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Physiological Stress associated with Structural Firefighting Observed in Professional Firefighters-Study

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Study

 

COOPERATIVE EFFORT WITH THE INDIANAPOLIS FD

A primary goal of the project was to investigate the physical rigor of real fire scene work. Fire scene work tasks may differ widely with respect to their cardiovascular and respiratory stress. Therefore, the project sought to illustrate normative data for multiple fire ground tasks including fire attack, search & rescue, exterior ventilation, and overhaul activities.

The presence of an independent observer (scientist) on the fire ground provided opportunity to describe the fire scene environment under which firefighter physiology data was being collected. Subsequent analysis allowed the identification of the fire scene factors having the greatest impact on firefighter physiology. Further, these factors were also prioritized with respect to their relative importance.

The full access to firefighters provided by the study also allowed some investigation into the psychological aspects of answering emergency call. Specifically, a comparison of emotional stress and anxiety between on and off duty life may provide some insight in to a source of firefighter risk for development of heart disease.

Accomplishing the goals of this project required the cooperation of many organizations. A research consortium was established among the primary organizations involved. However, the ultimate responsibility for success or failure of the project lay with the individual firefighters invited to participate. It was the role of the following institutions to provide support for participating firefighters.

 Indiana University Firefighter Health & Safety Research

The Firefighter Health & Safety Research program is component of Indiana University’s Harold H. Morris Human Performance Laboratory. It is governed by the Department of Kinesiology and the School of Health, Physical Education & Recreation.

 The program was organized to specifically to support faculty research interests in the health and safety of First Responder populations.

 The mission of Indianapolis Fire Department

Indianapolis is a rapidly growing, outstanding community that is recognized as a great place to work and live. Hailed as the 12th largest city in America and home to a diverse population, the city attracts millions of visitors annually. Indianapolis is proud to offer its citizens a world class Fire Department. IFD, with over 150 years of proud tradition, is made up of men and women with diverse cultural backgrounds, each who have taken the oath to protect and serve the citizens of Indianapolis.

Indianapolis Firefighters work closely with the residents and businesses through fire prevention and safety education programs to make their city as safe as possible. The Indianapolis Fire Department is made up of over 940 sworn members and a 50- member civilian support team. The IFD fire service district covers 198 square miles of downtown Indianapolis and surrounding areas.

With a strong history of being progressive thinking forward in areas of firefighter health and safety, IFD provided an ideal organization to participate in the study. Health status and work capacity of IFD firefighters are regularly tested. This provided a population of highly trained, medically supervised career professional firefighters.

Indianapolis Metropolitan Professional Firefighters Association

The International Association of Fire Fighters granted Indianapolis Firefighters their Charter in October of 1934. Today, Indianapolis (Marion County) and its citizens are served by 17 different fire departments are represented by Local 416. Currently Local 416 membership includes over 2,300 firefighters, paramedics, dispatchers and retirees. Local 416 fosters and encourages a high degree of skill, and efficiency, the cultivation of friendship among its members and the support of moral, intellectual and economic development of its membership. Endorsement of the project by Local 416 leadership facilitated the recruitment of firefighters for the research project. A union representative accompanied the scientific team to fire stations during recruitment. Their presence put potential subjects at ease and helped remove any suspicions or concerns the firefighters had. In addition, Local 416 worked closely with the research team to provide support

Embedded

A unique aspect of the study was the need for continuous scientific observation of on-duty firefighters. IFD rotates three shifts of firefighters on a 24-hour on / 48-hour off duty cycle. To accomplish continuous monitoring, a scientist was assigned to each IFD shift. The scientist lived in the fire station and accompanied firefighters on all fire runs.

Scientists were trained in fire station etiquette and fire ground safety procedures. Scientists worked under the command of the station’s shift officer and Incident Commander at the station and on fire scenes respectively. Scientists were uniformed for identification both in the fire station and on the fire ground. Scientist uniforms distinguished them from IFD personnel but made them easily recognizable as fire ground qualified.

The study is bound by the architectural and geographical character of Indianapolis, Indiana. In order to obtain sufficient fire scene data, a highfire- volume region of the city of Indianapolis was chosen for the study site. Architecturally, this area of the city is populated by single and double wood framed residences.

Typically, these structures are less than 2000 ft2. From a geographical stand point, Indianapolis enjoys a fairly moderate climate. Accordingly, Indianapolis does not provide exposure to extremes of weather, hot or cold. The study was conducted during the winter months in order to avoid the complication of atmospheric heat stress. The goal of the study was to assess, as much as possible, the physical aspects of firefighting work. The avoidance of added heat stress provides a more focused examination on that factor. This will allow us to identify firefighter and fire scene variables impacting the physiological responses of firefighters.

Unfortunately, these delimiting factors may limit the applicability of the findings to areas outside Indianapolis or central Indiana. In order to address the impact of weather and other atmospheric extremes (elevation), a future study is planned to assess the same physiological stress on firefighters in areas of the country that will provide access to these weather extremes. In addition, US cities providing access to other architectural character will also be utilized in that future study.

Finally, the study represents physiological responses of a firefighting corps that is known to be well trained technically and monitored by a medical program adhering to NFPA standards. This group of firefighters was chosen because it may be used as a model corps. Other, less fit firefighters should not expect to respond in a similar manner.

This document reports the physiological aspects of structural firefighting and the psychological impact of answering emergency call as outlined in the associated application for funding. The use of continuous physiological monitoring to capture data required the report resulted in the capture of much information not associated with fire scenes. Every heartbeat, breath, and footstep is captured throughout the duty shift. As a result, many other aspects of firefighter physiology were captured and should be evaluated despite being outside the scope of the original project proposal. This report is limited to reporting the goals of the original funded protocol.

Other physiological issues identified during the course of the study will be pursued in subsequent peer-reviewed scientific publications. These subsequent reports will cover such topics as sleep dysfunction,

Heart rate variability analysis for determination of sympathetic / parasympathetic balance, respiratory mechanics associated with positive pressure SCBA systems, and a comparison of physical activity levels on and off duty.

CONCLUSIONS

It is no surprise that heart rates, minute ventilation and blood pressures are elevated during firefighting activity. The physical work demand and the emotionally charged environment require these responses. However, prior to this study, the magnitude and duration of these responses were unclear.

  • Annual reports of firefighter deaths generally list the cause of on-duty heart attack deaths as “overexertion”.
  • However, overexertion is a relative term. Levels of work that produce overexertion in one individual might not do so in another, more fit individual. Therefore, several factors must be considered to put the data presented in to context.
  • When we report means or averages of heart rates (70% of predicted HRmax) and levels of minute ventilation (50 L/min), some of the work does not seem all that strenuous.

 However, firefighters studied here were highly trained, medically supervised, healthy and relatively fit individuals. The same work in a less well trained and less fit group of firefighters would result in much higher levels of cardiovascular stress.

  • In fact, work here that pushed studied firefighters to 100% of their maximum cardiovascular capacity could not be accomplished by some unhealthy and unfit firefighters.
  • Even within this group, individuals with higher levels of body fat not being able to work as hard as their leaner peers.
  • Another factor to consider is the fires themselves. The principle components analysis, the size of the structure and amount of fire involved have significant impact on the firefighter’s response. Indeed, the average structure studied was a relatively small (2500 ft2) residential structure.
  • As structures grow larger and more complex, the physical response grows. Yet, even some of these small structures pushed firefighters to their maximal abilities. Lastly, we must consider the weather conditions.

The study was conducted in the absence of ambient environmental heat stress. Unfortunately, firefighters must fight fire in all weather conditions, including hot humid weather that imposes extreme heat stress conditions on the fire scene. The process of thermoregulation can impart severe cardiovascular stress on firefighters before they set foot on the fire ground. During a 2005 study of training related physiology, a study conducted at the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute saw many firefighters reporting for duty in a dehydrated state. Dehydration exacerbates the cardiovascular stress associated with thermoregulation and can debilitate even the most fit firefighter.

FIRE SCENE AS A TRIGGER FOR HEART ATTACKS

So, how does the information presented here shed light on the extraordinary number of firefighter line of duty heart attacks? The answer lies in the magnitude of the physiological responses. Recently, a comprehensive examination of the LODD due to heart attack was completed by a group at Harvard University .  

  • The researchers found the primary cause of heart attack deaths associated with firefighting was overexertion in firefighters with existing cardiovascular disease.
  • A 2006 review of research on cardiac deaths indicated that high levels of physical exertion as well as severe emotional stress are triggers for a heart attack. In the case of firefighters, both physical and emotional triggers are present.
  • These researchers also concluded that periods of high physical or emotional stress essentially accelerate an inevitable cardiac event in persons with cardiovascular disease. This is an extremely important point with respect to fire fighters.
  • One of the most alarming facts with respect to on-duty firefighter heart attack fatality is the average age at the time of death is in the early 4th decade of life.
  • If you are a person with cardiovascular disease, death due to heart attack or stroke is probably inevitable.
  • However, if you are a firefighter with cardiovascular disease, that death due to heart attack or stroke is likely to come much sooner.

 Another question asked about firefighter line of duty heart attack deaths is why so many occur after leaving the fire scene.

  • As discussed earlier, there is an essential physical recovery period following any physical activity.
  • The duration of the recovery period is determined by the duration and magnitude of the physical activity combined with the individual’s level of aerobic fitness (all recovery is aerobic).

This is because physical activity raises body temperature and causes the release of many hormones that enable us to do high levels of work. One of these hormones, adrenaline, is also released in response to emotional stimuli. Adrenaline raises the heart rate, blood pressure and increases minute ventilation. The higher the physical demand or emotional stress, the greater the rise in temperature as well as the amount of hormone released. These factors do not simply disappear with the cessation of physical activity or the removal of an emotional stimulus.

  • Substantial time is required to metabolize hormones and to dissipate heat. As a result, stress effects tend to linger.
  • One incident captured by the study involved the rescue of children entrapped on the second floor of a fully involved residence. The incident resulted in severe physical and emotional stress on the firefighters driving heart rates to levels in excess of 100% of their predicted maximum.

Two hours after returning to station (some three hours following the completion of rescue operations), heart rates of individuals involved in the rescue remained in excess of 100 beats per minute. Essentially, the physical and emotional triggers for heart attack stay with the firefighter for some time after an incident. High levels of stress present long after an incident, is a potential trigger for cardiovascular events, especially in individuals with underlying cardiovascular disease.

REDUCING FIREFIGHTER DEATHS DUE TO HEART ATTACK

Unfortunately, many firefighters in the US are not only unfit for fire scene work but are generally unhealthy individuals. The discrepancy between the physical preparedness of firefighters and the high physical demand of firefighting stands at the center of fire service line of duty deaths. Simply to expect to survive fire ground operations, a firefighter needs, as a minimum, to be healthy (including the absence of cardiovascular disease).

The goal of this research is to support a service wide effort to reduce the number of firefighter line of duty deaths. Because heart attacks account for nearly half of these deaths, much attention is focused on elucidating and eliminating the cause of these events. Unfortunately, no substantial improvements in firefighter health have occurred in the last 25 or so years.

As a result, firefighter death statistics (as a result of heart attack) remains virtually unchanged. With improved research funding we are beginning to better understand the etiology of these events and to develop plans that will change the death statistics.

  • Currently, there appear to be two primary approaches to the problem. Some researchers are working on the development of physiology monitoring systems in hope of detecting severely elevated cardiovascular or respiratory responses during fire ground operations.
  • This in turn would allow affected firefighters to be relieved before a catastrophic event is triggered.
  • Unfortunately, the data presented here suggest this approach would not be successful. It is apparent that, in some cases, extreme physiological responses are appropriate on the fire ground.
  • Simply removing a firefighter because his or her heart rate is extremely high would stand in the way of getting the job done.

It is much more important that firefighters be healthy and fit enough to turn the output of their cardiac pumps up (increase heart rate) enough to do what they are expected to do and not experience adverse effects because of it. This seems to negate the utility of a monitoring device that simply alerts to extreme level of heart rate or ventilation.

Programs such as the Wellness/Fitness initiative undertaken by IAFF and IAFC, and the US

Fire Administration’s Life Safety Summit has recognized the need for improving the health of firefighters as a preventative measure. The national fire prevention association has issued guidelines for oversight of firefighter health programs. These programs set the stage for improvement in firefighter health. If successful, they will certainly result in a reduction in firefighter deaths due to heart attack. It is important however, that firefighters take advantage of such programs, either voluntarily or as a requirement for service.

Although there remain unknown factors on the fire ground that may increase a firefighter’s risk of developing heart disease, we know now that the vast majority of heart attack deaths occur in unhealthy, unfit firefighters. This study clearly demonstrates the magnitude of cardiovascular stress placed on working firefighters and indicates firefighting activity can be a trigger for a cardiac event. Essentially, firefighting is triggering a cardiac death that is inevitable in persons with cardiovascular disease.

So how do we stem the tide of heart attack deaths in working firefighters? We must improve firefighter health and reduce their risk factors for heart disease. Whether the responsibility for that improvement lies with the firefighter, their department or their labor organizations is for the fire service to decide.

The fire service is still asking why are firefighters dying of heart attacks and what can we do about it. Academic researchers have been demonstrating since the mid-seventies that firefighting is a substantial trigger for heart attack and preventative physical training should be required of firefighters.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FIREFIGHTER PHYSICAL TRAINING

Development of an effective physical training program begins with the identification of demand levels a job or event presents. Several studies have attempted to quantify the physical demand of firefighting by observation of training or simulated firefighting activity.

Unfortunately, laboratory measures tell us little about the physiology of real world structural firefighting. This was a primary reason the current study was undertaken. Adequate funding, appropriate technology, and an embedded relationship with a large metropolitan fire department enabled us to examine the physiology of real-world firefighting.

With information about the cardiovascular and respiratory demands of structural firefighting, we are now able to make statements about how firefighters should be trained. First, it is important to define what we refer to as physical fitness. The terms healthy and physically fit are not synonymous. Healthy refers to a state of well being and includes both physical and emotional aspects of life. Physical health includes not only the absence of disease but several functional physiological capabilities commonly referred to as health-related components of physical fitness.

These components include aerobic capacity, body composition, muscular strength, muscular endurance and flexibility. Sound physical training programs designed for the general population address all of these components. Programs designed for individuals who regularly endure high levels of physical stress go beyond these health-related components and include some performance-related components of physical fitness. In addition, the goals for health-related components are substantially different for these individuals compared to the general public. Athletes and firefighters fall into this higher-demand category. Sometimes you will even hear firefighters referred to as occupational athletes.

The cardiac and respiratory stress data, in combination with the inferred blood pressure responses described by this study, elucidate the firefighter’s need for a healthy cardiovascular system. The firefighter cardiovascular system will be stressed significantly, sometimes under high ambient heat stress conditions. In addition, the need to exert and maintain large muscular forces, usually from an awkward body position, indicates the need for significant muscular strength, muscular endurance, and joint flexibility compared to civilian counterparts.

Accordingly, standardized guidelines for physical training NFPA 1583, address these components for developing the firefighter’s physical fitness. As fire scene work begins, firefighters typically carry 60-70 pounds of protective clothing, breathing apparatus, and tools. As a result, little of the work executed on the fire ground could be described as having a large aerobic component. Instead, the high levels of power output required on the fire ground places emphasis on non-oxidative (anaerobic) metabolic processes. This anaerobic capacity is not considered a health-related but a performance- related component of physical fitness. An improved anaerobic capacity can significantly reduce cardiovascular stress in individuals executing anaerobic work.

Accordingly, firefighters would benefit from training that improves glycolytic and creatine phosphate metabolic system capacities. Other performance-related components of physical fitness also play a role on the fire ground. Studies conducted by Dr. Denise Smith have shown the effects of firefighting activity on the balance and coordination of firefighters. Training protocols that include agility training would also benefit the firefighter and alleviate some of the risk of trips and falls on the fire ground, a substantial origin of firefighter injury.

Lastly, it is important (from a physiological standpoint) to recognize the wide range in numbers of fires worked between fire service organizations and the effect is has firefighter physical demand.

The physiological demand required to fight a structural fire is primarily determined by the structure. Essentially, the structure sets the demand level without regard to who is coming to fight the fire (career professional, volunteer, paid volunteer etc.). As such, achieving similar goals on the fire ground places the similar physical stresses on all firefighters. However, a firefighter working in a busy company of a large metropolitan department may be required to fight multiple fires in a single shift. This lies in sharp contrast to the rural unpaid volunteer who may only work a handful of structural fires in a year.

As observed in this study, the physical stress placed on the firefighter does not simply disappear when they leave the fire scene. Significant cardiovascular stress may be present for some time following an incident. Unfortunately, this places a substantial burden on firefighters who fight large numbers of fires. These firefighters do need to be held to a higher standard of physical preparedness in order for them to recover quickly and be able to meet the demands of the next incident. Achieving a level of physical preparedness that enables the firefighter to survive and function appropriately on a fire scene should be the starting point for firefighter physical training, not the goal!

As always, the healthier and more physically fit any firefighter is, the better. However, at a minimum, the firefighter needs to a healthy and physically fit citizen. With increasing physical stress (as determined by the number and character of fires they fight), higher fitness goals need to be set to ensure the firefighter is physically prepared. This would include increased levels of all health-related fitness components and the incorporation of performance- related components into physical training programs.

In conclusion, it appears that firefighting activity presents significant cardiovascular and respiratory stress.

  • Recent evidence suggests that a majority of the cardiovascular-related line of duty deaths are caused by underlying heart disease.
  • It is clear from the data collected here that fire scene work exposes the firefighter to a substantial potential for triggering cardiovascular events. Therefore, firefighters with pre-existing cardiovascular disease exposed to the physical and emotional stress of afire scene are in extreme risk of a experiencing a myocardial infarction, stroke or other cardiovascular system collapse.
  • The fire scene is alive with many potential complicating exposure factors (toxic gases, particulates etc.) and it is certainly possible that working on a fire scene may contribute to the progression of the disease state. However, the best defense against the progression of the disease is a health monitoring plan coupled with a sound physical training program, and adequate operating procedures to lessen exposures.
  • The National Fire Protection Association has issued guidelines for such programs and, in the case of physical training program, suggests they be made mandatory.

Although this guideline meets with resistance from every faction of the fire service, departments, unions, and firefighters alike, it is a simple fact that sound physical training programs are the only way line of duty deaths due to heart attacks are going to be reduced.

Download the Indy Physiology Study – Final Report

Video Gallery

You may view or download the below videos for your personal use. Videos can be played on computers using QuickTime and on iPods. Click videos to play in a new Web browser window. Note that the videos may take time open.

Click here to download the entire video. Please note that all downloads and online playing will take time.

 To download parts of the entire video, click on the individual links below. Files will play in QuickTime. If you do not have QuickTime, scroll to the bottom of the page for the QuickTime link. Also for instructions on how to download, scroll to the bottom of the page.

To watch the video from this Web page, click on the image below.

Study Video – This video shows how to assess fitness and design a training program. Videos below are listed in screen size, smallest to largest.

Fitness Assessment – Use this video to assess fitness level. Videos below are listed in screen size, smallest to largest.

Level Specific Workouts – Exercise videos for three different fitness levels. Videos below are listed in screen size, smallest to largest.

Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Flexibility Training – Exercise video to increase flexibility. Videos below are listed in screen size, smallest to largest.

Download instructions:

To download the video files for personal use, do the following:

  1. Right-click on the file link. For example, if downloading Flexibility-240×180, your mouse pointer should be over the link and the hand should be showing.
  2. Click Save Target As…
  3. The Save As window for the computer will open.
  4. Select a folder. My Videos is a good choice.
  5. Click the Save button in the Save As window.
  6. Wait for the video to download and save to the computer.

The videos will play in the software QuickTime, a free program. To download QuickTime click here: http://www.apple.com/quicktime/download/

Posted by on May 14, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "health and safety", fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, line-of-duty, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD 2007; Is This on Your Radar Screen?

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Technician I Kyle Wilson

Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report-Remembrance and Learnings

The Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire and Rescue published a comprehensive line of duty death report for Technician I Kyle R. Wilson on Saturday, January 26, 2008. Have your read it?

Technician I Wilson was the first line of duty death in the Department’s 41-year history. The Department shared the LODD Investigative Report to honor Kyle, and in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels.

Technician Kyle Robert Wilson was 24-years old and was born in Olney, Maryland. He grew up in Prince William County and graduated from Hylton High School and George Mason University. He was an avid baseball and softball player. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006.

  • Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County.

On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive.

  • Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure.
  • Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.

The Department of Fire and Rescue immediately formed a multi-dimensional investigation team following the incident. The investigation team was comprised of five Department of Fire and Rescue uniform personnel and two external members from area fire departments. For eight months, the team thoroughly examined the events that occurred at the Marsh Overlook fire incident and identify the factors involved with the line of duty death of Technician I Kyle Wilson. The resulting report represents thousands of hours of effort to analyze fire and rescue operations and is a factual representation of the events that occurred. The report also provides a frame work for organizational level improvements.

Time Line

  • The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be:
    • The initial arriving fire suppression force size.
    • The size up of fire development and spread.
    • The impact of high winds on fire development and spread.
    • The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials.
    • The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts.
    • The incident control and management.
    • The Marsh Overlook fire incident was an immense fire fueled by extremely flammable building material products and a vicious wind. It was an environment where information gathering and decision making had to be performed in the time measurement of seconds. During the chain of events that occurred and under severe circumstances, fire and rescue personnel performed at exceptional levels.
  • During the repeated attempts to reach and rescue Technician I Wilson, personnel displayed heroic efforts and jeopardized their own safety.
  • The Department will never forget the sacrifice that Technician Wilson made in an attempt to ensure others were safe.
  • By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure his sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire and rescue departments can avoid another similar occurrence.
  • It’s up to you to learn from this event and determine if there are lessons that can be applied to your organization and operations.

 

Resources and Report

NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments

  • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
  • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
  • Reference Data HERE

Overview

 

Incident

 

The Predictability of Performance; It's Occupany Risk not Occupancy Type

 

Today’s incident demands on the fireground are unlike those of the recent past, requiring incident commanders and commanding officers to have increased technical knowledge of building construction with a heightened sensitivity to fire behavior, a focus on operational structural stability and considerations related to occupancy risk versus the occupancy type.

There is an immediate need for today’s emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their foundation of knowledge and insights related to the modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to adjust and modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions.

Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk, not occupancy type, and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumptive fire behavior.

The dramatic changes in buildings and occupancies over the past ten years have resulted inadequate fire suppression methodologies based upon conventional practices that do not align with the manner in which we used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions.

We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system and given an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions, we can safely and effectively mitigate a structural fire situation in any  given building type and occupancy.

Past operational experiences, both favorable and negative; gave us experiences that define and determine how the fireground is assessed, react and how we expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future; this formed the basis for the naturalistic decision-making process.

Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built upon nine decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

Are you aware of the defining changes in structural systems and support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of the fire-loading package in today’s buildings and occupancies? When was the last time you were out in the street with the companies, or spent some time doing a walk-through of construction or renovations site? Have you asked you commanding officers, division or battalion chief or your company officers for insights into what operational demands and risks are being imposed upon them while operating in the street and within the buildings, occupancies and structures that comprise your jurisdiction?

The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed; but no one has told us. The IAFC Safety, Health & Survival Section (SH&S) spent that past year refining and updating The IAFC Ten Rules of Structural Fire Engagement. First published in 2001, the original Ten Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting provided a set of principles and parameters that incident commanders, commanding and company officers could utilize and implement during incident operations to decrease operations risk, increase and The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety will provide a crucial link towards integrating occupancy risk considerations with more educated and informed understandings of buildings, occupancies, and the behavior of fire with a structure.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned command and company officer knows that at times. It’s what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances.

However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective; aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal-oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed strategic processes that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

Today’s incident commanders need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling, while implementing Tactical Patience.

Think about the following;

  • Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
  • Take a tour of your response area, district, community or city.
  • Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that are affecting your incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
  • Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory
  • Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
  • Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type and align your operations and deployments to match those risks
  • Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling
  • Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of  conducting fire service operations
  • Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going to do about that gap?

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies … You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

BECOME SAFE Buildingsonfire.com

Posted by on April 16, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, failures, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Provisional 2010 Firefighter LODD Fatality Statistics

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There were 85 LODD in the United States in 2010

Provisional 2010 Firefighter Fatality Statistics

The United States Fire Administration (USFA) recently released the Provisional 2010 Firefighter Fatality Statistics.

According to the report there were 85 onduty firefighter fatalities in the United States as a result of incidents that occurred in 2010, a 6 percent decrease from the 90 fatalities reported for 2009.

The 85 fatalities were spread across 31 states.

  • Illinois experienced the highest number of fatalities (9).
  • In addition to Illinois, only New York (8),
  • Ohio (8),
  • Pennsylvania (7), and
  • Kansas (5) had 5 or more firefighter fatalities.

Heart attacks and strokes were responsible for the deaths of 51 firefighters (60%) in 2010, nearly the same proportion of firefighter deaths from heart attack or stroke (58%) in 2009.

Nine onduty firefighters died in association with wildland fires, about half the number that died in association with wildland fires in 2009 and a third of the 26 such fatalities in 2008.

Forty-eight percent of all firefighter fatalities occurred while performing emergency duties.

Eleven firefighters died in 2010 as the result of vehicle crashes, down substantially from 16 deaths in 2009, and for the first time since 1999, none the of the deaths involved aircraft. Four firefighters in 2010 died in accidents involving firefighters responding in personal vehicles. Seven firefighter deaths involved fire department apparatus, one of which was a double firefighter fatality incident.

These 2010 firefighter fatality statistics are provisional and may change as the USFA contacts State Fire Marshals to verify the names of firefighters reported to have died onduty during 2010.

The final number of firefighter fatalities will be reported in USFA’s annual firefighter fatality report, expected to be available by July.

