Ten Minutes in the Street: “Rubbish Fire- Fill the Box”

Ten Minutes in the Street with Christopher Naum

This special weekend edition of Ten Minutes in the Street ^TM is being offered on CommandSafety.com and is taking advantage of a training video produced by the LAFD in 2009 that involved a basis initial dispatch to a report of a rubbish fire that escalates into two structure fires and resulted in multiple alarm operations.

Take the opportunity to view the video clip and stop at various hold points to discuss and dialog operational considerations and issues affecting strategic command level management as well as tactical company level operational and safety issues.

Ten Minutes in the Street Weekend Edition

Consider operational factors that would affect your organization profile and resources. Take the time to entertain open dialog and discussions in a group setting. Deliberate and debate the operational issues, roles and responsibilities, safety considerations, as well as tactical deployment demands and incident priorities. 

This version of “On the Fireground” uses live fire footage and talking points to illustrate some lessons learned at a recent fire incident in South Los Angeles.

A Training Aide PDF File is provided to support your company level drill or group tabletop training, HERE  and Ten Minutes in the Street Volume 11 Number 09

Click here to view the embedded video.

• “On the Fireground”-61st Street Fire from Los Angeles Fire Department on Vimeo.
• LAFD Link HERE

Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

 With so many changes (budget cuts, staffing reductions, reduced training, etc.) in so many fire departments, it is critical for fire fighters to focus on their own survival on the fire ground. There is no other call more challenging to fire ground operations than a Mayday call the unthinkable moment when a fire fighter’s personal safety is in imminent danger. Fire fighter fatality data compiled by the United States Fire Administration have shown that fire fighters becoming trapped and disoriented represent the largest portion of structural fire ground fatalities. The incidents in which fire fighters have lost their lives, or lived to tell about it, have a consistent theme inadequate situational awareness put them at risk.

New Rules of Engagement

 Fire fighters don’t plan to be lost, disoriented, injured or trapped during a structure fire or emergency incident. But fires are unpredictable and volatile, and they will not always go according to plan. What a fire fighter knows about a fire before entering a blazing building may radically change within minutes once inside the structure. Smoke, low visibility, lack of oxygen, structural instability and an unpredictable fire ground can cause even the most seasoned fire fighter to be overwhelmed in an instant.

It's Not a Matter of IF, It's a Matter of When

It’s not a matter of IF the MAYDAY happens, it’s WHEN! Thius the reason for the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

Theme: Surviving the Fire Ground Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

• IAFC Safety Week Resources: Firefighter Survival, HERE
• National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System Resources, HERE

With that being said, there must be a means and a method to better defined and more accurately

• Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.
• Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
• There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
• Refer to: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety 
• When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future.
• Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.
• Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports.
• Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.
• If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures.
• This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations.
• You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious

Original IAFC 2001 ROE

• Combat Fire Suppression and Engagement has been dramatically influenced by numerous challenges in terms of effectiveness, methodologies, risk and operational capabilities….yet we implement strategic and tactical models and protocol predicated on past performance of building structures and occupancies and fire fighting successes….
•  It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations
• We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations.
• These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.
• 2009 was a significant and decisive year for the fire service in a number of ways….
• Controversy, debate, argument; enlightenment, knowledge, insights, awareness, comprehension, understanding….
• Which leads me to call this the emerging tactical renaissance….

The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries. As part of that effort the nearly 1,000 member Safety, Health and Survival Section of the IAFC has developed the NEW  “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground.

The intent was to provide a set of “model procedures” for Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting to be made available by the IAFC to fire departments as a guide for their own standard operating procedure development.

In August, 2008, following a year of discussion, the Section moved to develop a set of “Rules of Engagement for Structure Firefighting”.

A project team was created consisting of Section members and representatives of other several other interested fire service organizations.

These included the;

• Fire Department Safety Officer Association (FDSOA),
• the National Fallen Firefighter Foundation (NFFF),
• the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC), the
• National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and other organizations.
• All draft material has also been shared with representatives of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) who developed a joint IAFF/IAFC “Fire Ground Survival Project”.

 Three Section members also participated in the IAFF project.

The direction provided the project team by the Section leadership was to develop rules of engagement with the following conceptual points;

• Rules should be a short, specific set of bullets
• Rules should be easily taught and remembered
• Rules should define critical risk issues
• Rules should define “go” or “no‐go” situations
• A companion lesson plan/explanation section should be provided

Early in development the Rules of Engagement, it was recognized that two separate rules were needed –one set for the firefighter, and another set for the incident commander.

Thus, the two sets of Rules of Engagement were conceived and developed.

Each set has several commonly shared bullets and objectives, but the explanations are described somewhat differently based on the level of responsibility (firefighter vs. incident commander).

The 2010 Rules of Engagement reflects nearly two years of public comment and feedback from several presentations at fire service conferences, including the National Fallen Fire Fighters Safety Summit held at the National Fire Academy this past March 2010.

The “Rules” was formally adopted by the IAFC Health, Safety and Survival Section at the Fire Rescue International Conference that was held in Chicago this past August 2010

The project team was lead by Chief Gary Morris,

• Document is available:     http://www.iafcsafety.org/Rules_of_Engagement_v8_7.10.pdf
• Charts and write-up with links on the New  ROE on CommandSafety.com:  http://commandsafety.com/2010/09/rules-of-engagement-2010/

Document Description

Section One

• includes introduction statements and background regarding the Rules of Engagement project.

Section Two

• acknowledges the Project team members and others that assisted in the project.

 Section Three

• contains the individual “Bullets” for both the Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival as well as the Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety.

 Section Four

• describes the objectives attached to each of the individual “bullets” for both set of Rules.

 Section Five

• provides an introduction and overview of the lesson plans for the Rules of Engagement.

 Section Six

• includes the lesson plan for the Rules of Engagement of Firefighter Survival.

 Section Seven

• contains the lesson plans for the Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety.

 Section Eight

• serves as appendixes and contains full investigation reports of several significant firefighter fatality incidents.

