Skip to content


Smart and Intelligent Firefighting

No comments

The continuing importance of fire research and the strive to understand fire and its relationship to buildings, systems and firefighting operations is challenging long held beliefs and anecdotal basis; encouraging stimulating debate and discussions- resulting in thought provoking and insightful theories, positions statements and a time of retrospect and critical self-examination that will influence numerous facets of the fire service profession.

It’s not about NOT fighting fires, but rather fighting fires smarter.

Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.

The Art and Science of Fire Fighting – Buildingsonfire

 

NFPA releases state-level fire service needs assessment for every U.S. state

No comments

 

NFPA releases state-level fire service needs assessment for every U.S. state.  Findings based on Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service with comparisons to earlier studies

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) released a fire service needs assessment for each state based on findings from the Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, a study that looked at the current needs of America’s fire departments as compared to those identified in assessments done in 2001 and 2005. The goal of the project was to identify major gaps in the needs of the U.S. fire service and to determine if the Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (DHS/FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) programs are continuing to reduce the needs of fire departments.

The report looked at personnel and their capabilities, including staffing, training, certification, and wellness/fitness; facilities and apparatus; personal protective equipment, fire prevention and code enforcement; the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents; and communications and new technologies.

Selected Findings:

  • Nearly half (46 percent) of all fire departments that are responsible for structural firefighting have not formally trained all their personnel involved in structural firefighting, down from 55 percent in 2001 and 53 percent in 2005.
  • Seven out of ten (70 percent) fire departments have no program to maintain basic firefighter fitness and health, down from 80 percent in 2001 and 76 percent in 2005.
  • Nearly half (46 percent) of all fire department engines and pumpers were at least 15 years old, down from 51 percent in 2001 and 50 percent in 2005.
  • Half (52 percent) of all fire departments cannot equip all firefighters on a shift with self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), down from 70 percent in 2001 and 60 percent in 2005.
  • Two out of five (39 percent) fire departments do not have enough personal alert safety system devices (PASS) to equip all emergency responders on a shift, down from 62 percent in 2001 and 48 percent in 2005.
  • Except for cities protecting at least 250,000 population, most cities do not assign at least four career firefighters to an engine or pumper and so are probably not in compliance with NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, which requires a minimum of four firefighters on an engine or pumper.

Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service conducted by NFPA concluded: 

  • Needs have declined to a considerable degree in a number of areas, particularly personal protective and firefighting equipment, two types of resources that received the largest shares of funding from the AFG programs.
  • Some innovative technologies that have not been identified as necessary in existing standards but are known to be very useful to today’s fire service – including Internet access and thermal imaging cameras – have also seen large increases in use.
  • Declines in needs have been more modest in some other important areas, such as training, which have received much smaller shares of AFG funds.
  • Still other areas of need, such as apparatus, stations, and the staffing required to support the stations, have seen either limited reductions in need (e.g., apparatus needs in rural areas) or no reductions at all (e.g., adequacy of stations and personnel to meet standards and other guidance on speed and size of response).
  • Fire prevention and code enforcement needs have shown no clear improvement over the past decade.
  • In all areas emphasized by the AFG and SAFER (Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response) grants, there is ample evidence of impact from the grants but also considerable residual need still to be addressed, even for needs that have seen considerable need-reduction in the past decade.
  • There has been little change in the ability of departments, using only local resources, to handle certain types of unusually challenging incidents, including two types of homeland security scenarios (structural collapse and chem/bio agent attack) and two types of large-scale emergency responses (a wildland/urban interface fire and a developing major flood).

 

The full report and state reports are available at www.nfpa.org/needsassessment.

  • National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Web Site, HERE
  • NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, 2010 Edition, Order HERE

 

Additional Supplemental

NFPA has conducted a series of national surveys to identify the needs of the fire service for resources required to safely and effectively carry out their responsibilities. The surveys indicated the resources fire departments had, while NFPA codes and standards and other national guidance documents defined the requirements. The gaps between resources in hand and resources required defined the needs. 

These reports look at personnel and their capabilities, including staffing, training, certification, and wellness/fitness; facilities and apparatus; personal protective equipment; fire prevention and code enforcement; the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents; and communications and new technologies. 

All three studies began with requests from Congress, and the first two studies were conducted with and sponsored by the U.S. Fire Administration and its parent agencies. 

2011
A Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (PDF, 1 MB)
June 2011. 216 pages
Updated study examining the needs of the U.S. fire service in such areas as training, certification, personnel, apparatus, equipment, and fire prevention, with particular attention to homeland security type incidents.

 

State-by-state reports

The following are state-level reports based on the findings in each of NFPA’s needs assessment reports.

Alabama 
2004 2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Alaska  
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Arizona 
2004  2007 2011 
2011 fact sheet 
Arkansas  
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
California
2004  2007  2011 
2011 fact sheet   
Colorado
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Connecticut
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Delaware 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Florida 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Georgia 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Hawaii 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Idaho 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Illinois 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Indiana 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Iowa 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Kansas 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Kentucky 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Louisiana 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Maine 
2004  2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Maryland 
2004 2007 2011
2011 fact sheet 
Massachusetts 
2004 2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Michigan 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Minnesota 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Mississippi 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Missouri 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Montana 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Nebraska 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Nevada 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
New Hampshire
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
New Jersey 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
New Mexico 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
New York
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
North Carolina
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
North Dakota 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Ohio 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Oklahoma 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Oregon 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet
Pennsylvania 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Rhode Island 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
South Carolina 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
South Dakota
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Tennessee
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Texas
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Utah
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Vermont
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Virginia 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Washington
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
West Virginia 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Wisconsin 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 
Wyoming 
2004  2007  2011
2011 fact sheet 

From the NFPA Web site, link  above


2006
Four Years Later – A Second Needs Assessment of the U.S.Fire Service (PDF, 4 MB)
Department of Homeland Security, USFA, and NFPA, October 2006. 159 pages
Updated assessment of needs of U.S. fire service in such areas as training, certification, personnel, apparatus, equipment, and fire prevention, with particular attention to homeland security type incidents.
Also see: Download an errata for this report. (PDF, 16 KB)  

Matching Assistance to Firefighters Grants to the Reported Needs of the U.S.Fire Service (PDF, 2 MB)
Department of Homeland Security, USFA, and NFPA, October 2006. 41 pages
Analysis of whether grants requested and received have addressed reported needs, by type of need, and whether popular types of grants have resulted in significant change in the overall national level of need.

2002
A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (PDF, 1 MB)
FEMA, USFA, and NFPA, December 2002. 160 pages
A comprehensive study done by FEMA, USFA and NFPA examining the needs and response capabilities of the U.S. fire service. Among the factors examined are personnel and their capabilities; fire prevention and code enforcement; stations, apparatus and equipment; and the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents. Results are reported by nationwide and community size.

Also see: “Underfunded, Understaffed, and Undertrained”: Read NFPA President Jim Shannon’s and others’ reactions to the study in an NFPA Journal® Special Report (March/April 2003)

 

 

 

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

No comments

Video Clip recorded live by Fire Department Network News TV (FDNNTV) at the 50th IAFF Fire Fighter Convention in San Diego, CA on August 23, 2010.

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, also known as NIOSH, is a federal agency that is part of the Centers for Disease Control. NIOSH has a mission of generating new knowledge in the occupational safety and health field and to transfer that knowledge into practice for the advancement of workers, including firefighters and emergency responders.

In 1998, the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) requested that Congress fund NIOSH to start a firefighter safety initiative called the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.  “We investigate fatalities to learn from the mistakes the others made and to try to prevent future fatalities and injuries from occurring in similar events,” stated Project Officer Tim Merinar with the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program. According to NIOSH, the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program has made over 1,000 recommendations arising from over 300 investigations since its inception in 1998.

Merinar claimed that some do not fully understand who NIOSH is and what their goals are, often being confused with OSHA. However, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is not an enforcement agency, they are a research and education agency. Merinar added, “We’re not looking to find fault or place blame on the fire departments or the individual firefighters in the incidents.”

As soon as possible after an incident, a NIOSH investigator will meet with the fire department. “Oftentimes, we have to explain who we are, why we’re there, what we’re trying to accomplish,” added Merinar. NIOSH investigates as many firefighter fatalities as possible involving structure fires, deaths from cardiovascular disease, as well as deaths during non-fireground incidents.

NIOSH offers many different publications to firefighters, including their newest one about risk management at structure fires. This literature is distributed to the fire service free of charge. Another publication offered to firefighters deals with floor joists and the risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. “They work very well for the construction industry, but when they’re exposed to fire they also fail very rapidly. Which leads to early building collapses,” explained Merinar. “Many firefighters have been injured and killed in these collapses.”

NIOSH FFFIPP

Trends such as this uncovered during their investigations and spread to the fire service, could help prevent future deaths. Another trend found several years ago by NIOSH involved PASS devices not sounding on firefighters who died. According to Merinar, NIOSH worked with the National Fire Protection Association to have the standard changed to make the PASS devices more reliable and more effective for firefighters. Currently, they are working with the NFPA on the thermal degradation characteristics of face piece lenses.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

For more information on the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, incident reports or fire fighter publications, visit www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/.

Cold-Storage and Warehouse Building Fire

Topic Index:

Reports and Publications
  Safety Advisories
  Fatality Reports
  Pending Investigations
  Safety Quizzes
  Publications
Program Information
  Program Description
  What to Expect During a NIOSH Investigation
  Public Comment Docket
  Future Directions
  Inspector General’s Program Review
  IAFC’s Program Review
  Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Evaluation
  Strategic Plan – 2009

 

NIOSH Request for Comment on the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP) is seeking stakeholder input to ensure that the FFFIPP program is meeting the needs and expectations of the fire service, and to identify ways in which the program can be improved to increase its impact on the safety and health of fire fighters across the United States. Additional information can be found in the FFFIPP Progress Report and Proposed Future Directions document.

Stakeholder Comment on the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP)-2011
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is seeking stakeholder input on the progress and future directions of the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP). Since its initiation in 1998, NIOSH has sought public input to help plan and direct the goals and objectives of the FFFIPP. NIOSH received public comments on the FFFIPP in 1998, March 2006, and November 2008. NIOSH is again seeking input on the progress and future directions of the FFFIPP to ensure that the program is meeting the needs and expectations of the U.S. fire service and to identify ways in which the program can improve its impact on the safety and health of fire fighters across the United States. NIOSH will compile and consider all comments received and use them in making decisions on how to proceed with the FFFIPP.

There are several resources that may be useful to individuals and groups who would like to comment on the FFFIPP:

  • The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Progress (FFFIPP) Report and Proposed Future Directions – 2011. This document includes specific topics for stakeholder input.
  • The Strategic Plan for the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program that was finalized in 2009 after public input.
  • The FFFIPP web site that includes an overview of the FFFIPP, fatality investigation reports and other publications.

Related Dockets
NIOSH Docket number 063NIOSH Docket number 063-A
——————————————————————————–

Public Comment Period
Written comments on the document will be accepted through July 29, 2011 in accordance with the instructions below. All material submitted to NIOSH should reference Docket Number NIOSH-063-B. All electronic comments should be formatted as Microsoft Word documents and make reference to docket number NIOSH-063-B.

Comments will be accepted until 5:00 p.m. EDT on July 29, 2011

To submit comments, please use one of these options:

  • Send NIOSH comments using this online form
  • Send comments by email.
  • Fax comments to the NIOSH Docket Office: 513-533-8285
  • Send by Mail to:
    NIOSH Mailstop: C-34
    Robert A. Taft Lab.
    4676 Columbia Parkway
    Cincinnati, Ohio 45226
    All information received in response to this notice will be available for public examination and copying at the …
    NIOSH Docket Office
    4676 Columbia Parkway, Room 111
    Cincinnati, Ohio 45226.

A complete electronic docket containing all comments submitted will be available on the NIOSH docket home page, and comments will be available in writing by request. NIOSH includes all comments received without change in the docket, including any personal information provided.

Contact persons for technical information

  • Paul Moore
    Chief, Fatality Investigations Team
    NIOSH/CDC
    1095 Willowdale Road
    Mailstop H-1808
    Morgantown, WV 26505
    304/285-6016

Recent NIOSH Fire Fighter Safety Publications

Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Operating Modified Excess/Surplus Vehicles
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2011-125
Fire fighters may be at risk for crash-related injuries while operating excess and other surplus vehicles that have been modified for fire service use. Fire departments with limited resources often craft fire apparatus out of excess/surplus military and other vehicles as an affordable alternative to purchasing new or used apparatus. NIOSH urges fire departments to take precautions and actions to minimize the hazards and risks to fire fighters when using modified excess/surplus vehicles.

Evaluation of Chemical and Particle Exposures During Vehicle Fire Suppression Training (2010)this document in PDF (56 pages, 4.85 MB)
Health Hazard Evaluation Report, HETA 2008-0241-3113
In September 2008 and July 2009, NIOSH researchers collected area and personal breathing zone air samples during a Health Hazard Evaluation (HHE) to evaluate firefighters’ exposures to airborne chemicals during vehicle fire suppression training. Several hazardous chemicals were found on the area samples, including respiratory toxicants and potential carcinogens. Of the chemicals measured in the personal breathing zones, levels of formaldehyde, carbon monoxide, and isocyanates were near or above short term exposure limits or ceiling limits. In addition, the number of particles and mass of the particles in the air increased during knockdown and remained elevated throughout the fire overhaul. Based on this evaluation, the levels of gases and particles released during vehicle fires have the potential to cause acute health effects to firefighters who do not wear self-contained breathing apparatus.

NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2010-153
Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures. These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.

Preventing Exposures to Bloodborne Pathogens among Paramedics
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2010-139
Patient care puts paramedics at risk of exposure to blood. These exposures carry the risk of infection from bloodborne pathogens such as hepatitis B virus (HBV), hepatitis C virus (HCV), and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes AIDS. A national survey of 2,664 paramedics contributed new information about their risk of exposure to blood and identified opportunities to control exposures and prevent infections.

Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2009-114
Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program: Leading Recommendations for Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities, 1998–2005
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2009-100
This document is a synthesis of the 1,286 individual recommendations from the 335 FFFIPP investigations conducted from 1998 to 2005.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Evaluation
NIOSH report of findings from its national survey of U.S. fire departments.

Preventing Fire Fighter Fatalities Due to Heart Attacks and Other Sudden Cardiovascular Events
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2007-133
Fire fighters are at risk of dying on the job from preventable cardiovascular conditions.

FDA AND NIOSH Public Health Notification: Oxygen Regulator Fires Resulting from Incorrect Use of CGA 870 Seals External Web Site Policy
This document provides information on the danger of fires at the interface of oxygen regulators and cylinder valves because of incorrect use of CGA 870 seals, and identifies measures to prevent such fires.

NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-132
Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.

NIOSH Workplace Solutions—Preventing Deaths and Injuries to Fire Fighters During Live-Fire Training in Acquired Structures
DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-102
Fire fighters are subjected to many hazards when participating in live-fire training. Training facilities with approved burn buildings should be used for live-fire training whenever possible. However, when acquired structures are used for live-fire training, NIOSH strongly recommends that fire departments follow the national consensus guidelines in NFPA 1403, standard on live-fire training evolutions [NFPA 2002a] to reduce the risk of injury and death. These guidelines are summarized in the recommendations in this document.

Radio Communication

The past few decades have seen major advancements in the communication industry. These advancements have improved radio frequency spectrum efficiency, but also have added complexity to the expansion of existing systems and the design of new systems. The U.S. Fire Administration in conjunction with the International Association of Fire Fighters has released the report Voice Radio Communications Guide for the Fire Service External Web Site Policy this document in PDF 3.85 MB (77 pages) This report is designed to help fire service leaders and members understand new communication and radio system issues in order to remain informed players in the process.

Current Status, Knowledge Gaps, and Research Needs Pertaining to Firefighter Radio Communication Systems
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) commissioned this study to identify and address specific deficiencies in firefighter radio communications and to identify technologies that may address these deficiencies. Specifically to be addressed were current and emerging technologies that improve, or hold promise to improve, firefighter radio communications and provide firefighter location in structures.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology, Building and Fire Research Laboratory publication “Testing of Portable Radios in a Fire Fighting EnvironmentExternal Web Site Policy this document in PDF 265 KB (24 pages)
focuses on the thermal environment that radios would be expected to withstand while being used in structural fire fighting operations. Current NFPA standards for radios are reviewed and recommendations for establishing performance standards are presented. The need for providing additional protection from the thermal environment is documented.

NIOSH Findings Reported on Bridgeport (CT) Double LODD Fire; Failed to Respond to Maydays

No comments

 

2 Bridgeport firefighters die in line of duty: wtnh.com

Fire vented through the roof. Note: NIOSH investigators believe this photo shows conditions very close to the time that the Mayday was called for Victim #2 by FF4. Wind was pushing the smoke plume from right to left. (Photo courtesy of Keith Muratori.)

Bridgeport (CT) fire officials’ failure on nearly ever level led to the line-of-duty deaths of two firefighters battling a fire in a residential occupancy in Bridgeport, CT on July 24, 2010. 

Among the findings of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) released Wednesday:

  • the deputy fire chief and his assistant at the scene of the Elmwood Street fire were having a discussion about whether they heard a mayday call from the two fallen firefighters instead of taking immediate action to rescue them.
  • The report also stated firefighters failed to immediately treat one of the firefighters who managed to make it to relative safety before collapsing.
  • Officials also did not properly managed firefighters’ air supplies — both firefighter’s air cylinders were empty when they were found, the report stated.
  • The department’s incident safety officer, who is required to be on scene for assistance in a fire also did not arrive more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch.

Lt. Steven Velasquez and Firefighter Michel Baik were on the third-floor of the wood-frame home at 41 Elmwood Ave. checking for hot spots and making sure there were no people in the smoldering blaze. Then trouble hit. The two sent mayday signals back to dispatch. Within minutes, the fire department’s rapid intervention team found the pair on the floor, unconscious, and gave them CPR. The two men could not be revived.

Full NIOSH Report F2010- 18 FINAL CT F2010-18

NIOSH Executive Summary

On July 24, 2010, a 40-year-old male career fire lieutenant and a 49-year-old male career fire fighter were found unresponsive at a residential structure fire. The victims and two additional crew members were tasked with conducting a primary search for civilians and fire extension on the 3rd floor of a multifamily residential structure. The fire had been extinguished on the 2nd floor upon their entry into the structure.

While pulling walls and the ceiling on the 3rd floor, smoke and heat conditions changed rapidly. The first firefighter transmitted a Mayday (audibly under duress) that was not acknowledged or acted upon. Minutes later the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the 3rd floor. As a fire fighter exited the 3rd floor, the lieutenant was discovered unconscious and not breathing, sitting on the stairs to the 3rd floor.

Approximately 7 minutes later, the second firefighter  was discovered on the 3rd floor in thick, black smoke conditions. Both victims were removed by the rapid intervention team (RIT) and other fire fighters who assisted them. Both victims were pronounced dead at local hospitals.

Contributing Factors

  • Failure to effectively monitor and respond to Mayday transmissions
  • Less than effective Mayday procedures and training
  • Inadequate air management
  • Removal and/or dislodgement of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
  • Incident safety officer (ISO) and rapid intervention team (RIT) not readily available on scene
  • Possible underlying medical condition(s) (coronary artery disease)
  • Command, control, and accountability.

Aerial View of House and Exposures

 
 

Key Recommendations

  • Ensure that radio transmissions are effectively monitored and quickly acted upon, especially when a Mayday is called
  • Ensure that Mayday training program(s) and department procedures adequately prepare fire fighters to call a Mayday
  • Train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their SCBA
  • Ensure that fire fighters use their SCBA during all stages of a fire and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures
  • Ensure that a separate incident safety officer (ISO), independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire with the initial dispatch
  • Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is readily available and prepared to respond to fire fighter emergencies
  • Consider adopting a comprehensive wellness and fitness program, provide annual medical evaluations consistent with NFPA standards, and perform annual physical performance (physical ability) evaluations for all fire fighters.

Timeline

This timeline is provided to set out, to the extent possible, the sequence of events according to recorded and intelligible radio transmissions. Two channels were used during this incident: the main dispatch channel and channel 2 (fireground). Times are approximate and were obtained from review of the dispatch records, witness interviews, photographs of the scene, and other available information. Times have been rounded to the nearest minute. NIOSH investigators have attempted to include all intelligible radio transmissions, but some may be missing. This timeline is not intended, nor should it be used, as a formal record of events.

  • 1544 Hours E3 and L5 dispatched to a report of an elevator rescue.
  • 1546 Hours While en route, E3 contacted the dispatcher on the main dispatch channel and advised them they needed to redirect all companies to a possible house fire.
  • 1547 Hours L5 copied E3‘s transmission on the main dispatch channel and redirected to the possible house fire. E3 advised the dispatcher, on the main dispatch channel, that they had a fire on the 2nd floor and that they did not have a hydrant. Note: It is unclear whether E3 established command, but L5 arrived just after E3 and established command.
  • 1548 Hours E3, E4, E1, E7 as RIT, L11, L5, R5, and B1 were dispatched on the main dispatch channel to the house fire.
  • 1549 Hours L5 arrived on scene and their officer stated over the main dispatch channel, ―2½-story wood frame with heavy fire coming from the 2nd floor, Alpha/Bravo side, L5 is now command.‖
  • 1550 Hours E7 en route.
  • 1551-1552 Hours E4 arrived on scene and laid a supply line in from the hydrant. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer (initial arriving IC) advised the dispatcher that the bulk of the fire was knocked down by E3 and the primary search was in progress. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised L11 and E7 which way they should approach the scene. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer requested an ambulance for an injured fire fighter (ankle injury). Over the main dispatch channel, B1 advised the dispatcher that he was on scene, and he confirmed the first report of heavy fire with the bulk of the fire knocked down. B1 then took command of the incident.
  • 1553 Hours L11 arrived on scene. E1 took an additional hydrant. A7116 dispatched to the incident for an injured fire fighter. Note: Dispatch of A7116 was not part of the initial fire assignment. The 9-1-1 center contacted the EMS dispatch center via landline to request an ambulance for the injured fire fighter on scene after the request from the L5 officer.
  • 1554 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the BA advised the dispatcher that the command post would be in front of the fire building and tag collection would be at the command post. On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 to charge the second hoseline. E7 (RIT) arrived on scene.
  • 1555 Hours On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 again to charge the second hoseline. Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested the dispatcher to have the safety officer respond to the incident. IC checked on the status of the ambulance. Fire dispatch advised the IC that the ambulance was en route.
  • 1556 Hours E3 advised the IC (on the main dispatch channel) that he needed hooks on the 2nd floor in the room of origin; the IC acknowledged the request. Over the main dispatch channel, IC advised all companies, ―Channel 2 fireground, channel 2 fireground.‖ Note: Up to this point, companies on scene were operating on the main dispatch and channel 2. Fire dispatch assigned fireground operations to channel 2 for the incident.
  • 1557-1558 Hours IC called L11 on channel 2. IC (on the main dispatch channel) confirmed with the dispatcher who was RIT (which was E7) on scene and advised them that their equipment was available at the command post. Victim#1 acknowledged the IC‘s request for L11 on channel 2, but the IC did not respond. E3 officer, who incorrectly identified himself as ―E4,‖ called command on channel 2 and stated they had a slight extension into the A/B corner. Note: He was working overtime the day of the incident at the station that houses E3 and E4, which is also his normal duty station. The IC copied the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2 and asked him if he had enough hooks available; the E3 officer stated he did. A7116 arrived on scene.
  • 1559 Hours E3 officer on channel 2 advised the IC that they needed a hoseline to the 3rd floor because they could not reach it (fire extension) from the 2nd floor. The IC acknowledged the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2. The IC, on channel 2, advised Victim #1 that E1 was bringing a hoseline to the 3rd floor. Victim #1 acknowledged the IC‘s transmission on channel 2 and advised, ―A primary is in progress, which is negative; and, they are still checking for extension.‖ The IC acknowledged Victim #1‘s transmission.
  • 1600 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the ISO advised the dispatcher that he was responding (from home). A7116 contacted EMS dispatch requesting a single ambulance to standby at the incident per the IC. A7110 dispatched and en route to fire to standby. On channel 2, the IC (at the command post) advised the E4 officer that he could see fire extending up the A/B corner. Note: NIOSH investigators were not sure if this transmission was meant for the E4 officer or the officer from E3 who identified himself as E4. At 1559 hours, the E3 officer advised the IC of the extension to the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the E4 officer advised the IC that he was working on getting a line up to the 3rd floor.
  • 1601 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised the IC that the ISO and DC were responding. On channel 2, the L5 officer contacted ―L5-Alpha‖ (believed to be L5‘s aerial ladder) to assist in the bucket; L5-Alpha acknowledged the transmission.
  • 1602-1603 Hours On channel 2, the IC contacted the L5 officer to verify whether he thought he could make the roof with L5. On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
  • 1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
  • 1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
  • 1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, ―…line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
  • 1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
  • On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
  • 1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
  • 1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
  • 1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
  • 1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
  • The IC called the L11 officer (Victim #1) on channel 2 (no response).
  • 1615 Hours On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to all companies on the 3rd floor, vacate the 3rd floor; I repeat, command to L11 and E1, vacate the 3rd floor.‖
  • 1616-1619 Hours (2nd Mayday Call) The IC attempted to contact L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The IC, on channel 2, then stated, ―Command to E1.‖ (1616.50 hours) On channel 2, FF2 stated, ―Mayday, Mayday…Rescue 5 Bravo command we have a downed fire fighter rear steps. Mayday-Mayday-Mayday fire fighter down rear steps, 2nd floor.‖ IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11‖ (no response). Note: An apparatus air horn is heard sounding in the background of this transmission. FF2 on channel 2 stated, ―Rescue 5 Bravo command, Rescue 5 Bravo command we need help 2nd floor, send the RIT, we need fresh bodies.‖ Note: No audio transmissions or emergency tones are heard on channel 2 or the main dispatch channel advising that the Mayday call had been acknowledged. DC contacted the IC on channel 2 to have him send the RIT to the rear stairs; the IC acknowledged. Note: The RIT may have already been advancing up the rear stairs, but they ran into difficulty accessing the 2nd floor landing off the rear stairs because a charged hoseline was against the closed door. Dispatch attempted to contact command on channel 2 (no response). The IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The DC contacted the IC requesting the ambulance on scene to come to the rear of the house. Victim #1 was extricated out the rear of the house.
  • 1620 Hours A7110 began medical care for the downed fire fighter (Victim #1). Over the main dispatch channel, the BA requested an advanced life support ambulance to the fire scene. A7126 was dispatched to intercept A7110 at the fire scene to provide advanced life support. (~1620.35 Hours) The following transmission is heard on channel 2, ―…Ladder 11 ‗mayday‘ (very quick transmission)…Ladder 11 (unintelligible word(s)).‖ Note: The dispatch caller ID for this radio is designated as “L-11 FF3,” which was assigned to the fire fighter (designated as FF4 for this report) who later finds Victim #2 (see below 1624 hours). FF4 had not found Victim #2 at the time of this transmission. On channel 2, FF4 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11 can‖ (no response). Note: “Ladder 11 can” was Victim #2’s designation that shift.
  • 1621 Hours A7126 en route to fire scene.
  • 1622 Hours On channel 2, the ISO advised the IC that the fire fighter (Victim #1) was removed and they needed to do a roll call for everyone on scene. On channel 2, the IC advised all company officers that the ―incident is taking a PAR‖ (personnel accountability report). Officers began calling in their respective PARs.
  • 1624 Hours (3rd and 4th Mayday Calls) FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Mayday-Mayday, I have a fire fighter trapped on the 3rd floor, Mayday-Mayday-Mayday 3rd floor.‖ Note: This Mayday is for Victim #2. A PASS device is heard alarming during FF4‘s transmission. On channel 2, the IC stated, ―This is command to all companies, vacate the building, I report, command to all companies, vacate the building.‖ FF4 on channel 2 stated again, ―Mayday-Mayday-Mayday, I‘ve got another fire fighter down, another one, 3rd floor, hurry!‖
  • 1625 Hours Over channel 2, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones. Note: It is unknown why the evacuation tones were sounded instead of the Mayday tones. Their evacuation tone is an alternating, high-low sound, similar to a European siren. Their Mayday tone is a rapid, high to low pitch, chirping sound. This was dispatch’s first acknowledgement of a Mayday over the radio. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on channel 2. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones as well. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on the main dispatch channel.
  • 1626 Hours The IC contacted the DC on channel 2. DC acknowledged with no further traffic from the IC. The IC on channel 2 again advised all companies to vacate the building. The dispatcher then activated the emergency tones on channel 2 and the main dispatch channel, and stated, ―All companies per command vacate the building, all companies vacate the building.‖
  • 1627 Hours The ISO contacted the IC on channel 2 and stated, ―We need to make contact with that Mayday, we need more information, we have not heard from them since the initial call.‖ On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to company declaring a Mayday; I repeat, command to the company declaring a Mayday sound off, sound off.‖ A fire fighter from the RIT advised the IC on channel 2 that they were moving the fire fighter off the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the dispatcher advised the IC that the Mayday call was for the 3rd floor. A7126 arrived at the fire scene.
  • 1628 Hours RIT advised the IC that they have the fire fighter (Victim #2) on the 3rd floor and will be bringing him down the rear stairs from the 3rd floor.
  • 1630 Hours A7110 en route to the hospital with Victim #1 without assistance from A7126.
  • 1632 Hours ISO asked for a progress report from the RIT on the Mayday. RIT replied, ―Coming down…3rd floor.‖ ISO asked RIT to repeat their traffic. A radio was keyed, but there was no transmission.
  • 1634 Hours RIT personnel advised the IC that they had the fire fighter (Victim #2) down to the 2nd floor landing.
  • 1640 Hours A7110 arrived at local hospital with Victim #1.
  • 1643 Hours A7126 began medical care on second downed fire fighter (Victim #2). Note: This time was taken from Victim #2’s patient care report and may not be accurate.
  • 1703 Hours A7126 arrived at local hospital with Victim #2.