  • 2010 Firefighter Fatality Provisional Statistics (PDF, 11 Kb) HERE
  • 2010 Firefighter Fatality Provisional Statistics (Text, 4 Kb) HERE
  • USFA 2010 LODD Fatality Notices, HERE
  • USFA 2011 LODD Fatality Notices, HERE

2010 Line of Duty

As Report From the USFA web Site

Firefighter’s Name City, State Date of Death
Hardy, Tom  Athens, Michigan 12/31/2010 
Adamo, Kenneth  Elmwood Park, New Jersey 12/28/2010 
Stringer, Edward  Chicago, Illinois 12/22/2010 
Ankum, Corey  Chicago, Illinois 12/22/2010 
Null, Chad  Sullivan, Indiana 12/16/2010 
Tuberville, Jimmy  Milledgeville, Tennessee 12/13/2010 
Denton, Dillon C. Lancaster, South Carolina 12/07/2010 
Valentino, Gary M. Brooklyn, New York 11/26/2010 
Marshall, Jr., Kenneth  Rehoboth, Massachusetts 11/25/2010 
Sanchez, Fernando  South Sacramento, California 11/23/2010 
Hall, Worne T. Hitchins, Kentucky 11/19/2010 
Zobel, Chance  Columbia, South Carolina 11/13/2010 
Gumbert, James  North Irwin, Pennsylvania 11/10/2010 
Murray, Leonard Arthur Nashville, Indiana 11/05/2010 
Drake, Rick  Taylorsville, Indiana 11/01/2010 
Cummins, Gary L. Brocton, Illinois 10/31/2010 
Quinn, Kevin  Dayton, Ohio 10/30/2010 
Bachinsky, Bruce  Waterbury, Connecticut 10/26/2010 
Davenport, Randall Scott Marshall, Missouri 10/24/2010 
Wilson, Daniel C. Curtice, Ohio 10/23/2010 
Akin, Jr., William  Ghent, New York 10/19/2010 
Saunders, Jim  Sacramento, California 10/07/2010 
Innes, Thomas  Hindsboro, Illinois 10/03/2010 
Hall, Robert  Lynchburg, Ohio 09/27/2010 
Mosley, Edward  Morgan, Texas 09/26/2010 
Stephan, Ronald W. Lynn, Indiana 09/25/2010 
Seitz, Ryan Neil McArthur, Ohio 09/24/2010 
Clark, William Harold “Hal” Atlantic, Virginia 09/24/2010 
Johnson, Mark  Hinsdale, Illinois 09/20/2010 
Owen, James M. Irvine, California 09/16/2010 
Kelly, John  Tarrytown, New York 09/06/2010 
Suiter, Larry  Lorraine, Kansas 09/04/2010 
Farrington, Douglas  Delta, Pennsylvania 08/23/2010 
Littleton, Jonathan Lewis “Johnny” Pine Level, North Carolina 08/20/2010 
Wheatley, Christopher  Chicago, Illinois 08/09/2010 
Adams, Christopher W. Little Rock, Arkansas 08/02/2010 
Costello, Steven N. Burlington, Vermont 07/30/2010 
Altice, William Daniel “Danny” Rocky Mount, Virginia 07/26/2010 
Dillon, Posey  Rocky Mount, Virginia 07/26/2010 
Sullivan, David  Otis, Massachusetts 07/25/2010 
Velasquez, Steven John Bridgeport, Connecticut 07/24/2010 
Baik, Michel  Bridgeport, Connecticut 07/24/2010 
Springman, Richard L. Trout Run, Pennsylvania 07/14/2010 
Hornberger, Charles  Milmont Park, Pennsylvania 07/12/2010 
Smith, Douglas L. Williamstown, Pennsylvania 07/09/2010 
Flintom, Charles “Bob” Robert Greer, South Carolina 07/04/2010 
Araguz III, Thomas  Wharton, Texas 07/03/2010 
Fouts, V, Frank William Kankakee, Illinois 07/01/2010 
Brown, Jay C. Eastman, Georgia 06/27/2010 
Bauermeister, Chet  Mesa, Washington 06/23/2010 
Davis, Scott W. Oswego, New York 06/20/2010 
Eckert, Edward  Manahawkin, New Jersey 06/06/2010 
Schneider Jr., Donald A. Belleville, Wisconsin 05/29/2010 
Meusel, Kurt  Scales Mound, Illinois 05/22/2010 
Curlin, David  Pine Bluff, Arkansas 05/22/2010 
Glaser, John  Shawnee, Kansas 05/22/2010 
IRR, David  Yuma, Arizona 05/22/2010 
Johnson, Paul  Fort Cobb, Oklahoma 05/19/2010 
Caldwell, Donnie  Ghent, West Virginia 05/13/2010 
Polimine, John  Windber, Pennsylvania 05/01/2010 
Crannell, Steven Scott Guthrie Center, Iowa 04/22/2010 
Iaccino, Vincent  Hyde Park, New York 04/12/2010 
Loomis, Garrett  Sackets Harbor, New York 04/11/2010 
Reed, Sr., Harold  Peru, Kansas 04/11/2010 
Schaper, Donald E Gainsville, Missouri 04/09/2010 
Powell, Leo  Lucasville, Ohio 04/03/2010 
Teare, Edward  Independence, Ohio 03/31/2010 
Robinson, Dennis  Tucson, Arizona 03/31/2010 
Carey, Brian  Homewood, Illinois 03/30/2010 
Moore, John P. Columbus, Ohio 03/29/2010 
Bolick, Jeremy  Blowing Rock, North Carolina 03/21/2010 
Wright, Tommy  Blowing Rock, North Carolina 03/21/2010 
Adkins, Donald “Donnie”  Glasgow, West Virginia 03/13/2010 
Swan, Kevin  Beacon Falls, Connecticut 03/10/2010 
Marcheterre, Gerard  Skaneateles, New York 03/06/2010 
Rowe, Brian  West Fork, Maine 03/05/2010 
Waynant, Sr., Brian P. Wilmington, Delaware 03/01/2010 
Siemers, Jonathan  Clay Center, Kansas 02/21/2010 
Mellott, Donald G. Woolrich, Pennsylvania 02/12/2010 
Giles, Stanley L. Linn Valley, Kansas 02/10/2010 
Coyle, John  Priest River, Idaho 02/08/2010 
Sandy, Henry  Batesville, Arkansas 01/26/2010 
Cannon, Terry  Louisville, Kentucky 01/17/2010 
McCafferty, Joseph Mack Lancaster, Ohio 01/16/2010 
Thompson, Jerry  Union, Mississippi 01/14/2010 
Kemp, Leroy  Tioga Center, New York 01/13/2010 
Eck, Urban Aloyisous Wichita, Kansas 01/02/2010 

 

Links of Interest

  • NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program
  • National Fallen Firefighters Foundation
  • EveryoneGoesHome.com
  • Firefighter Close Calls.com
  • Buildingsonfire.com
  • IAFC Safety, Health and Survival
  • National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System
    • Posted by on March 30, 2011 • Filed under: Building Construction for the Fire Srvice, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, fire service, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, research, statistics, Uncategorized, USFA • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Chesapeake (VA) Auto Parts Store Roof Collapse Double LODD 1996

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    Roof Collapse Chesapeake VA 1996 Double LODD

    OVERVIEW

    Fifteen years ago, on March 18, 1996, two firefighters were killed in Chesapeake, Virginia when they became trapped by a rapidly spreading fire in an auto parts store and a pre-engineered wood truss roof assembly collapsed on them. The cause of the fire was an electrical short created when a power company truck working in the rear of the building drove away with its boom in an elevated position, accidentally pulling an electrical feed line from the main breaker panel at the rear of the store.

    Post-incident investigations indicate that the electrical fault may have sparked multiple points of fire origin throughout the roof structure of the building, due to improperly grounded wiring. At the time of the report issuance, this was exemplified as another incident illustrating the rapid failure of lightweight construction systems when key support components are involved in a fire. The report pointed out the importance of prefire planning and accurate size up by fire companies to determine the risk factors associated with a fire in this type of construction.

    Lessons regarding importance of initial company actions, constant re-evaluation of action plans, strong command and coordination of units on the fireground, and recognition of signs of impending structural failure were also reinforced.

    Fifteen years later, reading through any number of NIOSH, USFA or NFPA reports, similar issues, challenges and operational factors resonate and continue to shape and challenge today’s fire ground operations.

    It is without exception that the knowledge and insights being gained by the recent and past UL and NIST Research Studies coupled with the recommendations, from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (HERE)

    Today’s fire ground is changing at a very rapid pace as it relates to the continued evolution, transition of engineered structural components and systems (ESS). Are you prepared, knowledgeable and understand that new strategic and tactical approaches are required?   

    One of the most significant actions initiated by the Chesapeake Fire Department was the implementation of a Truss Identification Program (TIP). Take a look at a past posting on CommandSafety.com where we published on an overview of truss and engineering component systems across the United States HERE. 

    City of Chesapeake (VA) Truss ID Program, HERE

     The following are excerpts and narrative from the USFA Technical Report Series TR-087 and NIOSH Report 96-17

    Aerial View 2010 Shopping Center Layout

     

    SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES 

    Staffing : The first alarm response provided a small attack force with limited capabilities. The full response brought only 10 personnel. 

    Size-up : The first arriving company officer was not able to determine the location and extent of the hidden fire. 

    Pre-fire plan information: This complex required a pre-fire plan due to the complex arrangement, multiple occupancies, mixed construction, lack of fixed protection, limited access and difficult water supply problems. The first-due company did carry a pre-fire plan that showed the layout of the shopping center and the floor plan for the auto parts store, but the prefire plan was not referenced by the crew during the fire. 

    Delayed response: The first arriving company was on the scene alone for several minutes with only 3 personnel. The back-up companies had long response times. The lack of evidence of a working fire prompted the initial incident commander to return some of the responding units, resulting in even longer response times. 

    Water supply: The first-in company did not establish a water supply. This required the second engine company to be committed to this task. 

    Incident command: The battalion chief was faced with a complicated and rapidly changing situation. He was not able to effectively transfer command from the initial officer and direct the operations of widely separated units. 

    Operational risk management:The officers involved in the initial part of the operation had to make critical risk management decisions with limited information. 

    Accountability: Accountability for the personnel operating in the hazardous area was not established prior to the structural collapse. As the situation became critical, no one realized that a crew was still inside the building. 

    Rapid intervention crew:  Additional crews did not arrive in time to assist the crew that was in trouble inside the building. 

    Radio communications: The lack of a clear radio channel for fire ground communications caused serious problems with command and control of the incident, including the failure to maintain communications with the crew inside and the failure to hear their request for assistance. 

    Lightweight construction: The roof collapsed quickly and with very little warning. This should be anticipated with a lightweight wood truss roof assembly. This hazard was not recognized by the crews on the scene. 

    BUILDING DESCRIPTION - Construction and History 

    The fire occurred in a modern, lightweight construction building that was added to an existing strip mall in 1984. The older mall on exposure side four was separated from the fire building by a masonry fire wall and was constructed with masonry walls and a steel bar-joist roof structure. The exposures on side two consisted of additional stores that were similar in construction to the auto parts store. There were no exposures on sides one and three. 

    The auto parts store was constructed with two masonry exterior walls and two wood frame exterior walls, with a lightweight wood truss roof assembly. It was approximately 120 feet deep and 50 feet wide, providing about 6,000 square feet of open display and storage space. The roof assembly was a pre-engineered lightweight wood truss assembled from 2 x 6 top and bottom chords, with 2 x 4 web members held together with metal gusset plates. 

    • There were no interior bearing walls or supports for the roof structure. At one end, the trusses were supported by a wood plate that was bolted to a metal beam.
    • The other end rested on top of the concrete block wall. Each truss was separated by 24 inches and they were covered with 1/2 inch CDX plywood sheathing under a two-ply rubber membrane.
    • A drywall ceiling was attached to the underside of the trusses, creating a truss void space (truss loft) 24 to 36 inches above the ceiling.
    • A sheet rock divider was located in the middle of the truss void as a draft stop. The roof had a slight pitch.
    • Three air handling units were on the roof of the building, with an estimated combined weight of 3,000 pounds. It is not known when these units were installed and they may have represented an unanticipated dead load on the roof assembly.
    • There was no indication that the trusses had been reinforced to support the extra weight of these units.
    • The original truss roof structure collapsed during the construction of the building, injuring three workers.
    • Most of the trusses were damaged and had to be replaced at the time. The fire building was occupied by Advance Auto Parts, a chain distributor of automobile part and lubricants. The store was designed with an open retail area containing display racks for goods.
    • A long counter ran from front to back behind which was shelving for additional auto parts. Waste oil and batteries were kept in a rear storage area separated from the front of the store by a drywall wall.
    • The southwest corner of the building contained employee restrooms which had a small water heater located in the ceiling space just above them. The main entrance to the store was through two large glass doors at the front of the building. A delivery and service entrance was located in the rear and a 40 foot trailer was parked behind the building and used for additional storage.

    THE FIRE 

    At approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 18, 1996, a power company employee set up a service truck at the rear of the Indian River Shopping Center in Chesapeake, Virginia. The worker was going to disconnect the electrical power to a customer who had not paid an electrical bill. The customer, a cocktail lounge and bar, was located adjacent to Advance Auto Parts. In preparing to disconnect service, the power company worker elevated the articulating boom on his truck to roof level. Faced with the immediate loss of power, an employee of the lounge paid the electrical bill while the power company employee was beginning work, and went to the back of the store to show the receipt. 

    A stamped receipt indicates the bill was paid at 11:16 a.m. at a supermarket also located in the shopping center. The power company employee, working from the bucket of the articulating boom, lowered the boom and verified the receipt. Although the bucket had been lowered, the hinged elbow of the articulating boom remained elevated. The employee then radioed his supervisor from the cab of his truck, and received instructions not to disconnect power. 

    The power company employee then attempted to drive the service truck away, forgetting to secure the boom, which snagged on a power line feeding the meter at the rear of the Advance Auto Parts Store. This caused a phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground arcing fault at the store’s electrical meter, starting the fire. The power company employee immediately stopped, exited his truck, and cut the remaining power connections to the meter at the rear of Advance Auto Parts. 

    Initial Actions Prior to Calling 911 

    After cutting the power line to the building, the power company employee removed the meter, noticed smoke coming from the meter base, notified his office and requested that another power company crew and a supervisor come and assist him. 

    • An employee of the Advance Auto Parts Store came to the rear of the building and met the power company employee, telling him that the store had lost electrical power and that a fire was being extinguished inside the building.
    • Another Advance Auto Parts employee discharged a dry chemical fire extinguisher on the spot fire that had started near the hot water heater above the employee restrooms.
    • All believed the fire had been extinguished at this time.
    • At 11:29 a.m., the Chesapeake Fire and Police Emergency Operations Center received a 911 call from Advance Auto Parts reporting a problem with the fuse box in the store.
    • The Chesapeake Fire Department was dispatched to a report of a fuse box sparking at 4345 Indian River Road at the Advance Auto Parts store.

    Emergency Response 

    • Initial response consisted of two engines, a ladder company, and a battalion chief, for a total of 10 personnel.
    • Engine 3 was the first due arriving company, responding from quarters. Engine 1 and Ladder 2 also responded.
    • Battalion 1 was dispatched as the command officer, but requested that Battalion 2 cover the assignment, since he was out of position.
    • Battalion 2 acknowledged the request, and he responded with the first alarm companies.
    • Engine 3’s crew consisted of three personnel: a driver/pump operator; Firefighter- Specialist John Hudgins, serving as Acting Lieutenant for the shift; and Firefighter- Specialist Frank Young, detailed to the station for the day, was riding in the jump seat. Engine 3 was responding in a reserve engine that had a 500 gallon water tank.

     

    Initial Size-Up and Company Actions 

    At approximately 11:35 a.m., about five and a half minutes after dispatch, Engine 3 arrived on the scene at the front of the strip mall. 

    • Hudgins reported “a single-story commercial structure, nothing showing from the front. Engine 3 is in command.”
    • Engine 3 took a position in front of the Advance Auto Parts Store. Hudgins and Young entered the structure from the front of the building to investigate.
    • Conditions were clear in the store, and there was no visible smoke or flames showing. They discovered light smoke near the electrical panel in the rear of the building, and radioed to Battalion 2 that they had a fire and were checking for extension.
    • Acting Lieutenant Hudgins then radioed for Engine 3’s driver to reposition the apparatus to the rear of the building.
    • Hudgins then radioed to Battalion 2, who had not yet arrived on the scene, that Engine 3 and Ladder 2 could handle the incident. Battalion 2 and Engine 1, the second due engine company, both went in service.

     Engine 3 Reports They Are Trapped, Roof Collapses 

    At approximately 11:49 a.m., almost 20 minutes after the initial dispatch time, Hudgins radioed that he and Young could not get out of the building. Battalion 2 radioed back that he could not understand their transmission. Hudgins then radioed that they needed someone to come to the front of the building and get them out. Again unable to understand their transmission, Battalion 2 radioed for any unit on the fireground to advise him if they heard the message that was transmitted. 

    • Engine 4 responded that they were unable to copy the transmission.
    • Engine 14 then marked on the scene and was instructed by Battalion 2 to lay a supply line to the front of the building. Battalion 1, enroute to the fire on the second alarm, radioed to Battalion 2 that it sounded like someone was trapped inside.
    • Battalion 3, also enroute, radioed that he would be on the scene momentarily and would assist.

    At this time, Ladder 2’s crew was setting the outriggers and preparing to elevate their aerial ladder for defensive operations. 

    • In the short time it took to accomplish the stabilization of the ladder truck, the front of the store became fully involved, the building contents ignited, and the roof collapsed.
    • Due to the radiant heat, Ladder 2 was forced to retract their outriggers and reposition to a safer defensive position on side one of the structure, and set up the aerial again.
    • Ladder 2’s crew did not hear Engine 3’s transmission that they were trapped.
    • Simultaneously, Engine 1 ran out of supply line about 200 feet short of the hydrant. Engine 2, responding on the second alarm, picked up the hydrant that Engine 1 was attempting to reach and laid a supply line to side one.
    • The driver of Engine 1 attempted to contact his officer by radio to advise that he could not reach the hydrant, but could not get through due to heavy radio traffic.
    • He parked the engine in the roadway, donned his SCBA, and went to the rear of the building to report to his Captain and rejoin his crew.
    • Battalion 3 arrived on side one about this time and radioed for all companies to switch to channel two, an alternate fireground tactical frequency.

    Driven by the northerly wind and the draft created by the burning contents of the structure, the fire at the rear had grown in such intensity that personnel were forced to move Engine 3. Assisted by employees of the power company, Engine 3 was moved back away from the rear of the building. At 11:55 a.m., about 26 minutes after dispatch, the Captain of Engine 1, with his crew at the rear of the building, confirmed to Battalion 2 that “I got men on the inside from Engine 3, and the lines have been burned. I do not know their status, and we still have no water to go in after them.” 

    Battalion 3 met with Battalion 2 and discussed that they may have lost a crew inside. Battalion 3 assumed command and Battalion 2 went to the rear of the building to coordinate rescue efforts. There, Battalion 2 met with the Captain from Engine 1. 

    By this time, the building was fully involved and no rescue efforts could be mounted until the fire was knocked down. Officers at the front and the rear attempted to conduct a personnel accountability report (PAR) to determine who was missing and where they might be located. 

    • An engine company responding on mutual aid from the Virginia Beach Fire Department was flagged down, connected to Engine 1’s supply line, and completed the water supply to a hydrant behind the shopping center within the City of Virginia Beach. Engine 3 was forced to move back once again, and the supply line was disconnected from Engine 3 and used to supply water to Engine 4, a telesquirt that was positioned for defensive operations at the rear.

    Extinguishment and Body Recovery 

    The fire spread to the attic of the exposures on side two and was held in check by the fire wall on side four of the building. The fire was brought under control as the contents of the auto parts store burned off and several aerial streams were put into operation. After the fire was extinguished, a search for the missing firefighters was initiated. After the bodies of the firefighters were located, they were  removed from the fire building by members of the Virginia Beach Fire Department, and transferred by members of the Chesapeake Fire Department to medic units. 

    The body recovery was supervised by the Chesapeake Fire Department Fire Marshal’s Office and documented. An investigation was immediately started by the Chesapeake Fire Department Fire Marshal. 

    ANALYSIS 

    Fire Cause and Flame Spread 

    • The fire was caused by the electrical short created when the power company truck struck the power line to the building. Investigation by the City of Chesapeake Electrical Inspector after the fire revealed that the meter contained wiring that appeared to have been tampered with and did not comply with the electrical code.
    • Several connections at the meter had been double-lugged, connecting multiple wires to single terminals. Additional investigation by Virginia Power revealed that the building may have been improperly grounded, leading to numerous hot connections when the short circuit occurred. The main fuse did not trip at the breaker panel and the wiring on all three air handling units had been fused. This probably resulted in the ignition of multiple spot fires in the truss loft above the store.
    • It appears that the fires in the truss loft were still relatively minor when Engine 3 arrived, but the fire spread rapidly throughout the space due to the light wood construction.
    • The wind drawn from the open doors at the front of the building also promoted rapid fire growth. This would have created a tremendous hidden fire in the wood truss loft area despite clear conditions inside the structure.
    • Reports of heavy smoke and fire conditions on the roof at the same time Engine 3’s crew was calling for pike poles and personnel to come inside are indications towards this scenario.
    • The interior of the auto parts store contained racks of auto parts and supplies, including oil, lubricants, rubber, and plastic parts. The contents were packed closely together and stored in tall racks near the ceiling.
    • Once the fire had broken through the ceiling in the rear of the building, these contents would have quickly reached their ignition temperatures, creating flashover conditions in the rear of the store as the fire progressed, trapping the firefighters and forcing them to seek an exit at the front of the store.

    Roof Collapse 

    • The collapse of the pre-engineered truss roof occurred approximately 21 minutes after the time of dispatch, and within 35 minutes of the initial accident, that caused the electrical short.
    • The structure appears to have collapsed within 10 to 12 minutes after the truss space became heavily involved.
    • The collapse of similar truss assemblies under fire conditions within this time period has been well documented.
    • Post-incident investigations indicate that this truss assembly may have been weakened by deficiencies in the connection of the trusses to the beam on the east side of the building.
    • Also, the dead load of the three air conditioning units may have contributed to the rapid failure of the roof.
    • Reports from firefighters on the scene indicate that a partial failure of the truss assembly may have occurred in the rear of the building, followed shortly by the failure of the entire roof assembly.
    • It is possible that the crew of Engine 3 was trapped by the partial collapse of the roof in the rear, or by the collapse of racks containing auto parts in the building, or by the rapid spread of the fire and smoke which had broken through the ceiling.
    • It is also possible that a combination of these events occurred simultaneously. The failure of the entire roof assembly and complete involvement of the interior of the building with fire took place within one minute after the firefighters radioed for help, before any reaction to assist them could take place.

      

      

    Fire Operations 

      

    Initial Response - The first alarm assignment was overwhelmed by the situation, the circumstances, and the unusual sequence of events that occurred at this incident. It is evident that a larger force would have been needed to initiate an effective offensive or defensive operation for a working fire in a 6,000 square foot commercial occupancy, with attached exposures on two sides, with or without the unusual complications. 

    • The response of two engine companies, one ladder company and a battalion chief, provided a total of 25 only 10 personnel on the initial assignment.
    • The individual companies, which responded with three person crews, had limited capabilities to perform tasks independently.
    • This incident generated only a single call to 9-1-1 reporting an electrical problem.

      

     

    LESSONS LEARNED AND REINFORCED  

    1. RISK ASSESSMENT is the primary responsibility of the incident commander. 

    This incident presented a very high risk to the firefighters who were attempting to make an interior attack. However, the risk factors were not recognized and the interior crew was not directed to abandon the building. Risk assessment should be a continual process, particularly when a situation is changing very quickly. 

    2. ACCOUNTABILITY is an essential function of the Incident Command System. 

    The location and operation of the initial attack crew was not tracked according to the incident command system that was in effect at the time of the fire. The system must keep track of the location, function, status, and assignment of every individual unit or company operating at the scene of an emergency incident. In order to be effective, the accountability process must be routinely initiated at the beginning of every incident and updated as the incident progresses and units are reassigned to different tasks. 

    3. TACTICAL RADIO CHANNELS are essential for firefighter safety. 

    The fireground operations were conducted on the same radio channel as the routine dispatch and transfer of additional units, hampering the fireground communications during the important early stages of the incident. Designated radio channels should be set aside specifically for communications between the incident commander and the units operating at the scene of an incident. The exchange of information, orders, instructions, warnings, and progress reports is essential to support safe and effective operations. Tactical channels should be assigned early and routinely to avoid the confusion that occurs when units that are already working are directed to switch to a different radio channel. 

    4. FIRE OPERATIONS must be limited to those functions that can be performed safely with the number of personnel that are available at the scene of an incident. 

    The initial response to this incident did not provide enough resources to safely initiate an effective interior attack for the situation that was encountered. The first arriving company initiated interior operations that could not be adequately performed or supported with the limited number of personnel at the scene or responding. The delayed arrival of back-up companies increased the risk exposure of the first due company. The situation called for a more conservative initial attack plan and/or an early retreat when the magnitude of the fire became evident. 

    5. WATER SUPPLY is a critical component of a safe and successful operation. 

    The failed attempt to establish an adequate and reliable water supply for the interior attack was a critical problem at this incident. This task occupied the second due engine company which was needed to provide either a back-up hose line to support the interior attack or a rapid intervention crew. 

    6. LIGHTWEIGHT WOOD TRUSS CONSTRUCTION is prone to rapid failure under fire conditions. 

    If the construction of the building had been known or recognized, the early failure of the roof structure should have been anticipated and the interior crew should have been withdrawn. This requires pre-fire planning to identify high risk properties and a reliable system to label the building or to inform the responding units of the risk factors of the building. It is usually difficult or impossible to make this determination when the building is burning.

