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Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse-PDF Download

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Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse PDF Training Aid

The recent post titled: Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse has been receiving a considerable amount of attention as the post makes its way throughout the fire service eMedia sites, links, likes, shares and commentary circles, with over 6,000 views in the past 24 hours on various sites.

It furthers the premise that I have advocated my entire career and that is the fire service continues to recognize the need for increased knowledge, training, insights and skill sets related to building construction and its diametric relationship to firefighter, command risk management and operational safety.  

And that we need to learn from each and every incident response,operation and run….Let’s continue to gain learnings and insights from not only this event,  but from the vast resources of published LODD investigations, after-action reports, case studies, near-miss events and close-calls; for each has a lesson that we can use on our next call.

In order to provide support for continuing training and insight opportunities, I’ve developed a PDF download of the Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse article in its entirety.
A power point program will be forthcoming to accompany both media items.

Remember: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

Posted by on December 28, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Christopher Naum, fire suppression, firefighting, firefighting-operations, first-due, inspections, LODD, major-incidents, risk-based assessment, size-up, Truss • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Collapse of Bowstring Truss Roof Seriously Injures Fire Fighter

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Fire suppression operations on Alpha side prior to collapse. Firefighter is seen in the immediate collapse zone

The NIOSH Fire fighter Investigation and Prevention Program, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports  recently released Report # F2009-12 for a Near-Miss event that seriously injured a firefighter  wih significant learnings;   HERE   

Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.  

On May 21, 2009, a 36-year-old male career fire fighter was seriously injured while operating in a non-designated collapse zone of a commercial structure when an overhang of a bowstring truss roof system collapsed and struck him. The first arriving company officer reported a working fire in a single story Type II warehouse.  

The officer looked under a steel roll-up door that was raised approximately three feet off of the ground and saw heavy fire towards the rear of the structure from floor to ceiling. Per department procedures, the first arriving companies went into a “Fast Attack” mode. Crews attempted but were unable to enter the structure because the steel roll-up door wasn’t functioning and the man door was heavily secured.  

The department’s Deputy Chief arrived on the scene 9 minutes after the initial crew and determined that the fire should be fought defensively, however, this command was not relayed over the radio or verified with all crews. A crew was operating a 2 ½-inch handline just outside the structure approximately 20 minutes after the first apparatus arrived when the overhang collapsed and trapped the nozzleman.  

Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include:  

  • scene management and risk analysis,
  • a well-involved fire in a structure with hazardous construction features, and
  • fire fighters operating within a potential collapse area.

STRUCTURE

The building was constructed in 1954 and was a single-story warehouse of Type IV construction. The dimensions of the building were 110 feet deep by 50 feet wide, covering approximately 5,500 square feet. The height of the building was approximately 20 feet. The occupancy use of the building was commercial and it operated as a warehouse. The building’s structural system consisted of masonry block bearing walls with four heavy timber wood bowstring trusses for a roof system.  

The heavy timber wood trusses had a 50-foot clear span to the bearing walls and were located 19 feet 9 inches on center. The heavy timber wood truss assemblies were 48 feet 7 inches in depth and were constructed of 4-inch x 6-inch timber cords and webs connected with bolt fasteners with a metal splice plate and bolt configuration at the bottom chord span. Solid 2-inch x 10-inch wood purlins located on 24-inch centering spanned perpendicular to the truss assembly with a ¾-inch plywood roofing deck. The roofing system assembly was exposed and did not have a membrane or other passive fire protection features.  

Aerial view of Building

Structural stability to the heavy timber truss units was provided by 2-inch x 6-inch wood cross bracing in conjunction with the stability provided by the wood purlins and plywood deck roofing membrane. The structure contained six skylights that were 3 feet by 6 feet .  

The overall integrity and structural stability of this type of structural support and roofing system is contingent upon all components maintaining their connections and load bearing or load transferring capacity.  

The A-side was a non-load bearing wall that showed the traditional arched roof profile that is consistent with bowstring roof construction. The A-side wall also consisted of what appeared to be an overhanging or cantilevered façade that was covered by stucco.  The overhang was part of the original construction that tied back into the bowstring truss system. The fire building was integrated into a block of commercial occupancies so that only the A-side was accessible for interior fire fighting activities.  

The B-side exposure of the building was adjacent to a parking lot and was of masonry construction without any windows or doors. The C-side and D-side exposures were of similar size and construction and shared party walls between their respective sides. A pre-plan had not been completed for this structure.  

Similar Interior Construction Features

At the time of the fire, the building was used as a place to grow marijuana illegally. The man door was heavily barricaded and a false wall was constructed to shield the operations from the exterior when the roll-up door was lifted. The electric service was severed and rerouted to circumvent the electric meter in order to conceal the operations.  

TRAINING and EXPERIENCE

The state requires all career fire fighters to complete training equivalent to NFPA, 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, Fire Fighter 1. The department provides up to 17 months of training to certify fire fighters to NFPA Fire Fighter 1 and 2 qualifications, and a one year probationary period of supervised training for department fire fighter certification. The additional training during this probationary time focuses on driver training, pump operations, aerial ladder operations, and specialized equipment training.  

  

Alpha Side

Injured Fire Fighter
The injured fire fighter had more than six years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training on topics such as: live fire training, rapid intervention crew (RIC) procedures, and hazardous materials.  

Initial Incident Commander (IC)
The first due company officer had more than 15 years of experience with the department. Six of those years were as a fire fighter, seven years as a cross-trained paramedic, and 18 months as a lieutenant in an acting and permanent appointment at the time of the incident. The initial IC had completed the department provided five four-day sessions on critical fireground topics that were required for newly appointed lieutenants. This training included the following topics: building construction, incident management system (IMS), size-up, company operations, and rapid intervention company (RIC) operations.  

Incident Commander (IC)
The IC had more than 30 years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training in topics such as: health and safety 1, 2, 3 & 4; fire command; fire instructor; fire investigation; fire management; fire officer; fire prevention; incident command; incident safety officer;  and RIC procedures.  

Incident Safety Officer (ISO)
The battalion chief who was assigned as the ISO for this incident had more than 20 years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training in topics such as: health and safety 1,2,3,and 4; fire command; fire instructor; RIC procedures; hazardous materials; heavy rescue 1 and 2; training officer development; wildland training; and emergency vehicle operations.  

INVESTIGATION INSIGHTS

At 0446 hours central dispatch received an alarm for a reported structure fire with fire and smoke showing at a commercial occupancy. Engine 42 (E42) was the first apparatus on the scene at 0449 hours and the officer reported on the radio a working fire in a single story Type II warehouse. Note: The classification of Type II was incorrect. This building was a Type IV construction due to the heavy timber bowstring trusses.   

The E42 Lieutenant and a fire fighter ran to a steel garage roll-up door that was raised approximately three feet off of the ground on the left of the A-side wall. The E42 Lieutenant looked under the door and saw heavy fire towards the rear of the structure from floor to ceiling. The E42 Lieutenant and the fire fighter attempted to raise the door but could not due to the door being dislodged from its track. Note: The door frame had been compromised by the fire and the tracks were not attached to the wall. They immediately went to a man door to the right of the A-side. It was locked and had heavy security bars. The E42 Lieutenant called Battalion Chief 6 for a truck company to perform forcible entry.  

The E42 Lieutenant ordered the crew to prepare the multiversal, which is a master stream appliance that can be used on the ground, and 2 ½-inch handlines to attempt to attack the fire through the roll-up door. Note: Per department policy, all first arriving companies and officers go to work in a “fast attack” mode. At approximately 0452 hours Engine 32 (E32) and Engine 17 (E17) pulled onto the road leading to the structure within a block from the structure.  

Both the E32 and E17 officers immediately radioed dispatch and requested a second alarm due to the heavy fire self-venting from the roof of the structure. E32 proceeded to the front of the structure, dropped off two 3-inch supply lines for E42, and went to hook up to a hydrant to supply E42. E32 used a 10-foot section of 3-inch supply line to hook up to one side of the hydrant. They used another 50-foot section of 3-inch supply line to hook up to the other side of the hydrant.  

During this same time, at approximately 0452 hours, BC6 arrived on the scene, called to ensure a second alarm, and conducted a size-up of the front of the building and the operations taking place. A division chief arrived on the scene at 0453 hours, assumed incident command (IC), and ordered BC6 to protect Exposure D. The E17 officer and fire fighters [including the injured fire fighter (IFF)] walked up to the front of the structure and saw the E42 and E32 crews attempting to deploy the multiversal and two 2 ½-inch handlines off of E42. Note: The crews were having difficulty due to having to assemble the three 50-foot sections of 2 ½-handlines from a bag stored on top of each apparatus. The crew also removed the multiversal from on top of E42 and placed it on the ground for operation.   

The IFF took the nozzle of one of the 2 ½-inch handlines and was backed up by an E17 fire fighter. Two additional fire fighters manned the other 2 ½-inch handline and were protecting the D-exposure by shooting water onto the roof from over 20 feet away from the structure. The E17 officer and E17 fire fighter operated the multiversal over 20 feet back from the roll-up door and attempted to shoot water through the opening where the door had pulled away from the wall. The E17 officer noticed that both handlines were ineffective and he went to check on the IFF. The IFF’s handline stream was ricocheting off of the man door and the four windows above it.  

The L7 crew had assembled handtools on the ground in front of the Command Post. The E17 officer took a saw to the man door in an attempt to open it so that the handline could be effective. He quickly determined that the saw would not work due to the door being so heavily protected. Battalion Chief 09 arrived on the scene at 0500 hours and was designated by the IC as the Incident Safety Officer (ISO) at approximately 0504 hours. He instructed the E17 officer to attempt to open the door with a rabbit tool; the E17 officer informed the ISO he wasn’t sure where the truck company kept it. Immediately after, BC6 ordered the E17 officer to take his saw to the roll-up door and cut an opening for access.  

He cut a three foot by six foot hole in the door and was attempting to cut across the door when he was tapped on the shoulder by the Deputy Chief which he assumed meant he was to quit. During this time, BC6 had received orders from the Deputy Chief to pull everyone back from the front of the building and to ensure that no one went inside. Note: According to interviews conducted by NIOSH investigators, this is the first time that anyone on the scene communicated the need to go defensive to the initial arriving officers. It was reported to the NIOSH investigators that every officer who reported to the command post was given face-to-face directions that the fire was defensive and that no one was to enter the building. This tactical decision was not relayed over the radio.   

BC6 ordered the crews from E42 and E17 to set up and direct a master stream into the hole through the roll-up door from a distance. The crews fought fire from a distance with the master stream for several minutes. The IFF and the E17 fire fighter continued to fight fire with the handline moving from the roll-up door to the man door several times. Note: This crew, along with many other members that were interviewed, reported not receiving any orders regarding a defensive operation.  

BC6 noticed that the fire had compromised an electrical weather head and that the power lines were going to come down soon. He turned to order crews to vacate the area where the power lines would possibly fall when he heard a large crash. He turned back and saw that the roof overhang had fallen onto the sidewalk. The collapse trapped the IFF who was operating the handline into the windows along with the E17 fire fighter. Members immediately rushed to the scene to rescue the trapped fire fighter.  

  • The IC ordered BC6 to command the rescue crew and complete a personnel accountability report (PAR) for the fireground.
  • A full PAR was completed and the trapped fire fighter was removed and transported to a local hospital. 

Collapse into the street on Alpha Side

 

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:  

  • ensure that they have consistent policies and training on an incident management system
  • develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
  • ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning fire fighting operations
  • ensure that the first due company officer establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in firefighting efforts
  • implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that define a defensive strategy
  • ensure that policies are followed to establish and monitor a collapse zone when conditions indicate the potential for structural collapse
  • train all fire fighting personnel on building construction and the risks and hazards related to structural collapse
  • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics

NIOSH RECOMMENDATIONS  

  • Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that they have consistent policies and training on an incident management system.
  • Recommendation #2: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
  • Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning fire fighting operations
  • Recommendati on #4: Fire departments should ensure that the first due company officer establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in firefighting efforts.
  • Recommendation #5: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures that define defensive fire fighting operations.
  • Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that policies are followed to establish and monitor a collapse zone when conditions indicate the potential for structural collapse.
  • Recommendation #7: Fire departments should train all fire fighting personnel in building construction and in the risks and hazards related to structural collapse.
  • Recommendation #8: Fire departments should conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
  • Discussion: NFPA 1620 Standard for Pre-Incident Planning, states “The purpose of this document shall be to develop pre-incident plans to assist responding personnel in effectively managing emergencies for the protection of occupants, responding personnel, property, and the environment.” A pre-incident plan identifies deviations from normal operations and can be complex and formal, or simply a notation about a particular problem such as the presence of flammable liquids, explosive hazards, modifications to structural building components, or structural damage from a previous fire.
  • Building characteristics including type (or more importantly risk) of construction, materials used, occupancy, fuel load, roof and floor design, and unusual or distinguishing characteristics should be recorded, shared with other departments who provide mutual aid, and if possible, entered into the dispatcher’s computer so that the information is readily available if an incident is reported at the noted address.
  • Since many fire departments have tens and hundreds of thousands of structures within their jurisdiction, it is a challenge to establish an effective preplanning system. Priority should be given to those having elevated or unusual fire hazards and life safety considerations.
  • One tool for fire departments to use in assessing their risks for structures within their jurisdictions is the mnemonic, BECOME SAFE: (HERE) 
    • Building
    • Evaluation
    • Construction/occupancy
    • Operational hazards
    • Manage time and elements
    • Engagement
    • Situational awareness
    • Assessment and risk analysis
    • Fire behavior and effects
    • Evaluate and execute  
 
 

BECOME SAFE by CJ Naum

In this incident, the presence of the bowstring truss presented an elevated life safety consideration in the event of a fire. A thorough building inspection and pre-incident plan for a single-story, bowstring truss occupancy in this area could have potentially identified the hazards typically associated with this type of construction such as: ceiling voids, fuel loads, non-permitted renovations, roof construction, HVAC location, and exit locations. Evaluating the construction features and layout of the structure allows the fire department the opportunity to determine a response protocol for the specific identified hazards and to develop fireground strategies and tactics (ventilation strategies, avenues of fire spread, proper attack line selection, etc.) before an incident occurs.  

