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Three Alarm High rise Fire: FDNY Bronx

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Lucas Jackson / Reuters/REUTERS

 

FDNY Bronx 66-33-2224 Third Alarm at 225 E 149th Street;

A three-alarm blaze tore through a South Bronx building on Saturday morning — leaving at least 37  people, including a child, hurt, according to published reports. The fire started on the fifth floor of the 27-story E. 149th St. building near Park Ave. about o7:40 a.m. More than 135 firefighters were operating. News media is reporting taht the fire was under control in a two hour time span.  Fire officials say 37 people suffered injuries as a result of a three-alarm fire Saturday morning at a 27-story building in the Bronx.

From NYC Fire Wire on Facebook

There are almost 500 apartments in the building, along with more than 20 stores. Video Clip and FDNY Interview HERE

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Aerial of Complex, BING Maps

Google Street Maps Image Capure

Links:

 

Fire in Syracuse: Four Firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978

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The 701 University Ave Fire- 1978

 

Fire in Syracuse: Four firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978

April 9th marks the 35th anniversary of the 701 University Ave. fire that claimed the lives of four Syracuse (NY) firefighters in 1978 while conducting search & rescue and suppression operations at an apartment building on the Syracuse University Campus, in Syracuse, New York.  

 

The fire began when one of the tenants lit a candle in a styrofoam wig stand and left it unattended. At 00:46 hours on Sunday April 9, 1978, an alarm of fire was transmitted for a reported building fire at 701 University Avenue on the campus of Syracuse University.

The Victorian style house was a three story building constructed of wood balloon framing and was built circa 1898. The house had been converted into ten (10) apartments that were occupied by SU students. The gross area of each of the three floors was approx. 1,750 sq. ft., with a predominate rectangular footprint shape measuring 69 ft. x 35 ft.  The third floor apartments only had access via a stairway in the rear, down a long narrow corridor that measured only 33 inches wide.

Post Fire View of Building from Bravo Side. Photo CJ Naum, 1978

 

The building had inherent vertical and horizontal concealed spaces indicative of balloon frame style construction along with additional concealed spaces in the third floor ceiling area. A partial automatic sprinkler system had been installed in the building in order to comply with a 1952 State of New York law. This system provided protection to the basement, means of egress, a storage area and a portion of the concealed space above the third floor.

The fire originated in a second floor apartment, and then spread into the combustible concealed space above the third floor ceiling. Approximately sixteen minutes into fireground operations the first indications of firefighting personnel being in distress were received.  The first call to the Alarm center was made at 0045:17 hrs., with the first-due engine arriving at 0048:05 and first water applied at 0051 (est).

 

The four SFD fire fighters, Frank Porpiglio Jr., Stanley Duda, Michael Petragnani, and Robert Schuler, who were assigned to the Squad and Rescue Companies, entered the house to conduct a primary search of the premises for SU students thought to be trapped in the house.

While operating on the third floor inside, a scalding steam caused by triggered sprinklers prevented the four firefighters from escaping, and they eventually depleted their air supply and suffocated to death. The firefighters were operating with full PPE that was complaint at that time ( 1978) and were utilizing state-of-the art SCBA in the form of the new 4.5 SCBA systems.   All the tenants had escaped safely before the fire fighters had entered the house. The fire was subsequently investigated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) at the request of the City of Syracuse and NFPA Report No. LS-3 was published.  

 

Syracuse Post Standard Front Page April 10, 1978

 

Killed in the Line of Duty on April 9th, 1978:

Syracuse (NY) Fire Department

  • FF Michael Petragnani, Age 27.   ~  Rescue Company – appointed 8/20/1973
  • FF Frank Porpiglio Jr., Age 24.   ~  Squad Company – appointed 8/20/1973
  • FF Robert Shuler, Age 31.  ~  Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973
  • FF Stanley Duda, Age 34.   ~  Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973 

 

Remembrance, Honor, Courage and Sacrifice

Never Forgotten

 

 

 

Post Fire View, East Adams Street and University Ave. Photo: CJ Naum, 1978

 

Martin J. Whitman School of Management stands today at the corner, Photo CJ Naum, 2013

Memorial Plaque placed in 2005 in the Martin J. Whitman School of Management located on the site of 1978 fire. Photo: CJ NAum, 2013

 

Remembrance 1978-2013 SFD Rescue ~ Squad

 

 

Colerain and Eleven Minutes to Mayday: Lessons from 2008 Resonate Today

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Remembering the Sacrafice: Capt. Broxterman and FF Schira

On Friday, April 4, 2008 at 06:13:02 hours, what began as a routine response for Colerain Township Fire and EMS Engine 102 to investigate a fire alarm activation at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane, Colerain Township, Ohio resulted in the deaths of Colerain Township Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira.

Upon their arrival at the scene of the two-story wood framed, residential building working fire conditions existed in the basement. The initial attack team consisted of Broxterman, Schira, and one other firefighter. The team advanced a 1¾-inch attack hose line through the interior of the building for fire control.

Even though, they were provided with some of the most technologically advanced protective clothing for structural firefighting and self-contained breathing apparatus, it appeared that Broxterman and Schira were overwhelmed by severe fire conditions in the basement. 

During their attempt to evacuate the building, the main-level family room flooring system in which the two were traveling on collapsed into the basement trapping the firefighters. Eleven minutes elapsed from time of arrival to the catastrophic chain of events.

This is one of those distinctive reports that has influential and critical operational, training and preparedness elements embedded throughout the report. 

It’s apparent there continues to be common threads shared by this event from 2008 and other events and incidents in the past five years where a single of multiple firefighters have lost their lives due to similarities in the apparent and common cause deficiencies and short comings identified.

All company and command officers should read and comprehend the lessons learned. Then, take these new found insights and see what the gaps are at the personal level (yours or those you supervise) as well as the shift, group, station, battalion, division or department as a whole.

If there are gaps, then identify a way to implement timely changes as necessary so there are No History Repeating (HRE) events.

The importance of Reading the Building, taking the time to complete the three sixty and being combat ready and “expecting fire”.

Remember their sacrifice, so we can learn.

 

  • Past Post on CommandSafety.com with Report Narrative and Incident Details HERE

 

The following factors were believed to have directly contributed to the deaths of Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira:

  • A delayed arrival at the incident scene that allowed the fire to progress significantly;
  • A failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices; and
  • A failure to abide by fundamental firefighter self-rescue and survival concepts

 Although the aforementioned factors were believed to have directly contributed to their deaths, they might have been prevented if:

  • Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident;
  • Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators;
  • The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
  • timely manner relative to the incident;
  • Personnel assigned to Engine 102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their first-due response area;
  • A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis
  • was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations;
  • Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural
  • firefighting existed within the department;
  • The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time;
  • The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
  • Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions;
  • Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
  • Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.

 

 

References

WLTW.com Previous Stories:

 

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Cugees Restaurant Roof Collapse-1981 LAFD

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LAFD January 28, 1981

 

Was working on an LODD report and came across a past notable incident that occurred over 32 years ago, that should be recognized,  for many of you that may not of heard or read about it previous to this.

Here’s an intro and a link to the LAFD January 28, 1981 incident;

http://lafire.com/lastalarm_file/1981-0728_Taylor/ThomasTaylor.htm

On January 28, 1981, at 3:33 a.m, a full alarm assignment was dispatched to Cugees Restaurant,5300 Lankershim Boulevard, in the North Hollywood area.
Firefighters found heavy smoke with some fire showing in the interior of the restaurant.

Because a back draft explosion was a distinct possibility and because the smoke had to be cleared in order to begin a meaningful fire attack, ventilation procedures were begun on the roof.
Four members of Truck 60 were cutting a hole near the center of the roof when, without warning, it began to sink beneath their feet. One firefighter described the sensation as similar to standing on the deck of a rapidly listing ship. As the roof sank, it fell at a steep angle, slowly and agonizingly pulling Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor to his death.

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Some additional links:

In Memory of Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor
Truck Company 60 B Platoon
Appointed July 22, 1973
Died January 28, 1981
Died of burns in roof collapse at arson fire.
Cugee’s Restaurant
5300 Lankershim Boulevard

 

 

Ready, Set, Go…

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Ready, Set, Go…

Before Making Entry, while in the street;

  • Has someone completed or assigned reconned a 360 of the building?
  • Have you looked at the Building and its Profile?
  • Made a Rapid Risk Assessment?
  • Assessed the Building’s Anatomy?
  • Considered the Compartment?
  • Considered the Fire Dynamics?
  • Assessed the Predictability of Performance?
  • Scanned for Situational Awareness?
  • Considered the MELT? (Most Error Likely Tactic)
  • Looked your partner in the Eye- and knew what needed to be done..
  • …and are Combat Ready to Deploy?

…Forty-five seconds to observe, process and implement

 

 

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A Delicate Balance

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A Delicate Balance

 

Light Weight construction has given way to Engineered Structural Systems (ESS) which in today’s evolving fireground, have an even more extensive array of performance, operational and integrity issues that affect a building’s performance under fire conditions.To unequivocally state that nothing has changed in buildings, occupancies, fire flow delivery rates and demands for increased proficiencies of our firefighters, company and command officers is absurd, ignorant and dangerous.

“It’s a lot more than just Stretching the Line…and going in….”

 
Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety…so we can do our job—and that’s firefighting .Another classic illustration by Paul Combs.

Another classic illustration by Paul Combs

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Building Construction for Today’s Fire Service

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Here’s the starting line-up of the New 2013 Buildingsonfire Training Programs and Seminars

Program Details coming early January

  • Building Construction for Today’s Fire Service
  • Reading the Building: Tactical Risk for the First-Due
    • Two New Programs Addressing The Needs for Today’s Evolving Fireground and Firefighter

      Building Construction for Today’s Fire Service
      Reading the Building: Tactical Risk for the First-Due

  • Building Construction for the Adaptive Fireground
  • Collapse Considerations for Buildings on Fire
  • Fireground Leadership for the Company and Command Officer
  • Adaptive Fireground Management for the Company and Command Officer
  • Engineered Systems: Buildings, Construction and Tactics

If you’re interested in hosting a program in 2013 or 2014, contact us at Buildingsonfire@gmail.com or CommandSafety@gmail.com

Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

Leading Causes of Residential Fire Fatalities: Unintentional/Careless Actions, Smoking

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USFA Releases Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010) Report “Other unintentionally set, careless” actions and “smoking” are the leading causes
 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report today examining the characteristics of civilian fire fatalities in residential buildings. The report, Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010) was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is based on 2008 to 2010 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).

According to the report:

  • Ninety-two percent of all civilian fatalities in residential building fires involve thermal burns and smoke inhalation.
  • The leading specific location where civilian fire fatalities occur in residential buildings is the bedroom (55 percent).
  • Fifty percent of civilian fire fatalities in residential buildings occur between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. This period also accounts for 47 percent of fatal fires.
  • Thirty-six percent of fire victims in residential buildings were trying to escape at the time of their deaths; an additional 35 percent were sleeping.
  • “Other unintentionally set, careless” actions and “smoking” (each accounting for 16 percent) are the leading causes of fatal residential building fires.
  • Approximately 44 percent of civilian fatalities in residential building fires are between the ages of 40 and 69.
  • Thirteen percent of the fire fatalities in residential buildings were less than 10 years old.

Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010) is part of the Topical Fire Report Series. Topical reports explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS.

Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.

 REPORT DOWNLOAD: Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2008-2010)
 

Time of Alarm

 

Human Factors Contrubuting to Fatalities

 
 

Age Factors

 

News and Features

Residential Fire Trends

ZoomClick charts below to enlarge.

Residential Building Cooking Fires Residential Building Electrial Malfunction Fires Residential Building Heating Fires Residential Building Smoking Fires

2008 State Fire Death Rates

National Fire Death Rate:
12.0 deaths per million population
State Fire Death Rate
District of Columbia 32.2
Oklahoma 26.4
Arkansas 24.1
West Virginia 23.7
Alabama 22.5
Mississippi 22.5
Tennessee 22.0
Louisiana 21.4
South Carolina 18.7
Alaska 17.5

View All States »

 

Fire Statistics

Browse Reports

      
Alcohol Lighters, Matches, and Candles
Civilian Casualties Mattresses and Bedding
Civilian Casualties – Children Outdoor
Civilian Casualties – Older Adults Rural and Urban
Civilian Casualties – People with Disabilities School and University
Cooking Smoke Alarms
Electrical and Appliances Smoking
Fire Departments Structure Fires
Firefighter Casualties Structure Fires (Nonresidential)
Heating Structure Fires (Residential)
Holiday and Seasonal Vehicles
Intentionally Set Fires Wildland

Fire in the United States

This report provides a statistical overview of fires in the United States and is designed to equip the fire service and others with information that motivates corrective action, sets priorities, targets specific fire programs, serves as a model for State and local analyses of fire data, and provides a baseline for evaluating programs.