    Aerial View of the Current Auto Parts Store 2010

     

    USFA Technical Report Series Incident Report: Tr-087 
    NFPA 1996 Report Summary Sheet: NFPAChesapeake

    Chesapeake fire dept. dedicates station to fallen members 2009; HERE

    Chesapeake FD Station Number 9: HERE

    Posted by on March 19, 2011 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, Engineered Structural Systems, firefighting-operations, fires, first-due, History Repeating Event, LODD, NIOSH, pre-planning • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire; Final NIST Report Issued

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    The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released its final report on its study of the June 18, 2007, fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., that trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter deaths in a single event since 9/11. The final report was strengthened by clarifications and supplemental text based on comments provided by organizations and individuals in response to the draft report of the study, released for public comment on Oct. 28, 2010. (HERE) 

    The revisions did not alter the study team’s main finding: the major factors contributing to the rapid spread of the fire at the Sofa Super Store were large open spaces with furniture providing high-fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows, and a lack of sprinklers. 

    Based on its findings, the study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes. These codes are used as models for building and fire regulations promulgated and enforced by U.S. state and local jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions have the option of incorporating some or all of the code’s provisions but often adopt most provisions. 

    If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented. 

    • Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).
    • Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.
    • Two of the recommendations in the draft report were slightly modified to increase their effectiveness.
    • The recommendation “that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard” was improved by listing three nationally accepted certification examinations as examples of “how professional qualification may be demonstrated.”
    • Another recommendation has been enhanced by urging state and local jurisdictions to “provide education to firefighters on the science of fire behavior in vented and non-vented structures and how the addition of air can impact the burning characteristics of the fuel.”

    Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:

    • The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
    • During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
    • The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
    • The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
    • When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
    • The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
    • Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.

    NIST is working with various public and private groups toward implementing changes to practices, standards, and building and fire codes based on the findings from this study. 

    The complete text of the final report, Volumes I and II, may be downloaded as Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) files from the links below; 

      

      

    Other Resources on the Charleston Fire from NIST Here; 

    jurisdictions have the option of incorporating some or all of the code’s provisions but generally adopt most provisions. 

    Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire

    1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised. 

    2.   Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address: 

    a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
    b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
    c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
    d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
    e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions. 

    3.  Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031. 

    4.  Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision: 

    a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
    b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet). 

    5.  Comprehensive Risk Management Plans:  NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to: 

    a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
    b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
    c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks. 

    6.  Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities:  

    a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
    b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground. 

    7.  Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are: 

    a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
    b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
    c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires. 

    8.  Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are: 

    a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
    b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
    c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
    d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service.  

    9.  Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to: 

    a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
    b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective. 

    10.  Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to: 

    a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
    b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations. 

    11.  Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to: 

    a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
    b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
    c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies. 

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Posted by on March 17, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, fire behavior, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    The Strand Theatre Fire Brockton (MA) 1941; 13 Firefighter LODD

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    The Strand Theater, Brockton, MA

    Strand Theatre Background 

    The Strand Theatre was first erected in 1915 on the site of a previous theatre which was destroyed by fire on April 7, 1915. The Strand Theatre opened in March, 1916 on School Street between Main Street and City Hall in Brockton. It replaced another theatre that was destroyed by fire April 7, 1915. With a seating capacity of 1,685, it was the largest playhouse in the City. 

    When opened, the Strand Theatre was considered a leader in modern fire safety. The stage area included a dry pipe sprinkler system termed “fireproof” and the surface exits were 20% more than state law requirements. 

    Located on an irregular lot, the Theatre measured 139 feet deep and 60 feet tall. The walls were made of brick and the roof was made up of wood boards on joists supported by unprotected steel trusses. The interior walls were metal lath and plaster as was the ceiling, which was suspended from the trusses. The balcony covered a large area above the auditorium and housed a manager’s office, usher’s room and rest rooms. The area under the auditorium was dead space with the exception of the west end of the basement where finished rooms contained the furnace, ventilation equipment and a janitor’s room. The lobby was an open area with two open stairwells on each end providing access to the balcony. A long corridor connected the Theatre lobby to School Street. 

    In August, 1937, the Strand Theatre underwent extensive remodeling and improvements under new management. The building remained intact under the new management until the fire occurred in 1941. 

    March 10, 1941: The Stand Theatre Fire 

    In the heart of Brockton’s business district, people usually flocked to the downtown area to shop or take in a show in what was a busy part of the city. Sunday, March 9, 1941, like all other Sundays, drew large crowds looking for the entertainment of a movie or vaudeville show. That evening the Strand showed the double feature, “Hoosier School Boy” starring Mickey Rooney, followed by “Secret Evidence,” a crime drama. 

    Long after the curtain had closed and the crowds had filtered out, a custodian discovered a fire burning in the Theatre basement and instructed his helper to activate the fire alarm box located at Main and High Street. At 12:38 a.m., the fire department received Box 1311 and sent the first alarm apparatus to the scene. A second alarm followed shortly after the first, and finally a general alarm was sounded bringing all of Brockton’s apparatus to the Strand Theatre. 

    When firefighters first arrived on the scene, the fire did not seem very serious. However, as time progressed, the fire gained headway. This became more apparent to those on the outside of the theatre than crews working inside. 

    Crews knocked down the fire in the basement with cellar pipes while flames raced through the vertical voids in the walls and ventilation ducts. Firefighters worked feverishly to extinguish hidden fire while crews opened walls and ceilings in the lobby and under the balcony. A number of men moved up to the balcony to attack the fire which had made its way to the auditorium ceiling just below the roof. 

    The first signs of visible outside fire erupted from the southwest corner of the building as outside crews played a large hose-line on the exposed flames. Firefighters on the balcony continued their efforts to expose the fire within the ceiling as hose streams were directed overhead from the auditorium floor. 

    Less than one hour later, the Strand Theatre Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Brockton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapsed, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters. 

    Roof Collapse

    Uninjured firefighters worked tirelessly to save their fellow brothers despite the danger and fear of another collapse. Eventually, fire departments from neighboring towns relieved Brockton firefighters. 

    No definite cause for the fire was ever discovered. Initial reports of arson proved to be inconclusive. Further investigation revealed that the unprotected steel roof trusses played a major role in the collapse. The heat of the fire within the concealed space between the roof and the auditorium ceiling was believed to have distorted the steel trusses, causing them to buckle and separate with ease. Experts questioned the effectiveness of the construction and design used in the roof assembly. Some reports state that the weight of a previous snowfall may have added to the collapse. However, witness accounts and photographs indicate a minimal amount of snow. 

    March 10, 1941 Newspaper Headlines

    Every year on March 10th a commemorative service is held at Brockton City Hall to honor the 13 Brockton firefighters who made the ultimate sacrifice that winter night: 

    • Captain John F. Carroll –Ladder Company 3
    • Lieutenant Raymond A. Mitchell–Engine Company 4
    • Firefighter Roy A. McKeraghan–Squad A
    • Firefighter Denis P. Murphy–Squad A
    • Firefighter William J. Murphy–Squad A
    • Firefighter Daniel C. O’Brien–Squad A
    • Firefighter George A. Collins–Engine Company 1
    • Firefighter Frederick F. Kelley–Engine Company 1
    • Firefighter Martin E. Lipper–Engine Company 1
    • Firefighter Henry E. Sullivan–Engine Company 1
    • Firefighter Bartholomew Herlihy–Ladder Company 1
    • Firefighter Matthew E. McGeary–Ladder Company 3
    • Firefighter John M. McNeill–Ladder Company 1

     

    From Brockton IAFF Local 144 site, The following information is available:  

  • Strand Theatre Memorial Dedication
  •  67th Strand Theatre Tragedy Remembrance
  •  Strand Theater Remembered
  •  History
  •  May 10th Dedication
  •  Strand Theatre Memorial Video
  •  Boston Globe Article.. Strand Theatre Tragedy
  •  Background
  •  Scranton PA Local 60 Memorial Gift 

    •    

     

    Brockton’s Strand Theatre fire disaster recalled, HERE

    Firefighter Memorial

    Brockton Church Street today

     

    Posted by on March 10, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    The Ides of March

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    Operational Safety

    Here are five (5) NIOSH Firefighter LODD Event report summaries for incidents that occurred in the March 4th through the 8th time frame in the years 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008.   

    Take the time to look over the event summaries, discuss and comment on the factors that lead to the events and the recommendations formulated from the subsequent investigations.   

    Take the opportunity to identify the common themes and apparent causes that were identified and discuss with your company, team or station, relevant considerations that may have a direct or indirect relationship to your organization, past incident calls or district risk profile.   

    What are your capabilities?   

    What are your gaps?   

    How can you prevent a similar situation from occurring?

        

    Promote questions and dialog related to operational issues such as these;   

    • Coordinated multi-company operations; how “coordinated” is your incident scene?
    • Do rapidly changing incident conditions get identified promptly and communicated to Command in rapid succession for actions?
    • How effective is the base line knowledge and skill set of company and command officers in “reading the building”?
    • What is the adequacy of your training for conducting operations above the fire floor?
    • When was the last time you “tested” the effectiveness of your RIT/FAST Team? Can they truly perform under the most demanding of incident conditions?
    • When was the last time you trained or drilled on Fire Behavior or on Building Construction?
    • Are you training on calling the mayday and personal survival techniques?
    • Have you implemented and trained on procedures for rapid and efficient transition in operational modes on the fireground?
    • Do you implement a 360 when applicable?

    Down load the complete NIOSH Reports and expand on the lessons learners and their applicably to your organization and capabilities.    

    Manlius, New Yrok

    Floor Collapse and Fire Conditions:
    On March 7, 2002, a 28-year-old male volunteer fire fighter and a 41-year-old male career fire fighter died after becoming trapped in the basement. One firefighter manned the nozzle while second firefighter provided backup on the handline as they entered the house. After entering the structure, the floor collapsed, trapping both victims in the basement.   

    A career fire fighter captain joining the fire fighters near the time of the collapse was injured trying to rescue one of the fire fighters. Crew members responded immediately and attempted to rescue the victims; however, the heat and flames overcame both victims and eliminated any rescue efforts from the garage entrance.   

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;
       

    • Ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual responsible for the overall coordination and direction of all activities at an incident
    • Ensure that the Incident Commander conveys strategic decisions to all suppression crews on the fireground and continually reevaluates the fire condition
    • Ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
    • Ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts
    • Ensure that fire fighters report conditions and hazards encountered to their team leader or Incident Commander
    • Ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire

    NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200206.html    

        

    Wall Collapse and Fire Conditions
    On March 7, 2008, two male career fire fighters, aged 40 and 19 were killed when they were trapped by rapidly deteriorating fire conditions inside a millwork facility in North Carolina. The captain of the hose line crew was also injured, receiving serious burn injuries.   

    The victims were members of a crew of four fire fighters operating a hose line protecting a firewall in an attempt to contain the fire to the burning office area and keep it from spreading into the production and warehouse areas. The captain attempted to radio for assistance as the conditions deteriorated but fire fighters on the outside did not initially hear his Mayday. Once it was realized that the crew was in trouble, multiple rescue attempts were made into the burning warehouse in an effort to reach the trapped crew as conditions deteriorated further.   

    Three members of a rapid intervention team (RIT) were hurt rescuing the injured captain. One firefighter was located and removed during the fifth rescue attempt. The second firefighter could not be reached until the fire was brought under control.   

    The fourth crew member had safely exited the burning warehouse prior to the deteriorating conditions that trapped his fellow crew members. Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include radio communication problems (unintelligible transmissions in and out of the fire structure that may have led to misunderstanding of operational fireground communications), inadequate size up and incomplete pre-plan information, a deep-seated fire burning within the floor of the office area that was able to spread into the production and warehouse facility, the procedures used in which operational modes were repeatedly changed from offensive to defensive, lack of crew integrity at a critical moment in the event, and weather which restricted fireground visibility.   

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:   

    • Ensure that detailed pre-incident plan information is collected and available when needed, especially in high risk structures
    • Limit interior offensive operations in well-involved structures that are not equipped with sprinkler systems and where there are no known civilians in need of rescue
    • Develop, implement, and enforce clear procedures for operational modes. Changes in modes must be coordinated between the Incident Command, the command staff and fire fighters
    • Ensure that Rapid Intervention Crews (RIC) / Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT) have at least one charged hose line in place before entering hazardous environments for rescue operations
    • Ensure that the incident commander establishes the incident command post in an area that provides a good visual view of the fire building and enhances overall fireground communication
    • Ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
    • Encourage local building code authorities to adopt code requirements for automatic protection (sprinkler) systems in buildings with heavy fire loads.

    NIOSH REPORT http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200807.html    

      

    Floor Collapses in Residential Fire - North Carolina

        

    Floor Collapse
    On March 4, 2002, a 22-year-old male career fire fighter was injured and subsequently died and a 25-year-old male Captain was injured when the floor collapsed while they were fighting a residential fire.   

    The Captain was transported by ambulance to an area hospital where he was admitted overnight for first- and second-degree burns. The victim was conscious and was transported by medical helicopter to a State medical center where he died 2 days later.   

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;   

    • Ensure that each Incident Commander conducts a size-up of the incident before initiating fire-fighting efforts, after command is transferred, and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
    • Ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the dangers of searching above a fire
    • Ensure that an Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed
    • Ensure that ventilation is closely coordinated with fire attack
    • Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position immediately upon arrival
    • Ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to operate safely and effectively

    NIOSH REPORT http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200211.html   

        

    Fall Through Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence - Ohio

         

    Floor Collapse
    On March 8, 2001, a 38-year-old male career fire fighter fell through the floor while fighting a structure fire, and died 12 days later from his injuries. At 1231 hours, Central Dispatch notified the career department of a structure fire with reports of the occupants still inside. The Assistant Chief arrived on the scene along with Engine 70 and assumed Incident Command (IC).   

    The IC immediately called for the second alarm, began conducting the initial size-up of the structure, and confirmed heavy fire in the left front section. At that time, the neighbors approached the IC and informed him that the occupants were trapped inside. The IC ordered the fire fighters on scene to commence search and rescue efforts, and then verified the stability of the structure through radio and face-to-face communications.   

    Engine 68 arrived on the scene at approximately 1250 hours with an Assistant Chief and the victim. The Assistant Chief provided tactical command of the fire ground, and along with the victim, conducted search and rescue operations. Other crews conducted searches with a thermal imaging camera of the first floor and basement level of the residence with no sign of any occupants. During these searches the stability of the structure was diminishing due to the intense fire that was now venting through the roof.   

    Fire fighter #3 and the victim were at the front entrance conducting a defensive attack as the third emergency evacuation signal was sounded. The neighbors were still insisting to the IC and fire fighters that the occupants were trapped inside, and one of the occupants was handicapped. The victim and one other fire fighter conducted another search of the structure.   

    The heat and flames were now extending from the basement level to the first floor when the fire fighter’s low air alarm sounded. The victim and the fire fighter were backing out of the structure when the floor beneath the victim gave way, causing him to fall through the floor and become trapped in the basement.   

    Attempts were made from the first floor to rescue the victim by utilizing a handline and an attic ladder, but they were unsuccessful due to the intense heat and flames. Two Rapid Intervention Teams (RIT #1 & RIT #2) were deployed simultaneously from separate entrances into the basement to perform a search and rescue operation for the downed fire fighter. The RITs were able to locate and remove the victim on their initial entry. He sustained third degree burns to over half of his body and died 12 days later.   

    NIOSH investigators concluded that to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should;   

    • Ensure that Incident Command continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident
    • Ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer independent from the Incident Commander is appointed
    • Ensure that fire fighters are trained in the tactics of defensive search
    • Ensure that fire fighters performing fire fighting operations under or above trusses are evacuated as soon as it is determined that the trusses are exposed to fire
    • Ensure consistent use of Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) devices at all incidents and consider providing fire fighters with a PASS integrated into their Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus which provides for automatic operation
    • Ensure that personnel equipped with a radio, position the radio to receive and respond to radio transmissions

    NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200116.html    

        

         

    Roof Collapse and Fire Conditions
    On March 8, 1998, one male fire fighter, the Captain on Engine 57, died while trying to exit a commercial structure after his egress was cut off by the wooden trussed roof that collapsed. Task Force 66 was the first on scene and reported light smoke showing from a one-story commercial building. A ventilation team from Truck 66 proceeded to the roof of the building and commenced roof ventilation. Forcible entry into the building required about 7 ½ to 9 ½ minutes from arrival on scene to force open the two metal security doors in the front. While fire companies waited for the security doors to be opened, fire conditions changed dramatically on the roof.   

    Fire was coming from the ventilation holes opened by the ventilation crew. As soon as the security doors were opened, three engine crews (Engine 66, Engine 57, and Engine 46) advanced hand lines through the front door in an attempt to determine the origin of the fire. Approximately 15 feet inside the front door, the fire fighters encountered heavy smoke with near zero visibility conditions. The engine crews advanced their hose lines approximately 30 to 40 feet inside the building.   

    As conditions continued to deteriorate inside the building, the members from the four engine companies involved in the fire attack began to withdraw. During this time the victim became separated from his crew and remained in the building. The victim was subsequently located by the Rapid Intervention Team and cardiopulmonary resuscitation was performed immediately and en-route to the hospital, where the victim was pronounced dead.   

    NIOSH investigators conclude that, to prevent similar occurrences, fire departments should:    

    • Ensure that incident command conducts an initial size up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts, and continually evaluate the risk versus gain during operation at an incident
    • Ensure that incident command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene
    • Ensure communications are established between the interior and exterior attack crews, e.g., the ventilation crew and the interior fire attack crew should communicate conditions among themselves and back to incident command
    • Ensure that Rapid Intervention Teams are in place before conditions become unsafe
    • Ensure that some type of tone or alert that is recognized by all fire fighters be transmitted immediately when conditions become unsafe for fire fighters
    • Ensure sufficient personnel are available and properly functioning communications equipment are available to adequately support the volume of radio traffic at multiple-responder fire scenes
    • Consider placing a bright, narrow-beamed light at the entry portal to a structure to assist lost or disoriented fire fighters in emergency egress.

    NIOSH REPORT: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9807.html    

      

    Stay tuned for upcoming announcements for the March 16th Taking it to the Streets Program on Firefighternetcast.com

      

    Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com

    Taking it to the StreetsTM  

    Featuring a two part program on Near Miss Firefighter Reporting with Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret) and Capt. CJ Haberkorn, Denver (CO) Fire Department and joing us on the second part of the program will be special guest, Captain Michael Long, with a personal Near-Miss Event account you won’t want to miss. 

    Join in on the live open discussion with fire service personnel from around the country. 

    Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com. 

    • Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening March 16th at 9:00 pm ET on Firefighternetcast.com HERE 
    • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 

    Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2010-2011 All Rights Reserved

    Posted by on March 8, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, decision-making, LODD, NIOSH • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Stakeholder Comments Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

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    Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

    Stakeholder Comment on the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP) Progress and Future Direction

    The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program is seeking stakeholder input on the progress and future directions of the NIOSH FFFIPP to ensure that the program is meeting the needs and expectations of the U.S. fire service, and to identify ways in which the program can be improved to increase its impact on the safety and health of fire fighters across the United States.

    NIOSH will compile and consider all comments received and use them in making decisions on how to proceed with the FFFIPP.

    An overview of the FFFIPP, associated reports and publications can be viewed by going to the NIOSH FFFIPP Web site.

    Public Comment Period
    Written comments on the document will be accepted through April 29, 2011 in accordance with the instructions below. All material submitted to NIOSH should reference Docket Number NIOSH-063-B. All electronic comments should be formatted as Microsoft Word and make reference to docket number NIOSH-063-B.

    Comments will be accepted until 5:00 p.m. EDT on April 29, 2011

    To submit comments, please use one of these options:

    • Send NIOSH comments using this online form
    • Send comments by email.
    • Fax comments to the NIOSH Docket Office: 513-533-8285
    • Send by Mail to:
      NIOSH Mailstop: C-34
      Robert A. Taft Lab.
      4676 Columbia Parkway
      Cincinnati, Ohio 45226
      All information received in response to this notice will be available for public examination and copying at the …
      NIOSH Docket Office
      4676 Columbia Parkway, Room 111
      Cincinnati, Ohio 45226.

    A complete electronic docket containing all comments submitted will be available on the NIOSH docket home page, and comments will be available in writing by request. NIOSH includes all comments received without change in the docket, including any personal information provided.

    Contact persons for technical information
    Paul Moore, Chief, Trauma Investigations Team
    NIOSH/CDC
    1095 Willowdale Road
    Mailstop H-1808
    Morgantown, WV 26505
    304/285-6016

    Related Dockets

    Fire Fighter Program Video

    Video summary of FFFIPP Program recorded live by Fire Department Network News TV (FDNNTV) at the 50th IAFF Fire Fighter Convention in San Diego, CA on August 23, 2010.

    Recently Released Reports

    Posted by on March 2, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "health and safety", Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, line-of-duty, LODD, NIOSH • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Three UK Fire Service Managers charged in LODD incident

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    Three fire service managers in charge of the operation at a south Warwickshire vegetable packing warehouse in which four firefighters died are to face prosecution for manslaughter. 

    The Crown Prosecution Service has decided that that Warwickshire Fire and Rescue Service managers Paul Simmons, Adrian Ashley and Timothy Woodward will face charges of manslaughter by gross negligence for the deaths at Atherstone-on-Stour in November 2007. 

    In addition, Warwickshire County Council will face a charge of failing to ensure the health and safety at work of its employees, under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 

    John Averis, 27, of Tredington near Shipston, Darren Yates-Bradley, 24, of Alcester, Ashley Stephens, 20, from Alcester and Ian Reid, 44, from Stratford, all died while fighteing the fire on November 2, 2007. 

    Four UK Firefighters Died in the Line of Duty

    Darren had married his sweetheart Fay Beesley from Chipping Campden only a month before he died. 

    Michael Gregory, reviewing lawyer in the CPS Special Crime Division, said: “Following a thorough investigation by Warwickshire Police and the Health and Safety Executive, I have reviewed the evidence in this case very carefully and I have decided that there is sufficient evidence and it is in the public interest to charge Paul Simmons, Adrian Ashley and Timothy Woodward with gross negligence manslaughter. 

    “Mr Simmons and Mr Ashley were Watch Managers and Mr Woodward was a Station Manager at the time of the fire, but they all acted as incident commanders before, during and after their colleagues were sent into the burning building. In that role they were responsible for making the operational decisions while their colleagues tried to put out the fire. 

    “I have also decided that there is sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction against Warwickshire County Council for failing to protect the health and safety of its employees and that it is in the public interest to prosecute. 

    “I send my sincere condolences to the families of these four men who died in such terrible circumstances.” 

    Nine other people investigated by Warwickshire Police in connection with the incident have been told there was insufficient evidence to take any action against them. 

    Related stories

    Previous Posting 

    CPS decision on Atherstone fire deaths 

    Three Warwickshire Fire and Rescue Service managers will face charges of manslaughter by gross negligence for the deaths of four firefighters in a warehouse in Atherstone-on-Stour in 2007, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has decided. 

    In addition, Warwickshire County Council will face a charge of failing to ensure the health and safety at work of its employees, under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 

    Ian Reid, John Averis, Ashley Stephens and Darren Yates-Badley tragically lost their lives in a fire at the premises of Wealmoor (Atherstone) Ltd on 2 November 2007. 

    Michael Gregory, reviewing lawyer in the CPS Special Crime Division, said: 

    “Following a thorough investigation by Warwickshire Police and the Health and Safety Executive, I have reviewed the evidence in this case very carefully and I have decided that there is sufficient evidence and it is in the public interest to charge Paul Simmons, Adrian Ashley and Timothy Woodward with gross negligence manslaughter.  

    “Mr Simmons and Mr Ashley were Watch Managers and Mr Woodward was a Station Manager at the time of the fire, but they all acted as incident commanders before, during and after their colleagues were sent into the burning building. In that role they were responsible for making the operational decisions while their colleagues tried to put out the fire.  

    “I have also decided that there is sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction against Warwickshire County Council for failing to protect the health and safety of its employees and that it is in the public interest to prosecute.  

    “I send my sincere condolences to the families of these four men who died in such terrible circumstances.”  

    Nine other individuals, who were investigated by Warwickshire Police, have been told that there was insufficient evidence to take any action against them. 

    The defendants will appear at Leamington Spa Magistrates’ Court on 1 April 2011. 

    • The CPS provided advice to Warwickshire Police and the Health and Safety Executive during the course of their investigations. Warwickshire Police passed a file of evidence to the CPS in August 2010 and submitted an outstanding expert report at the end of October 2010. The CPS received further expert advice at the end of January 2011, and received advice from a Queen’s Counsel on 14 February 2011 before reaching its decision. 

    • The CPS has not received any evidence from the police relating to any suspects for deliberately starting the fire. 

    • The decision whether any prosecutions should be brought under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 is one for the Health and Safety Executive. 

    From 2007 Incident Reporting:

    Firefighter dies tackling blaze

    Crews at the warehouse fire
    Hopes were fading for the wellbeing of the three missing firefighters

    A firefighter has died and three others are missing after a suspected arson attack at a warehouse in Warwickshire.The crew member’s body was recovered during the blaze at the vegetable packing plant in Atherstone on Stour, near Stratford-upon-Avon.The fire, on Atherstone Industrial Estate, started at 1845 GMT on Friday.Hopes were fading for the fate of the missing firefighters and union leaders said the incident may be the worst loss of life for more than 30 years. Andy Dark, assistant general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union (FBU), told BBC News the potential loss of four lives would make the incident the worst loss of life among its members since 1972.It is believed that warehouse staff were in the building when fire broke out and Mr Dark said crews would have been sent in if they thought more civilians may be inside.He said: “If there is any doubt in the mind of the firefighting crews, and particularly the officers in charge of those crews, that there may be a risk to life in that building they will commit crews where they believe it is safe to do so.”That is primarily what we are – our core and primary function is to save life and to rescue.”‘Worst night’Up to 100 firefighters and five ambulance crews were called to the scene and up to 16 fire engines were used to tackle the blaze, which was still alight on Saturday morning. 