The construction features of occupancy (bowstring truss), possible commercial fuel loads and access restrictions suggested large volumes of water would be necessary to fight a major fire at the site. A more complete pre-planning process, involving individual fire companies within their response territory could have noted this information which may have aided the IC in developing a safer and more effective offensive or defensive strategy. In order to facilitate open communication, fire department personnel and building code officials should be cross-trained on each-others’ duties and responsibilities.  

Fire fighters should have a basic understanding of what a code violation is and how to report them during a pre-plan, and building code inspectors should have a basic understanding of fire fighter safety issues during their inspections. The relay of this information could be used to facilitate dynamic risk management and enhanced command and control. 

  • See Report Insights related to Bowstring Truss Roof Operations on the FDNY Waldbaum’s Fire August 1978; HERE 

  

Posted by on December 19, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, compentencies, construction, decision-making, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, size-up, Truss • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse Fire 1999

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Today December 3, 2010 marks the 11th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.   

For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.   

The Worcester Six;   

  • Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
  • Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
  • Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
  • Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
  • Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
  • Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine

   

On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.   

Due to these and other factors, the responding District Chief ordered a second alarm within 4 minutes of the initial dispatch. The first alarm assignment brought 30 firefighters and officers and 7 pieces of apparatus to the scene. The second provided an additional 12 men and 3 trucks as well as a Deputy Chief. Firefighters encountered a light smoke condition throughout the warehouse, and crews found a large fire in the former office area of the second floor. An aggressive interior attack was started within the second floor and ventilation was conducted on the roof. There were no windows or other openings in the warehousing space above the second floor.   

Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors. Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.   

Copywrite 1999 Roger B. Conant All Rights Reserved

An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.   

A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and deluge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts.   

According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities.     

 

Fireground Operations

    

KEY ISSUES   

Abandoned building left unprotected and unsecured.   

  • The failure to properly secure and maintain security at this warehouse allowed vagrants to enter, live in, and cause a fire in the building.
  • The lack of detection and suppression systems allowed the fire to grow unrestrained until discovered from the outside.

No barriers to prevent the spread of fire and smoke in a large space.   

  • Despite some floors having over 15,000 square feet of storage space, there were no rated fire walls, functioning fire doors, or even an interior finish that would help limit fire growth and the spread of heat and smoke.

Fire spread via combustible interior finishes.   

  • Being a cold storage warehouse, many walls and ceilings were covered with a combustible insulation material including cork, tar, expanded polystyrene foam, and sprayed-on polyurethane foam.

Delayed fire reporting   

  • The building occupants left the warehouse without notifying authorities, and the fire was reported by passing motorists who observed smoke venting from the roof.
  • The absence of uncovered windows also prevented earlier detection from the exterior.

Access limitations for fire suppression and rescue.   

  • Building construction featured a single staircase from the basement to the roof. This vertical opening was the only way to move through all levels and was congested with men and equipment from the start of operations.
  • The storage areas of the warehouse had no windows. These two factors left firefighters above the first floor without a secondary escape route and prevented ladder and rescue operations through windows.

Unusually long interior travel distances.   

  • Firefighters had to crawl over 200 feet through heavy smoke from the single staircase to conduct a proper search.
  • Most lifelines were only 50 foot and SCBA air was limited to 30 minutes.
  • Searches and rescue operations were ineffective under these circumstances.

    

Exterior Circa 1998

BUILDING HISTORY AND CONSTRUCTION   

The Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse building was a six story structure at 266 Franklin Street in the heart of Worcester’s former warehousing and cold storage district. In the first half of the 21st century, cold storage was vital to the preservation and delivery of food before refrigerators became commonplace in American kitchens. The location was ideal with rail service provided by the former Boston and Albany Railroad which had a siding against the south end of the warehouse.   

Even after the post-WWII decline in railroads, truck traffic was easily accommodated over nearby roads and later on the abutting Interstate 290 which was built in the late 1960’s.   

The original warehouse (called “A-building” in previous reports) was constructed in 1906, faced due north onto Franklin Street and bordered Arctic Street to the east. There were six storage levels as well as a basement. The building measured 88 feet by 88 feet and had over 7,000 square feet of floor space on each level. The warehouse had an approximate exterior height of 80 feet.   

An addition (called “B-building”) was constructed in 1912 against the west wall of A-building and measured 72 feet by 120 feet on the third floor and above. The 72 foot wall faced Franklin Street. The first and second floors were 88 foot and 101 foot deep respectively to accommodate railroad sidings and other structures on the southern on “C” side. Other investigations have referred to the former western exterior wall of A-building as “the fire wall” but there is no indication that this was a planned function. At least one opening was cut through this party wall on each level to access the new addition. B-building provided an additional 7,000 square feet of storage on the third floor and over 8,000 on floors four through six.   

The Worcester Cold Storage complex involved additional structures to the south, but these were physically separate buildings and were not involved in this incident. The known openings between the warehouse and the southern structures were for utilities and refrigerants. The only effect was to block aerial access from the south during the fire.   

  • Construction methods appear to be the same in both A and B buildings.
  • Exterior walls were 18 inches thick and consisted of brick and mortar. Interior floors on the first and second levels were poured concrete and were supported by cast iron columns.
  • The concrete was covered with carpet or asbestos tile where appropriate for use.
  • Upper floors were of heavy timber construction with 12 foot long 4 inch by 12 inch wood joists (16 inch o.c.) resting in pockets in the east and west brick exterior walls and attached to 16 inch by 16 inch wood girders on the inside.
  • The girders were on 12 foot centers and rested on 16 inch by 16 inch wood columns which were spaced 12 feet apart in both dimensions.
  • Flooring consisted of two layers of tongue and groove hardwood with some areas having an additional layer of 3/8 inch diamond plate.
  • Ceilings on individual floors varied from open joists in storage areas to be a suspended ceiling in the office area on the second floor.
  • Photographs taken prior to the fire suggest that some sections also had “glass board” as a finished surface. The exact make up of this material has not been determined.
  • No documentation was made of ceiling heights within the warehouse, but it appears they were approximately 11 foot throughout.
  • The roof was tar and gravel over a wood deck which covered a 4 foot tall cockloft above the sixth floor ceiling/roof assembly.
  • Roof penetrations included the stairway and elevator shaft on the east end of A-building and a skylight over the elevator shafts on B-building. An illuminated billboard sat on the roof of B-building and received power external to the warehouse structure.

NOTE: For the balance of this report the entire fire building will be referred to as the “warehouse” which consists of “A-building” on the east and “B-building” on the west. The A and B terminology was adopted early on in other investigations and should not be confused with fireground identifications of sides “A, B, C, & D”. In a large complex such as this, other terminology could have been created such as “Building 1”, “Building Z”, etc. (refer to the USFA Report for diagrams)   

BUILDING USE   

Worcester Cold Storage, a business, occupied the warehouse from 1906 until 1983 when it was sold to Chicago Dressed Beef. In 1987, CDB Realty Trust purchased the warehouse. CDB moved its operations to Millbrook Street in 1988 and shut down the refrigeration system in 1989 at which time the building was abandoned.   

During its use, various petroleum based insulation materials were incorporated into the building including rigid expanded polystyrene boards and blown on polyurethane foam. These were applied to improve the temperature performance of the buildings Additionally, condensation along the exterior walls lead to the decay of some floor joists. Steel beams or angle brackets were added against the brick walls to pick up the floor load in several places.   

  • Even to long term employees, the building was hard to navigate.
  • The upper four stories were almost identical, and some workers reported getting lost under the dim interior lighting conditions.
  • Condensation would cause ice to form around the ceiling fixtures, and this cone of ice would severely limit the amount of illumination.
  • There was no useful external light then or during the fire.

After it’s closing in 1989, the building was illegally entered on many occasions, resulting in vandalism, occupancy by homeless individuals, and a number of small “campfires.” At the time the fire occurred, there were no utility services in operation. Significant amounts of garbage and human wastes were scattered around the warehouse. The homeless woman involved in this incident said the interior smelled like a sewer.   

VERTICAL PENETRATIONS   

There were three stairways in the warehouse. Stairway 1 was in the northwest corner of B-building and went from the first floor (approximate street level) up to the second floor office area. Stairway 2 was located in the southern portion of B-building and went from the first floor to the third. It may have also accessed the basement. Stairway 3 was on the east side of A-building and ran from the basement to the roof. This was the only means of egress from the upper floors and was used heavily during the fire.   

Two elevators were adjacent to stairway 3, and two more were adjacent to Stairway 2. At the time of the fire, all had been disabled, and the cars were in the basement. It is unknown if individual access doors were open or closed. The elevator shaft in B-building had a reinforced glass canopy at the roof level.   

  • A 14 inch by 14 inch shaft penetrated the ceiling of the second floor office area and originally housed a 12 inch pipe for the ammonia recovery system.
  • This may have opened through all floors, and the presence of the pipe could not be confirmed.

HORIZONTAL PENETRATIONS   

There was one opening on each level through the party wall dividing A-building from B-building. There were numerous doors and windows on the first floor, and several were forced open by firefighters to gain access. All windows on this level were secured with plywood to prevent entry. Windows on the second floor of B-building were limited to the office area in the northwest section and were also covered with plywood. There was a window on each of the second, third, and fourth floors in stairway 3 on the east side of A-building. A window opened into the adjacent elevator shaft on each of these floors also. All were blocked with plywood.   

INTERIOR FINISH   

Because the warehouse was used for cold storage, the insides of exterior walls and the roof were heavily insulated. Barriers between office space and freezer space were also heavily insulated. The original material of choice was cork which was impregnated or secured with tar. The thickness has been described from 6 inches to 18 inches depending on the location. Evidence was also found of additional layers of expanded polystyrene sheets and blown on polyurethane. In many places the finished surface was “glass board”. A recovered piece of this glass board was ignited by Worcester Fire personnel after this incident. The sample sustained combustion and gave off stringy black smoke not unlike pure styrene.   

It was reported that all the interior partitions were made of corkboard, but it was probably a covering rather than a structural element. The office walls on the second floor were paneling installed over drywall. Many photographs of the cold storage areas taken before the fire show interior surfaces with a clean outer appearance consistent with the glass board. This would have provided a cleanable and wear resistant surface as opposed to bare cork or foam insulation.   

INTERIOR LAYOUT   

Since the fire did not extend to the basement or first floor, the layout of these spaces is less important. The first floor did, however, provide the access to the rest of the building for fire operations. All space above the first floor was used for cold storage or moving goods with the exception of the second floor office area on the northern half of B-building.   

  

    

 

  

Posted by on December 3, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, command-leadership, fire-rescue-topics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, in-the-line-of-duty • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Fire Service Features of Buildings and Fire Protection Systems

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Fire Service Features of Buildings and Fire Protection Systems

Fire Service Features of Buildings and Fire Protection Systems is a very useful manual that was developed and published by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor for the purpose to increase the safety of building occupants and emergency responders by streamlining fire service interaction with building features and fire protection systems.

The information in this manual will assist designers of buildings and fire protection systems to better understand the needs of the fire service when they are called upon to operate in or near the built environment and provide fire service personnel with a greater degree of understanding  and be able to interface with governmental and design professionals for improved fire protection features and arrangements.

To put this another way, architects and engineers create workplaces for firefighters. Designs can be tailored to better meet operational needs, thereby reducing the time it takes to mitigate an incident. The guidance in this manual is expected to decrease the injuries to responding and operating fire service personnel. When an incident can be mitigated faster, there is less time for the hazardous situation to grow in proportion. With less potential exposure, employees occupying buildings will be afforded greater protection from fire incidents.

Employee occupants as well as fire service employees will realize the benefits of this manual in terms of safe working conditions as intended by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. The codes and standards governing buildings and fire protection systems are well understood by designers. However, many portions of these codes and standards allow design variations or contain only general performance language. The resulting flexibility permits the selection of different design options. Some of these options may facilitate fire service operations better than others.

The particular needs and requirements of the fire service are typically not known thoroughly by persons not associated with these operations. This manual discusses how the fire service interacts with different building features and it suggests methods for streamlining such interaction. To provide the most effective protection, fire service personnel should be considered as users of building features and fire protection systems. While far less frequent than mechanical events or other failures, fire can cause greater destruction in terms of property loss, disruption of operations, injury, and death.

Designers routinely consider the needs and comfort of building occupants when arranging a building’s layout and systems. Within the framework of codes and standards, design options may be exercised to benefit a particular owner, tenant, or user. For example, a building code would typically dictate the minimum number of lavatories and water fountains. However, the location, distribution, and types of such facilities are left to the designer in consultation with the client.

The application of fire protection features in buildings is similar. For instance, a fire code may require the installation of a fire department connection for a sprinkler system or an annunciator for a fire alarm system. However, there may be little or no guidance as to the location, position, features, or marking of such devices. This manual provides this type of guidance to designers. However, specific local requirements or preferences may differ. Input should always be obtained from local code officials and the fire service organization, the “client” in this case.

This manual is to be used voluntarily, as a companion to mandatory and advisory provisions in building codes, life safety codes, fire codes, safety regulations, and installation standards for fire protection systems. The material contained in this document focuses on ways that safety of building occupantsdesigners can contribute to the efficiency of fire suppression operations. This material is applicable to all fire service organizations, including fire brigades and fire departments.

Download the manual HERE or HERE 

Posted by on November 27, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", Codes, risk-based assessment • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Green Building Construction for the Fire Service

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Green Building Construction for the Fire Service by Lt. John Shafer

What is a Green Building? Take a look at a new Blog Post on Firehouse.com by an emerging and up and coming leader in the fire service Lt. John Shafer. Check out  Lt. Shafer’s facebook page called Green Buildings for the Fire Service with informative information on Green Building issues http://www.facebook.com/pages/Green-Building-Construction-for-Fire-Service/146302678730175

Posted by on November 25, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service • Tagged: , , , , , , , , ,

1980 MGM Grand Hotel Fire-Thirty Years Ago

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Thirty years ago on the morning of November 21, 1980, 85 people died and more than 700 were injured as a result of a fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. This was the second largest life-loss hotel fire in United States history. It was determined during the investigation that the fire originated in the wall soffit of the side stand in the Deli, one of five restaurants located on the casino level. The investigators concluded that several factors contributed to the cause of the fire but the primary source of ignition was an electrical ground fault. 

