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Large Warehouse Fire: Gastonia, NC

A large warehouse fire in a 211,000 SF complex resulted from from a transformer explosion this morning at the Wix Distribution Center in Gastonia, NC. The building complex was a former textile mill and was built in 1917.

Published report indicate that more than 60 firefighters operated at the scene to control the fire.

It was reported that Fire Chief Phillip Welch stated firefighters started fighting the fires inside the building after the transformer explosion occurred, but it quickly got out of control.“There was an aggressive attack inside, but just because of the storage fight, we were not able to overcome that nor was the sprinkler system,” Welch said.

Aerial View, BING Map Capture

Considerations and Thoughts

How prepared is your department for a large scale fire in a large footprint warehouse?
Have you completed pre-fire plans, walk through tours and table top exercises for the key at risk buildings or complexes?
Do you know what the sustained water flow requirements might be for a heavily or fully involved complex or building?
Practices and honed your skills on establishing and managing a complex, multi-operatonal period incident?
Have you looked at creating box alarms or pre-arranged greater alarm response and resource requests?
Have you trained with the departments, jurisdictions and companies that might respond?
Do you have strategies and tactics identified and have you trained on them for operations in large scale buildings? Don’t implment and treat the incident like you would a residential or small commercial fire….
Respect the building and predict with conservative decision-making
Manage and expect compromise and collapse, rapid fire extention and operational challenges to fixed suppression systems and protectivies
Don’t over extend companies while attmtping to operate in the interior: These are typcially closed building ( lack of immedate exiting capabilties) with a special need for air management and accountability and access control.

IMAGES: Scene of Gastonia warehouse fire Saturday

Viewer-submitted video of Gastonia warehouse fire

Posted by Christopher Naum on April 13, 2013 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, fire behavior, Fire Flow, firefighter, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, occupancies, operations, pre-planning, size-up, Systems, Systems and Assemblies, tactics, Uncategorized • Tagged: building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, command and control of large scale incidents, commandsafety.com, fire extension, fire load, Large scale fire, mill construction, Multiple alarm warehouse fire, semi-mill construction, Textile mill, the companyofficer.com, warehouse fire

Predictability and Performance Of Buildings and Today’s Fireground

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Understanding the distinctiveness of your first-due, mutual aid or greater-alarm response area requires constant vigilance and continuous observations. Building knowledge equals firefighter safety. Photo By CJ Naum

When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operations (good and bad) give us experience that defines and determines how we assess, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm. The “art and science of firefighting” is predicated on a fundamental understanding of how fire affects a building and its occupants and the manner in which the fire service engages when called on to combat a structure fire.

We have certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined, predictable manner:

That the building will react and perform under assumptions of past performance and outcomes
That fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable duration
That the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy or structural system
That we can safely and effectively mitigate a fire in any given building type and occupancy
That we will have the time to conduct the required tasks identified to be of importance based on identified or assumed indicators
That the building will conform to the rules of firefighting engagement

Times have changed

Today’s incident demands on the fireground are unlike those of even the recent past. This means incident commanders, commanding and company officers and firefighters alike must have increased technical knowledge of building construction with a heightened sensitivity of fire behavior and fire dynamics, a focus on operational structural stability of the compartment and building envelope and considerations related to occupancy risk versus the occupancy type. Understanding the building – its complexities in terms of anatomy, structural systems, materials, configuration, design, layout, systems, methods of construction, engineering and inherent features, limitations, challenges and risks – is fundamental for operational excellence on the fireground and firefighter safety.

There is an immediate need for emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their knowledge and insights of modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy and the building that accounts for presumptive fire behavior.

We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built on decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in current training programs and academy instruction.

We must maintain a balance with learning about old and new building construction. A renewed focus on Type III, Ordinary /Protected construction and Type IV Heavy Timber must be incorporated within initial, in-service and periodic training and drills. Recent firefighter LODD events in these building types reinforces this need and gap. Photo By CJ Naum

Increasing company and command officer competencies in Building Anatomy, structural systems and how buildings are built and affected by fire behavior is fundamental to effective fireground operations. Interdependent structural components are evident for wall, floor and support assemblies in this Type IV occupancy. Do you know the inherent collapse potential of these buildings? Photo by CJ Naum

We have assumed that the routiness or successes of past operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel. Photo By CJ Naum

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of combat structural fire engagement. Photo by CJ Naum

Executing tactical plans based on faulty or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after-action accounts and firefighter line-of-duty-death reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement Incident Action Plans (IAPs).

The demands of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel in situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations.

Managing Risk

“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for smart aggressive fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at risk. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die; it’s that simple, it’s that obvious.”

Those are the words of Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret.) of the Hackensack, NJ, Fire Department on the 20th anniversary of the Hackensack Ford dealership fire that killed five firefighters in 1988. Without understanding building-occupancy relationships and integrating fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety-conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies, you are derelict and negligent and everyone may not be going home. Empirical insights and test data must be integrated in emerging fire suppression models and improved firefighting theory.

It’s Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type; Changes in building size and floor area, compartment volume and interconnectivity, fire load packages, methods and materials in construction and structural support systems create specific risk profiles and demands in what used to be common Occupancy types. A report of a fire in a residential occupancy will have different risks and operational requirements if the house is a 1500 SF Bungalow, a 2500 SF old Decker/Flat or a 4000 SF Engineered system house. Photo By CJ Naum

Conclusion

Our world has evolved. Technological and sociological demands create a continuing element of change in the built environment and our infrastructure. With these changes and demands come the need to assess these vulnerabilities, hazards and threats with effective and dynamic risk management and competent command and control.

These changes influence the way we do business in the street, the interface-up close and personal with the buildings in your community and equate to the risks and hazards you and your personnel will be confronted with and the level of safety afforded them during incident operations.

Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities.

If the fire service can significantly increase proficiencies in building knowledge and equate that to other fundamental operational aspects in structural fire operations, then there would be a direct enhancement to firefighter safety, through injury and LODD reduction, operational efficiency and operational excellence. If we understand buildings, occupancies and construction, and balance this with our understanding of fire dynamics and orchestrate it with appropriate strategies, tactics and command management, then we made the new safety equation work; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S). It’s all about the Anatomy of Buildings on fire.

The Probability of Adverse Consequences (PAC) must be recognized in all buildings with continuous and focused risk assessment during all phases and task assignments. This single building and occupancy exemplifies an Integrated Hybrid Building (IHB) type that incorporates Type III Ordinary construction with an engineered wood I-beam roof assembly on the lower street level and Type II non-combustible construction on the upper floors. This would require different IAP’s and tactical deployment in the event of a fire. Photo by CJ Naum

Get out on to your streets and into the field and look at how the buildings are being constructed in your jurisdiction. Understanding how they are built and what the inherent dangers are, coupled with accurate pre-fire planning data will provide mission critical information when engaged in combat fire suppression operations. The anatomy of the building is fundamental to corresponding firefighting operations. Photo by CJ Naum

Understanding Buildings, Performance & Fire Operations

There is an acute corollary of technical knowledge and inter reliance on occupancies, construction, strategy, tactics, risk, safety, physics, engineering and fire suppression theory…FACT!
There are Fundamental Domains that can be applied
There is a direct empirical correlation that provides quantitative & qualitative performance indicators and command gauges that can be utilized for risk assessment and strategic & tactical operational decision-making.

Think about the following;

Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
Take a tour of your response area, district or community. Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that will affect and influence your future incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory, vent path studies and fire suppression theory.
Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type and align your operations and deployments to match those risks. It’s much more than just the Five Fundamental Building Types of the past.
Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling.
Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of conducting time sensitive tactical fire service operations
Think about Adaptive Fireground Management and Command Resiliency
Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going to about that gap?
Understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
Start knowing your buildings-intimately; it’s the key to effective firefighting

Understand the buildings and occupancies not only in your jurisdiction, first or second-due areas, but also in those areas that you may be called upon to respond to for greater alarms or mutual aid. Remember Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Understand and improve upon your skill set levels and those of your company, battalion, division, department or region.

Keep apprised of different types of building materials and construction used in your community.
The operative question is this: “What do you “really” know about the buildings in your district?”
As you drive about your response district, coming back from an alarm, heading to the firehouse tonight or running errands around your community, take a good look around. Ask yourself a simple question; “How well do you know the buildings, structures and occupancies in your response jurisdiction?”
Be honest, do you really understand how those “older residential” structures were built and understand how fire travels and impacts your fireground operations?
Are your aware of the newest features of engineered structural support systems being constructed within that new set of homes going up in your second-due area?
Are you aware, that vacant office building is being converted into a light manufacturing and assembly business?
How about those unoccupied store fronts and businesses that have recently closed up due to the tough economic times…. any special hazards or operational concerns to your company should you get a dispatch to respond?
Have the senior members of your station or department shared their stories of operations and incidents at various buildings around your district or community?
Did you listen to them, or were you quick to dismiss those “old war stories”. There’s a wealth of “pre-planning’ nuggets hidden in those stories. Take the time to listen, remember or postulate
Take a good look around….think about any given building, the one across the street that you’re looking at while you waited for the traffic light to change; Think about a fire in that same building.
Do you really understand how it will truly perform under combat structural fire conditions?
What’s the building’s collapse profile?
How much operational time will you have? Will you need?
What’s the fire load package size?
What are your concerns for rapid fire extension, extreme fire behavior and vent path issues that may affect firefighter safety?
What dynamic risk assessment factors will you have to deal with?
How safe is it for you to engage in interior operations upon your arrival?
How can this building, its occupancy and structural system hurt, my team, my company, my firefighters, my department, me?

Never assume the same rules of structural fire engagement can be applied to all buildings without constant risk assessment, recon and situational awareness. Strategies and tactics must remain fluid. This single story commercial occupancy looked like a basic renovated Type III building from the street. An exposed (minimal design) interior accompanied by a non-conventional bow string truss support system and a raftered roof deck are ingredients for catastrophe for the unsuspecting Engine or Truck Companies. Photo by CJ Naum

Keep an eye in the rear view mirror; learning from the wisdom and knowledge from where you’ve been, what you’ve done and all your past experiences and practice; but at the same time focusing on the road before you with keen attentiveness on situational awareness, anticipating error-likely conditions and balanced risk assessment and operational management in both your strategic and tactical deployments.

Ensure you’re glancing occasionally in your rear view mirror to monitor where you’ve been, while driving your initiatives, programs, processes and actions forward. Above all, maintain the courage to be safe and know and understand your buildings, occupancies and your company’s capabilities.

Posted by Christopher Naum on September 9, 2012 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, dynamics, Engineered Structural Systems, ESS, fire behavior, Fire Protection Engineering, firefighter, firefighting-operations, fires, History Repeating Event, LODD, occupancies, pre-planning, risk-based assessment, size-up, strategies, structure fires • Tagged: "pre-fire planning", Adaptive Fire Ground Management for Command and Company Officers, Adaptive Fireground Management, Adaptive Strategies and Tactical Patience, Building Anatomy, Building Construction for Fire Officers, Building Construction for the Fire Service, building construction principles, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety, Buildings on fire, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, CJ Naum, commandsafety.com, engineered structural system, Fire Fighting Strategy and Tactics, firefighting, First-Due Commanding Fire Officer, Heavy Timber Mill Construction, Occupancy Risk, Occupancy risk versus occupancy type, Operational Safety Considerations at Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies, Predictive Occupancy Profiling, Predictive Strategic Process, Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling, Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Type III and Type IV construction characteristics, Type III Collapse Safety, Type III Ordinary Construction, Understanding Buildings

Leading Causes of Residential Fire Fatalities: Unintentional/Careless Actions, Smoking

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USFA Releases Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010) Report “Other unintentionally set, careless” actions and “smoking” are the leading causes

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report today examining the characteristics of civilian fire fatalities in residential buildings. The report, Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010) was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is based on 2008 to 2010 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).