    Crews at the warehouse fire
    Crews were still fighting the fatal fire 12 hours after it began

    A search of the building for the missing firefighters is to get under way as soon as colleagues can enter the building, which suffered a partial collapse during the fire.Police said they were treating the blaze as suspicious and the county’s chief fire officer said it was a building “where we would not expect a fire to start”.Fire crews from Warwickshire, Herefordshire and Worcestershire and the West Midlands were called to the blaze.West Midlands Ambulance spokesman Murray MacGregor said he understood “large parts” of the roof had collapsed and said the three firefighters who were unaccounted for had not been seen since early in the evening.He said: “We were all hoping against hope that the situation we found ourselves in wouldn’t turn out to be true. 

    The firefighters tonight were heroically doing their job
    William Brown, chief fire officer, Warwickshire County Council

    He added that hopes of finding the three missing firefighters safe and well had “pretty much faded now”.Mr McGregor said the firefighter who died had been taken to Warwick Hospital following attempts to resuscitate him as soon as he was brought out of the building.‘Heroic firefighters’William Brown, Warwickshire Fire and Rescue’s chief fire officer, said: “We are deeply shocked by tonight’s tragedy.”Our hearts, thoughts and prayers go out to the families and friends of our firefighters. 

    Crews at the warehouse fire
    Firefighters from across the West Midlands were called to the scene

    “The firefighters tonight were heroically doing their job.”Our thanks go to our colleagues in the emergency services, the police, ambulance and of course our cross-border firefighters, who have worked with us and supported us through this terrible night.”Tonight has been one of those events that firefighters all over the world dread and it’s happened to us here in Warwickshire.”Asked why the fire was being treated as suspicious, he said: “This fire has started in a building where we would not expect a fire to start. 

    Our thoughts are with our colleagues in the fire service today and with the family and friends of the firefighter who has died and those who are missing
    Ch Supt Mak Chishty, Warwickshire Police

    “We don’t know what has caused the fire.”And we just approach it from that position – treat it as suspicious to start with and find out why this fire started.”Ch Supt Mak Chishty of Warwickshire Police said a full investigation into the cause of the fire had already begun and investigators from the police and fire service would be examining the scene after daylight on Saturday.He said: “Our thoughts are with our colleagues in the fire service today and with the family and friends of the firefighter who has died and those who are missing.”Local resident Ben Shimmin, who lives in a village near the scene of the fire, said the warehouse was on the site of a disused airfield, with the nearest houses about three-quarters of a mile away, but there were other industrial buildings nearby.He said he became aware of the fire when he lost his water supply, with water being diverted to use to fight the flames.He said: “From the road you can quite clearly see the blaze above the tree line and above the roof line of the building.”There’s a lot of smoke, and obviously a lot of police presence.”
    Posted by on March 1, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "health and safety", building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, command-leadership, compentencies, fire chief, firefighting-operations, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Remembering FDNY Black Sunday…Multiple Firefighter LODDs January 23, 2005

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    FDNY: Remembering FDNY Black Sunday…LODD 2005   

    The call had come at 7:59 on a Sunday morning, the day after a January blizzard had shut down the city. There was still more than a foot of unplowed snow on East 178th Street off the Grand Concourse, and some of it was still swirling in 45-mile-an-hour gusts. Wind like that has a habit of working like gasoline on even the tiniest fires.  

    Five trucks from five companies inched through the snow to converge on the tenement, a cookie-cutter version of thousands of other old buildings in the South Bronx. Engine 42 got there first; its men were stretching hoses from their truck and running them upstairs. Ladder 33 got there next, and a number of its men were sent to the third floor, where the fire was burning. The firefighters from Ladder 27 and Rescue 3 had arrived next; they were sent to the floor above the fire to clear it and keep the flames from spreading upward.  

    When the six men got to the fourth floor, they started searching from apartment to apartment, but they’d found no civilians (except the skinny guy and naked fat lady one of the guys saw hightailing it out of there just as they came up the stairs). Now they were in Apartment 4-L, feeling their way along the walls from room to room—six men loaded down with gear, sucking in air from their tanks—and soon they got turned around, lost in the smoke. Brendan Cawley, the probie with just a month on the job, kept seeing padlocks on the doors of every room and was confused; he hadn’t been around long enough to know how many apartments in this neighborhood had been converted into cheap, crowded rooming houses. This place had been chopped up, probably illegally. Random walls and carelessly thrown-up partitions created a maze.  

    The men were trying to make their way to the source of the heat surge, but among the locks and the walls and the smoke, they couldn’t seem to get there. And there was another problem: The men didn’t have working hoses. First, there was a frozen hydrant; then, something seemed wrong with some of the hoses themselves. The six men on the fourth floor couldn’t fight a fire they couldn’t find—and if any fire did come, they had nothing to fight it with.  

    At 8:26 a.m., Curt Meyran, the lieutenant in charge of the Ladder 27 crew, checked in on his radio. He was asked about the status of the fire on the fourth floor. “Slight extension, slight extension,” Meyran said—meaning they still saw just smoke, no fire.“Ten-four,” came the response.Somewhere between 18 and 23 seconds later—still 8:26 a.m., maybe even as the responder was talking—a turret of flame roared up though the floorboards. None of them saw it coming—in an instant, all six were pinned against the windows that faced the back. “We need a line on the floor above,” someone barked into the radio. “We have heavy fire on the floor above. Rescue to Battalion. Urgent.”  

    In the background, another voice—no one’s sure whose—could be heard: “We got no water!”  

    The flames formed a wall between the men and the apartment door. Walking out was no longer an option. Meyran called in a Mayday and he and Gene Stolowski and Cawley stuck their heads outside for air. At the windows next to them were two guys from Rescue 3, Jeff Cool and Joe DiBernardo. They had lost track of the sixth man, John Bellew. It was 17 degrees outside, but even as their faces were freezing, the men felt a scorching heat on their backs. Leaning out, they could see a fire escape two windows away—but it was too far for them to jump.  

    Meyran called in a Mayday at 8:29. Seconds later, DiBernardo radioed an outfit on the roof: “Brothers on the roof, you’re gonna need to send a rope over the side. Roof team—send a rope over the side to the two-four side of the building.” The flames were closer now. Jeff Cool could feel them at his neck. Cool had a wife and two kids. Meyran had a wife and three kids. Bellew had a wife and four kids. Stolowski had a daughter, and his wife was expecting twin girls in June. DiBernardo’s dad was a retired deputy fire chief. Cawley had an older brother who had died on 9/11.    

    Take the time to read both NIOSH reports and remember the sacrafice…
     
    Three veteran FDNY firefighters died in the LODD in Brooklyn, New York and the Bronx on Sunday January 23, 2005, a day that has become known as “Black Sunday” and called one of the saddest in fire department history. Two firefighters were killed and four others were badly hurt when they were forced to jump from a fourth-floor window of a burning building in the Bronx. Later, a third firefighter died after tackling a basement blaze in Brooklyn.Lt. Curtis Meyran, 46, of Battalion 26, and Firefighter John Bellew, 37, of Ladder 27, died after battling the Bronx blaze on East 178th Street in the Morris Heights section.
     
    Three firefighters were in critical condition at St. Barnabas, and a fourth was in serious condition at Jacobi Medical Center. Six Bronx firefighters became trapped in the building while searching for people on the fourth floor. When the fire from the third floor broke through to the fourth, they were faced with a horrifying choice. They jumped out a fourth-floor window, knowing that they would be critically injured.
     
    Firefighters Jeffrey Cool, Joseph DiBernardo, Eugene Stolowski, and Cawley were badly hurt in the Bronx fire. They were trapped on the fourth floor and were left with the life-or-death choice of leaping 50 feet or burning up. The Brooklyn firefighter, Richard Sclafani, 37, died at a hospital after being injured at a two-alarm fire in the East New York section.

    It will forever be remembered as Black Sunday – and now a highly-critical FDNY report into the double-fatal fire reveals how so many things went wrong on that day.  

    Two firefighters died and four were critically injured when fire and smoke in an illegally partitioned apartment forced them to jump from a fourth floor window.  

    Jeanette Meyran, Firefighter’s Widow: “You have to envision that it turned badly in seconds.”  

    The FDNY Internal Report of the event documented details of a long list of mistakes made from the top brass down to the front line. 

    Its key findings include:  

  • Failure to provide firefighters with escape ropes.
  • Failure to update operational procedures.
  • Inadequate training.
  • Failure to communicate level of danger to command.
  • Failure to thaw two frozen hydrants.
  • Water loss in main hose line.
  • Partitioned walls.

    •    

    Audio Radio Transmissions
       

    NIOSH REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONS
     
    Recommendation #1: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for structural fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters operating in hazardous areas have charged hoselines.
    Discussion: It is department policy to initiate an aggressive interior attack (offensive strategy) whenever possible. Fire departments should ensure that a hoseline is in position prior to entering hazardous or potentially hazardous areas. At this point, the hoseline can be charged and entry made. If the hoseline doesn’t charge or flow is restricted, fire fighters will still have time and space to escape.According to Dunn, the most important fire fighting operation at a structure fire is stretching the first attack hoseline to the fire.
    A properly positioned and functional fire attack line saves the most lives during a fire.“It confines the fire and reduces property damage. Searches will proceed quickly, rescues will be accomplished under less threat, sufficient personnel will be available for laddering, ventilation will be effective, and overhaul above the fire room will be unimpeded.”Firefighters should continually train on SOPs including but not limited to establishing effective water supply, proper hose deployment, and advancing and operating hoselines to ensure successful interior attacks.
     
    Refresher training should be provided to all fire fighters on a regular basis or as needed to ensure effective fire fighting skills are maintained.
     
    Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained on the hazards of operating on the floor above the fire without a charged hoseline and follow associated standard operating procedures (SOPs).
    Discussion: The most dangerous location on the fire ground is operating above the fire, especially during operations without the protection of a hoseline. Before operating above a fire, it is a good practice to deploy a hoseline. Where there is risk of extension to concealed spaces, additional precautionary hoselines are needed. According to Dunn, fire fighters are most often trapped on a floor above a fire because they fail to size-up the fire below them.Fire fighters should make certain that they take all necessary precautions and size-up the fire before making entry above it. Fire fighters should determine whether suppression teams are capable of extinguishing the fire and notify command.
    If not, then command should not permit fire fighters above the fire until conditions change. In this incident, operations continued above the fire on the 4th floor after the withdrawal of Engine 75’s hoseline.
      
    Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations provide the incident commander with progress reports.
      
    Discussion: Frequent progress reports to the IC are essential in the continuous size-up and assessment of an incident. Interior crews working in areas not visible to the IC are the IC’s eyes and ears during an incident. Progress reports also provide everyone on the fireground with information on aspects of the incident that relate to their activities (primary search, suppression, ventilation, etc.).
      
    Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that team continuity is maintained during interior operations.
      
    Discussion: Fire fighters should always work and remain in teams whenever they are operating inside a burning structure. Team continuity means knowing your team members and who is the team leader, staying within visual contact at all times (if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of each other), communicating needs and observations to the team leader, staging as a team, and watching out for other team members. Teams that enter burning structures should enter and leave together to ensure that team continuity is maintained. Working in teams and maintaining team continuity provides an added safety net of fellow team members.
     
    Recommendation #5: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for incident commanders to divide up functions during complex incidents.
      
    Discussion: Incident commanders have to address multiple tasks simultaneou
    sly during high stress activities.Incident commanders can only manage so much information and should divide up functions to make the span of control more manageable. During complex events, the IC should assign other personnel to functions such as accountability, radio communications, incident safety, company tracking, and resident evacuation in order for the IC to effectively focus on fire command.
      
    Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that Mayday transmissions are prioritized and fire fighters are trained on initiating Mayday radio transmissions immediately when they become trapped inside a structure.
      
    Discussion: In this incident, there was an initial delay in determining who made the initial Mayday transmission. The incident commander must monitor and prioritize every message, but only respond to those that are critical during a period of heavy communications on the fire ground. A radio transmission reporting a trapped firefighter is the highest priority transmission that command can receive. Mayday transmissions must always be acknowledged and immediate action must be taken. As soon as fire fighters become lost or disoriented, trapped or unsuccessful at finding their way out of the interior of structural fire, they must initiate emergency radio transmissions. They should manually activate their personal alarm safety system (PASS) device and announce “Mayday-Mayday” over the radio.
     
    A Mayday call will receive the highest communications priority from dispatch, the IC, and all other units. The sooner the IC is notified and a RIT is activated, the greater the chance of the fire fighter being rescued. A transmission of the Mayday situation should be followed by the fire fighter providing his last known location. A crew member who initiates a Mayday call for another person should quickly try to communicate with the missing member via radio and, if unsuccessful, initiate a Mayday providing relevant information.
     
    Recommendation #7: Fire departments should develop standard operating procedures (SOP’s) for fire fighting operations during high wind conditions.
    Discussion: Fire departments should develop SOPs to protect firefighters, including using defensive tactics if necessary, during incidents when high wind affects fire conditions. According to Dunn, “when the exterior wind velocity is in excess of 30 miles per hour, the chances of a conflagration are great; however, against such forceful winds the chances of successfully advancing an initial hoseline attack on the structure are diminished. The firefighter won’t be able to make forward hoseline progress because the flame and heat under the wind’s additional force will blow into the path of advancement.” The wind at the time of the incident was gusting up to 45 miles per hour, blowing from the northwest, speeding the fire extension to the 4th floor.Fire fighters encountering high wind conditions should change their strategy. According to Dunn, “the interior line should be withdrawn and the door to the fire area closed.
     
    The officer in command must be notified of the inability to advance the interior attack hoseline due to the strong wind. A second hoseline should be advanced on the fire from the opposite end, the window or door through which the wind is blowing. This method may require the firefighters to stretch the line up an aerial ladder, fire escape or portable ladder. The second attack line will advance on the fire from the upwind side.”
      
    Recommendation #8: Fire departments should provide fire fighters with the appropriate safety equipment, such as escape ropes, and associated training in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely.
      
    Discussion: According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Programs, 2007 Edition, Section 7.1.1, “the fire department shall provide each member with appropriate protective clothing and protective equipment to provide protection from the hazards to which the member is or is likely be exposed.”
    In this incident, aerials and ground ladders were unable to access the rear of the apartment. When fire fighters are beyond the reach of ladders, aerials, or elevated platforms, an option of last resort is a rope rescue. NFPA 1500, Section 7.16 Life Safety Rope and System Components states “all life safety ropes, harnesses, and hardware used by fire departments shall meet the applicable requirements of NFPA 1983, Standard on Life Safety Rope and Equipment for Emergency Services.” NFPA 1983 specifies the minimum design, performance, testing, and certification requirements for life safety rope, water rescue throwlines, life safety harnesses, belts, and auxiliary equipment for emergency services personnel. Fire departments in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely should provide all fire fighters with escape ropes per NFPA 1983 and the appropriate training to effectively utilize their escape ropes during emergencies.

    Additionally,Recommendation #9: Building owners should follow current building codes for the safety of occupants and fire fighters.  

    Discussion: State building codes require that single room occupancies (SROs) in non-fireproof tenement buildings have automatic fire sprinklers in every hall or passage within the apartment and at least one sprinkler head in every room. This apartment building did not have sprinklers. The transformation of the 4th floor apartment into a SRO led to the construction of an interior partition wall that impeded the discovery of the fire and hindered the fire fighters’ searches. It also prevented fire fighters from reaching the rear fire escape, their secondary means of egress.  

    FDNY Report Says “Black Sunday” Deaths May Have Been Avoided  

     Anatomy of a Fall from NY1 

    Anatomy of the Mayday

     

      

    (1) Firefighters Curt Meyran, Gene Stolowski, Brendan Cawley, and John Bellew, all from FDNY Ladder 27, arrive at 236 East 178th Street in the Bronx at approximately 8:05 a.m. on Sunday, January 23, 2005. Firefighters Jeff Cool and Joe DiBernardo, from the FDNY’s Rescue 3 unit, arrive soon after that.  

    (2) With firefighters from other companies already battling the blaze on the third floor, the main site of the fire, Meyran, Stolowski, Cawley, Bellew, Cool, and DiBernardo are sent to the fourth floor to clear it and prevent the fire from spreading. The six men case the area, but their efforts are made difficult by dense smoke and the mazelike structure of the chopped-up tenement building. Because of problems with a hydrant and other equipment, the men are also operating without working hoses.  

    (3) A burst of fire erupts through the third floor, trapping the six firefighters in Apartment 4-L. Their attempts to find a safe way out are thwarted by an illegal partition wall (in red, above) that hampers their efforts to find a fire escape.  

    (4) With the flames inches from their backs, the six men are forced to jump from four windows—a 50-foot drop. Meyran and Bellew die from the fall. They are survived by their wives and seven children, ranging in age from 5 months to 16 years old. The four other men suffer multiple critical injuries, are left with permanent disabilities, and are forced to retire from duty. The four survivors and two widows later sue the city for not supplying the firefighters with personal-safety ropes. Pinning the blame on the partition walls, the Bronx district attorney charges the building’s landlord and two tenants with manslaughter, criminal negligence, and reckless endangerment. Both legal actions are ongoing.  

    No Way Out

      

      

    Then came the transmissions:  

    8:30:43: “Mayday! Mayday 56! Man down, fell out the window!” 

    8:30:48: “Mayday! Mayday!”  

    8:30:49: “Fireman down in the rear! Two firemen down in the rear!”  

    8:30:51: “Two firemen down in the rear—let’s go!”  

    8:30:54: “Seventy-five, put your pumps…”  

    8:30:58: “Mayday! Mayday! Two firemen jumped from the top floor in the rear. We need a…”  

    8:31:09: “Brother in the…”  

    “Oh, man!”  

    8:31:15: “Start a mixer off—we got a whole company in the rear, they had to jump.”  

    8:31:23: “No way, no…”  

    “We got six guys…”  

    8:31:35: “Roof, let the rope down!”  

    8:31:40: “Mayday! Mayday in the rear! We need EMS in the rear.”  

    8:32:20: “One, two, three, four, five, six who jumped in the rear! We need massive EMS here! Massive injuries!”  

    On the morning of January 23, 2005, six firefighters jumped out of four fourth-story windows of a tenement at 236 East 178th Street in the Bronx, falling 50 feet to the pavement. Two of them, Curt Meyran and John Bellew, died from their injuries; another four—Gene Stolowski, Brendan Cawley, Joe DiBernardo, and Jeff Cool—barely survived, sustaining massive injuries of their own that left several of them in the hospital for months and effectively ended their careers. Another firefighter, Richard Sclafani, died at an unrelated fire in Brooklyn that same afternoon, making that day the first since 1918 that men had died in two separate incidents in the city; the dual tragedies have come to be known as Black Sunday.  

    Now the surviving firefighters are telling their version of the story for the first time. To date, the men have spoken publicly only briefly, but because of litigation they’ve filed against the city, they’ve avoided giving a full account of what happened that day. In the past few months, however, the four of them have begun appearing at private firefighter gatherings to tell their story, and three of them sat with New York Magazine for their first extensive interviews, speaking out about controversies that have surrounded the fire for two years. Shouldn’t the department have outfitted the firefighters with personal-safety ropes—a piece of equipment that was once standard issue but was not provided at the time? Is the building’s landlord primarily to blame, for blocking off access to the fire escape with an illegal subdivision?  

    Should the department have kept the six men on the fourth floor that long, given the problems with the hydrants and hoses? Or were the men themselves in part at fault for not making their situation clear to the officers on the ground? The survivors’ stories also reveal for the first time something much more personal: just how deeply the tragedy has affected them and their families. Their lives—once centered around straightforward concepts like action and adrenaline, honor and bravery—are more complicated than they once were. They are heroes, but they are lost.  

    It took the Ladder 27 crew longer than they expected—about six minutes—to make it just ten blocks. The blizzard was part of the problem, as was a double-parked truck on East Tremont Avenue. It didn’t help that they had the wrong address, though that was quickly corrected. When Gene Stolowski saw Engine 42 and Ladder 33 stretching hoses up to the third floor of the building, he knew this one was real. “I think we got something,” he told Brendan Cawley. “Let’s go.”  

    Curt Meyran, Stolowski, and Cawley walked into the front entryway, a wide foyer where they saw the first signs of smoke (John Bellew, the driver, came up a few minutes later). Up they marched, passing the guys from Ladder 33 on the third floor. But already, things had started going wrong.  

    At 8:05 a.m., about the same time that Ladder 27 had arrived, the driver from Engine 42 had reported the frozen hydrant. Outside, firefighters hustled to connect hoses to a booster tank on their truck, while others stretched hoses to hydrants farther away. For a moment, the third floor got water back, then lost it again; then the water came back but the pressure was too weak and the nozzle would shut. Now the hoses seemed to be frozen or ruptured: No one knew which. Without water, the fire was spreading unchecked.  

    When the Ladder 27 crew reached the fourth floor, Meyran told Stolowski to prop open the stairway door with his maul. Meyran, Stolowski, and Cawley slipped on their oxygen masks and walked into Apartment 4-L. Everything was pitch-black—no lights, no windows, nothing but smoke. Clothes and furniture were everywhere. Cawley had to feel his way around so he wouldn’t trip. In one of the bedrooms, he ran into another firefighter, knocking him to the floor; he looked at the uniform and saw a number three. He later guessed it was Jeff Cool, who’d made it upstairs with Joe DiBernardo and others from Rescue 3.  

       

    Posted by on January 23, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", Black Sunday, building construction, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, decision-making, FDNY, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    USFA Releases Provisional 2010 Firefighter Fatality Statistics

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    The United States Fire Administration (USFA) has announced there were 85 onduty firefighter fatalities in the United States as a result of incidents that occurred in 2010, a 6 percent decrease from the 90 fatalities reported for 2009.The 85 fatalities were spread across 31 states. Illinois experienced the highest number of fatalities (9).

    In addition to Illinois, only New York (8), Ohio (8), Pennsylvania (7), and Kansas (5) had 5 or more firefighter fatalities.

    Acting U.S. Fire Administrator Glenn Gaines noted that “When evaluating the trend in onduty firefighter fatalities over more than three decades, the past two years have seemed to reflect a possible change in the firefighting culture of the United States where Everyone Goes Home, including all firefighters.” Gaines then added, “Working closely with our partners, USFA will continue every effort to be sure that when it comes to firefighter health and safety this downward trend in onduty firefighter deaths continues.”

    Heart attacks and strokes were responsible for the deaths of 51 firefighters (60%) in 2010, nearly the same proportion of firefighter deaths from heart attack or stroke (58%) in 2009.

    Nine onduty firefighters died in association with wildland fires, about half the number that died in association with wildland fires in 2009 and a third of the 26 such fatalities in 2008.

    • Forty-eight percent of all firefighter fatalities occurred while performing emergency duties.
    • Eleven firefighters died in 2010 as the result of vehicle crashes, down substantially from 16 deaths in 2009, and for the first time since 1999, none the of the deaths involved aircraft.
    • Four firefighters in 2010 died in accidents involving firefighters responding in personal vehicles.
    • Seven firefighter deaths involved fire department apparatus, one of which was a double firefighter fatality incident.

    These 2010 firefighter fatality statistics are provisional and may change as the USFA contacts State Fire Marshals to verify the names of firefighters reported to have died onduty during 2010. The final number of firefighter fatalities will be reported in USFA’s annual firefighter fatality report, expected to be available by July.

    For additional information on firefighter fatalities, including the annual fatality reports from 1986 through 2009 and the Firefighter Fatality Retrospective Study 1990–2000, please visit the USFA website.

    Posted by on January 8, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, fire service, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD, structure fires, USFA • Tagged: , , , , , , , , ,

    Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse-PDF Download

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    Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse PDF Training Aid

    The recent post titled: Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse has been receiving a considerable amount of attention as the post makes its way throughout the fire service eMedia sites, links, likes, shares and commentary circles, with over 6,000 views in the past 24 hours on various sites.

    It furthers the premise that I have advocated my entire career and that is the fire service continues to recognize the need for increased knowledge, training, insights and skill sets related to building construction and its diametric relationship to firefighter, command risk management and operational safety.  

    And that we need to learn from each and every incident response,operation and run….Let’s continue to gain learnings and insights from not only this event,  but from the vast resources of published LODD investigations, after-action reports, case studies, near-miss events and close-calls; for each has a lesson that we can use on our next call.

    In order to provide support for continuing training and insight opportunities, I’ve developed a PDF download of the Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse article in its entirety.
    A power point program will be forthcoming to accompany both media items.

    Remember: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

    Posted by on December 28, 2010 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Christopher Naum, fire suppression, firefighting, firefighting-operations, first-due, inspections, LODD, major-incidents, risk-based assessment, size-up, Truss • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse

    10 comments
     
    FF Edward J. Stringer FF/EMT Corey D. Ankum

    The tragic events in the City of Chicago on Wednesday December 22, 2010, when Chicago Firefighter Edward J. Stringer – Engine Co.63 and Firefighter/EMT Corey D. Ankum, Truck Co.34 were killed in the line of duty while operating at a structure fire in an abandoned one-story brick building in the 1700 block of East 75th Street on the City’s South side, exemplifies the demands, challenges and sacrifice that come with responsibilities, duty and sworn obligation  that distinguishes the honorable profession of being a firefighter.     

    The fire was first reported at about 06:48 hours during the night and day tour shift change, with companies arriving at 06:52 hours reporting moderate fire in the  buildings northeast corner. The single story commercial structure was vacant, however it was readily known that squatters were known to seek shelter in the abandoned structure especially give the harsh weather being experienced in the city. The fire was quickly contained at approximately 07:00 hours according to published reports, and radio communications, with coordinated suppression, search and rescue and ventilation operations being conduction by companied both within the interior and on the roof. 

