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San Francisco FD Flashover LODD, two others injured

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San Francisco firefighters carry one of their own from the scene of a house blaze today in the Diamond Heights neighborhood. Patty Stanton / Special to The Chronicle

San Francisco (CA) Fire Department Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, died in the line of duty during fire suppression operations trying to extinguish a fire at a four-story residential occupancy in the Diamond Heights section of San Francisco. FF Anthony Valerio, 53, is reported in critical condition at San Francisco General Hospital’s intensive care unit with severe burns.

According to published reports, a third firefighter was treated and released for minor burns and smoke inhalation, Talmadge said. Her name was not released.

The single family home was constructed in 1975 and has 2058 square foot of living space,  3 bedrooms and 3.0 bathrooms.

by Mark (via uReport) ( Photo)

Alpha Street Side

 

 

San Francisco Chronical; S.F. firefighter dies, second fighting for life; Article and Photos HERE

Stairway Collapse and Mayday in Chicagoland

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A fire in single family residential occupancy in Chicago’s West Humboldt Park section on May 29th produced these dramatic occurrences: Serious injury to a woman and her grandchild, a firefighter being trapped, and good Samaritans lending a hand.

About 12:30 a.m., Chicago fire officials and police responded to a fire in a one-and-a-half story single family home in the 4200 block of West Hadden Avenue on the West Side, according to police and fire officials. A 2-11 Alarm and EMS Plan 1 were called for the fire, said Fire Media Affairs spokesman Chief Joe Roccasalva. The fire was located in a 1 1/2 story wood frame bungalow (SFR) dwelling.  According to published reports, the firefighter fell through a burning stairwell when it collapsed and was briefly trapped. He was quickly located and extricated with minor injuries following the mayday alert

4246 West Hadden Ave

Aerial

 

Chicago Sun-Times, HERE and Breaking News Report, HERE and ABC News7 TV, HERE

Typical Circa Stairway Construction

 

Don’t forget to check out the 2011 Safety and Survival Week focus on;

2011 Focus: Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness, HERE

 

Fire Behavior 101; Taking it to the Streets

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Fire Behavior

Fire Dynamics

Fire Dynamics is the study of how chemistry, fire science, material science and the mechanical engineering disciplines of fluid mechanics and heat transfer interact to influence fire behavior.

In other words, Fire Dynamics is the study of how fires start, spread and develop. But what exactly is a fire?

Defining Fire

Fire can be described in many ways – here are a few:

  • NFPA 921: ”A rapid oxidation process, which is a chemical reaction resulting in the evolution of light and heat in varying intensities.”
  • Webster’s Dictionary: “A fire is an exothermic chemical reaction that emits heat and light”

Fire can also be explained in terms of the Fire Tetrahedron – a geometric representation of what is required for fire to exist, namely, fuel, an oxidizing agent, heat, and an uninhibited chemical reaction.

Measuring Fire

Heat Energy is a form of energy characterized by vibration of molecules and capable of initiating and supporting chemical changes and changes of state (NFPA 921).

In other words, it is the energy needed to change the temperature of an object – add heat, temperature increases; remove heat, temperature decreases.

Heat energy is measured in units of Joules (J), however it can also be measured in Calories (1 Calorie = 4.184 J) and BTU’s (1 BTU = 1055 J).

Temperature is a measure of the degree of molecular activity of a material compared to a reference point.

Temperature is measured in degrees Farenheit (melting point of ice = 32 º F, boiling point of water = 212 º F) or degrees Celsius (melting point of ice = 0 º C, boiling point of water = 100 º C).

º C
º F
Response
37
98.6
 Normal human oral/body temperature
44
111
 Human skin begins to feel pain
48
118
 Human skin receives a first degree burn injury
55
131
 Human skin receives a second degree burn injury
62
140
 A phase where burned human tissue becomes numb
72
162
 Human skin is instantly destroyed
100
212
 Water boils and produces steam
140
284
 Glass transition temperature of polycarbonate
230
446
 Melting temperature of polycarbonate
250
482
 Charring of natural cotton begins
>300
>572
 Charring of modern protective clothing fabrics begins
>600
>1112
 Temperatures inside a post-flashover room fire

Heat Release Rate (HRR) is the rate at which fire releases energy – this is also known as power. HRR is measured in units of Watts (W), which is an International System unit equal to one Joule per second. 