PDF, 5MbFire in the United States Fifteenth Edition (2003-2007) (PDF, 5 Mb)

14th Edition (PDF, 4.1 Mb)
13th Edition (PDF, 1.3 Mb)

12th Edition (PDF, 2.3 Mb)
11th Edition (PDF, 1.7 Mb)

10th Edition (PDF, 2.0 Mb)
9th Edition (PDF, 3.7 Mb)

PDF, 1.3 MbProfile of Fire in the United States Fifteenth Edition (2003-2007) (PDF, 1.3 Mb)

 

Residential Fire Injures Seven Firefighters: Wind Driven Conditions Suspected

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Fireground Operations, View from Alpha-Bravo Corner street side. Photo by Billy McNeel.

 

Residential Fire in Prince George’s County (MD) Injures Seven Firefighters: Wind Driven Conditions Suspected  

Apparent wind driven condition contributed to rapidly escalating fire conditions resulting in extreme fire behavior during initial fire suppression operations being coordinated at a single family residential dwelling (SFD) fire Friday night February 24th in Riverdale, MD. At 9:11 p.m. firefighters responded to a house fire in the 6404 57th Avenue, according to published reports and the new release from Prince George’s County (MD) Firefighters.

PGFD companies arrived to find a one-story with basement, single-family home with fire on both levels. A review of public records indicates the SFD was built in 1967 of dimensioned wood frame construction consisting of a single story with a full basement with 780 square feet of occupied floor space.  The house foot print was approximately 30 feet x 26 feet and had a low profile gable roof. A review of building (birdseye view) aerial images suggests that a moderate grade change from the Alpha division to the Charlie division is apparent with  walk-in basement access.

 

Street View A-D. Screencapture Googlemaps

Firefighters initiated an interior attack from the Alpha Division when an apparent sudden rush of air fanned by high winds entered from the rear of the house (Delta Division), either from a door or window being opened or broken out, the news release said.

The rapid influx of air from the sustained winds into the interior room compartments combined with the already progressing fire conditions creating a “fire ball’ within the structure’s interior rooms where companies were operating engulfing the firefighters. Firefighters tried to escape and commanders immediately called for an EMS Task Force and Fire Task Force.

 

 

 

A review of internet published archival weather data for the general area (Riverdale/College Park, MD) during the period of 20:55 hrs. and 21:15 hrs., recorded wind speeds of 13.8 – 20.7 MPH with wind gusts of 27.6 – 36.8 MPH. gusts of  MPH. (wunderground.com HERE)

 

 

At this time two firefighters, Bladensburg Volunteer Fire Fighters Ethan Sorrell and Kevin O’Toole remain in critical condition at Washington Hospital Center.  A third fire fighter, Riverdale Volunteer, Michael McLary also remains hospitalized for injuries.  Four other injured fire fighters, three from Riverdale and one from College Park, were released and sent home last night according to the latest reports.

 Other Media Links:

 

For more insights and information on Wind Driven Fire Conditions, incidents, research and lessons learned, here are a few mission critical links;

  •  Wind Driven Fire Articles on CommandSafety.com, HERE

Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report-Remembrance and Learning’s HERE

  • Looking Back at The Cherry Road Townhouse Fire, Double LODD; DCFD 1999
  • Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House in Texas, 2009

  • Wind Driven Mansion Fire
  • Heavy Fire in 10,000 Square Foot Huntingtown (MD) Mega Mansion Injuring 9 Firefighters
  • A video of one of the wind driven fire experiments showing the pulsing flames out of the window. Pulsing Fire(83 MB)
  • A video of one of the wind driven fire experiments showing the deployment of a Wind Control Device (WCD). WCD Deployment. (40 MB)
  • A 4-view video of one of the wind driven fire experiments on the 7th floor. Governor’s Island Wind Driven Fire (368 MB)
  • A 4-view video of one of the wind driven fire experiments conducted where the wind control curtain is deployed. The video is 4 times real time. WDF Curtain Deploy (486 MB)
  • An 8-view video of experiment number five conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of a WCD on a wind driven fire.  The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 5-Oct View (450MB)
  • An 8-view video of experiment number eight conducted at the Large Fire Building at NIST’s Gaithersburg Campus which examined the impact of externally applied water, solid stream and fog stream, at 160 gpm.  The video is 4 times real time. Experiment 8- Oct View (419MB)
  • NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
    • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
    • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
    • Reference Data HERE

 

  • NIST Wind Driven Fire Study
    • Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
    • What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented?  Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening.  If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants.  NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
    • This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions.  There are many questions regarding wind driven fires.  For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures?  Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires.  In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
    • Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
    • A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings.  All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set.  All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player.  NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
    • NIST References HERE and HERE

    NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments

    • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
    • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
    • Reference Data HERE

 

Updated 02/26/2012

From Statter911: Here’s what Chief Bashoor told The Washington Post’s J. Freedom du Lac about the fire:

Strong winds were gusting out of the west at the time — “up to 40, 45 mph,” said the chief. They were blowing directly at — and into — the burning basement, which had a west-facing door.

“As soon as the guys opened the front door and advanced, it blew from the basement, up the steps and right out the front door,” Bashoor said. “It was like a blowtorch coming up the steps and out the door.”

The entire incident — “from the time they were in the door until they were burned” — took eight seconds, the chief said.

The firefighters inside the house “did everything they were trained to do,” he said, but they were essentially defenseless.

“Without that wind, the hot air and gases would have been venting out of the rear of the house,” he said. “The current of air essentially produced a chimney right up the steps and out the front door.”

San Francisco FD Berkeley Way Double LODD Report Issued: Routine Fire….

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Charlie Side Fire View

 
 
 The Chief of the Department directed the Department Safety Officer to conduct a Safety Investigation of this incident. The primary purpose of the investigation was to identify and analyze the contributing factors that led to the incident as well as to create situational awareness to prevent future occurrences. The main objective of the Team’s investigation and subsequent report was to discover the key factor that led to the fatal outcome of two Firefighters. The SFFD report contains the findings and recommendations to help prevent Firefighter injuries or fatalities in the future.

 

In analyzing and recording these events, the Investigation Team acknowledges and respects that members confronted a challenging situation. On‐scene personnel reacted quickly to the changing conditions at this incident. We request that every person who reads this report show respect, appreciation and consideration for all personnel who responded to this incident.

As is a common industry practice, for this report Lieutenant Vincent Perez was referred to as Victim 1 and Firefighter Paramedic Anthony Valerio was referred to as Victim 2, with the exception of the Rescue Events Section.

 Excerpt from Chief of Department’s Letter

“On Thursday, June 2, 2011 at 10:45 a.m., the San Francisco Fire Department responded to Box 8155, at 133 Berkeley Way. What was seemingly a routine working fire in a single family residence quickly transformed into a fierce and unrelenting incident with ultimately tragic results.

When we answered the call to a career in the Fire Service and took our Oath of Allegiance, we were aware of the inherent danger of our occupation. Despite this awareness, we do not expect to encounter a line of duty death of a brother or sister, especially not in our very own Department. The profound loss of Lieutenant Vincent Perez and Firefighter/Paramedic Anthony Valerio has left an indelible impression in our hearts and will forever be remembered in the annals of SFFD history.

Even as we mourned our fallen brothers in the early days after the tragedy, our Department began the painful and difficult, but necessary, steps of a Line of Duty Death investigation. We were resolute in understanding what occurred during those fateful minutes and compelled to uncover any recommendations for improvement that may arise to future operations so that their passing will not have been in vain. For over six months, the Investigative Team worked tirelessly, scrutinizing every piece of evidence in order to produce a comprehensive report.”

SFFD

 

Joanne Hayes‐White

Chief of Department

 

 

 

Executive Summary and Report Excerpt

On June 2, 2011 at 10:45 hours, the San Francisco Fire Department was dispatched to a report of a fire in the building at 133 Berkeley Way in the City’s Diamond  Heights neighborhood. The first unit arriving on the scene, Engine 26, observed light smoke showing from the garage of the 4 story (2 above grade, 2 below grade) wood framed building, detached on the Bravo side.

 

Aerial from the Charlie Side

An aggressive interior fire attack was initiated through the front door, which is on a level between the ground level and second floor. After investigating the garage (ground level), Engine 24, the second Engine on the scene, led a small line through the garage to the interior door to back up the first Company. Battalion 9 was assigned Fire Attack by Battalion 6, who had assumed Command. Battalion 9 entered the fire building and, after conferring face to face with Engine 26 on the first floor (ground level), concluded that the fire was below them.

 

Alpha Side Operations

Battalion 9 exited the building and proceeded to the Bravo side to check for an entrance leading directly to the fire floor. Engine 11 led a large line wye to the driveway with the intention of leading a 1 ¾ inch line through the garage. They were redirected by Battalion 6 to make their lead down the Bravo side of the building to Sublevel 1 (one floor below grade) to assist Battalion 9. The Division Chief, upon arrival, assumed Command. He assigned Battalion 6 to Division 3 (ground floor).

Truck 15 was assigned Roof Division. Truck 11 split their crew, two members to the roof and three members to search and ventilate the top floor of the fire building. The Rescue Squad was ordered to conduct a search. Two members initially attempted to make entry through the garage but, due to extreme heat conditions, redeployed and entered through Sublevel 1 on the Bravo side.

The other two members of the Rescue Squad made entry through the front door, were pushed back by the heat and then made a successful second effort and conducted a search of the top floor.

 

In the course of fireground operations, members of several Companies came upon the stricken members on the first level and removed them from the building. All possible efforts were employed to revive the members and they were transported to San Francisco General Hospital (SFGH). One member (Victim 1) succumbed to his injuries that day and the second member (Victim 2) succumbed to his injuries two days later. Two other Firefighters were treated at SFGH for various injuries and released that day.

The Medical Examiner determined the cause of death for both members was due to complications from external and internal thermal injuries. Both victims suffered burns to 40% of their body surface. This fire was determined to be accidental by the SFFD Fire Investigative Unit. The fire originated on Sublevel 1, on the West side of the family room, near the large floor to ceiling windows. The ignition was a non‐specific electrical sequence in the electrical wiring or appliance (handheld vacuum cleaner) in this area.

There was a delay in reporting the fire due to the occupants’ attempting to extinguish it on their own. (SFFD Fire Investigation Report 11‐0500532)

The investigation identified that the failing of the window on Sublevel 1, located near the seat of the fire and directly across the stairwell leading to the ground floor, led to the extreme fire behavior which ultimately caused the death of two Firefighters. This fire was in a stage of deprived oxygen when the window failed, causing a rapid extreme high heat event to occur. The extreme heat followed the natural flow path up the interior stairs where Victims 1 and 2 were located.

The Safety Investigation Team found no conclusive evidence that the members were exposed to direct flame impingement during this rapid extreme heat event. However,

Victims 1 and 2 received varying degree of burns up to 40% of their body. The investigation concluded that this was caused by the rapid extreme heat conditions that radiated through their Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to their bodies. These temperatures exceed the ability for human survival regardless of PPE.

The PPE was inspected and evaluated by NIOSH and the manufacturer. Both reviewing parties concluded that the PPE performed to its specifications and design. The manufacturer concluded that the PPE was exposed to temperatures in the range of 550‐ 700°F. These extreme temperatures were short in duration which caused limited damage to the outer shell of the PPE.

The Safety Investigation Team noticed severe heat damage to the portable radios remote speaker/microphones on Victims 1 and 2 and had the radios tested. The testing indicated that the remote speaker/microphones failed to operate correctly due to heat damage. The Safety Investigation Team was not able to determine, after testing, exactly when the remote speaker/microphones failed. The investigation has shown that multiple attempts were made to contact Engine 26 with no response.

The investigation also found that no radio transmissions of distress were received from Victims 1 or 2. Command and Control of any incident in the San Francisco Fire Department is acquired and maintained through the use of the Incident Command System (ICS).

The Incident Command System provides the tools for clear objectives, a single action plan, clear and acknowledged communications, and accountability for all members assigned to an incident. At this incident, some of the components of Incident Command System that were not followed include:

  • Single action plan
  • Fireground Accountability

From these findings, this report makes recommendations for several areas of the Department, including:

  • Training
  • Equipment
  • Policy Development
  • Policy Enforcement

The Safety Investigation Team gathered and analyzed many facts and conducted interviews of members directly involved in this incident. The Team identified several factors that occurred that contributed to the deaths at this incident.

These factors include:

  • Extreme heat conditions accelerated by the failure of a window on the fire floor.
  • Layout of building
  • Excessive live fuel load which contributed to the growth of the fire

Conclusion

This incident appeared from the onset to be a routine “room and contents” fire that the SFFD encounters on a regular basis. As the Companies were performing standard fireground operations, the incident rapidly deteriorated due to a hostile fire event. The failure of a window in the fire room allowed fresh oxygen to enter the room, providing a fire that was deprived of one of the key elements of combustion to rapidly intensify.

Due to the growth of the fire, the room flashed, causing extreme and rapid heat conditions which traveled up the interior stairs (the flow path) to the location which our members were operating. Our members were caught in this high heat, causing the injuries that ultimately claimed their lives.