    Timeline of Events
    It was during this phase of operations that a mayday was rapidly communicated at 07:07 hours after a portion of the roof and rear masonry wall unexpectedly collapsed sending personnel operating on the roof riding down with the collapse and trapping four firefighters within the confines of the interior voids. RIT was immediately deployed at the scene for the trapped personnel with reports of numerous firefighters injured by the collapsing wall into the alley way on the Charlie and Delta sides.

    Non-Bearing Sidewall lateral "push-out" collapse resulting from the inward failure of the roof system into the interior

    The incident escalated quickly to a 3-11 alarm with subsequent manpower and resources dispatched to provide immediate collapse search, rescue, extrication, medical treatment and incident scene management and support. The resulting structural collapse killed firefighters Stringer and Ankum and injured seventeen other firefighters.

    Previous Incident coverage HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE. 

    Operations in the Charlie Side Alleyway

    In this incident the Rules of Structural Fire Engagement were clear and resonated with the commitment and resolve that define the American Fire Service. Companies committed to tactical deployment operations consistent with departmental operating procedures and policy that required interior fire suppression, in conjunction with a coordinated interior search and rescue task assigned  and supported by roof ventilation. Although the one-story brick building was clearly abandoned and vacant; it was not known if it was unoccupied, thus the tactical search and rescue assignment. According to Chicago Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff, firefighters entered the burning structure because of reports there may have been squatters inside the old laundry and cleaning facility. 

    By all indications this alarm was a conventional fireground operation being conducted in a fashion consistent with the operating procedures and protocols of the Chicago Fire Department (CFD), executed in a formulative manner that was predicated upon similar past building performance and operations successes.  Various news reports and audio recordings of fireground communications identified that first arriving companies recognized the building and occupancy type and were aware that the building had a characteristic bowstring truss roof system in the rear (Charlie side) of the occupancy. CFD procedures dictate identification of the degree of fire involvement or impingement within the truss loft area (concealed or open area located within the open void space of the truss chords between the underdeck of the roof and the bottom chord of the truss) to determine risk and impact on further tactical operational deployment and task assignments. 

    The CFD is adeptly aware of the historical characteristics, hazards and safety concerns associated with firefighting operations in buildings of bowstring truss construction. The Chicagoland area has an abundance of vintage building types with an array of occupancies that have characteristic small and large span structural bowstring truss systems. 

    CFD Firefighters know bowstring truss roofs only too well because of the risk of collapse. Twelve years ago, two firefighters died when the bowstring truss roof collapsed on them while fighting a fire in a tire and auto repair shop in Beverly. The roof in the Beverly fire was already ablaze. In the case of 1744 East 75th Street, companies did not identify any fire extension or impingement within the truss loft area during initial phases of deployment and initiated tactical operation assignments accordingly based upon the fire location and strategic incident action plan. 

    FF Ankum and FF Stringer were killed by the crushing weight of the collapsed roof. With a structural support system comprised of wood timbers configured in a bowstring style truss system, this structural support system and construction style was common in the late 1920s when the building at 75th and Stony Island in South Shore was built. The truss is arched like a bowstring and provides a clear span within a room or large compartment floor area without intermediate vertical support columns. The structural truss component is typically anchored along the exterior walls where the roof load is transferred to the vertical walls and transmitted down to the foundation. 

    The building and occupancy at 1744 East 75th Street however did have a risk profile not related to its occupancy type and one that was not readily known to operating company or command officers during the initial stages of fireground operations; that this building was in state of disrepair and had received numerous citations and notices of action. The unstable nature of the building, the apparent poor condition of the roof and inherent deficiencies in the structural support system and construction created an operational risk profile that could not be identified readily through conventional size-up by arriving and deploying command or company officers. 

    It was reported that the city had previously cited the building owner for numerous building code violations; including failing to maintain the roof- which, according to the violation, had holes and was rotted and leaking. The violation also indicated the roof trusses were vented and rotted. It is not known if pre-fire plan information was readily available to responding companies or if recent first-due company level inspections or walk-thru had been initiated or completed. 

     

    2 Chicago Firefighters Killed: City Had Sued Owners of Building Over Roof Violations: MyFoxCHICAGO.com 

    In an effort to provide timely learning’s from this incident and in advance of the more thorough and detailed subsequent investigative reports and information that will be forthcoming in the months ahead, I’d like to provide some insights and basic information to increase firefighter, company and command officer awareness and knowledge related to the operational concerns for similar buildings with bowstring truss structural roof systems and share some observations related to presumptions  deduced from incident scene photos.  The representative insights derived from this incident are in no way meant to analyze or offer criticism towards any element of the operations conducted at 1744 East 75th Street; but are provided to increase your knowledge of building features to support operations at similar structures and occupancies so as to reduce the likelihood of other history repeating events (HRE) in your jurisdiction or response district.

    These insights are based upon an analysis of incident scene photographs, internet based images and maps from Google, Bing along with video and audio media clips. Interpretations and assumptions made (especially related to dimensions, size and configurations) are representative to provide content to scale and similarities with other typical construction features in an effort to advance firefighter knowledge. 

    Aerial view of the 1700 Block of East 75th Street and Collapse Area

    Aerial Photo of the Collapse Zone looking from the Delta Side. The Rear alleyway on the Charlie Side runs parallel to East 75th Street.

    Anatomy of the Building and Collapse 

    The structure at 1744 East 75th Street appears to have been part of a larger series of collective occupancies and structures that previously spanned the entire city block, sharing construction features and commonalities consistent with construction methodologies and practices in the 1920’s through the 1940’s. An aerial view of the 1700 block of East 75th Street clearly shows the series of one-story brick buildings sharing both common party walls and possibly independent bearing walls between separate occupancies, with their distinctive roof profiles and varying square footage of floor area. 

    The Alpha [A] side is East 75th Street with a common parallel alleyway located on the Charlie [C] side. The collapse area appears to have been approximately a 60 feet (depth) x 50 feet (width) for an area of ~ 3000 square feet. The outward failure of the Delta [D] side load bearing also occured as the roof failed inward into the building. Published reports indicated the roof system present in the immediate collapse zone was comprised of bowstring truss components. This is evident in a series of fireground photos that clearly depict the remnants of a shallow depth built-up chord bowstring truss comprised of timber wood components. 

    Built-up Bowstring Timber Truss Component

    Truss resting along a interior support pilaster Bearning End of Bowstring Truss Component

    Bearing End of a built-up Bowstring Chord Truss

    It appears the bowstring wood truss components rested on top a series of four (4) brick wall pilasters and pocketed within the east and west brick bearing walls. The north non-bearing brick wall appears to be a three wythe solid brick wall, with the bearing walls running east-west. The non-bearing brick wall running parallel to the alley way was the main portion of wall that collapsed outward as a result of the inward collapse of the truss roof support system, wood rafters and plank roof deck. The inward momentum created by the downward forces of the failing roof area, pushed outward the entire north wall face, which based upon the modular charactoristics of the brick and mortar, most likely caused the wall to collapse in sizeable sections (outward collapse as well as disintegrate into smaller projectiles with a classical curtain failure. Photos suggest the wall failure resulted in a collapse zone that spanned the entire narrow alley way from wall to wall (estimated at 18 +/- feet) leaving no room to escape the lateral failing wall collapse without running in an east and west direction only. 

    The single story size of this common Type (Class) III Ordinary Construction building which is estimated at 18 feet in height appears to have had a parapet wall raising above the roof line, consistent with design features found in buildings of this vintage. 

    The single story height coupled with the square foot floor/roof area, any loss of structural integrity of a single truss component would likely cause the compromise or collapse of adjacent truss components and connective decking planks due to the interdependence and connectivity of the roofing support (trusses), purlins, rafters and roofing planks and outer membrane system. 

    • Typically the failure of one bowstring truss span will compromise or cause the collapse of each adjacent truss to either side of the original affected truss causing the failure of a sizeable roof area.
    • Companies operating on such affected roof area areas are subject to high risk and vulnerability should the roof area fail. Refer to the incident conditions and structural collapse from the Waldbaum’s Collapse, FDNY August 2, 1978. Go to the incident overview at Commandsafety.com HERE.
    • In smaller square foot commercial occupancies that have shallow depth bowstring truss components and both limited spans (less than 100 linear feet clear span) and number of trusses (six or less) the likelihood of a catastrophic roof collapse should be considered highly predicable in all incident action plans and during incident status monitoring.
    • The loss of load bearing and load transfer capabilities at these wall connections can contribute towards failure and collapse conditions. The end connections points (end cap or end shoe) of a bowstring truss are critical towards maintain truss performance and structural integrity.
    • The loss of truss axial orientation, resultant excessive deflection, loss of integrity of chord/ web geometry and connection points can lead to failure mechanisms and a cascading effect due to transferring of loads and possible overstressing and directly lead to subsequent failures.

    Photo examination further identifies the presence of concrete masonry units (CMU) evident in a number of incident scene images that suggests renovations and alterations at some point in the building’s recent history that may have had an impact on the building’s integrity or performance profile ( postulated, actual or forecasted). 

    • It should be noted that fire service personnel should have a high degree of respect for the danger and susceptible risk imposed by compromised or failing bearing and non-load bearing walls.
    • Collapse zones must be established and access controlled based upon physical incident scene layout, access and proximal exposure structures.
    • All fire service personnel should have awareness level training and an understanding of recognizing collapse indicators for buildings of masonry construction and tactical safety considerations
    • Company and Command Officers must have a higher level of knowledge and training to be able to recognize subtle or obvious construction, conditions or indicators that will affect IAP, strategic, tactical or task assignments and be able to act upon those indicators with immediacy and urgency as conditions and risk dictate.
    • The Collapse Zone should be at a minimum be equal to the full height of the exterior masonry wall face and also take into consideration additional distance due building material momentum, bounce and toss due to individual bricks, steel lintels and other components and materials acting as projectiles and traveling distances greater than the defined “collapse zone”.

    Collapse Rescue Void Search Operations

    • The sheer weight and mass present in a brick wall presents significant probability of debilitating injuries and death if caught in the collapse zone by falling wall sections or brick projectiles.
    • A standard common brick may weight 4.5 – 6 lbs. each. An 8 inch wide brick wall may weigh upwards of 83 pounds per square foot (PSF).
    • For illustration purposes; A 50 foot long wall x 18 feet in height constructed with a solid 8 inch wide brick non-load bearing wall (assuming 15% openings for doors/windows) would have an estimated dead load weight of 63,500 lbs. (31.75 ton)
    • Fire Service personnel must be aware of the three common exterior masonry wall mechanisms of collapse  that include; outward monolithic wall collapse,  inward/outward wall collapse and curtain fall collapse. Building height, width (wyth) of the wall, bearing or non-bearing wall types, weather conditions, fire impingement or exposure and age, reinforcement, deterioration/integrity of mortar joints etc., all have influencing effects on the actual manner in which an exterior masonry wall will collapse.
    • In smaller single story commerical structures of Ordinary Type III construction, the 90-degree monolithic and/or curtain-fall wall collapse can be expected.
    • The probability of void spaces being present due to a catastrophic collapse of a bowstring truss roof system are predicated upon the presence of interior space features such as shelving, equipment, products/materials and any small height area partitions or physical barriers (that may even extend upwards to the understructure of the truss chord) and the manner in which the structural bowstring truss component and integrated roofing system fail or compromise from the outer wall bearing points. (pancake, lean-to)
    • The collapse of the roofing deck system resulting from a compromise or collapse of the bowstring truss system may cause under some circumstances a longitudinal failure or cracking of the upper masonry wall either along the line of the roof/parapet interface or in an area immediately beneath this point.
    • The resulting impact due to dynamic load transfers may cause the upper masonry wall and/or parapet to collapse inward while simultaneously causing the lower masonry wall section to collapse in an outward manner into the exterior collapse zone.
    • The manner in which the exertion of force applied to the outer masonry wall during the mechanism of the collapsing of the roofing system will determine the extent of force, failure and degree of brick material that will be deposited at the base of the wall and beyond within the collapse zone.

     

    Wood Roofing Planks and outer membrane with visible Wood Roof Rafters as part of the Roofing System

     

     
     
     
     
     

     

    Typical Pilaster Support

    Built-up bowstring trusses such as the ones that appear to have been present at 1744 East 75th Street came in varies sizes related to the dimension of the structural wood components utilized (heavy timber or built-up), the depth of truss related to its span and its load bearing design/capacity (and the subsequent truss loft void created by the truss top and bottom chord as well as the manner in which the truss  web members were held together, the connection methods utilized and the manner in which the truss component was designed to be seated in its load bearing position (pocketed or surface load bearing). 

    The following photographs provides a representative example of a heavy timber truss showing the steel U-shaped end shoe (bolted to the bottom chord) seated on the bearing plate of the pilaster. This is a common connection point and is a critical area for maintaining the structural integrity and stability of the roof system. These load bearing points are susceptible to age related deterioration of the bearing surface, shoe connection/chord connection, loss or degradation of the bearing wall conditions, decay or deterioration of the end connections that adversely affect the structural stability of the top truss cord to transfer the thrust loads imposed upon this connection into the bottom chord. 

    Typical Truss End w Bottom Chord, Steel End Shoe and Load Bearing Plate on a Pilaster

    Note: the crack in the bottom wood chord running from the steel shoe and bolt connections, indicating an area of concern 

    A bowing or outward thrust of brickwork on a visible exterior bearing wall is a clear indication that deterioration has occurred and that the structural stability of the wall roof system is in question as well as the stability to conduct safe tactical interior or roof operations by fire service personnel. 

    • Other age related conditions affecting bowstring truss stability include creep deformation, stressed, loosened or damaged connection points due to imposed loads over many decades, the effects on longer deflection under load, the effects or wood shrinkage and drying affecting the geometry and thus strength and stability of the truss, along with a higher potential for structural failure and collapse.

    These conditions can all be exasperated by fire, heat impingement or contact as well as long term imposing dead loads of the roofing system(s) and more importantly live loads such as rain or snow accumulation (as well as concentrated live loads) or the placement of fire personnel to conduct tactical roof assignments. Published research and test results  have shown that in many instances heritage vintage truss systems such as the bowstring truss (circa 1880-1950) were designed in a manner that did not take into account conservative bottom cord tensile strength design. Most trusses from this time frame were not designed under the same criteria implemented in today’s building codes and specifications and thus are prone to compromise and failure under a variety of both fire and non-fire induced incident scenarios. 

    Representative Construction Cut Away of a Heavy Timber Gable Truss Roof and Pilaster

    Typical Bowstring Roof Truss Configuration and span

    Bowstring Truss Profile

    Another key observation point during operational assessment and size-up includes the observation of any excessive truss chord sag along the span, rot, deterioration, cracked or split chords, splices, web members of visible end connections. The identification of  such conditions during any phases of operations such be promptly evaluated as a pronounced high risk to personnel safety and further operational integrity. In other words; it’s time to immediately reconsider risk, strategic and tactical operational objectives and the likelihood for isolated structural compromise or catastrophic structural collapse. 

    Various Wall Construction Features

    The following video clips provide good examples of the extent, physical force and collective momentum of mass that a collapsing section of brick wall can inflict as it fails. These video clips represent multi-floor collapse and variabley larger collapse zones on grade and within the immediate operating areas. 

    YouTube Preview Image

    YouTube Preview Image 

    Other Insights and Considerations 

    • During all operations involving actual or suspected Bowstring Truss Roofing Support Systems Command and Company Officers should be sensitive to risk assessment indicators related to both fire induced conditions as well as environmental and age induced factors.
    • Pre-plan your buildings look at the construction, components, features and condition of the building; there is a tremendous amount of information out there. Understand and comprehend what to look for, what it is that you’re looking at and more importantly make sure the information is retrievable for on-scene application and that the information is utilized when formulating IAP and in the dynamic risk assessment process
    • During Dynamic Risk Assessment, special attention should be focused on Predicated Building Performance common to identified building systems, features and structural systems that are based upon Occupancy Performance and NOT Occupancy Type.
    • The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report examining the characteristics of fires in vacant residential buildings. The report, Vacant Residential Building Fires, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and provides useful insights and recommendations. Link HERE
    • When developing incident action plans and operational assignments at incidents involving possible Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures, command and company officers shall implement a formulative risk -benefit assessment consistent with departmental procedures, policies and expectations.
    • Be knowledgable of operational factors and considerations related to operations at Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures; HERE and HERE
    • Read the Newest NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters at Structure Fires, HERE
    • Start considering building; age, deterioration, environmental impacts and influences in your IAP and tactical considerations, we at times forget to consider these performance indicators effectively during initial or sustained operations.
    • Learn more about Building Construction, Occupancy Profiling, Reading a Building, Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type and always consider Tactical Patience.
    • Increase your knowledge on Structural Collapse indicators especially for buildings of masonry construction in both Type III and Type IV construction.
    • There is a Predictability of Performance in all Buildings and Occupancies with Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural Systems; Know what they are.
    • Understand what to look for in Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural System integrity related to; Age and Deterioration, Gravity, Cross Grain Shrinkage, Wood Defects that are self-evident in chords and web members, Upper Chord Buckling, Lower Chord splitting or failure points, web splitting or pull-outs, multiple roofing systems or membranes, multiple void spaces, compromised bearing walls or pilasters, compromised or degraded bearing points or truss ends.
    • Learn to identify masonry wall features and what they mean towards tactical operations

    These are some immediate considerations for increasing operational integrity while maintaining firefighter safety and and does not reflect the full extent of safety or operational considerations that must be imposed and implemented at operations involving buildings of Type III or IV construction or those with bowstring truss components; but it is a stepping stone and for many, the first exposure to this type of information. 

    Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety 

    Other Links 

    • Roof of building in deadly fire called ‘defective’ in 2007, Link HERE
    • A fire commissioner’s words on tragedy, tempered by his family history, HERE
    • Chicago Tribune Editorial: ”Every fireman knows”, a must read….HERE

     

    Posted by on December 27, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Collapse, firefighting-operations, LODD, risk, roof • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Chicago Firefighters; Double LODD, 17 hurt during 3-11 alarm Blaze and Building Collapse

    1 comment

         

         

    Chicago fire personnel evacuate an injured firefighter at a extra-alarm fire at 1700 East 75th Street. (E. Jason Wambsgans/ Chicago Tribune)

    From emerging published reports, Two Chicago firefighters died after a wall collapsed during a 3-11 alarm fire at an abandoned South Side commercial building this morning, authorities said. Fourteen other firefighters were injured, including two who were trapped with the ones who died.    

    Police squad cars escorted two ambulances north on Lake Shore Drive to Northwestern as ramps were closed to clear it of traffic, according to fire communications. One of the firefighters taken there has died, sources said. The condition of the other one was not known.    

    A third trapped firefighter was taken to Christ Medical Center in Oak Lawn, where he died.  Late this morning, dozens of firefighters stood at attention, removing their caps and saluting, as the body of their fallen colleague was taken from the hospital and put in an ambulance.  A police escort led the ambulance to the medical examiner’s office    

    The fourth firefighter buried in the rubble, and as many as 12 other firefighters with undisclosed injuries, were also taken to hospitals. Fire officials and sources said 10 were stable and six were taken to hospitals in serious to critical condition, including the two who later diedThe firefighters’ deaths came on the 100th anniversary of a huge fire at the Union Stockyards that claimed the life of 21 Chicago firefighters, the single greatest loss in U.S. history of professional big-city firefighters until Sept. 11, 2001.    

    A dozen or fewer firefighters were in the building when the roof above them collapsed, said Fire Department spokesman Larry Langford. Firefighters searched through rubble for more than an hour as four trapped firefighters were pulled out and rushed to hospitals.    

    “They worked hard, got them out fast,” said Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff at the scene.    

    He said the search was continued, with dozens of firefighters digging through rubble, because of the possibility that homeless people may have been in the building seeking shelter from the cold. Neighbors reported that squatters have been staying in the building, but no others were found in the rubble.    

    The fire broke out about 6:54 a.m. in the abandoned one-story brick building in the 1700 block of East 75th Street.    

    The fire was raised to two and then three alarms to save the trapped firefighters. A “mayday” was called. Firefighters also reported having problems with frozen hydrants.    

    Aerial View of the Buildings along 1700 East 75th Street

     YouTube Preview Image   

    Informational Update- The two Chicago Firefighters have been identified;

      

    • FF Edward Stringer:    

    • FF Corey Ankum:     

    • According to published reports; Initial incident reports are that FF Stringer and FF Ankum had been on or near the roof of the building in the 1700 block of East 75th Street this morning with other Firefighters when it collapsed. The building had a bow string truss in the rear and a flat roof in front. 34-year-old Cory Ankum from Engine 72, had been on the department only sixteen months.  Corey had previously served as a Chicago Police officer before joining the city’s fire department.  His wife is Mayor Richard Daley’s personal secretary.  He is a father of three children under 12 years old, including a  one-year old child.    

    • FF Edward Stringer, a 12-year veteran of the CFD and is reported to have several grown children and lives alone.  Published sources are indicating, he was working as a “relief Lieutenant”, covering for another Lieutenant for an unknown reason .   

    • Before Stringer went in with the hoseline, the normally-assigned Lieutenant showed up told him he could leave now.  Stringer declined the offer, saying “I got it”, and went inside.  The ensuing collapse killed him and Ankum.   

    CHICAGO FD TERMINOLOGY:   

    HERE IS THE RECORDED RADIO TRAFFIC INCLUDING THE BC TRANSMITTING THE MAYDAY:   

    OFFICIAL UPDATES WILL BE POSTED HERE:    

     

    Some additional Insight Materials for discussion;  

      

    Firefighters and friends stand at attention as an ambulance carrying the body of Corey Ankum leaves Christ Medical Center in Oak Lawn for the Cook County medical examiner’s office. (Zbigniew Bzdak/Tribune)
    • Latest posted reports state Seventeen (17) Firefighters were injured: HERE 
    • Firefighter followed brother into ranks, HERE
    • Firefighter ‘loved his job’; HERE
    • Photos from the scene, aftermath

      

      

    YouTube Preview Image  

     

     

     

    Posted by on December 22, 2010 • Filed under: building construction, Collapse, failures, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fires, LODD • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements

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    Major factors contributing to a rapid spread of fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., on June 18, 2007, included large open spaces with furniture providing high fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows and a lack of sprinklers, according to a draft report released for public comment today by the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The fire trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter fatalities in a single event since 9/11.

    Based on its findings, the NIST technical study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes.1 If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented.

    “Furniture stores typically have large amounts of combustible material and represent a significant fire hazard,” said NIST study leader Nelson Bryner. “Model building codes should require both new and existing furniture stores to have automatic sprinklers, especially if those stores include large, open display areas.”

    Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet). Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.

    Using a state-of-the-art computer model to simulate the fire, the study team found that the addition of automatic sprinklers inside the loading dock could have significantly slowed the fire (which began just outside the dock area), prevented it from spreading beyond the dock, and eventually, extinguished it completely. The model also showed that sprinklers on the loading dock likely would have maintained what firefighters call tenability conditions, the ability for individuals in a fire event to escape unassisted.

    Factors identified as contributing to the fire’s progress include: (1) the high fuel loads—especially furniture—present throughout the building; (2) the lack of sprinklers throughout the Sofa Super Store; (3) the open floor plan of the facility; (4) the hidden build-up of combustible smoke and gases in the area between the drop ceiling and the roof of the main showroom; (5) the non-fire-activated roll-up door that was open between the loading dock and the holding area; (6) the four fire-activated roll-up doors (out of seven) that activated but did not close during the fire; (7) the metal walls in the warehouse and west showroom that allowed heat from the fire to ignite items next to the walls; and (8) the breaking of windows at the front of the store that supplied air to the fire.

    NIST’s team of experts traveled to Charleston to gather data within 36 hours of the Sofa Super Store fire. Using these data and other information collected in the following months (such as building design documents, records, plans, video and photographic data, radio transmissions, interviews with emergency responders, and informal discussions with store employees), the NIST study team developed its computer model to simulate and analyze the characteristics of the fire, including fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, and the operation of active and passive fire protection systems.

    Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:

    • The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
    • During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
    • The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
    • The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
    • When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
    • The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
    • Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.

    The complete draft report is available online at http://www.nist/gov/el

    NIST welcomes comments on the draft report and its recommendations. To be considered for the final report, comments must be received by noon EST on Dec. 2, 2010. Comments may be submitted via e-mail to firesafety@nist.gov; fax to (301) 975-4052; or mail to the attention of NIST Technical Study: Sofa Super Store, NIST, 100 Bureau Dr., Stop 8660, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8660.

    Once the final report is published, NIST will work with the appropriate committees of the International Code Council (ICC) on using the study’s recommendations to improve provisions in model building and fire codes. NIST also will work with the major organizations representing state and local governments—including building and fire officials—and firefighters to encourage them to seriously consider its recommendations.

    Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire

    1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised.

    2.   Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address:

    a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
    b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
    c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
    d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
    e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.

    3.  Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031.

    4.  Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision:

    a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
    b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).

    5.  Comprehensive Risk Management Plans:  NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to:

    a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
    b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
    c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.

    6.  Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities: 

    a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
    b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground.

    7.  Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are:

    a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
    b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
    c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires.

    8.  Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are:

    a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
    b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
    c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
    d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service. 

    9.  Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

    a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
    b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective.

    10.  Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to:

    a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
    b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations.

    11.  Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

    a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
    b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
    c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies.

    NIST has more than 40 years of experience conducting building and fire safety studies and researching the aftermath of disasters and failures. By understanding the technical causes for such incidents and making the information available to the public, NIST scientists and engineers strive to improve the safety of buildings, their occupants and emergency responders. NIST’s technical building failure and fire studies do not address fault.

