Archives for nfpa

The 701 University Ave Fire- 1978

Fire in Syracuse: Four firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978

April 9^th marks the 35^th anniversary of the 701 University Ave. fire that claimed the lives of four Syracuse (NY) firefighters in 1978 while conducting search & rescue and suppression operations at an apartment building on the Syracuse University Campus, in Syracuse, New York.

The fire began when one of the tenants lit a candle in a styrofoam wig stand and left it unattended. At 00:46 hours on Sunday April 9, 1978, an alarm of fire was transmitted for a reported building fire at 701 University Avenue on the campus of Syracuse University.

The Victorian style house was a three story building constructed of wood balloon framing and was built circa 1898. The house had been converted into ten (10) apartments that were occupied by SU students. The gross area of each of the three floors was approx. 1,750 sq. ft., with a predominate rectangular footprint shape measuring 69 ft. x 35 ft. The third floor apartments only had access via a stairway in the rear, down a long narrow corridor that measured only 33 inches wide.

Post Fire View of Building from Bravo Side. Photo CJ Naum, 1978

The building had inherent vertical and horizontal concealed spaces indicative of balloon frame style construction along with additional concealed spaces in the third floor ceiling area. A partial automatic sprinkler system had been installed in the building in order to comply with a 1952 State of New York law. This system provided protection to the basement, means of egress, a storage area and a portion of the concealed space above the third floor.

The fire originated in a second floor apartment, and then spread into the combustible concealed space above the third floor ceiling. Approximately sixteen minutes into fireground operations the first indications of firefighting personnel being in distress were received. The first call to the Alarm center was made at 0045:17 hrs., with the first-due engine arriving at 0048:05 and first water applied at 0051 (est).

The four SFD fire fighters, Frank Porpiglio Jr., Stanley Duda, Michael Petragnani, and Robert Schuler, who were assigned to the Squad and Rescue Companies, entered the house to conduct a primary search of the premises for SU students thought to be trapped in the house.

While operating on the third floor inside, a scalding steam caused by triggered sprinklers prevented the four firefighters from escaping, and they eventually depleted their air supply and suffocated to death. The firefighters were operating with full PPE that was complaint at that time ( 1978) and were utilizing state-of-the art SCBA in the form of the new 4.5 SCBA systems. All the tenants had escaped safely before the fire fighters had entered the house. The fire was subsequently investigated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) at the request of the City of Syracuse and NFPA Report No. LS-3 was published.

Syracuse Post Standard Front Page April 10, 1978

Killed in the Line of Duty on April 9^th, 1978:

Syracuse (NY) Fire Department

FF Michael Petragnani, Age 27. ~ Rescue Company – appointed 8/20/1973
FF Frank Porpiglio Jr., Age 24. ~ Squad Company – appointed 8/20/1973
FF Robert Shuler, Age 31. ~ Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973
FF Stanley Duda, Age 34. ~ Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973

Remembrance, Honor, Courage and Sacrifice

Never Forgotten

Post Fire View, East Adams Street and University Ave. Photo: CJ Naum, 1978

Martin J. Whitman School of Management stands today at the corner, Photo CJ Naum, 2013

Memorial Plaque placed in 2005 in the Martin J. Whitman School of Management located on the site of 1978 fire. Photo: CJ NAum, 2013

Remembrance 1978-2013 SFD Rescue ~ Squad

Posted by Christopher Naum on April 9, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, construction, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting, firefighting-operations, honor, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, NFPA, operations, Remembrance, Reports, Sprinklers, Uncategorized • Tagged: 701 University Avenue, 701 University Avenue Fire, 701 University Avenue Fire 1978, 701 University Avenue Fire Syracuse, Accountability, April 9 1978 University Ave Fire, Balloon Frame Construction, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Campus Fire, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, concealed spaces, FF Frank Porpiglio Jr, FF Michael Petragnani, FF Robert Shuler, FF Stanley Duda, Fire in Syracuse: Four firefighters LODD, Fire in Syracuse: Four firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire, Fire travel, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, Four Firefighter LODD, Four Firefighters Trapped, Frank Porpiglio Jr., LODD, Mayday, Michael Petragnani, Multiple LODD 1978, NFPA Report No. LS-3, Robert Schuler, search and rescue, SFD Rescue Company 1978, SFD Squad Company 1978, Stanley Duda, Syracuse (NY) Fire Department, Syracuse University 701 University Ave Fire 1978, ventilation

High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year

No comments

High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is reporting that in 2005-2009, there were an average of 15,700 reported structure fires in high-rise buildings per year with an associated $235 million in direct property damage.

The report, “High-Rise Building Fires,” (PDF, 499 KB) cites apartments, hotels, offices, and facilities that care for sick as accounting for roughly half of all high-rise fires. Structure fires in these four property classes resulted in $99 million in direct property damage per year.

There is a downward trend in high-rise fires. In the last few decades, a range of special provisions have migrated into the codes and standards for tall buildings.

Other findings from the report:

In 2005-2009, high-rise fires claimed the lives of 53 civilians and injured 546 others, per year.
The risks of fire, fire death, and direct property damage due to fire tend to be lower in high-rise buildings than in shorter buildings of the same property use.
An estimated three percent of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.
Usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings of the same property use.Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The risk of a fire is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

In 2005-2009, an estimated 15,700 reported high-rise structure fires per year resulted in associated losses of 53 civilian deaths, 546 civilian injuries, and $235 million in direct property damage per year. An estimated 2.6% of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.

The trends in high-rise fires and associated losses (inflation-adjusted for property damage) are clearly down, but the sharp post-1998 reduction appears to be mostly due to the change to NFIRS Version 5.0, which is shifting estimates to lower levels that also appear to be more accurate.

Four property classes account for roughly half of high-rise fires: apartments, hotels, facilities that care for the sick, and offices. In 2005-2009, in these four property classes combined, there were 7,800 reported high-rise structure fires per year and associated losses of 30 civilian deaths, 352 civilian injuries, and $99 million in direct property damage per year. The property damage average is inflated by the influence of one 2008 hotel fire, whose $100 million loss projected to nearly $40 million a year in the analysis.

The report emphasizes these four property classes.

Some other property uses – such as stores and restaurants – may represent only a single floor in a tall building primarily devoted to other uses. Some property uses – such as grain elevators and factories – can be as tall as a high-rise building but without a large number of separate floors or stories.

For these reasons, the four property use groups listed above define most of the buildings we think of as high-rise buildings, and their fires come closest to defining what we think of as the high-rise building fire problem.
By most measures of loss, the risks of fire and of associated fire loss are lower in highrise buildings than in other buildings of the same property loss.
This statement applies to risk of fire, civilian fire deaths, civilian fire injuries, and direct property damage due to fire, relative to housing units, for apartments, and risk of fire for hotels, offices, and facilities that care for the sick.

The usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings, for each property use group. Even so, considering the extensive requirements in NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, for fire and life safety features in both new and existing high-rise buildings, it seems clear that there are still major gaps, particularly in adoption and enforcement of the provisions requiring retrofit of automatic sprinkler systems and other life safety systems in existing high-rise buildings. NFPA 1®,Fire Code, has sprinkler retrofit requirements.

This has implications for public officials and ordinary citizens in any city. Public officials should make sure that the latest editions of NFPA 1®, Fire Code, and NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, are in place and that the codes they have are supported by effective code enforcement provisions, including plan review and inspection processes, both for new construction and for continued supervision of code compliance in existing buildings.

The public can take responsibility for their own safety by insisting that their public officials take these steps. As in so many areas of fire safety, we know what to do, but we still need to do it.

The trend had been toward a smaller share of fires being reported each year as occurring in buildings with fire-resistive construction, both for high-rise and other buildings, with the decline being most dramatic in facilities that care for the sick.

This statistical decline could reflect any or all of the following:
(a) a shift in construction between the two types permitted by codes, from Type I (442 or 332) construction, which is coded as fire-resistive, to Type II (222) construction, which is coded as protected non-combustible;
(b) a shift to acceptable alternative designs using more sprinklers and less fire-resistive construction; or
(c) enough success in containing fires that a rising fraction never are reported to fire departments, because the fires are caught and controlled so early by occupants.

Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The fraction of 2005-

2009 high-rise fires that began on the 7th floor or higher was 32% for apartments, 22% for hotels and motels, 21% for facilities that care for the sick, and 39% for office buildings. The risk of a fire start is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

High-rise apartments have a slightly larger share of their fires originating in means of egress than do their shorter counterparts (4% vs. 3%).
The same is true of hotels (7% vs. 5%) and facilities that care for the sick (6% vs. 4%).
In offices (4% vs. 6%), the differences in percentages are in the opposite direction, which means that high-rise buildings in those properties have a smaller share of their fires originating in means of egress.
In all four property classes, the differences are so small that one can say there is no evidence that high-rise buildings have a bigger problem with fires starting in means of egress.

NFPA FACT SHEET

More information on Solomon’s NFPA session and the conference can be found at www.nfpa.org/FLSCONF.
NFPA Report Download, HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on December 6, 2011 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, firefighting, firefighting-operations, high-rise, Highrise, NFPA, occupancies, pre-planning, Sprinklers, structure fires • Tagged: and offices, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, facilities that care for the sick, high-rise building fires, high-rise building fires 2010, High-rise fires, high-rise fires: apartments, Highrise fire property loss, Highrise fire protection, hotels, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), NFPA, NFPA High-Rise Building Fires, NFPA Highrise Fire Report, NFPA report, trends in high-rise fires, U.S. High-Rise Building Fires Fact Sheet

NFPA releases state-level fire service needs assessment for every U.S. state

No comments

NFPA releases state-level fire service needs assessment for every U.S. state. Findings based on Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service with comparisons to earlier studies

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) released a fire service needs assessment for each state based on findings from the Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, a study that looked at the current needs of America’s fire departments as compared to those identified in assessments done in 2001 and 2005. The goal of the project was to identify major gaps in the needs of the U.S. fire service and to determine if the Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (DHS/FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) programs are continuing to reduce the needs of fire departments.

The report looked at personnel and their capabilities, including staffing, training, certification, and wellness/fitness; facilities and apparatus; personal protective equipment, fire prevention and code enforcement; the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents; and communications and new technologies.

Selected Findings:

Nearly half (46 percent) of all fire departments that are responsible for structural firefighting have not formally trained all their personnel involved in structural firefighting, down from 55 percent in 2001 and 53 percent in 2005.
Seven out of ten (70 percent) fire departments have no program to maintain basic firefighter fitness and health, down from 80 percent in 2001 and 76 percent in 2005.
Nearly half (46 percent) of all fire department engines and pumpers were at least 15 years old, down from 51 percent in 2001 and 50 percent in 2005.
Half (52 percent) of all fire departments cannot equip all firefighters on a shift with self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), down from 70 percent in 2001 and 60 percent in 2005.
Two out of five (39 percent) fire departments do not have enough personal alert safety system devices (PASS) to equip all emergency responders on a shift, down from 62 percent in 2001 and 48 percent in 2005.
Except for cities protecting at least 250,000 population, most cities do not assign at least four career firefighters to an engine or pumper and so are probably not in compliance with NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, which requires a minimum of four firefighters on an engine or pumper.

Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service conducted by NFPA concluded:

Needs have declined to a considerable degree in a number of areas, particularly personal protective and firefighting equipment, two types of resources that received the largest shares of funding from the AFG programs.
Some innovative technologies that have not been identified as necessary in existing standards but are known to be very useful to today’s fire service – including Internet access and thermal imaging cameras – have also seen large increases in use.
Declines in needs have been more modest in some other important areas, such as training, which have received much smaller shares of AFG funds.
Still other areas of need, such as apparatus, stations, and the staffing required to support the stations, have seen either limited reductions in need (e.g., apparatus needs in rural areas) or no reductions at all (e.g., adequacy of stations and personnel to meet standards and other guidance on speed and size of response).
Fire prevention and code enforcement needs have shown no clear improvement over the past decade.
In all areas emphasized by the AFG and SAFER (Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response) grants, there is ample evidence of impact from the grants but also considerable residual need still to be addressed, even for needs that have seen considerable need-reduction in the past decade.
There has been little change in the ability of departments, using only local resources, to handle certain types of unusually challenging incidents, including two types of homeland security scenarios (structural collapse and chem/bio agent attack) and two types of large-scale emergency responses (a wildland/urban interface fire and a developing major flood).

The full report and state reports are available at www.nfpa.org/needsassessment.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Web Site, HERE
NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, 2010 Edition, Order HERE

Additional Supplemental

NFPA has conducted a series of national surveys to identify the needs of the fire service for resources required to safely and effectively carry out their responsibilities. The surveys indicated the resources fire departments had, while NFPA codes and standards and other national guidance documents defined the requirements. The gaps between resources in hand and resources required defined the needs.

These reports look at personnel and their capabilities, including staffing, training, certification, and wellness/fitness; facilities and apparatus; personal protective equipment; fire prevention and code enforcement; the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents; and communications and new technologies.

All three studies began with requests from Congress, and the first two studies were conducted with and sponsored by the U.S. Fire Administration and its parent agencies.

2011
A Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (PDF, 1 MB)
June 2011. 216 pages
Updated study examining the needs of the U.S. fire service in such areas as training, certification, personnel, apparatus, equipment, and fire prevention, with particular attention to homeland security type incidents.

State-by-state reports

The following are state-level reports based on the findings in each of NFPA’s needs assessment reports.

Alabama 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Alaska 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Arizona 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Arkansas 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	California 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet
Colorado 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Connecticut 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Delaware 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Florida 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Georgia 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet
Hawaii 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Idaho 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Illinois 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Indiana 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Iowa 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet
Kansas 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Kentucky 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Louisiana 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Maine 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Maryland 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet
Massachusetts 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Michigan 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Minnesota 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Mississippi 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Missouri 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet
Montana 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Nebraska 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Nevada 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	New Hampshire 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	New Jersey 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet
New Mexico 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	New York 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	North Carolina 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	North Dakota 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Ohio 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet
Oklahoma 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Oregon 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Pennsylvania 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Rhode Island 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	South Carolina 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet
South Dakota 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Tennessee 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Texas 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Utah 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Vermont 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet
Virginia 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Washington 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	West Virginia 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Wisconsin 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet	Wyoming 2004 2007 2011 2011 fact sheet

From the NFPA Web site, link above

2006
Four Years Later – A Second Needs Assessment of the U.S.Fire Service (PDF, 4 MB)
Department of Homeland Security, USFA, and NFPA, October 2006. 159 pages
Updated assessment of needs of U.S. fire service in such areas as training, certification, personnel, apparatus, equipment, and fire prevention, with particular attention to homeland security type incidents.
Also see: Download an errata for this report. (PDF, 16 KB)

Matching Assistance to Firefighters Grants to the Reported Needs of the U.S.Fire Service (PDF, 2 MB)
Department of Homeland Security, USFA, and NFPA, October 2006. 41 pages
Analysis of whether grants requested and received have addressed reported needs, by type of need, and whether popular types of grants have resulted in significant change in the overall national level of need.

2002
A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (PDF, 1 MB)
FEMA, USFA, and NFPA, December 2002. 160 pages
A comprehensive study done by FEMA, USFA and NFPA examining the needs and response capabilities of the U.S. fire service. Among the factors examined are personnel and their capabilities; fire prevention and code enforcement; stations, apparatus and equipment; and the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents. Results are reported by nationwide and community size.

Also see: “Underfunded, Understaffed, and Undertrained”: Read NFPA President Jim Shannon’s and others’ reactions to the study in an NFPA Journal® Special Report (March/April 2003)

Posted by Christopher Naum on October 28, 2011 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", Building Construction for the Fire Service, Christopher Naum, Fire Protection Engineering, fire suppression, fire-prevention-education, firefighting-operations, Naum, NFPA • Tagged: buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, Fire Service Equipment, Fire Service Operational Capabilities, Fire Service Training, Fire Service Wellness, NFPA, NFPA 1710, Risk assessment, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, Updated assessment of needs of U.S. fire service

Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011: Day Five: Near-Misses, Maydays and Floor Collapses

1 comment

Do you know what's underneath you as you're making entry?