Due to this fire event, other Companies attempting to conduct fireground support operations were prevented from making entry into the structure from street level (through garage) to back up Engine 26. These Companies were forced to regroup and find an alternate point of entry. In the process of doing so, crews made entry from the Bravo side directly into the fire room and extinguished the fire. This allowed members to make entry from above which led to the discovery and rescue of our members.

These events happened in a time frame of less than fourteen minutes.

 During the course of this investigation, the Safety Investigation Team recognized that no matter how experienced or properly prepared we are, we must always approach all incidents with the utmost awareness.

This incident showed that a simple failure of a piece of glass/window caused unforeseeable and fatal consequences.

We, as a Department, need to gain further knowledge and understanding of the following:

  • Having Situational Awareness prior to taking action, this would include the ongoing process when conditions change
  • How Risk Management must be used when making all decisions
  • Limitations of the PPE (turnouts, SCBA, and equipment)
  • Building construction, including layout and how fire/smoke will
  • move within the structure
  • Ventilation practices and how they affect fire conditions
  • Importance of Communications for all members operating on the scene
  • Companies must use strict discipline when assigned task/locations

Previous  CommandSafety Coverage from 2011, HERE, HERE  and HERE

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

Other Links;

Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE  and HERE.

SFFD Report PDF, HERE


 

SFFD Web Link, HERE

SFFD Mission

The mission of the Fire Department is to protect the lives and property of the people of San Francisco from fires, natural disasters, and hazardous materials incidents; to save lives by providing emergency medical services; to prevent fires through prevention and education programs; and to provide a work environment that values health, wellness and cultural diversity and is free of harassment and discrimination.

SFFD Color Seal

IN TRIBUTE TO
OUR FALLEN HEROES
 

 

Alpha Side

 

 STRUCTURE DESCRIPTION

Site overview: Steep downhill slope adjacent to Glen Canyon

Date of Construction: 1975

 

 Building overview:

  • Attached garage located in the front of the house. Main structure is 2 stories above grade and 2 stories below grade

 Type of Construction:

  • Four story, Type 5 wood framed, single family home, detached on three sides
  • Approximate square footage: 4,000 sq ft.
  • Four stories of living space
    • First Floor (Ground floor): garage, 3 bedrooms, 2 bathrooms
    • Second floor: dining room, living room, kitchen, bathroom and family room
    • Sublevel 1: large family room (origin of fire), mechanical room, bathroom, bedroom, balcony, side entrance on Bravo side
    • Sublevel 2: enclosed finished storage area, bathroom (no windows)

 Construction features:

  • Roof type: Flat roof, bitumen roofing membrane, normal dimensional lumber
  • Exterior: siding T1-11 plywood, 5/8”
  • Interior: drywall over normal insulated framing
    • Note: Fire origin room had decorative plywood veneer panels over drywall
  • Steel I beams wrapped in drywall were used as structural supports
    • Note: Fire origin room had a steel I beam that spanned horizontally from Bravo to Delta side
  • Rear of structure had extensive use of glass to capture views, including windows and sliding doors
  • Second floor and Sublevel 1 (fire origin) had large balconies
  • Flooring consisted of tile, carpet and sheet vinyl throughout the house
  • Dual glazed windows throughout, installed in 2003
  • Ground level had a two car garage with access to residence
    • Note: Two large vehicles occupying garage at time of fire
  • Main entrance was accessed by ascending a flight of stairs adjacent to the garage
    • Note: Main entrance stairs led to an interior landing which allowed access to top floor (5 stairs up) or grade level (7 stairs down)
  • Sublevel 1 had an access door from the exterior Bravo side along with access from interior stairs
  • Sublevel 2 had access door from exterior Bravo side. (no interior access)
    • Note: Access through the Bravo side was difficult due to unfinished terrain and poor housekeeping

 

 

 

 

 

Building-Occupancy Relationships and Firefighting

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Knowledge and proficiencies related to building construction are formulative to all strategic, tactical and task level assignments.

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, the compartment, occupancy risk, fire dynamics and fire behavior, fluid situational awareness and risk analysis, the art and science of aggressive and smart firefighting with well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies; You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

What do you think? Where do you fit in?

New Strategic Thinking for Today’s Evolving Fireground and Challenges…..

Wind Driven Fires

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Wind Driven Fires

Wind blowing into the broken window of a room on fire can turn a “routine room and contents fire” into a floor-to-ceiling firestorm. Historically, this has led to a significant number of firefighter fatalities and injuries, particularly in high-rise buildings where the fire must be fought from the interior of the structure.

Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House in Texas, 2009

On April 12, 2009, a fire in a one-story ranch home in Texas claimed the lives of two fire fighters.  (NIOSH REPORT HERE) Sustained high winds occurred during the incident.  The winds caused a rapid change in the dynamics of the fire after the failure of a large section of glass in the rear of the house. 

Wind Driven Fire in Home, Texas, 2009. Aerial view of damage to the structure. Photo credit: Houston Fire Department.

Wind Driven Fire in Home, Texas, 2009. Aerial view of damage to the structure. Photo credit: Houston Fire Department.

NIST performed computer simulations of the fire using the Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS)  and Smokeview, a visualization tool, to provide insight on the fire development and thermal conditions that may have existed in the residence during the fire.

The FDS simulation that best represents the witnessed fire conditions indicates that the fire that spread throughout the attic and first floor developed a wind driven flow with temperatures in excess of 260 °C (500 °F) between the den and front door.  The critical event in this fire was the creation of a wind-driven flow path between the upwind side of the structure and the exit point on the downwind side of the structure, the front door.  The flow path was created by the failure of a large span of windows in the den, in the rear of the structure.  Floor-to-ceiling temperatures rapidly increased in the flow path where multiple crews were performing interior operations.  In a simulation that excluded wind, the flow path was not created, and the thermal environment surrounding the location of interior operations was improved.

Still image from FDS Simulation.

Still image from FDS simulation.  Temperatures at 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor throughout the house 10 s after solarium failure. Image credit: NIST.

Wind has been recognized as a contributing factor to fire spread in wildland fires and large-area conflagrations and wildland fire fighters are trained to account for the wind in their tactics.  While structural fire departments have recognized the impact of wind on fires, in general, the standard operating guidelines for structural fire fighting have not changed to address the hazards created by a wind driven fire inside a structure.  The results of the “no-wind” and “wind” fire simulations demonstrate how wind conditions can rapidly change the thermal environment from tenable to untenable for fire fighters working in a single-story residential structure fire.

The simulation results emphasize the importance of including wind conditions in the scene size-up before beginning and while performing fire fighting operations and adjusting tactics based on the wind conditions.  These results are in agreement with NIST studies conducted to examine wind driven fire conditions in high-rise structures.

LESSONS  LEARNED

Based on the analysis of this fire incident and results from previous studies, adjusting fire fighting tactics to account for wind conditions in structural fire fighting is critical to enhancing the safety and the effectiveness of fire fighters.  Previous studies demonstrated that applying water from the exterior, into the upwind side of the structure can have a significant impact on controlling the fire prior to beginning interior operations.  It should be made clear that in a wind-driven fire, it is most important to use the wind to your advantage and attack the fire from the upwind side of the structure, especially if the upwind side is the burned side.  Interior operations need to be aware of potentially rapidly changing conditions.

See full report, Simulation of the Dynamics of a Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House – Texas (NIST TN 1729, January 2012)

F2009-11 Apr 12, 2009 Career probationary fire fighter and captain die as a result of rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire – Texas PDF Adobe PDF file
SIMULATION VIDEO
With Wind (WMV, 48 MB)
Without Wind (WMV, 35 MB)
 
From NIST Fire.gov site-  http://www.nist.gov/fire/wdf.cfm
 
From the NIOSH REPORT

Career Probationary Fire Fighter and Captain Die as a Result of Rapid Fire Progression in a Wind-Driven Residential Structure Fire – Texas

SUMMARY

Shortly after midnight on Sunday, April 12, 2009, a 30-year old male career probationary fire fighter and a 50-year old male career captain were killed when they were trapped by rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire. The victims were members of the first arriving company and initiated fast attack offensive interior operations through the front entrance. Less than six minutes after arriving on-scene, the victims became disoriented as high winds pushed the rapidly growing fire through the den and living room areas where interior crews were operating. Seven other fire fighters were driven from the structure but the two victims were unable to escape. Rescue operations were immediately initiated but had to be suspended as conditions deteriorated. The victims were located and removed from the structure approximately 40 minutes after they arrived on location.

Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: an inadequate size-up prior to committing to tactical operations; lack of understanding of fire behavior and fire dynamics; fire in a void space burning in a ventilation controlled regime; high winds; uncoordinated tactical operations, in particular fire control and tactical ventilation; failure to protect the means of egress with a backup hose line; inadequate fireground communications; and failure to react appropriately to deteriorating conditions.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • ensure that an adequate initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene is conducted before beginning interior fire fighting operations
  • ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior (such as smoke color, velocity, density, visible fire, heat)
  • ensure that fire fighters are trained to recognize the potential impact of windy conditions on fire behavior and implement appropriate tactics to mitigate the potential hazards of wind-driven fire
  • ensure that fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively apply ventilation and fire control tactics in a coordinated manner
  • ensure that fire fighters and officers understand the capabilities and limitations of thermal imaging cameras (TIC) and that a TIC is used as part of the size-up process
  • ensure that fire fighters are trained to check for fire in overhead voids upon entry and as charged hoselines are advanced
  • develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to insure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday
  • ensure fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures
  • ensure all fire fighters on the fire ground are equipped with radios capable of communicating with the Incident Commander and Dispatch

Additionally, research and standard setting organizations should:

  • conduct research to more fully characterize the thermal performance of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece lens materials and other personal protective equipment (PPE) components to ensure SCBA and PPE provide an appropriate level of protection.
  • Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation could have specifically prevented the fatalities, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments:
  • ensure that all fire fighters recognize the capabilities and limitations of their personal protective equipment when operating in high temperature environments.

Remembering Brackenridge 1991 Floor Collapse and LODD

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Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse

Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building.

Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement.

The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.  

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

  • Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
  • Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
  • Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
  • Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
  • Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
  • Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
  • Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
  • Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
  • Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
  • Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
  • Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
  • Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.

The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.

There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.

This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

  • USFA Report; HERE
  • NFPA Summary; HERE
  • NFPA Report Order; HERE 
  • Issues related to recent trends in floor collapse incidents, HERE

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

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Remembering

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

Buffalo Box 191

As Buffalo (NY) firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III Ordinary and Type IV Heavy Timber construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically.

The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5′s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1′s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32′s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.

Previously posted on Thecompanyofficer.com HERE

High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year

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High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year
  

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is reporting that in 2005-2009, there were an average of 15,700 reported structure fires in high-rise buildings per year with an associated $235 million in direct property damage.

The report, “High-Rise Building Fires,” (PDF, 499 KB) cites apartments, hotels, offices, and facilities that care for sick as accounting for roughly half of all high-rise fires. Structure fires in these four property classes resulted in $99 million in direct property damage per year.

There is a downward trend in high-rise fires. In the last few decades, a range of special provisions have migrated into the codes and standards for tall buildings.

Other findings from the report:

  • In 2005-2009, high-rise fires claimed the lives of 53 civilians and injured 546 others, per year.
  • The risks of fire, fire death, and direct property damage due to fire tend to be lower in high-rise buildings than in shorter buildings of the same property use.
  • An estimated three percent of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.
  • Usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings of the same property use.Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story.  The risk of a fire is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

 In 2005-2009, an estimated 15,700 reported high-rise structure fires per year resulted in associated losses of 53 civilian deaths, 546 civilian injuries, and $235 million in direct property damage per year. An estimated 2.6% of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.

The trends in high-rise fires and associated losses (inflation-adjusted for property damage) are clearly down, but the sharp post-1998 reduction appears to be mostly due to the change to NFIRS Version 5.0, which is shifting estimates to lower levels that also appear to be more accurate.

Four property classes account for roughly half of high-rise fires: apartments, hotels, facilities that care for the sick, and offices. In 2005-2009, in these four property classes combined, there were 7,800 reported high-rise structure fires per year and associated losses of 30 civilian deaths, 352 civilian injuries, and $99 million in direct property damage per year. The property damage average is inflated by the influence of one 2008 hotel fire, whose $100 million loss projected to nearly $40 million a year in the analysis.

The report emphasizes these four property classes.

Some other property uses – such as stores and restaurants – may represent only a single floor in a tall building primarily devoted to other uses. Some property uses – such as grain elevators and factories – can be as tall as a high-rise building but without a large number of separate floors or stories.

  • For these reasons, the four property use groups listed above define most of the buildings we think of as high-rise buildings, and their fires come closest to defining what we think of as the high-rise building fire problem.
  • By most measures of loss, the risks of fire and of associated fire loss are lower in highrise buildings than in other buildings of the same property loss.
  • This statement applies to risk of fire, civilian fire deaths, civilian fire injuries, and direct property damage due to fire, relative to housing units, for apartments, and risk of fire for hotels, offices, and facilities that care for the sick.

The usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings, for each property use group. Even so, considering the extensive requirements in NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, for fire and life safety features in both new and existing high-rise buildings, it seems clear that there are still major gaps, particularly in adoption and enforcement of the provisions requiring retrofit of automatic sprinkler systems and other life safety systems in existing high-rise buildings. NFPA 1®,Fire Code, has sprinkler retrofit requirements.

This has implications for public officials and ordinary citizens in any city. Public officials should make sure that the latest editions of NFPA 1®, Fire Code, and NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, are in place and that the codes they have are supported by effective code enforcement provisions, including plan review and inspection processes, both for new construction and for continued supervision of code compliance in existing buildings.

The public can take responsibility for their own safety by insisting that their public officials take these steps. As in so many areas of fire safety, we know what to do, but we still need to do it.

The trend had been toward a smaller share of fires being reported each year as occurring in buildings with fire-resistive construction, both for high-rise and other buildings, with the decline being most dramatic in facilities that care for the sick.

  • This statistical decline could reflect any or all of the following:
  • (a) a shift in construction between the two types permitted by codes, from Type I (442 or 332) construction, which is coded as fire-resistive, to Type II (222) construction, which is coded as protected non-combustible;
  • (b) a shift to acceptable alternative designs using more sprinklers and less fire-resistive construction; or
  • (c) enough success in containing fires that a rising fraction never are reported to fire departments, because the fires are caught and controlled so early by occupants.

 Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The fraction of 2005-

2009 high-rise fires that began on the 7th floor or higher was 32% for apartments, 22% for hotels and motels, 21% for facilities that care for the sick, and 39% for office buildings. The risk of a fire start is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

  • High-rise apartments have a slightly larger share of their fires originating in means of egress than do their shorter counterparts (4% vs. 3%).
  • The same is true of hotels (7% vs. 5%) and facilities that care for the sick (6% vs. 4%).
  • In offices (4% vs. 6%), the differences in percentages are in the opposite direction, which means that high-rise buildings in those properties have a smaller share of their fires originating in means of egress.
  • In all four property classes, the differences are so small that one can say there is no evidence that high-rise buildings have a bigger problem with fires starting in means of egress.

 

NFPA FACT SHEET

 

 

  • More information on Solomon’s NFPA session and the conference can be found at www.nfpa.org/FLSCONF.
  • NFPA Report Download, HERE

SFFD Diamond Heights LODD Safety Violations

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State investigators have cited the San Francisco Fire Department for “serious” worker safety violations in the deaths of two firefighters killed battling a Diamond Heights house fire in June. Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE  and HERE.

 Firefighters lost track of Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, after they went into the four-level home at 133 Berkeley Way on June 2 and failed to respond quickly to the men’s last radio communication, investigators with the state Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health said in a report issued Monday.

In recommending that the Fire Department be fined $21,000, the state investigators also said the department had violated state rules requiring that two firefighters be designated outside to assist any two firefighters who venture into a life-threatening environment.

Only one firefighter from Perez and Valerio’s engine company – the first on the scene – was available to come to their help during the blaze, the investigation found.

The state also cited the Fire Department for an incident – evidently before the fatal flareup – in which an unidentified battalion chief ventured into the burning building alone, without keeping in contact with Perez and Valerio. That was also deemed a serious violation of safety rules.

“These are serious in that they had protocols in place, but they weren’t following them,” said Erika Monterroza, spokeswoman for the worker safety agency. “There’s no question that a lack of communications was a big issue here. The investigator found there was a breakdown there.”

Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White said the department would appeal the findings. She said state officials have told her commanders that the violations fell short of finding the department’s actions responsible for the two firefighters’ deaths. “None of the citations involved a direct cause of the line-of-duty deaths,” Hayes-White said. Monterroza confirmed that, saying the exact circumstances of the firefighters’ deaths could not be determined.

Valerio, Perez and a third member of Engine Company 26 in Diamond Heights were the first firefighters to arrive at the mid-morning blaze, which started when a sparking electrical outlet set curtains on fire.

The third firefighter manned the pumper hose while Valerio and Perez went inside to fight the fire, but the safety regulations require a fourth firefighter to be available outside to assist.

A scene commander, identified by firefighters as Battalion Chief Thomas Abbott, ordered a crew from Engine Company 24 to back up Valerio and Perez inside the building. For several minutes, however, scene commanders tried to find the Engine 26 firefighters, without success.

There was an unspecified gap between that last communication and any effort by firefighters to respond over the radio or track down the men, the state investigation found.

The reports goes on to state that Hayes-White said the department’s investigative report – still in draft form – concluded that the fire had melted one of the firefighters’ microphone cords, cutting off communications. She said any delay in firefighters’ response would be addressed in the final report.

Firefighters ultimately found Perez and Valerio in a landing area and carried the injured men outside. Perez was pronounced dead at San Francisco General Hospital, and Valerio died there two days later.

The state probe also faulted the actions of the unnamed battalion chief who went into the building “alone and also did not remain in contact with the firefighters who were inside.”

Hayes-White said the battalion chief had gone inside only briefly, had seen Perez and Valerio alive and had never been out of other firefighters’ view.

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/02/BANQ1M7JBO.DTL#ixzz1fUEug7hu

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

 

The Argument for European, North American Unification

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While doing some research on UK and US Strategic Leadership and Operational issues, I came across an article published on FireChief .com on April 28, 2011 and written by By Glenn Bischoff titled: The Argument for European, North American Unification. After reading through the piece, I thought this had some interesting connotations worthy of reposting on CommandSafety.com.

The information contained in the article points out the highlights from John Chubb, a battalion chief for the Dublin Fire Brigade, who spoke on the topic at the 2011 Fire Department Instructors Conference (FDIC) held in Indianapolis. Take some time to read the excerpt here and follow the link for the complete article on FireChief.com HERE. I’m certain there can be some interesting dialog that can evolve from it.

Both the European and North American fire services would benefit greatly from a unified approach to firefighting for a very simple and straightforward reason: the former is well-schooled in the theories of fire dynamics, while the latter is expert on fireground tactics. So said John Chubb, a battalion chief for the Dublin Fire Brigade, who spoke on the topic last month at the Fire Department Instructors Conference (FDIC) held in Indianapolis.

Indeed, many sound North American tactics — such as technical rescue, hazmat response, positive pressure ventilation, tactical ventilation and forcible entry techniques, particularly the use of the Halligan tool — largely are being ignored by European fire departments, according to Chubb. “There is a level of ignorance towards the way in which North American departments operate, and even a level of arrogance,” Chubb said. “People in Europe feel that we have superior firefighting technology and a superior [knowledge of] firefighting science in the average firefighter. But I would suggest that such a belief is very close-minded.”

Chubb added that such beliefs are fueled by misconceptions about the number of line-of-duty deaths in North America, particularly in the United States, which at first glance are considerably higher than they are in Europe. “When you drill down into the American statistics, however, you find that they are taken from a much broader spectrum of deaths than the European statistics, particularly the United Kingdom,” he said.

“In other words, if you went home from work [in the U.S.] and 12 hours later you had a cardiac event, that would be associated with your job. That wouldn’t happen in the U.K.”

Chubb cited a couple of examples during the session where an application of North American tactics might have saved lives. In one, a fire started on the 14th floor of an apartment building in the U.K., when a tea light that had been left burning on top of a television set in a bedroom had burned through its container. One of the occupants awoke to the smell of smoke and raced to the kitchen to get a towel, thinking that he could somehow smother the fire. Unfortunately, he couldn’t get back to the bedroom where he had left his girlfriend because the smoke and heat was too oppressive. By this time, he also couldn’t find his way to the front door of the apartment, so he opened a window to call for help. Passerby placed the emergency call.

Two pumpers arrived to the incident about three minutes after the call was received, Chubb said. What they found when they arrived was a building that had no sprinkler system. It did have a hydrant/standpipe, but that was padlocked because of previous vandalism. Unfortunately, neither of the pumpers was equipped with a bolt cutter. Two firefighters raced to the 14th floor and kicked in the door of the apartment. When they were told that the girlfriend still was inside the unit, they decided to perform a rescue — despite having no water.

  • For the complete article on Firechief.com, HERE 
  • Published on FireChief .com on April 28, 2011 and written by By Glenn Bischoff: The Argument for European, North American Unification, all rights reserved.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports

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NIOSH has recently released the following Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports:

Are they on your radar screen?

Recently Released Reports

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation # F2011-04 Fire Apparatus Operator Suffers Fatal Heart Attack During Annual Fire Department Medical Evaluation – Missouri (added 10/4/11)

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation # F2011-11 Fire Fighter Suffers On-Duty Sudden Cardiac Death – Missouri (added 9/28/11)

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation # F2011-08 Fire Fighter Trainee Suffers Sudden Cardiac Death During Maze Training – Arkansas (added 9/14/11)

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation # F2010-16 Volunteer Captain Runs Low on Air, Becomes Disoriented, and Dies While Attempting to Exit a Large Commercial Structure – Texas (added 9/1/11)

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation # F2010-30 Seven Career Fire Fighters Injured at a Metal Recycling Facility Fire – California (added 8/17/11)

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation # F2010-38 Two Career Fire Fighters Die and 19 Injured in Roof Collapse during Rubbish Fire at an Abandoned Commercial Structure – Illinois (added 8/4/11)

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation # F2011-01 Fire Fighter Suffers Heart Attack While Fighting Grass Fire and Dies 2 Days Later – California (added 7/13/11)

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation # F2010-18 A Career Lieutenant and a Career Fire Fighter Found Unresponsive at a Residential Structure Fire – Connecticut (added 7/8/11)

 

FIRE FIGHTER FATALITY INVESTIGATION AND PREVENTION PROGRAM

Cold-Storage and Warehouse Building Fire

Each year an average of 100 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. This web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.

 

Chicago Attic Fire: Firefighter Maydays, Four Injured UPDATED

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Eric Clark for the Chicago Tribune / August 25, 2011

Four Chicago firefighters have been injured while battling a fire in the city’s West Englewood neighborhood Thursday night according to news media outlets. The fire was located within a 1-1/2 story wood frame residential occupancy in which fire suppression operations were underway.

Fire companies operating within the attic area with attack lines operating, experienced rapidly degrading conditions in which published reports indicated the “room lit up” suggesting a possible flashover condition. It was reported that vertical ventilation had been completed on the gable style roof and that coordinated company operations were well established both on the number one floor, within the attic and on exterior support operations.

Research indicates the house was built in 1905 and has 990 square feet of space. Constructed of balloon wood framing, the 1-1/2 story single family residential occupancy is typical of this vintage style housing.

Division Alpha Street Side (Google Maps)

 

Aerial of House and Exposures (Google Maps)

A series of links and videos are attached;

UPDATED:Fire commissioner credits quick rescue: ‘It’s a matter of seconds ‘

Chicago’s fire commissioner credited the quick response of rescuers after firefighters were hit by a flash of flames while working in the attic of a home in theWest Englewood neighborhood. “It’s a matter of seconds before we would have had a different outcome,” Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff said at Loyola University Hospital, where two of the four firefighters injured in the blaze remained hospitalized.

As reported by the Chicago Tribune (HERE) The fire started in the basement of a 1 1/2-story home in the 7000 block of South Justine Street and spread through the walls to the attic, Hoff said. As firefighters ventilated the roof and worked to extinguish the blaze, they were not aware of fire burning inside the walls behind them, Hoff said. Flames suddenly “lit up on them,” he said. “This is an example of how extremely dangerous and unpredictable this job is,” said Tom Ryan, president of Chicago Firefighters Union Local 2. “There is no such thing as a routine fire.”

The two firefighters still hospitalized are a 52-year-old captain who suffered burns to his ears and back of the neck; and a 31-year-old firefighter with burns to his left hand and forehead. They suffered the burns when their masks were knocked loose as they tried to escape, Hoff said. Both are from Engine 54 and are stable, Hoff said.
 
A third firefighter who was taken to Loyola was released early this morning, and a fourth taken to Mount Sinai Hospital Thursday night. Fire Officials credited the Fire Department’s five-person rapid intervention team — which is routinely called to fires — for responding so quickly.

View more videos at: http://nbcchicago.com.


 

 

Construction Insights for Typical Gabled Roof Attic with enclosed knee wall voids (typical examples)   Occupied or Storage Attic Space Enclosure

 
 
 
 
 

 

Typical Enclosed Attic Voids and Kneewalls

 

 

 

 

 

 

The New Fire Ground and the First-Due

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Join in on Wednesday August 17th at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

This edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM the program will be looking at the New Fire Ground and the First-Due

Joining the program will be two special guests: Divison Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) providing a great opportunity to listen to perspectives from coast to coast and the heartland.