Once the fire ignited, it quickly traveled to the ceiling and the giant air-circulation system above the casino. In the casino, flames fed on flammable furnishings, including wall coverings, PVC piping, glue, fixtures, and even the mirrors on the walls, which were made of plastic.  

The fire burned undetected for hours until it flashed over just after 7 a.m. and began spreading at a rate of 19 feet (5.8 meters) per second through the casino. As fire companies and firefighters were arriving, according to published reports, an estimated one-million-cubic-foot wall of flames was rushing through the casino, melting slot machines and sending a cyanide-laced cloud of killer smoke pouring upward.  

The investigation determined that the rapid fire spread was due to a series of installation and building design flaws. A wire at the point of fire origin that had been improperly grounded could’ve been discovered had the area been inspected. A compressor wasn’t properly installed. A piece of copper wasn’t insulated correctly. A fire alarm never sounded. A stairwell that was a crucial escape route filled with smoke. The laundry chutes failed to seal and defects existed in the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems. All of these factors contributed to the spread of smoke.  

Photo: AP/World Wide

This fire provided a wake-up call for the industry to improve fire safety standards in hotels around the country. As a result, hotels today are safer than ever.  

  • About 5,000 people were in the resort when the blaze started to burn in earnest.
  • Many were trapped in their rooms, in the corridors, and in stairwells, and most of the victims died at the scene or in Las Vegas Valley hospitals.
  • Another handful of victims succumbed to fire-related injuries within a year.
  • Fourteen firefighters were hospitalized, most suffering from smoke inhalation.
  • According to the newspapers reports, NFPA’s Fire Investigation Manager, David Demers, concluded that “with sprinklers, it would have been a one or two sprinkler fire, and we would never have heard about it.”
  • An employee cutting through the closed Deli on the way to work was the first to see the fire. The worker, not identified by name in the fire investigation report, called security, then tried to put it out. The worker wasn’t trained and the proper equipment wasn’t there, the NFPA investigation said.
  • A visiting firefighter from Illinois breakfasting in an adjacent coffee shop also tried to help a security guard find an extinguisher to put out the electrical fire, but they couldn’t locate one.
  • A flame front moved into the casino, where the fire gained speed and strength, fueled by more flammable materials, including the highly flammable adhesive used to attach ceiling tiles.
  • Again, sprinklers would have put the fire out there.
  • Without them, within minutes, the fireball tore through the casino, blowing out the doors leading to the valet area.
  • Soon, killer smoke rose through the 26-floor high-rise tower via ventilation ducts.
  • While the lack of sprinklers was a major factor contributing to the severity of the MGM fire, it’s not that simple. Blame also has to be given to code violations, design flaws, installation errors, and materials that made the fire worse.
  • The fire alarms didn’t sound because they were manual and nobody pulled them. However, the disaster might have been worse if the alarms had prompted more people to rush into smoke-filled hallways.
  • Despite the discovery of 83 building code violations, nobody was ever charged criminally with any wrongdoing

 To make matters worse, fire marshals had insisted sprinklers be installed in the casino during the building’s construction in 1972, but the hotel refused to pay for the $192,000 system, and a Clark County building official sided with the resort. Authorities later said the sprinkler system could have prevented the disaster at the hotel, which is now Bally’s Las Vegas Hilton Casino Resort. The fallout was $223 million in legal settlements, in addition to the lives lost.   

  • Construction of the 26-story MGM Grand Hotel and Casino (currently Bally’s) started in 1972 and it opened in December of 1973.
  • There were 2,078 rooms at the hotel and the total area of the hotel and casino was approximately two million square feet.
  • Fire sprinkler systems were not installed in the high-rise hotel, the casino (approximately 380 by 1200 feet, or 450,000 square feet), and the restaurant areas.
  • Only partial fire sprinkler protection was provided for limited areas (arcade, showrooms and convention areas) on the ground level.
  • Where the sprinklers had been installed, they clearly worked. But sprinklers weren’t anywhere near where the fire broke out behind a wall near a serving station at The Deli that Friday morning about 7:10 a.m.
  • The Deli had received an exemption for sprinklers because it was supposed to be a 24-hour restaurant. It was assumed someone would always be there to put out a fire.
  • But then the hours changed and The Deli wasn’t open all the time. It was closed when the fire erupted.
  • The fire, caused by an electrical ground-fault, smoldered for hours before breaking through the wall.

   

  • According to NFPA’s final investigation report , several major factors contributed to the large loss of life in this fire. Among them was the rapid fire and smoke development in the casino in the early stages of the fire due, in part, to the lack of sprinklers and adequate fire barriers.
  • The fire generated massive amounts of smoke that spread up the hotel’s 23-story high-rise tower through unprotected vertical seismic joints and elevator hoistways and the substandard interior stair enclosures and exit passages.
  • In addition, the hotel’s heating, ventilating, and air conditioning continued to operate during the fire, pushing smoke throughout the high-rise.
  • Investigators found no evidence that the hotel had executed an emergency plan or sounded an evacuation alarm signal. Nor was there any evidence of manual fire alarm pull stations in the natural escape path in the casino.
  • The number and capacity of the exits from the casino were deficient, and the travel distances from certain areas of the casino to the exits were too long.
  • Finally, there was no automatic means of recalling the elevators to the main floor during the fire to prevent people from boarding them. Ten of the MGM Grand victims were found in the hotel’s elevators.
  • As a result of this fire, NFPA Life Safety Code® requirements for stairwell re-entry onto building floors if the exit stair enclosure becomes untenable were changed to include three options.
  • Stairwell doors must now remain unlocked on the inside of the stairwell so that people can get from the stairwell back to guest room floor.
  • Or they may be locked, but they must automatically unlock when the building’s fire alarm system activates.
  • Or hotels may use selected re-entry, in which there may be no more than four intervening floors between unlocked doors and signs must be provided to direct occupants to the floors with unlocked doors

Graphic by Mike Johnson.

  On the night of February 10, 1981, just 90 days after the devastating MGM Grand fire, an arson fire started at the Las Vegas Hilton, which at the time was being retrofitted with modern fire safety equipment. Firefighters, using the knowledge they had learned from the MGM fire, used local television networks to notify people to stay in their rooms and not go out to the halls and stairwells. Because of the lessons learned, only eight people died in this fire compared with the 84 people who died in the MGM Grand fire 

   

   

Reference Links: HERE, HERE, HERE , HERE and HERE   

Clark County (NV) Fire Department Report: HERE and Link to FD Page HERE   

NFPA Summary Report, HERE and HERE  and Article Link HERE 

NFPA Looking back at the MGM Fire, HERE   

RELATED NFPA INFORMATION
 NFPA Investigation Report: Las Vegas MGM Grand Fire  

 U.S. Hotel Fire Incident With 10 Or More Fatalities (PDF, 17KB)
 Additional Hotel/Motel Safety Information and Statistics
 Looking Back: The MGM Grand Hotel Fire (NFPA Journal, May/June 2010)
 NFPA remembers the 1980 MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas (NFPA Journal, March/April 2001) 

Las Vegas Review Journal Media Research: Here   

USFA Topical Fire Report Series; Hotel and Motel Fires, HERE 

Lessons from the Past: MGM Grand Fire on Firehouse.com, HERE   

Las Vegas and Nevada history as told by those who lived it- The MGM Fire 1980. This six part series was broadcast in 2000 and produced by KNPR’s Tim Anderson with support from the Nevada Humanities Committee. HERE   

These links from the Las Vegas Review Journal Media covered the 25th Anniversary of the event;   

IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER
IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Disaster didn’t have to be
IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Officer recalls eerie scene at burned hotel   

MGM Grand Fire Photos, HERE   

Current Data from the USFA:  

  • An estimated 3,900 hotel and motel fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 15 deaths, 150 injuries, and $76 million in property loss.
  • Hotel and motel fires are considered part of the residential fire problem. However, they comprise only approximately 1 percent of residential building fires.
  • Half of hotel and motel fires are small, confined fires.
  • Cooking is the leading cause of hotel and motel fires (46 percent). Almost all hotel and motel cooking fires are small, confined fires (97 percent).
  • Eighteen percent of non-confined hotel and motel fires extend beyond the room of origin. The leading causes of these larger fires are electrical malfunctions (24 percent), intentionally set fires (15 percent), and fires caused by open flames (12 percent). In contrast, 42 percent of all non-confined residential building fires extend beyond the room of origin.
  • While bedrooms are the primary origin of non-confined fires (23 percent), when confined cooking fires are considered, the kitchen or other cooking area is the most prevalent area of fire origin.
  • Hotel and motel fires are more prevalent in the cooler months due to increases in heating fires and peak in February (9 percent).

Bally's Las Vegas, formerly the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino today

Posted by on November 20, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Codes, construction, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, high-rise, major-incidents, mass-casualty-incident, NFPA, pre-planning, Sprinklers, structure fires, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Residential Fire Sprinklers: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH FOR COMMUNITIES

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Residential Fire Sprinklers: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH FOR COMMUNITIES

Residential Fire Sprinklers…A Step-By-Step Approach for Communities (Second Edition) – National Fire Sprinkler Association and International Association of Fire Chiefs – has developed and published a comprehensive  guide  for all stakeholders, from the citizen to the fire chief and from the homebuilder to the elected official, with an interest in improving fire protection in their community. There are a lot of great examples of communities who have been successful in adopting fire sprinkler requirements; this guide expresses some of their tactics to success.

The Guide has been developed by the National Fire Sprinkler Association in cooperation with the International Association of Fire Chiefs to assist you as a local Authority Having Jurisdiction and/or as a community advocate. You can meet the challenge and minimize the loss of life and property to fire in your community through the planning and implementation of a comprehensive residential fire sprinkler program.

The Guide essentially consists of six sections intended to systematically support the process of developing, adopting, and defending a residential fire sprinkler requirements.

  • Section 1 – Policy Decision: Are You Ready?
  • Section 2 – Building Partnerships: Mobilizing the Stakeholders
  • Section 3 – Planning and Research: Choosing the Path
  • Section 4 – Presentation and Adoption: Making it Happen
  • Section 5 – Customer Service and Support
  • Section 6 – Never Let Your Guard Down

While these sections focus on the residential dwelling segment of the current fire sprinkler market and technology, the concepts described in each of these sections may be found to be helpful in addressing similar issues with other types of occupancies for which fire sprinkler ordinances are appropriate. The most effective means of reducing community risk is achieved when current fire and building codes are adopted and enforced as well as all buildings, residential included, are protected with fire sprinklers.

 The Guide will also discuss the collection and use of statistical data and show how it can be used effectively to reflect issues specific to your community. The outline, which helps to focus on the use of a Blue-Ribbon Task Force (working group),may be useful in opening lines of communication between the agency and its “stakeholders” and “unexpected messengers” who will be impacted by the adoption of the residential fire sprinkler requirements. These types of working groups can often resolve problems before they become a political issue.

And finally, the Guide defines some materials that should be obtained, so that the information collected can be “user friendly” and effective throughout the process. Also incorporated in this Guide is a list of other resources, which may be helpful in the planning, research, analysis, or other phases of the process. The National Fire Sprinkler Association and the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and their staff and membership stand united and committed to assisting you in this undertaking.

The resources referenced in the guide are as comprehensive as exists when it comes to fire sprinklers in all new construction, especially residential fire sprinklers. With a majority of the fire deaths in the United States occurring in residential buildings, and billions of dollars in fire loss attributed to the direct and indirect costs associated with residential fires, it is time for state and local fire and building officials to seek the solutions to this national tragedy.

The people who use this guide will play different roles in the process to improve quality of life in the community through fire protection improvements. The amount of time spent to ensure a safer future for the community will vary depending on the role in the community. The authors strongly recommend that regardless of the role, everyone involved should make the commitment to read this guide as a minimum. Each section of this guide contains information important to each stakeholder in the process. As you read through it, pay particular attention to the parts directly related to your role, also look for the other perspectives in relation to yours. Taking this action will help to ensure the outcome focuses on the citizen and the quality of life of the community.

You can find a wealth of reference and technical information at the National Fire Sprinkler Association web site HERE and download the Residential Fire Sprinklers…A Step-By-Step Approach for Communities (Second Edition) Guide HERE

Posted by on November 7, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", advocate, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Codes, fire behavior, Fire Protection Engineering, fire-prevention-education, firefighting-operations, fires, research, residential, Sprinklers • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements

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Major factors contributing to a rapid spread of fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., on June 18, 2007, included large open spaces with furniture providing high fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows and a lack of sprinklers, according to a draft report released for public comment today by the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The fire trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter fatalities in a single event since 9/11.

Based on its findings, the NIST technical study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes.1 If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented.

“Furniture stores typically have large amounts of combustible material and represent a significant fire hazard,” said NIST study leader Nelson Bryner. “Model building codes should require both new and existing furniture stores to have automatic sprinklers, especially if those stores include large, open display areas.”

Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet). Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.

Using a state-of-the-art computer model to simulate the fire, the study team found that the addition of automatic sprinklers inside the loading dock could have significantly slowed the fire (which began just outside the dock area), prevented it from spreading beyond the dock, and eventually, extinguished it completely. The model also showed that sprinklers on the loading dock likely would have maintained what firefighters call tenability conditions, the ability for individuals in a fire event to escape unassisted.

Factors identified as contributing to the fire’s progress include: (1) the high fuel loads—especially furniture—present throughout the building; (2) the lack of sprinklers throughout the Sofa Super Store; (3) the open floor plan of the facility; (4) the hidden build-up of combustible smoke and gases in the area between the drop ceiling and the roof of the main showroom; (5) the non-fire-activated roll-up door that was open between the loading dock and the holding area; (6) the four fire-activated roll-up doors (out of seven) that activated but did not close during the fire; (7) the metal walls in the warehouse and west showroom that allowed heat from the fire to ignite items next to the walls; and (8) the breaking of windows at the front of the store that supplied air to the fire.

