see the top of my helmet and the reflective stripes on my coat sleeves.
By a bit of luck, a roof ladder was laying in the front yard that had just been taken off the roof after the completion of a ventilation operation.
My deputy chief directed the crew to put the ladder into the hole for my escape. “By this time, I was burned on my legs and struggling with exhaustion and the intense heat. I was screaming both from pain and due to fear. I could hear screaming coming from above, butwas unable to make out the majority of it. I finally heard the word “ladder” and then felt something across my back. Once they got the ladder into the basement, I had to get around to it. I still could not see anything but fire, so this was all by feel. As I started up the ladder, I got two rungs up, reached for the third rung, and lost my grip and fell back into the basement landing on my back. I was so exhausted that I started making my peace with God that this was where I was going to die.
For the full excerpt from Captain Long’s near miss report go to the NFF Near Miss Reporting Site and Resource Link, HERE
Captain Long
Incident Lessons Learned from Captain Long:
Train as if it is real. Train, train, train, and then train some more. Take advantage of every opportunity to train. The better we are trained, the less our chance of injury. The training must be physically and mentally. Crews must focus on more hands-on scenario-based training that allows for problem solving. If crews are taught that the outcome to every scenario is static, they are not being encouraged to think. Every run is different; no single solution applies to every situation. Adaptations or decisions that are not in step with changing conditions can actually be disadvantageous. We must make the right decisions based on the correct interpretation of the environment and blend those observations with our knowledge, skills, and abilities to map a course of action that will lead us to a successful outcome. Read reality and come up with the best possible plan. In my situation, quick thinking and adapting to the problem that presented itself saved my life.
Mutual-aid training is a must. We must train more with our neighboring departments to improve operations. It is occasionally difficult to work in situations where you do not really know with whom you will be working or where the command structure and tactics differ from those of your department. We all learn from the same book; however, the interpretations and tactics differ from person to person and department to department. I am not saying anyone is right or wrong in the way they do things—we all just need to do a better job of understanding that there is more than one way to get the job done.
We cannot know exactly how everyone on an emergency scene will perform because each person has a different interpretation of his surroundings and role in the system. Standard operating guidelines (SOGs) can assist in this area, but SOGs rely on perceptions and interpretations by individuals to be implemented as intended. Accidents often happen because everyone has a unique perspective on the environment, and each makes different decisions based on their perception.
We must perceive the environment correctly to ensure we make the right move. If these actions are not communicated and coordinated in the intricate system that is the fireground, accidents will be the inevitable and regrettable results. Training and frequent reviewing of SOGs are vital to our safety.
Risk assessment. Sounding the floor prior to entry is not always a good indicator of the floor’s stability. Less than two minutes before I made entry, there were three other firefighters, at least the same weight as I, in the same area where the collapse occurred. Everything changed in a very short time. There was no warning. Adkins told me at the hospital that all he heard was a “whoosh” sound when the floor collapsed. Then I disappeared. Within two minutes, the floor assembly went from being able to sustain a live load of at least 900 pounds in that area (accounting for gear, equipment, SCBA, and so on) to collapsing with about a 300-pound load, and I was close to a load-bearing wall. A good way to evaluate risk vs. gain is to get the most accurate report on burn time as possible to help determine structural integrity.
Rapid intervention. RIT is a critical fireground benchmark and is very important for safety, but it would have been ineffective in this situation. Had my crew not reacted the way they did immediately, I would not have been able to last long enough to wait for the RIT. In the time it would have taken for the RIT to gear up, come up with a plan, and enter, I would have died. The stars aligned in my favor that night. The person calling the Mayday or a nearby crew often mitigates personnel emergencies. My crew was able to act decisively at the correct time, and I am alive because of it. It is important to remember that a large percentage of Maydays are mitigated by the crew to which the lost firefighter is assigned or a nearby crew. RIT deployments account for a small number of rescues; we must always be alert and ready for the “incident within the incident.”
Manage your emotional response. From a personal standpoint, you must rely on your training and try not to panic. Know your equipment and procedures well. I did panic, but I was still able to keep myself together enough to know not to leave the area since I had been told that the stairs had burned away. Keeping my SCBA on, resisting the emotional reaction to remove my mask because of claustrophobia, was a huge factor in my survival. If I had tried to find another way out, my crew could not have gotten to me with the ladder. Had I removed my mask, the story would have ended quite differently. When I teach, I try to train as if it is the real thing. Never take a run for granted. Always expect the worst; you will be better prepared to deal with the unexpected.