 

Fire Behavior

The room and contents fire was determined to have originated in a bedroom on the 2nd floor, A/B corner; it was quickly knocked down by E3 (see Photo 2). It is believed that the fire got into the eves when it was lapping out the A/B corner windows, and then spread within the large void spaces in the ceiling and walls of the 3rd floor. The fire was situated toward the A/B corner of the 3rd floor, but the open void areas allowed smoke to accumulate within the ceilings and walls before they were opened.

Operating on the 3rd floor at varying times were members from L5, R5, L11, E4, and E7. Initially, light-to-moderate smoke conditions were observed on the 3rd floor, depending on how close fire fighters were to the A-side of the 3rd floor. Fire fighters recalled the 3rd floor being very hot. TICs used by different individuals on the 3rd floor showed the room to be hot on the A-side and ceiling. Windows on the A-, B-, and D-sides were opened, allowing most of the smoke to self ventilate. Light smoke remained within the 3rd floor, with good visibility.

Extension was checked around A- and B-side baseboards. Some fire fighters recall Victim #1 telling them the fire was in the ceiling and possibly the walls, and to not open those areas until a hoseline was in place. Even after providing horizontal ventilation on the 3rd floor, smoke conditions worsened, banking down to fire fighters‘ chin levels and becoming denser.

While waiting for the hoseline, L5 members were reassigned by the IC to ventilate the roof to provide additional relief to the 3rd floor. The IC reported to NIOSH investigators that he ordered the roof vented because he saw smoke pushing out the B-side windows. Personnel from E4 advanced the charged hoseline to the 3rd floor, allowing the ceilings and walls to be opened. A mixture of thick, brown/black smoke quickly filled the room, reducing visibility.

  

Initial conditions observed when the BC arrived on scene at approximately 1551 hours. Note: Fire was under control on the 2nd floor and fire fighters were checking for extension. White-to-gray smoke can be seen flowing in the direction of right to left from the gables. The A-side window on the 3rd floor had been opened for ventilation (unsure at what stage of the fire or by whom).

  

  

Structure

Built in the early 1900s, the two-and-half-story house (see Photo 1) was purchased approximately 4 years prior to the incident as a multifamily rental occupancy. One family lived in the 1st floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.); a second family lived in the 2nd floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.) and the owner occupied the finished half-story or attic space (approx. 700 sq. ft.).  The house also contained an unfinished basement (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.).

The common front entrance contained access to the 1st floor apartment and a private stairwell, located at the A/D corner of the house, which provided access to the 2nd floor apartment. The house also had a single rear-entry door that provided access to a stairwell that led up to the owner‘s apartment and had landings to access all the apartments from the rear. According to the owner of the house, smoke detectors were installed within the house about a year prior to the incident. These smoke detectors were installed in every bedroom, in each hallway, and in the stairwells.

The house did not have an installed sprinkler system and had been inspected in accordance with Department of Housing and Urban Development Section 8a guidelines, according to the homeowner. The house was Type V wood frame construction, but, during the initial stages of the fire, was presumed by arriving fire fighters to be balloon-framed due to the era when it was constructed. State fire investigators were able to confirm Type V construction after closer inspection.

The Office of the State Fire Marshal‘s building code compliance inspection showed that the house did not meet certain Connecticut Fire Safety Code requirements for this type of structure. NIOSH investigators do not believe that these non-compliance issues contributed to the deaths of the two fire fighters.

  

Typical Ballon Framing Construction

 

 LINKS

 

2 Bridgeport firefighters die in line of duty: wtnh.com

Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011: Day Five: Near-Misses, Maydays and Floor Collapses

1 comment

Do you know what's underneath you as you're making entry?

During the last quarter of 2010 and leading well into the second quarter of 2011 there has been a significant emerging trend developing in basement fires, compromised floor systems and assemblies leading to collapse and numerous near-miss events, close calls and unfortunatly, line of duty deaths during fire operations.

If you’ve been paying attention to the various news and on the job reports these past number of months, you may have noticed the increasing numbers of emerging trend evident in near miss, close-calls resulting in maydays, RIT deployments and self-rescue resulting from floor compromise and floor collapse. The double line of duty deaths of two San Francisco (CA) Fire fighers while operating in a Terraced (Hillside construction) residential occupancy while operating below the base level diaphragm (upper street level access). (HERE)

In December 2010,  I was doing some research and posting links related to the first one or two events on Buildingsonfire on Facebook, HERE, it became evident at the time that there was an immediate opportunity to get some learning’s and insights out. If you have a chance head over to Facebook and link into Buildingsonfire and check out the incident links posted as well as some immediate report links. (Demember 2010 time frame)

In a coincidential posting on July 28, 2010, I posted on CommandSafety.com an interesting incident that I came across while preparing for a new post related to a near-miss event that occured in which a Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel after calling a mayday.

This event has all the ingrediants the the 2011 Safety Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground and managing the Mayday. Little did I know that later, in February 2011, while participating in the National FireFighter Near-Miss Reporting System Stakeholders meeting in California, would I have the chance to hear Captain Long’s story first hand, and then also have the opportunity to have him as a guest, sharing his story live on the Taking it to the Streets Radio program in February. (HERE)

Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long’s near-miss and story of survival resonates with this year’s theme of  Surviving the Fire Ground- Firefighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness and Managing the Mayday and provides an opportunity to focus on the event in this, Day Five of the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Surival Week activities. The details of Captain Long’s story can be found on the National FireFighter Near Miss Reporting System web site (HERE) as well as in the June 2011 issue of Fire Engineering Magazine titled, Floor Collapse: A Survivors Story. Let me state upfront also the Captain Michael Long will be presenting the accounts of his near miss event and the lessons-learned at IAFC Fire-Rescue International Conference in Atlanta in August (HERE).

 On July 25, 2010, Captain Michael Long of the Camp Taylor (Ky.) Fire Protection District fell through the floor of a house during a four-alarm fire and suffered severe burn injuries. On Aug. 30, 2010, Capt. Long submitted a near-miss report based on this event. The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is an anonymous and confidential reporting system; however, Capt. Long wanted to have his name associated with this report so that others would understand the value of sharing near-miss events. What follows is an excerpt from his report and excerpts from a recent phone interview. To read his full report, including an extensive lessons learned section, search by report number for report #10-1072 on the Search Reports page of www.firefighternearmiss.com.

  

Near Miss Report Event #2010-1072

  

 “I made sure my crew was ready to enter, sounded the floor for stability and then crossedover the threshold, entering the structure. When I was approximately 5 feet inside the structure, I felt the floor start to give way. I turned toward the front door to try to bail out, and at the same time yelled at others to get out, when the floor system collapsed. This was no ordinary collapse. More than two-thirds of the first floor collapsed simultaneously. The living room, dining room, kitchen, bathroom and foyer all fell at once. “When the collapse happened, I was the only one who fell into the basement, right into the heart of the fire. All I could see around me were flames.

I could not see the hole that I had fallen through. I could not see my fellow firefighters above me. All I could see was fire. I began to try to find something to use to climb back up with. Since I did not know what type of collapse had occurred, I just started clawing away at anything as I was trying to climb. During this time, my legs were burning.

Fire was burning up between my boots and my bunker pants. The pain was intense. My deputy chief was trying to put a line on me for protection, but the fire was extremely intense. He was lying on the porch with fire shooting out over his head. He stated he could occasionally see the top of my helmet and the reflective stripes on my coat sleeves.

By a bit of luck, a roof ladder was laying in the front yard that had just been taken off the roof after the completion of a ventilation operation.

My deputy chief directed the crew to put the ladder into the hole for my escape. “By this time, I was burned on my legs and struggling with exhaustion and the intense heat. I was screaming both from pain and due to fear. I could hear screaming coming from above, butwas unable to make out the majority of it. I finally heard the word “ladder” and then felt something across my back. Once they got the ladder into the basement, I had to get around to it. I still could not see anything but fire, so this was all by feel. As I started up the ladder, I got two rungs up, reached for the third rung, and lost my grip and fell back into the basement landing on my back. I was so exhausted that I started making my peace with God that this was where I was going to die.

For the full excerpt from Captain Long’s near miss report go to the NFF Near Miss Reporting Site and Resource Link, HERE

  

Captain Long

Incident Lessons Learned from Captain Long:

  • Train as if it is real. Train, train, train, and then train some more. Take advantage of every opportunity to train. The better we are trained, the less our chance of injury. The training must be physically and mentally. Crews must focus on more hands-on scenario-based training that allows for problem solving. If crews are taught that the outcome to every scenario is static, they are not being encouraged to think. Every run is different; no single solution applies to every situation. Adaptations or decisions that are not in step with changing conditions can actually be disadvantageous. We must make the right decisions based on the correct interpretation of the environment and blend those observations with our knowledge, skills, and abilities to map a course of action that will lead us to a successful outcome. Read reality and come up with the best possible plan. In my situation, quick thinking and adapting to the problem that presented itself saved my life.
  • Mutual-aid training is a must. We must train more with our neighboring departments to improve operations. It is occasionally difficult to work in situations where you do not really know with whom you will be working or where the command structure and tactics differ from those of your department. We all learn from the same book; however, the interpretations and tactics differ from person to person and department to department. I am not saying anyone is right or wrong in the way they do things—we all just need to do a better job of understanding that there is more than one way to get the job done.
    We cannot know exactly how everyone on an emergency scene will perform because each person has a different interpretation of his surroundings and role in the system. Standard operating guidelines (SOGs) can assist in this area, but SOGs rely on perceptions and interpretations by individuals to be implemented as intended. Accidents often happen because everyone has a unique perspective on the environment, and each makes different decisions based on their perception.
    We must perceive the environment correctly to ensure we make the right move. If these actions are not communicated and coordinated in the intricate system that is the fireground, accidents will be the inevitable and regrettable results. Training and frequent reviewing of SOGs are vital to our safety.
  • Risk assessment. Sounding the floor prior to entry is not always a good indicator of the floor’s stability. Less than two minutes before I made entry, there were three other firefighters, at least the same weight as I, in the same area where the collapse occurred. Everything changed in a very short time. There was no warning. Adkins told me at the hospital that all he heard was a “whoosh” sound when the floor collapsed. Then I disappeared. Within two minutes, the floor assembly went from being able to sustain a live load of at least 900 pounds in that area (accounting for gear, equipment, SCBA, and so on) to collapsing with about a 300-pound load, and I was close to a load-bearing wall. A good way to evaluate risk vs. gain is to get the most accurate report on burn time as possible to help determine structural integrity.
  • Rapid intervention. RIT is a critical fireground benchmark and is very important for safety, but it would have been ineffective in this situation. Had my crew not reacted the way they did immediately, I would not have been able to last long enough to wait for the RIT. In the time it would have taken for the RIT to gear up, come up with a plan, and enter, I would have died. The stars aligned in my favor that night. The person calling the Mayday or a nearby crew often mitigates personnel emergencies. My crew was able to act decisively at the correct time, and I am alive because of it. It is important to remember that a large percentage of Maydays are mitigated by the crew to which the lost firefighter is assigned or a nearby crew. RIT deployments account for a small number of rescues; we must always be alert and ready for the “incident within the incident.”
  • Manage your emotional response. From a personal standpoint, you must rely on your training and try not to panic. Know your equipment and procedures well. I did panic, but I was still able to keep myself together enough to know not to leave the area since I had been told that the stairs had burned away. Keeping my SCBA on, resisting the emotional reaction to remove my mask because of claustrophobia, was a huge factor in my survival. If I had tried to find another way out, my crew could not have gotten to me with the ladder. Had I removed my mask, the story would have ended quite differently. When I teach, I try to train as if it is the real thing. Never take a run for granted. Always expect the worst; you will be better prepared to deal with the unexpected.
    If we continually study accident reports and learn from them, the likelihood of being surprised will be diminished. Peter Leschak writes in Ghosts of the Fireground: ”In fire and other emergency operations, you must not only tolerate uncertainty; you must savor it, or you won’t last long. The most efficient preparation is a general mental, physical, and professional readiness nurtured over years of training and experience. You live to live. Preparing is itself an activity, and action is preparation.”
  • Talk about it. Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) is important for ensuring that personnel from all departments on scene are taken care of emotionally. CISD needs to extend beyond just one or two briefings. Personnel involved in a highly emotional event must be given the opportunity to speak to a trained CISD team member early and be given as much time as is needed to work through their issue. Some firefighters have a macho attitude and try to deal with their emotions on their own, or maybe they don’t deal with them at all. Others self-medicate with alcohol or, worse, these difficult emotional events are allowed to fester with no relief. People should be accepting of those who deal with issues up front and tell their stories. Telling these stories makes us better and helps to keep us safe. This reduces the possibility of “snapping” because you have too much pent-up emotion.
    My fellow firefighters are still affected by this event, even those who were not there. Department personnel must be open-minded and receptive to the fact that emotional events will affect your performance and your personal life and that it is acceptable to be open and deal with them. When difficult emotional situations present themselves, members should attempt to deal with them as soon as possible.
  • Know what is possible and what is not. Know the experience level of your crew. Going into a bad situation with a crew that may not have exposure to a lot of different situations or that you aren’t that familiar with could make operations more difficult. I had everything from a 30-year veteran to a one-year recruit, so the experience level was all across the board. I knew that the situation we were going into was getting worse and required quick action, so I took the lead to ensure that the operation would be completed as quickly as possible. I knew my deputy chief would be watching us to ensure things were proceeding safely. I knew my crew could get the job done; however, this was an operation that is not often practiced and I wanted to make sure it was done correctly. I will not send my crew into an area that I am not comfortable going into. The more you train and the more people you can train with, the better you will understand your capabilities.