According to the report:

Ninety-two percent of all civilian fatalities in residential building fires involve thermal burns and smoke inhalation.
The leading specific location where civilian fire fatalities occur in residential buildings is the bedroom (55 percent).
Fifty percent of civilian fire fatalities in residential buildings occur between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. This period also accounts for 47 percent of fatal fires.
Thirty-six percent of fire victims in residential buildings were trying to escape at the time of their deaths; an additional 35 percent were sleeping.
“Other unintentionally set, careless” actions and “smoking” (each accounting for 16 percent) are the leading causes of fatal residential building fires.
Approximately 44 percent of civilian fatalities in residential building fires are between the ages of 40 and 69.
Thirteen percent of the fire fatalities in residential buildings were less than 10 years old.

Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010) is part of the Topical Fire Report Series. Topical reports explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS.

Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.

REPORT DOWNLOAD: Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010)

Time of Alarm

Human Factors Contrubuting to Fatalities

Age Factors

News and Features

Residential Fire Trends

Click charts below to enlarge.

2008 State Fire Death Rates

National Fire Death Rate:
12.0 deaths per million population
State	Fire Death Rate
District of Columbia	32.2
Oklahoma	26.4
Arkansas	24.1
West Virginia	23.7
Alabama	22.5
Mississippi	22.5
Tennessee	22.0
Louisiana	21.4
South Carolina	18.7
Alaska	17.5

View All States »

Fire Statistics

Browse Reports

Alcohol	Lighters, Matches, and Candles
Civilian Casualties	Mattresses and Bedding
Civilian Casualties – Children	Outdoor
Civilian Casualties – Older Adults	Rural and Urban
Civilian Casualties – People with Disabilities	School and University
Cooking	Smoke Alarms
Electrical and Appliances	Smoking
Fire Departments	Structure Fires
Firefighter Casualties	Structure Fires (Nonresidential)
Heating	Structure Fires (Residential)
Holiday and Seasonal	Vehicles
Intentionally Set Fires	Wildland

Fire in the United States

Many of the reports on this page may be ordered from our Publications Catalog »

This report provides a statistical overview of fires in the United States and is designed to equip the fire service and others with information that motivates corrective action, sets priorities, targets specific fire programs, serves as a model for State and local analyses of fire data, and provides a baseline for evaluating programs.

Fire in the United States Fifteenth Edition (2003-2007) (PDF, 5 Mb)

14th Edition (PDF, 4.1 Mb)
13th Edition (PDF, 1.3 Mb)

12th Edition (PDF, 2.3 Mb)
11th Edition (PDF, 1.7 Mb)

10th Edition (PDF, 2.0 Mb)
9th Edition (PDF, 3.7 Mb)

Profile of Fire in the United States Fifteenth Edition (2003-2007) (PDF, 1.3 Mb)

Posted by Christopher Naum on March 18, 2012 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Fatalities, fire behavior, firefighting, fires, occupancies, USFA • Tagged: building construction, buildingsonfire.com, characteristics of civilian fire fatalities in residential buildings, Christopher Naum, Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings, Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010), commandsafety.com, Firefighting statistics, National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS)., Occupancy Risk, Occupancy Types, Residential Buildings, residential firefighting, Residential Fires, Topical Fire Report Series, United States Fire Administration (USFA), USFA, USFA's National Fire Data Center

High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year

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High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is reporting that in 2005-2009, there were an average of 15,700 reported structure fires in high-rise buildings per year with an associated $235 million in direct property damage.

The report, “High-Rise Building Fires,” (PDF, 499 KB) cites apartments, hotels, offices, and facilities that care for sick as accounting for roughly half of all high-rise fires. Structure fires in these four property classes resulted in $99 million in direct property damage per year.

There is a downward trend in high-rise fires. In the last few decades, a range of special provisions have migrated into the codes and standards for tall buildings.

Other findings from the report:

In 2005-2009, high-rise fires claimed the lives of 53 civilians and injured 546 others, per year.
The risks of fire, fire death, and direct property damage due to fire tend to be lower in high-rise buildings than in shorter buildings of the same property use.
An estimated three percent of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.
Usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings of the same property use.Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The risk of a fire is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

In 2005-2009, an estimated 15,700 reported high-rise structure fires per year resulted in associated losses of 53 civilian deaths, 546 civilian injuries, and $235 million in direct property damage per year. An estimated 2.6% of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.

The trends in high-rise fires and associated losses (inflation-adjusted for property damage) are clearly down, but the sharp post-1998 reduction appears to be mostly due to the change to NFIRS Version 5.0, which is shifting estimates to lower levels that also appear to be more accurate.

Four property classes account for roughly half of high-rise fires: apartments, hotels, facilities that care for the sick, and offices. In 2005-2009, in these four property classes combined, there were 7,800 reported high-rise structure fires per year and associated losses of 30 civilian deaths, 352 civilian injuries, and $99 million in direct property damage per year. The property damage average is inflated by the influence of one 2008 hotel fire, whose $100 million loss projected to nearly $40 million a year in the analysis.

The report emphasizes these four property classes.

Some other property uses – such as stores and restaurants – may represent only a single floor in a tall building primarily devoted to other uses. Some property uses – such as grain elevators and factories – can be as tall as a high-rise building but without a large number of separate floors or stories.

For these reasons, the four property use groups listed above define most of the buildings we think of as high-rise buildings, and their fires come closest to defining what we think of as the high-rise building fire problem.
By most measures of loss, the risks of fire and of associated fire loss are lower in highrise buildings than in other buildings of the same property loss.
This statement applies to risk of fire, civilian fire deaths, civilian fire injuries, and direct property damage due to fire, relative to housing units, for apartments, and risk of fire for hotels, offices, and facilities that care for the sick.

The usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings, for each property use group. Even so, considering the extensive requirements in NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, for fire and life safety features in both new and existing high-rise buildings, it seems clear that there are still major gaps, particularly in adoption and enforcement of the provisions requiring retrofit of automatic sprinkler systems and other life safety systems in existing high-rise buildings. NFPA 1®,Fire Code, has sprinkler retrofit requirements.

This has implications for public officials and ordinary citizens in any city. Public officials should make sure that the latest editions of NFPA 1®, Fire Code, and NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, are in place and that the codes they have are supported by effective code enforcement provisions, including plan review and inspection processes, both for new construction and for continued supervision of code compliance in existing buildings.

The public can take responsibility for their own safety by insisting that their public officials take these steps. As in so many areas of fire safety, we know what to do, but we still need to do it.

The trend had been toward a smaller share of fires being reported each year as occurring in buildings with fire-resistive construction, both for high-rise and other buildings, with the decline being most dramatic in facilities that care for the sick.

This statistical decline could reflect any or all of the following:
(a) a shift in construction between the two types permitted by codes, from Type I (442 or 332) construction, which is coded as fire-resistive, to Type II (222) construction, which is coded as protected non-combustible;
(b) a shift to acceptable alternative designs using more sprinklers and less fire-resistive construction; or
(c) enough success in containing fires that a rising fraction never are reported to fire departments, because the fires are caught and controlled so early by occupants.

Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The fraction of 2005-

2009 high-rise fires that began on the 7th floor or higher was 32% for apartments, 22% for hotels and motels, 21% for facilities that care for the sick, and 39% for office buildings. The risk of a fire start is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

High-rise apartments have a slightly larger share of their fires originating in means of egress than do their shorter counterparts (4% vs. 3%).
The same is true of hotels (7% vs. 5%) and facilities that care for the sick (6% vs. 4%).
In offices (4% vs. 6%), the differences in percentages are in the opposite direction, which means that high-rise buildings in those properties have a smaller share of their fires originating in means of egress.
In all four property classes, the differences are so small that one can say there is no evidence that high-rise buildings have a bigger problem with fires starting in means of egress.

NFPA FACT SHEET

More information on Solomon’s NFPA session and the conference can be found at www.nfpa.org/FLSCONF.
NFPA Report Download, HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 6, 2011 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, firefighting, firefighting-operations, high-rise, Highrise, NFPA, occupancies, pre-planning, Sprinklers, structure fires • Tagged: and offices, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, facilities that care for the sick, high-rise building fires, high-rise building fires 2010, High-rise fires, high-rise fires: apartments, Highrise fire property loss, Highrise fire protection, hotels, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), NFPA, NFPA High-Rise Building Fires, NFPA Highrise Fire Report, NFPA report, trends in high-rise fires, U.S. High-Rise Building Fires Fact Sheet

Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Types

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The Predictability of Performance; It's Occupany Risk not Occupancy Type

Today’s incident demands on the fireground are unlike those of the recent past, requiring incident commanders and commanding officers to have increased technical knowledge of building construction with a heightened sensitivity to fire behavior, a focus on operational structural stability and considerations related to occupancy risk versus the occupancy type.

There is an immediate need for today’s emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their foundation of knowledge and insights related to the modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to adjust and modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions.

Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk, not occupancy type, and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumptive fire behavior.

The dramatic changes in buildings and occupancies over the past ten years have resulted inadequate fire suppression methodologies based upon conventional practices that do not align with the manner in which we used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions.

We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system and given an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions, we can safely and effectively mitigate a structural fire situation in any given building type and occupancy.

Past operational experiences, both favorable and negative; gave us experiences that define and determine how the fireground is assessed, react and how we expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future; this formed the basis for the naturalistic decision-making process.

Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built upon nine decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

Are you aware of the defining changes in structural systems and support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of the fire-loading package in today’s buildings and occupancies? When was the last time you were out in the street with the companies, or spent some time doing a walk-through of construction or renovations site? Have you asked you commanding officers, division or battalion chief or your company officers for insights into what operational demands and risks are being imposed upon them while operating in the street and within the buildings, occupancies and structures that comprise your jurisdiction?

The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed; but no one has told us. The IAFC Safety, Health & Survival Section (SH&S) spent that past year refining and updating The IAFC Ten Rules of Structural Fire Engagement. First published in 2001, the original Ten Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting provided a set of principles and parameters that incident commanders, commanding and company officers could utilize and implement during incident operations to decrease operations risk, increase and amplify personnel safety of operating companies.

The section moved to develop rules of engagement for structural firefighting to serve as nationally developed model procedures (SOPs) offered by the IAFC. These new Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting have been posted on the IAFC SH&S web page and were officially rolled out the Fire Rescue International in Chicago in 2010.

The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety will provide a crucial link towards integrating occupancy risk considerations with more educated and informed understandings of buildings, occupancies, and the behavior of fire with a structure.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned command and company officer knows that at times. It’s what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances.

However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective; aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal-oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed strategic processes that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

Today’s incident commanders need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling, while implementing Tactical Patience.

Think about the following;

Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
Take a tour of your response area, district, community or city.
Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that are affecting your incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory
Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type and align your operations and deployments to match those risks
Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling
Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of conducting fire service operations
Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going todo about that gap?