NIST’s team of experts traveled to Charleston to gather data within 36 hours of the Sofa Super Store fire. Using these data and other information collected in the following months (such as building design documents, records, plans, video and photographic data, radio transmissions, interviews with emergency responders, and informal discussions with store employees), the NIST study team developed its computer model to simulate and analyze the characteristics of the fire, including fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, and the operation of active and passive fire protection systems.

Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:

  • The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
  • During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
  • The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
  • The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
  • When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
  • The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
  • Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.

The complete draft report is available online at http://www.nist/gov/el

NIST welcomes comments on the draft report and its recommendations. To be considered for the final report, comments must be received by noon EST on Dec. 2, 2010. Comments may be submitted via e-mail to firesafety@nist.gov; fax to (301) 975-4052; or mail to the attention of NIST Technical Study: Sofa Super Store, NIST, 100 Bureau Dr., Stop 8660, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8660.

Once the final report is published, NIST will work with the appropriate committees of the International Code Council (ICC) on using the study’s recommendations to improve provisions in model building and fire codes. NIST also will work with the major organizations representing state and local governments—including building and fire officials—and firefighters to encourage them to seriously consider its recommendations.

Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire

1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised.

2.   Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address:

a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.

3.  Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031.

4.  Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision:

a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).

5.  Comprehensive Risk Management Plans:  NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to:

a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.

6.  Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities: 

a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground.

7.  Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are:

a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires.

8.  Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are:

a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service. 

9.  Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective.

10.  Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to:

a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations.

11.  Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies.

NIST has more than 40 years of experience conducting building and fire safety studies and researching the aftermath of disasters and failures. By understanding the technical causes for such incidents and making the information available to the public, NIST scientists and engineers strive to improve the safety of buildings, their occupants and emergency responders. NIST’s technical building failure and fire studies do not address fault.

  • Volume I: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
  • Volume II: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
    (Note: The reports are presented in .pdf. To read these files, you can download Adobe Acrobat Reader free.)
  • Statement to the Media Delivered at NIST Charleston Fire Study Press Briefing, Oct. 28, 2010, by Nelson Bryner, Lead, Study Team
  • PowerPoint Presentation Accompanying Statement at Press Briefing
  • Video B-Roll on the NIST Charleston Fire Study (mp4)
  • Graphic Showing Floor Plan of Charleston Sofa Super Store
  • Graphic Showing Smoke and Fire Movement at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Temperature Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Oxygen Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
    • Posted by on October 28, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Charleston, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, decision-making, events, failures, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, History Repeating Event, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Naum, NIST, Reports, Safety, Sprinklers • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    International Society of Fire Service Instructors; “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.”

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    The International Society of Fire Service Instructors is proud to announce the release of “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.” The program is a train-the trainer package that combines the latest research on light weight building construction from National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), Underwriters Laboratories(UL), Michigan State University, The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and the Chicago Fire Department into a single resource tailored for company-level instruction.

    The program was made possible through a Prevention & Research Grant from the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program and the Department of Homeland Security. The ISFSI partnered with Eastern Kentucky University’s Fire & Safety Engineering Technology Program to analyze line of duty deaths between 1997 and 2009 to study the impact that lightweight construction has had on firefighters and firefighting operations.

    The DVD included in the program package contains all of the instructional resources necessary to provide quality training on this important topic. A wide variety of support materials are included to provide the user a deep understanding of the challenges with modern building construction techniques. Instructors can tailor the program to meet the needs of their audience, including a 2-hour brief up to a week-long program.

    The program will be distributed to all members of the ISFSI as a free member benefit. The ISFSI has also partnered with the Safety & Health Section of the IAFC to provide a copy to each of its members. ISFSI President, Eddie Buchanan, was on hand at the Safety & Health Section Meeting at FRI to personally deliver Chief Billy Goldfeder his copy as chair of the section. All members should expect their copy to arrive in their mailboxes over the next week.

    “I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to the ISFSI members and staff who worked so hard to bring this product to firefighters across America and the globe. It is truly a lifesaving program and a fantastic use of grant funds. It is critical that this package get into the hands of every instructor and fire officer to ensure they are educated and prepared to handle the real risk that looms out there on the next call,” said President Buchanan.

    Check out the International Society of Fire Service Instructor’s (ISFSI) web site HERE.

    Not a member? Take the time to sign up and get connected.

    Posted by on September 3, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "health and safety", "pre-fire planning", assemblies, behaviors, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, dynamics, Engineered Structural Systems, failures, Fatalities, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, IAFC, NIST, occupancies, Safety Culture, size-up, statistics, strategies • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings Report issued by the USFA

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    The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA)has  issued a special report examining the characteristics of fatal fires in residential buildings. The report, Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.

    The report is part of the Topical Fire Report Series and is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). According to the report, an estimated 1,800 fatal residential building fires occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss. The leading cause of fatal residential fires is smoking (19 percent) and the leading areas of fire origin are bedrooms (27 percent) and common areas such as living and family rooms (23 percent). In addition, fatal residential fires, which tend to be larger, cause more damage, and have higher injury rates than nonfatal residential fires, occur most frequently in the late evening and early morning hours, peaking from midnight to 5 a.m. Finally, these types of fires are more prevalent in the cooler months, peaking in January (13 percent).

    The topical reports are designed to explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS. Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.

    Findings

    ■ An estimated 1,800 fatal residential building fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss.

    ■ Fatal residential building fires tend to be larger, cause more damage, and have higher injury rates than nonfatal residential fires.

    ■ Smoking is the leading cause of fatal residential building fires (19 percent).

    ■ The leading areas of fire origin in fatal residential building fires are bedrooms (27 percent) and common areas such as living and family rooms (23 percent).

    ■ Fatal residential building fires are more prevalent in the cooler months, peaking in January (13 percent).

    ■ Fatal residential building fires occur most frequently in the late evening and early morning hours, peaking from midnight to 5 a.m. One-third (33 percent) of fatal residential fires occur during these 5 hours.

    ■ About two-thirds (66 percent) of fatal residential building fires are confined to the building of origin or extend beyond the building of origin.

    The U.S. fire death rate has gone down dramatically over the past three decades since the creation of the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), from over 30 deaths per million population to 11 deaths per million population. The United States, however, continues to have one of the highest fire death rates per capita among Western Nations.

     The original goal for USFA was to help lead a reduction in fire deaths by 50 percent in a generation. With annual fire deaths dropping from over 9,000 to less than 3,500 in that period of time, USFA’s goal has been achieved. Nevertheless, fire deaths are still high. Approximately 1,800 fatal residential building fires occurred annually in recent years (2006 to 2008). These fires resulted in an annual average of approximately 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss.

    This report is one of a continuing series of topical reports issued by the USFA’s National Fire Data Center and addresses the characteristics of fatal residential building fires reported to the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) from 2006 to 2008, the most recent data available at the time of the analysis. Because 79 percent of fire deaths occur in residential buildings, they are the focus of this report. The information in this report about fatal residential fires can be used not only to assess progress but also to understand the nature of the fatal fire problem and its implications for targeting of prevention programs. For the purpose of this report, the terms “residential fires” and “fatal residential fires” are synonymous with “residential building fires” and “fatal residential building fires,” respectively. “Fatal residential fires” is used throughout the body of this report; the findings, tables, charts, headings, and footnotes reflect the full category, “fatal residential building fires.”

    The report, Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings,HERE 

    Posted by on August 21, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Fatalities, fire service, fire suppression, Reports, Tpical Report Series, USFA • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety

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    Commandsafety.com is pleased to make available the latest update to the Buildingsonfire.com’s Building Construction Training and Lecture Series for 2010. Recently updated with a series of new seminar and training program topics addressing the emerging training and educational needs of the fire service, these programs provide timely and relevant information and insights on Building Construction, Command Risk Management, Dynamic and Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Situational Awareness, Engineered Structural Systems and Fire Fighter Safety.

    These programs also present and integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and much more.  

    These programs, lectures and seminars examine crucial construction elements and occupancy types and correlates building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety. These fast paced programs will utilize extensive multimedia materials, interactive activities, case study activities and simulations to reinforce course content and subject areas, providing exceptional learning opportunities.

    Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)

    Down load the program files from the link below for more information.

    Building Construction Training Programs 2010

     

    Posted by on July 2, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, courage to be safe, decision-making, education, Engineered Structural Systems, Fire Protection Engineering, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, Naum, research, strategies, Systems and Assemblies, training, training-development, training-fire-rescue-topics • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report

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    8-26-2009 7-07-53 AMNIOSH released it’s report on the August 24, 2009 three alarm fire at 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo, New York that resulted in the LODD of Lt. Charles McCarthy and FF Jonathan Croom. On August 24, 2009, 45-year-old career Lieutenant Charles McCarthy died following a partial floor collapse into a basement fire, and  34-year-old career fire fighter Jonathan Croom was fatally injured while attempting to rescue the Lieutenant.  The Buffalo Fire Department was dispatched for “an alarm of fire” with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. Repeated attempts were made to force open this basement door in order to search for trapped civilians, but crews had difficulty gaining access through this door because it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the 1st and 2nd floors with no civilians found.

    Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional manpower was sent with special tools to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2. Lieutenant Charles McCarthy and two fire fighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify all fire fighters had exited a 1st floor deli. Lt. McCarthy following a hoseline into the structure, was well ahead of the other two fire fighters when the 1st floor partially collapsed beneath him. McCarthy fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire. The other two fire fighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. Lt. McCarthy made several Mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device. Confusion erupted exteriorly on scene when trying to verify who was calling the Mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement.

    The incident commander was aware that he had crews attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure. Simultaneously, FF Croom, a member of the fire fighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside  Lieutenant McCarthy’s point of entry when the Mayday calls came out. It is believed that FF Croom  knew where the Lt., was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. FF Croom grabbed a tool, went on air, and rushed into the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other fire fighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device alarming. Lt. McCarthy was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but FF Croom was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after Lt. McCarthy’s Mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the 1st floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. the Lt’s. PASS device was still alarming. They were pronounced dead on scene. Four fire fighters and one lieutenant suffered minor injuries during the incident. No civilians were discovered within the structure.

    Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity not maintained.

    NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

    • Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
    • Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
    • Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
    • Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
    • Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
    • Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
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    1815 Genesee Street 1815 Genesee Street

    CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

    Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that may have led to the fatalities:

    • Working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire.
    • Interior condition reports not communicated to command.
    • Inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments.
    • Crew integrity not maintained.

    Time Line from the Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report

    3:51 a.m. – fire crews were sent to 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo. When they arrived, they were met by a resident who said he heard people trapped inside. Crews began searching the building, but were eventually ordered out as conditions deteriorated.

    4:22 a.m. – Members of Rescue 1 entered the building to make sure all firefighters had evacuated the building. Less than two minutes later the floor in the rear of the building collapsed. Lt. McCarthy of Rescue 1 fell into the basement as the floor collapsed. according to the report, other members of Rescue 1 were unaware of the collapse and only reported hearing a loud noise. McCarthy began calling for help on his radio, but other members of Rescue 1 were unable to determine where the calls were coming from and left the building unaware that Lt. McCarthy was trapped.

    4:23 a.m. – Firefighter Croom entered the building after hearing the calls for help. the report says he did not exit the building, apparently falling into the basement near Lt. McCarthy.

    4:31 a.m. – An emergency head count was ordered to determine the identity of the missing firefighter. Lt. McCarthy was reported missing at that time, but FF Croom was not. Firefighters in the front of the store reported hearing a pass alarm, but could not reach it due to extreme fire conditions, a weakened floor and continuing collapse.

    4:48 a.m. – all crews were ordered out of the building because it had become unsafe.

    Later, concerns began to arise that FF Croom was missing. the report says he was erroneously reported in a remote area.

    5:46 a.m. – On scene personal realize FF Croom is missing and likely inside the building.

    6:10 a.m. – Another head count is taken and FF Croom is reported missing.

    9:18 a.m. – the Recovery Group reports that the two missing firefighters had been located in the basement, covered in fallen debris.

    9:32 a.m. – the debris is cleared and Recovery Group firefighters reach Lt. McCarthy and FF Croom.

    Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report, issued December 2, 2009, HERE

    For a comprehensive Power Point Program on Operational Safety at Heavy Timber and Ordinary Construction Occupancys that you can down load, go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting Web Site HERE.

    I produced an informational training PPT program and support information that aligned with a previoulsy reported Near Miss Event Report. You can download the PPT Training Program HERE and the PDF File HERE

    NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE

    Posted by on March 30, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, assemblies, building construction, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, floors, LODD, NIOSH, ordinary, pre-planning, structure fires • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Operational Safety at Buildings Under Renovation

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    httpv://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8F_rSeUQQYM

    A multiple alarm fire consumed the county courthouse in downtown Pittsboro, North Carolina yesterday. The building was undergoing renovations at the time of the fire and was occupied and operational. The fire started in the clock tower of the 130-yr.-old building and is believed to have been caused by welders.  The entire building was undergoing renovation with the outside enclosed with scaffolding. 

    The clock tower had a protective tarp wrapped around it that preventing outside hose streams from reaching the seat of the fire. The fire broke out at 4:45 p.m., according to county and court officials, shortly after court sessions had ended. All who worked in the building were evacuated safely, according to county officials, and no injuries had been reported late Thursday. According to published reports, the courthouse, the centerpiece of the Pittsboro downtown, was built in stages. It was initially constructed in 1881 at a cost of $10,666, according to Paul Shield Crane’s first edition of “North Carolina Taproots: Courthouses of North Carolina.” In 1930, another story was added to the brick building and, in 1959, there was an extensive renovation that cost $130,000.

    Bottom line, buildings undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations can pose significant risk to suppression operations and lead to firefighter injuries and fatalities. This can not be stressed enough.

    The unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences, requires a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation. You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.

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    The following are assessment considerations that may provide insights in the assessment, risk profile and development of pre-fire plans, operational procedures and field directives to prevent history repeating events (HRE) with similar conditions and attributes;

     Construction Type

    • What is the construction type or mixed application? How does this affect suppression, rescue, special operations and typical daily operations?
    • Stage and/or Phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
    • The Stage and/or phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovation has, SIGNIFICANT impact on firefighter safety and operational integrity.
    • Understanding these stages and phases can provide mission critical decision-making considerations to incident management teams and company officers.