During the last quarter of 2010 and leading well into the second quarter of 2011 there has been a significant emerging trend developing in basement fires, compromised floor systems and assemblies leading to collapse and numerous near-miss events, close calls and unfortunatly, line of duty deaths during fire operations.

If you’ve been paying attention to the various news and on the job reports these past number of months, you may have noticed the increasing numbers of emerging trend evident in near miss, close-calls resulting in maydays, RIT deployments and self-rescue resulting from floor compromise and floor collapse. The double line of duty deaths of two San Francisco (CA) Fire fighers while operating in a Terraced (Hillside construction) residential occupancy while operating below the base level diaphragm (upper street level access). (HERE)

In December 2010, I was doing some research and posting links related to the first one or two events on Buildingsonfire on Facebook, HERE, it became evident at the time that there was an immediate opportunity to get some learning’s and insights out. If you have a chance head over to Facebook and link into Buildingsonfire and check out the incident links posted as well as some immediate report links. (Demember 2010 time frame)

In a coincidential posting on July 28, 2010, I posted on CommandSafety.com an interesting incident that I came across while preparing for a new post related to a near-miss event that occured in which a Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel after calling a mayday.

Operational Safety at Basement Fires: Close Call; Originally Posted on CommandSafety.com on July 28, 2010

This event has all the ingrediants the the 2011 Safety Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground and managing the Mayday. Little did I know that later, in February 2011, while participating in the National FireFighter Near-Miss Reporting System Stakeholders meeting in California, would I have the chance to hear Captain Long’s story first hand, and then also have the opportunity to have him as a guest, sharing his story live on the Taking it to the Streets Radio program in February. (HERE)

Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long’s near-miss and story of survival resonates with this year’s theme of Surviving the Fire Ground- Firefighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness and Managing the Mayday and provides an opportunity to focus on the event in this, Day Five of the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Surival Week activities. The details of Captain Long’s story can be found on the National FireFighter Near Miss Reporting System web site (HERE) as well as in the June 2011 issue of Fire Engineering Magazine titled, Floor Collapse: A Survivors Story. Let me state upfront also the Captain Michael Long will be presenting the accounts of his near miss event and the lessons-learned at IAFC Fire-Rescue International Conference in Atlanta in August (HERE).

On July 25, 2010, Captain Michael Long of the Camp Taylor (Ky.) Fire Protection District fell through the floor of a house during a four-alarm fire and suffered severe burn injuries. On Aug. 30, 2010, Capt. Long submitted a near-miss report based on this event. The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is an anonymous and confidential reporting system; however, Capt. Long wanted to have his name associated with this report so that others would understand the value of sharing near-miss events. What follows is an excerpt from his report and excerpts from a recent phone interview. To read his full report, including an extensive lessons learned section, search by report number for report #10-1072 on the Search Reports page of www.firefighternearmiss.com.

Near Miss Report Event #2010-1072

“I made sure my crew was ready to enter, sounded the floor for stability and then crossedover the threshold, entering the structure. When I was approximately 5 feet inside the structure, I felt the floor start to give way. I turned toward the front door to try to bail out, and at the same time yelled at others to get out, when the floor system collapsed. This was no ordinary collapse. More than two-thirds of the first floor collapsed simultaneously. The living room, dining room, kitchen, bathroom and foyer all fell at once. “When the collapse happened, I was the only one who fell into the basement, right into the heart of the fire. All I could see around me were flames.

I could not see the hole that I had fallen through. I could not see my fellow firefighters above me. All I could see was fire. I began to try to find something to use to climb back up with. Since I did not know what type of collapse had occurred, I just started clawing away at anything as I was trying to climb. During this time, my legs were burning.

Fire was burning up between my boots and my bunker pants. The pain was intense. My deputy chief was trying to put a line on me for protection, but the fire was extremely intense. He was lying on the porch with fire shooting out over his head. He stated he could occasionally see the top of my helmet and the reflective stripes on my coat sleeves.

By a bit of luck, a roof ladder was laying in the front yard that had just been taken off the roof after the completion of a ventilation operation.

My deputy chief directed the crew to put the ladder into the hole for my escape. “By this time, I was burned on my legs and struggling with exhaustion and the intense heat. I was screaming both from pain and due to fear. I could hear screaming coming from above, butwas unable to make out the majority of it. I finally heard the word “ladder” and then felt something across my back. Once they got the ladder into the basement, I had to get around to it. I still could not see anything but fire, so this was all by feel. As I started up the ladder, I got two rungs up, reached for the third rung, and lost my grip and fell back into the basement landing on my back. I was so exhausted that I started making my peace with God that this was where I was going to die.

For the full excerpt from Captain Long’s near miss report go to the NFF Near Miss Reporting Site and Resource Link, HERE

Captain Long

Incident Lessons Learned from Captain Long:

Train as if it is real. Train, train, train, and then train some more. Take advantage of every opportunity to train. The better we are trained, the less our chance of injury. The training must be physically and mentally. Crews must focus on more hands-on scenario-based training that allows for problem solving. If crews are taught that the outcome to every scenario is static, they are not being encouraged to think. Every run is different; no single solution applies to every situation. Adaptations or decisions that are not in step with changing conditions can actually be disadvantageous. We must make the right decisions based on the correct interpretation of the environment and blend those observations with our knowledge, skills, and abilities to map a course of action that will lead us to a successful outcome. Read reality and come up with the best possible plan. In my situation, quick thinking and adapting to the problem that presented itself saved my life.
Mutual-aid training is a must. We must train more with our neighboring departments to improve operations. It is occasionally difficult to work in situations where you do not really know with whom you will be working or where the command structure and tactics differ from those of your department. We all learn from the same book; however, the interpretations and tactics differ from person to person and department to department. I am not saying anyone is right or wrong in the way they do things—we all just need to do a better job of understanding that there is more than one way to get the job done.
We cannot know exactly how everyone on an emergency scene will perform because each person has a different interpretation of his surroundings and role in the system. Standard operating guidelines (SOGs) can assist in this area, but SOGs rely on perceptions and interpretations by individuals to be implemented as intended. Accidents often happen because everyone has a unique perspective on the environment, and each makes different decisions based on their perception.
We must perceive the environment correctly to ensure we make the right move. If these actions are not communicated and coordinated in the intricate system that is the fireground, accidents will be the inevitable and regrettable results. Training and frequent reviewing of SOGs are vital to our safety.
Risk assessment. Sounding the floor prior to entry is not always a good indicator of the floor’s stability. Less than two minutes before I made entry, there were three other firefighters, at least the same weight as I, in the same area where the collapse occurred. Everything changed in a very short time. There was no warning. Adkins told me at the hospital that all he heard was a “whoosh” sound when the floor collapsed. Then I disappeared. Within two minutes, the floor assembly went from being able to sustain a live load of at least 900 pounds in that area (accounting for gear, equipment, SCBA, and so on) to collapsing with about a 300-pound load, and I was close to a load-bearing wall. A good way to evaluate risk vs. gain is to get the most accurate report on burn time as possible to help determine structural integrity.
Rapid intervention. RIT is a critical fireground benchmark and is very important for safety, but it would have been ineffective in this situation. Had my crew not reacted the way they did immediately, I would not have been able to last long enough to wait for the RIT. In the time it would have taken for the RIT to gear up, come up with a plan, and enter, I would have died. The stars aligned in my favor that night. The person calling the Mayday or a nearby crew often mitigates personnel emergencies. My crew was able to act decisively at the correct time, and I am alive because of it. It is important to remember that a large percentage of Maydays are mitigated by the crew to which the lost firefighter is assigned or a nearby crew. RIT deployments account for a small number of rescues; we must always be alert and ready for the “incident within the incident.”
Manage your emotional response. From a personal standpoint, you must rely on your training and try not to panic. Know your equipment and procedures well. I did panic, but I was still able to keep myself together enough to know not to leave the area since I had been told that the stairs had burned away. Keeping my SCBA on, resisting the emotional reaction to remove my mask because of claustrophobia, was a huge factor in my survival. If I had tried to find another way out, my crew could not have gotten to me with the ladder. Had I removed my mask, the story would have ended quite differently. When I teach, I try to train as if it is the real thing. Never take a run for granted. Always expect the worst; you will be better prepared to deal with the unexpected.
If we continually study accident reports and learn from them, the likelihood of being surprised will be diminished. Peter Leschak writes in Ghosts of the Fireground: ”In fire and other emergency operations, you must not only tolerate uncertainty; you must savor it, or you won’t last long. The most efficient preparation is a general mental, physical, and professional readiness nurtured over years of training and experience. You live to live. Preparing is itself an activity, and action is preparation.”
Talk about it. Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) is important for ensuring that personnel from all departments on scene are taken care of emotionally. CISD needs to extend beyond just one or two briefings. Personnel involved in a highly emotional event must be given the opportunity to speak to a trained CISD team member early and be given as much time as is needed to work through their issue. Some firefighters have a macho attitude and try to deal with their emotions on their own, or maybe they don’t deal with them at all. Others self-medicate with alcohol or, worse, these difficult emotional events are allowed to fester with no relief. People should be accepting of those who deal with issues up front and tell their stories. Telling these stories makes us better and helps to keep us safe. This reduces the possibility of “snapping” because you have too much pent-up emotion.
My fellow firefighters are still affected by this event, even those who were not there. Department personnel must be open-minded and receptive to the fact that emotional events will affect your performance and your personal life and that it is acceptable to be open and deal with them. When difficult emotional situations present themselves, members should attempt to deal with them as soon as possible.
Know what is possible and what is not. Know the experience level of your crew. Going into a bad situation with a crew that may not have exposure to a lot of different situations or that you aren’t that familiar with could make operations more difficult. I had everything from a 30-year veteran to a one-year recruit, so the experience level was all across the board. I knew that the situation we were going into was getting worse and required quick action, so I took the lead to ensure that the operation would be completed as quickly as possible. I knew my deputy chief would be watching us to ensure things were proceeding safely. I knew my crew could get the job done; however, this was an operation that is not often practiced and I wanted to make sure it was done correctly. I will not send my crew into an area that I am not comfortable going into. The more you train and the more people you can train with, the better you will understand your capabilities.