If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at risk. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Taking it to the Streets, Hosted By Christopher Naum on FireFighterNEtcast.com. Tactical Renaissance and The New Rules of Combat Engagement. September, 2010 Radio Program. Download HERE
IAFC: The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety, HERE and HERE
NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE
What’s on your Radar Screen; http://commandsafety.com/2010/07/whats-on-your-radar-screen/
Reflecting upon these days of June; http://commandsafety.com/2010/06/reflecting-on-these-days-of-june/

Posted by Christopher Naum on November 25, 2010 • Filed under: buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, firefighting-operations, occupancies, risk-based assessment • Tagged: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, building performance under fire conditions, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, Commansafety.com, compartment fires, extreme fire behavior, fire behavior, Fire Load Package, fire loading, firefighting strategy and tactics, firefighting tactics, fireground situational awareness, occupancies, Occupancy Risk, occupancy type, Predictive Occupancy Profiling, risk, Rules of Structural Fire Engagement, Strategy and tactics, Structural Fire Fighting, structural fire situation

Thanksgiving Day Fires in Residential Buildings

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The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report examining the characteristics of Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings. The report, Thanksgiving Day Fires in Residential Buildings, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe during this holiday.

The report is part of the Topical Fire Report Series and is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). According to the report, an estimated 2,000 Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 5 deaths, 25 injuries, and $21 million in property loss. The leading cause of all Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings is, by far, cooking.

In addition, these fires occur most frequently in the afternoon hours from noon to 4 p.m. Smaller, confined fires account for 71 percent and larger, nonconfined fires account for 29 percent of Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings. Finally, smoke alarms were not present in 20 percent of nonconfined Thanksgiving Day fires that occurred in occupied residential buildings.

The topical reports are designed to explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS. Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.

FINDINGS

An estimated 2,000 Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated average of 5 deaths, 25 injuries, and $21 million in property loss.
Smaller, confined fires account for 71 percent of Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings.
Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings occur most frequently in the afternoon hours from 12 to 4 p.m., peaking from noon to 1 p.m.
Cooking is the leading cause of all Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings at 69 percent. Nearly all of these cooking fires (97 percent) are small, confined fires with limited damage.
Electrical malfunctions (14 percent), carelessness or other unintentional actions (14 percent), and open flames (13 percent) are the leading causes of the larger, nonconfined Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings.
Nonconfined Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings most often start in cooking areas and kitchens (22 percent).
The leading category of factors contributing to ignition of nonconfined Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings is the “misuse of material or product” (35 percent). Within this category, heat source too close to combustible materials and abandoned or discarded materials account for 14 percent and 9 percent of all nonconfined Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings, respectively.
No smoke alarms were present in 20 percent of nonconfined Thanksgiving Day fires in occupied residential buildings.

Seventy-nine percent of Thanksgiving Day fires in residen-tial buildings are confined to the object of origin (Figure 2). Included in these fires are those coded as “confined fires” in NFIRS. Nine percent of the Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings are confined to the room of origin, and the remaining 12 percent extend beyond the room of fire origin.

Copy of the Report, HERE

http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/v11i5.pdf

Posted by Christopher Naum on November 4, 2010 • Filed under: Building Construction for the Fire Service, Christopher Naum, events, Fire Protection Engineering, fire service, fire-rescue-topics, firefighting-operations, fires, occupancies, pre-planning, research • Tagged: Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, FEMA, firefighting, Holiday Fires, Home Fire Prevention, House Fires, oven fires, residential, smoke alarms, statistics, Thanksgiving Day Fires in Residential Buildings, Thanksgiving fires, Topical Fire Report Series, USFA, USFA's National Fire Data Center

Taking it to the Streets; “Redefining the Fire Ground” Rescheduled

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Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

Wednesday Night’s Program has been postponed due to Emergent Server issues at BlogTalkRadio.

The Program has been rescheduled for Thursday November 4th at 9:00pm EDT

Turn Out to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued. Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention? Join the live broadcast on Thursday night November 4th at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

Posted by Christopher Naum on November 3, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, behaviors, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Charleston, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, decision-making, fire behavior, Fire Flow, fire suppression, fire-rescue-topics, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, Naum, NIST, occupancies, risk-based assessment, Safety Culture, size-up, structure fires, Uncategorized • Tagged: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", active fire protectives, alterations, automatic sprinkler systems, Blogtalkradio, Building codes, building construction, building permits, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, City of Charleston Sofa Super Store LODD, Combat Fire Suppression Operations, commandsafety.com, commerical fire, construction, Doug Cline, Dynamic Risk Assessment, FierFighting Tactics, fire behavior, Fire Codes, Fire Fighting Strategy and Tactics, Fire Ground, fire inspections, fire loading, fire modeling, fire spread, fire suppression, fire tenability, FireFighter Netcast, firefighting, Fuel Load, ICC, Incident Command Management, International Code Council, local codes, LODD, Mercantile Occupancies, National Institute of Standards & Technology, National Model Building Codes, NFA, NIST, passive fire protectives, pre-fire, rapid spread of fire, Risk assessment, Routley Report, Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting, Smoke migration, smoke movement, smoke ventilation, Sofa Super Store Fire, Sofa Super Store Fire Behavior, Sprinklers, Strategy and tactics, tactics, Taking it to the Streets, ventilation

International Society of Fire Service Instructors; “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.”

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The International Society of Fire Service Instructors is proud to announce the release of “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.” The program is a train-the trainer package that combines the latest research on light weight building construction from National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), Underwriters Laboratories(UL), Michigan State University, The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and the Chicago Fire Department into a single resource tailored for company-level instruction.

The program was made possible through a Prevention & Research Grant from the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program and the Department of Homeland Security. The ISFSI partnered with Eastern Kentucky University’s Fire & Safety Engineering Technology Program to analyze line of duty deaths between 1997 and 2009 to study the impact that lightweight construction has had on firefighters and firefighting operations.

The DVD included in the program package contains all of the instructional resources necessary to provide quality training on this important topic. A wide variety of support materials are included to provide the user a deep understanding of the challenges with modern building construction techniques. Instructors can tailor the program to meet the needs of their audience, including a 2-hour brief up to a week-long program.

The program will be distributed to all members of the ISFSI as a free member benefit. The ISFSI has also partnered with the Safety & Health Section of the IAFC to provide a copy to each of its members. ISFSI President, Eddie Buchanan, was on hand at the Safety & Health Section Meeting at FRI to personally deliver Chief Billy Goldfeder his copy as chair of the section. All members should expect their copy to arrive in their mailboxes over the next week.

“I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to the ISFSI members and staff who worked so hard to bring this product to firefighters across America and the globe. It is truly a lifesaving program and a fantastic use of grant funds. It is critical that this package get into the hands of every instructor and fire officer to ensure they are educated and prepared to handle the real risk that looms out there on the next call,” said President Buchanan.

Check out the International Society of Fire Service Instructor’s (ISFSI) web site HERE.

Not a member? Take the time to sign up and get connected.

Posted by Christopher Naum on September 3, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "health and safety", "pre-fire planning", assemblies, behaviors, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, dynamics, Engineered Structural Systems, failures, Fatalities, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, IAFC, NIST, occupancies, Safety Culture, size-up, statistics, strategies • Tagged: "firefighter safety", building construction, Christopher Naum, Collapse, commandsafety.com, engineered systems, fire instructor, Firefighter LODD, Firefighters Grant Program, ISFSI, lightweight construction, National Institute of Standards & Technology, odern Construction Considerations for Company Officers, The International Society of Fire Service Instructors, training, UL, Underwriters Laboratories

Operational Safety at Basement Fires: Close Call

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Basement fires in both residential and commercial occupancies are one of the most challenging tactical operations that present numerous risk factors that required the highest degree of situational awareness, training skill sets and continuous incident monitoring and assessment to gauge building structural integrity, fire behavior and crew integrity and performance.

An explosion rocked a Fairdale, Kentucky neighborhood this past weekend while the homeowner was in the process of doing remodeling his basement. A Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Mark Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel.

Fellow firefighters, including his brother-in-law, who was right behind him prior to his fall, were yelling and screaming at Long to hang on. They managed to get a ladder to the basement and it was up to Long to find the strength to get out. He says “I started to try to climb up. I got two, I lost my grip, fell flat into the fire. I was so exhausted.” On his third attempt, he did find the strength and pulled himself up the ladder and out of the flames.

According to published reports a coordinated fire suppression effort was undertaken, with heavy fire involvement extending throughout the house and into the roof area. Interior fire attack was commenced, and as crews began moving across the first floor area above the seat of the fire, the floor subassembly failed causing an isolated collapse and compromise of the structural floor system and sub-floor decking, resulting in Captain Long falling into the basement. The fire originating in the basement was the result of the homeowners’ use of acetone as a floor treatment when the chemical vapors were ignited by the hot water heater causing an explosion and resulting fire.

Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive)

Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner.
Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment

Here are some resources and case studies resulting from operations at floor collapses;

Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know, Here
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE
Remembering Brackenridge 1991 Floor Collapse and LODD
Brackenridge-USFA Report; HERE
Brackenridge-NFPA Summary; HERE
Maintaining Situational Awareness
NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors
Career Fire Fighter Dies While Exiting Residential Basement Fire – New York, HERE
First-Floor Collapse During Residential Basement Fire Claims the Life of Two Fire Fighters (Career and Volunteer) and Injures a Career Fire Fighter Captain – New York, HERE
Career Engineer Dies and Fire Fighter Injured After Falling Through Floor While Conducting a Primary Search at a Residential Structure Fire – Wisconsin, HERE
Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE
Floor Collapse Claims the Life of One Fire Fighter and Injures Two-California, HERE
UL University CBT: “Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions”

Incident links; HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on July 28, 2010 • Filed under: "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, close-call, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, Engineered Structural Systems, failures, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, first-due, floors, Mayday, Naum, NFPA, NIOSH, occupancies, pre-planning, risk-based assessment, size-up, strategies, Systems and Assemblies, training-development, Trapped, Truss, UL, Uncategorized • Tagged: basement fire, Brackenridge Collapse, Building Profile, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, crew integrity, engineered wood floor joists, fire attack, Fire Floor Integrity, fire suppression, firefighting, floor Collapse, floor construction, floor system compromise, floor systems, interior fire suppression operations, Mayday, NIOSH, NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Reports, preplanning, risk assessement, Risk versus Gain, RIT, situational awareness, standard operating procedures, Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions, UL

What’s On Your Radar Screen?

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BuildingsonFire 2010; Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Operational Safety

Major Influencing Fire Service Reports, Issues or Focus that should be on Your Radar Screen

The following list is but a modest cross section of pertinent information or focus areas today’s Firefighter, Company or Command Officer MUST be knowledgeable in, have insights and proficiency based technical skills to function with a level of competencies demanded in today’s fire service.

If these are not on your radar screen or you haven’t got a blip of a clue what they’re about; then you are derelict and not doing your job- and the end result could be a less than desirable outcome on the fireground; it’s that simple, it’s that direct.

Have you read these reports, understand the issues & influences, increased your knowledge, skills and abilities in any gap areas or taken the time to research the cutting edge issues affecting today’s fire service?

The City of Charleston Sofa Super Store LODD-Routley Fire Report

Read the report; understand the incident, the building performance, the fire behavior and the operation process deployed. Gain the insights from the overall apparent and contributing causes identified and presented and assess how these relate to your fire service perspective and department’s culture and performance today.