Join in on what is certainly going to be an insightful look and discussion of the New Fire Ground and the issues affecting the First-Due Officer and Command…

Both Divison Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) are speakers at the Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference brought to you by Go Forward Training and coming to the St. Charles/St.Louis, Missouri metro area on October 21-23. 2011. I also have the honor of lecturing and presenting two programs, one of which one will be co-presented with my good friend and colleague Lt. John Shafer. (The GreenMaltese.com HERE)

  • Conference Direct Link HERE.
  • Go Forward Training HERE

Incorporating and facilitating the latest training delivery concepts and methodologies and integrating current and emerging technology, social media platforms, eMedia and internet based content management material in order to provide unparalleled fire service curricula, training and education, The Command Institute, Buildingsonfire.com and Fire Fighternetcast.com will be integrating content across a number of platforms to provide you with supportive information and training that will ultimately integrate with the direct training deliveries at the conference.

This segment of Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com is the first step in achieving that goal and process. Look for more integrated materials, exercises and eMedia on CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing developing concepts, methodologies and operational perspectives affecting today’s emerging and evolving fire ground and the new considerations for the First-Due with Christopher Naum and fire service leaders, Division Chief Ed Hadfield and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann.

Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a 36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and the distinguished leading national authority on building construction and fire ground operations. Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2011 All Rights Reserved

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

  • Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening August 17th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
  • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

Delayed Standpipe Operations Investigated in Asheville Medical Building Fire

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Photo: C.J. Naum, 2010

 

Apparent delays with establishing a sustained water supply via the building standpipe system are being published in the Asheville Citizens-Times.com today. Direct link HERE

Published reports are indicating possible problems with water delivery to the standpipe system designed to supply water from a street hydrant system to the fifth floor of a burning medical office building likely delayed firefighters as they battled the deadly blaze, according to Fire Department radio transmissions.
Nearly 25 minutes passed from the time the first trucks left their stations about 12:30 p.m. Thursday until a company reported they were finally putting water on the blaze at 445 Biltmore Center from a ladder truck.

Typical Standpipe Stairwell Valve Connection

Firefighters repeatedly made references to a lack of water, even as they reached the fourth floor and made their way toward flames one floor above according to same publication. They are referencing transcripts from fireground radio transmissions. HERE.

  • Asheville NC Fatal FF Mayday Audio 7/28/11; The audio has been edited and most of the Mayday audio from the FF has been edited out

The lack of timely application of water as a suppression agent to disrupt the progressing fire growth and magnitude could contribute towards increased fire severity based upon the fire load package and heat release rate and likely contribute towards untenable interior conditions in the absence of a vent path and confinement of the escalating products of combustion due to fire growth.

  • Refer to the CommandSafety.com posting HERE with a typical floor layout plan and interior photos
  • Reports indicating delays and challenges in gaining access into various rooms and locations are also being reported whcih should be expected based upon typical medical office layouts and configurations.

Vent path considerations, when addressing interior suppression operations, ventilation profiles and avenues and fire and heat propagation all have considerations and applications when working a seated fire within a compartment fire in a commercial occupancy

Refer to the following links for some further insights on the aforementioned elements and factors;

 

 

Fire Location on the Number Five Floor. Medical Office Building Copyright 2011 Microscoft Pictometry Birdseye View Pictometry Intl. Corp

 

 

  •  PDFs On Standpipe Systems: HERE and HERE
  • San Diego Fire & LIfe Safety Services LINK HERE
  • FDNY Standpipe Operations, HERE
  • STANDPIPE SYSTEM OPERATIONS: ENGINE COMPANY BASICS BY ANDREW A. FREDERICKS, FDNY (1996),

 

Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Seven; Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Training and Preparedness

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Preparing for the Mayday Event; Not a matter of IF, But a Question of When… Are you ready? Are you Prepared?

As the official Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011 begins to wind down, in many stations around the country this weekend is dedicated to training, drills and evolutions dedicated toward the many facets and functional elements that focus upon Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness. 

The Safety Planning and Resource Aid and Guide published by the IAFC and IAFF (HERE) and the direct link here 2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries provided resources and planning templates and suggested training and activities to support the focus and emphasis on fire ground survival, increased focus on firefighter operations and mayday elements crucial to company integrity, firefighter safety and operational excellence.

Being ready for a mayday (mentally and physically), self-rescue and self-survival training and methodologies are mission critical when engaging in structural firefighting operations. Proficiencies, capabilities, rigor, demeanor and performance must be orchestrated in a manner that requires optimum execution of required actions and engagements to enable a successful outcome to a reported single or multiple mayday calls.

On a crisp fall day in October, 2009 two fires, both in residential occupancies but over 350 miles apart had similar operational needs, deployment and fire suppression and rescue engagement consistent with modern firefighting practices, methodologies and expectations.

In one, three firefighters become trapped, resulting in a mayday, bailout and resulting LODD of a 16 year fire service veteran. City of Yonkers (NY) Firefighter Patrick Joyce  died during the operations at a 3-Alarm fire in a three story residential occupancy while conducting search and rescue operations for reported trapped civilians. Incident overviews; HERE and HERE .

The other structure fire in a residential occupancy in Syracuse, NY, results in a fire fighter mayday and successful RIT extraction that is captured on video.  Two structure fires with common elements, each with projected predictable outcomes based upon past fire department operational experiences at similar structures, occupancies and fire conditions and reports; however with two different outcomes.

The program information from The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)which forms a major component of thsis year’s Safety Weeks activities with the focus on comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention programming  incorporating incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, with the FGS program objectives  aimed to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.

  • For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

Here’s a recap of the Self-Survial Procedure insights from the FGS Chapter 3 Section;

Self-Survival Procedures

FGS Online Program Chapter 3
To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:

  • First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
  • Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
  • If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
  • Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
  • Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
  • Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall. 

The following video clip depicting FDNY Rescue Co. 1 operations at a Mayday, and provides some insightful and subtle commentary that should put some things in proper perspective about the job its hazards and the unexpected that can occur in the blink of an eye.

 

Another exceptional training piece that we are providing again here on CommandSafety.com are the two part video clips provided by TheBravestOnline.com that covers the mayday distress cakk an subsequent RIT extraction of HFD Captain Joel Eric Abbt at a four alarm fire with civilian fatalities in a six story high rise office building on March 28, 2007.

This video along with the information obtained from the FGS  program can provide substantial opportunites for training, discussions and dialog.  Take the time to watch the HFD vdeo and the elapsed time, communications and actions deployed. This mayday event had a successful outcome due to a variety of factors.

The question is how prepared are you, your firefighters, the officers and commanders? Surviving the fire ground requires a  wide variety of skills, knowledge , training and experience.

Training is the foundation from which proficiencies are developed. If your organization has invested in supporting this weeks activities, don’t stop here. There are additional day ahead to take teh momentum gathered from this week and use it to chart a new course of actions and committments for the weeks and months ahead. If you didn’t have the opportunity to engage or involve, its not a missed opportuity- just find the right time and place to have your own safety day of week.

Houston FD Mayday Part 1

Houston FD Mayday Part 2

Other Training and Drill Opportunties

Suggested Considerations include the follow, as well as encouraging Departments to identify and integrate local issues, needs and identified gaps or enhancements that can contribute towards operational excellence and safety integration

  • Review and Select a Near Miss Event Report from the National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System or the Report of the Week (ROTW) series related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
  • Review and Select a NIOSH LODD Report from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/
  • Take out your Rapid Intervention Equipment and review the purpose and function of each piece of equipment. Identify and discuss alternative uses or tools that can be obtained or used in the event of unavailability, malfunction or additional resource needs. Discuss protocols, procedures, safety awareness and operational hazards, expectations and precautions. Inspection the equipment for operability and integrity.
  • Identify and select a recent departmental or local/regional incident event that was either a near-miss/close-call or transitioned into a mayday event. Discuss and facilitate dialog on lessons learned, gaps, enhancements or operational successes, achievements and positive elements. Identify any factors or elements that were presented in the FGS training series that are applicable to the event, strategies, tactics or operations: can anything be improved or enhanced?
  • Lead a discussion on how to call and initiate a Mayday. Discuss the factors and insights from FGS Program Chapter 3 Self-Survival Procedures and Chapter 4 Self-Survival Skills.
  • Select and lead a discussion on a pertinent incident case study from either the list provided or your own selection and discuss the relevancy of the event in terms of mayday operations, fire ground survival, incident outcome and relationship to your Department or agency. What is the relevancy, similarities or differences? Can this event or circumstances occur in your jurisdiction?  What can be done to prevent a history repeating event (HRE)?
  • Review and discuss Roles and Responsibilities for mayday events and operations. How do they match up with your operating procedures, policies and expectations?
  • Develop and facilitate a table top exercise (TTE) on a mayday event scenario utilizing a building in your first-due or response jurisdiction. Take photographs and integrate into your program. Refer to example of a simple TTE  attached or go to Fire Fighternation.com for an example here; http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an
  • Visit a residential or commercial construction site (with pre-arrival authorization and approvals) and tour the stage of construction, looking critically at the type of construction and structural systems being implemented, materials used, workmanship and signs of deficient or adverse conditions that may affect operational integrity, safety or collapse and compromise once the building is occupied. Discuss issues such as structural integrity, collapse risk, occupancy risk versus occupancy type considerations, avenues for fire travel, effects on fire load package and rate of heat release and projected fire intensity. How would you fire a fire in the occupancy? What will define the strategy and tactics that would be or should be selected and used?
  • In a controlled setting with or without PPE, Practice calling a mayday with the identified communication attributes defined in the FGS training program. Critique and practice the evolution until the group feels that it is acceptable.

Here are some additional Resource Links to Support your training and drill needs;

Selected References

  • IAFC: The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety, HERE and HERE
  • NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE
  • What’s on your Radar Screen; http://commandsafety.com/2010/07/whats-on-your-radar-screen/
  • Reflecting upon these days of June; http://commandsafety.com/2010/06/reflecting-on-these-days-of-june/
  • http://www.isfsi.org/Resources/ResourceLinks.aspx
  • ·         NIST References HERE and HERE 
  • ·         Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE 
  • ·         Reference Data HERE 
  • ·         NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments download at the NIST, HERE or Synopsis HERE 
  • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
  • Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies
  • ·         UL University on-line Program HERE 
  • NIOSH LODD Reports
    • Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
    • NIOSH Web Page HERE
    • Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
    • Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports, HERE
    • NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
      • Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
      • These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
      • Report HERE
      • NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors
        • Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
        • Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
        • NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
        • Report HERE
        • NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
          • Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
          • The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
          • NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
          • ALERT Report HERE
          • National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience
            • The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
            • Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
            • National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
            • Search Reports, HERE
            • Resources, HERE
            • Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report-Remembrance and Learning’s HERE
              • Resources and Report
              • LODD Report Fact Sheet (23.9kb)
              • LODD Investigative Report (9.16 mb)
              • LODD Report Presentation (6.65 mb)
              • LODD Report Basic House Model (Section 1) (1.87 mb)
              • LODD Report Fire Model (Section 3) (5.16 mb)
              • LODD Flashover Chart (60 kb)
              • Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE
              • NIOSH LODD REPORT: Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire – Virginia, HERE
              • NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
                • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
                • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
                • Reference Data HERE
                • Colerain Township Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know HERE
                  • Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Web Site HERE
                  • Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths April, 2010 Full Report HERE
                  • NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
                  • WLTW.com news report Summary HERE
                  • Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire; Final NIST Report
                  • Analytical Study Reveals Patterns in U.S Firefighter Fatalities Report 
                    • The entire report is available at a nominal fee, HERE; 
                    • Journal Reference: 
  1. Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith, David M. DeJoy. Line-of-duty deaths among U.S. firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2011; 43 (3): 1171 DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2010.12.030

 

Training Drill Template

This Training Schedule Template utilizes a Three Hour, Thirty minute (3.5) Hour Format integrating Suggested basic Functional Area Topics as a lead-in introduction that can be interchanged based on local needs and incorporates two (2) primary modules of the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS). Please note you can select any modules determined to be of local need or interests. An optional Weekend Session is attached for FGS Chapter 3 and 4 Module Deliveries and a Hands-on Field Exercise Component.

Go HERE for the Color PDF Format

Safety Week 2011: Surviving the Fire Ground-Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

Functional Area 3.5 Hour Schedule with FGS Modules

Time

Hour Functional Area Key Issues and Considerations

Reference and Links

00:30 1 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives Procedures, Policies and Guides
  • Discuss and facilitate discussion on organizational

 

  • Review key SOPs & SOGs related to Fire Ground Operations culture and safety

 

  • How does Safety Week 2001 fit into your operational environment?