Depending on the size of the fire, HRR is also measured in Kilowatts (equal to 1,000 Watts) or Megawatts (equal 1,000,000 Watts).

Heat Flux is the rate of heat energy transferred per surface unit area – kW/m2.

Heat Flux (kW/m2)
Example
1
Sunny day
2.5
Typical firefighter exposure
3-5
Pain to skin within seconds
20
Threshold flux to floor at flashover
84
Thermal Protective Performance Test (NFPA 1971)
60 – 200
Flames over surface
 
Temperature vs. Heat Release Rate

One candle vs. ten candles – same flame temperature but 10 times the heat release rate!

CANDLE

HRR: ~ 80 W Temperature:
500 C - 1400 C
(930 F - 2500 F)

10 CANDLES

HRR: ~ 800 W

Heat Transfer

Heat transfer is a major factor in the ignition, growth, spread, decay and extinction of a fire.

It is important to note that heat is always transferred from the hotter object to the cooler object - heat energy transferred to and object increases the object’s temperature, and heat energy transferred from and object decreases the object’s temperature.

CONDUCTION

Conduction is heat transfer within solids or between contacting solids.

Conduction          Firefighter Conduction

 

The governing equation for heat transfer by conduction is:

Conduction Equation

Where T is temperature (in Kelvin), A is the exposure area (meters squared), L is the depth of the solid (meters), and k is a constant that unique for different materials know as the thermal conductivity and has units of (Watts/meters*Kelvin).

Thermal Conductivity of Common Materials

Copper = 387
Gypsum = 0.48
Steel = 45.8
Oak = 0.17
Glass = 0.76
Pine = 0.14
Brick = 0.69
PPE = 0.034 – 0.136
Water = 0.58
Air = 0.026

CONVECTION

Convection is heat transfer by the movement of liquids or gasses.

Convection          Firefighter Convection

The governing equation for heat transfer by convection is:

Convection Equation

Where T is temperature (in Kelvin), A is the area of exposure (in meters squared), and h is a constant that is unique for different materials known as the convective heat transfer coefficient, with units of W/m2*K.

These values are found empirically, or, by experiment.

For free convection, values usually range between 5 and 25. But for forced convection, values can range anywhere from 10 to 500.

RADIATION

Radiation is heat transfer by electromagnetic waves.

Radiation          Firefighter Radiation

The governing equation for heat transfer by radiation is:

Radiation Equation

Where T is temperature (in Kelvin), A is the area of exposure (in meters squared), α is the thermal diffusivity (a measure of how quickly a material will adjust it’s temperature to the surroundings, in meters squared per second) and ε is the emissivity (a measure of the ability of a materials surface to emit energy by radiation).

Fire Phenomena

Fire Development is a function of many factors including: fuel properties, fuel quantity, ventilation (natural or mechanical), compartment geometry (volume and ceiling height), location of fire, and ambient conditions (temperature, wind, etc).

Traditional Fire Development
The Traditional Fire Development curve shows the time history of a fuel limited fire. In other words, the fire growth is not limited by a lack of oxygen. As more fuel becomes involved in the fire, the energy level continues to increase until all of the fuel available is burning (fully developed).

Then as the fuel is burned away, the energy level begins to decay.

The key is that oxygen is available to mix with the heated  gases (fuel) to enable the completion of the fire triangle and the generation of energy.

 Fire Development Chart

Watch

Windows: Traditional Fire Development in a Compartment Fire 

Mac: Traditional Fire Development in a Compartment Fire

Fire Behavior in a Structure
The Fire Behavior in a Structure curve demonstrates the time history of a ventilation limited fire. In this case the fire starts in a structure which has the doors and windows closed.Early in the fire growth stage there is adequate oxygen to mix with the heated gases, which results in flaming combustion. As the oxygen level within the structure is depleted, the fire decays, the heat release from the fire decreases and as a result the temperature decreases.

When a vent is opened, such as when the fire department enters a door, oxygen is introduced. 