City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team Phase I Report, HERE
Routley Final Phase II Report HERE
NIOSH Investigative Report, HERE
NIOSH REPORT SUMMARY
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for an occupational safety and health program in accordance with NFPA 1500
develop, implement, and enforce a written Incident Management System to be followed at all emergency incident operations
develop, implement, and enforce written SOPs that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual with overall authority and responsibility for management of all activities at an incident
ensure that the Incident Commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior fire fighting operations
train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
ensure that the Incident Commander establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in fire-fighting efforts
ensure the early implementation of division / group command into the Incident Command System
ensure that the Incident Commander continuously evaluates the risk versus gain when determining whether the fire suppression operation will be offensive or defensive
ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed at each structure fire
ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
ensure that a rapid intervention crew (RIC) / rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents
ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents
ensure that ventilation to release heat and smoke is closely coordinated with interior fire suppression operations
conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics
consider establishing and enforcing standardized resource deployment approaches and utilize dispatch entities to move resources to fill service gaps
develop and coordinate pre-incident planning protocols with mutual aid departments
ensure that any offensive attack is conducted using adequate fire streams based on characteristics of the structure and fuel load present
ensure that an adequate water supply is established and maintained
consider using exit locators such as high intensity floodlights or flashing strobe lights to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit
ensure that Mayday transmissions are received and prioritized by the Incident Commander
train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure
ensure that all fire fighters and line officers receive fundamental and annual refresher training according to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021
implement joint training on response protocols with mutual aid departments
ensure apparatus operators are properly trained and familiar with their apparatus
protect stretched hose lines from vehicular traffic and work with law enforcement or other appropriate agencies to provide traffic control
ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression and overhaul activities
ensure that fire fighters are trained in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
develop, implement and enforce written SOPS to ensure that SCBA cylinders are fully charged and ready for use
use thermal imaging cameras (TICs) during the initial size-up and search phases of a fire
develop, implement and enforce written SOPs and provide fire fighters with training on the hazards of truss construction
establish a system to facilitate the reporting of unsafe conditions or code violations to the appropriate authorities
ensure that fire fighters and emergency responders are provided with effective incident rehabilitation
provide fire fighters with station / work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments.

Additionally, federal and state occupational safety and health administrations should:

consider developing additional regulations to improve the safety of fire fighters, including adopting National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus standards.

Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn SCBA
conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.

Additionally, code setting organizations and municipalities should:

require the use of sprinkler systems in commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards, and establish retroactive requirements for the installation of fire sprinkler systems when additions to commercial buildings increase the fire and life safety hazards
require the use of automatic ventilation systems in large commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards.

Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:

coordinate the collection of building information and the sharing of information between building authorities and fire departments
consider establishing one central dispatch center to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions
ensure that fire departments responding to mutual aid incidents are equipped with mobile and portable communications equipment that are capable of handling the volume of radio traffic and allow communications among all responding companies within their jurisdiction.

Everyone Goes Home Campaign

Everyone Goes Home® is a national program by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries. In March 2004, a Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held to address the need for change within the fire service. At this summit, the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives were created and a program was born to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
Recognizing the need to do more to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation has launched a national initiative to bring prevention to the forefront.
In March 2004, the Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held in Tampa, Florida to address the need for change within the fire and emergency services. Through this meeting, 16 Life Safety Initiatives were produced to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
The first major action was to sponsor a national gathering of fire and emergency services leaders. The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation will play a major role in helping the U.S. Fire Administration meet its stated goal to reduce the number of preventable firefighter fatalities. The Foundation sees fire service adoption of the summit’s initiatives as a vital step in meeting this goal.
The Courage to Be Safe® On-Line Program , HERE
Media CenterUsing variations of the Courage to Be Safe ^®…So Everyone Goes Home® field program, along with material from the Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resource Kit we will develop and deploy a new online learning segment each month. These online learning segments will allow you to expand upon your personal and professional development when you want and how you want. Watch them by yourself or integrate them into your organizational training programs. Remember, that safety results from constant training and putting those skills to work everyday, on every call – SO EVERYONE GOES HOME. HERE
The Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Advocates Program will play a key role in helping to bring about awareness of the Initiatives and act as a conduit for resources to enable departments to implement and advocate them. HERE
The 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives
1. Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.
2. Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.
3. Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.
4. All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
5. Develop and implement national standards for training, qualifications, and certification (including regular recertification) that are equally applicable to all firefighters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
6. Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that are equally applicable to all firefighters, based on the duties they are expected to perform.
7. Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.
8. Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety.
9. Thoroughly investigate all firefighter fatalities, injuries, and near misses.
10. Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement.
11. National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should be developed and championed.
12. National protocols for response to violent incidents should be developed and championed.
13. Firefighters and their families must have access to counseling and psychological support.
14. Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a critical fire and life safety program.
15. Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the installation of home fire sprinklers.
16. Safety must be a primary consideration in the design of apparatus and equipment.

NIST Wind Driven Fire Study

Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them. Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire. This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building. In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure. This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway. The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented? Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening. If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants. NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions. There are many questions regarding wind driven fires. For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures? Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires. In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings. All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set. All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player. NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
NIST References HERE and HERE

NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments

A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
Reference Data HERE

NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments

The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments was recently released to the public providing . A copy of the report is attached.
Report Abstract:
Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.
This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.
This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.
Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.
The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
Synopsis HERE

USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002

Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies

UL Fire Academy CBT

UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions
Base on the UL research and
This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This self-guided course, which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions, is targeted toward the 1.1 million fire service personnel in the United States and Canada. The knowledge developed and shared in this course is critically important to firefighter and civilian safety.
This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
Program Objectives:
Provide brief history of events leading up to DHS Grant tests
Identify the fire test hypothesis, parameters, and steps completed in the testing process
Compare tests results (legacy vs. modern construction)
Communicate learnings from our partners representing the fire service
Discuss code recommendations
UL University on-line Program HERE

USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002

Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies

NIOSH LODD Reports

Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
NIOSH Web Page HERE
Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports, HERE

NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
Report HERE

NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors

Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
Report HERE

NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures

Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
ALERT Report HERE

National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience

The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
Search Reports, HERE
Resources, HERE

USFA Incident Reports (Stop History Repeating Events-HRE)

USFA provides information resources in many formats, including books, pamphlets and DVD’s, free of charge.
The U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire–the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.
The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters
This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas.
The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made
Technical Reports and On-line Publications, HERE

Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report

The Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire and Rescue published a comprehensive line of duty death report for Technician I Kyle R. Wilson on Saturday, January 26, 2008. Technician I Wilson was the first line of duty death in the Department’s 41-year history. The Department is sharing the LODD Investigative Report to honor Kyle, and in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels.
Technician Kyle Robert Wilson was 24-years old and was born in Olney, Maryland. He grew up in Prince William County and graduated from Hylton High School and George Mason University. He was an avid baseball and softball player. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006. Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive.
Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure.
Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.
The Department of Fire and Rescue immediately formed a multi-dimensional investigation team following the incident. The investigation team was comprised of five Department of Fire and Rescue uniform personnel and two external members from area fire departments. For eight months, the team thoroughly examined the events that occurred at the Marsh Overlook fire incident and identify the factors involved with the line of duty death of Technician I Kyle Wilson. The resulting report represents thousands of hours of effort to analyze fire and rescue operations and is a factual representation of the events that occurred. The report also provides a frame work for organizational level improvements.
The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be:
- The initial arriving fire suppression force size.
- The size up of fire development and spread.
- The impact of high winds on fire development and spread.
- The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials.
- The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts.
- The incident control and management.
- The Marsh Overlook fire incident was an immense fire fueled by extremely flammable building material products and a vicious wind. It was an environment where information gathering and decision making had to be performed in the time measurement of seconds. During the chain of events that occurred and under severe circumstances, fire and rescue personnel performed at exceptional levels.
During the repeated attempts to reach and rescue Technician I Wilson, personnel displayed heroic efforts and jeopardized their own safety. The Department will never forget the sacrifice that Technician Wilson made in an attempt to ensure others were safe. By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure his sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire and rescue departments can avoid another similar occurrence.
Resources and Report
- LODD Report Fact Sheet (23.9kb)
- LODD Investigative Report (9.16 mb)
- LODD Report Presentation (6.65 mb)
- LODD Report Basic House Model (Section 1) (1.87 mb)
- LODD Report Fire Model (Section 3) (5.16 mb)
- LODD Flashover Chart (60 kb)
- Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE

Loudoun County (VA) Fire Rescue Significant Near Miss Event Report

On May 25, 2008, fire and rescue personnel from Loudoun County responded to a structure fire at 43238 Meadowood Court in Leesburg, Virginia. During the course of the incident, seven responders were injured. Of those injured, four firefighters received significant burn injuries, two firefighters sustained orthopedic injuries, and one EMS provider was treated for minor respiratory distress. To date, five of the injured personnel have returned to duty. Two firefighters continue to recover from their injuries, including one who was severely burned.
Given the severity of the injuries and magnitude of the event, an independent Investigative Team was assembled to review the incident. The Team was comprised of four Loudoun County personnel, three external members from area fire departments, and two resource/support personnel. The Team was tasked with reviewing “the events leading up to the incident, the incident operation(s), the firefighter MAYDAY(s), and incident mitigation.”
For three months, the Team thoroughly examined the events surrounding the Meadowood Court fire incident and identified the factors associated with the injury of personnel.
The Report contains the results of the Investigative Team’s comprehensive review and analysis.
Fact Sheet, HERE
SIGNIFICANT INJURY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 43238 MEADOWOOD COURT MAY 25, 2008 Report HERE

Worcester (MA) Fire Cold Storage Fire LODD Report; Abandoned Cold Storage Warehouse Multi-Firefighter Fatality Fire 1999, Worcester, Massachusetts

A technical review of the 1999 Worcester, MA fire that claimed six firefighters concludes that abandoned buildings are a serious threat to firefighters and fire departments must make a concerted effort to use technology to maintain data on buildings in their response districts.
On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors. Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.
An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.
A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and deluge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts. According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities.
USFA Report HERE

Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department Final Report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels Nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths

The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter. This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.
Incident Overview, HERE
NIOSH Report, HERE
Investigative Report, HERE

Field Trips

Take a good look at the structures, occupancies and buildings in you first, second and third due areas, look around your community and jurisdiction as well as your mutual aid and greater alarm response box areas.
Have you stopped for a minute today and taken a good look around? Whether you’re sitting in the front seat at the stop light of an intersection or as you’re peering out the side cab window coming back from an alarm or while running errands in your POV; have you taken a good look around? As the Springsteen song goes; “this is your town”.
There’s a lot that can be gleaned from your surroundings on any given day. We sometimes take for granted the subtle changes that are happening all around us as we take care of business on our rounds, runs and calls. We tend to focus in on the immediacy of the events that are happening in front of us that demand our attention but fail to take a look around to pick up on information, data and insights that can help us on that next run or down the road in the future.
Take a look at the construction that might be going up in your areas. I’m certain you’re paying close attention to what’s happening in your first-due, but what about that third-due area, that neighboring jurisdiction or the mutual-aid area that you occasionally run in to? When you’re on that next EMS run or an investigation of an odor or alarm bells service call, take a few extra minutes to walk through the occupancy. Conduct your own mini company level pre-plan.
Look at the layout, features, access and construction features. If you have a chance, verify the structural support systems employed by the building for the floor and roof systems. If you have time, take the company on a quick site visit to that building that’s under construction or the renovations that are again underway in that commercial or business occupancy around the corner from quarters.
These continuing challenging economic times places a great deal of influence on what’s being built, how it might be constructed, the manner in which a building may be operational one day, vacant the other and under renovation the next. Sometimes these transformations occur literally overnight.
Take a good look around, this is your town…your district, your response area. Know your buildings, understand their performance profiles, and assess the predictability of performance. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Building Construction

I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must adjusted and enhanced to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a profound need to gain building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Its all about the new formula….Bk=F2S.