 Listen or download the special interview I had with Captain Mike Long as well as

Taking it to the Streets Radio Program and Interview with Capt. Long

 

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

Podcast: Play in new window | Download

The progam was taped from the Live Broadcast on March 16th at 9pm EST

Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

On Your Street, In Your City, Across the Country, Around the WorldTM

The direct show link is here

The line-up of Program guests included, Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret), Captain CJ Haberkorn Denver (CO) Fire Department and Special Guest Captain Michael Long, Camp Taylor (KY) Fire Protection District.

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the National Near-Miss Reporting System and the untapped resources that the program and system provides with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire service leaders. The second part of the program will dedicated to the personal account of Captain Long’s Close Call event from July 25, 2010 (NMR #10-1072) when a catastrophic floor collapse at a residential occupancy plunged him into a fire involved basement.

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
  • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE  

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production, in affiliation with the Command Institute

 

National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System’s Support for the 2011 Safety Week

Don’t forget to go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System for  number of exceptional training aids, resources, PPT and more. NFFNMRS, HERE

Here are some of the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System Produced 2011 Safety Week Products

 
File Title File Size File Description
  • Presentation: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Presentation: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
  • Presentation: Fire Fighter Expectations of Command
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about fire fighter expectations of command.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Skills
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival skills at a mayday.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival procedures.
  • Grouped Report: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Grouped Report: Self Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A grouped report about self survival procedures
  • Grouped Report: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems

    In the meantime here are some links I pulled together that you should take the time to read and share with your companies, personnel and staff…..

    This seems like a good time to have a ten minute drill on these events as Operating Experience (OE) on floor systems and operational safety, calling or commanding the mayday.

     Or take some time to visit the The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)site which has the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.  (Day One: Are you ready, HERE)

    • For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

    Self-Survival Procedures

    FGS Online Program Chapter 3
    To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
    When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:

    • First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
    • Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
    • If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
    • Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
    • Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
    • Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall. 

    Self-Survival Skills

    FGS Online Program Chapter 4

    Disentanglement Maneuvers

    Fires inside an enclosed structure create a mess for fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters often encounter debris that has fallen off shelves, and ceiling and wall fixtures that have burned and are left hanging to the floor. These hazards, coupled with the mess a fire fighter creates when searching for victims in smoky environments, can create egress problems for a fire fighter.

    As fire burns draperies, blinds, lighting fixtures, computer wiring, and HVAC ducting, the possibility of encountering an entanglement hazard increases. The overhead ducting of the HVAC system contains wires that give the ducting its stability.

    If a fire breaches the ceiling and burns the ducting, the wires within the ducting fall to the floor. These wires can cause a dangerous entanglement hazard to fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters must anticipate these hazards and have a plan to follow when egress is cut off.

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters

    Fire Fighter Expectations of Command

    FGS Online Program Chapter 5
    A discussion of what command must communicate to the distressed fire fighter, dispatch, the RIT group supervisor and all others assigned to the incident to assure a successful rescue.

    Here are Some Mission Critical Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE) to support Your Training and Operational Needs not only this week, but through the entire year.

     

    Here are some Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) for Operations at Basement Fires that will support fireground operational safety:

    • Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
    • Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
    • Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
    • Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
    • Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
    • Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
    • Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
    • Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
    • Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
    • If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
    • Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
    • Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
    • Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner. 
    • Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
    • Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
    • Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
    • Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
    • Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
    • Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
    • Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
    • Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
    • Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment

    Here’s some screen shots from Buildingsonfire on Facebook. Go HERE or follow the link at the left column. Join the growing list of over 3900 fans with Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Buildingsonfire.com

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

    6 comments

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

     With so many changes (budget cuts, staffing reductions, reduced training, etc.) in so many fire departments, it is critical for fire fighters to focus on their own survival on the fire ground. There is no other call more challenging to fire ground operations than a Mayday call the unthinkable moment when a fire fighter’s personal safety is in imminent danger. Fire fighter fatality data compiled by the United States Fire Administration have shown that fire fighters becoming trapped and disoriented represent the largest portion of structural fire ground fatalities. The incidents in which fire fighters have lost their lives, or lived to tell about it, have a consistent theme inadequate situational awareness put them at risk.

    New Rules of Engagement

     Fire fighters don’t plan to be lost, disoriented, injured or trapped during a structure fire or emergency incident. But fires are unpredictable and volatile, and they will not always go according to plan. What a fire fighter knows about a fire before entering a blazing building may radically change within minutes once inside the structure. Smoke, low visibility, lack of oxygen, structural instability and an unpredictable fire ground can cause even the most seasoned fire fighter to be overwhelmed in an instant.

    It's Not a Matter of IF, It's a Matter of When

    It’s not a matter of IF the MAYDAY happens, it’s WHEN! Thius the reason for the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

    Theme: Surviving the Fire Ground Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

    • IAFC Safety Week Resources: Firefighter Survival, HERE
    • National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System Resources, HERE

    With that being said, there must be a means and a method to better defined and more accurately

    • Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.
    • Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
    • There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
    • Refer to: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety 
    • When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future.
    • Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.
    • Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports.
    • Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.
    • If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures.
    • This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations.
    • You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious

     

    Original IAFC 2001 ROE

     

    • Combat Fire Suppression and Engagement has been dramatically influenced by numerous challenges in terms of effectiveness, methodologies, risk and operational capabilities….yet we implement strategic and tactical models and protocol predicated on past performance of building structures and occupancies and fire fighting successes….
    •  It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations
    • We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations.
    • These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.
    • 2009 was a significant and decisive year for the fire service in a number of ways….
    • Controversy, debate, argument; enlightenment, knowledge, insights, awareness, comprehension, understanding….
    • Which leads me to call this the emerging tactical renaissance….

     

    The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries. As part of that effort the nearly 1,000 member Safety, Health and Survival Section of the IAFC has developed the NEW  “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground.

    The intent was to provide a set of “model procedures” for Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting to be made available by the IAFC to fire departments as a guide for their own standard operating procedure development.

    In August, 2008, following a year of discussion, the Section moved to develop a set of “Rules of Engagement for Structure Firefighting”.

    A project team was created consisting of Section members and representatives of other several other interested fire service organizations.

    These included the;

    • Fire Department Safety Officer Association (FDSOA),
    • the National Fallen Firefighter Foundation (NFFF),
    • the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC), the
    • National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and other organizations.
    • All draft material has also been shared with representatives of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) who developed a joint IAFF/IAFC Fire Ground Survival Project”.

     Three Section members also participated in the IAFF project.

    The direction provided the project team by the Section leadership was to develop rules of engagement with the following conceptual points;

    • Rules should be a short, specific set of bullets
    • Rules should be easily taught and remembered
    • Rules should define critical risk issues
    • Rules should define “go” or “nogo” situations
    • A companion lesson plan/explanation section should be provided

    Early in development the Rules of Engagement, it was recognized that two separate rules were needed –one set for the firefighter, and another set for the incident commander.

    Thus, the two sets of Rules of Engagement were conceived and developed.

    Each set has several commonly shared bullets and objectives, but the explanations are described somewhat differently based on the level of responsibility (firefighter vs. incident commander).

    The 2010 Rules of Engagement reflects nearly two years of public comment and feedback from several presentations at fire service conferences, including the National Fallen Fire Fighters Safety Summit held at the National Fire Academy this past March 2010.

    The “Rules” was formally adopted by the IAFC Health, Safety and Survival Section at the Fire Rescue International Conference that was held in Chicago this past August 2010

    The project team was lead by Chief Gary Morris,

    Document Description

    Section One

    • includes introduction statements and background regarding the Rules of Engagement project.

    Section Two

    • acknowledges the Project team members and others that assisted in the project.

     Section Three

    • contains the individual “Bullets” for both the Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival as well as the Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety.

     Section Four

    • describes the objectives attached to each of the individual “bullets” for both set of Rules.

     Section Five

    • provides an introduction and overview of the lesson plans for the Rules of Engagement.

     Section Six

    • includes the lesson plan for the Rules of Engagement of Firefighter Survival.

     Section Seven

    • contains the lesson plans for the Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety.

     Section Eight

    • serves as appendixes and contains full investigation reports of several significant firefighter fatality incidents.

     The Need for Rules of Engagement

    • Firefighter safety must always be a priority for every fire chief and every member. Over the past three decades, the fire service has applied new technology, better protective clothing and equipment, implemented modern standard operating procedures, and improved training.
    • According to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data during this same period the fire service has experienced a 58 percent reduction in firefighter line of duty deaths. But, the country has also seen a paralleling 54 percent drop in the number of structural fires over the same period – thus, reducing firefighter exposure to risk.
    • With a continued annual average of more than 100 firefighter fatalities, the question remains; have we really made a difference with all these technology improvements? Or, is there more that we can do to improve the safety culture of the American fire service?
    • The U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study, conducted by Captain Willie Mora, San Antonio, Texas, Fire Department, conducted a review of 444 firefighter fireground deaths occurring over a recent 16 year period (1990-2006).
      • The project broke out traumatic firefighter fatalities occurring in “open structures” and “enclosed structures”. Open structures was defined as smaller structures with an adequate number of windows and doors (within a short distance) to allow for prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation.
      • Enclosed structures were defined as large buildings with inadequate windows or doors to allow prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation. Research determined that 23 percent occurred when a fast and aggressive interior attack was made on an “opened structure”. When fast, aggressive interior attacks occurred in “enclosed structures” the fatality rate rose to 77 percent. Many occurred in “marginal” or rapidly changing conditions in which the firefighter should not have been in the building.
    • The fireground creates a significant risk to firefighters and it is the responsibility of the incident commander and command organization officers to minimize firefighter exposure to unsafe conditions and stop unsafe practices.
    • The fire service has always been a para-military organization when it comes to fireground operations. In most cases, the Incident Commander makes a decision, sends the order down to through supervisors to the company officer and crew.
    • Fire crews generally view these orders as top down direction. There is often little two‐way discussion about options.
    • Where this culture exists, crews have been trained to accept the order and do it – generally without question.
    • While these orders may be viewed as valid when issued they may involve inadequate risk assessment.
    • There has been little national development of basic “rules” that the incident command should use in defining risk assessment process and what is too high risk that may result in a “no-go” decision.
    • Furthermore, for the individual firefighter who is exposed to the greatest risk, we have not defined “rules” for them to follow in assessing their individual risk and when and how to say “no” to unsafe conditions or practices. The “Rules of Engagement” changes that.
    • The “Rules of Engagement” have been developed to assist both the incident command (as well as command team officers) in risk assessment and “Go” – “No-Go” decisions. Applying the rules will make the fireground safer for all and reduce injuries and fatalities.

     

    The development of the rules integrated several nationally recognized programs and principles. They included risk assessment principles from NFPA Standards 1500 and 1561.

    Also included where concepts and principles from Crew Resource Management (available from iafc.org) and data and lessons from the National Near-Miss Reporting System (firefighternearmiss.com).

    The development process also included review of lessons learned from numerous firefighter fatality investigations conducted by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.

    It’s incumbent that the fire chief and the Departments management team insure the safety of all firefighters working at structural fires.

    • All command organization officers are responsible for their own safety and the safety of all personnel working with them.
    • All officers and members are responsible are responsible for continually identifying and reporting unsafe conditions or practices.
    • The Rules of Engagement allows both the firefighter and the incident commander to apply and process these principles.
    • One principle applied in the Rules of Engagement is firefighters and the company officers are the members at most risk for injury or death.
    • The Rules integrate the firefighter into the risk assessment decision making process.
    • These members should be the ultimate decision maker as to whether it’s safe to proceed with assigned objectives.
    • The “Rules” allow a process for that decision to be made while still maintain command unity and discipline.

     

    Operational Excellence and the ROE

     

    The NEW Rules of Engagement

    It is well known that firefighting is hazardous with varying levels of risk to the firefighter.

    However, firefighting is not a military campaign where lives are lost to establish a beach head.

    No firefighter’s life is a building that eventually will be rebuilt. Keep all members safe so “Everyone Goes Home”!

    Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival

    • Size-Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.
    • Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
    • DO NOT Risk Your Life for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved.
    • Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
    • Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
    • Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together
    • Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions.
    • Constantly Monitor Fireground Communications for Critical Radio Reports.
    • You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
    • You Are Required to Abandon Your Position and Retreat Before Deteriorating Conditions Can Harm You.
    • Declare a May Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger. 