The oxygen mixes with the heated gases in the structure and the energy level begins to increase.

This change in ventilation can result in a rapid increase in fire growth potentially leading to a flashover (fully developed compartment fire) condition.

 Typical Fire Behavior

Watch

Windows: Fire Behavior in a Structure (Ventilation limited)
Mac: Fire Behavior in a Structure (Ventilation limited)

Flashover is the transition phase in the development of a contained fire in which surfaces exposed to the thermal radiation, from fire gases in excess of 600° C, 

reach ignition temperature more or less simultaneously and fire spreads rapidly through the space.

This is the most dangerous stage of fire development.

Dorm Room Flashover          Room Flashover from Sofa Fire

Videos:

Reports:

Informational Source: The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. (HERE)

Predictability of Performance: Its Occupancy Risk NOT Occupancy Type

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

 

UL Ventilation and Fire Behavior Full Scale Testing

 

Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

For many of you that have been following my writings and perspectives on building construction, firefighting, command risk management and operational excellence for firefighter safety have long recognized that I have been promoting and advocating the fact the fireground is changining, our stratgies and tactics demand change adn does the demand for increased knowledge within the areas of building construction, fire dynamics, while integrating the art and science of firefighting. The most recent release of the testing report from Underwriters Laboratories; Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction and the accompaning emphirical data further validates assumptions and presmises that many of us shared based upon field obervations and first hand incident operations related to the dramatic changes being witnessed as a result of operational challenges in a wide varity of occupanies and building types.

This material is a must read for all emerging and practicing company and command officers ( for starters) to being grasping the magnitude and extent of quantifiable data that supports the premise that combat fire engagement and suppression operations and the rules of engagement are going to change and that change is fast approaching.

Considerations for Tactical Patience and Adaptive Fireground Management are continued themes I will expand upon in future postings….

Here’s the executive summary of the report and findings from UL. For an download of the entire UL Report, go HERE.

Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries. There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics. This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL. The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms. The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms. The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two-story great room and open foyer. Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house. One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability.

The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.

There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.

This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

  • Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.
  • The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.
  • The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, and 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.
  • The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two story great room and open foyer.

 Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.

One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability. The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

The tactical considerations addressed include:

  • Stages of fire development:The stages of fire development change when a fire becomes ventilation limited.
    • It is common with today’s fire environment to have a decay period prior to flashover which emphasizes the importance of ventilatio
  • Forcing the front door is ventilation: Forcing entry has to be thought of as ventilation as well.
    • While forcing entry is necessary to fight the fire it must also trigger the thought that air is being fed to the fire and the clock is ticking before either the fire gets extinguished or it grows until an untenable condition exists jeopardizing the safety of everyone in the structure.
  • No smoke showing:A common event during the experiments was that once the fire became ventilation limited the smoke being forced out of the gaps of the houses greatly diminished or stopped all together.
    • No some showing during size-up should increase awareness of the potential conditions inside.
  • Coordination:If you add air to the fire and don’t apply water in the appropriate time frame the fire gets larger and safety decreases.
    • Examining the times to untenability gives the best case scenario of how coordinated the attack needs to be.
    • Taking the average time for every experiment from the time of ventilation to the time of the onset of firefighter untenability conditions yields 100 seconds for the one-story house and 200 seconds for the two-story house
    • In many of the experiments from the onset of firefighter untenability until flashover was less than 10 seconds.
    • These times should be treated as being very conservative. If a vent location already exists because the homeowner left a window or door open then the fire is going to respond faster to additional ventilation opening because the temperatures in the house are going to be higher.
    • Coordination of fire attack crew is essential for a positive outcome in today’s fire environment.
  • Smoke tunneling and rapid air movement through the front door:Once the front door is opened attention should be given to the flow through the front door.
    • A rapid in rush of air or a tunneling effect could indicate a ventilation limited fire.
  • Vent Enter Search (VES):During a VES operation, primary importance should be given to closing the door to the room.
    • This eliminates the impact of the open vent and increases tenability for potential occupants and firefighters while the smoke ventilates from the now isolated room.
  • Flow paths: Every new ventilation opening provides a new flow path to the fire and vice versa.
    • This could create very dangerous conditions when there is a ventilation limited fire.
  • Can you vent enough?:In the experiments where multiple ventilation locations were made it was not possible to create fuel limited fires.
    • The fire responded to all the additional air provided.
    • That means that even with a ventilation location open the fire is still ventilation limited and will respond just as fast or faster to any additional air.
    • It is more likely that the fire will respond faster because the already open ventilation location is allowing the fire to maintain a higher temperature than if everything was closed. In these cases rapid fire progression if highly probable and coordination of fire attack with ventilation is paramount.
  • Impact of shut door on occupant tenability and firefighter tenability:Conditions in every experiment for the closed bedroom remained tenable for temperature and oxygen concentration thresholds.
    • This means that the act of closing a door between the occupant and the fire or a firefighter and the fire can increase the chance of survivability.
    • During firefighter operations if a firefighter is searching ahead of a hoseline or becomes separated from his crew and conditions deteriorate then a good choice of actions would be to get in a room with a closed door until the fire is knocked down or escape out of the room’s window with more time provided by the closed door
  • Potential impact of open vent already on flashover time:All of these experiments were designed to examine the first ventilation actions by an arriving crew when there are no ventilation openings.
    • It is possible that the fire will fail a window prior to fire department arrival or that a door or window was left open by the occupant while exiting.
    • It is important to understand that an already open ventilation location is providing air to the fire, allowing it to sustain or grow.
  • Pushing fire:There were no temperature spikes in any of the rooms, especially the rooms adjacent to the fire room when water was applied from the outside. It appears that in most cases the fire was slowed down by the water application and that external water application had no negative impacts to occupant survivability.
    • While the fog stream “pushed” steam along the flow path there was no fire “pushed”.
  • No damage to surrounding rooms:Just as the fire triangle depicts, fire needs oxygen to burn.
    • A condition that existed in every experiment was that the fire (living room or family room) grew until oxygen was reduced below levels to sustain it.
    • This means that it decreased the oxygen in the entire house by lowering the oxygen in surrounding rooms and the more remote bedrooms until combustion was not possible.
    • In most cases surrounding rooms such as the dining room and kitchen had no fire in them even when the fire room was fully involved in flames and was ventilating out of the structure.

Online Training Program

In order to make the results of this study more user friendly for the fire service to examine, UL developed an online interactive training module that can be viewed by clicking here. The program includes a professionally narrated description of all of the experiments, their results and the tactical considerations. Experimental video is used and graphical data is explained in a way that brings science to the street level firefighter.

UL University On-Line CBT

 

Comparison of Modern and Legacy Home Furnishings

An experiment was conducted with two side by side living room fires. The purpose was to gain knowledge on the difference between modern and legacy furnishings. The rooms measured 12 ft by 12 ft, with an 8 ft ceiling and had an 8 ft wide by 7 ft tall opening on the front wall. Both rooms contained similar amounts of like furnishings.

The modern room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted gypsum board and the floor was covered with carpet and padding.

  • The furnishings included a microfiber covered polyurethane foam filled sectional sofa, engineered wood coffee table, end table, television stand and book case.
  • The sofa had a polyester throw placed on its right side. The end table had a lamp with polyester shade on top of it and a wicker basket inside it.
  • The coffee table had six color magazines, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
  • The television stand had a color magazine and a 37 inch flat panel television.
  • The book case had two small plastic bins, two picture frames and two glass vases on it.
  • The right rear corner of the room had a plastic toy bin, a plastic toy tub and four stuffed toys.
  • The rear wall had polyester curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.

The legacy room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted cement board and the floor was covered with unfinished hardwood flooring.

  • The furnishings included a cotton covered, cotton batting filled sectional sofa, solid wood coffee table, two end tables, and television stand.
  • The sofa had a cotton throw placed on its right side.
  • Both end tables had a lamp with polyester shade on top of them.
  • The one on the left side of the sofa had two paperback books on it.
  • A wicker basket was located on the floor in front of the right side of the sofa at the floor level.
  • The coffee table had three hard-covered books, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
  • The television stand had a 27 inch tube television.
  • The right front corner of the room had a wood toy bin, and multiple wood toys.
  • The rear wall had cotton curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.