 The Need for Rules of Engagement

• Firefighter safety must always be a priority for every fire chief and every member. Over the past three decades, the fire service has applied new technology, better protective clothing and equipment, implemented modern standard operating procedures, and improved training.
• According to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data during this same period the fire service has experienced a 58 percent reduction in firefighter line of duty deaths. But, the country has also seen a paralleling 54 percent drop in the number of structural fires over the same period – thus, reducing firefighter exposure to risk.
• With a continued annual average of more than 100 firefighter fatalities, the question remains; have we really made a difference with all these technology improvements? Or, is there more that we can do to improve the safety culture of the American fire service?
• The U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study, conducted by Captain Willie Mora, San Antonio, Texas, Fire Department, conducted a review of 444 firefighter fireground deaths occurring over a recent 16 year period (1990-2006).
  • The project broke out traumatic firefighter fatalities occurring in “open structures” and “enclosed structures”. Open structures was defined as smaller structures with an adequate number of windows and doors (within a short distance) to allow for prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation.
  • Enclosed structures were defined as large buildings with inadequate windows or doors to allow prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation. Research determined that 23 percent occurred when a fast and aggressive interior attack was made on an “opened structure”. When fast, aggressive interior attacks occurred in “enclosed structures” the fatality rate rose to 77 percent. Many occurred in “marginal” or rapidly changing conditions in which the firefighter should not have been in the building.
• The fireground creates a significant risk to firefighters and it is the responsibility of the incident commander and command organization officers to minimize firefighter exposure to unsafe conditions and stop unsafe practices.
• The fire service has always been a para-military organization when it comes to fireground operations. In most cases, the Incident Commander makes a decision, sends the order down to through supervisors to the company officer and crew.
• Fire crews generally view these orders as top down direction. There is often little two‐way discussion about options.
• Where this culture exists, crews have been trained to accept the order and do it – generally without question.
• While these orders may be viewed as valid when issued they may involve inadequate risk assessment.
• There has been little national development of basic “rules” that the incident command should use in defining risk assessment process and what is too high risk that may result in a “no-go” decision.
• Furthermore, for the individual firefighter who is exposed to the greatest risk, we have not defined “rules” for them to follow in assessing their individual risk and when and how to say “no” to unsafe conditions or practices. The “Rules of Engagement” changes that.
• The “Rules of Engagement” have been developed to assist both the incident command (as well as command team officers) in risk assessment and “Go” – “No-Go” decisions. Applying the rules will make the fireground safer for all and reduce injuries and fatalities.

The development of the rules integrated several nationally recognized programs and principles. They included risk assessment principles from NFPA Standards 1500 and 1561.

Also included where concepts and principles from Crew Resource Management (available from iafc.org) and data and lessons from the National Near-Miss Reporting System (firefighternearmiss.com).

The development process also included review of lessons learned from numerous firefighter fatality investigations conducted by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.

It’s incumbent that the fire chief and the Departments management team insure the safety of all firefighters working at structural fires.

• All command organization officers are responsible for their own safety and the safety of all personnel working with them.
• All officers and members are responsible are responsible for continually identifying and reporting unsafe conditions or practices.
• The Rules of Engagement allows both the firefighter and the incident commander to apply and process these principles.
• One principle applied in the Rules of Engagement is firefighters and the company officers are the members at most risk for injury or death.
• The Rules integrate the firefighter into the risk assessment decision making process.
• These members should be the ultimate decision maker as to whether it’s safe to proceed with assigned objectives.
• The “Rules” allow a process for that decision to be made while still maintain command unity and discipline.

Operational Excellence and the ROE

The NEW Rules of Engagement

It is well known that firefighting is hazardous with varying levels of risk to the firefighter.

However, firefighting is not a military campaign where lives are lost to establish a beach head.

No firefighter’s life is a building that eventually will be rebuilt. Keep all members safe so “Everyone Goes Home”!

Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival

• Size-Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.
• Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
• DO NOT Risk Your Life for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved.
• Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
• Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
• Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together
• Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions.
• Constantly Monitor Fireground Communications for Critical Radio Reports.
• You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
• You Are Required to Abandon Your Position and Retreat Before Deteriorating Conditions Can Harm You.
• Declare a May Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger. 

The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety

• Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Size‐Up of the Incident.
• Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
• Conduct an Initial Risk Assessment and Implement a SAFE ACTION PLAN.
• If You Do Not Have The Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
• DO NOT Risk Firefighter Lives for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
• Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
• Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
• Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Firefighters. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
• Maintain Frequent Two‐Way Communications and Keep Interior Crews Informed of Changing Conditions.
• Obtain Frequent Progress Reports and Revise the Action Plan.
• Ensure Accurate Accountability of All Firefighter Location and Status.
• If, After Completing the Primary Search, Little or No Progress Towards Fire Control Has Been Achieved -Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
• Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires
• Always Have Firefighter Rehab Services in Place at All Working Fires

ROE Fire Fighter

ROE Command

Other ROE Insights

Size-Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.

Objective:    To cause the company officer and firefighters to pause for a moment and look over their area of operation and evaluate their individual risk exposure and determine a safe approach to completing their assigned tactical objectives.

Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Situational Size Up of the Incident

Objective:    To cause the incident commander to obtain an early 360 degree survey and risk assessment of the fireground in order to determine the safest approach to tactical operations as part the risk assessment and action plan development and before firefighters are placed at substantial risk.

______________________________________________________________________________

Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.

Objective: To cause the company officer and firefighter to consider fire conditions in relation to possible occupant survival of a rescue event as part of their initial and ongoing individual risk assessment and action plan development.

Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.

Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together

Objective: To ensure that firefighters always enter a burning building as a team of two or more members and no firefighter is allowed to be alone at any time while entering, operating in or exiting a building. 

Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions

Objective: To cause all firefighters and company officers to maintain constant situational awareness their SCBA air supply and where they are in the building and all that is happening in their area of operations and elsewhere on the fireground that may affect their risk and safety.

______________________________________________________________________________

You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate, and Decide.

Objective: To prevent company officers and firefighters from engaging in unsafe practices or exposure to unsafe conditions that can harm them and allowing any member to raise an alert about a safety concern without penalty and mandating the supervisor address the question to ensure safe operations.

Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Them. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.

Objective: To prevent firefighters and supervisors from engaging in unsafe practices or exposure to unsafe conditions that will harm them and allowing any member to raise an alert about a safety concern without penalty and mandating the incident commander and command organization officers promptly address the question to insure safe operations. 

______________________________________________________________________________  

Declare a May-Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger

Objective: To ensure the firefighter is comfortable with, and there is no delay in, declaring a May Day when a firefighter is faced with a life threatening situation and the May Day is declared as soon as they THINK they are in trouble.

Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires.

Objective: To cause the incident commander to have a rapid intervention team in place ready to rescue firefighters at all working fires.