If we continually study accident reports and learn from them, the likelihood of being surprised will be diminished. Peter Leschak writes in Ghosts of the Fireground: ”In fire and other emergency operations, you must not only tolerate uncertainty; you must savor it, or you won’t last long. The most efficient preparation is a general mental, physical, and professional readiness nurtured over years of training and experience. You live to live. Preparing is itself an activity, and action is preparation.”
Talk about it. Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) is important for ensuring that personnel from all departments on scene are taken care of emotionally. CISD needs to extend beyond just one or two briefings. Personnel involved in a highly emotional event must be given the opportunity to speak to a trained CISD team member early and be given as much time as is needed to work through their issue. Some firefighters have a macho attitude and try to deal with their emotions on their own, or maybe they don’t deal with them at all. Others self-medicate with alcohol or, worse, these difficult emotional events are allowed to fester with no relief. People should be accepting of those who deal with issues up front and tell their stories. Telling these stories makes us better and helps to keep us safe. This reduces the possibility of “snapping” because you have too much pent-up emotion.
My fellow firefighters are still affected by this event, even those who were not there. Department personnel must be open-minded and receptive to the fact that emotional events will affect your performance and your personal life and that it is acceptable to be open and deal with them. When difficult emotional situations present themselves, members should attempt to deal with them as soon as possible.
Know what is possible and what is not. Know the experience level of your crew. Going into a bad situation with a crew that may not have exposure to a lot of different situations or that you aren’t that familiar with could make operations more difficult. I had everything from a 30-year veteran to a one-year recruit, so the experience level was all across the board. I knew that the situation we were going into was getting worse and required quick action, so I took the lead to ensure that the operation would be completed as quickly as possible. I knew my deputy chief would be watching us to ensure things were proceeding safely. I knew my crew could get the job done; however, this was an operation that is not often practiced and I wanted to make sure it was done correctly. I will not send my crew into an area that I am not comfortable going into. The more you train and the more people you can train with, the better you will understand your capabilities.
Listen or download the special interview I had with Captain Mike Long as well as
Taking it to the Streets Radio Program and Interview with Capt. Long
The line-up of Program guests included, Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret), Captain CJ Haberkorn Denver (CO) Fire Department and Special Guest Captain Michael Long, Camp Taylor (KY) Fire Protection District.
Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the National Near-Miss Reporting System and the untapped resources that the program and system provides with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire service leaders. The second part of the program will dedicated to the personal account of Captain Long’s Close Call event from July 25, 2010 (NMR #10-1072) when a catastrophic floor collapse at a residential occupancy plunged him into a fire involved basement.
Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.
Taking it to the StreetsTM, is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production, in affiliation with the Command Institute
A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
In the meantime here are some links I pulled together that you should take the time to read and share with your companies, personnel and staff…..
This seems like a good time to have a ten minute drill on these events as Operating Experience (OE) on floor systems and operational safety, calling or commanding the mayday.
Or take some time to visit the The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)site which has the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens. (Day One: Are you ready, HERE)
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
Self-Survival Procedures
FGS Online Program Chapter 3
To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:
First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall.
Fires inside an enclosed structure create a mess for fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters often encounter debris that has fallen off shelves, and ceiling and wall fixtures that have burned and are left hanging to the floor. These hazards, coupled with the mess a fire fighter creates when searching for victims in smoky environments, can create egress problems for a fire fighter.
As fire burns draperies, blinds, lighting fixtures, computer wiring, and HVAC ducting, the possibility of encountering an entanglement hazard increases. The overhead ducting of the HVAC system contains wires that give the ducting its stability.
If a fire breaches the ceiling and burns the ducting, the wires within the ducting fall to the floor. These wires can cause a dangerous entanglement hazard to fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters must anticipate these hazards and have a plan to follow when egress is cut off.
FGS Online Program Chapter 5
A discussion of what command must communicate to the distressed fire fighter, dispatch, the RIT group supervisor and all others assigned to the incident to assure a successful rescue.