    The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety

    • Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Size‐Up of the Incident.
    • Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
    • Conduct an Initial Risk Assessment and Implement a SAFE ACTION PLAN.
    • If You Do Not Have The Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
    • DO NOT Risk Firefighter Lives for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
    • Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
    • Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
    • Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Firefighters. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
    • Maintain Frequent Two‐Way Communications and Keep Interior Crews Informed of Changing Conditions.
    • Obtain Frequent Progress Reports and Revise the Action Plan.
    • Ensure Accurate Accountability of All Firefighter Location and Status.
    • If, After Completing the Primary Search, Little or No Progress Towards Fire Control Has Been Achieved -Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
    • Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires
    • Always Have Firefighter Rehab Services in Place at All Working Fires

      

     
     
     

    ROE Fire Fighter

     

      

      

    ROE Command

     

    Other ROE Insights

    Size-Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.

    Objective:    To cause the company officer and firefighters to pause for a moment and look over their area of operation and evaluate their individual risk exposure and determine a safe approach to completing their assigned tactical objectives.

    Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Situational Size Up of the Incident

    Objective:    To cause the incident commander to obtain an early 360 degree survey and risk assessment of the fireground in order to determine the safest approach to tactical operations as part the risk assessment and action plan development and before firefighters are placed at substantial risk.

    ______________________________________________________________________________

    Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.

    Objective: To cause the company officer and firefighter to consider fire conditions in relation to possible occupant survival of a rescue event as part of their initial and ongoing individual risk assessment and action plan development.

      

    Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.

    Objective: To cause the incident commander to consider fire conditions in relation to possible occupant survival of a rescue event before committing firefighters to high risk search and rescue operations as part of the initial and ongoing risk assessment and action plan development.

      

    Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together

    Objective: To ensure that firefighters always enter a burning building as a team of two or more members and no firefighter is allowed to be alone at any time while entering, operating in or exiting a building. 

      

    Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions

    Objective: To cause all firefighters and company officers to maintain constant situational awareness their SCBA air supply and where they are in the building and all that is happening in their area of operations and elsewhere on the fireground that may affect their risk and safety.

    ______________________________________________________________________________

    You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate, and Decide.

    Objective: To prevent company officers and firefighters from engaging in unsafe practices or exposure to unsafe conditions that can harm them and allowing any member to raise an alert about a safety concern without penalty and mandating the supervisor address the question to ensure safe operations.

      

    Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Them. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.

    Objective: To prevent firefighters and supervisors from engaging in unsafe practices or exposure to unsafe conditions that will harm them and allowing any member to raise an alert about a safety concern without penalty and mandating the incident commander and command organization officers promptly address the question to insure safe operations. 

    ______________________________________________________________________________  

    Declare a May-Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger

    Objective: To ensure the firefighter is comfortable with, and there is no delay in, declaring a May Day when a firefighter is faced with a life threatening situation and the May Day is declared as soon as they THINK they are in trouble.

      

    Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires.

    Objective: To cause the incident commander to have a rapid intervention team in place ready to rescue firefighters at all working fires.

    ______________________________________________________________________________

    Ensure Accurate Accountability of Every Firefighter Location and Status

    Objective: To cause the incident commander, and command organization officers, to maintain a constant and accurate accountability of the location and status of all firefighters within a small geographic area of accuracy within the hazard zone and aware of who is presently in or out of the building.

    If You Do Not Have the Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters, Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy

    Objective: To prevent the commitment of firefighters to high risk tactical objectives that cannot be accomplished safely due to inadequate resources on the scene.

    SOPs/SOGs

    Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting (pdf)

    Risk Management

    General Order: Two-In, Two-Out Compliance, Rapid Intervention Team, and Firefighter Survival

    Emergency Evacuation
    This policy identifies a standard system for the emergency evacuation of personnel at an emergency incident or training exercise.

    Fire and Rescue Departments of Northern Virginia – Rapid Intervention Team Command and Operational Procedures
    A collaborative RIT manual developed by fire and rescue departments in Northern Virginia. Promotes interoperability between multiple fire agencies.

    Lost or Trapped Firefighters
    This policy identifies the required actions for the search and rescue of lost or trapped firefighter(s).

    Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a Biological Threat
    Local and world events have placed the nation s emergency service at the forefront of homeland defense. The service must be aware that terrorists, both foreign and domestic, are continually testing the homeland defense system.

    Safety Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
    This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).

    Safety Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)
    This policy establishes the department s criteria and procedures for Rapid Intervention Teams.

      

    Operational Excellence in 2011 and Beyond

      

    Taking It To The Streets: My Closing Commentary and The Rules of Combat Fire Suppression  

    The essence of fire service suppression operations is predicated upon the deployment and application of water as an extinguishing agent, in sufficient quantities, location and duration to extinguish a fire within an enclosed structural compartment. The universal engine company correlation of: “putting the wet stuff on the red stuff” is fundamental to structural fire suppression operations but is ambiguous at best in the context of today’s modern building construction, occupancies, structural systems and building features. 

    We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

    The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine engine company operations in order to identify with the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.

    Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

    The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived…..

    However, we now have a new set of Rules for Engagement….

    • The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
    • Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival
    • Tactical Renaissance ……….Tactical Patience

    …….integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and Integrating the RULES OF ENGAGEMENT for Structural Firefighting much more.  

    It’s really all about Fighting Fire with More Knowledge and smartly

      

     

    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

       

    Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

     

    Taking it to the Streets “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement”

    Podcast: Play in new window | Download

    Share

    This is the netcast which was offered live on September 22, 2010. Taking it to the Streets “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department, and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA join Chris Naum as they discuss the emerging Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations [...]

    Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

    Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

    • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
    • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

      

    A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production

    Taking it to the StreetsTM  with Christopher Naum
     
     

    Listen to all of the Taking It To The Streets shows here

     On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com

    Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.

     

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health & Survival Week 2011: Day One- Are You Ready?

    8 comments
    Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011

    Fire/EMS Safety Week: Day One

     Today is Day One of Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011.

     The previous week leading up to today has brought with it two significant incidents; one in Illinois, the other in Indiana, both involving structure fires and combat fire engagement, both  different types of occupacies with assocated risks; both having structural collapse- both fireground operations leading to fire service line of duty deaths. ( Indiana, HERE and Illinois, HERE )

    During this past week we also solemnly remembered three events, The Hotel Vendome Collapse in Boston, MA (1972), The Father’s Day Fire, FDNY (2001) and the Super Store Fire in Charleston, SC (2007) Here and Here

    The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the International Association of Fire Fighters(IAFF) were formative in developing this year’s  2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week (also known as Safety Week)which commences today, June 19th and ends on June 25th. ( Week of June 19-25, 2011)

    The message this year is: Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness

    Safety, Health and Survival Week (Safety Week) is a collaborative program sponsored by the IAFC and the IAFF, coordinated by the IAFC’s Safety, Health and Survival Section and the IAFF’s Division of Occupational Health, Safety and Medicine, in partnership with more than 20 national fire and emergency service organizations.

    Fire departments are encouraged to suspend all non-emergency activity during Safety Week and instead focus entirely on survival training and education until all shifts and personnel have taken part. An entire week is provided to ensure each shift and duty crew can spend one day focusing on these critical issues.

    With so many changes (budget cuts, staffing reductions, reduced training, etc.) in so many fire departments, it is critical for fire fighters to focus on their own survival on the fire ground. There is no other call more challenging to fire ground operations than a MAYDAY call — the unthinkable moment when a fire fighter’s personal safety is in imminent danger.

    Fire fighter fatality data compiled by the United States Fire Administration have shown that fire fighters “becoming trapped and disoriented represent the largest portion of structural fire ground fatalities.” The incidents in which fire fighters have lost their lives, or lived to tell about it, have a consistent theme — inadequate situational awareness put them at risk.

    Fire fighters don’t plan to be lost, disoriented, injured or trapped during a structure fire or emergency incident. But fires are unpredictable and volatile, and an unpredictable fire ground can cause even the most seasoned fire fighter to be overwhelmed in an instant.

    This year’s Safety Week focuses on delivering the online IAFF Fire Ground Survival (FGS) awareness training course to all fire departments.

    The program is the most comprehensive survival skills and MAYDAY prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Additional planning tools and resources will be available on the Safety Week website.

    The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.

    • For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

    The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday.

    Topics covered include:

    • Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
    • Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
    • Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
    • Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
    • Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

    Keep watching the website and the IAFC’s Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn pages for continuing updates to this year’s program and planning resources.

    If you’re still in need of resources, visit the SHS Section’s website for more information on health and safety issues and the IAFF’s Health, Safety and Medicine’s website for more information on health, wellness and safety programs.

    Don’t forget to go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System for  number of exceptional training aids, resources, PPT and more. NFFNMRS, HERE

    Here are some of the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System Produced 2011 Safety Week Products

     
    File Title File Size File Description
  • Presentation: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Presentation: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
  • Presentation: Fire Fighter Expectations of Command
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about fire fighter expectations of command.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Skills
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival skills at a mayday.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival procedures.
  • Grouped Report: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Grouped Report: Self Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A grouped report about self survival procedures
  • Grouped Report: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems

    Look for a continuing comprehensive series of articles, activities, insights, downloads, podcasts, video clips and resources that will be posted each day this week during Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week here on Commandsafety.com, Thecompanyofficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com.

    We hope to be offering a special live show on Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com and blogtalkradio later this week pending some last minute logists addressing key issues with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders. Stay tuned to anouncements and postings for the date and time . This will be an exceptional opportunity to listen in, call in and participate actively in the week’ theme of Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

      

    Download the Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries

    2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries (pdf, 1.8 mb)

    IAFC Safety Week , Direct Link, HERE

    Preventing the Mayday

    FGS Online Program Chapter 1
    Between 1997 and 2008 NIOSH investigations reported that 25 fire fighters died in unprotected light-weight truss collapse events related to roof or basement truss system failures. A total of 11 injuries also occurred in these fatalities. Additionally, between 2005 and 2006, the National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System reported 20 near-misses related to unprotected light-weight truss systems. Considering the Near-Miss Reporting System is relatively new, and it is a self-reporting system, it is likely there are far more near-miss incidents occurring than presently indicated.

    Construction-Related Considerations

    The NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures provides information on roof collapses in structures containing truss systems and includes case studies where fire fighters have become trapped and were injured or killed.

    UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions

    Reading Smoke

    Fire fighters must be able to recognize the dangers associated with the smoke conditions when en route, upon arrival, and during fire fighting operations. Missing signs indicative of flash over, smoke explosions, backdraft, or rapid fire development has proven deadly to fire fighters in the past. The ability to read smoke correctly will prevent a Mayday situation from occurring.

    Being Ready for the Mayday

    FGS Online Program Chapter 2
    Understanding what safety equipment is required and what fire fighter tools are necessary for readiness, accountability system functionality and dispatch responsibilities.

    Radio Communications Training

    Having a radio assigned to each person is not enough. Fire fighters must be trained in using the radio to request resources and, most importantly, to call a Mayday.
    In 2003, NIOSH issued a firefighter radio report detailing the challenges surrounding fire ground communications. Although the report is several years old, many of these same issues are still challenging the North American fire service. Under the topic of “Inadequate Training” it states: “Though firefighters receive hundreds of hours of training on emergency response, radio communications do not typically receive the same amount of attention. As such, firefighters may not be aware of proper radio usage. Examples include how to use the radio in general, how to use the radio while wearing SCBA, and how radio communications are affected by a Mayday event” (pages 17-18).USFA Voice Radio Communications Guide for the Fire Service 

    Self-Survival Procedures

    FGS Online Program Chapter 3
    To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
    When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:

    • First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
    • Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
    • If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
    • Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
    • Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
    • Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall. 

    Self-Survival Skills

    FGS Online Program Chapter 4

    Disentanglement Maneuvers

    Fires inside an enclosed structure create a mess for fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters often encounter debris that has fallen off shelves, and ceiling and wall fixtures that have burned and are left hanging to the floor. These hazards, coupled with the mess a fire fighter creates when searching for victims in smoky environments, can create egress problems for a fire fighter.

    As fire burns draperies, blinds, lighting fixtures, computer wiring, and HVAC ducting, the possibility of encountering an entanglement hazard increases. The overhead ducting of the HVAC system contains wires that give the ducting its stability.

    If a fire breaches the ceiling and burns the ducting, the wires within the ducting fall to the floor. These wires can cause a dangerous entanglement hazard to fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters must anticipate these hazards and have a plan to follow when egress is cut off.

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters

    Fire Fighter Expectations of Command

    FGS Online Program Chapter 5
    A discussion of what command must communicate to the distressed fire fighter, dispatch, the RIT group supervisor and all others assigned to the incident to assure a successful rescue.

    Near-Miss

    National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System
    This program aims to turn near-miss experiences into lessons learned.

    • 2011 Safety Week Near-Miss Resources

    SOPs/SOGs

    Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting (pdf)

    Risk Management

    General Order: Two-In, Two-Out Compliance, Rapid Intervention Team, and Firefighter Survival

    Emergency Evacuation
    This policy identifies a standard system for the emergency evacuation of personnel at an emergency incident or training exercise.

    Fire and Rescue Departments of Northern Virginia – Rapid Intervention Team Command and Operational Procedures
    A collaborative RIT manual developed by fire and rescue departments in Northern Virginia. Promotes interoperability between multiple fire agencies.

    Lost or Trapped Firefighters
    This policy identifies the required actions for the search and rescue of lost or trapped firefighter(s).

    Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a Biological Threat
    Local and world events have placed the nation’s emergency service at the forefront of homeland defense. The service must be aware that terrorists, both foreign and domestic, are continually testing the homeland defense system.

    Safety – Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
    This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).

    Safety – Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)
    This policy establishes the department’s criteria and procedures for Rapid Intervention Teams.

    Accident Reports

    Firefighter Fatality Report – Southwest Supermarket, Phoenix, AZ
    PFD full report on the LODD of Firefighter Brett Tarver. Report contains extensive analysis of fire ground operations, may-day and lessons learned.

    NFPA Fire Investigation Report of 1995 Pittsburgh Fire
    This report describes the investigation of a fire which killed three firefighters in 1995.