  • Volume I: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
  • Volume II: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
    (Note: The reports are presented in .pdf. To read these files, you can download Adobe Acrobat Reader free.)
  • Statement to the Media Delivered at NIST Charleston Fire Study Press Briefing, Oct. 28, 2010, by Nelson Bryner, Lead, Study Team
  • PowerPoint Presentation Accompanying Statement at Press Briefing
  • Video B-Roll on the NIST Charleston Fire Study (mp4)
  • Graphic Showing Floor Plan of Charleston Sofa Super Store
  • Graphic Showing Smoke and Fire Movement at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Temperature Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Oxygen Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
    • Posted by on October 28, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Charleston, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, decision-making, events, failures, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, History Repeating Event, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Naum, NIST, Reports, Safety, Sprinklers • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    FireFighter Fatalities in 2009

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    The USFA recently issued the Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the Undited States for the year 2009. Ninety (90) on-duty firefighters from 33 states lost their lives as the result of incidents that occurred in 2009. Pennsylvania experienced the highest number of fatalities (8). In addition to Pennsylvania, only New York (7), North Carolina (6), Louisiana (5), and Texas (5), respectively, had 5 or more firefighter fatalities. This compares favorably to 2008′s firefighter losses where 9 states experienced 5 or more on-duty fatalities. The total number of fatalities in 2009 was one of the lowest totals in more than 30 years of record.

    The unique and specific objective of Firefighter Fatalities in the United States is to identify all on-duty firefighter fatalities that occurred in the United States and its protectorates during the calendar year and to present in summary narrative form the circumstances surrounding each occurrence.

    An overview of the 90 firefighters that died while on duty in 2009:

    • The total break down included 47 volunteer, 36 career, and 7 wildland agency firefighters.
    • There were 6 firefighter fatality incidents where 2 or more firefighters were killed, claiming a total of 13 firefighters’ lives.
    • 16 firefighters died in duties associated with wildland fires, compared to 26 such fatalities in 2008.
    • Activities related to emergency incidents resulted in the deaths of 57 firefighters.
    • 30 firefighters died while engaging in activities at the scene of a fire.
    • 15 firefighters died while responding to or returning from 13 emergency incidents in 2009. This compares to 24 responding/returning fatalities in 2008.
    • 10 firefighters died while they were engaged in training activities.
    • 14 firefighters died after the conclusion of their on-duty activity.
    • Heart attacks were the most frequent cause of death with 39 firefighter deaths.

    Heart attacks were the most frequent cause of death with 39 firefighter deaths. For 33 years, USFA has tracked the number of firefighter fatalities and conducted an annual analysis. Through the collection of information on the causes of firefighter deaths, the USFA is able to focus on specific problems and direct efforts toward finding solutions to reduce the number of firefighter fatalities in the future. This information is also used by many organizations to measure the effectiveness of their current efforts directed toward firefighter health and safety.

    Type of Duty Activities related to emergency incidents resulted in the deaths of 57 firefighters in 2009. (This includes all firefighters who died responding to an emergency or at an emergency scene, returning from an emergency incident, and during other emergency-related activities. Nonemergency activities accounted for 33 fatalities. Nonemergency duties include training, administrative activities, performing other functions that are not related to an emergency incident, and post incident fatalities where the firefighter does not experience the illness or injury during the emergency. Non-Emergency Type of Duty LODD accounted for 36.6% (33) versus Emergency Type of Duty which accounted for 63.3% (57) LODD.

    In 2009, 49 firefighters died while responding to or working on the scene of an emergency. This number includes deaths resulting from injuries sustained on the incident scene or en route to the incident scene and firefighters who became ill on an incident scene and later died. It does not include firefighters who became ill or died after or while returning from an incident, e.g., a vehicle collision.

    Thirty-nine firefighters were killed during firefighting duties; 3 firefighters were killed on emergency medical services (EMS) calls; 5 on motor vehicle accidents; 1 firefighter was killed in association with a weather incident; and 1 was killed during other emergency circumstances.

    Of the 30 firefighters killed during fireground operations in 2009, 19 firefighters died while on the scene of a structure fire, 9 firefighters died while en route or at the scene of a wildland or outside fire, and 1 firefighter at the scene of a vehicle fire. One other firefighter fell ill while at the scene of an alarm in an apartment building and later died from a cerebrovascular accident (CVA) after being transported to the hospital.

    Types of fireground activities in which firefighters were engaged at the time they sustained their fatal injuries or illnesses identified Fire Fighting duty accounting for 79.6% (39), with Motor Vehicle Accidents accounting for 10.2% (5). This total includes all firefighting duties, such as wildland fire-fighting and structural firefighting. There were 19 fatalities in 2009 where firefighters be-came ill or injured while on the scene of a structure fire.

    The distribution of LODD deaths by fixed property use identified residential property use as the leading occupancy resulting in a LODD with 13 events, followed by commercial occupancy use resulting in six events. As in most years, residential occupancies accounted for the highest number of these fireground fatalities in 2009.

    In 2009, there were nine firefighter fatalities where the type of emergency duty was not related to a fire. Four were from motor vehicle accidents, four from EMS incidents, and one fatality was related to an in-clement weather incident. In 2009, 14 firefighters died after the conclusion of their on-duty activity. Six deaths were due to heart at-tacks, five were due to CVA/strokes, and three were due to other causes (one aortic separation, one from asthma, and one unknown).

    Firefighting is extremely strenuous physical work and is likely one of the most physically demanding activities that the human body performs. Stress or overexertion is a general category that includes all firefighter deaths that are cardiac or cerebrovascular in nature such as heart attacks, strokes, and other events such as extreme climatic thermal expo-sure. Classification of a firefighter fatality in this cause of fatal injury category does not necessarily indicate that a firefighter was in poor physical condition.

    Fifty firefighters died in 2009 as a result of stress/ overexertion:

    • Thirty-nine firefighters died due to a heart attack.
    • Eight firefighters died due to CVAs.
    • One firefighter died from heat exhaustion.
    • One firefighter died from a pulmonary embolism.
    • One firefighter died from damage to a heart valve, an acute event caused by the extreme physical exertion. 

    Lost or Disoriented Two firefighters died in 2009 when they became lost or disoriented inside of a manufactured home next to a camper where the fire had originated. The fire-fighters advanced an attack line into the home as other firefighters attacked the fire in the camper. Five to 10 minutes after their entry, the pump operator sounded an evacuation signal, concerned that he was running out of water. When the two firefighters did not emerge from the home, firefighters called out for them, at-tempted to contact them on the radio, and tugged on the attack line to no avail. The firefighters were eventually discovered in the front room of the home un-conscious. Both firefighters were pronounced dead at the scene.

    Caught or Trapped  Three firefighters were killed in 2009 in two separate incidents when they were caught or trapped. This classification covers firefighters trapped in wildland and structural fires who were unable to escape due to rapid fire progression and the byproducts of smoke, heat, toxic gases, and flame. This classification also includes firefighters who drowned, and those who were trapped and crushed.

    • The cause of death for one firefighter was listed as asphyxiation due to probable carbon monoxide toxicity after he had re-entered a large grain silo to assist a fellow firefighter attempt an exit from the structure. Both firefighters subsequently lost conscious-ness. Firefighters on the exterior cut a hole in the metal wall of the bin and extricated the firefighters, saving one.
    • Two firefighters were caught and trapped after they advanced an attack line to the interior of the residence and fire conditions changed rapidly.

    Collapse Two firefighters died in 2009 while they were searching a burning commercial structure and the main floor collapsed trapping the firefighters.

    For a copy of the entire USFA Firefighter Fatalities in the United States in 2009 Report, HERE

    USFA Statistics, HERE

    Adobe PDF, 215 KbU.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study (PDF, 215 Kb)

    Adobe PDF, 2.5 MbFire-Related Firefighter Injuries in 2004 (PDF, 2.5 Mb)

    Adobe PDF, 3.0 MbFirefighter Fatality Retrospective Study 1990-2000 (PDF, 3.0 Mb)

    Adobe PDF, 1.1 MbFire in the United States, Chapter 5: Firefighter Casualties (PDF, 1.1 Mb)

    Posted by on October 12, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", Christopher Naum, decision-making, Fatalities, fire service, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, incidents, LODD, Reports, research, Safety, Safety Culture, USFA • Tagged: , , , , , , , , ,

    Residential Structure Flashover and FF LODD- NIOSH Report

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    Photo Warren Skalski

    On March 30, 2010, a 28-year-old male career fire fighter/paramedic (victim) died and a 21-year-old female part-time fire fighter/paramedic was injured when caught in an apparent flashover while operating a hoseline within a residence. Units arrived on scene to find heavy fire conditions at the rear of a house and moderate smoke conditions within the uninvolved areas of the house. A search and rescue crew had made entry into the house to search for a civilian who was entrapped at the rear of the house. The victim, the injured fire fighter/paramedic, and a third fire fighter made entry into the home with a charged 2 ½ inch hoseline. Thick, black rolling smoke banked down to knee level after the hoseline was advanced 12 feet into the kitchen area. While ventilation activities were occurring, the search and rescue crew observed fire rolling across the ceiling within the smoke. They immediately yelled to the hoseline crew to “get out.” The search and rescue crew were able to exit the structure safely, then returned to rescue the injured fire fighter/paramedic first and then the victim. The victim was found wrapped in the 2 ½ inch hoseline that had ruptured and without his facepiece on. He was quickly brought out of the structure, received medical care on scene, and was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead.

    Contributing Factors

    • Well involved fire with entrapped civilian upon arrival
    • Incomplete 360 degree situational size-up
    • Inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis
    • Ineffective fire control tactics
    • Failure to recognize, understand, and react to deteriorating conditions
    • Uncoordinated ventilation and its effect on fire behavior
    • Removal of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
    • Inadequate command, control, and accountability
    • Insufficient staffing.

    Key Recommendations

    • Ensure that a complete 360 degree situational size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it is physically possible and ensure that a risk-versus-gain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped occupants is conducted prior to committing to interior fire fighting operations
    • Ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the fire effectively to include appropriate fire flow for the given fire load and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate personnel to operate the hoseline
    • Ensure that fire fighters maintain crew integrity when operating on the fireground, especially when performing interior fire suppression activities
    • Ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior
    • Ensure that incident commanders and fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with suppression techniques to release smoke and heat
    • Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

    Recommendations

    Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that a complete 360 degree situational size-up is conducted on dwelling fires and others where it is physically possible and ensure that a risk-versus-gain analysis and a survivability profile for trapped occupants is conducted prior to committing to interior fire fighting operations.

    Discussion: Among the most important duties of the first officer on the scene is conducting an initial 360 degree situational size-up of the incident. A proper size-up begins from the moment the alarm is received, and it continues until the fire is under control. The size-up should include an evaluation of factors such as the fire size and location, length of time the fire has been burning, conditions on arrival, occupancy, fuel load and presence of combustible or hazardous materials, exposures, time of day, available staffing on scene or en route, and weather conditions. Information on the structure itself should include size, construction type, age, condition (e.g., evidence of deterioration, weathering), renovations, lightweight construction, loads on roof and walls (e.g., air conditioning units, ventilation ductwork, utility entrances), and available preplan information-all key information that can affect whether an offensive or defensive strategy is employed. The size-up should also include a risk-versus-gain assessment during incident operations, especially after primary searches have been conducted, situational awareness, and a survivability profile.

    Even before the IC takes command of an incident he will be faced with having to determine what critical tasks are going to have to be performed to bring the incident under control. He will use current knowledge and previous experience to formulate a plan for his arriving apparatus and personnel. When the IC arrives he needs to ascertain as much information as possible to make a determination whether his plan will still work. The IC may be faced with several priorities such as an entrapped civilian, a larger scale incident then previously determined, and the fire environment itself. This is additionally part of the initial situational size-up and the risk assessment, which will constantly change as the incident progresses until it is brought under control. The IC should be willing to prioritize and change his strategy and plan based on these assessments. Situational awareness is a highly critical aspect of human decision making: the understanding of what is happening around you, projecting future situation events, comprehending information and its relevance, being realistic, and an individual’s perception. Conducting accurate risk assessments and receiving interior/exterior status updates is critical to the safety of fire fighters in the incident, rescue/recovery efforts, and overall control of the incident. “The decision to commit interior fire fighting personnel should be made on a case-by-case basis with proper risk-benefit decisions being made by the incident commander. The commitment of firefighters’ lives for saving property and an unknown or marginal risk of civilian life must be balanced appropriately.”

    Another tool that the IC should consider using is survivability profiling. Survivability profiling uses the knowledge learned of fire behavior and spread, smoke (i.e., color, condition, movement), and building construction to examine a situation and make an intelligent decision of whether to commit fire fighters to life saving and/or interior operations. In other words, survivability profiling involves assessing the probability that a trapped occupant is still alive and can safely be rescued with the current or impending conditions. The NIOSH publication Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires states that the IC must make a determination that offensive (interior) operations may be conducted without exceeding a reasonable degree of risk to fire fighters before ordering an offensive attack and must be prepared to discontinue the offensive attack if the risk evaluation changes during the fire fighting operation. The fireground is very dynamic, and conditions can either improve or deteriorate based on fire suppression activities, and available resources. Most importantly, assessments/size-ups of the incident are necessary to detect a change on the fireground.

    During this incident, the responding departments were made aware while en route that there was a paralyzed civilian entrapped in the structure. His wife advised 911 and arriving units that the chair he was sitting in caught fire with him still in it. Units arrived on scene 6 minutes after the 911 call to find heavy fire conditions to the addition on the C-side of the house where the entrapped civilian was last seen by his wife sitting in the chair. Prior to a complete 360 degree situational size-up, decisions were made to send a hoseline crew through the A-side front door to assist with search and rescue, and to locate and attack the fire (located on the C-side in the addition and garage). Fire fighters entering the house from the A-side were initially met with moderate smoke conditions banked down to waist level, which quickly changed to thick, black smoke conditions that went to the floor due to the fire being uncontrolled and spreading into the house from the C-side. The victim and injured fire fighter/paramedic were eventually exposed to a flashover. The civilian was not rescued. A full range of factors must be considered in making the risk evaluation including a realistic evaluation of the ability to execute a successful offensive fire attack with the resources that are available and a realistic evaluation of occupant survivability and rescue potential.

    Fire departments should be aware of the recently released 2010 International Association of Fire Chiefs’ (IAFC) Rules of Engagement (ROE) of Structural Firefighting. These guidelines recommend that ICs conduct or obtain a 360 degree situational incident size-up, determine the occupant survival profile, and conduct an initial risk assessment.

    Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that interior fire suppression crews attack the fire effectively to include appropriate fire flow for the given fire load and structure, use of fire streams, appropriate hose and nozzle selection, and adequate personnel to operate the hoseline.

    Discussion: An assessment and decision of suppression methods must be made before attacking a fire in hopes of extinguishing it and keeping fire fighters safe while doing so. To accomplish such tasks, ICs, officers, and fire fighters need to consider such factors as fire load and flow, hose and nozzle selection, placement and use of fire streams, and required staffing. Fire load, or heat released from combustible materials, will directly affect how the fire develops throughout the incident and how long and severely it may burn. The more combustible materials involved, the greater the heat that will be produced requiring additional fire flow. Fire flow is the calculated amount of water in gallons per minute needed to extinguish a fire in a specific structure. To assist fire fighters in calculating the fire flow, one of three formulas could be used: the Iowa Rate-of-Flow Formula, the National Fire Academy (NFA) Formula, and the Insurance Services Office Formula. The Iowa Rate-of-Flow and NFA Formulas were designed to be used on the fireground because they allow fire fighters to mentally compute the fire flow with relative ease by estimating such things as the square footage (area) of a structure or the cubic footage (volume) of a room, and percentage involved, then inputting that data into a predetermined formula.

    Iowa Rate-of-Flow Formula: rate of fire flow=volume of room in cubic feet÷100

    NFA Formula: fire flow in gallons per minute for one floor at 100% involvement=(length ×width)÷3. If less than 100% involvement,then multiply answer by estimated percentage of involvement.

    The fire stream, or water stream, is an important aspect both for fire fighter safety and tactical considerations. The wrong choice of fire stream can place a fire fighter and crew in a bad situation. Also, the wrong type of fire stream will affect the tactical outcome of the incident in regards to how quickly the fire is controlled. To produce an effective fire flow, there must be a viable water supply; sufficient water pressure; a means to transport the stream to the desired point (fire); and trained, competent personnel to deploy these three elements. These elements are applied through the use of a fire hose and nozzle. The diameter of the fire hose can affect how much water is flowed on a fire, but the larger the diameter, the more potential to max out the delivering pump’s capacity, and additional personnel will be needed to handle the hoseline. The nozzle will allow the water to leave its mechanical hold within the hoseline to produce the desired fire stream. Typical fire streams include solid, fog, and broken, and each have their own characteristics, advantages/disadvantages, and application. Proper training on all these aspects will greatly influence fire fighter’s knowledge on the fireground, provide for quicker control and extinguishment of the fire, and increase overall fire fighter safety.

    During this incident, arriving fire departments were faced with a large volume of fire and an entrapped civilian. Prior to the flashover, the fire was burning uncontrolled at the rear of the house (house addition and garage) and spreading into the house. FF1, the victim, and injured fire fighter/paramedic were tasked with advancing a charged 2½-inch hoseline into the house to assist with the search and for fire suppression. They were able to advance this hoseline approximately 12 feet into the house, but advancing and operating a large-diameter hoseline within tight quarters may be extremely cumbersome even if adequate staffing is available to accomplish this task. Note: When FF1 had a problem with his PPE, he handed the nozzle over to the victim, and eventually backed out of the structure, that left only two personnel available to operate the hoseline. Fire fighters and officers need to understand that while a 2½-inch hoseline provides a greater flow, fire fighters need to be able to move the line quickly and efficiently interiorly, especially when performing a search and experiencing deteriorating fire conditions. An alternate decision to advancing the 2½-inch hoseline into the small house could have been to deploy and advance a 1¾-inch hoseline(s), which would have been easier to maneuver within the house.

    Due to the large volume of fire at the C-side that was extending into the house, the 2½-inch hoseline(s) could have been deployed exteriorly to the B- and/or D-sides to combat the fire, paying close attention to directly attack the fire, an elevated master stream (carefully directed on fire burning uncontrolled within the addition and garage) could have been deployed early into the fire had the assessment been made that the entrapped civilian (last reported to be in the addition) could not be saved, thus possibly stopping further progression of fire and volatile smoke into the house. Additionally, a lightweight portable master stream, placed exteriorly at the B- and/or D-sides, which is fairly easy to deploy by using a 2½- to 3-inch supply line, may only require one fire fighter to operate once in position. These types of water delivery appliances are capable of delivering a large volume of water that will assist in extinguishing the fire from an exterior position, especially when conditions are deteriorating interiorly, which could place fire fighter’s safety at risk.

    An incident commander needs to constantly assess whether his strategies and tactics to control and extinguish the fire are working, paying close attention to fire and smoke conditions/changes, the affects from ventilation performed by fire fighters and occurring naturally as the fire progresses, and to fire fighter safety.

    Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters maintain crew integrity when operating on the fireground, especially when performing interior fire suppression activities.

    Discussion: Fire fighters should always work and remain in teams whenever they are operating in a hazardous environment. Team integrity depends on team members knowing who is on their team and who is the team leader; staying within visual contact at all times (if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of each other); communicating needs and observations to the team leader; and rotating together for team rehab, team staging, and watching out for each other (e.g., practicing a strong buddy system). Following these basic rules helps prevent serious injury or even death by providing personnel with the added safety net of fellow team members. Teams that enter a hazardous environment together should leave together to ensure that team continuity is maintained.The 2010 IAFC ROE of Structural Firefighting states, “Go in together, stay together, come out together.”

    Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior.

    Discussion: Reading fire behavior indicators and recognizing fire conditions serve as the basis for predicting likely and potential fire behavior. Reading the fire requires recognition of patterns of key fire behavior indicators. It is essential to consider these indicators together and not to focus on the most obvious indicators or one specific indicator (e.g., smoke). Identifying building factors, smoke, wind direction, air movement, heat and flame indicators are all critical to reading the fire. Focusing on reading “smoke” may result in fire fighters missing other critical indicators of potential fire behavior. One important concept that must be emphasized is that smoke is fuel and must be viewed as potential energy. Smoke that is thick, black and pressurized can emit from a structure at a high rate. This is indicative of a potentially under-ventilated structure or a ventilation controlled fire. This smoke is fuel-rich and is termed “black fire.” It can potentially do as much damage as fire itself, but it is an indicator that some type of extreme fire behavior may occur.

    Since the IC should be staged at a designated command post (outside), the interior conditions should be communicated by interior company officers (or the member supervising the crew) as soon as possible to their supervisor (e.g., IC, division supervisor). Knowledge of interior conditions could change the IC’s strategy or tactics. Interior crews can aid the IC in this process by providing reports of the interior conditions as soon as they enter the fire building and by providing regular updates. In addition to the importance of communicating reports on fire conditions, it is essential that fire fighters recognize what type of information is important. Command effectiveness can be impaired by excessive and extraneous information as well as from a lack of information. In the case of communicating observations related to fire behavior, this requires development of fire fighters’ skill in recognition of key fire behavior indicators and reading the fire.

    During this incident, FF1 made a decision to quickly open and close the smooth bore nozzle (water applied as a solid stream) while aiming at the ceiling. It is believed this was done in an attempt to cool the thermal (hot gas) layer, a common practice, in hopes of preventing a potential flashover. Ceiling temperatures can be reduced through carefully considered fire control actions, such as applying short bursts of water spray into the hot gas layer, or directly applying water onto the fire itself which will limit the release of unburned products of combustion as well as reduce ceiling temperature.

    Also, the search and rescue crew (operating without the protection of a hoseline) were able to make a quick determination that the conditions within the house were imminent to flashover. They made an attempt to alert the victim and injured fire fighter/paramedic, but were too late. If conditions are right for a flashover, there are only seconds to make a decision. Fire fighters will be met with a sudden increase in heat and rollover within the ceiling level. The injured fire fighter/paramedic was unaware that the conditions she was operating in deteriorated quickly. She remembers thick, black smoke pushing down to the floor while in the structure and then “the room and everything in it caught fire.” Prior to the flashover, windows on the B-side were vented and thick, black and heavily pressurized smoke billowed from these windows. The IC, and individuals working on the exterior, need to recognize this as a potential for extreme fire behavior and evacuate interior crews. Obtaining proper training and hands-on experience through the use of a flashover simulator may assist interior fire fighters in making sound decisions on when to evacuate a structure fire.

    Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure that incident commanders and fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively coordinate ventilation with suppression techniques to release smoke and heat.

    Discussion: Ventilation is the systematic removal of heated air, smoke, and fire gases from a burning building and replacing them with cooler air.1 The two types of ventilation are vertical and horizontal. During vertical ventilation the natural convection of the heated gases creates upward currents that draw the fire and heat in the direction of the vertical opening. Horizontal ventilation allows for heat, smoke, and gases to escape by means of a doorway or window but is highly influenced by the location and extent of the fire, and special caution should be taken if the fire is in the attic.

    Properly coordinated ventilation can decrease the rate the fire spreads, increase visibility, and lower the potential for flashover or backdraft. Proper ventilation reduces the threat of flashover by removing heat before combustibles in a room or enclosed area reach their ignition temperatures. Proper ventilation can reduce the risk of a backdraft by reducing the potential for superheated fire gases and smoke to accumulate in an enclosed area. Properly ventilating a structure fire will reduce the tendency for rising heat, smoke, and fire gases, trapped by the roof or ceiling, to accumulate, bank down, and spread laterally to other areas within the structure. The ventilation opening may produce a chimney effect, causing air movement from within a structure toward the opening. These air movements help facilitate the venting of smoke, hot gases, and products of combustion but may also cause the fire to grow in intensity and may endanger fire fighters who are between the fire and the ventilation opening. For this reason, ventilation should be closely coordinated with hoseline placement and offensive fire suppression tactics. Close coordination means the hoseline is in place and ready to operate, so that when ventilation occurs, the hoseline can overcome the increase in combustion, which is likely to occur. If a ventilation opening is made directly above a fire, fire spread may be reduced, allowing fire fighters the opportunity to extinguish the fire. If the opening is made elsewhere, the chimney effect may actually contribute to the spread of the fire.1

    ICs and fire fighters need to consider the following and how it will affect ventilation and overall control of the fire:

    • Who will ventilate (knowledge and skills)?
    • What type of ventilation?
    • When to ventilate?
    • Where to ventilate?
    • Why ventilate?
    • How to properly and safely ventilate?
    • What are the expected results from ventilation?

    Fire development in a compartment may be described in several stages, although the boundaries between these stages may not be clearly defined.1 The incipient stage starts with ignition, followed by growth, fully developed, and decay stages. The available fuel largely controls the growth of the fire during the early stages. This is known as a fuel-controlled fire, and ventilation during this time may initially slow the spread of the fire as smoke, hot gases, and products of incomplete combustion are removed. As noted above, increased ventilation can also cause the fire to grow in intensity as additional oxygen is introduced. Effective application of water during this time can suppress the fire but if the fire is not quickly knocked down, it may continue to grow.

    If the fire grows until the compartment approaches a fully developed state, the fire is likely to become ventilation controlled. Further fire growth is limited by the available air supply as the fire consumes the oxygen in the compartment. Ventilating the compartment at this point will allow a fresh air supply (with oxygen to support combustion), which may accelerate the fire growth, resulting in an increased heat release rate. If coordinated fire suppression activities do not quickly decrease the heat release rate, a ventilation induced flashover can occur.1 Considering that most fires beyond the incipient stage are or will quickly become ventilation controlled, changes in ventilation are likely to be some of the most significant factors in changing fire behavior.

    During this incident, uncoordinated ventilation occurred while the hoseline and search and rescue crews were inside the house. The victim and other fire fighters, within the small house, were between the fire and the ventilation source. One fire fighter accounts heavy, turbulent, black smoke pushing from a window on the B-side after it was broken. Shortly after, the house sustained an apparent ventilation-induced flashover.

    Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

    Discussion: Fire fighters are tasked at times to operate within environments which pose inhalation hazards (e.g., toxic smoke and oxygen deficiency),defined by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH). Proper training along with an implemented and enforced policy or procedure will assist fire fighters with proper maintenance, use, and removal of a SCBA. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134 (g)(4)(iii) states, “The employer shall ensure that all employees engaged in interior structural firefighting use SCBAs.”

    According to the autopsy report, the victim died from carbon monoxide intoxication due to inhalation of smoke and soot. The medical examiner also indicated that the victim’s COHb level (a measure of carbon monoxide in the bloodstream) was 30%. Even if nothing but carbon dioxide, water vapor, and nitrogen were present in the fire products and these were to mix with the air being breathed by a fire fighter, then the oxygen percentage would be reduced below the normal 21%. At 15% oxygen, fire fighters can experience lethargy, poor coordination, and confused thinking. The two principal toxins in smoke—carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide—act to deprive the brain of oxygen, and their effects would be enhanced due to the lower levels of oxygen in the air. The victim was discovered with his facepiece off, but still connected to his regulator. Due to the smoke conditions, the victim would have had to have been on air when entering the structure. It has not been determined why the victim was found without his facepiece on.

    Emergencies created by, or associated with, SCBA can be overcome in several ways. Fire departments can develop and implement a comprehensive respiratory protection program that includes fire fighter fitness, training, and competency and skill assessments in SCBA and emergency procedures. Firefighters should remember the first rule in any emergency situation-to not panic. Panic causes an increased breathing rate and consequently, an increase in air consumption; and an inability to focus on emergency procedures. If fire fighters become lost, trapped, or disoriented, they need to focus on managing remaining air in their SCBA cylinder until other fire fighters can make a rescue attempt. Removing one’s facepiece in an IDLH atmosphere can immediately expose the respiratory system to a potentially fatal environment, thus incapacitating an individual. Choosing to leave one’s SCBA facepiece on may be the best chance in providing additional time for a fire fighter to be rescued. Fire fighters should follow their department’s SOPs regarding emergency SCBA procedures and emergency communications.

    Recommendation #7: Fire departments should ensure that adequate staffing is available to respond to emergency incidents.

    Discussion: NFPA 1710 Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments contains recommended guidelines for minimum staffing of career fire departments. NFPA 1710 states the following: “On-duty fire suppression personnel shall be comprised of the numbers necessary for fire-fighting performance relative to the expected fire-fighting conditions. These numbers shall be determined through task analyses that take the following factors into consideration:

    1. Life hazard to the populace protected.
    2. Provisions of safe and effective fire-fighting performance conditions for the fire fighters.
    3. Potential property loss.
    4. Nature, configuration, hazards, and internal protection of the properties involved.
    5. Types of fireground tactics and evolutions employed as standard procedure, type of apparatus used, and results expected to be obtained at the fire scene.

    The NFPA standard states that both engine and truck companies shall be staffed with a minimum of four on-duty personnel. The standard also states that companies shall be staffed with a minimum of five or six on-duty members in jurisdictions with tactical hazards, high-hazard occupancies, high-incident frequencies, geographical restrictions, or other pertinent factors identified by the authority having jurisdiction.

    During this incident, the victim’s department responded with three personnel on the engine and two personnel on the ambulance, but the Still assignment also consisted of an engine, two ladder trucks, and a squad, with four fire personnel on each. It was routine to have an ambulance respond with an engine on a first due fire assignment. Due to short staffing, the ambulance personnel were tasked with fire suppression activities, thus taking them out-of-service as a medical unit. Also, due to short staffing, the lieutenant/acting officer (IC) was required to ride and operate as the officer of E534. This removed him from his command response vehicle which would have allowed him to command at a tactical level versus having to potentially perform tasks.

    Recommendation #8: Fire departments should ensure that staff for emergency medical services is available at all times during fireground operations.

    Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. Emergency medical care and transportation for injured or ill fire fighters should be immediately available on the scene of working structure fires. Many fire departments incorporate an automatic dispatch of an EMS unit to working structure fires. Automatic dispatch can help to ensure that qualified emergency medical care and transportation for injured or ill fire fighters is available without having to call and wait for a unit after a medical emergency or injury has occurred.

    During this incident, the victim and the injured fire fighter/paramedic responded in an ambulance. Upon their arrival to the scene, the IC immediately tasked them with interior operations due to staffing issues. The IC did not request an additional ambulance to respond to the scene for medical care until after the victim was down within the house. Additional resources (e.g., apparatus and personnel) arrived minutes after the ambulance’s arrival.

    Recommendation #9: Fire departments and dispatch centers should ensure they are capable of communicating with each other without having to monitor multiple channels/frequencies on more than one radio.

    Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. It is important that fire service personnel have an efficient means of communicating during an emergency incident. The use of radio communications provides fire fighters on scene with the ability to communicate to individuals they cannot see or to receive vital information about the incident. To assist with this, localities should ensure that communications can occur without having to utilize different radios and/or monitor multiple channels/frequencies.

    During this incident, the IC had to monitor more than one radio and even had to go to the cab of his engine to accomplish this task. Having to monitor multiple radios and potentially take your eyes off the scene for a moment could be extremely detrimental to the management of the incident.

    Recommendation #10: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander, or designee, maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground.

    Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. The use of an accountability system is recommended by NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program and NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System.21 A functional personnel accountability system requires the following:

    • Development of a departmental SOP
    • Training all personnel
    • Strict enforcement during emergency incidents

    As the incident escalates, additional staffing and resources may be needed, adding to the burden of tracking personnel. At this point, an accountability system should be in place which includes an incident command board that is established and maintained by an assigned accountability officer or aide. A properly maintained incident command board allows the IC to readily identify the location and time of all fire fighters on the fireground. As a fire escalates and additional fire companies respond, a chief’s aide or accountability officer assists the IC with accounting for all fire fighting companies at the fire, at the staging area, and at the rehabilitation area. The personnel accountability report (PAR) is an organized on-scene roll call in which each supervisor reports the status of his crew when requested by the IC or emergency dispatcher.1 A properly initiated and enforced accountability system on every response, which is consistently integrated into fireground command and control, enhances fire fighter safety and survival by helping to ensure a more timely and successful identification and rescue of a disoriented or downed fire fighter.

    During this incident, the accountability system was never set in place and a PAR was not conducted following the Mayday.

    Recommendation #11: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression.

    Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program states, “The fire department shall provide each member with protective clothing and protective equipment that is designed to provide protection from the hazards to which the member is likely to be exposed and is suitable for the tasks that the member is expected to perform…protective clothing and protective equipment shall be used whenever a member is exposed or potentially exposed to the hazards for which the protective clothing (and equipment) is provided.” NFPA 1971 Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting has established minimum requirements for structural fire fighting protective ensembles and ensemble elements designed to provide fire fighting personnel limited protection from thermal, physical, environmental, and bloodborne pathogen hazards encountered during structural fire fighting operations. These requirements will assist in protecting firefighters, but only if they wear the PPE as recommended by the manufacturer.

    During this incident, the victim was discovered without a hood over his head or rolled down on his neck. NIOSH investigators could not determine whether this equipment was properly donned prior to the incident.

    Recommendation #12: Fire departments should ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.

    Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. According to NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System,“The incident commander shall have overall authority for management of the incident and the incident commander shall ensure that adequate safety measures are in place.” This shall include overall responsibility for the safety and health of all personnel and for other persons operating within the incident management system. While the incident commander is in overall command at the scene, certain functions must be delegated to ensure adequate scene management is accomplished.According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program,“as incidents escalate in size and complexity, the incident commander shall divide the incident into tactical-level management units and assign an incident safety officer (ISO) to assess the incident scene for hazards or potential hazards.” These standards indicate that the incident commander is in overall command at the scene but acknowledge that oversight of all operations is difficult. On-scene fire fighter health and safety is best preserved by delegating the function of safety and health oversight to the ISO. Additionally, the incident commander relies upon fire fighters and the ISO to relay feedback on fireground conditions in order to make timely, informed decisions regarding risk versus gain and offensive-versus-defensive operations. The safety of all personnel on the fireground is directly impacted by clear, concise, and timely communications among mutual aid fire departments, sector command, the ISO, and the incident commander. NFPA 1521 Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer defines the role of the ISO at an incident scene and identifies duties such as recon of the fireground and reporting pertinent information back to the incident commander; ensuring the department’s accountability system is in place and operational; monitoring radio transmissions and identifying barriers to effective communications; and ensuring established safety zones, collapse zones, hot zones, and other designated hazard areas are communicated to all members on scene. Larger fire departments may assign one or more full-time staff officers as safety officers who respond to working fires. In smaller departments, every officer should be prepared to function as the ISO when assigned by the incident commander. The presence of a safety officer does not diminish the responsibility of individual fire fighters and fire officers for their own safety and the safety of others. The ISO adds a higher level of attention and expertise to help the fire fighters and fire officers. The ISO must have particular expertise in analyzing safety hazards and must know the particular uses and limitations of protective equipment.3

    Recommendation #13: Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters are equipped with a means to communicate with fireground personnel before entering a structure fire.

    Discussion: Although there is no evidence that this recommendation would have prevented this fatality, it is being provided as a reminder of a good safety practice. NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System states, “To enable responders to be notified of an emergency condition or situation when they are assigned to an area designated as immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH), at least one responder on each crew or company shall be equipped with a portable radio and each responder on the crew or company shall be equipped with either a portable radio or another means of electronic communication. Radio communications on the fireground are imperative for the IC to command and control the incident and for fire fighters to work effectively and safely within a structure fire. Fire fighters within a structure are unable to see all areas affected by fire and whether the structure is maintaining its stability. Having radio communications can enhance fire fighter safety and health by providing fire fighters a means to communicate with other crew members or with the IC when they find themselves in need of assistance.

    During this incident, the victim did have a radio, but it was positioned in the back pocket of his station pants. Thus, when he donned his bunker pants, his radio became inaccessible during the incident.

    Recommendation #14: The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) should consider developing more comprehensive training requirements for fire behavior to be required in NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications and NFPA 1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications.

    Discussion: Structural fires frequently display indicators and warning signs of rapid fire development such as flashover, backdraft, and fire gas ignition for which many fire fighters and officers may not have been sufficiently trained to recognize or understand. It is imperative that fire fighters and officers develop the understanding and skills necessary to identify and interpret the indicators so that they can anticipate the potential for extreme fire behavior and immediately communicate their findings to the IC.  This requires comprehensive training in fire behavior (theory) and practical application inclusive of realistic live fire training.

    NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications and NFPA 1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications were developed to ensure that fire fighters and officers have the skills necessary to perform their job, also known as job performance requirements (JPRs). Currently, these JPRs include language that individuals have requisite knowledge on such topics as heat transfer, principles of thermal layering, advantages and disadvantages of different types of ventilation, and fire behavior in a structure. These standards do not include guidance on how many hours or what available scientific information will be used to verify that an individual has a sound understanding of the physical, chemical, and thermal behavior of fire and how to make a connection between fire dynamics/behavior and the influence of tactical operations (e.g., fire flow, types of ventilation) and external factors (e.g., wind). These JPRs are taken by curriculum developers and formatted into educational content. Standard setting agencies, states, curriculum developers, and other authorities having jurisdiction should consider developing a nationwide curriculum so that fire fighters and officers receive fundamental and refresher training on how to: recognize and interpret fire behavior and indications of impending extreme fire behavior (e.g., flashover, back draft, smoke explosion); and, anticipate what could or should happen when a tactical operation is performed (e.g., ventilation, fire flow). Standard setting agencies and curriculum developers should also consider providing guidelines (e.g., required topics and hours) for instructors to deliver such information and recommendations for verifying an individual’s learning and retention.

    According to documented training reviewed by NIOSH investigators, the victim, injured fire fighter/paramedic, and IC had a combined 24 hours of fire behavior training out of 5,654 total combined training hours. Additional fire behavior training to include such areas as theory, chemistry, physics, smoke reading, current research, and the cause and effects of tactics during fire suppression operations may improve fire fighter safety.

    NIOSH REPORT: HERE

    Previous Video Coverage, HERE

    Posted by on October 3, 2010 • Filed under: "Situational Awareness" assessment, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, Company, explosion, fire behavior, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, LODD, Mayday, NIOSH, rescues, residential, risk-based assessment, strategies, structure fires, Trapped • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , ,

    “It’s Not Something You Do; It’s Something You Are”

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    Remembering the Sacrifices’ of that day in September and all of those who came before us in this the United States Fire Service and those that were with us, in the commission of our sworn duties who didn’t go home…..as we do what we do best, being Fire Fighters.

    Posted by on September 4, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", 911, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, country, courage, destiny, FDNY, fire service, Fire Service Tradition, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fortitude, LODD, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    FDNY Deutsche Bank Building LODD Fire Report issued by NIOSH

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    The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program has released the investigation report of the line of duty deaths of two career FDNY  firefighters during a 2007 seven-alarm high-rise fire in the former Deutsche Bank building undergoing deconstruction and asbestos abatement.

    On August 18, 2007,  two FDNY firefighters; Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo lost thier lives while operating at this incident. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations. FDNY Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran and FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino,  became trapped in the maze-like conditions of a high-rise building undergoing deconstruction. The building’s standpipe system had been disconnected during the deconstruction and the partitions constructed for asbestos abatement prohibited fire fighters from getting water to the seat of the fire. An hour into the incident, the fire department was able to supply water by running an external hoseline up the side of the structure. Soon after the victims began to operate their hoseline, they ran out of air. The victims suffered severe smoke inhalation and were transported to a metropolitan hospital in cardiac arrest where they succumbed to their injuries.

    By the time the fire was extinguished, 115 fire fighters had suffered a variety of injuries.Key contributing factors to this incident include: delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel, inoperable standpipe and sprinkler system, delay in establishing water supply, inaccurate information about standpipe, unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously, extreme fire behavior, uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor, blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress, maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris, heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented, failure of fire fighters to always don SCBAs inside structure and to replenish air cylinders, communications overwhelmed with numerous Mayday and urgent radio transmissions, and lack of crew integrity.

    NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

    • review and follow existing standard operating procedures on high-rise fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters are not operating in hazardous areas without the protection of a charged hoseline.
    • be prepared to use alternative water supplies when a building’s standpipe system is compromised or inoperable.
    • develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating guidelines for risk management during complex high-rise operations.
    • ensure that crew integrity is maintained during high-rise fire suppression operations.
    • train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning high-rise structure.
    • ensure that fire fighters diligently wear their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) when working in environments that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).
    • train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
    • use exit locators (both visual and audible) or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit.
    • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
    • encourage building owners and occupants to report emergency situations as soon as possible and provide accurate information to the fire department.
    • consider additional fire fighter training using a high-rise fire simulator.

    Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

    • conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters in high-rise structures.
    • continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communications in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
    Municipalities should:

    • ensure that construction and/or demolition is done in accordance with NFPA 241: Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations.
    • develop a reporting system to inform the fire department of any ongoing, unique building construction activities (such as deconstruction or asbestos abatement) that would adversely affect a fire response.
    • establish a system for property owners to notify the fire department when fire protection/suppression systems are taken out of service.


    The Complete NIOSH Report is available HERE

    An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of  the PPT program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites

    Additional Links, HERE and HERE

    New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work, HERE

    Other References and postings;

  • NY Daily News: Battle to save trapped firefighters
  • WABC: Fatal Deutsche Bank fire report released (2008)
  • FDNY Penalties After Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Lawyers: Evidence Withheld in Deutsche Bank Fire Trial
  • FDNY Disciplines Company Officers Following Tragic Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Attorney Claims Deutsche Bank Contractors Are “Scapegoats”
    • YouTube Preview Image YouTube Preview Image

    Posted by on August 13, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, construction, Deconstruction, dynamics, Fatalities, FDNY, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, hazards, hazmat, high-rise, Highrise, LODD, Mayday, NIOSH, risk-based assessment, RIT, size-up, standpipe, Trapped, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    The Waldbaum Fire Collapse FDNY 1978 Remembrance

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    The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978  

    The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.  

      

    Thirty-four firefighters, one emergency medical technician and one Emergency Services police officer were injured in the fire and the tragedy is remembered as one of the worst disasters in the New York City Fire Department’s 143-year history.  

    The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
    • Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33
    • Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156
    • Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42
    • Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153
    • Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156
    • Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153 

    The fire started at 8:40 am in Waldbaum’s supermarket located at 2892  Avenue Y and Ocean Avenue in the Sheepshead Bay section of Brooklyn. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers and contractors were renovating the building when the fire was discovered in mezzanine area. Box 3300 was transmitted at 08:39 hours and the All hands transmitted at 08:49 and subsequently a 2nd alarm at 09:02 hrs. Shortly after 09:20 with 20 firefighters operating on the bowstring truss roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the roof fell into the smoke and flames. Some of the firefighters were seen running toward the edge of the roof; some made it, others nearby fell into the gaping hole. The third alarm was transmitted at 09:18 3rd alarm and subsequently escalated to a Fifth alarm assignment during the rescue and recovery operations.  

    Roof Operations prior to collapse

     

    Laborers and firefighters managed to pull out some who were near walls, some crawled out. Several holes were made into the wall to pull out injured survivors and victims.  

    The Building  

    The approximately 120 ft.  x 120 ft. primary building was originally built in 1952 as a supermarket and at the time of the fire was undergoing extensive renovations and was open and operating. Constructed with exterior masonry bearing walls of  with  timber roof trusses with a 100-foot clear span, supported on pilaster columns embedded in the exterior walls, it was classical Type III construction. The truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a conventional suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system.  A two story mezzanine and machine room was located at the north wall of the original building. Access through the truss loft area was accessible through man-doors at the plane of each truss.  

    Waldbaum Supermarket FDNY Box 3300 1978

     

    The heavy timber bowstring arch roof consisted of seven (7) truss units constructed of 4-5 bundled 3 inch x 12 inch attached assemblies.  Two factors contributed to the collapse of the bowstring arch truss system; double roof (rain roof) alterations with concealed spaces and the extent and severity of the fire within the concealed spaces affecting the assembly’s structural stability. The presence of the double concealed ceiling systems; the truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a convential suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system. The failure of  operating companies and command personnel to recognize the signs of an unchecked concealed fire that was propagating at a rapid pace impinging upon critical structural assembly points was a significant contributing factor in the incident outcome. 

    Typical Heavy Timber Bowstring Arch Truss Configuration

     

    This roof collapsed 32 minutes after the initial units arrived. The immediate collapse occurred approximately 85 feet inward from the Alpha side (Ocean Avenue) and approximately 50 feet from the Bravo side (Avenue Y). The immediate failure and loss of structural stability and collapse of truss unit #5 was followed with the subsequent collapse of truss units #6 and #4 that were interdependent on the roof rafter and purlin system to maintain thier structural stability and vertical orientation. This type of interdependent structural system of structural trusses, rafters and roof deck (membrane) result in large area collapses since the primary truss will usually cause the adjacent two truss systems (on either side of the primary compromised truss) to fail by pulling downward.  

    The effects of direct flame impingement on the truss assessmblies, thier connection points of bearing at the outter masonry walls, coupled with the tactical trench cut that had been comopleted by the operating ladder companies resulted in 4,000 sf section of roof to collapse in the truss #5, 6 and 4 bay areas. Rapid and progressing fire travel within the concealed spaces and the degradation of the roof assembly and structural support system, failure to recognize the inherent opertaional risks associated with roof and interior operations on heavy timber truss roof systems and the failure to correlate continued interior suppression operations with simultaneous roof ventilation operations with no significant change in operational progress or mitigation contributed to the tragic outcome of the incident.  

    A short ten years would pass and the lessons from the Waldbaum Fire would soon be forgotten when on July 2, 1988 operations in a Type III building consisting of an auto dealership would lead to the deaths of five (5) Firefighters in Hackensack, New Jersey when operations were being conducted in the truss loft storage area when an 80 foot heavy timber truss collapsed trapping the firefighters. The Hackensack Ford Fire occured less than four weeks short of the tenth anniversary of the Waldbaum Fire right across the Hudson River. More on the Hackensack Ford Fire HERE.  

     
     
     
     
     

    Bravo Side View

     

    Additional References :http://stevespak.com/waldbaums.html  

    Fire Investigation: An Analysis of the Waldbaum Fire, Brooklyn, New York, August 3, 1978. Quintiere, J. G. NISTIR 6030; June 1997 http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID;=18676&  

    NFPA Fire Command Magazine, Brooklyn Roof Collapse Claims six Lives. Demers, David P.; December 1978  

    Waldbaum Fire Facebook page, HERE with numerous photos and recollections honoring those that lost their lives and those that operated at FDNY Brooklyn Box 3300.
       

    Rescue efforts on the Bravo Side

     

      

    2892 Ocean Avenue Today

     

    The lessons learned in the years following the Walbaum’s fire in 1978 and the subsequent Hackensack Ford Fire, NJ in 1988 focused on understanding building construction systems, occupancies and structural assemblies, in both of these cases the timber bowstring truss systems. Over the years the foundation of knowledge necessary to build competencies and knowledgeable firefighters, fire officers and commanders cognizant in the science and technology of building construction has waned and at time has been less than an area of focus.  

    Take the time to learn about the FDNY Walbaum’s fire, its history repeating significance as a major fire service LODD event, the lessons learned from the Hackensack Ford Fire (July 2, 1988) and other related case studies that can be found on the NIOSH, USFA and NFPA web sites.  

    Look at your buildings within your response areas and jurisdiction. Understand how they’re built and more importantly how they are affected by the exposure and impingement of fire and its byproducts. Understand key building performance indicators and appropriate strategic and tactical actions based upon building profiles, occupancies, fire loading, construction features and fire service resources. Take the time to honor the brave brother firefighters from FDNY who made the supreme sacrifice thirty two years ago, and gave a legacy to learn from in this and in future fire service generations.  

    It’s time to think; BUILDING KNOWLEDGE = FIREFIGHTER SAFETY  

    Memorial

     

    Posted by on August 1, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", Brooklyn, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, honor, LODD, Naum, Remembrance, roof, tactics, timber, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know

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    The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter.  This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.

    This is one of those distinctive reports that has influential and critical operational, training and preparedness elements embedded throughout the report. Following my review of the report, having previously read the preliminary report findings, it is apparent there continues to be common threads shared by this and other events and incidents where a single of multiple firefighters have lost their lives due to similarities in the apparent and common cause deficiencies and short comings identified.

    All company and command officers should read and comprehend the lessons learned. Then, take these new found insights and see what the gaps are at the personal level (yours or those you supervise) as well as the shift, group, station, battalion, division or department as a whole. If there are gaps, then identify a way to implement timely changes as necessary so there are No History Repeating (HRE) events.

    I have provided a comprehensive synopsis of the report for your review. Take the time to read the entire report, make the time to improve where you need to.  

    On Friday, April 4, 2008 at 06:13:02 hours, what began as a routine response for Colerain Township Fire and EMS Engine 102 to investigate a fire alarm activation at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane, Colerain Township, Ohio resulted in the deaths of Colerain Township Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira.

    Upon their arrival at the scene of the two-story wood framed, residential building working fire conditions existed in the basement. The initial attack team consisted of Broxterman, Schira, and one other firefighter. The team advanced a 1¾-inch attack hose line through the interior of the building for fire control.

    Even though, they were provided with some of the most technologically advanced protective clothing for structural firefighting and self-contained breathing apparatus, it appeared that Broxterman and Schira were overwhelmed by severe fire conditions in the basement. 

    During their attempt to evacuate the building, the main-level family room flooring system in which the two were traveling on collapsed into the basement trapping the firefighters. Eleven minutes elapsed from time of arrival to the catastrophic chain of events.

    The investigation of this incident provided a number of findings and recommendations that should be considered by Colerain’s fire department, as well as other fire department organizations. The examination encompassed issues that related to building construction, firefighting tactics, command and control, situational awareness, communications, training, firefighting equipment and the individual responsibility of firefighters of the Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (Colerain Fire & EMS). In addition, a segment of the examination included a review of the individual and group affects following such an event, and the measures initiated that attempted to ensure individual, family and organizational wellness.

    The following factors were believed to have directly contributed to the deaths of Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira:

    • A delayed arrival at the incident scene that allowed the fire to progress significantly;
    • A failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices; and
    • A failure to abide by fundamental firefighter self-rescue and survival concepts

     Although the aforementioned factors were believed to have directly contributed to their deaths, they might have been prevented if:

    • Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident;
    • Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators;
    • The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
    • timely manner relative to the incident;
    • Personnel assigned to Engine 102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their first-due response area;
    • A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis
    • was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations;
    • Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural
    • firefighting existed within the department;
    • The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time;
    • The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
    • Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions;
    • Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
    • Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.

     Incident Reported

    On Friday, April 4, 2008, at 06:11:23, the Hamilton County Communications Center (HCCC) received notification of an automatic alarm activation (smoke detector and carbon monoxide) at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane (LN).

    • An automatic fire alarm response complement of two engine companies (Engines 102 & 109), one ladder company (Ladder 25), and the Battalion Chief (District 25) were dispatched to investigate at 06:13:02.
    • At 06:13:43, a second notification was received from the female homeowner reporting a fire in the basement of the building.
    • At 06:20:43, a third notification by means of a cellular phone from the female homeowner to HCCC routed through the City of Cincinnati’s Fire and Police Communications Center was received.
    • At 06:22:41, the initial response complement was then upgraded to a building fire, also known as a structure fire response complement to include one additional engine company (Engine 25), one rescue company (Rescue 26), and one basic life support transport unit (Squad 25).

    Property and Building Description: The building at 5708 Squirrels nest LN was a single-family residence that set back approximately 450-feet from the street at the end of a private driveway on a heavily wooded lot.