Listen or download the special interview I had with Captain Mike Long as well as

Taking it to the Streets Radio Program and Interview with Capt. Long

Taking it to the Streets^TM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a 36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and the distinguished leading national authority on building construction and fire ground operations. Taking it to the Streets^TMis a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2011 All Rights Reserved

Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

Filed under Live Netcasts, News, Our Show Archives, Taking It To The Streets

Podcast: Play in new window | Download

The progam was taped from the Live Broadcast on March 16th at 9pm EST

Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

On Your Street, In Your City, Across the Country, Around the World^TM

The direct show link is here

The line-up of Program guests included, Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret), Captain CJ Haberkorn Denver (CO) Fire Department and Special Guest Captain Michael Long, Camp Taylor (KY) Fire Protection District.

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the National Near-Miss Reporting System and the untapped resources that the program and system provides with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire service leaders. The second part of the program will dedicated to the personal account of Captain Long’s Close Call event from July 25, 2010 (NMR #10-1072) when a catastrophic floor collapse at a residential occupancy plunged him into a fire involved basement.

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

Firefighternetcast.com HERE
Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

Taking it to the Streets^TM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

Taking it to the Streets^TM, is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production, in affiliation with the Command Institute

National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System’s Support for the 2011 Safety Week

Don’t forget to go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System for number of exceptional training aids, resources, PPT and more. NFFNMRS, HERE

Here are some of the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System Produced 2011 Safety Week Products


File Title	File Size	File Description
Presentation: Preventing The Mayday	176 KB	A powerpoint presentation about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
Presentation: Being Ready for the Mayday	176 KB	A powerpoint presentation about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
Presentation: Fire Fighter Expectations of Command	176 KB	A powerpoint presentation about fire fighter expectations of command.
Presentation: Self-Survival Skills	176 KB	A powerpoint presentation about self survival skills at a mayday.
Presentation: Self-Survival Procedures	176 KB	A powerpoint presentation about self survival procedures.
Grouped Report: Preventing The Mayday	176 KB	A grouped report about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
Grouped Report: Self Survival Procedures	176 KB	A grouped report about self survival procedures
Grouped Report: Being Ready for the Mayday	176 KB	A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems

In the meantime here are some links I pulled together that you should take the time to read and share with your companies, personnel and staff…..

This seems like a good time to have a ten minute drill on these events as Operating Experience (OE) on floor systems and operational safety, calling or commanding the mayday.

Or take some time to visit the The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)site which has the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens. (Day One: Are you ready, HERE)

For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

Self-Survival Procedures

FGS Online Program Chapter 3
To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:

First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall.

Self-Survival Skills

FGS Online Program Chapter 4

Disentanglement Maneuvers

Fires inside an enclosed structure create a mess for fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters often encounter debris that has fallen off shelves, and ceiling and wall fixtures that have burned and are left hanging to the floor. These hazards, coupled with the mess a fire fighter creates when searching for victims in smoky environments, can create egress problems for a fire fighter.

As fire burns draperies, blinds, lighting fixtures, computer wiring, and HVAC ducting, the possibility of encountering an entanglement hazard increases. The overhead ducting of the HVAC system contains wires that give the ducting its stability.

If a fire breaches the ceiling and burns the ducting, the wires within the ducting fall to the floor. These wires can cause a dangerous entanglement hazard to fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters must anticipate these hazards and have a plan to follow when egress is cut off.

NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters

Fire Fighter Expectations of Command

FGS Online Program Chapter 5
A discussion of what command must communicate to the distressed fire fighter, dispatch, the RIT group supervisor and all others assigned to the incident to assure a successful rescue.

Here are Some Mission Critical Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE) to support Your Training and Operational Needs not only this week, but through the entire year.

Here are some Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) for Operations at Basement Fires that will support fireground operational safety:

Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner.
Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment

Here’s some screen shots from Buildingsonfire on Facebook. Go HERE or follow the link at the left column. Join the growing list of over 3900 fans with Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Buildingsonfire.com

Posted by Christopher Naum on June 22, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "health and safety", "pre-fire planning", "Safety Week", "Situational Awareness" assessment, assemblies, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, close-call, command presence, construction, courage to be safe, Engineered Structural Systems, ESS, failures, fire behavior, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, floors, IAFC, IAFF, LODD, Mayday, Naum, NFFF, NFPA, NIOSH • Tagged: 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives, 2011 Fire/EMS Safety Week Training Resources, 2011 Focus: Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, 2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries, 2011 Safety Health and Survival Week, 2011 Surviving the Fire Ground- Firefighter Fire Officer and Command Preparedness, Basement Fire Near Miss events, Basement fire operations safety, basement fires, Building, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Buildingsonfire, buildingsonfire.com, Buildingsonfre.com, Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long, Chicago Fire Department Courage to Be Safety, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, combat fire suppression, commandsafety.com, compromised floor systems and assemblies leading to collapse, Diamond Heights section, Everyone Goes Home Program, FDNY Courage to BE Safet, fire behavior, fire dynamics, Fire Fighter Safety Week, Fire Fighting, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness, Fire Service LODD from Basement fires, fire suppression, Fire/EMS Safety, Fire/EMS Safety Health & Surival Week 2011, Fire/EMS Safety Health & Surival Week 2011: Day One- Are You Ready, Firefighter Close-call, Fireground Operations, Flashover, flashover lodd, Health and Survival Week 2011: Day Five: Near-Misses Maydays and Floor Collapses, Hillside construction firefighting safety, IAFC, IAFF, Incident Command, Initial Fire Attack, LODD, Lt Vincent Perez, Mayday, Mayday Training, mayday-prevention program, Nation Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting Systems, National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System 2011 Safety Week Resources, National FireFighter Near Miss Reporting System, National Near Miss Reporting System, Near Miss Reporting System, near-miss, NFFF, NIOSH, NIOSH Alerts, NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Reports, NIOSH Reports, NMR, operations, Preventing the Mayday, residential occupancy, RIT, RIT Training, Safety Considerations and Operations at Basement Fires, Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) for Operations at Basement Fires, Safety Health and Survival Section, San Francisco FD, San Francisco FD LODD June 2011, SFFD, SFFD Diamond Heights Fire, Sixteen Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives, Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter Fire Officer and Command Preparedness, tactics, Terraced (Hillside construction) residential occupancy, Terraced Occupancy Firefighting, Wind Driven Fire

NFPA Research Report on Firefighter Fatalities 2010 Released

No comments

According to the recently published NFPA Research Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2010; In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977.

Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, continued to account for the largest number of fatalities.
More than half of the deaths resulted from overexertion, stress and related medical issues.
Of the 39 deaths in this category, 34 were classified as sudden cardiac deaths (usually heart attacks) and five were due to strokes or brain aneurysm.

Download the NFPA 2010 FF LODD PFD Report, HERE
NFPA Web Site Link, HERE

2010 Experience

In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977. The average number of deaths annually over the past 10 years is 95.

Figure 1 shows firefighter deaths for the years 1977 through 2010, excluding the 340 firefighter deaths at the World Trade Center in 2001.

Of the 72 firefighters who died while on duty in 2010, 44 were volunteer firefighters, 25 were career firefighters, two were employees of state land management agencies, and one was a member of a prison inmate crew.

In 2010, there were four double-fatality incidents. Two firefighters died in a vehicle crash while returning from a training weekend, two died in an apparatus crash while responding to a structure fire and four firefighters were killed during interior operations at two structure fires. More details are presented throughout the report.

Analyses in the NFPA Research Report examine the types of duty associated with firefighter deaths, the cause and nature of fatal injuries to firefighters, and the ages of the firefighters who died. They highlight deaths in intentionally-set fires and in motor vehicle-related incidents.

Finally, the NFPA study presents summaries of individual incidents that illustrate important concerns in firefighter safety.

The victims include members of local career and volunteer fire departments; seasonal, full-time and contract employees of state and federal agencies who have fire suppression responsibilities as part of their job description; prison inmates serving on firefighting crews; military personnel performing assigned fire suppression activities; civilian firefighters working at military installations; and members of industrial fire brigades. Fatal injuries and illnesses are included even in cases where death is considerably delayed.

When the injury and the death occur in different years, the incident is counted in the year of the injury.

The NFPA recognizes that a comprehensive study of on-duty firefighter fatalities would include chronic illnesses (such as cancer or heart disease) that prove fatal and that arise from occupational factors. In practice, there is no mechanism for identifying fatalities that are due to illnesses that develop over long periods of time. This creates an incomplete picture when comparing occupational illnesses to other factors as causes of firefighter deaths. This is recognized as a gap the size of which cannot be identified at this time because of limitations in tracking the exposure of firefighters to toxic environments and substances and the potential long-term effects of such exposures.

The NFPA also recognizes that other organizations report numbers of duty-related firefighter fatalities using different, more expansive, definitions that include deaths that occurred when the victims were off-duty. (See, for example, the USFA and National Fallen Firefighters Memorial websites.*)

Readers comparing reported losses should carefully consider the definitions and inclusion criteria used in any study.

Type of Duty

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 72 deaths by type of duty. The largest share of deaths occurred while firefighters were operating on the fire ground (21 deaths).

This total is well below the average 32 deaths per year on the fire ground over the past 10 years, and less than a third the average of 69 deaths per year in the first 10 years of this study (1977 through 1986). The low number of fire ground deaths in 2010 is not only because of the small number of multiple-fatality fire incidents – the number of fire incidents resulting in firefighter deaths in 2010 was the lowest recorded, with 19 fatal fires, compared to an average of 28 annually in the previous 10 years. Fourteen of the 21 fire ground deaths occurred at 12 structure fires. Deaths in structure fires are discussed in more detail later in this report. There were seven deaths at seven wildland-related incidents.

There were no firefighter deaths at vehicle fires in 2010.

Twelve of the 21 fire ground victims were career firefighters, eight were volunteer firefighters and one was a firefighter with a state land management agency.
The average number of career firefighter deaths on the fire ground over the past 10 years is 12 deaths per year, while the average for volunteer firefighters is 16 deaths per year.
An additional four or more deaths of state or federal wildland management agency personnel, on average, occur on wildland fires each year.

Eighteen firefighters died while responding to or returning from emergency calls. It is important to note that deaths in this category are not necessarily the result of crashes. Twelve of the deaths were due to sudden cardiac events or stroke, five occurred in four collisions or rollovers and one firefighter was crushed between two fire department vehicles as one was backed into the station. All 18 victims were volunteer firefighters. All crashes and sudden cardiac deaths are discussed in more detail later.

Eleven deaths occurred during training activities. Two firefighters died when their personal vehicle crashed while they were returning from a training weekend. Four firefighters collapsed and died of sudden cardiac events after training exercises and one died during unsupervised physical fitness activities. One suffered a stroke after a weekly training meeting at the station, one suffered a brain aneurysm after hose loading training, one died after being exposed to smoke at a wildland live fire training exercise, and one hit his elbow during training and died of necrotizing fasciitis (also known as flesh-eating disease).

Five firefighters died at non-fire emergencies, including two at the scene of motor vehicle crashes (one victim was struck by a vehicle and the other suffered sudden cardiac death), one drowned during a swift water rescue, one died after clearing downed trees after a storm and one was asphyxiated while attempting to rescue a worker from a manhole without SCBA and before the oxygen levels were tested.

The remaining 17 firefighters died while involved in a variety of non-emergency-related on-duty activities. These activities included normal administrative or station duties (11 deaths), fire station construction projects (two deaths), vehicle maintenance (one death), driving to check on a wildland fire the previous day (one death), and a work project in a wildland area (one death). One firefighter died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound while on-duty.

Report Authors

Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2010
Rita F. Fahy, Paul R. LeBlanc and Joseph L. Molis, June 2011. 33 pages.
Overall statistics on line-of-duty firefighter fatalities in 2010, including non-incident-related deaths. Includes patterns, trends, career vs. volunteer comparisons, and brief narratives on selected incidents.

Abstract: In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977. Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, continued to account for the largest number of fatalities. More than half of the deaths resulted from overexertion, stress and related medical issues. Of the 39 deaths in this category, 34 were classified as sudden cardiac deaths (usually heart attacks) and five were due to strokes or brain aneurysm.

Download this report . (PDF, 151 KB)
See older versions of this report.

Posted by Christopher Naum on June 13, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, NFPA, Uncategorized • Tagged: "firefighter safety", Annual Firefighter LODD Statistics, buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, Fire Research, Firefighter Fatalities, Firefighter LODD, Firefighter on-duty deaths, firefighting, NFPA, NFPA Research Report on Firefighter Fatalities 2010

1980 MGM Grand Hotel Fire-Thirty Years Ago

No comments

Thirty years ago on the morning of November 21, 1980, 85 people died and more than 700 were injured as a result of a fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. This was the second largest life-loss hotel fire in United States history. It was determined during the investigation that the fire originated in the wall soffit of the side stand in the Deli, one of five restaurants located on the casino level. The investigators concluded that several factors contributed to the cause of the fire but the primary source of ignition was an electrical ground fault.

Once the fire ignited, it quickly traveled to the ceiling and the giant air-circulation system above the casino. In the casino, flames fed on flammable furnishings, including wall coverings, PVC piping, glue, fixtures, and even the mirrors on the walls, which were made of plastic.

The fire burned undetected for hours until it flashed over just after 7 a.m. and began spreading at a rate of 19 feet (5.8 meters) per second through the casino. As fire companies and firefighters were arriving, according to published reports, an estimated one-million-cubic-foot wall of flames was rushing through the casino, melting slot machines and sending a cyanide-laced cloud of killer smoke pouring upward.

The investigation determined that the rapid fire spread was due to a series of installation and building design flaws. A wire at the point of fire origin that had been improperly grounded could’ve been discovered had the area been inspected. A compressor wasn’t properly installed. A piece of copper wasn’t insulated correctly. A fire alarm never sounded. A stairwell that was a crucial escape route filled with smoke. The laundry chutes failed to seal and defects existed in the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems. All of these factors contributed to the spread of smoke.