     Site conditions and accessibility

    • Considerations for both horizontal, vertical and grade conditions.
    • Considerations during changes in stages and phases. Expect changes
    • Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s

     Exposures

    • These will be specific to the commonality or uniqueness of the structure and occupancy.

     Resources

    • Do you have enough of what’s going to be needed? Plan for it now, before you’re in the street needing it “yesterday”.
    • Think BIG, as the adage goes, you can always send the companies back. Don’t under estimate the types and kind of resources needs, based upon the structure profile and the potential of undetermined conditions. (reinforces need for pre-planning)
    • Share the Knowledge, Situational Awareness and Pre-planning inf
      ormation with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

     Operating procedures
    Again, response and operations at these types of structures demands that pre-fire plan considerations, dialog, discussions, communications and what ever else is appropriate to you organization is identified and disseminated BEFORE an alarm response occurs. Take advantage of pre-gaming and table top a target occupancy, to increase preparedness and reduce risk potential.

    • Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
    • Update the plans as conditions change
    • Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

     Knowledge and Situational Awareness

    • Understand, explore, research and obtain ALL the necessary information on the structure(s) undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
    • Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
    • Communicate the observations, findings, conditions and considerations.

     Communications

    • What ever you identify- COMMUNICATE this throughout the organization.
      Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

     Special and Unique Conditions

    • Identify and plan for the Special and Unique Conditions that may exclusive to you jurisdiction’s structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.

     Contingency Plans

    • Plan of the unexpected and have contingent plans in place.

     The magnitude and complexity of an incident involving a structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations will be directly proportional to the size of the building/construction site and corresponding age profile (vintage) of the existing building, if under renovation, and degree of construction. Operational deployment and the Incident Action Plan- IAP must be addressed during strategic and tactical incident management, risk profiling and pre-incident and on-scene intelligence, reconnaissance and planning considerations: More HERE

    Posted by on March 26, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, deconstrucion, demolition, major-incidents, operations, pre-planning, Renovations, structure fires • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Shopping Center Explosion: Fluid Risk Assessment

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    YouTube Preview Image

    NIOSH recently released it’s report on the Penn-Mar Shopping Center Explosion that occured on May 7, 2008 in Prince George’s County, Maryland. Report Copy HERE. A number of mission critial lessons and insights can be gained regarding initial response, command management, operational safety, tactical deployment and effective situational awareness and dynamic risk assessment through an unstable progressing incident. Here are some of the insights and specifics.

    At 12:54 PM on Thursday, May 7, 2009, Prince George’s County Firefighter/Medics were dispatched to respond to the Penn-Mar Shopping Center, a large 1-story strip mall, in the 3400 Block of Donnell Drive in Forestville and arrived at 12:59 PM.  First arriving crews initiated an investigation into a strong odor of natural gas inside the businesses.  Firefighters evacuated 5 of the 6 stores that were in the area of the odor, a sixth store was vacant. 

    • Forty-five people were evacuated from the 5 stores and firefighters then started ventilation efforts and called for assistance of the Washington Gas Company.  Firefighters discovered natural gas bubbling up from the ground on the exterior rear of the vacant store and minutes later reported that there was a fire on the interior. 
    • Within a minute, at about 1:20 PM, a massive explosion occurred. 
    • A MAYDAY call was sounded and additional resources including paramedics and a second alarm of firefighters were summoned to the scene.

    Large plate glass windows blew shattered glass and other debris 60-70 feet into the front parking lot, the roof assembly appeared to have been lifted up and then fell back into place and the rear brick and block wall was completely blown out.  Firefighters were in the direct line of the explosion and suffered burns and injuries from flying debris.  Firefighters were wearing their personal protective gear which is believed to have minimized injuries.  They quickly gathered themselves and checked on other crew members and civilians that may have been injured.  A total of eight firefighters sustained a variety of injuries ranging from lacerations to second degree burns.  Four Firefighters were transported to the Washington Hospital Center Burn Unit where two were treated and released and two were admitted for additional treatment.  While initially transported with serious injuries, the firefighter’s conditions have been upgraded to “good.”  Four other firefighters were transported to other area hospitals and were treated and released.  One civilian, an employee of the Washington Gas Company was also treated and released from an area hospital.  There were no injuries to any of the 45 evacuated civilians. 

     3-18-2010 9-29-48 PM

    A small fire resulted from the explosion that was quickly contained and extinguished.  The investigation so far has determined that the release of natural gas occurred in the vacant store and reached an ignition point that resulted in the explosion.  The Fire/EMS Department’s Technical Rescue Team completed a through secondary post-blast search of the damaged stores confirming that everyone heeded the orders of first arriving firefighters to evacuate.  (Excerpt from PGFD Press Release 05.07.2009)

     3-18-2010 9-09-52 PM

    Building Knowledge

    The south side of the structure was comprised of 10 business spaces (three of which were vacant) in a strip mall designed and constructed as a Type II, noncombustible classification in the 1970s. The section of the commercial structure involved in the incident was comprised of a main 2 story building, which included 2 vacant businesses and a mall office, with an adjoining wing on the right consisting of 6 businesses (1 unoccupied) in a single story with high dropped ceilings, large attic void spaces, and a sprinkler system. In the wing along the C-side were utility rooms housing the electrical circuit panels, sprinkler system controls, and security panels. It was constructed of brick/block and mortar with large plate glass windows on the A-side, block and mortar exterior C and D-side walls, and a block and mortar interior B-side wall adjoining the rest of the structure. The roof was a commercial flat roof consisting of open web, steel bar flat roof trusses covered with corrugated metal “q-deck” with multi-layered plies of bitumen laminated roof felts and topped with a granule-surfaced cap sheet. The open web steel bar roof trusses were connected to a steel beam and column structural assembly system.

    The interior walls separating the businesses were primarily light weight galvanized metal studs covered with a ½ inch gypsum wall board providing tenant separation and compartmentation. The ceiling was a suspended acoustic tile ceiling system which provided a common void space over the business occupied areas of the adjoining right wing. The businesses contained office furniture, partitions, restaurant equipment and supplies, and health and beauty equipment and products.

    NIOSH Report Summary

    On May 7, 2009, two captains, a lieutenant, and five fire fighters were injured during a natural gas explosion at a strip mall in Maryland. At 1254 hours, dispatch reported a natural gas leak inside a business at a strip mall. Five minutes later, the initial responding crew and the incident commander (IC) arrived on scene to find a gas company employee looking for an underground gas leak. Approximately 6 minutes later, a natural gas leak was found near the exterior rear corner of the structure. After 23 minutes on scene, approximately 45 civilians were evacuated from 7 occupied businesses.

    A captain exited the rear door of the business that had called in the natural gas leak and noticed fire along the roof line. Crews in the front and rear of the structure had begun to pull hoselines as another captain was looking out the rear doorway of a middle unoccupied business and noticed the electric meter located on the exterior wall on fire. Anticipating an explosion, he tried to leap out the rear doorway. At the same time, a fire fighter had entered the front door of the unoccupied business, noticed the heavy smell of natural gas, and felt air rush by as the structure exploded. Debris and fire blew out the front, rear, and roof of the structure. The captain who tried to leap out the rear doorway was blown into the rear parking lot and the fire fighter who had entered the front of the structure was blown out the front door and covered with debris. Numerous other fire fighters, primarily near the front of the structure were blown off their feet and hit with debris.

    An uninjured captain issued a Mayday, followed by the IC ordering evacuation tones and a personnel accountability report. Crews began to look for the captain who was blown out the rear doorway. He had walked around the side to the front of the structure, and radioed his location to command. Fire fighters began moving injured personnel to ambulances staged in the front parking lot. Eight fire fighters and a gas company employee were transported to local hospitals. The injuries ranged from third degree burns to an ankle sprain.

    Key contributing factors identified in this investigation included: insufficient execution of the fire department’s updated standard operating guidelines (SOGs) on incidents involving flammable gas, e.g., apparatus and fire fighters operating in a flammable area (hot zone); the accumulation of natural gas in the structure’s void spaces; unmitigated ignition source; insufficient combustible gas monitoring equipment usage and training; and, ineffective ventilation techniques.

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should

    • ensure that standard operating guidelines for natural gas leaks are understood and followed
    • contact utility companies (natural gas and electric) immediately to cut external supply/power to structures when gas leaks are suspected
    • ensure gas monitoring equipment is adequately maintained and fire fighters are routinely trained on proper use
    • ensure ventilation techniques are conducted after ignition sources are mitigated
    • ensure that rapid intervention teams are staged at the onset of an incident
    • ensure that collapse/explosion control zones are established when dealing with a potential explosion hazard

    Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations would have prevented these injuries, they are being provided as a reminder of good safety practices.

    • provide manual personal alert safety system (PASS) or tracking devices to locate potentially missing fire fighters when SCBA are not utilized
    • ensure standard operating guidelines for communications are understood by dispatch
    • ensure adequate staffing for emergency medical services and rapid intervention teams (RITs)
    • ensure training is evaluated for rank and skill levels across the combination department personnel

    Contributing Incident Factors

    Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that ultimately led to the injuries of eight fire fighters:

    • Insufficient execution of the fire department’s updated standard operating guideline on incidents involving flammable gas, e.g., apparatus and fire fighters operating in a flammable area (hot zone).
    • The accumulation of natural gas in the structure’s void spaces.
    • An unmitigated ignition source.
    • Insufficient combustible gas monitoring equipment usage and training
    • Ineffective ventilation techniques.

    Building Knowledge=Fire Fighter Safety

    When was the last time you and your company took a good look around some of your commercial shopping centers, strip centers, malls and business retail complexes? There is a wealth of mission critical information to be gained by conducting a basis walk through and looking at some key construction, configuration, layout and access and utilities features.

    Take note of the structural systems that comprise the roof assemblies and the wall and supporting interface. Identify the basic volume of the commercial spaces paying close attention to the common tenant storage, storerooms, access and transfer loading dock and delivery areas.  Focus and take note of the fire loading and its expected degree of fire behavior and intensity. Check out the condition and operability of the fixed suppression systems and the integrity of fire barriers and separations.

    There’s so much “free” data and information to be gained by going “shopping”; all of which will transcend and can be retrieved at such time a response materializes at that location in the future. If you can, capture the pertinent information into your pre-fire planning data base and make sure you discuss and share your observations, postulated strategies and tactics around the kitchen table or as a table top exercise or better yet in the form of an on-site drill or multi-company training exercise.

    Be prepared for the unexpected and always use extreme caution and heightened situational awareness and fluid risk assessment and reconnaissance processing to stay atop of any undefined and evolving incident. Do not allow the potential lack of severity; of what may have all the indications of an unremarkable/uneventful and common call run such as a gas odor investigation or a natural gas leak cause your companies to have less than a high level of alert, focus and attentive accretions through all phases and deployments of the incident. Don’t become complacent.

    In addition, take a look at some information relate to another tragic incident response to a reported gas leak that occurred in December, 1983 that lead to five fire fighter LODD’s in Buffalo, New York. HERE

    Archived Report From STATter911, from May, 2009 HERE and recent 2010 update HERE with fireground Audio

    Prince George’s County (MD) Fire Press Release from May 7, 2009, HERE

    Slide Show from WUSA9.com HERE 

    BING mapping Images, HERE

    Posted by on March 18, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, command, construction, explosion, failures, firefighting-operations, gas leak, Mayday, NIOSH, special-operations, Sprinklers, Systems and Assemblies, tactics, training • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Building Types

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    newyork-ogleThe United States Fire Administration (USFA) recently published a series of bulletins under their highly acclaimed Coffee Break Training series of informational bulletins. This series provided insights and awareness of how Buildings are “types” from a codes perspective related to fire resistance. All firefighters and officers need to have a firm understanding of the principles, concepts and methodologies of building construction. Another mission critical concept that I’ve discussed recently is operational risks and tactical deployment must be based upon Occupancy Risk, not Occupancy Type.

    Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

    Here are the USFA document links;

    Part 1: Understanding Construction “Types, HERE

    Part 2: Where Fire Resistance May Be Required, HERE

    Part 3: Fire-Resistive Assemblies, HERE

    Part 4: How Fire Resistance Ratings are measured, HERE

    Part 5: Understanding Construction: Fire Test “Survival”, HERE

    Part 6: Required Fire Resistance, HERE

    Part 7: Fire Resistance Based on Separation, HERE

    More on Building Types in an upcoming post.

    UL Fire Resistive Assemblies Information, HERE

    Rating Definitions, HERE

    Posted by on January 14, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", Architectural Design, assemblies, building construction, Fire Protection Engineering, Systems and Assemblies • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Engineered Structural Systems- Hazards

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    600x6CNN recently presented an informative piece on the continuing trends in the design and use of engineered structural systems (ESS) . CNN correspondant Gerri Willis provides an informative and  insightful look at something the fire service knows all too well.  Here’s some additional information for you; According to the Wood Truss Council of America (WTCA), wooden trusses are used in roof systems in more than 60% of all buildings in the United States [SBCMAG 2004]. Truss and related engineered wooden floor systems are also becoming more common. Today, more engineered structures use lighter weight materials, producing …larger spans and clear openings. Trusses can be designed to carry expected loads, be produced economically, be safely handled, and reduce construction costs.

    Engineered building components may provide adequate strength under normal loading; but under fire conditions, these truss systems can become weakened and fail, leading to the collapse of roofs, floors, and possibly the entire structure. Truss systems are usually hidden, and fires within truss systems may go unnoticed for long periods of time, resulting in loss of integrity.

    Structural design codes often do not factor in this decreased system integrity, as fire degrades the structural members. Fire fighters typically rely on warning signs to indicate imminent truss failure such as roofs and floors that feel spongy or are visibly sagging. Quite often, these warning signs are not good predictors of truss system failures. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) reports that during 1990-2000, structural fires and explosions accounted for 46.1% of all reported fire fighter fatalities (500 of 1,085) [USFA 2002].  Statistics compiled by the WTCA suggest that 4.7% of the total fatalities (108 of 2,286) during 1980-2001 were due to structural collapse [Grundahl 2003b]. Fifteen separate incidents investigated by NIOSH identified at least 20 fatalities and 12 injuries that have occurred from 1998-2003 during fire-fighting operations in buildings containing truss systems.

    http://us.cnn.com/video/?/video/living/2009/12/18/willis.new.housing.fire.danger.cnn CNN Reports on ESS Dangers

    At least three scenarios can occur in which fire fighters suffer fatalities and injuries while operating at fires involving truss roof and floor systems:
    1. While fire fighters are operating above a burning roof or floor truss , they may fall into a fire as the sheathing or the truss system collapses below them.
    2. While fire fighters are operating below the roof or floor inside a building with burning truss floor or roof structures , the trusses may collapse onto them.
    3. While fire fighters are operating outside a building with burning trusses , the floor or roof trusses may collapse and cause a secondary wall collapse.