    NIOSH LOD Report
    This report recounts a residential basement fire that claimed the life of a career lieutenant in Pennsylvania.

    Training & Drill Topics

    Technical Rescue resources

    Analysis of Structural Firefighter Fatality Database (pdf)

    Hazelton Firefighter caught in Flashover
    PowerPoint presentation

    Firefighter Survival Training

    Rapid Intervention Crew Standard Operating Guidelines
    Provided by the Town of Menasha Fire Department

    Standardized Actions of a Lost/Disoriented Firefighter

    Understanding Fireground LODDS
    A fresh perspective on an old problem.

    General Resources

    Observing Firefighter Performance (pdf)

    Emergency Radio Protocol

    “Everybody Goes Home” Campaign: Sticker use memo

    EveryoneGoesHome.com
    Several applicable resources to assist you in your Stand Down planning.

    50 Ways to Save Your Brother (or Sister)
    Provided by the South Milwaukee Fire Department.

    Fire Chief Magazine article – “No more maydays”
    Disorientation Prevention Article

    National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
    This web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other firefighter safety resources.

    The Incident Commander’s Response to a “May-Day” Lost Firefighter Incident
    A check list of items to consider when handling a may-day incident, provided by Chief Gary Morris, Scottsdale, AZ.

    U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study (1979-2001)
    This study was conducted in an effort to stop firefighter fatalities caused by smoke inhalation, burns, and traumatic injuries attributable to disorientation. It focused on 17 incidents occurring between 1979 and 2001 in which disorientation played a major part in 23 firefighter fatalities.

    USFA – Firefighter Fatality Retrospective Study (1990-2000)
    This report identifies trends in mortality and examines relationships among data elements on firefighter fatalites between 1990-2000.

      

      

      

    Keep this week In Perspective 

    Take a look at these videos and the messages conveyed….

    Are YOU getting it, is Your Company, Your Officers, Your Commanders, Your Firefighters? …..

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     


     

    When was the last time you looked at the Initiatives?

    1. Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.
    2. Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.
    3. Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.
    4. All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
    5. Develop and implement national standards for training, qualifications, and certification (including regular recertification) that are equally applicable to all firefighters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
    6. Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that are equally applicable to all firefighters, based on the duties they are expected to perform.
    7. Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.
    8. Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety.
    9. Thoroughly investigate all firefighter fatalities, injuries, and near misses.
    10. Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement.
    11. National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should be developed and championed.
    12. National protocols for response to violent incidents should be developed and championed.
    13. Firefighters and their families must have access to counseling and psychological support.
    14. Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a critical fire and life safety program.
    15. Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the installation of home fire sprinklers.
    16. Safety must be a primary consideration in the design of apparatus and equipment.

    The Following links From the NFFF/Everyone Goes Home web site, HERE

    Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resources

    16 Intiatives Overview & Explanation

    Watch Media Resources:

    » Overview & Explanation: View | Download
    » Initiative 1: CultureView | Download
    » Initiatives 1 – 4View | Download
    » Initiatives 5 – 8View | Download
    » Initiatives 9 – 12View | Download
    » Initiatives 13 – 16View | Download

    Related Resources:
    » 16 Initiatives in Español
    » Power Point Presentations: Part 1 | Part 2
    » Resolution: Home Fire Sprinklers (Initiative 15)

    In Print:
    » 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Handout
    » 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Poster
    » Everyone Goes Home® Bookmark

    For Your Computer:
    » 16 Initiatives Desktop Wallpaper

     It is NOT too late to set plans into motion for Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011…..You have ALL week and the rest of the year…..

    The Consciences Observer or Activist
    The operative question going forward will be this: What will you personally commit to for Safety, Health and Survival week, or what will your department choose to do; participate in, contribute, join in, share, lead, promote, instruct, present, facilitate, help, assist, aid, or neglect, disregard, undermine, abuse, challenge, demoralize, undercut, damage, torpedo, circumvent, or avoid?

     

    Coming Monday on;

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two-Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

    Flags at the NFFF Memorial; SFFD LODD

    4 comments

    National Fallen Fire Fighters Memorial this morning

    The flags at the National Fallen Fire Fighter Memorial at the National Fire Academy are once again lowered this morning as a result of the line of duty death of Lieutenant Vincent Perez of the San Francisco (CA) Fire Department as a result of injuries sustained while conducting  fire suppression operations in a residential occupancy on June 2, 2011.  More on the incident HERE.

    Lt. Vincent Perez, San Francisco FD

    Another SFFD Fire Fighter Anthony Valerio, 53, is still in critical condition at San Francisco General Hospital’s intensive care unit with severe burns as a result of operations in the same fire.

    Firefighter Anthony Valerio remains in critical condition

    Being on campus this week at the NFA, there is seldom a time in which the flags are at full staff, and if so, its for a short time span. We should take pause and reflect on our job as fire fighters this morning and keep our brothers and sisters of the San Francisco Fire Department and these firefighter’s families in our thoughts and prayers.

    The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger in order for  us to carry out our mission, goals and objectives, because of who we are; Fire Fighters.

    Other Links;

    Update:

    • The fire was first reported around 10:45 a.m. in a four-story home in the 100 block of Berkeley Way, according to San Francisco Fire Lt. Mindy Talmadge.
    • Perez, Valerio and an unidentified female firefighter were inside the structure fighting what was described as an “aggressive fire” when an emergency alarm beacon attached to the active department employees went off, according to Talmadge.
    • Staff tried to contact the firefighter, but was unable to do so.
    • The communications center then notified the command staff of the problem.\Additional crew members were sent in, and they found two firefighters down and “pretty badly burned,” Talmadge said.
    • Perez and Valerio were pulled out of the burning building, the woman walked out on her own.
    • Perez later went into full cardiac arrest after suffering burns and smoke inhalation during the morning blaze,  Hayes-White said at a news conference outside San Francisco General Hospital.

     

    Side Charlie Balcony, Photo Jeff Chiu/AP

    AP Photo/Patty Stanton

     

    SFFD

    Double Mayday Deployments at Three Alarm FDNY Fire

    1 comment

    2 Firefighters Escape Close Call in Belle Harbor: MyFoxNY.com

    Published reports from various NYC eMedia outlets indicated that two FDNY firefighters battling a three-alarm fire on Saturday April 9th in the Rockaways section of the Borough of Queens (NY) transmitted Maydays signals during fire suppression operations after a fire officer was partially trapped in a compromised  floor collapse and in another area of the occupancy a firefighter route was blocked due to fire extension resulting in the need to deploy this personal safety system (PSS)  to bail from a window. Reports indicated that FDNY Fire Lt. Richard Barnes fell through the second floor of the three-story Rockaways taxpayer building, but managed to hang on by his armpits until FAST firefighters could pull the 22-year veteran to safety, officials stated.

    FDNY Firefighter Evan Davis transmitted a mayday signal when he was trapped by flames in another part of the building’s second floor, resulting in the eight-year veteran deploying his personal escape rope to lower himself out a window, unaware there was an adjacent roof less than 10 feet below.

    • The first mayday was transmitted 27 minutes into the operations, the second mayday was transmitted 43 minutes elapsed time into the operations
    • 10:36 hours – Duration 27 minutes elapsed incident time:  First Mayday, Trapped firefighter due to partial  floor collapse
    • Sixteen minutes later;
    • 10:54 hours – Duration 43 minutes elapsed incident time: Second Mayday, Firefighter bailout of window

    A dozen of the 138 firefighters who responded to the fire suffered minor injuries.

    Fire Officials reported the fire started about 10:oo hours near an oil burner in the basement of the building.

    Read more: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/queens/close_call_for_qns_bravest_v120FHtVrYnSOlvMeile1L#ixzz1JAPLC1c6

    The building (Fire Building) consisting of a single story commerical occupancy on the Alpha (street side) that was attached to a three story wood frame multiple occupancy (MO) structure 30 x 100 (ft)

    From FirefighterSpot.com

     

    Aerial From Bing Maps

     

    Alpha Side Street View from GoogleStreets

     

    Surrounding Properties consisted of the following based upon radio transmissions;

    • Exposure #1: Is a street
    • Exposure #2: Is a 2 Story Similar attach (structure)
    • Exposure #3: Is a Rear Yard
    • Exposure #4: Is an Alleyway

    All – Hands transmitted:
    7 – 5 – 1407 @ 10:19
    Batt. 47 reports: Box 1407, All – Hands on arrival.
    Extra Engine & truck. We have a heavy fire condition in a 3 Story Commercial.
    Engine 309 & Lad. 134 are s/c

    2nd Alarm:
    2 – 2 – 1407 @ 10:21
    Engs. 264, 328, 323
    T. Lad. 153
    Eng. 284 w / Satellite 4
    Batt. 39 “Safety Officer”
    Batt. 43 “Resource Unit Leader”
    Rescue Battalion / Safety Battalion
    Fieldcom 1 / Tactical Support Unit #2

    Links and coverage;

    Here’s the incident particulars based upon radio transmssions and transcript : From the Nassau FD Rant (HERE) NassauFDrant.com

    • FDNY Belle Harbor, Queens, New York April 9th, 2011
      Address: 424 Beach 129 st between Cronston and Newport Aves10:10 hours
      Phone Box 1407 – Report of fire in a restaurant
      Engs. 268, 329, 266
      L137, TL121
      Battalion 4710-75-1407 – 10:13 hours
      E265
      TL159 (FAST Truck)
      Battalion 33
      Division 13
      Squad 270
      Rescue 4

    CIDS for 420 Beach 129 st:
    Restaurant 1 story 30×100 class 3. Partial sprinkler siamese on exposure 1 for cellar and kitchen areas

    7-5-1407 – 10:19 hours
    Battalion 47: We have a heavy fire condition, extra engine and truck. All-Hands on Arrival.
    E309, L134 S/C
    RAC2

    2-2-1407 – 10:19 hours
    Engs. 264, 328, 323
    E284 w/ Satellite 3
    TL153
    Battalion 39 (Safety Officer)
    Battalion 43 (Resource Unit Leader)
    Safety, Rescue Battalions
    Tactical Support 2
    FieldCom 1

    10:23 hours – Duration 14 minutes
    BC47: Box 1407, the address 424 Beach 129 st, we have fire on the 1st and 2nd floor extended to the 3rd floor, check the basement for extension. Exposure 1 is a street, 2 is a similar attached, 3 is a rear yard, 4 is an alley, k.

    10:27 hours
    TL157 S/C

    10:29 hours
    The staging area is Cronston Ave and Beach 131 st

    10:29 hours – Duration 22 minutes
    Division 13: 2nd Alarm Box 1407, we’ve got 4 lines stretched, 2 in operation, we have heavy fire on the 2nd floor of a 2 1/2 story commercial. You’ve got a 30×100, fire on the 2nd floor. 1st floor commercial occupancy, 2nd floor multiple dwelling, 3rd floor possibly apartments also.

    10:31 hours – Duration 23 minutes
    DC13: 2nd Alarm Box Box 1407, we have 4 lines stretched, 2 in operation. We’re going to change it from a 2 1/2 story to a 3 story building. Fire’s Doubtful, searches in progress, trucks are opening up, the 2nd Alarm is still Doubtful.

    10:36 hours – Duration 27 minutes
    DC13: 2nd Alarm Box 1407, a MAYDAY has been transmitted, the MAYDAY has been recovered and removed from the building. We put the FAST Truck to work, special call another FAST Truck. We’re Doubtful on the 2nd Alarm.
    L173 (FAST Truck) S/C

    10:38 hours – Duration 30 minutes
    E321 S/C

    3-3-1407 – 10:40 hours
    Division 13 to Queens, URGENT, 3rd Alarm, as soon as you get the companies give me a rundown.
    Engs. 254, 331, 225
    Battalion 50
    Battalion 58 (Staging Manager)
    Battalion 42 (Air-Recon Chief)
    Mask Service Unit
    Car 4A( AC James Manahan, Assistant Chief of Operations)

    10:41 hours
    Car 1E (Commissioner’s Liaison) is responding

    10:52 hours
    Car 36A (Department Chaplain) is responding

    10:54 hours – Duration 43 minutes
    DC13: 3rd Alarm Box 1407, we had a 2nd MAYDAY, he used his PSS to escape the building.

    10:55 hours
    Car 11A (BC Thomas J. Richardson, Chief of Rescue Operations) is responding

    11:00 hours – Duration 52 minutes
    FieldCom: Progress report on the Queens 3rd Alarm Box 1407, the address 424 Beach 129 st near Cronston Ave, fire on the 2nd and 3rd floor of a 3 story commercial 30×100. Division 13 reports he has 6 handlines stretched in operation, truck companies continuing to open up and they’re in the process of setting up the tower ladder operation. Fire is Doubtful.

    11:14 hours – Duration 1 hour 5 minutes
    FC: Special call 1 additional truck, have them respond to the staging area.
    TL107 S/C

    11:18 hours – Duration 1 hour 9 minutes
    FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, at this time Car 4A, Assistant Chief Manahan reports: a roll call has been conducted and all members are accounted for. Members have been backed out of the building and a tower ladder operation is in progress, and the fire remains Doubtful.

    11:20 hours – Duration 1 hour 11 minutes
    FC: Notify the Buildings Dept. to respond, they want to check the stability of the building.

    11:25 hours
    FC: By authority of the Incident Commander you can 10-2 the Air-Recon Chief.

    11:27 hours – Duration 1 hour 18 minutes
    FieldCom requests mixer-off message

    11:33 hours – Duration 1 hour 24 minutes
    FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, at this time Car 4A, Chief Manahan reports that they have 4 handlines in operation, they have 1 tower ladder in operation on exposure 1. Conditions remain the same and searches will be delayed. Fire remains Doubtful.

    11:58 hours – Duration 1 hour 49 minutes
    FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, at this time Car 4A, Chief Manahan reports that the safety chief is going to enter the building to assess the stability, searches are delayed, and the fire is now Probably Will Hold.

    12:02 hours
    Car 14C (Fire Marshal) is 10-84

    12:09 hours
    Car 14 (Chief Fire Marshal Robert Byrnes) is 10-84

    12:11 hours
    Car 4A is 10-8, Division 13 is Incident Commander.