Photo: AP/World Wide

This fire provided a wake-up call for the industry to improve fire safety standards in hotels around the country. As a result, hotels today are safer than ever.

About 5,000 people were in the resort when the blaze started to burn in earnest.
Many were trapped in their rooms, in the corridors, and in stairwells, and most of the victims died at the scene or in Las Vegas Valley hospitals.
Another handful of victims succumbed to fire-related injuries within a year.
Fourteen firefighters were hospitalized, most suffering from smoke inhalation.
According to the newspapers reports, NFPA’s Fire Investigation Manager, David Demers, concluded that “with sprinklers, it would have been a one or two sprinkler fire, and we would never have heard about it.”
An employee cutting through the closed Deli on the way to work was the first to see the fire. The worker, not identified by name in the fire investigation report, called security, then tried to put it out. The worker wasn’t trained and the proper equipment wasn’t there, the NFPA investigation said.
A visiting firefighter from Illinois breakfasting in an adjacent coffee shop also tried to help a security guard find an extinguisher to put out the electrical fire, but they couldn’t locate one.
A flame front moved into the casino, where the fire gained speed and strength, fueled by more flammable materials, including the highly flammable adhesive used to attach ceiling tiles.
Again, sprinklers would have put the fire out there.
Without them, within minutes, the fireball tore through the casino, blowing out the doors leading to the valet area.
Soon, killer smoke rose through the 26-floor high-rise tower via ventilation ducts.
While the lack of sprinklers was a major factor contributing to the severity of the MGM fire, it’s not that simple. Blame also has to be given to code violations, design flaws, installation errors, and materials that made the fire worse.
The fire alarms didn’t sound because they were manual and nobody pulled them. However, the disaster might have been worse if the alarms had prompted more people to rush into smoke-filled hallways.
Despite the discovery of 83 building code violations, nobody was ever charged criminally with any wrongdoing

To make matters worse, fire marshals had insisted sprinklers be installed in the casino during the building’s construction in 1972, but the hotel refused to pay for the $192,000 system, and a Clark County building official sided with the resort. Authorities later said the sprinkler system could have prevented the disaster at the hotel, which is now Bally’s Las Vegas Hilton Casino Resort. The fallout was $223 million in legal settlements, in addition to the lives lost.

Construction of the 26-story MGM Grand Hotel and Casino (currently Bally’s) started in 1972 and it opened in December of 1973.
There were 2,078 rooms at the hotel and the total area of the hotel and casino was approximately two million square feet.
Fire sprinkler systems were not installed in the high-rise hotel, the casino (approximately 380 by 1200 feet, or 450,000 square feet), and the restaurant areas.
Only partial fire sprinkler protection was provided for limited areas (arcade, showrooms and convention areas) on the ground level.
Where the sprinklers had been installed, they clearly worked. But sprinklers weren’t anywhere near where the fire broke out behind a wall near a serving station at The Deli that Friday morning about 7:10 a.m.
The Deli had received an exemption for sprinklers because it was supposed to be a 24-hour restaurant. It was assumed someone would always be there to put out a fire.
But then the hours changed and The Deli wasn’t open all the time. It was closed when the fire erupted.
The fire, caused by an electrical ground-fault, smoldered for hours before breaking through the wall.

According to NFPA’s final investigation report , several major factors contributed to the large loss of life in this fire. Among them was the rapid fire and smoke development in the casino in the early stages of the fire due, in part, to the lack of sprinklers and adequate fire barriers.
The fire generated massive amounts of smoke that spread up the hotel’s 23-story high-rise tower through unprotected vertical seismic joints and elevator hoistways and the substandard interior stair enclosures and exit passages.
In addition, the hotel’s heating, ventilating, and air conditioning continued to operate during the fire, pushing smoke throughout the high-rise.
Investigators found no evidence that the hotel had executed an emergency plan or sounded an evacuation alarm signal. Nor was there any evidence of manual fire alarm pull stations in the natural escape path in the casino.
The number and capacity of the exits from the casino were deficient, and the travel distances from certain areas of the casino to the exits were too long.
Finally, there was no automatic means of recalling the elevators to the main floor during the fire to prevent people from boarding them. Ten of the MGM Grand victims were found in the hotel’s elevators.
As a result of this fire, NFPA Life Safety Code® requirements for stairwell re-entry onto building floors if the exit stair enclosure becomes untenable were changed to include three options.
Stairwell doors must now remain unlocked on the inside of the stairwell so that people can get from the stairwell back to guest room floor.
Or they may be locked, but they must automatically unlock when the building’s fire alarm system activates.
Or hotels may use selected re-entry, in which there may be no more than four intervening floors between unlocked doors and signs must be provided to direct occupants to the floors with unlocked doors

Graphic by Mike Johnson.

On the night of February 10, 1981, just 90 days after the devastating MGM Grand fire, an arson fire started at the Las Vegas Hilton, which at the time was being retrofitted with modern fire safety equipment. Firefighters, using the knowledge they had learned from the MGM fire, used local television networks to notify people to stay in their rooms and not go out to the halls and stairwells. Because of the lessons learned, only eight people died in this fire compared with the 84 people who died in the MGM Grand fire

Reference Links: HERE, HERE, HERE , HERE and HERE

Clark County (NV) Fire Department Report: HERE and Link to FD Page HERE

NFPA Summary Report, HERE and HERE and Article Link HERE

NFPA Looking back at the MGM Fire, HERE

RELATED NFPA INFORMATION
NFPA Investigation Report: Las Vegas MGM Grand Fire

U.S. Hotel Fire Incident With 10 Or More Fatalities (PDF, 17KB)
Additional Hotel/Motel Safety Information and Statistics
Looking Back: The MGM Grand Hotel Fire (NFPA Journal, May/June 2010)
NFPA remembers the 1980 MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas (NFPA Journal, March/April 2001)

Las Vegas Review Journal Media Research: Here

USFA Topical Fire Report Series; Hotel and Motel Fires, HERE

Lessons from the Past: MGM Grand Fire on Firehouse.com, HERE

Las Vegas and Nevada history as told by those who lived it- The MGM Fire 1980. This six part series was broadcast in 2000 and produced by KNPR’s Tim Anderson with support from the Nevada Humanities Committee. HERE

These links from the Las Vegas Review Journal Media covered the 25th Anniversary of the event;

IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER
IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Disaster didn’t have to be
IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Officer recalls eerie scene at burned hotel

MGM Grand Fire Photos, HERE

Current Data from the USFA:

An estimated 3,900 hotel and motel fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 15 deaths, 150 injuries, and $76 million in property loss.
Hotel and motel fires are considered part of the residential fire problem. However, they comprise only approximately 1 percent of residential building fires.
Half of hotel and motel fires are small, confined fires.
Cooking is the leading cause of hotel and motel fires (46 percent). Almost all hotel and motel cooking fires are small, confined fires (97 percent).
Eighteen percent of non-confined hotel and motel fires extend beyond the room of origin. The leading causes of these larger fires are electrical malfunctions (24 percent), intentionally set fires (15 percent), and fires caused by open flames (12 percent). In contrast, 42 percent of all non-confined residential building fires extend beyond the room of origin.
While bedrooms are the primary origin of non-confined fires (23 percent), when confined cooking fires are considered, the kitchen or other cooking area is the most prevalent area of fire origin.
Hotel and motel fires are more prevalent in the cooler months due to increases in heating fires and peak in February (9 percent).

Bally's Las Vegas, formerly the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino today

Posted by Christopher Naum on November 20, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Codes, construction, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, high-rise, major-incidents, mass-casualty-incident, NFPA, pre-planning, Sprinklers, structure fires, Uncategorized • Tagged: automatic sprinkler systems, Casino Fire, Christopher Naum, Clark County (NV) Fire Department, Code Violations, Codes and Standards, commandsafety.com, extreme fire behavior, fire behavior, fire dynamics and fire behavior, Fire Load Package, Fire travel, firefighting, High Rise Fire, high-rise, Hotel Fires, MGM Grand Fire, MGM Grand fire 1980, MGM Grand Hotel Fire Thirty year Anniversary, NFPA, NFPA Investigation Report: Las Vegas MGM Grand Fire, smoke inhalation, Smoke migration, smoke movement, U.S. Hotel Fire Incident With 10 Or More Fatalities, USFA Topical Fire Report Series; Hotel and Motel Fires

Vacant Residential Building Fires Report

3 comments

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report examining the characteristics of fires in vacant residential buildings. The report, Vacant Residential Building Fires, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.