Additionally, think about the following

Don’t Treat Your Buildings and Occupancies the Same anymore
Increase Situational Awareness
Increase Your Competencies
Know Your Buildings
Be aware of Command Compression
Implement Tactical Patience
Tactical Entertainment
Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety
Fire Behavior & Fire Dynamics
Situational Awareness
Naturalistic Decision Making

More on these and some additional key reports on a future post…..

Posted by Christopher Naum on July 12, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, advocate, behaviors, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Charleston, Christopher Naum, close-call, compentencies, construction, courage to be safe, decision-making, Deployment, Engineered Structural Systems, fire behavior, Fire Protection Engineering, fire service, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, near-miss, NFFF, NIOSH, NIST, occupancies, pre-planning, professional development, qualifications, Recommendations, Reports, research, Safety Culture, study, tactics, training-development • Tagged: 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, City of Charleston Sofa Super Store LODD, Command Compression, Command Risk Management, commandsafety.com, company officer, competencies, courage to be safe, engineered systems, Everyone Goes Home, fire behavior, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, fire fighter line-of-duty deaths, Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions, Fire Service Reports, Firefighter Fatalities, Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, History Repeating Events, Kyle Wilson LODD Report, lightweight construction, LODD, Mayday, National Near Miss Reporting System, Naum, NFFF, NFPA, NIOSH, NIOSH Reports, NIST, NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments, NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study, Operational Safety, Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, Routley Report, Structural Collapse, tactical Deployment Model, Tactical Entertainment, truss construction, U.S. Fire Administration, UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions, USFA, Worcester (MA) Fire Cold Storage Fire

In Search of Tactical Patience

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Today commemorates the anniversary of the Sofa Superstore fire in Charleston, South Carolina, in which nine firefighters lost their lives while engaged in aggressive interior operations at a commercial building occupied and operating as a furniture store and warehouse. On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters and changed the lives of countless others. The incident galvanized the nation’s fire service and to this day continues to generate commentary and observations within wide latitude of functional areas. What has changed since that day, three years ago?

The publication of the Routley Report was a wake-up call to the fire service, but did we hit the snooze button and roll back over? Are we catching those extra forty winks at the expense of what we should be jumping out of our bunks and engaging in? If you haven’t taken the time to read the authoritative reports, now is the time to do so. Make it one of your definitive activities for the weekend. Reflect upon its insights, recommendations and suggestions and think about your organization, department or agency.

Stop and think about where the fire service is today; where is your department today? Any measurable changes that reflect the front page news of past events or reports? Or is it business as usual? More importantly; where are YOU today? What have you done based upon the lessons learned or insights expressed to make you a better prepared and knowledgeable firefighter, officer or commander?

During the past twelve months of travels around the country presenting programs on building construction and command risk management and firefighter safety, there continues to be a common thread within the Fire Service that resonates loudly (at times and in some regions); “were’ just not getting it”. Dialog and discussion, ranting and challenges; sometimes on the verge of aggression and hostility at times continue to punctuate and permeate program conversation and debate. We argue about the merits of operational aggressiveness at the expense of looking (and understanding) the ways to increase our proficiency and knowledge that can translate into refined and intelligent tactical operations.

We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling. ( more on these in upcoming posts…)

Take the time today to remember and honor the Charleston Nine.

Comprehend the sacrifice and grasp the essence of our noble profession and the tradition of the Fire Service. Remember the past and learn from it and improve the future so that that the cycle of potential history repeating events is disrupted and eventually broken.

Work conscientiously and diligently to improve our profession and yourself; identifying gaps, correcting the deficiencies and improving the job, through a legacy of operational excellence and safety- for tomorrow’s firefighters.

Honor and Remembrance- The Charleston Nine

Bradford Rodney “Brad” Baity – Engineer 19
Theodore Michael Benke – Captain 16
Melvin Edward Champaign – Firefighter 16
James “Earl” Allen Drayton – Firefighter 19
Michael Jonathon Alan French – Engineer 5
William H. “Billy” Hutchinson, III – Captain 19
Mark Wesley Kelsey – Captain 5
Louis Mark Mulkey – Captain 15
Brandon Kenyon Thompson – Firefighter 5

Posted by Christopher Naum on June 18, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", building construction, Charleston, decision-making, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, Generations, History Repeating Event, honor, lessons, line-of-duty, LODD, occupancies, operations, professional development, Remembrance, risk, Safety, tradition, Uncategorized • Tagged: "firefighter safety", building construction, Charleston, Charleston Fire Department, Christopher Naum, Command Compression, Command operations, commandsafety.com, commercial fire, fire service, History Repeating Events, HRE, LODD, NIOSH, Predictive Risk, Remberence, Risk assessment, Routley Report, situational awareness, Sofa Super Store, Tactical Entertainment, Tactical Patience, The Charleston Nine, tradition

Reflecting on These Days of June

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Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is. Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed. Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.

We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?

We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.

The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.

Modern building construction is no longer predicable
Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
Command & Company Officer dereliction
Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.

These behaviors include;
• Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.

• Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.

• Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.

Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;

TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.

If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.

Check out these links;

If you haven’t read Chief Mayers’s discerning reflections on Firehouse Zen, this is a MUST read. Where Were You That Night?

The Lessons Learned from the Past

From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

Combat Fire Engagement

Situations, Size-Up, Actions and Entertainment

Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior

Posted by Christopher Naum on June 17, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Safety Week", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Charleston, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, courage to be safe, dynamics, FDNY, fire behavior, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, lessons, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Naum, NIOSH, occupancies, Remembrance, Safety Culture, tradition, training • Tagged: "firefighter safety", building construction, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety, Charleston, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, commandsafety.com, Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement, FDNY, fire suppression, firefighting, Firehouse Zen, Hackensack, History Repeating Events, Hotel Vendome, HRE, IAP, Lessons Learned, LODD, Mick Mayers, NIOSH, occupancies, Risk assessment, SEAFC, Sofa Super Store Fire, strategies and tactics, Tactical Entertainment, Tactical Patience, tactics, The Charleston Nine, thecompanyofficer.com, Walbaum's

NIST Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments ISSUED

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Report-on-Residential-Fireground-Field-Experiments

The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiements was issued this morning. A copy of the report is attached. The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE

Report Abstract:

Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.

This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.

This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.

A were deployed in response to live fires within this facility. In addition to systematically controlling for the arrival times of the first and subsequent fire apparatus, crew size was varied to consider two-, three-, four-, and five-person staffing. Each deployment performed a series of 22 tasks that were timed, while the thermal and toxic environment inside the structure was measured. Additional experiments with larger fuel loads as well as fire modeling produced additional insight. Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.

We will review the report findings and provide insights over the upcoming weekend.

Addition project information and insights, HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on April 28, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", Christopher Naum, Company, compentencies, Deployment, fire service, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, first-due, NIST, occupancies, Reports, research, residential, Safety, study • Tagged: "firefighter safety", CFAI, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, Deployment, Deployment Report, IAFC, IAFF, NIST, NIST Technical Note 1661, operations, research, residential, Residential Fireground Field Experiments Report, staffing, studies, WPI

Maintaining Situational Awareness

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Maintaining focused situational awareness while recognizing and processing a wide latitude of incoming information and observations at complex and multiple alarm incidents is a significant challenge to even the most experienced of incident command teams. However, things can go wrong and they can go wrong in a rapidly escalating manner with little time to recover. A prominent double LODD incident from six years ago provides poignant lessons learned as does another history repeating event (HRE) from 1972.

The Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972) have a number of commonalities related to extended multi-alarm operations, building compromise and collapse and multiple line-of-duty deaths of operating fire service personnel. Although building type, construction features and systems are unique for each incident as are the circumstances that lead to the events, there are mission critical lessons to be reexamined or newly introduced if you’re not familiar with either event. This is especially true when we talk about operational challenges and adverse conditions that result in firefighter injuries and fatalities during overhaul and take-up phases of an incident.

Remember Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.

Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.

To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. We’ll expand on some posting in the near future and address Dynamic Risk Assessment in the context of building and occupancy profiling and operations. Additionally, maintaining a heightened sense of risk and safety integrity when operating within non-combat fire suppression modes or phases also requires due diligence, focused and fluid situational awareness coupled with concise monitoring of building conditions, indicators (both evident and projected) and taking conservative actions and postures to ensure personnel are not placed in high risk, no value positions that have a high potential for error likely outcomes.

Check out the detailed posting at our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com for insights into both the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972) HERE. Think about the questioned posed related to complex multi-company operations, command safety and operational integrity of compromised buildings and structural systems. Remember; Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.

Posted by Christopher Naum on March 16, 2010 • Filed under: "Situational Awareness" assessment, assemblies, building construction, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Combat Fire Engagement, command, construction, decision-making, Deployment, events, firefighting-operations, fires, History Repeating Event, LODD, major-incidents, NIOSH, occupancies, ordinary, risk-based assessment, Safety, strategies • Tagged: Boston, Christopher Naum, Collapse, combat fire suppression, command, commandsafety.com, compromise, construction, Dynamic Risk Assessment, Ebenezer Baptist Church fire, History Repeating Event, Hotel Vendome Fire, LODD, multiple alarm, NIOSH, occupancy type, operations, overhaul, Pittsburg, Risk assessment, situational awareness, thecompanyofficer.com, type III, type IV, USFA

Building Behaving Badly

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Buildings Behaving Badly; Ok, it’s been a very quiet morning. Nothing much in the way of any work or excitment. The bells come in….Your company gets a dispatch for a report of walls showing signs of cracking and movement in the building. You arrive at curb side with the balance of the one and one assignment to find that you have a thirteen story apartment building lying in its side on the ground. Now; how are you going to transmit that “on-scene size-up and status report?”…..The following are a series of exceptional photos from of all places China that depict a thirteen story apartment building that clearly behaved badly. The unoccupied apartment building toppled over due a series of design flaws and environmental factors. “Engine 21 to dispatch….can you fill the box and strike a fifth alarm…reporting a thirteen story apartment building laying on the ground……” “Oh, and by the way; you may want to notify the Fire Chief on this one….”

There are some of the known facts;

An underground garage was being dug on the south side, to a depth of 15 feet (4.6 meters)

The excavated dirt was being piled up on the north side, to a height of 33 feet (10 meters)

The building experienced uneven lateral pressure from south and north

This resulted in a lateral pressure of 3,000 tonnes; which was greater than what the pilings could tolerate.

The building was evacuated as conditions were becoming obvious that there was a problem

The Building was constructed on grade with no basement foundation a series of pilings

Construction was started on the north side of the building for an underground garage to be built. The excavated soil was piled on the south side of the building

Environmental conditions-Heavy Rains resulted in significant water saturation into the ground and foundation

The building began to shift due to the tremendous uneven lateral forces being applied from the soil pile, water saturation and soil movement in the foundation. This caused the concrete pilings to snap at the base

This caused the building to begin a slow tilt, followed by it toppling over in one unified piece

Thus the entire building toppled over in the southerly direction.If the adjacent Apartment buildings were closer in proximity, the likelihood of domino effect would have occurred.