    12:32 hours – Duration 2 hours 23 minutes
    FC: Progress report on Box 1407, primary searches on the 2nd and 3rd floors are complete and negative, k, the secondaries are in progress.

    12:36 hours – Duration 2 hours 27 minutes
    FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, Division 13 reports: The primary searches throughout the fire building are complete and negative, the secondaries are underway, and the fire is Under Control.

    Relocations
    Engines: 275/265, 319/266, 233/329, 259/331
    Ladders: 155/121, 135/155, 150/134, 120/137, 125/173
    Battalions: 48/43, 51/47, 52/51


    FDNY Radio Codes HERE

    Taking it to the Streets; “Redefining the Fire Ground” Rescheduled

    No comments

    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

    Wednesday Night’s Program has been postponed due to Emergent Server issues at BlogTalkRadio.

    The Program has been rescheduled for Thursday November 4th at 9:00pm EDT

    Turn Out to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

    If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

    The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued.  Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

    Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention?  Join the live broadcast on Thursday night November 4th at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

    • For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
    • Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the WorldTM ©2010

    Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

    Taking it to the Streets; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

    No comments

    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

    For a Rockin’ Hot Time, Tune in this coming Wednesday night, November 3rd  to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

    If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

    The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued.  Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

    Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention?  Join the live broadcast on Wednesday night November 3rd at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

    • For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
    • Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the WorldTM ©2010

    Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

    NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements

    1 comment

    Major factors contributing to a rapid spread of fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., on June 18, 2007, included large open spaces with furniture providing high fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows and a lack of sprinklers, according to a draft report released for public comment today by the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The fire trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter fatalities in a single event since 9/11.

    Based on its findings, the NIST technical study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes.1 If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented.

    “Furniture stores typically have large amounts of combustible material and represent a significant fire hazard,” said NIST study leader Nelson Bryner. “Model building codes should require both new and existing furniture stores to have automatic sprinklers, especially if those stores include large, open display areas.”

    Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet). Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.

    Using a state-of-the-art computer model to simulate the fire, the study team found that the addition of automatic sprinklers inside the loading dock could have significantly slowed the fire (which began just outside the dock area), prevented it from spreading beyond the dock, and eventually, extinguished it completely. The model also showed that sprinklers on the loading dock likely would have maintained what firefighters call tenability conditions, the ability for individuals in a fire event to escape unassisted.

    Factors identified as contributing to the fire’s progress include: (1) the high fuel loads—especially furniture—present throughout the building; (2) the lack of sprinklers throughout the Sofa Super Store; (3) the open floor plan of the facility; (4) the hidden build-up of combustible smoke and gases in the area between the drop ceiling and the roof of the main showroom; (5) the non-fire-activated roll-up door that was open between the loading dock and the holding area; (6) the four fire-activated roll-up doors (out of seven) that activated but did not close during the fire; (7) the metal walls in the warehouse and west showroom that allowed heat from the fire to ignite items next to the walls; and (8) the breaking of windows at the front of the store that supplied air to the fire.

    NIST’s team of experts traveled to Charleston to gather data within 36 hours of the Sofa Super Store fire. Using these data and other information collected in the following months (such as building design documents, records, plans, video and photographic data, radio transmissions, interviews with emergency responders, and informal discussions with store employees), the NIST study team developed its computer model to simulate and analyze the characteristics of the fire, including fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, and the operation of active and passive fire protection systems.

    Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:

    • The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
    • During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
    • The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
    • The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
    • When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
    • The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
    • Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.

    The complete draft report is available online at http://www.nist/gov/el

    NIST welcomes comments on the draft report and its recommendations. To be considered for the final report, comments must be received by noon EST on Dec. 2, 2010. Comments may be submitted via e-mail to firesafety@nist.gov; fax to (301) 975-4052; or mail to the attention of NIST Technical Study: Sofa Super Store, NIST, 100 Bureau Dr., Stop 8660, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8660.

    Once the final report is published, NIST will work with the appropriate committees of the International Code Council (ICC) on using the study’s recommendations to improve provisions in model building and fire codes. NIST also will work with the major organizations representing state and local governments—including building and fire officials—and firefighters to encourage them to seriously consider its recommendations.

    Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire

    1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised.

    2.   Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address:

    a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
    b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
    c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
    d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
    e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.

    3.  Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031.

    4.  Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision:

    a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
    b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).

    5.  Comprehensive Risk Management Plans:  NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to:

    a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
    b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
    c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.

    6.  Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities: 

    a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
    b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground.

    7.  Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are:

    a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
    b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
    c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires.

    8.  Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are:

    a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
    b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
    c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
    d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service. 

    9.  Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

    a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
    b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective.

    10.  Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to:

    a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
    b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations.

    11.  Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

    a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
    b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
    c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies.

    NIST has more than 40 years of experience conducting building and fire safety studies and researching the aftermath of disasters and failures. By understanding the technical causes for such incidents and making the information available to the public, NIST scientists and engineers strive to improve the safety of buildings, their occupants and emergency responders. NIST’s technical building failure and fire studies do not address fault.

  • Volume I: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
  • Volume II: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
    (Note: The reports are presented in .pdf. To read these files, you can download Adobe Acrobat Reader free.)
  • Statement to the Media Delivered at NIST Charleston Fire Study Press Briefing, Oct. 28, 2010, by Nelson Bryner, Lead, Study Team
  • PowerPoint Presentation Accompanying Statement at Press Briefing
  • Video B-Roll on the NIST Charleston Fire Study (mp4)
  • Graphic Showing Floor Plan of Charleston Sofa Super Store
  • Graphic Showing Smoke and Fire Movement at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Temperature Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Oxygen Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • The Waldbaum Fire Collapse FDNY 1978 Remembrance

    20 comments

    The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978  

    The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.  

      

    Thirty-four firefighters, one emergency medical technician and one Emergency Services police officer were injured in the fire and the tragedy is remembered as one of the worst disasters in the New York City Fire Department’s 143-year history.  

    The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
    • Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33
    • Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156
    • Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42
    • Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153
    • Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156
    • Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153 

    The fire started at 8:40 am in Waldbaum’s supermarket located at 2892  Avenue Y and Ocean Avenue in the Sheepshead Bay section of Brooklyn. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers and contractors were renovating the building when the fire was discovered in mezzanine area. Box 3300 was transmitted at 08:39 hours and the All hands transmitted at 08:49 and subsequently a 2nd alarm at 09:02 hrs. Shortly after 09:20 with 20 firefighters operating on the bowstring truss roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the roof fell into the smoke and flames. Some of the firefighters were seen running toward the edge of the roof; some made it, others nearby fell into the gaping hole. The third alarm was transmitted at 09:18 3rd alarm and subsequently escalated to a Fifth alarm assignment during the rescue and recovery operations.  

    Roof Operations prior to collapse

     

    Laborers and firefighters managed to pull out some who were near walls, some crawled out. Several holes were made into the wall to pull out injured survivors and victims.  

    The Building  

    The approximately 120 ft.  x 120 ft. primary building was originally built in 1952 as a supermarket and at the time of the fire was undergoing extensive renovations and was open and operating. Constructed with exterior masonry bearing walls of  with  timber roof trusses with a 100-foot clear span, supported on pilaster columns embedded in the exterior walls, it was classical Type III construction. The truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a conventional suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system.  A two story mezzanine and machine room was located at the north wall of the original building. Access through the truss loft area was accessible through man-doors at the plane of each truss.  

    Waldbaum Supermarket FDNY Box 3300 1978

     

    The heavy timber bowstring arch roof consisted of seven (7) truss units constructed of 4-5 bundled 3 inch x 12 inch attached assemblies.  Two factors contributed to the collapse of the bowstring arch truss system; double roof (rain roof) alterations with concealed spaces and the extent and severity of the fire within the concealed spaces affecting the assembly’s structural stability. The presence of the double concealed ceiling systems; the truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a convential suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system. The failure of  operating companies and command personnel to recognize the signs of an unchecked concealed fire that was propagating at a rapid pace impinging upon critical structural assembly points was a significant contributing factor in the incident outcome. 

    Typical Heavy Timber Bowstring Arch Truss Configuration

     

    This roof collapsed 32 minutes after the initial units arrived. The immediate collapse occurred approximately 85 feet inward from the Alpha side (Ocean Avenue) and approximately 50 feet from the Bravo side (Avenue Y). The immediate failure and loss of structural stability and collapse of truss unit #5 was followed with the subsequent collapse of truss units #6 and #4 that were interdependent on the roof rafter and purlin system to maintain thier structural stability and vertical orientation. This type of interdependent structural system of structural trusses, rafters and roof deck (membrane) result in large area collapses since the primary truss will usually cause the adjacent two truss systems (on either side of the primary compromised truss) to fail by pulling downward.  

    The effects of direct flame impingement on the truss assessmblies, thier connection points of bearing at the outter masonry walls, coupled with the tactical trench cut that had been comopleted by the operating ladder companies resulted in 4,000 sf section of roof to collapse in the truss #5, 6 and 4 bay areas. Rapid and progressing fire travel within the concealed spaces and the degradation of the roof assembly and structural support system, failure to recognize the inherent opertaional risks associated with roof and interior operations on heavy timber truss roof systems and the failure to correlate continued interior suppression operations with simultaneous roof ventilation operations with no significant change in operational progress or mitigation contributed to the tragic outcome of the incident.  

    A short ten years would pass and the lessons from the Waldbaum Fire would soon be forgotten when on July 2, 1988 operations in a Type III building consisting of an auto dealership would lead to the deaths of five (5) Firefighters in Hackensack, New Jersey when operations were being conducted in the truss loft storage area when an 80 foot heavy timber truss collapsed trapping the firefighters. The Hackensack Ford Fire occured less than four weeks short of the tenth anniversary of the Waldbaum Fire right across the Hudson River. More on the Hackensack Ford Fire HERE.  

     
     
     
     
     

    Bravo Side View

     

    Additional References :http://stevespak.com/waldbaums.html  

    Fire Investigation: An Analysis of the Waldbaum Fire, Brooklyn, New York, August 3, 1978. Quintiere, J. G. NISTIR 6030; June 1997 http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID;=18676&  

    NFPA Fire Command Magazine, Brooklyn Roof Collapse Claims six Lives. Demers, David P.; December 1978  

    Waldbaum Fire Facebook page, HERE with numerous photos and recollections honoring those that lost their lives and those that operated at FDNY Brooklyn Box 3300.
       

    Rescue efforts on the Bravo Side

     

      

    2892 Ocean Avenue Today

     

    The lessons learned in the years following the Walbaum’s fire in 1978 and the subsequent Hackensack Ford Fire, NJ in 1988 focused on understanding building construction systems, occupancies and structural assemblies, in both of these cases the timber bowstring truss systems. Over the years the foundation of knowledge necessary to build competencies and knowledgeable firefighters, fire officers and commanders cognizant in the science and technology of building construction has waned and at time has been less than an area of focus.  

    Take the time to learn about the FDNY Walbaum’s fire, its history repeating significance as a major fire service LODD event, the lessons learned from the Hackensack Ford Fire (July 2, 1988) and other related case studies that can be found on the NIOSH, USFA and NFPA web sites.  

    Look at your buildings within your response areas and jurisdiction. Understand how they’re built and more importantly how they are affected by the exposure and impingement of fire and its byproducts. Understand key building performance indicators and appropriate strategic and tactical actions based upon building profiles, occupancies, fire loading, construction features and fire service resources. Take the time to honor the brave brother firefighters from FDNY who made the supreme sacrifice thirty two years ago, and gave a legacy to learn from in this and in future fire service generations.  

    It’s time to think; BUILDING KNOWLEDGE = FIREFIGHTER SAFETY  

    Memorial

     

    Operational Safety at Basement Fires: Close Call

    4 comments

    Basement fires in both residential and commercial occupancies are one of the most challenging tactical operations that present numerous risk factors that required the highest degree of situational awareness, training skill sets and continuous incident monitoring and assessment to gauge building structural integrity, fire behavior and crew integrity and performance. 

    An explosion rocked a Fairdale, Kentucky neighborhood this past weekend while the homeowner was in the process of doing remodeling his basement. A Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Mark Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel. 

    Fellow firefighters, including his brother-in-law, who was right behind him prior to his fall, were yelling and screaming at Long to hang on.  They managed to get a ladder to the basement and it was up to Long to find the strength to get out.  He says “I started to try to climb up. I got two, I lost my grip, fell flat into the fire.  I was so exhausted.” On his third attempt, he did find the strength and pulled himself up the ladder and out of the flames.  

    According to published reports a coordinated fire suppression effort was undertaken, with heavy fire involvement extending throughout the house and into the roof area. Interior fire attack was commenced, and as crews began moving across the first floor area above the seat of the fire, the floor subassembly failed causing an isolated collapse and compromise of the structural floor system and sub-floor decking, resulting in Captain Long falling into the basement. The fire originating in the basement was the result of the homeowners’ use of acetone as a floor treatment when the chemical vapors were ignited by the hot water heater causing an explosion and resulting fire. 

    Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) 

    • Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
    • Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
    • Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
    • Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
    • Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
    • Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
    • Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
    • Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
    • Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
    • If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
    • Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
    • Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
    • Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner. 
    • Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
    • Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
    • Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
    • Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
    • Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
    • Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
    • Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
    • Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
    • Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment

    Here are some resources and case studies resulting from operations at floor collapses;

    Incident links; HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE 


     

    Premiering “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen”? on Fire Fighter Netcast.com

    No comments

    Taking it to the Streets

    Premiering Wednesday July 21st  9:00pm ET

    Live on Firefighter Netcast.com

    Premiering “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen”?

    Check out what’s on of off your radar screen on CommandSafety.com

    If you’ve never listened to a FirefighterNetcast, visit the site now, sign up for a new user account for BlogTalkRadio, and be prepared to join in the conversation Wednesday night.

    Listen in via the Internet, listen and/or participate by calling in, and join in the live chat that takes place amongst listeners while the show is going on. In case you miss the live show, you can even download the recording after the fact on FirefighterNetcast and iTunes too. It’s free, it’s fun and it’s easy.