Both rooms were ignited by placing a lit stick candle on the right side of the sofa. The fires were allowed to grow until flashover. The modern room transitioned to flashover in 3 minutes and 30 seconds and the legacy room at 29 minutes and 30 seconds.

View the entire video, or you may also download the video:

Physiological Stress associated with Structural Firefighting Observed in Professional Firefighters-Study

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Study

 

COOPERATIVE EFFORT WITH THE INDIANAPOLIS FD

A primary goal of the project was to investigate the physical rigor of real fire scene work. Fire scene work tasks may differ widely with respect to their cardiovascular and respiratory stress. Therefore, the project sought to illustrate normative data for multiple fire ground tasks including fire attack, search & rescue, exterior ventilation, and overhaul activities.

The presence of an independent observer (scientist) on the fire ground provided opportunity to describe the fire scene environment under which firefighter physiology data was being collected. Subsequent analysis allowed the identification of the fire scene factors having the greatest impact on firefighter physiology. Further, these factors were also prioritized with respect to their relative importance.

The full access to firefighters provided by the study also allowed some investigation into the psychological aspects of answering emergency call. Specifically, a comparison of emotional stress and anxiety between on and off duty life may provide some insight in to a source of firefighter risk for development of heart disease.

Accomplishing the goals of this project required the cooperation of many organizations. A research consortium was established among the primary organizations involved. However, the ultimate responsibility for success or failure of the project lay with the individual firefighters invited to participate. It was the role of the following institutions to provide support for participating firefighters.

 Indiana University Firefighter Health & Safety Research

The Firefighter Health & Safety Research program is component of Indiana University’s Harold H. Morris Human Performance Laboratory. It is governed by the Department of Kinesiology and the School of Health, Physical Education & Recreation.

 The program was organized to specifically to support faculty research interests in the health and safety of First Responder populations.

 The mission of Indianapolis Fire Department

Indianapolis is a rapidly growing, outstanding community that is recognized as a great place to work and live. Hailed as the 12th largest city in America and home to a diverse population, the city attracts millions of visitors annually. Indianapolis is proud to offer its citizens a world class Fire Department. IFD, with over 150 years of proud tradition, is made up of men and women with diverse cultural backgrounds, each who have taken the oath to protect and serve the citizens of Indianapolis.

Indianapolis Firefighters work closely with the residents and businesses through fire prevention and safety education programs to make their city as safe as possible. The Indianapolis Fire Department is made up of over 940 sworn members and a 50- member civilian support team. The IFD fire service district covers 198 square miles of downtown Indianapolis and surrounding areas.

With a strong history of being progressive thinking forward in areas of firefighter health and safety, IFD provided an ideal organization to participate in the study. Health status and work capacity of IFD firefighters are regularly tested. This provided a population of highly trained, medically supervised career professional firefighters.

Indianapolis Metropolitan Professional Firefighters Association

The International Association of Fire Fighters granted Indianapolis Firefighters their Charter in October of 1934. Today, Indianapolis (Marion County) and its citizens are served by 17 different fire departments are represented by Local 416. Currently Local 416 membership includes over 2,300 firefighters, paramedics, dispatchers and retirees. Local 416 fosters and encourages a high degree of skill, and efficiency, the cultivation of friendship among its members and the support of moral, intellectual and economic development of its membership. Endorsement of the project by Local 416 leadership facilitated the recruitment of firefighters for the research project. A union representative accompanied the scientific team to fire stations during recruitment. Their presence put potential subjects at ease and helped remove any suspicions or concerns the firefighters had. In addition, Local 416 worked closely with the research team to provide support

Embedded

A unique aspect of the study was the need for continuous scientific observation of on-duty firefighters. IFD rotates three shifts of firefighters on a 24-hour on / 48-hour off duty cycle. To accomplish continuous monitoring, a scientist was assigned to each IFD shift. The scientist lived in the fire station and accompanied firefighters on all fire runs.