 

  • Agency Mission Statement
  • Overview & Explanation: View | Download 
  • Initiative 1: CultureView | Download 
  • Initiatives 1 – 4View | Download 
  • Initiatives 5 – 8View | Download 
  • Initiatives 9 – 12View | Download 
  • Initiatives 13 – 16View | Download
  • Agency SOPs, SOGs, Policies
  • Agency Expectations
  • Company Expectations or Gaps
  • What defines your level of preparedness?
00:30 Building Construction
  • Discuss pertinent issues relate to Building Construction that is present in your area

 

00:30          

 

2

Review FGS Chapter 1; Preventing the Mayday  Modules 1-1 thru 1-4
  • Mayday Prevention
  • Pre-Planning
  • Building Construction
  • UL Structural Stability
  • LT Wt. Truss Systems
  • Overhead Hazards

 

00:30 Review FGS Chapter 1;  Preventing the Mayday Modules 1-5 thru 1-8Continued
  • Mayday Prevention
  • Pre-Planning
  • Building Construction
  • UL Structural Stability
  • LODD Reports
  • Interior Size up
  • Reading Smoke
  • Air Management
  • Defensive Operations
  • Situational
  • Awareness
  • Rapid Heat Release
  • Fire Suppression OPS
  • NIST Fire Modeling

 

00:30 3 Review FGS Chapter 2;Mayday Ready Modules 2-1 thru 2-3
  • Preparing for the Mayday
  • Are You Ready?
  • Mayday Training
  • Personal safety Equipment
  • Tools & Equipment
  • Mission Critical Resources

 

00:30 Review FGS Chapter 2;Mayday Ready Modules 2-4 thru 2-5Continued
  • Three Point Communications
  • Role of Dispatch
  • Personal Radio Position
  • Communications Training
  • Radio Discipline
  • Comm Order Model
  • Portable Radios
  • Why “Mayday?”
  • Accountability

 

00:30 4 Wrap-up and Closing Discussions
  • Facilitate discussion on the presentations
  • Are there any identified gaps or identified areas for improvement?
  • How will the information presented be implemented during future shifts or operations?
  • What level of individual and/or company level accountability can be implemented?
  • How can the organization become safer and effective to minimize and reduce risk to mayday events to improve fire ground survivability?
  • Agency Specific and/or developed or;
  • Utilize  resources from the Functional Matrix
 
00:00  
  •  
  •  
 

Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

7 comments

Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

 

Know Your World Buildingsonfire.com

Other Considerations in Program Planning for Safety Week; Other considerations to support the theme, objectives and initiatives of Safety Week include wide latitude of activities and interactive actions that can achieve the goals for increasing awareness and providing dialog, interaction, training while encouraging discussion and interchange.

These functional area topics can be integrated into planned program development to support the FGS training presentations, delivery and support a comprehensive strategy for integrated Fire Ground Survival training, awareness and insights. These functional areas are supported with references and links to support program develop and deliveries.

Suggested Functional Areas for Alignment with the Theme and Focus during Safety Week;

  • 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives

  • Rule of Engagement

  • Fire Fighter Near-Miss Learning‘s

  • Procedures, Policies and Guidelines

  • Pre-Fire Planning

  • Building Construction

  • Structural Systems

  • Occupancy Risk Profiling

  • Fire Dynamics & Fire Behavior

  • Reading Smoke

  • Survivability Profiling

  • Risk Management

  • Crew Resource Management

  • Situational Awareness

  • Disorientation Awareness

  • Structural Collapse & Compromise

  • Mayday & Rapid Intervention

  • Fire Ground Survival

  • Air Resource Management

  • Tactical Patience

  • Go to the Planning Resource Guide for Direct Resources, templates and suggested planning and instructional aids. HERE

Suggested considerations include the following, as well as encouraging fire/EMS departments to identify and integrate local issues, needs and identified gaps or enhancements that can contribute towards operational excellence and safety integration.

  • Review and select a Near Miss Event Report from the National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System or the Report of the Week (ROTW) series related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
  • Review and select a NIOSH LODD Report from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/
  • Take out your Rapid Intervention Equipment and review the purpose and function of each piece of equipment. Identify and discuss alternative uses or tools that can be obtained or used in the event of unavailability, malfunction or additional resource needs. Discuss protocols, procedures, safety awareness and operational hazards, expectations and precautions. Inspection the equipment for operability and integrity.
  • Identify and select a recent departmental or local/regional incident event that was either a near-miss/close-call or transitioned into a mayday event. Discuss and facilitate dialog on lessons learned, gaps, enhancements or operational successes, achievements and positive elements. Identify any factors or elements that were presented in the FGS training series that are applicable to the event, strategies, tactics or operations: can anything be improved or enhanced?
  • Lead a discussion on how to call and initiate a Mayday. Discuss the factors and insights from FGS Program Chapter 3 Self-Survival Procedures and Chapter 4 Self-Survival Skills.
  • Select and lead a discussion on a pertinent incident case study from either the list provided or your own selection and discuss the relevancy of the event in terms of mayday operations, fire ground survival, incident outcome and relationship to your Department or agency. What is the relevancy, similarities or differences? Can this event or circumstances occur in your jurisdiction? What can be done to prevent a history repeating event (HRE)?
  • Review and discuss Roles and Responsibilities for mayday events and operations. How do they match up with your operating procedures, policies and expectations?
  • Develop and facilitate a table top exercise (TTE) on a mayday event scenario utilizing a building in your first-due or response jurisdiction. Take photographs and integrate into your program. Refer to example of a simple TTE attached or go to Fire Fighternation.com for an example here; http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an
  • Visit a residential or commercial construction site (with pre-arrival authorization and approvals) and tour the stage of construction, looking critically at the type of construction and structural systems being implemented, materials used, workmanship and signs of deficient or adverse conditions that may affect operational integrity, safety or collapse and compromise once the building is occupied.
    • Discuss issues such as structural integrity, collapse risk, occupancy risk versus occupancy type considerations, avenues for fire travel, effects on fire load package and rate of heat release and projected fire intensity.
    • How would you fire a fire in the occupancy? What will define the strategy and tactics that would be or should be selected and used?
  • In a controlled setting with or without PPE, Practice calling a mayday with the identified communication attributes defined in the FGS training program. Critique and practice the evolution until the group feels that it is acceptable.

Understand your Response District

 

“Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety”, Know Your District and its Risk

Protect Yourself: Your Safety, Health and Survival Are Your Responsibility.

 Within the focus area of Survival and the elements of Structural Size-Up and Situational Awareness, some suggeted key functional components could include the following;

  • Keep apprised of different types of building materials and construction used in your community.
  • The operative question today is this: “What do you “really” know about the buildings in your district?”
  • As you drive about your response district today, coming back from an alarm, heading to the firehouse tonight or running errands around your community, take a good look around. Ask your self a simple question; “How well do you know the buildings, structures and occupancies in your response jurisdiction?”
  • Be honest, do you really understand how those “older residential” structures were built and understand how fire travels and impacts your fireground operations?
  • Are your aware of the newest features of engineered structural support systems being constructed within that new set of homes going up in your second-due area?
  • Are you aware, that vacant office building is being converted into a light manufacturing and assembly business?
  • How about those unoccupied store fronts and businesses that have recently closed up due to the tough economic times…. any special hazards or operational concerns to your company should you get a dispatch to respond?
  • Have the senior members of your station or department shared their stories of operations and incidents at various buildings around your district or community?
  • Did you listen to them, or were you quick to dismiss those “old war stories”. There’s a wealth of “pre-planning’ nuggets hidden in those stories. Take the time to listen, remember or postulate
  • Take a good look around….think about any given building, the one across the street that you’re looking at while you waited for the traffic light to change; Think about a fire in that same building.
  • Do you really understand how it will truly perform under combat structural fire conditions?
  • What’s the building’s collapse profile?
  • How much operational time will you have? Will you need?
  • What’s the fire load package size?
  • What are your concerns for rapid fire extension, extreme fire behavior and vent path issues that amy affect firefighter safety?
  • What dynamic risk assessment factors will you have to deal with?
  • How safe is it for you to engage in interior operations upon your arrival?
  • How can this building, its occupancy and structural system hurt, my team, my company, my firefighters, my department, me?

Sometimes things aren’t as obvious as them seem. You may have responded and operated at numerous incidents at a wide variety of buildings in your response area, or very few; some routine, others maybe more demanding…the question remains, “What do you really know about your buildings?” Your life may one day depend on what you actually do know or recollect. Take a good look around.

Pre-Incident planning is formulative to any effective fire service organization. A good staring point is to look at the NFPA 1620 Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning document. ( NFPA Codes and Standards, HERE)

The purpose of the NFPA 1620 Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning document is to aid in the development of a pre-incident plan to help responding personnel effectively manage emergencies with available resources and should not be confused with fire inspections, which monitor code compliance.

The Pre-Incident Plan document is developed by gathering general and detailed data used by responding emergency service personnel to determine the necessary resources and actions necessary to mitigate anticipated emergencies at a specific facility, structure or occupancy.The Pre-Incident Plan document can contain a variety of useful information related to the construction features and systems, building materials and components, occupancy, layout and floor plan, access/egress, built-in protective, detection and suppression systems, special hazards, fire loading, fire suppression flow needs, pre-determined resource needs, exposure factors, etc.The Pre-Incident Plan document can be as simple or detailed as occupancy and/or operational factors dictate.

The import issue here is that you HAVE Pre-Incident Plan documents available for at the very least targeted or high hazard occupancies and buildings, and that they have been updated at some periodic frequency. There’s nothing worst that arriving at a particular box alarm, pulling open the pre-fire “binder” and finding the occupancy was last planned twenty years ago at best.

The 2007 Deutsche Bank Building fire in lower Manhattan, New York City that resulted in the LODD of FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia, stressed the need for timely and accurate pre-incident plans, when a seven alarm fire progressed through the 40 story high-rise building that was in the process of being deconstructed.An informative Training PDF download is attached that provides Operational Safety Considerations at Demolition and Deconstruction sites.

The full power-point version is available for direct download HERE.

Think about your Buildings and Occupancies and correlate your incident operations using an effect acronym called BECOME SAFE.

Our world has evolved and changed. There are a variety of technological and sociological demands that create a continuing element of change in the built environment and our infrastructure. With these changes and demands come the requirements to assess these vulnerabilities, hazards, threats and dangers with effective and dynamic risk management and competent command and control.

These changes influence the way we do business in the street, the interface-up close and personal with the buildings in your community and equate to the risks and hazards you and your personnel will be confronted with and the level of safety afforded them during incident operations. Dynamic Risk and Command Management and the integration of BECOME SAFE concepts, ingredients for safer operations.

  • Building
  • Evaluation
  • Construction/Occupancy
  • Operational Hazards
  • Manage Time and Elements
  • Engagement
  • Situational Awareness
  • Assessment and Risk Analysis
  • Fire Behavior and Effects
  • Evaluate and Execute

BECOME SAFE Buildingsonfire.com

 

With the advancements in technology, software and programs, there is a vast extent of options and financial levels available to all organizations to develop publish and revise pre-incident planning documents. The key safety message here is that Pre-Fire Plans and Incident Plans can provide a significant margin of support to you during incident operations and can increase firefighter safety, reduce operational risk and aid in the risk management and command management of a give incident.

Regardless of your agency and respond district size, complexity of simplicity, Pre-Incident Plans are a necessary part of modern firefighting and all-hazards operations. An informative planning flow chart is available within the NFPA 1620 document, Figure 4.2.3. ( Order the NFPA 1620 document through the NFPA (HERE)

  • Attached is a copy of the Tempe, AZ Fire Department Pre-Incident Planning SOP
  • The Phoenix, AZ Fire Department Pre-Incident Planning SOP is available HERE
  • An informative Pre-Fire Planning article by Battalion Chief Michael Lee is available HERE

Spend time touring through construction sites as you monitor the progress of a building or occupancy going up.

Look at the manner in which structural support systems are fabricated and assembled. Observe the types of materials that are being used and how they are assembled to form rooms and compartments within the structure.

Take a good look at the manner in which floor and roof systems are constructed, these will become mission critical informational items that can be used to determine your operational profile and formulate your incident action plans. Keep abreast of changes, renovations and alternations to buildings and structures, especially as commercial and business occupancies change owners. These are special areas of concerns on wide latitude of safety and operational considerations.

With the continued challenges in these economic times, pay very close attention to the state of your vacant and unoccupied structures. A change in strategic and tactical deployment considerations MUST be instituted; it shouldn’t be business as usual in these structures.

  • Keep apprised of different types of building materials and construction used in your community.
  • Document those conditions and aspects and train your personnel to understand the occupancies within your community.
  • Understand the Structural AnatomyTM of your buildings and occupancies.
  • The operative response to the opening question this time next year will be this: “What do you “really” know about the buildings in your district?” …The answer will hopefully be…”A lot!”

Are you keeping up the latest construction terminology, materials and methods? Changes are you are not. But I can assure you, somewhere in your community, jurisdiciton, first, second or third-due or mutual aid area; there is new construction features, systems, components and materials being used that will affect the manner you which a structural fire will need to be addressed; The Rules of Structural Fire Suppression have changed- but know has told you…yet.

Of the many issues affecting the Fire Service, the prevailing challenge that has a pronounced impact on operational safety is the assimilation of engineered structural systems (ESS) into mainstream building design and construction. The presence of engineered structural systems (ESS) are no longer considered to be an innocuous feature in a given building or occupancy; it is the predominate feature in nearly all current construction, renovation and adaptive reuse or infill applications. It has become far more than just concerning ourselves with the presence of a simple light-weight or “engineered” truss roof system or a wood I-beam  floor assembly.