    • The building was two-stories in height, approximately 45-feet wide by 30-feet deep with a finished below-grade (basement) living space and attached two-car garage.
    • For simplicity, the report refers to the living space under the main-level of the building as a basement.
    • From the front (side Alpha), the building was two-stories above grade. The vertical distance between floors was approximately eight-feet. The exterior main entrance was located in the front middle of the building approximately one-foot above grade level.
    • Additional entrances to the first-floor living space were by means of a rear entry door from an upper-level deck area and through the garage area.
    • The interior stairway to the basement was located approximately 15-feet from the front main entry door towards the rear of the building. There were no exposed buildings on the adjacent sides of the fire building.

    The building was located approximately 450-feet from the curb and a driveway leading to the front entrance. The nearest fire hydrant was located approximately 500- feet from the front entrance. To provide for uniform identification of locations and operationalforces at the incident scene, the scene was divided geographically into smaller parts, which were designated as sectors. Specific areas of the incident scene were designated as follows:

    • The side of the building that bears the postal address of the location was designated as Side Alpha or front by the Incident Commander;
    • The property sloped downward towards the rear (side Charlie) of the building with an approximate 13-foot elevation difference from side Alpha to Charlie. The
    • Charlie side of the building was three-stories above the rear grade level with the building’s basement floor approximately five-feet above grade level. The exterior entrance to the building’s’ basement area, also known as a walk-out was by means of a stairway that led to a wooden deck on the Charlie side adjacent to the Delta side. A second stairway led to an upper level deck that served the main level of the building.

     

    Initial Fire Attack Operation: Upon arrival at the incident address, Engine 102 (E102), assigned four personnel (one captain, one fire apparatus operator [FAO], and two firefighters) entered and proceeded down the driveway deploying a five-inch supply hose line.

    • With their apparatus positioned in front of the building Captain (Capt.) Broxterman radioed, “Moderate smoke showing. E102 will be Squirrelsnest Command.” at 06:24:01.
    • Verification was made by the E102’s FAO through face-to-face communication with the male homeowner that all occupants were out of the building, which was then relayed to Capt. Broxterman.

    District 25 (D25) arrived at the scene at 06:26:35 and assumed Command from Capt. Broxterman. Capt. Broxterman, Firefighter (Ffr.) Schira and E102’s Ffr. #2 advanced a 1¾-inch pre-connected hose line through the front main entrance. The fire was determined to be located in the basement of the building.

    • At 06:27:52, Capt. Broxterman radioed, “E102 making entry into the basement, heavy smoke”.
    • At 06:30:35, E109′s captain radioed, “Command from E109, contact 102,have them pull out of the first floor, redeploy to the back. It’s easy access. Conditions are changing at the front door.”
    • At 06:34:48, Engine 25 (E25), the designated Rapid Assistance Team, had just completed their 360-degree size-up around the building, and encountered E102’s Ffr. #2 in front of the building, whom reported that he had lost contact with his crew.
    • During the time period between 06:29:24 and 06:34:48, the investigation committee believed that one or more catastrophic events occurred including a failure of the main-level flooring system near the Beta – Charlie corner of the building.

     Rescue and Recovery Operations

    • At 06:35:34, the Incident Commander (IC) identified a potential Mayday operation, which indicates a life threatening situation to a firefighter.  
    • RAT25 was deployed at 06:36:48. The actual Mayday operation was initiated by the IC at 06:37:41 followed by a request at 06:37:53 to the HCCC for a second alarm complement of firefighting resources.  
    • At 06:42:01, RAT25 entered the basement from the rear of the building. At 07:00:27, E26’s personnel entered through the front main entrance of the building and into the basement by means of the interior stairway.  
    • Both missing firefighters were located in the basement near the Charlie side wall adjacent to the Beta side following a floor collapse. Capt. Broxterman and Ffr. Schira were obviously deceased as a result of their injuries. 

    Fire Origin and Cause: Information from the property owners was that the female had smelled an odor in the house. She told her husband, who went to investigate. Neither of them observed any smoke or flames at that time. The husband went to the basement, and located a fire near a cedar wood lined closet used to cultivate orchids in the unfinished utility room. He attempted to extinguish the fire with portable fire extinguishers and pans of water. As the fire alarm activated, the husband had his wife call 9-1-1 to report the fire. The state of Ohio Fire Marshal’s Office Fire and Explosion Investigation Bureau ruled the fire to be accidental in nature. The fire was determined to have originated in the unfinished utility room of the basement level in or near the cedar closet. This area was directly below the family room on the first floor. The probable ignition source for this fire was determined to be at and about a plastic air circulation fan and the associated electrical wiring.

    Cause of Deaths

    Capt. Broxterman was a 37-year old employee of the Colerain Fire & EMS with approximately 17-years of certified firefighting experience. Capt. Broxterman became trapped in the basement area for a prolonged amount of time following the sudden floor collapse. Capt. Broxterman was found positioned face down over top of Ffr. Schira. The majority of her protective clothing ensemble and equipment were heavily damaged as a result of exposure to heat and direct flame impingement. She was pronounced deceased following her removal from the building. Her body was transported to the Hamilton County Coroner’s Office for autopsy. The Coroner’s report cited the manner of death as “accidental” and the cause of death as “burns and inhalation of smoke and superheated and noxious gases.” Capt. Broxterman sustained burns to 100% of her body surface, which ranged from first to fourth degree in severity as described in the coroner’s autopsy report. Postmortem carboxyhemoglobin (COHb), which is a measure of carbon monoxide exposure, was measured at 22% saturation and soot was observed in portions of her upper and lower respiratory system.

    • Based on the injuries sustained and the damage to Capt. Broxterman’s protective clothing ensemble and equipment, it is likely that she was exposed to a rapid intensification of heat and flames in the building’s basement that overwhelmed her protective ensemble and equipment, exposing her body and respiratory system to intense heat and toxic products of combustion.

     Ffr. Schira was a 29-year old employee of Colerain Fire & EMS with approximately 3½-years of certified firefighting experience. He also became trapped in the basement area for a prolonged amount of time following the sudden floor collapse. Ffr. Schira was found positioned on his right side and back, face-up beneath Capt. Broxterman. The majority of his protective clothing ensemble and equipment was heavily damaged as a result of exposure to heat and direct flame impingement. Ffr. Schira was pronounced deceased following his removal from the building. His body was transported to the Hamilton County Coroner’s Office for autopsy. The Coroner’s report cited the manner of death as “accidental” and the cause of death as “burns and inhalation of smoke and superheated and noxious gases”. Ffr. Schira sustained burns to 100% of his body surface, which ranged from first to fourth degree in severity as described in the coroner’s autopsy report. Postmortem COhb was measured at 8% saturation and soot was observed in portions of his upper and lower respiratory system.

    • Based on the injuries sustained and the damage to Ffr. Schira’s protective equipment, it is likely that that he was exposed to a rapid intensification of heat and flames in the building’s basement that overwhelmed his protective ensemble and equipment, exposing his body and respiratory system to intense heat and toxic products of combustion.

    Select Findings and Recommendations

    Findings, Discussions and Recommendations

    FINDING #3.1: The area of fire origin had no finished ceiling, which exposed the floor joists and the underside of the floor decking to direct fire impingement causing rapid deterioration and failure of the flooring system directly underneath the main-level family room.

    During this incident, based on communications transcripts (telephone and radio) it’s probable that the fire had advanced from its incipient stage to a free burning stage in approximately 18 to 20-minutes by the time Capt. Broxterman radioed that they were making entry into the basement.

    • As stated in the Incident Overview section, during the time period between 06:29:24 and 06:34:48, it is believed that one or more catastrophic events occurred within the building, which included a failure of the flooring system near the Beta-Charlie corner of the building’s first floor.

    It has been widely believed in the firefighting profession that traditional sawn lumber is far superior to some of the more innovative lightweight construction components (e.g., wood I-joist) in use today. With dimensional lumber, two-inch by eight-inch and larger, there is a greater surface to mass ratio to resist the damaging effects of fire and the structural components will maintain their integrity for a longer period of time. While this has traditionally been accurate, this incident clearly shows that this may not always be the case. Heavy charring was evident to structural members in the fire area of origin. Notice the burn damage shows how the wooden floor joists had been burned to and away from the band joist. A band joist is a vertical member that forms the perimeter of a floor system in which the floor joists tie in to. Also known as the rim joist. Early platform framed homes very likely used solid, dimensional lumber and plywood, which provided a reasonable surface to mass ratio. But the later the home was built, the less mass even dimensional lumber has due to the reduction in the actual thickness of solid dimensional lumber provided by the lumber industry through the mid-1900’s. As the years go by, building materials will likely keep getting lighter and lighter and introduce more resins and other chemicals.

     Laboratory tests that exposed structural wood components to the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E119 Assembly Test indicated that a traditional two-inch by ten-inch structural member failed in 12-minutes and six-seconds. ASTM E119 test is the standard test method for evaluating building and construction materials exposed to fire. Unlike the standardized ASTM test fires, it is widely recognized that real building fires are highly variable in their size, rate of growth and intensity. Responding firefighters are unlikely to know when a given fire started, how hot it had been prior to arrival, how long it had been at any given temperature, the design capacity and actual loads on the floors over the fire or the amount of actual damage that the fire may have done to the joists. All of these factors make it impossible to predict the remaining capacity of a floor by even the most knowledgeable, professional fire experts.

    RECOMMENDATION #3.1a: Fire departments should ensure that firefighters and incident commanders are aware that unprotected floor and ceiling joist systems, no matter the type, may fail at a faster rate when exposed to direct fire impingement.

    Unfinished basement ceilings and other areas that have exposed joists or trusses jeopardize flooring and roof systems unnecessarily during a fire, causing premature failure. Often, a weakened floor and ceiling joist system can be difficult to detect from above as the floor surface above may still appear intact. Firefighters operating on floors above fire-damaged joist systems may fall through a weakened area and become trapped in a fire below. IC’s and firefighters must be aware that these systems can fail rapidly and without warning, and plan interior operations accordingly.

    Firefighters must also be aware that while floor sag may be a widely accepted warning of an impending structural failure, floor sag is not always present or visible prior to a catastrophic collapse in a fire, regardless of the joist type, due to floor coverings, the fire’s intensity, the combination of joist spans and loads present, the location of serious structural fire damage or simply because it is too dark and smoky to see a sag in the floor. This is true for all types of structural joists, including materials such as sawn lumber, wood I-joists, and open web wood trusses and noncombustible members such as lightweight steel joists. The floor covering in this area was carpeting that transitioned to ceramic tile. When unprotected, any traditional or lightweight residential floor or ceiling assembly material, either combustible or noncombustible, may fail within several minutes of the fire’s ignition. It makes sense, therefore, that when there is a serious fire beneath a floor, there is no predictable safe amount of time that anyone can remain on that floor. Any floor system protected or not, can fail unpredictably when exposed to a substantial fire beneath.

    FINDING # 4.2: E102′s officer failed to properly analyze the scene by not performing a 360-degree scene size-up to determine an overall strategy, and implement safe and effective firefighting tactics.

    After the apparatus was positioned in front of the building, E102’s FAO was ordered by Capt. Broxterman to, “Ask the homeowner where the fire [location] was”, which was indicated to be in the basement by the male homeowner. As this was taking place, Capt. Broxterman continued donning her protective clothing ensemble (coat, helmet and self-contained breathing apparatus). Although E102′s officer provided a brief radio report of conditions observed upon arrival, she did not properly evaluate the scene so as to develop a basic strategy for implementation of safe and effective firefighting tactics. Had the officer visually evaluated the Charlie side of the building, the advanced fire conditions may have been noted, and that the lower level fire area was accessible by means of an exterior entry door for a more direct fire attack from the interior unburned side.

    This means that firefighters enter a building and position the attack hose line between the fire and the uninvolved portions of the building. This direction of fire attack is preferred because it is likely to contain the fire, protect occupants, and push heat and gases out of the building if ventilation has been performed. On the other hand, danger increases significantly when attacking from the unburned side and is not always practical based on fire location, intensity, and building construction.

    It cannot be conclusively known as to why Capt. Broxterman and Ffr. Schira proceeded into the area of the building that eventually collapsed resulting in their deaths. The investigation committee has concluded that the most probable explanation is that E102′s three-person interior team was successful in advancing their uncharged attack hose line into the basement recreation room area; reaching a point approximately 10 to15-feet from the bottom of the basement stairway as shown in the Incident Overview chapter. Once the team reached this area, it was realized they did not have sufficient hose line to continue advancing towards the seat of the fire. The team’s third member (Ffr. #2) reversed his travel and made his way back to the exterior of the building to advance additional hose line. As the team of two waited for additional hose line to be stretched and the hose line to be charged by the pump operator, the interior conditions rapidly deteriorated to a stage that it became untenable for them to hold their position.

    The team evacuated back-up the stairway without following the hose line, which by all indications was tight up against the stairway wall and tightly wrapped around the stairway door entry. Once at the top of the stairway, one of the two deceased, if not both were likely in some form of distress; became disoriented and proceeded into the family room in a direction opposite the route of travel from which they entered the building. As the two moved across the family room floor, the flooring system collapsed into the utility room area of the basement. When the third team member re-entered the building, he was unable to locate the other two members.

    The inability of Ffr. #2 to locate his team and the loss of radio communications contact with the interior team prompted the IC to declare a Mayday and activation of the RATs. This incident resulted in tragedy primarily due to the concealment of several burned-through floor joists under the carpet covered flooring system, which was nearly impossible to recognize due to heavy smoke conditions inside the burning building.

    The following factors are believed to have directly contributed to the deaths that occurred in this incident:

    • The delayed arrival at the incident scene allowed the fire to progress significantly and the hazardous conditions to exponentially increase;
    • The failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices (e.g., entry into an enclosed building with obvious working fire conditions without a charged attack hose line)
    • The failure to abide by the fundamental concepts of fire fighter self-rescue and survival (e.g., following of the hose line in the direction of travel back to the building’s entrance or exit).

     Although the aforementioned factors are believed to have directly contributed to the deaths reported here, they might have been prevented if:

    • Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident which eventually led to being overwhelmed in their response to their initial findings;
    • Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators, and the potential threats and risks that presented themselves;
    • The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
    • timely manner relative to the incident, especially critical was the information  given to the emergency communications center from the homeowners reporting an actual fire
    • Personnel assigned to E102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their firstdue response area specifically related to road and street locations, and any particular characteristics related to those areas.
    • A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations; the risk of an action must be weighed against the probable benefit that may be reasonably and realistically expected.
    • Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural firefighting existed within the department;
    • The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time. This competition led to missed and distorted messages and less than efficient use of resources, which exacerbated the problems of already taxed communications.
    • The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
    • Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions as encountered with an emphasis placed on fire ground tactical priorities (i.e., life safety, incident stabilization and property conservation);
    • Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
    •  Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.

    In Memory

    The Colerain Township (OH) Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services’s report examined the events of April 4th, 2008 with the benefit of hindsight, while seeking to be independent, impartial, and thorough. From the beginning, Colerain Fire & EMS has been committed to share our findings with others in the hope that it may prevent another such event.

    The deaths of Captain Robin M. Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira had a profound loss not only to their parents, family and this organization, but also to the larger fire service community. In order to prevent these tragic losses in the future, we must first understand how and why our sister and brother firefighters died. We must learn from their incident and take that knowledge forward. If it was possible, what would these firefighters tell us today that might prevent a similar death of a firefighter in the future? What would they want us as firefighters, company officers and chief officers to know about the circumstances that lead to their deaths and the things we (and they) might have done to alter the most tragic of outcomes?  

    From the information that was made available for review, it was evident that these two individuals were well-loved in life, and greatly missed in death. Every line of duty death of a firefighter in the United States is significant. This investigative analysis document is dedicated to Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira, their families, friends and the community whose lives were forever changed. In working to improve the health and safety of all United States firefighters, we have much to learn from the supreme sacrifice of these two individuals, who they were in life and in death. We honor their memories.

      

    References

    • Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Web Site HERE
    • Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths April, 2010 Full Report HERE
    • NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
    • WLTW.com news report Summary HERE

      

     

    Posted by on July 2, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, compentencies, construction, decision-making, dynamics, failures, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, first-due, LODD, Lumber, Mayday, NIOSH, Recommendations, Reports, residential, risk-based assessment, strategies, tactics, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    No More History Repeating Events-Remembrance

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    As we approach the July 4th holiday period, two significant LODD incidents previously occurred during this time frame that hold a number of lessons learned related to command management, operations, building construction principles and building performance, fire behavior and the ever present dangers of the job. Take the opportunity to learn more about these events, and expand your insights and knowledge base.  Those events being the 1988 Hackensack (NJ) Ford Fire which resulted in five (5) LODD and the 2002 Gloucester City (NJ) Fire that resulted in three (3) LODD along with three children.

    Take a moment to reflect upon the supreme sacrifice made by these heroic firefighters and the messages that lay within the pages of the incident case studies, reports and summaries.  Our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com   has a comprehensive overview of both events with report links and a must see video on the Gloucester City (NJ) 2002 LODD event. For Remembering Hackensack and Gloucester follow the link HERE

    Remembrance (1988)

    Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department
    • CAPT. RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Engine Co. No. 304
    • LIEUT. RICHARD REINHAGEN, Engine Co. No. 302
    • F/F WILLIAM KREJSA, Engine Co. No. 301
    • F/F LEONARD RADUMSKI, Engine Co. No. 302
    • F/F STEPHEN ENNIS, Rescue Co. No. 308      

    Remember (2002)

    Gloucester City (NJ) Fire
    • James Sylvester Fire Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
    • John West Deputy Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
    • Thomas G. Stewart III Paid Firefighter, Gloucester City Fire Department

    Posted by on July 2, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, command-leadership, compentencies, construction, decision-making, failures, Fatalities, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, honor, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, mass-casualty-incident, NFPA, NIOSH, Remembrance, special-operations, structure fires, Trapped, Truss • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    In Search of Tactical Patience

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    Today commemorates the anniversary of the Sofa Superstore fire in Charleston, South Carolina, in which nine firefighters lost their lives while engaged in aggressive interior operations at a commercial building occupied and operating as a furniture store and warehouse. On the evening of June 18, 2007, units from the Charleston Fire Department responded to a fire at the Sofa Super Store, a large retail furniture outlet in the West Ashley district of the city. Within less than 40 minutes, the fire claimed the lives of nine firefighters and changed the lives of countless others. The incident galvanized the nation’s fire service and to this day continues to generate commentary and observations within wide latitude of functional areas. What has changed since that day, three years ago?

    The publication of the Routley Report was a wake-up call to the fire service, but did we hit the snooze button and roll back over? Are we catching those extra forty winks at the expense of what we should be jumping out of our bunks and engaging in? If you haven’t taken the time to read the authoritative reports, now is the time to do so. Make it one of your definitive activities for the weekend. Reflect upon its insights, recommendations and suggestions and think about your organization, department or agency.

    Stop and think about where the fire service is today; where is your department today? Any measurable changes that reflect the front page news of past events or reports? Or is it business as usual? More importantly; where are YOU today? What have you done based upon the lessons learned or insights expressed to make you a better prepared and knowledgeable firefighter, officer or commander?

    During the past twelve months of travels around the country presenting programs on building construction and command risk management and firefighter safety, there continues to be a common thread within the Fire Service that resonates loudly (at times and in some regions); “were’ just not getting it”.  Dialog and discussion, ranting and challenges; sometimes on the verge of aggression and hostility at times continue to punctuate and permeate program conversation and debate. We argue about the merits of operational aggressiveness at the expense of looking (and understanding) the ways to increase our proficiency and knowledge that can translate into refined and intelligent tactical operations.

    I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

    We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.

    The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling. ( more on these in upcoming posts…)

    Take the time today to remember and honor the Charleston Nine.

    Comprehend the sacrifice and grasp the essence of our noble profession and the tradition of the Fire Service. Remember the past and learn from it and improve the future so that that the cycle of potential history repeating events is disrupted and eventually broken.

    Work conscientiously and diligently to improve our profession and yourself; identifying gaps, correcting the deficiencies and improving the job, through a legacy of operational excellence and safety- for tomorrow’s firefighters.

    Honor and Remembrance- The Charleston Nine

    • Bradford Rodney “Brad” Baity – Engineer 19
    • Theodore Michael Benke – Captain 16
    • Melvin Edward Champaign – Firefighter 16
    • James “Earl” Allen Drayton – Firefighter 19
    • Michael Jonathon Alan French – Engineer 5
    • William H. “Billy” Hutchinson, III – Captain 19
    • Mark Wesley Kelsey – Captain 5
    • Louis Mark Mulkey – Captain 15
    • Brandon Kenyon Thompson – Firefighter 5
    Posted by on June 18, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", building construction, Charleston, decision-making, fire behavior, firefighting-operations, Generations, History Repeating Event, honor, lessons, line-of-duty, LODD, occupancies, operations, professional development, Remembrance, risk, Safety, tradition, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Reflecting on These Days of June

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    Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is.  Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed.  Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.

    We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?

    We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to  the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.

    • Modern building construction is no longer predicable
    • Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
    • Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
    • Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
    • Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
    • Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
    • Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
    • Command & Company Officer dereliction
    • Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

    STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
    There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.

    These behaviors include;
    • Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.

    • Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.

    • Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.

    Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;

    TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
    1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
    1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
    2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
    1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.

    The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.

    Check out these links;

    If you haven’t read Chief Mayers’s discerning reflections on Firehouse Zen, this is a MUST read. Where Were You That Night?

    The Lessons Learned from the Past

    From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

    Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

    Combat Fire Engagement

    Situations, Size-Up, Actions and Entertainment

    Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior

    Posted by on June 17, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "Safety Week", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Charleston, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, courage to be safe, dynamics, FDNY, fire behavior, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event, lessons, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Naum, NIOSH, occupancies, Remembrance, Safety Culture, tradition, training • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report

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    8-26-2009 7-07-53 AMNIOSH released it’s report on the August 24, 2009 three alarm fire at 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo, New York that resulted in the LODD of Lt. Charles McCarthy and FF Jonathan Croom. On August 24, 2009, 45-year-old career Lieutenant Charles McCarthy died following a partial floor collapse into a basement fire, and  34-year-old career fire fighter Jonathan Croom was fatally injured while attempting to rescue the Lieutenant.  The Buffalo Fire Department was dispatched for “an alarm of fire” with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. Repeated attempts were made to force open this basement door in order to search for trapped civilians, but crews had difficulty gaining access through this door because it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the 1st and 2nd floors with no civilians found.

    Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional manpower was sent with special tools to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2. Lieutenant Charles McCarthy and two fire fighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify all fire fighters had exited a 1st floor deli. Lt. McCarthy following a hoseline into the structure, was well ahead of the other two fire fighters when the 1st floor partially collapsed beneath him. McCarthy fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire. The other two fire fighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. Lt. McCarthy made several Mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device. Confusion erupted exteriorly on scene when trying to verify who was calling the Mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement.

    The incident commander was aware that he had crews attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure. Simultaneously, FF Croom, a member of the fire fighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside  Lieutenant McCarthy’s point of entry when the Mayday calls came out. It is believed that FF Croom  knew where the Lt., was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. FF Croom grabbed a tool, went on air, and rushed into the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other fire fighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device alarming. Lt. McCarthy was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but FF Croom was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after Lt. McCarthy’s Mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the 1st floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. the Lt’s. PASS device was still alarming. They were pronounced dead on scene. Four fire fighters and one lieutenant suffered minor injuries during the incident. No civilians were discovered within the structure.

    Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity not maintained.

    NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

    • Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
    • Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
    • Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
    • Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
    • Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
    • Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
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    1815 Genesee Street 1815 Genesee Street

    CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

    Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that may have led to the fatalities:

    • Working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire.
    • Interior condition reports not communicated to command.
    • Inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments.
    • Crew integrity not maintained.

    Time Line from the Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report

    3:51 a.m. – fire crews were sent to 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo. When they arrived, they were met by a resident who said he heard people trapped inside. Crews began searching the building, but were eventually ordered out as conditions deteriorated.

    4:22 a.m. – Members of Rescue 1 entered the building to make sure all firefighters had evacuated the building. Less than two minutes later the floor in the rear of the building collapsed. Lt. McCarthy of Rescue 1 fell into the basement as the floor collapsed. according to the report, other members of Rescue 1 were unaware of the collapse and only reported hearing a loud noise. McCarthy began calling for help on his radio, but other members of Rescue 1 were unable to determine where the calls were coming from and left the building unaware that Lt. McCarthy was trapped.

    4:23 a.m. – Firefighter Croom entered the building after hearing the calls for help. the report says he did not exit the building, apparently falling into the basement near Lt. McCarthy.

    4:31 a.m. – An emergency head count was ordered to determine the identity of the missing firefighter. Lt. McCarthy was reported missing at that time, but FF Croom was not. Firefighters in the front of the store reported hearing a pass alarm, but could not reach it due to extreme fire conditions, a weakened floor and continuing collapse.

    4:48 a.m. – all crews were ordered out of the building because it had become unsafe.

    Later, concerns began to arise that FF Croom was missing. the report says he was erroneously reported in a remote area.

    5:46 a.m. – On scene personal realize FF Croom is missing and likely inside the building.

    6:10 a.m. – Another head count is taken and FF Croom is reported missing.

    9:18 a.m. – the Recovery Group reports that the two missing firefighters had been located in the basement, covered in fallen debris.

    9:32 a.m. – the debris is cleared and Recovery Group firefighters reach Lt. McCarthy and FF Croom.

    Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report, issued December 2, 2009, HERE

    For a comprehensive Power Point Program on Operational Safety at Heavy Timber and Ordinary Construction Occupancys that you can down load, go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting Web Site HERE.

    I produced an informational training PPT program and support information that aligned with a previoulsy reported Near Miss Event Report. You can download the PPT Training Program HERE and the PDF File HERE

    NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE

    Posted by on March 30, 2010 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, assemblies, building construction, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, floors, LODD, NIOSH, ordinary, pre-planning, structure fires • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,