The report is part of the Topical Fire Report Series and is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). According to the report, an estimated 28,000 vacant residential building fires occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 45 deaths, 225 injuries, and $900 million in property loss. Vacant residential fires are considered part of the residential fire problem as they comprise approximately 7 percent of residential building fires. In addition, intentional is the leading cause of vacant residential building fires which are more prevalent in July (9 percent), due in part to an increase in intentional fires on July 4 and 5. Finally, almost all vacant residential building fires are non-confined and half spread to involve the entire building.

The topical reports are designed to explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS. Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.

The report, Vacant Residential Building Fires,HERE

Findings

■ An estimated 28,000 vacant residential building fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 45 deaths, 225 injuries, and $900 million in property loss.

■ Vacant residential building fires are considered part of the residential fire problem and comprise approximately 7 percent of all residential building fires.

■ Almost all vacant residential building fires are non-confined fires (over 99 percent).

■ Intentional is the leading cause of vacant residential building fires (37 percent).

■ Half of vacant residential building fires spread to involve the entire building. An additional 11 percent extend beyond the building to adjacent properties.

■ Bedrooms are the primary origin of all vacant residential building fires (12 percent). Following closely are common rooms such as dens, family and living rooms (10 percent), and cooking areas, kitchens (9 percent).

■ Vacant residential building fires are more prevalent in July (9 percent), due in part to an increase in intentional fires on July 4 and 5.

■ January 1, July 4 and 5, and October 31 have the highest incidence of vacant residential fires.

From 2006 to 2008, an estimated 28,000 vacant residential building fires were reported annually in the United States. The number of vacant residential buildings has always been seen as an issue in our society. These buildings are rarely maintained and often serve as a common site for illicit or illegal activity. In addition, vacant residential buildings are sometimes used by homeless people as temporary shelters or housing. A major concern when a vacant building catches fire is that little is known about the building’s overall condition.

Many buildings are in disrepair and can be missing certain structures, such as staircases or portions of floors. If individuals are known to use the vacant building as a residence, the unknown condition of the building and the unknown number of people using the building as shelter can put the firefighters’ lives in danger when they enter the building to attempt a rescue during a fire. The surrounding non-vacant properties are also at risk when vacant residential buildings catch fire.

It typically takes longer for vacant residential building fires to be detected as there are no occupants to be alerted by the smell or sound of the fires or respond to an alarm and the property loss is greater. In addition, if the fire has been intentionally set, especially with multiple ignition points, the damage can be greater, placing the lives of more individuals’ firefighters, adjacent residents, and any squatters in danger.

Fires in vacant residential buildings have become an even greater issue in the past few years. Many communities have seen an increase in the number of vacant residential buildings as the economy has declined; and with that an increase in the number of vacant residential building fires. From 2006 to 2008, intentionally set fires was the main cause of all vacant residential building fires (37 percent, as discussed later in this report), posing a serious issue for the community.

These types of fires continue to be a problem and concern within our society. “Devil’s Night” in Detroit, MI, is an example of the intentional fire issue in vacant properties. Prior to the late 1970s, October 30 or “Devil’s Night,” as it has been referred to in Detroit, was full of childhood pranks and minor vandalism acts. It was not until the late 1970s that this night of mischief went from being innocent to terrifying when arson became the leading cause of fire on Devil’s Night. Devil’s Night activity peaked in 1984 when over 800 fires were set in Detroit alone.

This issue of arson was exacerbated as Detroit was seeing a decrease in real estate values, resulting in some owners of vacant residences using the fires as a means to collect insurance dollars. This situation exists currently in Detroit (as well as other cities). In the 1990s, Detroit’s mayor took a major step in fighting Devil’s Night arson by renaming it “Angel’s Night” and calling upon police, firefighters, and local citizens to help patrol vacant properties that night and by cleaning up, or in some cases, removing the property entirely.

The efforts have proved effective but there is concern that the increase of vacant property within the past few years may lead to an upswing in fires in vacant and abandoned buildings. This topical report addresses the characteristics of vacant residential building fires reported to the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) from 2006 to 2008. Vacant residential building fires, as analyzed in this report, include properties where the building is under construction, under major renovation, vacant and secured, vacant and unsecured, and being demolished. The remaining building status categories (occupied and operating; idle, not routinely used; building status, other; and undetermined) are considered “non-vacant” but not necessarily occupied. For the purpose of this report, the terms “residential fires” and “vacant residential fires” are synonymous with “residential building fires” and “vacant residential building fires,”

Additional References;

Posted by Christopher Naum on November 19, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, Abandoned, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, Christopher Naum, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, fires, NFPA, operations, Safety, vacant • Tagged: "firefighter safety", Arson, building fires spread, building status categories, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, fierfighting, house fire, intentionally set fires, interior operations, NIOSH Reports, non-occupied building, occupancy profile, occupancy type, occupied building, residential Fire, Risk assessment, Risk Management, search and rescue, thecompanyofficer.com, Topical Fire Report Series, U.S. fire problem, United States Fire Administration, Vacant Residential Building Fires

New NFPA campaign puts a face on the lifesaving impact of home sprinklers

No comments

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) announced the Faces of Fire campaign, featuring personal stories of those who have been affected by fires in the home. Faces of Fire is a tool to promote the required installation of fire sprinklers in new one- and two-family homes and is part of NFPA’s Fire Sprinkler Initiative. Faces of Fire was developed with funding from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Faces of Fire features the personal stories of home fire survivors, family members of victims, first responders and homeowners whose property has been protected by fire sprinklers. Through video interviews, photographs and written profiles available online, Faces of Fire is a resource for local advocates and fire personnel, putting personal stories front and center during consideration of fire sprinkler mandates.

The campaign was unveiled at a conference of fire and building officials in Boston today that included a live side-by-side burn to demonstrate the effectiveness of fire sprinklers. Speakers at the burn demonstration included U.S. Fire Administrator Glenn Gaines; Gary Keith, NFPA vice president of field operations; and Princella Lee-Bridges, fire survivor and Faces of Fire participant, Greenville, S.C.

“Home fire sprinklers save lives, protect property, preserve community resources and are affordable in new construction. They should not be considered optional in new homes,” said James M. Shannon, NFPA president. “It is our goal that states across the country require lifesaving home fire sprinklers in new construction.”

Because the tragedy of home fires doesn’t discriminate, Faces of Fire features stories from across the racial, gender, geographic and economic breadth of America.

Stories like those of Ms. Lee-Bridges, a former operating room nurse and Desert Storm veteran:

“In the grand scheme of things, how does the cost of putting in sprinklers at $1.25, 2.60, or 3.40 per square foot compare to the loss of a loved one. For me, the burns I suffered in a home fire led to not only physical impacts, but also the loss of a marriage, and the loss of a career I loved,” she says. “How does the cost of installing sprinklers measure up to all of that?”

Each year about 3,000 people in the United States die in home fires. Many home fire deaths and injuries could be prevented through the increased use of fire sprinklers. Today all relevant model building codes call for the use of sprinklers in such homes. By containing fires before they spread, home fire sprinklers protect lives and property.

“Sprinkler opponents are spreading misleading information about sprinklers and putting false information in the minds of consumers and policy makers,” said Shannon. “Such tactics of delay and defeat can cost lives. NFPA is fighting back by sharing research-based information, advocacy tools and now, personal stories of those affected by home fires.”

“One of the toughest parts of my job is seeing the faces of people who have been killed by smoke, heat and flames from a home fire that could have been controlled easily with a residential sprinkler system,” said Mark Showmaker, chief fire marshal/emergency management director for Upper Southampton Township in Southampton, Pa. “In the fire service, we do everything we possibly can to save lives. Our counterparts in the home building industry can do the same by simply supporting the installation of fire sprinklers.”