    Taking it to the Streets is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter Netcast.com Production

    Check out Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Twitter

    Check out FireDaily and The FireCritic

    Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety

    1 comment

    Commandsafety.com is pleased to make available the latest update to the Buildingsonfire.com’s Building Construction Training and Lecture Series for 2010. Recently updated with a series of new seminar and training program topics addressing the emerging training and educational needs of the fire service, these programs provide timely and relevant information and insights on Building Construction, Command Risk Management, Dynamic and Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Situational Awareness, Engineered Structural Systems and Fire Fighter Safety.

    These programs also present and integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and much more.  

    These programs, lectures and seminars examine crucial construction elements and occupancy types and correlates building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety. These fast paced programs will utilize extensive multimedia materials, interactive activities, case study activities and simulations to reinforce course content and subject areas, providing exceptional learning opportunities.

    Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)

    Down load the program files from the link below for more information.

    Building Construction Training Programs 2010

     

    Reflecting on These Days of June

    5 comments

    Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is.  Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed.  Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.

    We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?

    We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to  the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.

    • Modern building construction is no longer predicable
    • Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
    • Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
    • Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
    • Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
    • Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
    • Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
    • Command & Company Officer dereliction
    • Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

    STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
    There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.

    These behaviors include;
    • Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.

    • Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.

    • Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.

    Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;

    TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
    1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
    1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
    2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
    1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.

    The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.

    Check out these links;

    If you haven’t read Chief Mayers’s discerning reflections on Firehouse Zen, this is a MUST read. Where Were You That Night?

    The Lessons Learned from the Past

    From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

    Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

    Combat Fire Engagement

    Situations, Size-Up, Actions and Entertainment

    Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior

    Buildingsonfire reaches Milestone

    No comments

    Buildingsonfire on Face Book reaches 3,000 fan milestone, are you one? Sign up and follow Buildingsonfire on Facebook today

    Remember, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety

    Follow Commandsafety on Twitter, HERE and Buildingsonfire on Twitter, HERE

    3-26-2010 9-31-01 PM

    Twenty Ten

    1 comment

    august_detailAs we transition into a new year, and as plans begin to take place that frame and outline the year’s activities, foremost in this planning, preparation, scheduling and outlook should be those activities and commitments that training, education and skill development can be implemented and enhanced. Take the initiative to recognize and identify training and operational gaps and distinguish the risk and options available to lessen or eliminate the risk and reduce the gap deficiencies. Take the time to implement effective, accurate and frequent training and skill development drills, training curriculums and programs.

    Don’t sacrifice or forego on this mission critical area when so much is at stake in the domain of combat structural fire suppression. Understand the predictability of performance in the buildings and occupancies not only in your jurisdiction, first or second-due areas, but also in those areas that you may be called upon to respond to for greater alarms or mutual aid. Remember Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

    Keep an eye in the rear view mirror; learning from the wisdom and knowledge from where you’ve been, what you’ve done and all your past experiences and practice; but at the same time focusing on the road before you with keen attentiveness on situational awareness, anticipating error-likely conditions and balanced risk assessment and operational management in both your strategic and tactical deployments. 

    Twenty Ten(2010)

     Here are twenty (20) Suggested activities or initiatives for you to consider in 2010….

    Above all, be safe in all your endeavors, assignments and incident tasks.

    1. Regardless of my years of experience, I will increase my understanding of the basic principles of Building Construction, because; Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.  
    2. Identify ten (10) buildings within your first-due or response district and complete a pre-fire plan and present this to my company of organization.
    3. Identify an area where new residential construction is underway and follow the construction process from foundation through completion to gain an understanding of operational issues.
    4. I will complete the UL Structural stability of engineered lumber in fire conditions online course and implement the lessons learned in my strategic and tactical operations.
    5. I will not take any building or occupancy for granted, and shall take all precautions to ensure crew integrity and safety during my task assignments.
    6. Complete a 360 assessment of all buildings upon arrival, when ever feasible to gain reconnaissance information on the building and incident risks and implement this info into my strategic, tactical plans or company task assignments.
    7. Research the issues affecting; Engineered Structural Systems (ESS), Fire Behavior/Fire Dynamics or Fire Suppression Management/Fire Loading and develop a training drill to share the lessons learned.
    8. Select a new or previous published fire service text book and read up on a subject area that I may have neglected or ignored to increase my skill set.
    9. Implement an objective approach towards effective risk assessment and profiling of all buildings and occupancies during incident operations and implement balanced tactical deployment with aggressive/measured assignments; recognizing that my company and I are not invincible.
    10. During demanding Combat Structural Fire Engagements, I will; Do the Right Thing at the Right Time for the Right Reasons and will not practice Tactical Entertainment.
    11. Read the Report of the Week (ROTW) on the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System web site and share the operating experience (OE) lessons with my company or department, to reduce the likelihood of a similar or more serious event.
    12. I will read Ten (10) NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Reports and present the lessons learned in a discussion, table top, drill or training program.
    13. I will attend a regional or national training conference to increase my perspective and awareness of other firefighting, safety or operational methodologies, process or practices to increase firefighter safety in my home organization.
    14. I will increase my understanding of the NFFF Everyone Goes Home Program initiatives, including the Sixteen Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives, Safety Thru Leadership and the Courage to Be Safe Programs and other new program initiatives and advocate and promote enhanced safety measures in my organization.
    15. I will advocate and promote safe and defensive apparatus operations during emergency responses and will always buckle-up my seat belt and ensure my crew is always belted-in, not placing my company at risk and obeying traffic signals and postings.
    16. I will implement the New Rules of Engagement during combat structural fire operations; while monitoring and reacting to on-going building performance and fire behavior.
    17. I will increase my understanding of the Predictability of Building Performance and base my operational deployments on Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type.
    18. I will become a mentor to a new or less experienced firefighter and promote the traditions, honor and duty of our fire service profession, tempered with an emphasis on firefighter safety, survival and wellness.
    19. I will take NO emergency incident responses as being routine in nature, due to frequency , regularity or  past performance, demands or outcomes, nor will I take any building for granted; Company, Team and personal safety and integrity is paramount and I will not be complacent, but remain vigilant based upon my training, skills and experience.
    20. This one’s for you to identify and fill in………..

    Ensure you’re glancing occasionally in your rear view mirror to monitor where you’ve been, while driving your initiatives, programs, processes and actions forward. Above all, maintain the courage to be safe. We don’t know what’s in the cards on any given day, but the citizens we protect can rest assured, we will do our job as firefighters, to the best of our abilities, because of who we are; today, in 2010 and certainly well into the next decade and beyond. Stay safe, with the hopes for a Happy New Year.

    Looking Forward Through the Rear View Mirror

    No comments

    crystalBall1As the end of the year fast approaches and in turn the end of the decade, it amazes me how “fast” time seems to have passed. Certainly when looking back and reflecting upon the past year or the previous few years, each of us thinks and contemplates upon those events, milestones, anniversaries, highlights as well as those common everyday occurrences that seem to permeate back and forth in our minds and hang at times like the smoke from a smoldering contents fire. When reflecting, there are the good times as well as those that were not so good. There are those events that were life altering and changing that forever formulate a different view upon each of our respective worlds we live and work within. As well as those events that have provided us with the joys and virtue of what we do everyday as firefighters both on and off the job, at the firehouse and at home.

    For each or us, the events that form and shape our worlds; our families at home and our families at the fire station and within the fire department or agencies we volunteer or work for, leave indelible marks upon us that at times formulate and transcend us. My good friend Chief Ben Waller reflected upon a number of issues and insights in his recent post that was right on the mark as did my partner Chief Doug Cline in his perspective of 2009 and for 2010. A lot has happened to this our Fire Service during the past ten years and most certainly in the past twelve months that has shaped and forged a new generation of firefighters and tempered the existing veterans. Stop and think about it.

    Looking back at 2009 and in the waning decade, the one certainty that we all share is that we have the ability and look forward to a new year, a new decade and to new challenges. Prior to this week, the 2009 Firefighter LODD events that sadly have occurred seemed like it would pause and we’d end the year with no further events. Tragically, in the past few days, five additional line-of-duty deaths have been reported through the USFA. From the events of 9-11, to the seeds that were planted in Tampa and the crusade that was embarked upon to ensure everyone [has] the opportunity to go home, through the tragedy, wake-up call and the lessons-learned from Charleston. A lot has happened, many tears have been shed, alot was learned, with so much more work still remaining.

    As of this posting, the United States Fire Service has borne ninety-three (93) LODDs this year. In comparison to previous years, this may finally indicate a turning point in the previous escalating trends in LODD we’ve experienced during the past decade. Take a moment to look through the USFA postings and the narratives of each of the firefighters who made the supreme sacrifice in 2009 and reflect upon the circumstances and events that lead to their respective LODD incident. Take the time to spend an evening reading through some of the recent or past reports published on the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program web site. Look the History Repeating Events (HRE) and think about what you can do to champion changes in your organization, department or company to eliminate or reduce the likelihood for a similar event from occurring to you or your organization.

    The formulative and diligent efforts of the NFFF and the Everyone Goes Home Program and the Sixteen Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives have made their mark in this decade and must continue to be embraced and institutionalized as we move forward to twenty ten. Don’t forget about the inroads made by the National Firefigher Near-Miss Reporting System and the knowledge being gained to reduce HRE. We must look at and examine the successes and the failures of our methodologies, processes, culture and perspectives and continue to seek behaviors and practices that make our job safer. When we focus our attention on Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety and the essence of combat structural fires; Structural firefighting is what it’s all about, is it not? The fundamental nature and reason we have such veneration for firefighting and the fire service and all it entails, has a lot to do with going into burning buildings and fighting fire. But firefighting has its adverse consequences, with all too familiar costs, in the form of injuries, debilitating accidents and line of duty deaths. As a firefighter; to say that we love firefighting would be an understatement, BUT one issue that we need to address is the fact that there are many individual firefighters, companies and organizations that employ fireground operational practices that promote the “enjoyment and entertainment” of working a good job within the occupancy compartment of a structural fire in the building environment.

    One of the formulative postings I published this past year focused on working that good job for the shear enjoyment of what and who we are; firefighters. It’s worth repeating again, since this is an opportune time to reflect. Today’s incident scene and structural fires are unlike those in past decades and will continue to challenge us operationally when confronted with structural fire engagement and combat operations. Operationally, we need to be doing the right thing, for the right reason in the right place to increase our safety and incident survivability.

    We also can share the belief and understanding that we at times may have found ourselves staying too long in the wrong place, operating tactically in an adverse environment with known hazards that do not have value, for nothing other than the enjoyment of nozzle and operating time in the fire. We have a tendency when working a room and contents, compartment fire or a structural fire in the building environment placing operating companies and personnel in high hazard environments- sometimes at the expense of justifying our own entertainment value in working the job, the assignment or in maintaining the interior operational interface. Think about it.

    We need to stop “entertaining” ourselves. Don’t mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference. The job is dangerous, it has risks, we are not invincible, and we can die; at any alarm, in any fire, at anytime for any number of reasons. But it’s tragic when we die for all the wrong reasons. Think about the definitions; think about how they apply to you, your personnel, your company or your operations; past, present or future. More importantly, think about when and where you’ve found yourself doing any one of these; could the outcome have been different?

    TACTICAL AMUSEMENT “tak-ti-kəl ə- myüz-mənt”

    1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk

    2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk

    3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL DIVERSION “tak-ti-kəl də- vər-zhən”

    1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk

    2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION “tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- ven(t)-shən”

    1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel. We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

    On any given day, at any give alarm, the dynamics around us at times may be in or out of our direct control. We may not be able to see what the cards have in store for us, BUT we must ensure we use every fragment of training, fortitude, knowledge, skills, courage, bravery, insights, luck and sometimes (other divine) intervention to get us through. We must have the fortitude and courage to be both safety conscious and measured in the performance of our sworn duties while maintaining the appropriate balance of risk and bravery.
    • The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger.

    • As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel.

    • We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

    • The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified.

    Risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

    Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…

    Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…

    There is a melting of both pragmatic aggressive firefighting with measured and deliberate tactical approaches. It’s a balance and equilibrium; the question is do you know when to recognize that balance, where it exists and how not to cross that adverse threshold?

    Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past Conventional Construction; Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.

    Looking Forward through the Rear View Mirror; remember the past, recall those history repeating events that seem to manifest themselves time and time again; are we ever going to learn. I truly believe we are starting to finally “get it”-even if it’s on a smaller incremental scale, it’s a starting point. Remember the lessons from those events that have impacted you, your department, your community and the fire service; from close-calls to near-miss events; from minor or debilitating injuries to the tragedy and sorrow of a LODD event.

    As we transition into a new year, and as plans begin to take place that frame and outline the year’s activities, foremost in this planning, preparation, scheduling and outlook should be those activities and commitments that training, education and skill development can be implemented and enhanced. Take the initiative to recognize and identify training and operational gaps and distinguish the risk and options available to lessen or eliminate the risk and reduce the gap deficiencies. Take the time to implement effective, accurate and frequent training and skill development drills, training curriculums and programs. Don’t sacrifice or forego on this mission critical area when so much is at stake in the domain of combat structural fire suppression. Understand the predictability of performance in the buildings and occupancies not only in your jurisdiction, first or second-due areas, but also in those areas that you may be called upon to respond to for greater alarms or mutual aid. Understand the structural anatomy of your community. Remember Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Understand the fomulative issues affecting engineered structural systems (ESS) and the change in operational deployment and tactics on the fire ground. Keep an eye in the rear view mirror; learning from the wisdom and knowledge from where you’ve been, what you’ve done and all your past experiences and practice; but at the same time focusing on the road before you with keen attentiveness on situational awareness, anticipating error-likely conditions and balanced risk assessment and operational management in both your strategic and tactical deployments.

    We don’t know what’s in the cards on any given day, but the citizens we protect can rest assured, we will do our jobs as firefighters, to the best of our abilities, because of who we are; today, in 2010 and certainly well into the next decade and beyond. 

    Ensure you’re glancing occasionally in your rear view mirror to monitor where you’ve been, while driving your initiatives, programs, processes and actions forward. Above all, maintain the courage to be safe.