There is a new lexicon of building construction components and systems that must be added to your operational safety vocabulary and incident action plans. There is a new terminology, applications and a knowledge base to learn that will support operational excellence and support the integrity of incident safety performance of companies and personnel. Do you know what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence an incident?

Take a tour of your local construction sites; You’ll be surprised what you’ll see

The fire service continues to apply the term “light weight construction” to a wide variety of building construction and systems. This expression has become a miss-application of both term and the correlation of risk and severity related to operational profiling. In other words, we apply and express the use of “light weight construction” for all types of engineered components, systems, designs and assemblies in nearly all types of building construction and occupancy use.

Although the roots of the term can be traced back to the early 1980′s, and its application to the (then) emerging use of trussed roofing systems and the advent of wood I-beam floor supports (sans solid dimensional lumber joists), the use of the terminology in today’s context of risk assessment, strategic and tactical management and deployment models and within the context of incident operational tactics is no longer applicable, valid or suitable. It must be expanded into a more specific and descriptive level of classification and correlation.

For the most part, when discussing buildings and occupancies, aside from classifications related to code type or class as an element of fire resistance; the emphasis has been to differentiate between conventional and engineered construction, and the application of the term “light weight construction”. I continue advocating and promoting through my lectures that it’s much more than this when looking at the spectrum of construction and the structural anatomy of buildings. Current and past generations of buildings, construction and occupancies can be more accurately differentiated and classified within six (6) expanding categories in the following Building Construction Systems;

  • Heritage:              Pre-1900
  •  Legacy:                1900-1949
  • Conventional:      1950-1979
  • Engineered:         1980-current 2011
  • Blended Hybrid:  2005- current 2011

         
We’ll discuss these six classifications in greater details in a series of future postings and expand the level of details on the CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com sites.

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past “conventional” construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address the advancement of new rules of combat structural fire engagement. But if you don’t understand or know what and how those changes in predictability have occurred, you may be operating with a false sense of operational risk and safety margin.

It’s a Lot More than just talking about “Light Weight” Construction….

  • From Plywood-CDX….to
  • Particle Board- PB…..to;
  • Orient Strand Board-OSB
  • Structural Composite Lumber- SCL
  • Laminate Strand Lumber- LSL
  • Laminate Veneer Lumber-LVL
  • Structural Insulated Panels-SIP
  • Parallel Strand Lumber-PSL
  • Machine Stress Rated Lumber- MSR
  • Medium Density Fiberboard-MDF and MDL (Lumber)
  • Finger Jointed Lumber-FJL
  • Adhesives…..
  • Do some research and check these terms out for starters.
  • We’ll talk more about these components and assemblies in the near future. So get busyover the next few days during Safety Week and discover the implications these components may have in your community….

New Materials, New Construction; New Problems

Here’s a link to a past informative posting related to engineered systems and their relationship to firefighter safety and operations, HERE.

There’s some great contributed information and manufacturer “insights” on the subject engineered wood I-joists and beams and firefighter safety. There are some interesting statistical extrapolations, correlations and conveniences’ that attempt to make the case. But then again, You be the judge.

Take at look at the presentation developed by the American Forest and Paper Association, HERE and HERE.
 
If you haven’t done so yet, don’t forget to check out the free online training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions at the UL University developed and provided by Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL),  HERE and   Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

Here’s a series of other important Reference Links that provide some insights on operational safety, incident conditions and factors and the lessons-learned from a number of LODD events;  

  • NIOSH Publication No. 2009-114: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors HERE
  •  NIOSH Publication No. 2005-132: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters Due to Truss System Failures HERE
  • Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE
  • First-floor collapse during residential basement fire claims the life of two fire fighters (career and volunteer) and injures a career fire fighter captain – New York, Report HERE
  • Career Fire Fighter Dies After Falling Through the Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence – Ohio, HERE
  • Colerain Township, Ohio Double LODD Preliminary Report, HERE
  • Career engineer dies and fire fighter injured after falling through floor while conducting a primary search at a residential structure fire – Wisconsin, HERE
  • NFPA Report on Light Weight Construction, HERE
  • Informative USFA Coffee Break series postings related to Building Types & Fire Resistance:  HERE. HEREHERE, HERE, and HERE

 Just Look Over your Shoulder….

I’ve commented with more than a few postings on the issues related to engineer building construction components and assemblies. I posed some questions related to Engineered Structural Assemblies & Systems (ESS) and asked if you knew what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence incident operations.

I also presented some information on the pioneering efforts and quantitative results of the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) engineers and fire service representatives from the Chicago Fire Department, HERE and HERE.

If you’ve spent any amount of time reading through the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, LODD Reports or have invested time and effort to look through the data base of near miss reports and ROTW at the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System, you’d recognize the magnitude of the issues and multi-faceted challenges confronting the U.S. Fire Services in the areas of engineered structural assemblies, components and building features.

Paul Comb’s editorial image provides a poignant and distressing reality that the fire service needs to come to terms with, addressing and implementing the necessary components that assimilating refined combat firefighting techniques and methodologies; that align with the risks and hazards presented by current and emerging construction techniques, materials and consumer lifestyles that comprise our buildings and occupancies. We need to start looking over our shoulders; we need redefined strategies and tactics for today’s buildings and occupancies. When we do have the opportunity to engage in firefighting with the dragon; we may not recognize the dragon has changed, it has evolved. Yet we stand poised to engage or take-on the dragon with faulted incident operations, strategic plans and tactical intentions that provide less than adequate results.

In those situations where we are deficient or we achieved less than expected results, we continue to miss the apparent or root causes and fall back on perceived notions and excuses. Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety; Understanding today’s building construction, fire dynamics, fire loading and behaviors and instituting appropriate firefighting methodologies, we can achieve safe and successful fireground operations.

Better Look Over your Shoulder

 

  •   Have you and your company, battalion or department discussed limiting factors, enhanced firefighting tactics or operational experiences related to engineered systems, past fires, observed new construction or renovations and what it all means to your assigned duties or company assignments?
  • Are you and your company adequately trained to address “modern” construction, occupancies and conditions or is a much bigger dragon lurking in the shadows?

 Remember, the Predictability of Performance and the combat firefighting based upon Occupancy Risk not Occupany Type.

  

Remember its Occupancy RISK not Occupancy TYPE

 

Here’s the New Formula for Fire Fighter Safety ; Bk = f2S; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

 

STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT

There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.

These behaviors include;

Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment. 

Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.

Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.

  

Here’s the expanded versions in case this is the first time you’ve seen them;

TACTICAL AMUSEMENT*tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt

1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk

2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk

3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL DIVERSION*tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən

1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk

2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION*tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən

1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

  

TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience  later this month.

If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.

” The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures.

The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change.

Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations.

Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.”

  

 

Remember one thing…Don’t ever under estimate what you might encounter on any structure fire, or what might change in a second;  focus on the Occupancy Risk not the Occupancy Type….. And Know your buildings, your team and your capabilities

 

 

Remembering FDNY Black Sunday…Multiple Firefighter LODDs January 23, 2005

 

Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse

 

Anatomy of a Building and Its Collapse

 

Buildingsonfire.com

Buildingsonfire.com

If you have not had a chance to look over the emerging website, Buildingsonfire.com…take some time to explore…its still under construction, with a wealth of information, research and data today’s Firefighter, Company Officer and command Officer need to know.

The authoritative and informational site that provides leading insights on fire service issues related to Building Construction for the Fire Service,  Firefighting Operations and Command Risk Management for Operational Excellence and Firefighter Safety. 

  •  Buildingsonfire.com Link HERE

  • Buildingsonfire.com coupled with it’s companion sites CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyofficer.com will continue to provide prominent and timely information to support the continuing traditions and missions of the Fire and Emergency Services. 

Fire/EMS Safety, Health & Survival Week 2011: Day One- Are You Ready?

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Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011

Fire/EMS Safety Week: Day One

 Today is Day One of Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011.

 The previous week leading up to today has brought with it two significant incidents; one in Illinois, the other in Indiana, both involving structure fires and combat fire engagement, both  different types of occupacies with assocated risks; both having structural collapse- both fireground operations leading to fire service line of duty deaths. ( Indiana, HERE and Illinois, HERE )

During this past week we also solemnly remembered three events, The Hotel Vendome Collapse in Boston, MA (1972), The Father’s Day Fire, FDNY (2001) and the Super Store Fire in Charleston, SC (2007) Here and Here

The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the International Association of Fire Fighters(IAFF) were formative in developing this year’s  2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week (also known as Safety Week)which commences today, June 19th and ends on June 25th. ( Week of June 19-25, 2011)

The message this year is: Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness

Safety, Health and Survival Week (Safety Week) is a collaborative program sponsored by the IAFC and the IAFF, coordinated by the IAFC’s Safety, Health and Survival Section and the IAFF’s Division of Occupational Health, Safety and Medicine, in partnership with more than 20 national fire and emergency service organizations.

Fire departments are encouraged to suspend all non-emergency activity during Safety Week and instead focus entirely on survival training and education until all shifts and personnel have taken part. An entire week is provided to ensure each shift and duty crew can spend one day focusing on these critical issues.

With so many changes (budget cuts, staffing reductions, reduced training, etc.) in so many fire departments, it is critical for fire fighters to focus on their own survival on the fire ground. There is no other call more challenging to fire ground operations than a MAYDAY call — the unthinkable moment when a fire fighter’s personal safety is in imminent danger.

Fire fighter fatality data compiled by the United States Fire Administration have shown that fire fighters “becoming trapped and disoriented represent the largest portion of structural fire ground fatalities.” The incidents in which fire fighters have lost their lives, or lived to tell about it, have a consistent theme — inadequate situational awareness put them at risk.

Fire fighters don’t plan to be lost, disoriented, injured or trapped during a structure fire or emergency incident. But fires are unpredictable and volatile, and an unpredictable fire ground can cause even the most seasoned fire fighter to be overwhelmed in an instant.

This year’s Safety Week focuses on delivering the online IAFF Fire Ground Survival (FGS) awareness training course to all fire departments.

The program is the most comprehensive survival skills and MAYDAY prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Additional planning tools and resources will be available on the Safety Week website.

The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.

  • For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday.

Topics covered include:

  • Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
  • Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
  • Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
  • Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
  • Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

Keep watching the website and the IAFC’s Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn pages for continuing updates to this year’s program and planning resources.

If you’re still in need of resources, visit the SHS Section’s website for more information on health and safety issues and the IAFF’s Health, Safety and Medicine’s website for more information on health, wellness and safety programs.

Don’t forget to go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System for  number of exceptional training aids, resources, PPT and more. NFFNMRS, HERE

Here are some of the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System Produced 2011 Safety Week Products

 
File Title File Size File Description
  • Presentation: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Presentation: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
  • Presentation: Fire Fighter Expectations of Command
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about fire fighter expectations of command.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Skills
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival skills at a mayday.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival procedures.
  • Grouped Report: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Grouped Report: Self Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A grouped report about self survival procedures
  • Grouped Report: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems

    Look for a continuing comprehensive series of articles, activities, insights, downloads, podcasts, video clips and resources that will be posted each day this week during Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week here on Commandsafety.com, Thecompanyofficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com.

    We hope to be offering a special live show on Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com and blogtalkradio later this week pending some last minute logists addressing key issues with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders. Stay tuned to anouncements and postings for the date and time . This will be an exceptional opportunity to listen in, call in and participate actively in the week’ theme of Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

      

    Download the Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries

    2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries (pdf, 1.8 mb)

    IAFC Safety Week , Direct Link, HERE

    Preventing the Mayday

    FGS Online Program Chapter 1
    Between 1997 and 2008 NIOSH investigations reported that 25 fire fighters died in unprotected light-weight truss collapse events related to roof or basement truss system failures. A total of 11 injuries also occurred in these fatalities. Additionally, between 2005 and 2006, the National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System reported 20 near-misses related to unprotected light-weight truss systems. Considering the Near-Miss Reporting System is relatively new, and it is a self-reporting system, it is likely there are far more near-miss incidents occurring than presently indicated.

    Construction-Related Considerations

    The NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures provides information on roof collapses in structures containing truss systems and includes case studies where fire fighters have become trapped and were injured or killed.

    UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions

    Reading Smoke

    Fire fighters must be able to recognize the dangers associated with the smoke conditions when en route, upon arrival, and during fire fighting operations. Missing signs indicative of flash over, smoke explosions, backdraft, or rapid fire development has proven deadly to fire fighters in the past. The ability to read smoke correctly will prevent a Mayday situation from occurring.

    Being Ready for the Mayday

    FGS Online Program Chapter 2
    Understanding what safety equipment is required and what fire fighter tools are necessary for readiness, accountability system functionality and dispatch responsibilities.