______________________________________________________________________________

Ensure Accurate Accountability of Every Firefighter Location and Status

Objective: To cause the incident commander, and command organization officers, to maintain a constant and accurate accountability of the location and status of all firefighters within a small geographic area of accuracy within the hazard zone and aware of who is presently in or out of the building.

If You Do Not Have the Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters, Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy

Objective: To prevent the commitment of firefighters to high risk tactical objectives that cannot be accomplished safely due to inadequate resources on the scene.

Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting (pdf)

Risk Management

General Order: Two-In, Two-Out Compliance, Rapid Intervention Team, and Firefighter Survival

Emergency Evacuation
This policy identifies a standard system for the emergency evacuation of personnel at an emergency incident or training exercise.

Fire and Rescue Departments of Northern Virginia – Rapid Intervention Team Command and Operational Procedures
A collaborative RIT manual developed by fire and rescue departments in Northern Virginia. Promotes interoperability between multiple fire agencies.

Lost or Trapped Firefighters
This policy identifies the required actions for the search and rescue of lost or trapped firefighter(s).

Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a Biological Threat
Local and world events have placed the nation s emergency service at the forefront of homeland defense. The service must be aware that terrorists, both foreign and domestic, are continually testing the homeland defense system.

Safety Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).

Safety Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)
This policy establishes the department s criteria and procedures for Rapid Intervention Teams.

Taking It To The Streets: My Closing Commentary and The Rules of Combat Fire Suppression  

The essence of fire service suppression operations is predicated upon the deployment and application of water as an extinguishing agent, in sufficient quantities, location and duration to extinguish a fire within an enclosed structural compartment. The universal engine company correlation of: “putting the wet stuff on the red stuff” is fundamental to structural fire suppression operations but is ambiguous at best in the context of today’s modern building construction, occupancies, structural systems and building features. 

We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine engine company operations in order to identify with the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.

Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived…..

However, we now have a new set of Rules for Engagement….

• The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
• Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival
• Tactical Renaissance ……….Tactical Patience

…….integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and Integrating the RULES OF ENGAGEMENT for Structural Firefighting much more.  

It’s really all about Fighting Fire with More Knowledge and smartly

Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

   

Taking it to the Streets^TM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

 

Taking it to the Streets “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement”

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This is the netcast which was offered live on September 22, 2010. Taking it to the Streets “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department, and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA join Chris Naum as they discuss the emerging Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations [...]

Taking it to the Streets^TM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the Streets^TM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

• Firefighternetcast.com HERE
• Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
• Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production

Remember: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

Fire Service Features of Buildings and Fire Protection Systems

Fire Service Features of Buildings and Fire Protection Systems is a very useful manual that was developed and published by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor for the purpose to increase the safety of building occupants and emergency responders by streamlining fire service interaction with building features and fire protection systems.

The information in this manual will assist designers of buildings and fire protection systems to better understand the needs of the fire service when they are called upon to operate in or near the built environment and provide fire service personnel with a greater degree of understanding  and be able to interface with governmental and design professionals for improved fire protection features and arrangements.

To put this another way, architects and engineers create workplaces for firefighters. Designs can be tailored to better meet operational needs, thereby reducing the time it takes to mitigate an incident. The guidance in this manual is expected to decrease the injuries to responding and operating fire service personnel. When an incident can be mitigated faster, there is less time for the hazardous situation to grow in proportion. With less potential exposure, employees occupying buildings will be afforded greater protection from fire incidents.

Employee occupants as well as fire service employees will realize the benefits of this manual in terms of safe working conditions as intended by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The codes and standards governing buildings and fire protection systems are well understood by designers. However, many portions of these codes and standards allow design variations or contain only general performance language. The resulting flexibility permits the selection of different design options. Some of these options may facilitate fire service operations better than others.

The particular needs and requirements of the fire service are typically not known thoroughly by persons not associated with these operations. This manual discusses how the fire service interacts with different building features and it suggests methods for streamlining such interaction. To provide the most effective protection, fire service personnel should be considered as users of building features and fire protection systems. While far less frequent than mechanical events or other failures, fire can cause greater destruction in terms of property loss, disruption of operations, injury, and death.

Designers routinely consider the needs and comfort of building occupants when arranging a building’s layout and systems. Within the framework of codes and standards, design options may be exercised to benefit a particular owner, tenant, or user. For example, a building code would typically dictate the minimum number of lavatories and water fountains. However, the location, distribution, and types of such facilities are left to the designer in consultation with the client.

The application of fire protection features in buildings is similar. For instance, a fire code may require the installation of a fire department connection for a sprinkler system or an annunciator for a fire alarm system. However, there may be little or no guidance as to the location, position, features, or marking of such devices. This manual provides this type of guidance to designers. However, specific local requirements or preferences may differ. Input should always be obtained from local code officials and the fire service organization, the “client” in this case.

This manual is to be used voluntarily, as a companion to mandatory and advisory provisions in building codes, life safety codes, fire codes, safety regulations, and installation standards for fire protection systems. The material contained in this document focuses on ways that safety of building occupantsdesigners can contribute to the efficiency of fire suppression operations. This material is applicable to all fire service organizations, including fire brigades and fire departments.

Download the manual HERE or HERE 

The Predictability of Performance; It's Occupany Risk not Occupancy Type

Today’s incident demands on the fireground are unlike those of the recent past, requiring incident commanders and commanding officers to have increased technical knowledge of building construction with a heightened sensitivity to fire behavior, a focus on operational structural stability and considerations related to occupancy risk versus the occupancy type.

There is an immediate need for today’s emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their foundation of knowledge and insights related to the modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to adjust and modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions.

Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk, not occupancy type, and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumptive fire behavior.

The dramatic changes in buildings and occupancies over the past ten years have resulted inadequate fire suppression methodologies based upon conventional practices that do not align with the manner in which we used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions.

We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system and given an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions, we can safely and effectively mitigate a structural fire situation in any  given building type and occupancy.

Past operational experiences, both favorable and negative; gave us experiences that define and determine how the fireground is assessed, react and how we expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future; this formed the basis for the naturalistic decision-making process.

Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built upon nine decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

Are you aware of the defining changes in structural systems and support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of the fire-loading package in today’s buildings and occupancies? When was the last time you were out in the street with the companies, or spent some time doing a walk-through of construction or renovations site? Have you asked you commanding officers, division or battalion chief or your company officers for insights into what operational demands and risks are being imposed upon them while operating in the street and within the buildings, occupancies and structures that comprise your jurisdiction?