The Apartment Building was built to a height of 13 stories, on grade with no basement or foundation. It was "anchored" to grade with "Hollow" concrete pilings with NO reinforcing bars

Posted by Christopher Naum on February 12, 2010 • Filed under: accident, Architectural Design, building construction, buildings, Collapse, construction, Disaster Response, Engineered, events, failures, hazards, high-rise, inspections, occupancies, risk • Tagged: apartment building, building construction, China, Christopher Naum, Collapse, commandsafety.com, concrete, design, engineering, environmental, evacuated, failure, first-due, monolithic collapse, operations, Safety, structural triage, Type I, USAR, weather

Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

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Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived. We seek the elusive “Rosetta stone” that aligns and interprets the emerging and traditionalist acumen related to fire stream effectiveness, flow rates, cooling capacity, extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics, compartment fire theory, propagation and cooling capacity and tactical deployment all relate towards defining an engineering approach to firefighting tactics versus the manual, labor-driven tactics of line deployment and rudiment placement of water on a fuel source within the fire compartment (room).

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that defines structural fire suppression operations. It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined engine company operations within the modern building construction setting. We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

The work of such notable suppression theory pioneers as P. Grimwood, E. Hartin, S. Särdqvist and S. Svennson and the concepts surrounding 3D firefighting, B-SAHF and other emerging research from the NIST and UL are areas that today’s discerning and progressive fire officer and commanders must become well-informed and conversant. The quantitative scientific data and emerging concepts from continuing research and testing such as the NIST’s Wind Drive Fire Studies and UL’s The Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions are providing enlightenment on fire development, fuel controlled and ventilation controlled fire development, operational time-duration parameters and degradation and failure mechanisms related to compromise and structural collapse in occupancies.

Building Construction Systems
- Heritage
  - Pre-1919
- Legacy
  - 1920-1949
- Conventional
  - 1950-1979
- Engineered
  - 1980-2010
- Hybrid
- Chameleon

The fundamental compartment that comprised a typical room configuration in terms of area (square footage), volume (height/Width), furnishings (fire load package) and materials of construction (structural anatomy) found within conventional, legacy or heritage construction provided predictability in terms of fire suppression, fire behavior, operational time and survivability (civilian/firefighter). The dramatic changes since the early 1980’s in the evolution of modern building construction and the institutionalization of engineered structural systems (ESS) have created compartment (room) areas in excess 500 SF, volumes that are open and spaciously interconnected to other habitable space, fire load packages that create extreme fire behavior, compromising structural stability in shorter time spans creating decreasing interior operational time and requiring increasing fire flow rates and volume to sustain requisite extinguishment demands.

Commanders and Company Offices need to gain new insights and knowledge related to the modern building occupancy and to modify and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and nozzle appliances orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumed fire behavior. Today’s engine company operations and fire suppression theory has to progress beyond the pragmatic approaches to fire suppression such as “Big Fire-Big Water principle.

When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future. Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.

Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports. Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.

If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again; Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting

Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
- Predictive Strategic Process
- Tactical Deployment Model
- Dynamic Tactical Deployment
- Performance Indicators and Street Aides
  - Fire Dynamics
  - Resistance
  - Resilience
  - Structural Systems
  - Occupancy Hazard Profiles

Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional or legacy construction and occupancies;

Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.
Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type.

The following are quotes from Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos (ret) Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department, Fire Chief during the Hackensack Ford Fire, July, 1988…

“If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner. This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes”.

Posted by Christopher Naum on February 12, 2010 • Filed under: "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildings, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, decision-making, dynamics, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, LODD, Lumber, occupancies, operations, risk-based assessment, Safety Culture, structure fires, survival • Tagged: building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Combat Fire Engagement, command, commandsafety.com, construction, Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement, ESS, fire behavior, fire conditions, fire dynamics, fire loading, forecasting, LODD, NIST, occupancy, predictability, RHR, Risk assessment, risk profile, Safety, situational awareness, structure fire, suppression, tactics, UL

Putting the wet stuff on the red stuff

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The essence of fire service suppression operations is predicated upon the deployment and application of water as an extinguishing agent, in sufficient quantities, location and duration to extinguish a fire within an enclosed structural compartment. The universal engine company correlation of: “putting the wet stuff on the red stuff” is fundamental to structural fire suppression operations but is ambiguous at best in the context of today’s modern building construction, occupancies, structural systems and building features.

We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine engine company operations in order to identify with the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.

Posted by Christopher Naum on February 4, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, dynamics, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting, firefighting-operations, first-due, hydraulics, occupancies, strategies • Tagged: "firefighter safety", building construction, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, commandsafety.com, compartmentation, engine company, fire behavior, fire dynamics, fire suppression, initial attack, structural anatomy, suppression

Executing Effective Tactical Plans

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Posted by Christopher Naum on January 24, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, assemblies, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, construction, decision-making, dynamics, Engineered Structural Systems, fire behavior, occupancies, risk-based assessment, size-up, strategies, tactics • Tagged: buildings, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, construction, Engineered Structural Systems, engineered systems, ESS, IAP, performance, Predict, risk, tactics

It’s more than just Size-Up; Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment

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Dynamic Risk Assessment is commonly used to describe a process of risk assessment being carried out in a changing or evolving environment, where what is being assessed is developing as the process itself is being undertaken.

This is further problematical for the Incident Commander when confronted with competing or conflicting incident priorities, demands or distractions before a complete appreciation of all mission critical or essential information and data has been obtained. The dynamic management of risk is all about effective, informed and decisive decision making during all phases of an incident.

Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.

Traditional incident scene size-up is antiquated and no longer appropriate or applicable to modern fire service operations.Situational awareness is a combination of attitudes, previously learned knowledge and new information gained from the incident scene and environment that enables the strategic commanders, decision-makers and tactical companies to gather the information they need to make effective decisions that will keep their firefighters and resources out of harm’s way, reducing the likelihood of adverse or detrimental effects.

According to a 1998 published TriData study report, “Situational Awareness is one of the most difficult skills to master and is a weakness in the fire community. The report goes on to state that “The culture must change so that [personnel] are observing, thinking, and discussing the situation constantly.” It’s all about implementing effective human performance tools; perceptions versus reality, expectations versus realization, comprehension and forecasting, informed decision-making and calculated and formulated risk.

It’s a whole lot more than just “Size-Up”. What do you think?

Posted by Christopher Naum on January 14, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, behaviors, building construction, command presence, compentencies, courage to be safe, decision-making, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, first-due, incidents, occupancies, pre-planning, risk, risk-based assessment, Risk-preferring, Safety Culture, structure fires • Tagged: buildings, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, commmand, company officer, construction, Dynamic Risk Assessment, environment, fire behavior, fire dynamics, firefighter survival, first-due, incident, occupancies, priorities, risk, Safety, safety & health, Situational Awarness, size-up

Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror

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As the end of the year fast approaches and in turn the end of the decade, it amazes me how “fast” time seems to have passed. Certainly when looking back and reflecting upon the past year or the previous few years, each of us thinks and contemplates upon those events, milestones, anniversaries, highlights as well as those common everyday occurrences that seem to permeate back and forth in our minds and hang at times like the smoke from a smoldering contents fire. When reflecting, there are the good times as well as those that were not so good. There are those events that were life altering and changing that forever formulate a different view upon each of our respective worlds we live and work within. As well as those events that have provided us with the joys and virtue of what we do everyday as firefighters both on and off the job, at the firehouse and at home.

For each or us, the events that form and shape our worlds; our families at home and our families at the fire station and within the fire department or agencies we volunteer or work for, leave indelible marks upon us that at times formulate and transcend us. My good friend Chief Ben Waller reflected upon a number of issues and insights in his recent post that was right on the mark as did my partner Chief Doug Cline in his perspective of 2009 and for 2010. A lot has happened to this our Fire Service during the past ten years and most certainly in the past twelve months that has shaped and forged a new generation of firefighters and tempered the existing veterans. Stop and think about it.

Looking back at 2009 and in the waning decade, the one certainty that we all share is that we have the ability and look forward to a new year, a new decade and to new challenges. Prior to this week, the 2009 Firefighter LODD events that sadly have occurred seemed like it would pause and we’d end the year with no further events. Tragically, in the past few days, five additional line-of-duty deaths have been reported through the USFA. From the events of 9-11, to the seeds that were planted in Tampa and the crusade that was embarked upon to ensure everyone [has] the opportunity to go home, through the tragedy, wake-up call and the lessons-learned from Charleston. A lot has happened, many tears have been shed, alot was learned, with so much more work still remaining.

As of this posting, the United States Fire Service has borne ninety-three (93) LODDs this year. In comparison to previous years, this may finally indicate a turning point in the previous escalating trends in LODD we’ve experienced during the past decade. Take a moment to look through the USFA postings and the narratives of each of the firefighters who made the supreme sacrifice in 2009 and reflect upon the circumstances and events that lead to their respective LODD incident. Take the time to spend an evening reading through some of the recent or past reports published on the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program web site. Look the History Repeating Events (HRE) and think about what you can do to champion changes in your organization, department or company to eliminate or reduce the likelihood for a similar event from occurring to you or your organization.

The formulative and diligent efforts of the NFFF and the Everyone Goes Home Program and the Sixteen Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives have made their mark in this decade and must continue to be embraced and institutionalized as we move forward to twenty ten. Don’t forget about the inroads made by the National Firefigher Near-Miss Reporting System and the knowledge being gained to reduce HRE. We must look at and examine the successes and the failures of our methodologies, processes, culture and perspectives and continue to seek behaviors and practices that make our job safer. When we focus our attention on Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety and the essence of combat structural fires; Structural firefighting is what it’s all about, is it not? The fundamental nature and reason we have such veneration for firefighting and the fire service and all it entails, has a lot to do with going into burning buildings and fighting fire. But firefighting has its adverse consequences, with all too familiar costs, in the form of injuries, debilitating accidents and line of duty deaths. As a firefighter; to say that we love firefighting would be an understatement, BUT one issue that we need to address is the fact that there are many individual firefighters, companies and organizations that employ fireground operational practices that promote the “enjoyment and entertainment” of working a good job within the occupancy compartment of a structural fire in the building environment.

One of the formulative postings I published this past year focused on working that good job for the shear enjoyment of what and who we are; firefighters. It’s worth repeating again, since this is an opportune time to reflect. Today’s incident scene and structural fires are unlike those in past decades and will continue to challenge us operationally when confronted with structural fire engagement and combat operations. Operationally, we need to be doing the right thing, for the right reason in the right place to increase our safety and incident survivability.

We also can share the belief and understanding that we at times may have found ourselves staying too long in the wrong place, operating tactically in an adverse environment with known hazards that do not have value, for nothing other than the enjoyment of nozzle and operating time in the fire. We have a tendency when working a room and contents, compartment fire or a structural fire in the building environment placing operating companies and personnel in high hazard environments- sometimes at the expense of justifying our own entertainment value in working the job, the assignment or in maintaining the interior operational interface. Think about it.