    Building Construction Spring09 173

    Posted by on December 28, 2009 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, buildings, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Engineered, Engineered Structural Systems, engineered systems, ESS, failures, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting, floors, hazards, LODD, Lumber, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Remembering Brackenridge 1991 Floor Collapse and LODD

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    12-21-2009 9-53-23 PMRemembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse

    Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building. Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement. The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.  

     SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

    • Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
    • Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
    • Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
    • Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
    • Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
    • Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
    • Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
    • Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
    • Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
    • Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
    • Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
    • Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.

    The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.

    There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.

    This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

    USFA Report; HERE

    NFPA Summary; HERE

    NFPA Report Order; HERE 

    Brackenridge Pioneer Hose Co. Memorial, Pennsylvania, HERE

    Posted by on December 21, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildings, Collapse, command, command-leadership, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, occupancies, Remembrance, Reports, risk-based assessment, tactics, Trapped, volunteer • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Truss and Engineered Systems Placards

    1 comment

    11-22-2008 9-05-24 PMThe Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act of 2008 became law on December 13, 2009 after unanimously passing the Florida House and Senate in 2008. The new law is named in honor of two Orange County, Florida  Firefighters, Todd Aldridge and Mark Benge, who died in 1989 after the roof of a gift shop collapsed; the bill is called the Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act. For a copy of the Act, HERE

     The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act will require owners of any commercial, industrial, or any multi-unit residential structure, to mark these buildings in a manner that identifies them as light-frame truss-type construction. A sign or symbol will alert firefighters of the construction material and allow them to modify their tactics for fighting fires in buildings.

    12-18-2009 9-58-41 AM

    Aldridge-Benge Florida Placards

    633.027 Buildings with light-frame truss-type construction; notice requirements; enforcement.

    (1) The owner of any commercial or industrial structure, or any multiunit residential structure of three units or more, that uses light-frame truss-type construction shall mark the structure with a sign or symbol approved by the State Fire Marshal in a manner sufficient to warn persons conducting fire control and other emergency operations of the existence of light-frame truss-type construction in the structure.

    (2) The State Fire Marshal shall adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of this section, including, but not limited to:
    (a) The dimensions and color of such sign or symbol.
    (b) The time within which commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structures that use light-frame truss-type construction shall be marked as required by this section.
    (c) The location on each commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structure that uses light-frame truss-type construction where such sign or symbol must be posted.

    (3) The State Fire Marshal, and local fire officials in accordance with s. 633.121, shall enforce the provisions of this section. Any owner who fails to comply with the requirements of this section is subject to penalties as provided in s. 633.161

    Truss Systems Placards For Firefighter Safety from across the United States. This was originally posted HERE . Check out the link for examples of various types of placards from various locations around the US. Additional Links HERE and HERE

    - The Valley Independent Sentinel covers the proposed law in Derby, Can You Spare Five Dollars (To Save A Life)?.
    - NFPA Journal: It’s not lightweight construction. It’s what happens when lightweight construction meets fire.
    - Firehouse.com: Understanding the Dangers of Lightweight Truss Construction

    -FireRescue1.com: Enhancing Firefigher SAfety, One Step at a time:

     New York State:  PDF HEREFR20Poster0320Large

    The following represent various state or local level efforts that have been instituted to provide the fire service with identification placards for attachment to buildings constructed with truss support systems. What we don’t have is a unified national standard, nor do we have these systems in all states. The political strife and lobbying backed by special interest groups and mfg. associations that DO NOT Support these types of placard systems is appalling and inexcusable. This post is to make many of you aware of the various enhacements that exist to support firefighter safety.

    New York State TRUSS TYPE CONSTRUCTION PlacardsNYS 19 NYCRR Part 1264 – IDENTIFICATION OF BUILDINGS UTILIZING TRUSS TYPE CONSTRUCTION
    http://www.dos.state.ny.us/code/trussID.htm

    More from New York State…..
    http://www.trussid.org/index.html

    City of San Francisco, CA
    5.05 Signage of Buildings with Wood or Lightweight Steel Truss, or Composite Wood Joist (TJI) or Roof Construction
    Reference: 2007 San Francisco Fire Code Section 507.3.2
    http://www.sfgov.org/site/sffd_page.asp?id=80083

    State of New Jersey TRUSS SIGNS (Truss Roof and Truss Floor Assembly Signs)
    Exterior Placard NJAC 5:70 – 2.20(a)1 and 2 This attachment was provided by the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety and is referenced as Exterior Placard NJAC 5:70 – 2.20(a)1 and 2.
    Truss roof signs are required by the New Jersey State Uniform Fire Code for buildings, which utilize either a floor or roof assembly consisting of truss construction. A truss sign gives early warning to fire and emergency service members that the roof and/or floor may be subject to early collapse in the event of a fire condition.

    ISOSCELES TRIANGLE SIGNS
    N.J.A.C. 5:70-2.20(a)1.
    “The emblem shall be of a bright and reflective color, or made of reflective material. The shape of the emblem shall be an isosceles triangle and the size shall be 12 inches horizontally by 6 inches vertically. With letters of a size and color to make them conspicuous, shall be printed on the emblem, as shown in images below.”

    N.J.A.C. 5:70-2.20(a)2
    “The emblem shall be permanently affixed to the left of the main entrance door at the height of between 4 feet and 6 feet above the ground, and shall be installed and maintained by the owner of the building”.

    NJtruss_signs

    New Jersey Truss Placards

     

     

     

    NIOSH Suggested Truss Placard Type
    EXAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR A LAW REQUIRING LABELING OF BUILDINGS FOR THE FIRE SERVICE
    This sample language is based on recommendations in the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) report entitled “NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Firefighters due to Truss System Failures.”
    The report states: “Consider placing building construction information outside the building. Include
    information about roof and floor type.

    The NIOSH report also recommends as part of pre-fire planning to: Record data regarding roof and floor construction (e.g., wooden joist, wood truss, steel joist, steel truss, beam and girder, etc.) [NFPA 2003]. The sample language below provides building labeling that identifies the building’s construction type, is simple yet logical, and should allow firefighters to quickly know the building’s floor and roof construction materials, promoting better and more complete information on the fireground and increased firefighter safety.

    xxx Identification of structural construction. Structural construction types shall be identified by a sign or signs, in accordance with the provisions of this section.

    xxx.1 Signs. Signs shall be affixed where a building or a portion thereof is classified as Group A, B, E, F, H, I, M, R-1, R-2, R-4 or S occupancy. The owner of the building shall be responsible for the installation of the sign.
    xxx.2 New buildings and buildings being added to. Signs shall be provided in newly constructed buildings and in existing buildings where an addition that extends or increases the floor area of the building. Signs shall be affixed prior to the issuance of a certificate of occupancy or a certificate of compliance.

    xxx.3 Existing buildings. Signs shall be provided in existing buildings. Signs shall be affixed within ninety days of being notified in writing by the Code Enforcement Official.

    xxx.4 Contents of signs. Signs shall consist of a diagram 6 inches (152.4 mm)in height and width, with a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm). The sign background shall be reflective white in color. The diagram and contents shall be reflective red in color, conforming to Pantone matching system (PMS) #187. Where a sign is directly applied to a door or sidelight, it may be a permanent non-fading sticker or decal. Signs not directly applied to doors or sidelights shall be of sturdy, non-fading, weather resistant material.

    xxx.5 Identification of construction classification. Signs shall contain the roman alphanumeric designation of the construction classification of the building, in accordance with the provisions for the classification of types of construction (types I through V) of the building code. The roman numeral designating construction classification shall be 1 inch (25.4 mm) minimum in height and have a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm) minimum, and it shall be reflective white in color on a background of reflective red.

    xxx.6 Identification of year of construction. Signs shall indicate the building’s year of construction or major reconstruction. The arabic numeral indicating year of construction shall be 1 inch (25.4 mm) minimum in height and have a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm) minimum, and it shall be reflective white in color on a background of reflective red.

    xxx.7 Identification of structural construction types. Signs shall contain the alphabetic designations identifying the structural construction types used in the building, as follows:

    “W” shall mean sawn joist/rafter construction, wood members
    “I” shall mean engineered I-joist construction, wood members
    “S” shall mean steel construction
    “T” shall mean truss type construction
    “C” shall mean concrete construction

    NIOSH Suggested Truss Placard

    NIOSH Suggested Truss Placard

    State of Florida, Truss Placard System 2008;
    The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act. The law was named in honor of Orange County firefighters Todd Aldridge and Mark Benge, who died in 1989 after the truss roof of a gift shop collapsed. Under the new law, owners of any commercial, industrial or multi unit residential structure, have to clearly mark if their buildings have lightweight roof or floor trusses, allowing firefighters to change their tactics when working in these types of structures

    http://www.cfnews13.com/News/Local/2008/7/2/new_firefighter_protect….

    633.027 Buildings with light-frame truss-type construction; notice requirements; enforcement
    (1) The owner of any commercial or industrial structure, or any multiunit residential structure of three units or more, that uses light-frame truss-type construction shall mark the structure with a sign or symbol approved by the State Fire Marshal in a manner sufficient to warn persons conducting fire control and other emergency operations of the existence of light-frame truss-type construction in the structure.
    (2) The State Fire Marshal shall adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of this section, including, but not limited to:
    (a) The dimensions and color of such sign or symbol.
    (b) The time within which commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structures that use light-frame truss-type construction shall be marked as required by this section.
    (c) The location on each commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structure that uses light-frame truss-type construction where such sign or symbol must be posted.
    (3) The State Fire Marshal, and local fire officials in accordance with s. 633.121, shall enforce the provisions of this section. Any owner who fails to comply with the requirements of this section is subject to penalties as provided in s. 633.161.

    Florida Placard

    Florida Placard

     

    Wheeling, Illinois Wood Truss Warning Signs
    Attached is information from Wheeling, Illinois, who enacted thier own local code requriement. April 18, 1994 adopted Ordinance 2948 amending Title 14, Fire, of the Wheeling Municipal Code by adding Chapter 14.08 “Wood Truss Warning Signs”

    State of Vermont
    F or additional Info HERE

    CITY OF CHESAPEAKE, VA TRUSS ID PROGRAM; A designated sticker is used for quick recognition of potential Collapse Dangers associated with TRUSS constructed buildings. The sticker is placed on every entry door of all commercial buildings with Truss construction. The use of trusses in building construction presents a great danger to firefighting personnel when those structures are involved in fire conditions. By design, the truss members in floor and roof assemblies will collapse, without warning, after being exposed to heat or flame contact for a very short period of time. Because of the inherent danger firefighters must face while operating within these buildings, a Truss Identification Program (TIP) has been instituted to alert personnel of the danger prior to beginning fire suppression operations. The Truss Identification Program is intended to alert the members of the Chesapeake Fire Department with pertinent pre-plan information before firefighting forces are committed to an interior attack.

    The TIP shall be an ongoing program applied to all commercial buildings inspected by the Chesapeake Fire Department.
    http://www.chesapeake.va.us/services/depart/fire/truss.shtml

    City of Greencastle, Indiana

    The City of Greencastle, Indiana and the Greencastle Fire Department recently enacted and approved an Engineered Lumber ID Program consisting of a sticker that is used for quick recognization of potential Collapse Dangers associated with Engineered Lumber constructed buildings. The sticker is placed on every electrical meter of all residential & commercial buildings with Engineered Lumber construction built after May 13th 2008. The news release states that; the use of this type of lumber in building construction presents a great danger to firefighting personnel when those structures are involved in fire conditions. By design, the Engineered Lumber in floor and roof assemblies will collapse, without warning, after being exposed to heat or flame contact for a very short period of time. Because of the inherent danger firefighters must face while operating within these buildings, an Engineered Lumber Identification Program (ELIP) has been instituted to alert personnel of the danger prior to beginning fire suppression operations.

    The Engineered Lumber Identification Program is intended to alert the members of the Greencastle Fire Department with pertinent pre-plan information before firefighting forces are committed to an interior attack. The sticker is unobtrusive and is placed directly on a meter box, for example, and alerts the FD if either the floor joists and/or the trusses are made of and Engineered Lumber System and materials. The fire officers are already checking the utility boxes on all fires as part of their initial size-up. The ELIP shall be an ongoing program applied to all residential & commercial buildings inspected by the Greencastle Fire Department.

    ORDINANCE 2008 – 4 states; AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING A REFLECTIVE SYMBOL ON STRUCTURES USING ENGINEERED LUMBER
    WHEREAS, many new building structures currently use engineered lumber in their construction;
    WHEREAS, some types of engineered lumber burn at a rate faster that other types of lumber; and
    WHEREAS, in fighting fires, it would be helpful to know the types of materials used in the construction of a structure.

    NOW THEREFORE be it ordained by the Common Council of the City of Greencastle as follows:
    1. Definitions:
    a. Engineered Lumber shall mean prefabricated I-joists, truss joists, and truss rafters, and laminated beams and studs.
    b. Structure shall mean primary, secondary and accessory structures as defined in the Greencastle Zoning Code that have electrical meters that serve the structure.

    2. All structures constructed with engineered lumber after the effective date of this ordinance must have a reflective symbol affixed to each electrical meter serving the structure.

    3. The reflective symbol shall be in the form of a sticker, issued by the City of Greencastle that states that the structure is constructed with engineered lumber

    4. Any person violating this ordinance by refusing to use the reflective symbol or by removing the reflective symbol shall be subject to a fine in an amount of $25.00 per violation. Each day that a violation occurs shall constitute a separate violation, subject to a separate fine.