The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed; but no one has told us. The IAFC Safety, Health & Survival Section (SH&S) spent that past year refining and updating The IAFC Ten Rules of Structural Fire Engagement. First published in 2001, the original Ten Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting provided a set of principles and parameters that incident commanders, commanding and company officers could utilize and implement during incident operations to decrease operations risk, increase and amplify personnel safety of operating companies.

The section moved to develop rules of engagement for structural firefighting to serve as nationally developed model procedures (SOPs) offered by the IAFC. These new Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting have been posted on the IAFC SH&S web page and were officially rolled out the Fire Rescue International in Chicago in 2010.

The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety will provide a crucial link towards integrating occupancy risk considerations with more educated and informed understandings of buildings, occupancies, and the behavior of fire with a structure.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned command and company officer knows that at times. It’s what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances.

However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective; aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal-oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed strategic processes that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

Today’s incident commanders need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling, while implementing Tactical Patience.

Think about the following;

• Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
• Take a tour of your response area, district, community or city.
• Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that are affecting your incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
• Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory
• Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
• Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type and align your operations and deployments to match those risks
• Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling
• Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of  conducting fire service operations
• Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going todo about that gap?

If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at risk. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies … You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

• Taking it to the Streets, Hosted By Christopher Naum on FireFighterNEtcast.com. Tactical Renaissance and The New Rules of Combat Engagement. September, 2010 Radio Program. Download HERE
• IAFC: The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety, HERE and HERE
• NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE
• What’s on your Radar Screen; http://commandsafety.com/2010/07/whats-on-your-radar-screen/
• Reflecting upon these days of June; http://commandsafety.com/2010/06/reflecting-on-these-days-of-june/

Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

Wednesday Night’s Program has been postponed due to Emergent Server issues at BlogTalkRadio.

The Program has been rescheduled for Thursday November 4th at 9:00pm EDT

Turn Out to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued.  Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention?  Join the live broadcast on Thursday night November 4th at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

• For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
• Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
• Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

Taking it to the Streets^TM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the World^TM ©2010

Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

Photo Warren Skalski

On March 30, 2010, a 28-year-old male career fire fighter/paramedic (victim) died and a 21-year-old female part-time fire fighter/paramedic was injured when caught in an apparent flashover while operating a hoseline within a residence. Units arrived on scene to find heavy fire conditions at the rear of a house and moderate smoke conditions within the uninvolved areas of the house. A search and rescue crew had made entry into the house to search for a civilian who was entrapped at the rear of the house. The victim, the injured fire fighter/paramedic, and a third fire fighter made entry into the home with a charged 2 ½ inch hoseline. Thick, black rolling smoke banked down to knee level after the hoseline was advanced 12 feet into the kitchen area. While ventilation activities were occurring, the search and rescue crew observed fire rolling across the ceiling within the smoke. They immediately yelled to the hoseline crew to “get out.” The search and rescue crew were able to exit the structure safely, then returned to rescue the injured fire fighter/paramedic first and then the victim. The victim was found wrapped in the 2 ½ inch hoseline that had ruptured and without his facepiece on. He was quickly brought out of the structure, received medical care on scene, and was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead.

Contributing Factors

• Well involved fire with entrapped civilian upon arrival
• Incomplete 360 degree situational size-up
• Inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis
• Ineffective fire control tactics
• Failure to recognize, understand, and react to deteriorating conditions
• Uncoordinated ventilation and its effect on fire behavior
• Removal of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
• Inadequate command, control, and accountability
• Insufficient staffing.

Key Recommendations

• Ensure that a complete 360 degree situational size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it is physically possible and ensure that a risk-versus-gain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped occupants is conducted prior to committing to interior fire fighting operations
• Ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the fire effectively to include appropriate fire flow for the given fire load and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate personnel to operate the hoseline
• Ensure that fire fighters maintain crew integrity when operating on the fireground, especially when performing interior fire suppression activities
• Ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior
• Ensure that incident commanders and fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with suppression techniques to release smoke and heat
• Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

Recommendations

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that a complete 360 degree situational size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it is physically possible and ensure that a risk-versus-gain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped occupants is conducted prior to committing to interior fire fighting operations.

Discussion: Among the most important duties of the first officer on the scene is conducting an initial 360 degree situational size-up of the incident. A proper size-up begins from the moment the alarm is received, and it continues until the fire is under control. The size-up should include an evaluation of factors such as the fire size and location, length of time the fire has been burning, conditions on arrival, occupancy, fuel load and presence of combustible or hazardous materials, exposures, time of day, available staffing on scene or en route, and weather conditions. Information on the structure itself should include size, construction type, age, condition (e.g., evidence of deterioration, weathering), renovations, lightweight construction, loads on roof and walls (e.g., air conditioning units, ventilation ductwork, utility entrances), and available preplan information-all key information that can affect whether an offensive or defensive strategy is employed. The size-up should also include a risk-versus-gain assessment during incident operations, especially after primary searches have been conducted, situational awareness, and a survivability profile.

Even before the IC takes command of an incident he will be faced with having to determine what critical tasks are going to have to be performed to bring the incident under control. He will use current knowledge and previous experience to formulate a plan for his arriving apparatus and personnel. When the IC arrives he needs to ascertain as much information as possible to make a determination whether his plan will still work. The IC may be faced with several priorities such as an entrapped civilian, a larger scale incident then previously determined, and the fire environment itself. This is additionally part of the initial situational size-up and the risk assessment, which will constantly change as the incident progresses until it is brought under control. The IC should be willing to prioritize and change his strategy and plan based on these assessments. Situational awareness is a highly critical aspect of human decision making: the understanding of what is happening around you, projecting future situation events, comprehending information and its relevance, being realistic, and an individual’s perception. Conducting accurate risk assessments and receiving interior/exterior status updates is critical to the safety of fire fighters in the incident, rescue/recovery efforts, and overall control of the incident. “The decision to commit interior fire fighting personnel should be made on a case-by-case basis with proper risk-benefit decisions being made by the incident commander. The commitment of firefighters’ lives for saving property and an unknown or marginal risk of civilian life must be balanced appropriately.”