We need to stop “entertaining” ourselves. Don’t mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference. The job is dangerous, it has risks, we are not invincible, and we can die; at any alarm, in any fire, at anytime for any number of reasons. But it’s tragic when we die for all the wrong reasons. Think about the definitions; think about how they apply to you, your personnel, your company or your operations; past, present or future. More importantly, think about when and where you’ve found yourself doing any one of these; could the outcome have been different?

TACTICAL AMUSEMENT “tak-ti-kəl ə- myüz-mənt”

1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk

2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk

3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL DIVERSION “tak-ti-kəl də- vər-zhən”

1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk

2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION “tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- ven(t)-shən”

1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel. We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

On any given day, at any give alarm, the dynamics around us at times may be in or out of our direct control. We may not be able to see what the cards have in store for us, BUT we must ensure we use every fragment of training, fortitude, knowledge, skills, courage, bravery, insights, luck and sometimes (other divine) intervention to get us through. We must have the fortitude and courage to be both safety conscious and measured in the performance of our sworn duties while maintaining the appropriate balance of risk and bravery.
• The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger.

• As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel.

• We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

• The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified.

Risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

• Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…

• Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…

There is a melting of both pragmatic aggressive firefighting with measured and deliberate tactical approaches. It’s a balance and equilibrium; the question is do you know when to recognize that balance, where it exists and how not to cross that adverse threshold?

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past Conventional Construction; Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.

Looking Forward through the Rear View Mirror; remember the past, recall those history repeating events that seem to manifest themselves time and time again; are we ever going to learn. I truly believe we are starting to finally “get it”-even if it’s on a smaller incremental scale, it’s a starting point. Remember the lessons from those events that have impacted you, your department, your community and the fire service; from close-calls to near-miss events; from minor or debilitating injuries to the tragedy and sorrow of a LODD event.

As we transition into a new year, and as plans begin to take place that frame and outline the year’s activities, foremost in this planning, preparation, scheduling and outlook should be those activities and commitments that training, education and skill development can be implemented and enhanced. Take the initiative to recognize and identify training and operational gaps and distinguish the risk and options available to lessen or eliminate the risk and reduce the gap deficiencies. Take the time to implement effective, accurate and frequent training and skill development drills, training curriculums and programs. Don’t sacrifice or forego on this mission critical area when so much is at stake in the domain of combat structural fire suppression. Understand the predictability of performance in the buildings and occupancies not only in your jurisdiction, first or second-due areas, but also in those areas that you may be called upon to respond to for greater alarms or mutual aid. Understand the structural anatomy of your community. Remember Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Understand the fomulative issues affecting engineered structural systems (ESS) and the change in operational deployment and tactics on the fire ground. Keep an eye in the rear view mirror; learning from the wisdom and knowledge from where you’ve been, what you’ve done and all your past experiences and practice; but at the same time focusing on the road before you with keen attentiveness on situational awareness, anticipating error-likely conditions and balanced risk assessment and operational management in both your strategic and tactical deployments.

We don’t know what’s in the cards on any given day, but the citizens we protect can rest assured, we will do our jobs as firefighters, to the best of our abilities, because of who we are; today, in 2010 and certainly well into the next decade and beyond.

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 30, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, advocate, behaviors, building construction, Christopher Naum, command presence, command-leadership, compentencies, construction, courage to be safe, education, EGH, Engineered Structural Systems, fire service, firefighter-safety-health, fortitude, Future, History Repeating Event, honor, LODD, mentoring, Naum, NFFF, NIOSH, occupancies, Officers, Reports, research, risk-based assessment, Safety Culture, structure fires, tactics • Tagged: 2010, building construction, building knowledge, Christopher Naum, command, EGH, Engineered Structural Systems, ESS, HRE, leadership, LODD, NFFF, situational awareness, structural anatomy, training, USFA

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

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Buffalo Box 191

December 27, 1983 Buffalo, New York Five Firefighter Line-of-Duty Deaths

As Buffalo (NY) firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III ordinary and Type IV heavy timber construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically. The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5′s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1′s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32′s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.

Two civilians were also killed and another 60 to 70 were injured. While operating at the rescue effort, another 19 firefighters were injured. The blast and ensuing fire ignited 14 residences and damaged as many as 130 buildings over a four block area. The explosion occurred when an employee was moving an illegal 500-lb. propane tank with a forklift truck and dropped it, breaking off a valve. The gas leaked out, found an ignition source, and the explosion occurred.

At 20:23 hours, a full assignment was dispatched to North Division & Grosvenor streets. The three engines, two trucks, rescue and 3rd Battalion were responding to a report of a large propane tank leaking in a building. Engine 32 arrived and reported nothing showing, but they were talking to some workmen from the four-story, heavy-timber warehouse (approx. 50′ x 100′). Truck 5, Engine 1 and BC Supple arrived right behind E-32. Thirty-seven seconds after the chief announced his arrival, there was a tremendous explosion. It completely leveled the four-story building. It demolished many buildings on four different blocks. It seriously damaged buildings that were over a half a mile away. The ensuing fireball started buildings burning on a number of streets. A large gothic church on the next block had a huge section ripped out of it as if a great hand carved out the middle. A ten-story housing projects a couple blocks away had every window broken and some had even more damage. Engine 32 and Truck 5′s firehouse, which was a half mile away or so, had all its windows shattered.

Killed in the line of duty were all assigned to Buffalo FD Ladder Company 5;

Firefighter Michael Austin,
Firefighter Michael Catanzaro,
Firefighter Matthew Colpoys,
Firefighter James Lickfield and
Firefighter Anthony Waszkielewicz.

Remember to think about occupancy risk and not occupancy type and the factors related to the occupancy usage and the nature of the call. Nothing is ever routine.

WKBW.com Cached video clip, HERE

Buffalo, NY Propane Gas Explosion, Dec 1983, HERE

Propane blast death affects son of fireman, HERE and HERE

PROPANE EXPLOSION 25th ANNIVERSARY IN BUFFALO,NEW YORK, HERE

New York Times, HERE and HERE

Rememberance, HERE and History Repeating Events, HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 28, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildings, events, explosion, firefighting-operations, fires, first-due, gas leak, hazards, in-the-line-of-duty, lessons, LODD, major-incidents, mass-casualty-incident, occupancies, Remembrance, structure fires, Uncategorized • Tagged: 1983 Propane Explosion, Buffalo FD, building types, buildings, Christopher Naum, Collapse, communications, explosion, HRE, illegal, ladder co., LODD, mass casualty, New York, North Division and Grosvenor, North Division Explosion, occupancy, operations, propane, rememberance, response, risk, situational, size-up, type III, type IV, valve

Remembering Brackenridge 1991 Floor Collapse and LODD

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Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse

Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building. Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement. The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.

The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.

There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.

This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

USFA Report; HERE

NFPA Summary; HERE

NFPA Report Order; HERE

Brackenridge Pioneer Hose Co. Memorial, Pennsylvania, HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 21, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildings, Collapse, command, command-leadership, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, occupancies, Remembrance, Reports, risk-based assessment, tactics, Trapped, volunteer • Tagged: Brackenridge, Collapse, command, concrete, construction, firefighing, floors, ICS, LODD, Mayday, occupancies, operations, PPE, resources, risk, SCBA, situational, size-up, time, Trapped, USFA, Water Supply, weather

FDNY Brooklyn Box 4080: 17 Vandalia Avenue 12.18.98

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Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.

As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.

NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup. During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?” The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature. The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.

This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE. NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 18, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, Brooklyn, building construction, construction, dynamics, FDNY, fire behavior, first-due, high-rise, History Repeating Event, NIOSH, NIST, occupancies, structure fires, survival, tactics

Truss and Engineered Systems Placards

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The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act of 2008 became law on December 13, 2009 after unanimously passing the Florida House and Senate in 2008. The new law is named in honor of two Orange County, Florida Firefighters, Todd Aldridge and Mark Benge, who died in 1989 after the roof of a gift shop collapsed; the bill is called the Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act. For a copy of the Act, HERE

The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act will require owners of any commercial, industrial, or any multi-unit residential structure, to mark these buildings in a manner that identifies them as light-frame truss-type construction. A sign or symbol will alert firefighters of the construction material and allow them to modify their tactics for fighting fires in buildings.

Aldridge-Benge Florida Placards

633.027 Buildings with light-frame truss-type construction; notice requirements; enforcement.

(1) The owner of any commercial or industrial structure, or any multiunit residential structure of three units or more, that uses light-frame truss-type construction shall mark the structure with a sign or symbol approved by the State Fire Marshal in a manner sufficient to warn persons conducting fire control and other emergency operations of the existence of light-frame truss-type construction in the structure.

(2) The State Fire Marshal shall adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of this section, including, but not limited to:
(a) The dimensions and color of such sign or symbol.
(b) The time within which commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structures that use light-frame truss-type construction shall be marked as required by this section.
(c) The location on each commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structure that uses light-frame truss-type construction where such sign or symbol must be posted.

(3) The State Fire Marshal, and local fire officials in accordance with s. 633.121, shall enforce the provisions of this section. Any owner who fails to comply with the requirements of this section is subject to penalties as provided in s. 633.161

Truss Systems Placards For Firefighter Safety from across the United States. This was originally posted HERE . Check out the link for examples of various types of placards from various locations around the US. Additional Links HERE and HERE

- The Valley Independent Sentinel covers the proposed law in Derby, Can You Spare Five Dollars (To Save A Life)?.
- NFPA Journal: It’s not lightweight construction. It’s what happens when lightweight construction meets fire.
- Firehouse.com: Understanding the Dangers of Lightweight Truss Construction

-FireRescue1.com: Enhancing Firefigher SAfety, One Step at a time:

New York State: PDF HERE

The following represent various state or local level efforts that have been instituted to provide the fire service with identification placards for attachment to buildings constructed with truss support systems. What we don’t have is a unified national standard, nor do we have these systems in all states. The political strife and lobbying backed by special interest groups and mfg. associations that DO NOT Support these types of placard systems is appalling and inexcusable. This post is to make many of you aware of the various enhacements that exist to support firefighter safety.

New York State TRUSS TYPE CONSTRUCTION PlacardsNYS 19 NYCRR Part 1264 – IDENTIFICATION OF BUILDINGS UTILIZING TRUSS TYPE CONSTRUCTION
http://www.dos.state.ny.us/code/trussID.htm

More from New York State…..
http://www.trussid.org/index.html

City of San Francisco, CA
5.05 Signage of Buildings with Wood or Lightweight Steel Truss, or Composite Wood Joist (TJI) or Roof Construction
Reference: 2007 San Francisco Fire Code Section 507.3.2
http://www.sfgov.org/site/sffd_page.asp?id=80083

State of New Jersey TRUSS SIGNS (Truss Roof and Truss Floor Assembly Signs)
Exterior Placard NJAC 5:70 – 2.20(a)1 and 2 This attachment was provided by the New Jersey Division of Fire Safety and is referenced as Exterior Placard NJAC 5:70 – 2.20(a)1 and 2.
Truss roof signs are required by the New Jersey State Uniform Fire Code for buildings, which utilize either a floor or roof assembly consisting of truss construction. A truss sign gives early warning to fire and emergency service members that the roof and/or floor may be subject to early collapse in the event of a fire condition.

ISOSCELES TRIANGLE SIGNS
N.J.A.C. 5:70-2.20(a)1.
“The emblem shall be of a bright and reflective color, or made of reflective material. The shape of the emblem shall be an isosceles triangle and the size shall be 12 inches horizontally by 6 inches vertically. With letters of a size and color to make them conspicuous, shall be printed on the emblem, as shown in images below.”