Here are Some Mission Critical Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE) to support Your Training and Operational Needs not only this week, but through the entire year.
Here are some Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) for Operations at Basement Fires that will support fireground operational safety:
Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner.
Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum. On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com. A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production. Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program
No commentsVideo Clip recorded live by Fire Department Network News TV (FDNNTV) at the 50th IAFF Fire Fighter Convention in San Diego, CA on August 23, 2010.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, also known as NIOSH, is a federal agency that is part of the Centers for Disease Control. NIOSH has a mission of generating new knowledge in the occupational safety and health field and to transfer that knowledge into practice for the advancement of workers, including firefighters and emergency responders.
In 1998, the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) requested that Congress fund NIOSH to start a firefighter safety initiative called the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. “We investigate fatalities to learn from the mistakes the others made and to try to prevent future fatalities and injuries from occurring in similar events,” stated Project Officer Tim Merinar with the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. According to NIOSH, the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program has made over 1,000 recommendations arising from over 300 investigations since its inception in 1998.
Merinar claimed that some do not fully understand who NIOSH is and what their goals are, often being confused with OSHA. However, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is not an enforcement agency, they are a research and education agency. Merinar added, “We’re not looking to find fault or place blame on the fire departments or the individual firefighters in the incidents.”
As soon as possible after an incident, a NIOSH investigator will meet with the fire department. “Oftentimes, we have to explain who we are, why we’re there, what we’re trying to accomplish,” added Merinar. NIOSH investigates as many firefighter fatalities as possible involving structure fires, deaths from cardiovascular disease, as well as deaths during non-fireground incidents.
NIOSH offers many different publications to firefighters, including their newest one about risk management at structure fires. This literature is distributed to the fire service free of charge. Another publication offered to firefighters deals with floor joists and the risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. “They work very well for the construction industry, but when they’re exposed to fire they also fail very rapidly. Which leads to early building collapses,” explained Merinar. “Many firefighters have been injured and killed in these collapses.”
NIOSH FFFIPP
Trends such as this uncovered during their investigations and spread to the fire service, could help prevent future deaths. Another trend found several years ago by NIOSH involved PASS devices not sounding on firefighters who died. According to Merinar, NIOSH worked with the National Fire Protection Association to have the standard changed to make the PASS devices more reliable and more effective for firefighters. Currently, they are working with the NFPA on the thermal degradation characteristics of face piece lenses.
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program
For more information on the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, incident reports or fire fighter publications, visit www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/.
Topic Index:
Stakeholder Comment on the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP)-2011
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is seeking stakeholder input on the progress and future directions of the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP). Since its initiation in 1998, NIOSH has sought public input to help plan and direct the goals and objectives of the FFFIPP. NIOSH received public comments on the FFFIPP in 1998, March 2006, and November 2008. NIOSH is again seeking input on the progress and future directions of the FFFIPP to ensure that the program is meeting the needs and expectations of the U.S. fire service and to identify ways in which the program can improve its impact on the safety and health of fire fighters across the United States. NIOSH will compile and consider all comments received and use them in making decisions on how to proceed with the FFFIPP.
There are several resources that may be useful to individuals and groups who would like to comment on the FFFIPP:
Related Dockets
NIOSH Docket number 063NIOSH Docket number 063-A
——————————————————————————–
Public Comment Period
Written comments on the document will be accepted through July 29, 2011 in accordance with the instructions below. All material submitted to NIOSH should reference Docket Number NIOSH-063-B. All electronic comments should be formatted as Microsoft Word documents and make reference to docket number NIOSH-063-B.
Comments will be accepted until 5:00 p.m. EDT on July 29, 2011
To submit comments, please use one of these options:
NIOSH Mailstop: C-34
Robert A. Taft Lab.
4676 Columbia Parkway
Cincinnati, Ohio 45226
All information received in response to this notice will be available for public examination and copying at the …
NIOSH Docket Office
4676 Columbia Parkway, Room 111
Cincinnati, Ohio 45226.
A complete electronic docket containing all comments submitted will be available on the NIOSH docket home page, and comments will be available in writing by request. NIOSH includes all comments received without change in the docket, including any personal information provided.