Another tool that the IC should consider using is survivability profiling. Survivability profiling uses the knowledge learned of fire behavior and spread, smoke (i.e., color, condition, movement), and building construction to examine a situation and make an intelligent decision of whether to commit fire fighters to life saving and/or interior operations. In other words, survivability profiling involves assessing the probability that a trapped occupant is still alive and can safely be rescued with the current or impending conditions. The NIOSH publication Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires states that the IC must make a determination that offensive (interior) operations may be conducted without exceeding a reasonable degree of risk to fire fighters before ordering an offensive attack and must be prepared to discontinue the offensive attack if the risk evaluation changes during the fire fighting operation. The fireground is very dynamic, and conditions can either improve or deteriorate based on fire suppression activities, and available resources. Most importantly, assessments/size-ups of the incident are necessary to detect a change on the fireground.

During this incident, the responding departments were made aware while en route that there was a paralyzed civilian entrapped in the structure. His wife advised 911 and arriving units that the chair he was sitting in caught fire with him still in it. Units arrived on scene 6 minutes after the 911 call to find heavy fire conditions to the addition on the C-side of the house where the entrapped civilian was last seen by his wife sitting in the chair. Prior to a complete 360 degree situational size-up, decisions were made to send a hoseline crew through the A-side front door to assist with search and rescue, and to locate and attack the fire (located on the C-side in the addition and garage). Fire fighters entering the house from the A-side were initially met with moderate smoke conditions banked down to waist level, which quickly changed to thick, black smoke conditions that went to the floor due to the fire being uncontrolled and spreading into the house from the C-side. The victim and injured fire fighter/paramedic were eventually exposed to a flashover. The civilian was not rescued. A full range of factors must be considered in making the risk evaluation including a realistic evaluation of the ability to execute a successful offensive fire attack with the resources that are available and a realistic evaluation of occupant survivability and rescue potential.

Fire departments should be aware of the recently released 2010 International Association of Fire Chiefs’ (IAFC) Rules of Engagement (ROE) of Structural Firefighting. These guidelines recommend that ICs conduct or obtain a 360 degree situational incident size-up, determine the occupant survival profile, and conduct an initial risk assessment.

Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the fire effectively to include appropriate fire flow for the given fire load and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate personnel to operate the hoseline.

Discussion: An assessment and decision of suppression methods must be made before attacking a fire in hopes of extinguishing it and keeping fire fighters safe while doing so. To accomplish such tasks, ICs, officers, and fire fighters need to consider such factors as fire load and flow, hose and nozzle selection, placement and use of fire streams, and required staffing. Fire load, or heat released from combustible materials, will directly affect how the fire develops throughout the incident and how long and severely it may burn. The more combustible materials involved, the greater the heat that will be produced requiring additional fire flow. Fire flow is the calculated amount of water in gallons per minute needed to extinguish a fire in a specific structure. To assist fire fighters in calculating the fire flow, one of three formulas could be used: the Iowa Rate-of-Flow Formula, the National Fire Academy (NFA) Formula, and the Insurance Services Office Formula. The Iowa Rate-of-Flow and NFA Formulas were designed to be used on the fireground because they allow fire fighters to mentally compute the fire flow with relative ease by estimating such things as the square footage (area) of a structure or the cubic footage (volume) of a room, and percentage involved, then inputting that data into a predetermined formula.

Iowa Rate-of-Flow Formula: rate of fire flow=volume of room in cubic feet÷100

NFA Formula: fire flow in gallons per minute for one floor at 100% involvement=(length ×width)÷3. If less than 100% involvement,then multiply answer by estimated percentage of involvement.

The fire stream, or water stream, is an important aspect both for fire fighter safety and tactical considerations. The wrong choice of fire stream can place a fire fighter and crew in a bad situation. Also, the wrong type of fire stream will affect the tactical outcome of the incident in regards to how quickly the fire is controlled. To produce an effective fire flow, there must be a viable water supply; sufficient water pressure; a means to transport the stream to the desired point (fire); and trained, competent personnel to deploy these three elements. These elements are applied through the use of a fire hose and nozzle. The diameter of the fire hose can affect how much water is flowed on a fire, but the larger the diameter, the more potential to max out the delivering pump’s capacity, and additional personnel will be needed to handle the hoseline. The nozzle will allow the water to leave its mechanical hold within the hoseline to produce the desired fire stream. Typical fire streams include solid, fog, and broken, and each have their own characteristics, advantages/disadvantages, and application. Proper training on all these aspects will greatly influence fire fighter’s knowledge on the fireground, provide for quicker control and extinguishment of the fire, and increase overall fire fighter safety.

During this incident, arriving fire departments were faced with a large volume of fire and an entrapped civilian. Prior to the flashover, the fire was burning uncontrolled at the rear of the house (house addition and garage) and spreading into the house. FF1, the victim, and injured fire fighter/paramedic were tasked with advancing a charged 2½-inch hoseline into the house to assist with the search and for fire suppression. They were able to advance this hoseline approximately 12 feet into the house, but advancing and operating a large-diameter hoseline within tight quarters may be extremely cumbersome even if adequate staffing is available to accomplish this task. Note: When FF1 had a problem with his PPE, he handed the nozzle over to the victim, and eventually backed out of the structure, that left only two personnel available to operate the hoseline. Fire fighters and officers need to understand that while a 2½-inch hoseline provides a greater flow, fire fighters need to be able to move the line quickly and efficiently interiorly, especially when performing a search and experiencing deteriorating fire conditions. An alternate decision to advancing the 2½-inch hoseline into the small house could have been to deploy and advance a 1¾-inch hoseline(s), which would have been easier to maneuver within the house.

Due to the large volume of fire at the C-side that was extending into the house, the 2½-inch hoseline(s) could have been deployed exteriorly to the B- and/or D-sides to combat the fire, paying close attention to directly attack the fire, an elevated master stream (carefully directed on fire burning uncontrolled within the addition and garage) could have been deployed early into the fire had the assessment been made that the entrapped civilian (last reported to be in the addition) could not be saved, thus possibly stopping further progression of fire and volatile smoke into the house. Additionally, a lightweight portable master stream, placed exteriorly at the B- and/or D-sides, which is fairly easy to deploy by using a 2½- to 3-inch supply line, may only require one fire fighter to operate once in position. These types of water delivery appliances are capable of delivering a large volume of water that will assist in extinguishing the fire from an exterior position, especially when conditions are deteriorating interiorly, which could place fire fighter’s safety at risk.

An incident commander needs to constantly assess whether his strategies and tactics to control and extinguish the fire are working, paying close attention to fire and smoke conditions/changes, the affects from ventilation performed by fire fighters and occurring naturally as the fire progresses, and to fire fighter safety.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters maintain crew integrity when operating on the fireground, especially when performing interior fire suppression activities.