N.J.A.C. 5:70-2.20(a)2
“The emblem shall be permanently affixed to the left of the main entrance door at the height of between 4 feet and 6 feet above the ground, and shall be installed and maintained by the owner of the building”.

New Jersey Truss Placards

NIOSH Suggested Truss Placard Type
EXAMPLE LANGUAGE FOR A LAW REQUIRING LABELING OF BUILDINGS FOR THE FIRE SERVICE
This sample language is based on recommendations in the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) report entitled “NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Firefighters due to Truss System Failures.”
The report states: “Consider placing building construction information outside the building. Include
information about roof and floor type.

The NIOSH report also recommends as part of pre-fire planning to: Record data regarding roof and floor construction (e.g., wooden joist, wood truss, steel joist, steel truss, beam and girder, etc.) [NFPA 2003]. The sample language below provides building labeling that identifies the building’s construction type, is simple yet logical, and should allow firefighters to quickly know the building’s floor and roof construction materials, promoting better and more complete information on the fireground and increased firefighter safety.

xxx Identification of structural construction. Structural construction types shall be identified by a sign or signs, in accordance with the provisions of this section.

xxx.1 Signs. Signs shall be affixed where a building or a portion thereof is classified as Group A, B, E, F, H, I, M, R-1, R-2, R-4 or S occupancy. The owner of the building shall be responsible for the installation of the sign.
xxx.2 New buildings and buildings being added to. Signs shall be provided in newly constructed buildings and in existing buildings where an addition that extends or increases the floor area of the building. Signs shall be affixed prior to the issuance of a certificate of occupancy or a certificate of compliance.

xxx.3 Existing buildings. Signs shall be provided in existing buildings. Signs shall be affixed within ninety days of being notified in writing by the Code Enforcement Official.

xxx.4 Contents of signs. Signs shall consist of a diagram 6 inches (152.4 mm)in height and width, with a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm). The sign background shall be reflective white in color. The diagram and contents shall be reflective red in color, conforming to Pantone matching system (PMS) #187. Where a sign is directly applied to a door or sidelight, it may be a permanent non-fading sticker or decal. Signs not directly applied to doors or sidelights shall be of sturdy, non-fading, weather resistant material.

xxx.5 Identification of construction classification. Signs shall contain the roman alphanumeric designation of the construction classification of the building, in accordance with the provisions for the classification of types of construction (types I through V) of the building code. The roman numeral designating construction classification shall be 1 inch (25.4 mm) minimum in height and have a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm) minimum, and it shall be reflective white in color on a background of reflective red.

xxx.6 Identification of year of construction. Signs shall indicate the building’s year of construction or major reconstruction. The arabic numeral indicating year of construction shall be 1 inch (25.4 mm) minimum in height and have a stroke width of ¼ inch (6.4 mm) minimum, and it shall be reflective white in color on a background of reflective red.

xxx.7 Identification of structural construction types. Signs shall contain the alphabetic designations identifying the structural construction types used in the building, as follows:

“W” shall mean sawn joist/rafter construction, wood members
“I” shall mean engineered I-joist construction, wood members
“S” shall mean steel construction
“T” shall mean truss type construction
“C” shall mean concrete construction

NIOSH Suggested Truss Placard

State of Florida, Truss Placard System 2008;
The Aldridge-Benge Firefighter Safety Act. The law was named in honor of Orange County firefighters Todd Aldridge and Mark Benge, who died in 1989 after the truss roof of a gift shop collapsed. Under the new law, owners of any commercial, industrial or multi unit residential structure, have to clearly mark if their buildings have lightweight roof or floor trusses, allowing firefighters to change their tactics when working in these types of structures

http://www.cfnews13.com/News/Local/2008/7/2/new_firefighter_protect….

633.027 Buildings with light-frame truss-type construction; notice requirements; enforcement
(1) The owner of any commercial or industrial structure, or any multiunit residential structure of three units or more, that uses light-frame truss-type construction shall mark the structure with a sign or symbol approved by the State Fire Marshal in a manner sufficient to warn persons conducting fire control and other emergency operations of the existence of light-frame truss-type construction in the structure.
(2) The State Fire Marshal shall adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of this section, including, but not limited to:
(a) The dimensions and color of such sign or symbol.
(b) The time within which commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structures that use light-frame truss-type construction shall be marked as required by this section.
(c) The location on each commercial, industrial, and multiunit residential structure that uses light-frame truss-type construction where such sign or symbol must be posted.
(3) The State Fire Marshal, and local fire officials in accordance with s. 633.121, shall enforce the provisions of this section. Any owner who fails to comply with the requirements of this section is subject to penalties as provided in s. 633.161.

Florida Placard

Wheeling, Illinois Wood Truss Warning Signs
Attached is information from Wheeling, Illinois, who enacted thier own local code requriement. April 18, 1994 adopted Ordinance 2948 amending Title 14, Fire, of the Wheeling Municipal Code by adding Chapter 14.08 “Wood Truss Warning Signs”

State of Vermont
F or additional Info HERE

CITY OF CHESAPEAKE, VA TRUSS ID PROGRAM; A designated sticker is used for quick recognition of potential Collapse Dangers associated with TRUSS constructed buildings. The sticker is placed on every entry door of all commercial buildings with Truss construction. The use of trusses in building construction presents a great danger to firefighting personnel when those structures are involved in fire conditions. By design, the truss members in floor and roof assemblies will collapse, without warning, after being exposed to heat or flame contact for a very short period of time. Because of the inherent danger firefighters must face while operating within these buildings, a Truss Identification Program (TIP) has been instituted to alert personnel of the danger prior to beginning fire suppression operations. The Truss Identification Program is intended to alert the members of the Chesapeake Fire Department with pertinent pre-plan information before firefighting forces are committed to an interior attack.

The TIP shall be an ongoing program applied to all commercial buildings inspected by the Chesapeake Fire Department.
http://www.chesapeake.va.us/services/depart/fire/truss.shtml

City of Greencastle, Indiana

The City of Greencastle, Indiana and the Greencastle Fire Department recently enacted and approved an Engineered Lumber ID Program consisting of a sticker that is used for quick recognization of potential Collapse Dangers associated with Engineered Lumber constructed buildings. The sticker is placed on every electrical meter of all residential & commercial buildings with Engineered Lumber construction built after May 13th 2008. The news release states that; the use of this type of lumber in building construction presents a great danger to firefighting personnel when those structures are involved in fire conditions. By design, the Engineered Lumber in floor and roof assemblies will collapse, without warning, after being exposed to heat or flame contact for a very short period of time. Because of the inherent danger firefighters must face while operating within these buildings, an Engineered Lumber Identification Program (ELIP) has been instituted to alert personnel of the danger prior to beginning fire suppression operations.

The Engineered Lumber Identification Program is intended to alert the members of the Greencastle Fire Department with pertinent pre-plan information before firefighting forces are committed to an interior attack. The sticker is unobtrusive and is placed directly on a meter box, for example, and alerts the FD if either the floor joists and/or the trusses are made of and Engineered Lumber System and materials. The fire officers are already checking the utility boxes on all fires as part of their initial size-up. The ELIP shall be an ongoing program applied to all residential & commercial buildings inspected by the Greencastle Fire Department.

ORDINANCE 2008 – 4 states; AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING A REFLECTIVE SYMBOL ON STRUCTURES USING ENGINEERED LUMBER
WHEREAS, many new building structures currently use engineered lumber in their construction;
WHEREAS, some types of engineered lumber burn at a rate faster that other types of lumber; and
WHEREAS, in fighting fires, it would be helpful to know the types of materials used in the construction of a structure.

NOW THEREFORE be it ordained by the Common Council of the City of Greencastle as follows:
1. Definitions:
a. Engineered Lumber shall mean prefabricated I-joists, truss joists, and truss rafters, and laminated beams and studs.
b. Structure shall mean primary, secondary and accessory structures as defined in the Greencastle Zoning Code that have electrical meters that serve the structure.

2. All structures constructed with engineered lumber after the effective date of this ordinance must have a reflective symbol affixed to each electrical meter serving the structure.

3. The reflective symbol shall be in the form of a sticker, issued by the City of Greencastle that states that the structure is constructed with engineered lumber

4. Any person violating this ordinance by refusing to use the reflective symbol or by removing the reflective symbol shall be subject to a fine in an amount of $25.00 per violation. Each day that a violation occurs shall constitute a separate violation, subject to a separate fine.

5. The owner of any structure that was constructed with engineered lumber prior to the effective date of this ordinance is requested to place the reflective symbol on the electrical meter serving the structure on a voluntary basis.

This is another great example how local level insights, actions and legislation can go a long way in supporting fire service operational challanges as they relate to building construction systems, methodologies and materials. Remember, We can certainly work diligently AND cooperativley with local government officials to enhance incident operations and make our jobs safety, one step at a time….

For additional information on the Fire Department’s efforts in Greencastle, IN contact Lt. John Shafer, Lieutenant/Training Officer HERE.

An invaluable free on-line training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions – is available from UL, check HERE for further information.

The 2006 NIOSH LODD Report, HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 18, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, buildings, Christopher Naum, Codes, Collapse, construction, engineered systems, inspections, line-of-duty, Lumber, occupancies, placard, pre-planning, Protection • Tagged: "firefighter safety", aldridge-Benge, Buildingsonfire.com engineered construction, Christopher Naum, Collapse, command, construction, emblem, engineered systems, floors, Florida, legislation, LODD, orange county, placards, pre-fire plan, pre-planing, risk, Risk assessment, roof, signs, situational awareness, Systems, truss construction, UL, warning

Predicated Building Performance

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We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a given duration of time, that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system. That may be true for conventional or legacy structures, but what about modern construction and engineered structural systems? Same expectations?…….

What do you think?

There’s a great series of photos depicting initial operations at a small-sized (square foot) single family residential occupancy fire that captures fire and smoke behavior, HERE and HERE

Take at look the at this residential fire and interior attack that injured a number of Maryland Firefighters HERE

Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. NIOSH Report HERE. NIST References HERE

Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 18, 2009 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Christopher Naum, construction, decision-making, dynamics, high-rise, Highrise, History Repeating Event, NIOSH, occupancies, pre-planning, residential, risk-based assessment, Safety • Tagged: buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, FDNY, fire behavior, fire dynamics, firefighting, Flashover, HRE, NIOSH, observations, occupancies, predictable, risk assessement, Risk assessment, risk profile, Safety, size-up, tactics, Wind Driven

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home". Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)

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An estimated 2,000 Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated average of 5 deaths, 25 injuries, and $21 million in property loss.

Smaller, confined fires account for 71 percent of Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings.

Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings occur most frequently in the afternoon hours from 12 to 4 p.m., peaking from noon to 1 p.m.

Cooking is the leading cause of all Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings at 69 percent. Nearly all of these cooking fires (97 percent) are small, confined fires with limited damage.

Electrical malfunctions (14 percent), carelessness or other unintentional actions (14 percent), and open flames (13 percent) are the leading causes of the larger, nonconfined Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings.

Nonconfined Thanksgiving Day fires in residential buildings most often start in cooking areas and kitchens (22 percent).

No smoke alarms were present in 20 percent of nonconfined Thanksgiving Day fires in occupied residential buildings.

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