Contact persons for technical information
Chief, Fatality Investigations Team
NIOSH/CDC
1095 Willowdale Road
Mailstop H-1808
Morgantown, WV 26505
304/285-6016
Recent NIOSH Fire Fighter Safety Publications
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Operating Modified Excess/Surplus Vehicles
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2011-125
Fire fighters may be at risk for crash-related injuries while operating excess and other surplus vehicles that have been modified for fire service use. Fire departments with limited resources often craft fire apparatus out of excess/surplus military and other vehicles as an affordable alternative to purchasing new or used apparatus. NIOSH urges fire departments to take precautions and actions to minimize the hazards and risks to fire fighters when using modified excess/surplus vehicles.
Evaluation of Chemical and Particle Exposures During Vehicle Fire Suppression Training (2010)
(56 pages, 4.85 MB)
Health Hazard Evaluation Report, HETA 2008-0241-3113
In September 2008 and July 2009, NIOSH researchers collected area and personal breathing zone air samples during a Health Hazard Evaluation (HHE) to evaluate firefighters’ exposures to airborne chemicals during vehicle fire suppression training. Several hazardous chemicals were found on the area samples, including respiratory toxicants and potential carcinogens. Of the chemicals measured in the personal breathing zones, levels of formaldehyde, carbon monoxide, and isocyanates were near or above short term exposure limits or ceiling limits. In addition, the number of particles and mass of the particles in the air increased during knockdown and remained elevated throughout the fire overhaul. Based on this evaluation, the levels of gases and particles released during vehicle fires have the potential to cause acute health effects to firefighters who do not wear self-contained breathing apparatus.
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2010-153
Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures. These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
Preventing Exposures to Bloodborne Pathogens among Paramedics
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2010-139
Patient care puts paramedics at risk of exposure to blood. These exposures carry the risk of infection from bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes AIDS. A national survey of 2,664 paramedics contributed new information about their risk of exposure to blood and identified opportunities to control exposures and prevent infections.
Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2009-114
Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors.
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program: Leading Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998–2005
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2009-100
This document is a synthesis of the 1,286 individual recommendations from the 335 FFFIPP investigations conducted from 1998 to 2005.
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Evaluation
NIOSH report of findings from its national survey of U.S. fire departments.
Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities Due to Heart Attacks and Other Sudden Cardiovascular Events
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2007-133
Fire fighters are at risk of dying on the job from preventable cardiovascular conditions.
FDA AND NIOSH Public Health Notification: Oxygen Regulator Fires Resulting from Incorrect Use of CGA 870 Seals
This document provides information on the danger of fires at the interface of oxygen regulators and cylinder valves because of incorrect use of CGA 870 seals, and identifies measures to prevent such fires.
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-132
Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
NIOSH Workplace Solutions—Preventing Deaths and Injuries to Fire Fighters During Live-Fire Training in Acquired Structures
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-102
Fire fighters are subjected to many hazards when participating in live-fire training. Training facilities with approved burn buildings should be used for live-fire training whenever possible. However, when acquired structures are used for live-fire training, NIOSH strongly recommends that fire departments follow the national consensus guidelines in NFPA 1403, standard on live-fire training evolutions [NFPA 2002a] to reduce the risk of injury and death. These guidelines are summarized in the recommendations in this document.
Radio Communication
The past few decades have seen major advancements in the communication industry. These advancements have improved radio frequency spectrum efficiency, but also have added complexity to the expansion of existing systems and the design of new systems. The U.S. Fire Administration in conjunction with the International Association of Fire Fighters has released the report Voice Radio Communications Guide for the Fire Service
3.85 MB (77 pages) This report is designed to help fire service leaders and members understand new communication and radio system issues in order to remain informed players in the process.
Current Status, Knowledge Gaps, and Research Needs Pertaining to Firefighter Radio Communication Systems
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) commissioned this study to identify and address specific deficiencies in firefighter radio communications and to identify technologies that may address these deficiencies. Specifically to be addressed were current and emerging technologies that improve, or hold promise to improve, firefighter radio communications and provide firefighter location in structures.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology, Building and Fire Research Laboratory publication “Testing of Portable Radios in a Fire Fighting Environment”
265 KB (24 pages)
focuses on the thermal environment that radios would be expected to withstand while being used in structural fire fighting operations. Current NFPA standards for radios are reviewed and recommendations for establishing performance standards are presented. The need for providing additional protection from the thermal environment is documented.