Discussion: Fire fighters should always work and remain in teams whenever they are operating in a hazardous environment. Team integrity depends on team members knowing who is on their team and who is the team leader; staying within visual contact at all times (if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of each other); communicating needs and observations to the team leader; and rotating together for team rehab, team staging, and watching out for each other (e.g., practicing a strong buddy system). Following these basic rules helps prevent serious injury or even death by providing personnel with the added safety net of fellow team members. Teams that enter a hazardous environment together should leave together to ensure that team continuity is maintained.The 2010 IAFC ROE of Structural Firefighting states, “Go in together, stay together, come out together.”

Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior.

Discussion: Reading fire behavior indicators and recognizing fire conditions serve as the basis for predicting likely and potential fire behavior. Reading the fire requires recognition of patterns of key fire behavior indicators. It is essential to consider these indicators together and not to focus on the most obvious indicators or one specific indicator (e.g., smoke). Identifying building factors, smoke, wind direction, air movement, heat and flame indicators are all critical to reading the fire. Focusing on reading “smoke” may result in fire fighters missing other critical indicators of potential fire behavior. One important concept that must be emphasized is that smoke is fuel and must be viewed as potential energy. Smoke that is thick, black and pressurized can emit from a structure at a high rate. This is indicative of a potentially under-ventilated structure or a ventilation controlled fire. This smoke is fuel-rich and is termed “black fire.” It can potentially do as much damage as fire itself, but it is an indicator that some type of extreme fire behavior may occur.

Since the IC should be staged at a designated command post (outside), the interior conditions should be communicated by interior company officers (or the member supervising the crew) as soon as possible to their supervisor (e.g., IC, division supervisor). Knowledge of interior conditions could change the IC’s strategy or tactics. Interior crews can aid the IC in this process by providing reports of the interior conditions as soon as they enter the fire building and by providing regular updates. In addition to the importance of communicating reports on fire conditions, it is essential that fire fighters recognize what type of information is important. Command effectiveness can be impaired by excessive and extraneous information as well as from a lack of information. In the case of communicating observations related to fire behavior, this requires development of fire fighters’ skill in recognition of key fire behavior indicators and reading the fire.

During this incident, FF1 made a decision to quickly open and close the smooth bore nozzle (water applied as a solid stream) while aiming at the ceiling. It is believed this was done in an attempt to cool the thermal (hot gas) layer, a common practice, in hopes of preventing a potential flashover. Ceiling temperatures can be reduced through carefully considered fire control actions, such as applying short bursts of water spray into the hot gas layer, or directly applying water onto the fire itself which will limit the release of unburned products of combustion as well as reduce ceiling temperature.

Also, the search and rescue crew (operating without the protection of a hoseline) were able to make a quick determination that the conditions within the house were imminent to flashover. They made an attempt to alert the victim and injured fire fighter/paramedic, but were too late. If conditions are right for a flashover, there are only seconds to make a decision. Fire fighters will be met with a sudden increase in heat and rollover within the ceiling level. The injured fire fighter/paramedic was unaware that the conditions she was operating in deteriorated quickly. She remembers thick, black smoke pushing down to the floor while in the structure and then “the room and everything in it caught fire.” Prior to the flashover, windows on the B-side were vented and thick, black and heavily pressurized smoke billowed from these windows. The IC, and individuals working on the exterior, need to recognize this as a potential for extreme fire behavior and evacuate interior crews. Obtaining proper training and hands-on experience through the use of a flashover simulator may assist interior fire fighters in making sound decisions on when to evacuate a structure fire.

Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure that incident commanders and fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with suppression techniques to release smoke and heat.

Discussion: Ventilation is the systematic removal of heated air, smoke, and fire gases from a burning building and replacing them with cooler air.¹ The two types of ventilation are vertical and horizontal. During vertical ventilation the natural convection of the heated gases creates upward currents that draw the fire and heat in the direction of the vertical opening. Horizontal ventilation allows for heat, smoke, and gases to escape by means of a doorway or window but is highly influenced by the location and extent of the fire, and special caution should be taken if the fire is in the attic.

Properly coordinated ventilation can decrease the rate the fire spreads, increase visibility, and lower the potential for flashover or backdraft. Proper ventilation reduces the threat of flashover by removing heat before combustibles in a room or enclosed area reach their ignition temperatures. Proper ventilation can reduce the risk of a backdraft by reducing the potential for superheated fire gases and smoke to accumulate in an enclosed area. Properly ventilating a structure fire will reduce the tendency for rising heat, smoke, and fire gases, trapped by the roof or ceiling, to accumulate, bank down, and spread laterally to other areas within the structure. The ventilation opening may produce a chimney effect, causing air movement from within a structure toward the opening. These air movements help facilitate the venting of smoke, hot gases, and products of combustion but may also cause the fire to grow in intensity and may endanger fire fighters who are between the fire and the ventilation opening. For this reason, ventilation should be closely coordinated with hoseline placement and offensive fire suppression tactics. Close coordination means the hoseline is in place and ready to operate, so that when ventilation occurs, the hoseline can overcome the increase in combustion, which is likely to occur. If a ventilation opening is made directly above a fire, fire spread may be reduced, allowing fire fighters the opportunity to extinguish the fire. If the opening is made elsewhere, the chimney effect may actually contribute to the spread of the fire.¹

ICs and fire fighters need to consider the following and how it will affect ventilation and overall control of the fire:

• Who will ventilate (knowledge and skills)?
• What type of ventilation?
• When to ventilate?
• Where to ventilate?
• Why ventilate?
• How to properly and safely ventilate?
• What are the expected results from ventilation?

Fire development in a compartment may be described in several stages, although the boundaries between these stages may not be clearly defined.¹ The incipient stage starts with ignition, followed by growth, fully developed, and decay stages. The available fuel largely controls the growth of the fire during the early stages. This is known as a fuel-controlled fire, and ventilation during this time may initially slow the spread of the fire as smoke, hot gases, and products of incomplete combustion are removed. As noted above, increased ventilation can also cause the fire to grow in intensity as additional oxygen is introduced. Effective application of water during this time can suppress the fire but if the fire is not quickly knocked down, it may continue to grow.