    5. The owner of any structure that was constructed with engineered lumber prior to the effective date of this ordinance is requested to place the reflective symbol on the electrical meter serving the structure on a voluntary basis.

    This is another great example how local level insights, actions and legislation can go a long way in supporting fire service operational challanges as they relate to building construction systems, methodologies and materials. Remember, We can certainly work diligently AND cooperativley with local government officials to enhance incident operations and make our jobs safety, one step at a time….
    For additional information on the Fire Department’s efforts in Greencastle, IN contact Lt. John Shafer, Lieutenant/Training Officer HERE.
     
    An invaluable free on-line training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions – is available from UL, check HERE for further information.
    The 2006 NIOSH LODD Report, HERE
    Posted by on December 18, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, buildings, Christopher Naum, Codes, Collapse, construction, engineered systems, inspections, line-of-duty, Lumber, occupancies, placard, pre-planning, Protection • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Predicated Building Performance

    No comments

    6When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis.

    We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system. That may be true for conventional or legacy structures, but what about modern construction and engineered structural systems? Same expectations?…….

    What do you think?

    There’s a great series of photos depicting initial operations at a small-sized (square foot) single family residential occupancy fire that captures fire and smoke behavior, HERE and HERE

    Take at look the at this residential fire and interior attack that injured a number of Maryland Firefighters HERE

    Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. NIOSH Report HERE. NIST References HERE

    Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

    Posted by on December 18, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Christopher Naum, construction, decision-making, dynamics, high-rise, Highrise, History Repeating Event, NIOSH, occupancies, pre-planning, residential, risk-based assessment, Safety • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Wind Driven Mansion Fire

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    YouTube Preview Image

    A million dollar Baltimore County, Maryland  home was destroyed Sunday December 13, 2009  by a fire that tore through the 4,700-square-foot structure with such intensity that firefighters were forced to battle the flames from the exterior. Shortly after 21:00 hours, Baltimore County Fire Dispatch alerted crews for Fire Box 50-2 at 12607 Nancy Lee Court in the Worthington Trace subdivision in the Chestnut Ridge area. As firefighters were responding, dispatch advised they were receiving multiple calls to 911, with some reporting the entire house was on fire. While en route to the scene, Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Company Captain Dan Uddeme reported heavy fire was visible and requested a 2nd alarm and a Tanker Strike Team as the house sits in an area without fire hydrants. Upon arrival, Capt. Uddeme reported fire had consumed the entire 2nd floor and roof area and was spreading. Firefighters were forced to use exterior operations due to the heavy volume of fire. Responding units set up for rural water operations, shuttling more than 17,000 gallons of water from an underground tank on Greenspring Avenue and Walnut Avenue near the scene. Reisterstown Volunteer Fire Companys Engine 412 was also utilized for its Compressed Air Foam System, with several handlines and the ladder pipe from Glyndon Volunteers Truck 404 flowing foam. The Baltimore County Fire Investigation Division is investigating to determine the fires cause and origin. Video and data was obtained from Michael Schwartzberg’s Firepix1075 . Additional photos, HERE and newsreports, HERE

    While watching the video, take the time to listen to the wind howling across the mic and observe the intesity level of the fire severity and propogation in the Charlie side. This provides an opportunity for those that are not familiar with the NIST Wind Driven Fire Studies or the PWC (VA) Kyle Wilson LODD to take some time to read about the affects of wind on incident operations, strategies and tactical personnel safety. This was a 4,700 SF large volume residential structure. Think about the performance and your deparment’s capabilities? Remember, it’s not “just” a house fire

    Take a look at the Prince William County (VA) Fire & Rescue case study information related to Technician I Kyle Wilson – LODD Report. This event: Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive. Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure. Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.

    National Institute of Standards and Technology – NIST Wind Driven Fire Research HERE Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries.

    What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented?  Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening.  If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants.  NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service. Fire Chief Magazine article HERE

  • A video of one of the wind driven fire experiments showing the pulsing flames out of the window. Pulsing Fire(83 MB)
  • A video of one of the wind driven fire experiments showing the deployment of a Wind Control Device (WCD). WCD Deployment. (40 MB)
  • A 4-view video of one of the wind driven fire experiments on the 7th floor. Governor’s Island Wind Driven Fire (368 MB)
  • A 4-view video of one of the wind driven fire experiments conducted where the wind control curtain is deployed. The video is 4 times real time. WDF Curtain Deploy (486 MB)
  • An 8-view video of experiment number five conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of a WCD on a wind driven fire.  The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 5-Oct View (450MB)
  • An 8-view video of experiment number eight conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of externally applied water, solid stream and fog stream, at 160 gpm.  The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 8- Oct View (419MB)
    • Posted by on December 15, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", building construction, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, decision-making, Deployment, dynamics, Engineered, engineered systems, fire behavior, firefighting, pre-planning, strategies, structure fires, Uncategorized, Wind Driven • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    The New Lexicon and Challenges

    3 comments

    Floor TrussOf the many issues affecting the Fire Service, the prevailing challenge that has a pronounced impact on operational safety is the assimilation of engineered structural systems (ESS) into mainstream building design and construction. The presence of engineered structural systems (ESS) are no longer considered to be an innocuous feature in a given building or occupancy; it is the predominate feature in nearly all current construction, renovation and adaptive reuse or infill applications. It has become far more than just concerning ourselves with the presence of a simple light-weight or “engineered” truss roof system or a wood I-beam  floor assembly.

    There is a new lexicon of building construction components and systems that must be added to your operational safety vocabulary and incident action plans. There is a new terminology, applications and a knowledge base to learn that will support operational excellence and support the integrity of incident safety performance of companies and personnel. Do you know what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence an incident?

    The fire service continues to apply the term “light weight construction” to a wide variety of building construction and systems. This expression has become a miss-application of both term and the correlation of risk and severity related to operational profiling. In other words, we apply and express the use of “light weight construction” for all types of engineered components, systems, designs and assemblies in nearly all types of building construction and occupancy use. Although the roots of the term can be traced back to the early 1980′s, and its application to the (then) emerging use of trussed roofing systems and the advent of wood I-beam floor supports (sans solid dimensional lumber joists), the use of the terminology in today’s context of risk assessment, strategic and tactical management and deployment models and within the context of incident operational tactics is no longer applicable, valid or suitable. It must be expanded into a more specific and descriptive level of classification and correlation.

    For the most part, when discussing buildings and occupancies, aside from classifications related to code type or class as an element of fire resistance; the emphasis has been to differentiate between conventional and engineered construction, and the application of the term “light weight construction”. I continue advocating and promoting through my lectures that it’s much more than this when looking at the spectrum of construction and the structural anatomy of buildings. Current and past generations of buildings, construction and occupancies can be more accurately differentiated and classified within six (6) expanding categories in the following Building Construction Systems;

    ·        Heritage:              Pre-1900
    ·        Legacy:                1900-1949
    ·        Conventional:      1950-1979
    ·        Engineered:         1980-2009     Current into 2010…
    ·        Blended Hybrid:  1995-2009     Current into 2010…
    ·        Enigmatic:            2010-             Projected
     
    We’ll discuss these six classifications in greater details in future postings here and expand the level of details on the CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com sites. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past “conventional” construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address the advancement of new rules of combat structural fire engagement. But if you don’t understand or know what and how those changes in predictability have occurred, you may be operating with a false sense of operational risk and safety margin.

    It’s a Lot More than just talking about “Light Weight” Construction….
    ·        From Plywood-CDX….to
    ·        Particle Board- PB…..to;
    ·        Orient Strand Board-OSB
    ·        Structural Composite Lumber- SCL
    ·        Laminate Strand Lumber- LSL
    ·        Laminate Veneer Lumber-LVL
    ·        Structural Insulated Panels-SIP
    ·        Parallel Strand Lumber-PSL
    ·        Machine Stress Rated Lumber- MSR
    ·        Medium Density Fiberboard-MDF and MDL (Lumber)
    ·        Finger Jointed Lumber-FJL
    ·        Adhesives…..
     
    Do some research and check these terms out for starters. We’ll talk more about these components and assemblies in the near future. So get busy on your down time today over the next few days and discover the implications these components may have in your community….

    Here’s a link to a past informative posting related to engineered systems and their relationship to firefighter safety and operations, HERE. There’s some great contributed information and manufacturer “insights” on the subject engineered wood I-joists and beams and firefighter safety. There are some interesting statistical extrapolations, correlations and conveniences’ that attempt to make the case. But then again, You be the judge. Take at look at the presentation developed by the American Forest and Paper Association, HERE and HERE.
     
    If you haven’t done so yet, don’t forget to check out the free online training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions at the UL University developed and provided by Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL),  HERE

    Here’s a series of other important Reference Links that provide some insights on operational safety, incident conditions and factors and the lessons-learned from a number of LODD events;  

    NIOSH Publication No. 2009-114: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors HERE

     NIOSH Publication No. 2005-132: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters Due to Truss System Failures HERE

    Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE

    First-floor collapse during residential basement fire claims the life of two fire fighters (career and volunteer) and injures a career fire fighter captain – New York, Report HERE

    Career Fire Fighter Dies After Falling Through the Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence – Ohio, HERE

    Colerain Township, Ohio Double LODD Preliminary Report, HERE

    Career engineer dies and fire fighter injured after falling through floor while conducting a primary search at a residential structure fire – Wisconsin, HERE

    NFPA Report on Light Weight Construction, HERE

    Informative USFA Coffee Break series postings related to Building Types & Fire Resistance:  HERE. HERE, HERE, HERE, and HERE

    Remember, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk-F2S)

    Posted by on December 8, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", building construction, buildings, construction, decision-making, engineered systems, firefighting-operations, incidents, Lumber, Manufacturing, occupancies, risk-based assessment, Wood Frame • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Remembering the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse Fire 12.03.99

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    WFD 12.03.99

    leadfire

     

    December 3, 2009 marks the 10th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.

    The Worcester Six;
    Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
    Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
    Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
    Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
    Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
    Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine 3

    Overview
    On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dis¬patched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motor¬ist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years. Due to these and other factors, the responding District Chief ordered a second alarm within 4 minutes of the initial dispatch.

    The first alarm assignment brought 30 firefighters and officers and 7 pieces of apparatus to the scene. The second provided an additional 12 men and 3 trucks as well as a Deputy Chief. Firefighters encountered a light smoke condition throughout the warehouse, and crews found a large fire in the former office area of the second floor. An aggressive interior attack was started within the second floor and ventilation was conducted on the roof. There were no windows or other openings in the warehousing space above the second floor.

    Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors.

    Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.
    An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.

    A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and del¬uge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts.

    According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities. (Excerpt from USFA report )

    Take a moment to reflect on the events of December 3, 1999 and what they may mean to you. Consider your knowledge and understanding of buildings and structures within your district and surrounding response areas. Remember; “Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety”. For those of you who do not know about this incident, attached is the USFA Incident Report that provides insights into the event and the lessons learned. Also check out the NIOSH Report and numerous archived articles on the web and within various journals.

    Take at look at The Worcester Telegram & Gazette which has an archived webpage; http://www.telegram.com/static/fire/video.html

    HERE ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 1999 USFA REPORT

    1. Abandoned buildings remain a serious threat to the fire service and a danger to the communities in which they stand.
    Fire departments have long recognized the danger of abandoned buildings in their communities, and fires in these structures have to be approached with a certain amount of caution and restraint. If questionable structural integrity, unknown hazardous materials, unusual dangers to firefighters, or other extreme risks exist, the buildings should not be entered. It is paramount that the fire service apply tactical risk assessment in its daily operations.

    Because of the building design, the fire’s magnitude and location could not be ascertained from the exterior, and the Incident Commander had to assess the risks of sending in teams to evaluate the fire and sending in firefighters for suppression. Initial interior reports did not indicate a serious threat to personnel, and operations were conducted accordingly. To assist arriving crews, a placard system should be instituted which clearly defines the risks at an abandoned building. Subsequent to the fire, Worcester Fire put such a system in place. The process has an added benefit of placing firefighters and/or inspectors on locations which might be at risk and where prefire planning should be initiated.

    Risks are not limited to the fire service. Homeless people and drug addicts have been known to inhabit such buildings out of necessity. Ordinary citizens can be impacted by increased crime, and these properties can become a very dangerous playground for inquisitive children. Efforts should be made to renovate or demolish such places even if public funding is not required.

    2. Firefighters must make a concerted effort to know the buildings in their response districts.
    Commercial buildings, by their very nature, pose additional dangers to firefighters, and their familiarity with any given fire building will help to lower these dangers. Company tours are an excellent way to accomplish this goal, and can serve to strengthen the bonds between firefighters and business owners. Such efforts must be conducted with sensitivity, and observed conditions or problems within a business should be conveyed in a helpful rather than confrontational manner.

    3. Fire prevention efforts should be maximized in abandoned and temporarily vacated building to avoid fires in the first place.
    Even temporarily vacated properties can be at risk if utilities like water for a sprinkler system or electricity for an alarm system are disconnected. Although service cessation often occurs when properties are the subject of financial problems it may also take place at the end of a lease or during the sale or renovation of a commercial building. Every effort should be made to forward change of occupancy or use information to first response stations.

    4. Fire departments should continue to grown their file information on buildings in their communities.
    Through the use of mobile computer systems, much information can be forwarded to responding companies and Incident Command during an emergency. Data could include floor plans, occupancies, hazardous materials, water supplies, special hazards, and much more. A system of this type would certainly not be limited to abandoned buildings, but it could be invaluable at such a scene since the probability of an owner showing up is unlikely.

    Although this is laborious process, it may also be a valid use of on duty personnel who can gather information during regular shift time and either forward it to fire prevention or enter it themselves on provided computer terminals. Data could be gathered during in-service inspections and tours.

    5. Delayed reporting allowed the fire growth to exceed the capabilities of aggressive interior attack suppression.
    The exact time of ignition remains an unknown, but it has been established that the fire was burning for a minimum of 25 minutes before smoke was observed venting from the roof. It could have been burning for over an hour and a half. The huge volume of air in the warehouse could supports a large fire without any additional air from the outside.

    Because flames weren’t visible from the exterior, passers-by did not recognize the presence of the fire, and it wasn’t discovered until smoke vented from the roof. Even that was apparently not enough to motivate the hundred of average citizens driving on I-290 that evening to call 9-1-1.