The Faces of Fire campaign will be shared through traditional news as well as social media outlets and will be available on NFPA’s Fire Sprinkler Initiative® website: www.firesprinklerinitiative.org/faces

About the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
NFPA is a worldwide leader in providing fire, electrical, building, and life safety to the public since 1896. The mission of the international nonprofit organization is to reduce the worldwide burden of fire and other hazards on the quality of life by providing and advocating consensus codes and standards, research, training, and education. Visit NFPA’s website at www.nfpa.org

About the Fire Sprinkler Initiative®
The Fire Sprinkler Initiative®, a project of the National Fire Protection Association, is a nationwide effort to encourage the use of home fire sprinklers and the adoption of fire sprinkler requirements for new construction. Visit the Fire Sprinkler Initiative website at www.firesprinklerinitiative.org.

Posted by Christopher Naum on October 27, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, fire-prevention-education, firefighting-operations, NFPA, Uncategorized • Tagged: Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, Faces of Fire, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fire Prevention, fire safety, Home fire sprinklers, Home Fires, Home Safety, NFPA, NFPA’s Fire Sprinkler Initiative, residential, Residential Sprinklers, Sprinklers

Operational Safety at Basement Fires: Close Call

4 comments

Basement fires in both residential and commercial occupancies are one of the most challenging tactical operations that present numerous risk factors that required the highest degree of situational awareness, training skill sets and continuous incident monitoring and assessment to gauge building structural integrity, fire behavior and crew integrity and performance.

An explosion rocked a Fairdale, Kentucky neighborhood this past weekend while the homeowner was in the process of doing remodeling his basement. A Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Mark Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel.

Fellow firefighters, including his brother-in-law, who was right behind him prior to his fall, were yelling and screaming at Long to hang on. They managed to get a ladder to the basement and it was up to Long to find the strength to get out. He says “I started to try to climb up. I got two, I lost my grip, fell flat into the fire. I was so exhausted.” On his third attempt, he did find the strength and pulled himself up the ladder and out of the flames.

According to published reports a coordinated fire suppression effort was undertaken, with heavy fire involvement extending throughout the house and into the roof area. Interior fire attack was commenced, and as crews began moving across the first floor area above the seat of the fire, the floor subassembly failed causing an isolated collapse and compromise of the structural floor system and sub-floor decking, resulting in Captain Long falling into the basement. The fire originating in the basement was the result of the homeowners’ use of acetone as a floor treatment when the chemical vapors were ignited by the hot water heater causing an explosion and resulting fire.

Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive)

Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner.
Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment

Here are some resources and case studies resulting from operations at floor collapses;

Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know, Here
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE
Remembering Brackenridge 1991 Floor Collapse and LODD
Brackenridge-USFA Report; HERE
Brackenridge-NFPA Summary; HERE
Maintaining Situational Awareness
NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors
Career Fire Fighter Dies While Exiting Residential Basement Fire – New York, HERE
First-Floor Collapse During Residential Basement Fire Claims the Life of Two Fire Fighters (Career and Volunteer) and Injures a Career Fire Fighter Captain – New York, HERE
Career Engineer Dies and Fire Fighter Injured After Falling Through Floor While Conducting a Primary Search at a Residential Structure Fire – Wisconsin, HERE
Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE
Floor Collapse Claims the Life of One Fire Fighter and Injures Two-California, HERE
UL University CBT: “Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions”

Incident links; HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on July 28, 2010 • Filed under: "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, close-call, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, Engineered Structural Systems, failures, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, first-due, floors, Mayday, Naum, NFPA, NIOSH, occupancies, pre-planning, risk-based assessment, size-up, strategies, Systems and Assemblies, training-development, Trapped, Truss, UL, Uncategorized • Tagged: basement fire, Brackenridge Collapse, Building Profile, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, crew integrity, engineered wood floor joists, fire attack, Fire Floor Integrity, fire suppression, firefighting, floor Collapse, floor construction, floor system compromise, floor systems, interior fire suppression operations, Mayday, NIOSH, NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Reports, preplanning, risk assessement, Risk versus Gain, RIT, situational awareness, standard operating procedures, Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions, UL

No More History Repeating Events-Remembrance

No comments

As we approach the July 4th holiday period, two significant LODD incidents previously occurred during this time frame that hold a number of lessons learned related to command management, operations, building construction principles and building performance, fire behavior and the ever present dangers of the job. Take the opportunity to learn more about these events, and expand your insights and knowledge base. Those events being the 1988 Hackensack (NJ) Ford Fire which resulted in five (5) LODD and the 2002 Gloucester City (NJ) Fire that resulted in three (3) LODD along with three children.

Take a moment to reflect upon the supreme sacrifice made by these heroic firefighters and the messages that lay within the pages of the incident case studies, reports and summaries. Our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com has a comprehensive overview of both events with report links and a must see video on the Gloucester City (NJ) 2002 LODD event. For Remembering Hackensack and Gloucester follow the link HERE

Remembrance (1988)

Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department
• CAPT. RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Engine Co. No. 304
• LIEUT. RICHARD REINHAGEN, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F WILLIAM KREJSA, Engine Co. No. 301
• F/F LEONARD RADUMSKI, Engine Co. No. 302
• F/F STEPHEN ENNIS, Rescue Co. No. 308

Remember (2002)

Gloucester City (NJ) Fire
• James Sylvester Fire Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
• John West Deputy Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
• Thomas G. Stewart III Paid Firefighter, Gloucester City Fire Department

Posted by Christopher Naum on July 2, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, command-leadership, compentencies, construction, decision-making, failures, Fatalities, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, honor, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, mass-casualty-incident, NFPA, NIOSH, Remembrance, special-operations, structure fires, Trapped, Truss • Tagged: Bowstring Truss, building construction, building construction principles, Christopher Naum, Collapse, command, Command Disfunction, command management, communications, Dynamic Risk Assessment, fire behavior, Fire Flow, fire load, firefighting, Gloucester City, Gloucester City NJ, Hackensack LODD, LODD, manpower, New Jersey Division of Fire Safety, NFPA, operations, Overload, Rescue, resources, risk, Risk assessment, RIT, situational awareness, tactics, Truss, Truss collapse, Truss Roof

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home". Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)

Archives for nfpa

Fire in Syracuse: Four Firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978

High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year

NFPA releases state-level fire service needs assessment for every U.S. state

NFPA Research Report on Firefighter Fatalities 2010 Released

1980 MGM Grand Hotel Fire-Thirty Years Ago

Vacant Residential Building Fires Report

New NFPA campaign puts a face on the lifesaving impact of home sprinklers

Operational Safety at Basement Fires: Close Call

No More History Repeating Events-Remembrance

Mission Critical

Connect with Command Safety

FirefighterNetCast on Blog Talk Radio

CommandSafety.com

The Tombs

Buildingsonfire.com on Facebook

The New Safety Formula: Bk = F2S

CommandSafety.com

CommandSafety.com

NATIONAL FALLEN FIREFIGHTERS MEMORIAL

Blogroll

Sponsored Links

Addressing Today’s Evolving Fireground

Lectures,Seminars and Training Programs

Taking it to the Streets Radio

QR Code for Commandsafety.com

FireEMSBlogs.com Community

Featured from across Fire/EMS

Shoals VFD (NC) Hosts Honor Walk for West,…

What Replaced The 50-Foot Ladder?…

Quick Drill: Apparatus Drill for Appliances…

Compton, CA Deputy Chief Marcel Melanson,…

Archives for nfpa

Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

Self-Survival Procedures

Self-Survival Skills

Disentanglement Maneuvers

Fire Fighter Expectations of Command

Mission Critical

Connect with Command Safety

FirefighterNetCast on Blog Talk Radio

CommandSafety.com

The Tombs

Buildingsonfire.com on Facebook

The New Safety Formula: Bk = F2S

CommandSafety.com

CommandSafety.com

NATIONAL FALLEN FIREFIGHTERS MEMORIAL

Blogroll

Sponsored Links

Addressing Today’s Evolving Fireground

Lectures,Seminars and Training Programs

Taking it to the Streets Radio

QR Code for Commandsafety.com

Tags Across FireEMSBlogs.com

FireEMSBlogs.com Community

Featured from across Fire/EMS