    Radio Communications Training

    Having a radio assigned to each person is not enough. Fire fighters must be trained in using the radio to request resources and, most importantly, to call a Mayday.
    In 2003, NIOSH issued a firefighter radio report detailing the challenges surrounding fire ground communications. Although the report is several years old, many of these same issues are still challenging the North American fire service. Under the topic of “Inadequate Training” it states: “Though firefighters receive hundreds of hours of training on emergency response, radio communications do not typically receive the same amount of attention. As such, firefighters may not be aware of proper radio usage. Examples include how to use the radio in general, how to use the radio while wearing SCBA, and how radio communications are affected by a Mayday event” (pages 17-18).USFA Voice Radio Communications Guide for the Fire Service 

    Self-Survival Procedures

    FGS Online Program Chapter 3
    To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
    When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:

    • First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
    • Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
    • If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
    • Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
    • Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
    • Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall. 

    Self-Survival Skills

    FGS Online Program Chapter 4

    Disentanglement Maneuvers

    Fires inside an enclosed structure create a mess for fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters often encounter debris that has fallen off shelves, and ceiling and wall fixtures that have burned and are left hanging to the floor. These hazards, coupled with the mess a fire fighter creates when searching for victims in smoky environments, can create egress problems for a fire fighter.

    As fire burns draperies, blinds, lighting fixtures, computer wiring, and HVAC ducting, the possibility of encountering an entanglement hazard increases. The overhead ducting of the HVAC system contains wires that give the ducting its stability.

    If a fire breaches the ceiling and burns the ducting, the wires within the ducting fall to the floor. These wires can cause a dangerous entanglement hazard to fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters must anticipate these hazards and have a plan to follow when egress is cut off.

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters

    Fire Fighter Expectations of Command

    FGS Online Program Chapter 5
    A discussion of what command must communicate to the distressed fire fighter, dispatch, the RIT group supervisor and all others assigned to the incident to assure a successful rescue.

    Near-Miss

    National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System
    This program aims to turn near-miss experiences into lessons learned.

    • 2011 Safety Week Near-Miss Resources

    SOPs/SOGs

    Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting (pdf)

    Risk Management

    General Order: Two-In, Two-Out Compliance, Rapid Intervention Team, and Firefighter Survival

    Emergency Evacuation
    This policy identifies a standard system for the emergency evacuation of personnel at an emergency incident or training exercise.

    Fire and Rescue Departments of Northern Virginia – Rapid Intervention Team Command and Operational Procedures
    A collaborative RIT manual developed by fire and rescue departments in Northern Virginia. Promotes interoperability between multiple fire agencies.

    Lost or Trapped Firefighters
    This policy identifies the required actions for the search and rescue of lost or trapped firefighter(s).

    Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a Biological Threat
    Local and world events have placed the nation’s emergency service at the forefront of homeland defense. The service must be aware that terrorists, both foreign and domestic, are continually testing the homeland defense system.

    Safety – Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
    This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).

    Safety – Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)
    This policy establishes the department’s criteria and procedures for Rapid Intervention Teams.

    Accident Reports

    Firefighter Fatality Report – Southwest Supermarket, Phoenix, AZ
    PFD full report on the LODD of Firefighter Brett Tarver. Report contains extensive analysis of fire ground operations, may-day and lessons learned.

    NFPA Fire Investigation Report of 1995 Pittsburgh Fire
    This report describes the investigation of a fire which killed three firefighters in 1995.

    NIOSH LOD Report
    This report recounts a residential basement fire that claimed the life of a career lieutenant in Pennsylvania.

    Training & Drill Topics

    Technical Rescue resources

    Analysis of Structural Firefighter Fatality Database (pdf)

    Hazelton Firefighter caught in Flashover
    PowerPoint presentation

    Firefighter Survival Training

    Rapid Intervention Crew Standard Operating Guidelines
    Provided by the Town of Menasha Fire Department

    Standardized Actions of a Lost/Disoriented Firefighter

    Understanding Fireground LODDS
    A fresh perspective on an old problem.

    General Resources

    Observing Firefighter Performance (pdf)

    Emergency Radio Protocol

    “Everybody Goes Home” Campaign: Sticker use memo

    EveryoneGoesHome.com
    Several applicable resources to assist you in your Stand Down planning.

    50 Ways to Save Your Brother (or Sister)
    Provided by the South Milwaukee Fire Department.

    Fire Chief Magazine article – “No more maydays”
    Disorientation Prevention Article

    National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
    This web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other firefighter safety resources.

    The Incident Commander’s Response to a “May-Day” Lost Firefighter Incident
    A check list of items to consider when handling a may-day incident, provided by Chief Gary Morris, Scottsdale, AZ.

    U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study (1979-2001)
    This study was conducted in an effort to stop firefighter fatalities caused by smoke inhalation, burns, and traumatic injuries attributable to disorientation. It focused on 17 incidents occurring between 1979 and 2001 in which disorientation played a major part in 23 firefighter fatalities.

    USFA – Firefighter Fatality Retrospective Study (1990-2000)
    This report identifies trends in mortality and examines relationships among data elements on firefighter fatalites between 1990-2000.

      

      

      

    Keep this week In Perspective 

    Take a look at these videos and the messages conveyed….

    Are YOU getting it, is Your Company, Your Officers, Your Commanders, Your Firefighters? …..

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     


     

    When was the last time you looked at the Initiatives?

    1. Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.
    2. Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.
    3. Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.
    4. All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
    5. Develop and implement national standards for training, qualifications, and certification (including regular recertification) that are equally applicable to all firefighters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
    6. Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that are equally applicable to all firefighters, based on the duties they are expected to perform.
    7. Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.
    8. Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety.
    9. Thoroughly investigate all firefighter fatalities, injuries, and near misses.
    10. Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement.
    11. National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should be developed and championed.
    12. National protocols for response to violent incidents should be developed and championed.
    13. Firefighters and their families must have access to counseling and psychological support.
    14. Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a critical fire and life safety program.
    15. Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the installation of home fire sprinklers.
    16. Safety must be a primary consideration in the design of apparatus and equipment.

    The Following links From the NFFF/Everyone Goes Home web site, HERE

    Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resources

    16 Intiatives Overview & Explanation

    Watch Media Resources:

    » Overview & Explanation: View | Download
    » Initiative 1: CultureView | Download
    » Initiatives 1 – 4View | Download
    » Initiatives 5 – 8View | Download
    » Initiatives 9 – 12View | Download
    » Initiatives 13 – 16View | Download

    Related Resources:
    » 16 Initiatives in Español
    » Power Point Presentations: Part 1 | Part 2
    » Resolution: Home Fire Sprinklers (Initiative 15)

    In Print:
    » 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Handout
    » 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Poster
    » Everyone Goes Home® Bookmark

    For Your Computer:
    » 16 Initiatives Desktop Wallpaper

     It is NOT too late to set plans into motion for Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011…..You have ALL week and the rest of the year…..

    The Consciences Observer or Activist
    The operative question going forward will be this: What will you personally commit to for Safety, Health and Survival week, or what will your department choose to do; participate in, contribute, join in, share, lead, promote, instruct, present, facilitate, help, assist, aid, or neglect, disregard, undermine, abuse, challenge, demoralize, undercut, damage, torpedo, circumvent, or avoid?

     

    Coming Monday on;

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two-Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

    NFPA Research Report on Firefighter Fatalities 2010 Released

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    According to the recently published NFPA Research Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2010; In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977.

    • Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, continued to account for the largest number of fatalities.
    • More than half of the deaths resulted from overexertion, stress and related medical issues.
    • Of the 39 deaths in this category, 34 were classified as sudden cardiac deaths (usually heart attacks) and five were due to strokes or brain aneurysm.

     

    • Download the NFPA 2010 FF LODD PFD Report, HERE
    • NFPA Web Site Link, HERE

    2010 Experience

    In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977. The average number of deaths annually over the past 10 years is 95.

    Figure 1 shows firefighter deaths for the years 1977 through 2010, excluding the 340 firefighter deaths at the World Trade Center in 2001.

    Of the 72 firefighters who died while on duty in 2010, 44 were volunteer firefighters, 25 were career firefighters, two were employees of state land management agencies, and one was a member of a prison inmate crew.

    In 2010, there were four double-fatality incidents. Two firefighters died in a vehicle crash while returning from a training weekend, two died in an apparatus crash while responding to a structure fire and four firefighters were killed during interior operations at two structure fires. More details are presented throughout the report.

    Analyses in the NFPA Research Report examine the types of duty associated with firefighter deaths, the cause and nature of fatal injuries to firefighters, and the ages of the firefighters who died. They highlight deaths in intentionally-set fires and in motor vehicle-related incidents.

    Finally, the NFPA study presents summaries of individual incidents that illustrate important concerns in firefighter safety.

    The victims include members of local career and volunteer fire departments; seasonal, full-time and contract employees of state and federal agencies who have fire suppression responsibilities as part of their job description; prison inmates serving on firefighting crews; military personnel performing assigned fire suppression activities; civilian firefighters working at military installations; and members of industrial fire brigades. Fatal injuries and illnesses are included even in cases where death is considerably delayed.

    When the injury and the death occur in different years, the incident is counted in the year of the injury.

    The NFPA recognizes that a comprehensive study of on-duty firefighter fatalities would include chronic illnesses (such as cancer or heart disease) that prove fatal and that arise from occupational factors. In practice, there is no mechanism for identifying fatalities that are due to illnesses that develop over long periods of time. This creates an incomplete picture when comparing occupational illnesses to other factors as causes of firefighter deaths. This is recognized as a gap the size of which cannot be identified at this time because of limitations in tracking the exposure of firefighters to toxic environments and substances and the potential long-term effects of such exposures.

    The NFPA also recognizes that other organizations report numbers of duty-related firefighter fatalities using different, more expansive, definitions that include deaths that occurred when the victims were off-duty. (See, for example, the USFA and National Fallen Firefighters Memorial websites.*)

    Readers comparing reported losses should carefully consider the definitions and inclusion criteria used in any study.

    Type of Duty

    Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 72 deaths by type of duty. The largest share of deaths occurred while firefighters were operating on the fire ground (21 deaths).

     

    This total is well below the average 32 deaths per year on the fire ground over the past 10 years, and less than a third the average of 69 deaths per year in the first 10 years of this study (1977 through 1986). The low number of fire ground deaths in 2010 is not only because of the small number of multiple-fatality fire incidents – the number of fire incidents resulting in firefighter deaths in 2010 was the lowest recorded, with 19 fatal fires, compared to an average of 28 annually in the previous 10 years. Fourteen of the 21 fire ground deaths occurred at 12 structure fires. Deaths in structure fires are discussed in more detail later in this report. There were seven deaths at seven wildland-related incidents.

     There were no firefighter deaths at vehicle fires in 2010.

    • Twelve of the 21 fire ground victims were career firefighters, eight were volunteer firefighters and one was a firefighter with a state land management agency.
    • The average number of career firefighter deaths on the fire ground over the past 10 years is 12 deaths per year, while the average for volunteer firefighters is 16 deaths per year.
    • An additional four or more deaths of state or federal wildland management agency personnel, on average, occur on wildland fires each year.

     Eighteen firefighters died while responding to or returning from emergency calls. It is important to note that deaths in this category are not necessarily the result of crashes. Twelve of the deaths were due to sudden cardiac events or stroke, five occurred in four collisions or rollovers and one firefighter was crushed between two fire department vehicles as one was backed into the station. All 18 victims were volunteer firefighters. All crashes and sudden cardiac deaths are discussed in more detail later.

    Eleven deaths occurred during training activities. Two firefighters died when their personal vehicle crashed while they were returning from a training weekend. Four firefighters collapsed and died of sudden cardiac events after training exercises and one died during unsupervised physical fitness activities. One suffered a stroke after a weekly training meeting at the station, one suffered a brain aneurysm after hose loading training, one died after being exposed to smoke at a wildland live fire training exercise, and one hit his elbow during training and died of necrotizing fasciitis (also known as flesh-eating disease).

    Five firefighters died at non-fire emergencies, including two at the scene of motor vehicle crashes (one victim was struck by a vehicle and the other suffered sudden cardiac death), one drowned during a swift water rescue, one died after clearing downed trees after a storm and one was asphyxiated while attempting to rescue a worker from a manhole without SCBA and before the oxygen levels were tested.

    The remaining 17 firefighters died while involved in a variety of non-emergency-related on-duty activities. These activities included normal administrative or station duties (11 deaths), fire station construction projects (two deaths), vehicle maintenance (one death), driving to check on a wildland fire the previous day (one death), and a work project in a wildland area (one death). One firefighter died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound while on-duty.

     

    Report Authors

    Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2010
    Rita F. Fahy, Paul R. LeBlanc and Joseph L. Molis, June 2011. 33 pages.
    Overall statistics on line-of-duty firefighter fatalities in 2010, including non-incident-related deaths. Includes patterns, trends, career vs. volunteer comparisons, and brief narratives on selected incidents. 

    Abstract: In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S.  This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977. Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, continued to account for the largest number of fatalities. More than half of the deaths resulted from overexertion, stress and related medical issues. Of the 39 deaths in this category, 34 were classified as sudden cardiac deaths (usually heart attacks) and five were due to strokes or brain aneurysm. 
     

    Download this report. (PDF, 151 KB)
     See older versions of this report.