If the fire grows until the compartment approaches a fully developed state, the fire is likely to become ventilation controlled. Further fire growth is limited by the available air supply as the fire consumes the oxygen in the compartment. Ventilating the compartment at this point will allow a fresh air supply (with oxygen to support combustion), which may accelerate the fire growth, resulting in an increased heat release rate. If coordinated fire suppression activities do not quickly decrease the heat release rate, a ventilation induced flashover can occur.¹ Considering that most fires beyond the incipient stage are or will quickly become ventilation controlled, changes in ventilation are likely to be some of the most significant factors in changing fire behavior.

During this incident, uncoordinated ventilation occurred while the hoseline and search and rescue crews were inside the house. The victim and other fire fighters, within the small house, were between the fire and the ventilation source. One fire fighter accounts heavy, turbulent, black smoke pushing from a window on the B-side after it was broken. Shortly after, the house sustained an apparent ventilation-induced flashover.

Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

Discussion: Fire fighters are tasked at times to operate within environments which pose inhalation hazards (e.g., toxic smoke and oxygen deficiency),defined by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH). Proper training along with an implemented and enforced policy or procedure will assist fire fighters with proper maintenance, use, and removal of a SCBA. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134 (g)(4)(iii) states, “The employer shall ensure that all employees engaged in interior structural firefighting use SCBAs.”

According to the autopsy report, the victim died from carbon monoxide intoxication due to inhalation of smoke and soot. The medical examiner also indicated that the victim’s COHb level (a measure of carbon monoxide in the bloodstream) was 30%. Even if nothing but carbon dioxide, water vapor, and nitrogen were present in the fire products and these were to mix with the air being breathed by a fire fighter, then the oxygen percentage would be reduced below the normal 21%. At 15% oxygen, fire fighters can experience lethargy, poor coordination, and confused thinking. The two principal toxins in smoke—carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide—act to deprive the brain of oxygen, and their effects would be enhanced due to the lower levels of oxygen in the air. The victim was discovered with his facepiece off, but still connected to his regulator. Due to the smoke conditions, the victim would have had to have been on air when entering the structure. It has not been determined why the victim was found without his facepiece on.

Emergencies created by, or associated with, SCBA can be overcome in several ways. Fire departments can develop and implement a comprehensive respiratory protection program that includes fire fighter fitness, training, and competency and skill assessments in SCBA and emergency procedures. Firefighters should remember the first rule in any emergency situation-to not panic. Panic causes an increased breathing rate and consequently, an increase in air consumption; and an inability to focus on emergency procedures. If fire fighters become lost, trapped, or disoriented, they need to focus on managing remaining air in their SCBA cylinder until other fire fighters can make a rescue attempt. Removing one’s facepiece in an IDLH atmosphere can immediately expose the respiratory system to a potentially fatal environment, thus incapacitating an individual. Choosing to leave one’s SCBA facepiece on may be the best chance in providing additional time for a fire fighter to be rescued. Fire fighters should follow their department’s SOPs regarding emergency SCBA procedures and emergency communications.

Recommendation #7: Fire departments should ensure that adequate staffing is available to respond to emergency incidents.

Discussion: NFPA 1710 Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments contains recommended guidelines for minimum staffing of career fire departments. NFPA 1710 states the following: “On-duty fire suppression personnel shall be comprised of the numbers necessary for fire-fighting performance relative to the expected fire-fighting conditions. These numbers shall be determined through task analyses that take the following factors into consideration:

1. Life hazard to the populace protected.
2. Provisions of safe and effective fire-fighting performance conditions for the fire fighters.
3. Potential property loss.
4. Nature, configuration, hazards, and internal protection of the properties involved.
5. Types of fireground tactics and evolutions employed as standard procedure, type of apparatus used, and results expected to be obtained at the fire scene.

The NFPA standard states that both engine and truck companies shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel. The standard also states that companies shall be staffed with a minimum of five or six on-duty members in jurisdictions with tactical hazards, high-hazard occupancies, high-incident frequencies, geographical restrictions, or other pertinent factors identified by the authority having jurisdiction.

During this incident, the victim’s department responded with three personnel on the engine and two personnel on the ambulance, but the Still assignment also consisted of an engine, two ladder trucks, and a squad, with four fire personnel on each. It was routine to have an ambulance respond with an engine on a first due fire assignment. Due to short staffing, the ambulance personnel were tasked with fire suppression activities, thus taking them out-of-service as a medical unit. Also, due to short staffing, the lieutenant/acting officer (IC) was required to ride and operate as the officer of E534. This removed him from his command response vehicle which would have allowed him to command at a tactical level versus having to potentially perform tasks.

Recommendation #8: Fire departments should ensure that staff for emergency medical services is available at all times during fireground operations.

Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. Emergency medical care and transportation for injured or ill fire fighters should be immediately available on the scene of working structure fires. Many fire departments incorporate an automatic dispatch of an EMS unit to working structure fires. Automatic dispatch can help to ensure that qualified emergency medical care and transportation for injured or ill fire fighters is available without having to call and wait for a unit after a medical emergency or injury has occurred.

During this incident, the victim and the injured fire fighter/paramedic responded in an ambulance. Upon their arrival to the scene, the IC immediately tasked them with interior operations due to staffing issues. The IC did not request an additional ambulance to respond to the scene for medical care until after the victim was down within the house. Additional resources (e.g., apparatus and personnel) arrived minutes after the ambulance’s arrival.

Recommendation #9: Fire departments and dispatch centers should ensure they are capable of communicating with each other without having to monitor multiple channels/frequencies on more than one radio.

Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. It is important that fire service personnel have an efficient means of communicating during an emergency incident. The use of radio communications provides fire fighters on scene with the ability to communicate to individuals they cannot see or to receive vital information about the incident. To assist with this, localities should ensure that communications can occur without having to utilize different radios and/or monitor multiple channels/frequencies.

During this incident, the IC had to monitor more than one radio and even had to go to the cab of his engine to accomplish this task. Having to monitor multiple radios and potentially take your eyes off the scene for a moment could be extremely detrimental to the management of the incident.

Recommendation #10: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander, or designee, maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground.

Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. The use of an accountability system is recommended by NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program and NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System.²¹ A functional personnel accountability system requires the following:

• Development of a departmental SOP
• Training all personnel
• Strict enforcement during emergency incidents

As the incident escalates, additional staffing and resources may be needed, adding to the burden of tracking personnel. At this point, an accountability system should be in place which includes an incident command board that is established and maintained by an assigned accountability officer or aide. A properly maintained incident command board allows the IC to readily identify the location and time of all fire fighters on the fireground. As a fire escalates and additional fire companies respond, a chief’s aide or accountability officer assists the IC with accounting for all fire fighting companies at the fire, at the staging area, and at the rehabilitation area. The personnel accountability report (PAR) is an organized on-scene roll call in which each supervisor reports the status of his crew when requested by the IC or emergency dispatcher.¹ A properly initiated and enforced accountability system on every response, which is consistently integrated into fireground command and control, enhances fire fighter safety and survival by helping to ensure a more timely and successful identification and rescue of a disoriented or downed fire fighter.

During this incident, the accountability system was never set in place and a PAR was not conducted following the Mayday.

Recommendation #11: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression.

Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program states, “The fire department shall provide each member with protective clothing and protective equipment that is designed to provide protection from the hazards to which the member is likely to be exposed and is suitable for the tasks that the member is expected to perform…protective clothing and protective equipment shall be used whenever a member is exposed or potentially exposed to the hazards for which the protective clothing (and equipment) is provided.” NFPA 1971 Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting has established minimum requirements for structural fire fighting protective ensembles and ensemble elements designed to provide fire fighting personnel limited protection from thermal, physical, environmental, and bloodborne pathogen hazards encountered during structural fire fighting operations. These requirements will assist in protecting firefighters, but only if they wear the PPE as recommended by the manufacturer.

During this incident, the victim was discovered without a hood over his head or rolled down on his neck. NIOSH investigators could not determine whether this equipment was properly donned prior to the incident.

Recommendation #12: Fire departments should ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.

Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. According to NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System,“The incident commander shall have overall authority for management of the incident and the incident commander shall ensure that adequate safety measures are in place.” This shall include overall responsibility for the safety and health of all personnel and for other persons operating within the incident management system. While the incident commander is in overall command at the scene, certain functions must be delegated to ensure adequate scene management is accomplished.According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program,“as incidents escalate in size and complexity, the incident commander shall divide the incident into tactical-level management units and assign an incident safety officer (ISO) to assess the incident scene for hazards or potential hazards.” These standards indicate that the incident commander is in overall command at the scene but acknowledge that oversight of all operations is difficult. On-scene fire fighter health and safety is best preserved by delegating the function of safety and health oversight to the ISO. Additionally, the incident commander relies upon fire fighters and the ISO to relay feedback on fireground conditions in order to make timely, informed decisions regarding risk versus gain and offensive-versus-defensive operations. The safety of all personnel on the fireground is directly impacted by clear, concise, and timely communications among mutual aid fire departments, sector command, the ISO, and the incident commander. NFPA 1521 Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer defines the role of the ISO at an incident scene and identifies duties such as recon of the fireground and reporting pertinent information back to the incident commander; ensuring the department’s accountability system is in place and operational; monitoring radio transmissions and identifying barriers to effective communications; and ensuring established safety zones, collapse zones, hot zones, and other designated hazard areas are communicated to all members on scene. Larger fire departments may assign one or more full-time staff officers as safety officers who respond to working fires. In smaller departments, every officer should be prepared to function as the ISO when assigned by the incident commander. The presence of a safety officer does not diminish the responsibility of individual fire fighters and fire officers for their own safety and the safety of others. The ISO adds a higher level of attention and expertise to help the fire fighters and fire officers. The ISO must have particular expertise in analyzing safety hazards and must know the particular uses and limitations of protective equipment.³

Recommendation #13: Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters are equipped with a means to communicate with fireground personnel before entering a structure fire.

Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System states, “To enable responders to be notified of an emergency condition or situation when they are assigned to an area designated as immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH), at least one responder on each crew or company shall be equipped with a portable radio and each responder on the crew or company shall be equipped with either a portable radio or another means of electronic communication. Radio communications on the fireground are imperative for the IC to command and control the incident and for fire fighters to work effectively and safely within a structure fire. Fire fighters within a structure are unable to see all areas affected by fire and whether the structure is maintaining its stability. Having radio communications can enhance fire fighter safety and health by providing fire fighters a means to communicate with other crew members or with the IC when they find themselves in need of assistance.

During this incident, the victim did have a radio, but it was positioned in the back pocket of his station pants. Thus, when he donned his bunker pants, his radio became inaccessible during the incident.

Recommendation #14: The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) should consider developing more comprehensive training requirements for fire behavior to be required in NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications and NFPA 1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications.

Discussion: Structural fires frequently display indicators and warning signs of rapid fire development such as flashover, backdraft, and fire gas ignition for which many fire fighters and officers may not have been sufficiently trained to recognize or understand. It is imperative that fire fighters and officers develop the understanding and skills necessary to identify and interpret the indicators so that they can anticipate the potential for extreme fire behavior and immediately communicate their findings to the IC.  This requires comprehensive training in fire behavior (theory) and practical application inclusive of realistic live fire training.

NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications and NFPA 1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications were developed to ensure that fire fighters and officers have the skills necessary to perform their job, also known as job performance requirements (JPRs). Currently, these JPRs include language that individuals have requisite knowledge on such topics as heat transfer, principles of thermal layering, advantages and disadvantages of different types of ventilation, and fire behavior in a structure. These standards do not include guidance on how many hours or what available scientific information will be used to verify that an individual has a sound understanding of the physical, chemical, and thermal behavior of fire and how to make a connection between fire dynamics/behavior and the influence of tactical operations (e.g., fire flow, types of ventilation) and external factors (e.g., wind). These JPRs are taken by curriculum developers and formatted into educational content. Standard setting agencies, states, curriculum developers, and other authorities having jurisdiction should consider developing a nationwide curriculum so that fire fighters and officers receive fundamental and refresher training on how to: recognize and interpret fire behavior and indications of impending extreme fire behavior (e.g., flashover, back draft, smoke explosion); and, anticipate what could or should happen when a tactical operation is performed (e.g., ventilation, fire flow). Standard setting agencies and curriculum developers should also consider providing guidelines (e.g., required topics and hours) for instructors to deliver such information and recommendations for verifying an individual’s learning and retention.

According to documented training reviewed by NIOSH investigators, the victim, injured fire fighter/paramedic, and IC had a combined 24 hours of fire behavior training out of 5,654 total combined training hours. Additional fire behavior training to include such areas as theory, chemistry, physics, smoke reading, current research, and the cause and effects of tactics during fire suppression operations may improve fire fighter safety.

NIOSH REPORT: HERE

Previous Video Coverage, HERE