    The trained eyes of public safety professionals were needed to separate this from “the ordinary” and then react appropriately. By this time, however, most of the second floor of B-building was burning, and few barriers were present to prevent further growth.

    The initial report from Ladder 1 on the second floor describes a “room full of fire” in B-building beyond the door in the party wall. This location is some 30 feet from the room or origin, so a one room fire had enough time to engulf the entire floor. A sustained flow of 1000 GPM for 20 minutes had virtually no effect on the fire, and conditions deteriorated around attack crews.

    6. Combustible interior finishes contributed to the rapid fire spread.
    The concept of having 18 inches of combustible materials on the inside of all exterior walls of a building is almost unthinkable to firefighters. The original cork insulation which appears to have been attached with a tar-like substance provided a large volume of fuel, and additional layers of polystyrene and polyurethane with there ferocious burn characteristics gave this fire enormous intensity.

    The area of origin was office space converted from a cold storage area. Under its original design and intent, insulation would only have been placed on exterior walls since the third floor was also cooled. Large amounts of insulation were put into place during the transition and would have included heavy insulation above the suspended ceiling on the underside of the third floor deck. An easily applied insulation would have been sprayed-on polyurethane foam which would have adhered to the wood joists and girders. Once the ceiling tiles were in place, it would not be noticed. The southern wall of the office space would have also required substantial insulation to keep out the cold and to retain the forced hot water heat from the radiators.

    The fire fed on ordinary combustibles during its initial growth, but once the ceiling tiles were breached, flame contacted combustible wire insulation and ceiling insulation. The stubborn flames observed by fire crews and the smoke conditions described on upper floors are consistent with the sustained burning of petroleum based products including rigid polystyrene, polyurethane, tar, and glass board.

    Proper permitting and on going inspections for construction changes within business occupan¬cies can help reduce non-complaint interior finishes.

    7. The fire service should initiate life safety activities early on at a fire scene.
    The concept of a Rapid Intervention Team was known to the Worcester Fire Department and was being implemented before the Worcester Cold Storage Fire, but it was not put into place until the 5th alarm on December 3rd. Firefighters had entered an unknown structure over one hour before the team was assigned. It is now standard procedure in Worcester to assign a RIT at the onset of each structure fire attack.

    The first radio transmission by the Safety Officer was 10 minutes after the RIT was assigned. For control and monitoring of personnel, structural integrity, and other safety concerns, this position should also be filled early on. In an ideal fire scene, the Safety Officer and RIT would be in place before the first firefighters enter the building. Command should strive to have these jobs filled as early as possible even if doing so escalates the event to a higher alarm level to provide sufficient personnel. A system of personnel accountability should be in place. Someone should be tracking who enters the building, the time of entry, and time of exit. Firefighters who are nearing expected times of air exhaustion could then be contacted to ascertain their safety. The establishment of a Safety Officer at the onset of an event can work towards the goal of accountability. The Safety Officer need not be a department officer but could be a chief’s aide or available firefighter familiar with the duties and responsibilities of the assignment.

    8. Large buildings such as warehouses and highrise merit unique search techniques and tools.
    While the standard air bottle for SCBA has a 30 minute capacity, it might be necessary to have available 60 minute bottles for extended search situations and/ or RIT use. Some fire depart¬ments have obtained 60 minute systems for use in confined space rescues or other unusually long events. The 30 minute system has remained the norm in recent years as the necessity of Rehab time has gained prominence, and it would not be advisable to use longer air supplies on a regular basis.

    In high rise incidents, it is common practice to carry in extra SCBA bottles. The same can be done in large space searches. Development of equipment and techniques to change bottles in a hot environment would give extra range to rescuers, and it could prolong their survival should their own rescue be required.

    Long lifelines should be maintained for entry crews in these types of structures as well as marking devises for the interior. These devices include luminescent stickers to show direction, labels to signify searched areas, and other commercially available products. Their effectiveness, how¬ever, depends on their use. And the fire service should incorporate these procedures into more common firegrounds, such as single family houses. The time to try out a new technique is not during a major fire scene.

    For searches involving extended distances, it might be helpful to position secondary search teams part way into a search area. They can wait in reserve in case they are needed, and they can serve as a rescue team for civilians or firefighters.

    Finally, all firefighters who enter a structure must be wearing an SCBA. Worcester Fire has such a policy. Although the facemask and air may not be needed, it must be available. This includes chief officers, aides, and ladder personnel. Even firefighters who are outside structure like apparatus drivers should have SCBA protection available in case of wind shifts or air born particles and debris. With the preponderance of hazardous materials in businesses and residences, SCBA’s use is an essential.

    9. Techniques must be improved to better track the movements of firefighters within a structure.
    Under current technology limitations, Incident Command is essentially limited voice communication/radio to track the movements of firefighters once they enter a building and disappear from sight. IC normally knows where a crew entered and possibly what their destination is, but without good radio reports, the exact movements and locations of crews are uncertain at best.
    Rescue 1’s crew and Engine 3’s Lieutenant both had difficulty communicating their positions which complicated and delayed rescue attempts. Crews continued to search multiple floors in the warehouse because of this uncertainty tying up precious personnel resources and adding more congestion to Stairway 3.

    Despite all lost firefighters wearing integral PASS alarms on their SCBA’s, no surviving firefighters recalled hearing them at any time. The building insulation may have absorbed much of their sound, and the ever present background noise of the fire scene itself may have obscured the rest.

    10. Radio channels are often overloaded at multiple alarm fires, and alternatives must be explored.
    The 800 Mhz trunked radio system used by the Worcester Fire Department had several major failures during this event. Mechanical failure of individual units occurred when the “emergency alert” button on the hand microphone shorted out on contact with water. Fire Alarm repeatedly ordered individual radio operators to shut down, and this took precious air time during an escalating multiple alarm event. In some cases the microphones were detached in the field at which time they functioned normally. Microphones without the alert button were placed on all radios after the conclusion of this fire. During interior operations, there were 1,000 “push-to-talks” registered for the Operations A talk group, the assigned fireground channel.

    Like many progressive fire departments, Worcester has taken steps to insure that all crews enter¬ing a fire building have radio communications. A typical piece of apparatus carries one portable for the officer and one for a second firefighting crew. All members of the Rescue Company carry portables. Having multiple radios is good for safety, but their use requires significant training and discipline. It is all too easy to clog up the air with nonessential transmissions.

    In some events it may even be necessary to use more than one radio and frequency to properly manage the incident. This would require someone to assist the Incident Commander and keep communications in order. If nothing else, a fireground frequency must be adopted by Command and all working units. One possible way to limit talk time would be to have a staging officer communicate with, and pass along assignments to incoming companies on a frequency other than those used for dispatch and fireground command. Once an assignment was initiated, the company would switch over to the fire- ground channel.

    Departments must also choose their radio equipment carefully. The band used must be the best for the standard physical environment in which operations are conducted. Urban departments working inside cement buildings have requirements that contrast greatly with a rural department operating over long geographical distances. If transmission quality continues to suffer, the use of mobile repeaters or other devices might need to be explored.

    11. The use of Thermal Imaging Cameras should be further developed.
    The Thermal Imaging Camera has become a useful rescue and investigative tool for the fire ser¬vice over the past six years. Although early models had some operational problems, the latest versions are reliable and offer more options such as transmission capabilities. It is a device that belongs in every fire department, but its high cost has prevented the purchase by many agencies. Sales volume will hopefully bring down the price of this beneficial tool.

    The camera used at the Worcester fire failed to operate properly, and the manufacturer attributed the problem to thermal overload. This was an early model, and the rescue crew using it was nearly prevented from entering the warehouse by the high heat. Their attempt to enter was one of the last, and no other crews made significant interior progress.

    Under this high heat, the effectiveness of the device is questionable. Thermal imaging devices work well in cooler environments where the body temperature of a victim is higher than the surrounding air or a hot spot within a wall is warmer than the abutting construction. At high heat levels, these cameras will often “white out” because everything in its view is hot enough to affect the imager. If a victim was down in elevated heat, he would absorb the thermal energy of his environment. The turnout gear, for instance, would get hotter and the camera would not be able to differentiate between it and its surrounds. The survivability of a person in high heat for an extended time is negligible.

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should

    ensure that inspections of vacant buildings and pre-fire planning are conducted which cover all potential hazards, structural building materials (type and age), and renovations that may be encountered during a fire, so that the Incident Commander will have the necessary structural information to make informed decisions and implement an appropriate plan of attack

    ensure that the incident command system is fully implemented at the fire scene

    ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed when activities, size of fire, or need occurs, such as during multiple alarm fires, or responds automatically to pre-designated fires

    ensure that standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment are adequate and sufficient to support the volume of radio traffic at multiple-alarm fires

    ensure that Incident Command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene

    use guide ropes/tag lines securely attached to permanent objects at entry portals and place high-intensity floodlights at entry portals to assist lost or disoriented fire fighters in emergency escape

    ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position upon their arrival at the fire scene

    implement an overall health and safety program such as the one recommended in NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program

    consider using a marking system when conducting searches

    identify dangerous vacant buildings by affixing warning placards to entrance doorways or other openings where fire fighters may enter

    ensure that officers enforce and fire fighters follow the mandatory mask rule per administrative guidelines established by the department

    explore the use of thermal imaging cameras to locate lost or downed fire fighters and civilians in fire environments

    In addition,
    manufacturers and research organizations should conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters on the fireground.

    http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9947.html

    Derelict buildings marked after Mass. LODDs

    Haunting memories spurred Mass. chief to positive action

    Special 10 Year Anniversary Coverage HERE

    21

    Posted by on December 1, 2009 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Collapse, command presence, command-leadership, construction, courage, decision-making, fire behavior, Fire Flow, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, fortitude, History Repeating Event, in-the-line-of-duty, leadership, LODD, Mayday, Remembrance, Trapped, Uncategorized, vacant • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Is it Still Business as Usual?

    2 comments

    2984586419_1ea7eed384

    We’ve taked about a few things recently such as looking at the big picture related to buildings and occupancies and the functional parameters dealing with size-up and risk assessment. Then there’s the dialog and discussion on the Predictability of Performance related to buildings and occupancies. Back in July I talked about a number of operational considerations realated to firefighter safety at Vacant Structures that built upon a posting on vacant or unoccupied building determinations and the question: is it business as usual?

    Over the weekend some lively dialog and discussion was overheard regarding the advantages and disadvantages of working a fire in a vacant or unoccupied structure and the value of such company officer or command level descision-making. It still appears to be a hot button topic (to some) and has its camps of interest and champions on either side of the street. How does your viewpoint fit in? Is it STILL business as usual?
    Here are some basic definitions to keep us all on the same playing field;
    Vacant; refers to a building that is not currently in use, but which could be used in the future. The term “vacant” could apply to a property that is for sale or rent, undergoing renovations, or empty of contents in the period between the departure of one tenant and the arrival of another tenant. A vacant building has inherent property value, even though it does not contain valuable contents or human occupants.

    Unoccupied; generally refers to a building that is not occupied by any persons at the time an incident occurs. An unoccupied building could be used by a business that is temporarily closed (i.e. overnight or for a weekend). The term unoccupied could also apply to a building that is routinely or periodically occupied; however the occupants are not present at the time an incident occurs. A residential structure could be temporarily unoccupied because the residents are at work or on vacation. A building that is temporarily unoccupied has inherent property value as well as valuable contents.

     

    What are your thoughts on the issues related to conducting offensive, tactical operations in vacant or unoccupied structures? Does the level of direpair or dilapidation dictate the call? What are the actual or perceived risks? Does working the job, balance with the the risk, benefits, returns? As the escalating adverse trend continues, and more and more buildings become vacant and unoccupied, now is the time to focus greater attention on adequate risk assessments and effective strategic size-up with firefighter safety considerations remaining clear and distinguished.

    There may be a lot of reasons why a vacant building turns into a structure fire, that ultimately involves our services; don’t let that contribute to an undesired injury or worst.

    Here are some previously published insights for reconsiderations;

    • Implement and perform an effective dynamic risk assessment of the incident involving a vacant structure.
    • Consider an appropriate incident action plan and options for defensive operations, risk versus benefit considerations out weighing offensive interior operations.
    • Maintain effective and heightened situational awareness at all times
    • Conduct or delegate a 360 reconn of the affected structure, if the building profile allows
    • Consider the factors related to presumed Vacant or Unoccupied; and the suggested demands associated with search team deployment, escalating and rapid fire spread, decreased time-to-collapse potential and RIT Team availability, be aware of potential squatters
    • Vacant residential occupancies constructed within the past ten years are very likely to have engineered structural systems (ESS) that will increase the potential early structural collapse and increase unacceptable risk to firefighter safety.
    • Resulting time delays in the discovery and reporting of fires in vacant structures increases fire severity and magnitude, increases the potential fire spread and communication to adjacent structures and requires adequate resources and fire flows to combat fire suppression activities.
    • Conduct pre-incident planning to identify the magnitude of the vacant structures within your jurisdiction and define operational expectations and deployment strategies. It shouldn’t be business as usual. Consider the safety risks to firefighters.
    • Assume potential for compromised interior conditions resulting from vandalism and intentional destruction of interior walls, floors, Compartmentation and structural system integrity.
    • Assume rapid fire extension and early structural collapse potential
    • Identify and establish collapse zone perimeters and maintain them for firefighter safety.
    • Develop or enhance operating protocols for fire operations for both vacant residential AND commercial properties. Determine acceptable risk profiles and operational modes. Consider the Rules of Engagement.
    • Be consciously cautious with personnel safety foremost in your IAP and tactical operations; Remember this is vacant structure.
    • BECOME SAFE

    A recent article related to a recently released NIOSH LODD Report from 2006 on a Career Firefighter injured during rapid fire progression in an Abandoned Structure who died six days later in Georgia summarized and recommended that Fire departments, municipalities and organizations like NFPA that set standards should consider developing and implementing a system for identifying and marking unoccupied, vacant or abandoned structures to improve firefighter safety. Take the time to read the report.

    Posted by on November 25, 2009 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, risk-based assessment, size-up, vacant