Scientists were trained in fire station etiquette and fire ground safety procedures. Scientists worked under the command of the station’s shift officer and Incident Commander at the station and on fire scenes respectively. Scientists were uniformed for identification both in the fire station and on the fire ground. Scientist uniforms distinguished them from IFD personnel but made them easily recognizable as fire ground qualified.

The study is bound by the architectural and geographical character of Indianapolis, Indiana. In order to obtain sufficient fire scene data, a highfire- volume region of the city of Indianapolis was chosen for the study site. Architecturally, this area of the city is populated by single and double wood framed residences.

Typically, these structures are less than 2000 ft2. From a geographical stand point, Indianapolis enjoys a fairly moderate climate. Accordingly, Indianapolis does not provide exposure to extremes of weather, hot or cold. The study was conducted during the winter months in order to avoid the complication of atmospheric heat stress. The goal of the study was to assess, as much as possible, the physical aspects of firefighting work. The avoidance of added heat stress provides a more focused examination on that factor. This will allow us to identify firefighter and fire scene variables impacting the physiological responses of firefighters.

Unfortunately, these delimiting factors may limit the applicability of the findings to areas outside Indianapolis or central Indiana. In order to address the impact of weather and other atmospheric extremes (elevation), a future study is planned to assess the same physiological stress on firefighters in areas of the country that will provide access to these weather extremes. In addition, US cities providing access to other architectural character will also be utilized in that future study.

Finally, the study represents physiological responses of a firefighting corps that is known to be well trained technically and monitored by a medical program adhering to NFPA standards. This group of firefighters was chosen because it may be used as a model corps. Other, less fit firefighters should not expect to respond in a similar manner.

This document reports the physiological aspects of structural firefighting and the psychological impact of answering emergency call as outlined in the associated application for funding. The use of continuous physiological monitoring to capture data required the report resulted in the capture of much information not associated with fire scenes. Every heartbeat, breath, and footstep is captured throughout the duty shift. As a result, many other aspects of firefighter physiology were captured and should be evaluated despite being outside the scope of the original project proposal. This report is limited to reporting the goals of the original funded protocol.

Other physiological issues identified during the course of the study will be pursued in subsequent peer-reviewed scientific publications. These subsequent reports will cover such topics as sleep dysfunction,

Heart rate variability analysis for determination of sympathetic / parasympathetic balance, respiratory mechanics associated with positive pressure SCBA systems, and a comparison of physical activity levels on and off duty.

CONCLUSIONS

It is no surprise that heart rates, minute ventilation and blood pressures are elevated during firefighting activity. The physical work demand and the emotionally charged environment require these responses. However, prior to this study, the magnitude and duration of these responses were unclear.

  • Annual reports of firefighter deaths generally list the cause of on-duty heart attack deaths as “overexertion”.
  • However, overexertion is a relative term. Levels of work that produce overexertion in one individual might not do so in another, more fit individual. Therefore, several factors must be considered to put the data presented in to context.
  • When we report means or averages of heart rates (70% of predicted HRmax) and levels of minute ventilation (50 L/min), some of the work does not seem all that strenuous.

 However, firefighters studied here were highly trained, medically supervised, healthy and relatively fit individuals. The same work in a less well trained and less fit group of firefighters would result in much higher levels of cardiovascular stress.

  • In fact, work here that pushed studied firefighters to 100% of their maximum cardiovascular capacity could not be accomplished by some unhealthy and unfit firefighters.
  • Even within this group, individuals with higher levels of body fat not being able to work as hard as their leaner peers.
  • Another factor to consider is the fires themselves. The principle components analysis, the size of the structure and amount of fire involved have significant impact on the firefighter’s response. Indeed, the average structure studied was a relatively small (2500 ft2) residential structure.
  • As structures grow larger and more complex, the physical response grows. Yet, even some of these small structures pushed firefighters to their maximal abilities. Lastly, we must consider the weather conditions.

The study was conducted in the absence of ambient environmental heat stress. Unfortunately, firefighters must fight fire in all weather conditions, including hot humid weather that imposes extreme heat stress conditions on the fire scene. The process of thermoregulation can impart severe cardiovascular stress on firefighters before they set foot on the fire ground. During a 2005 study of training related physiology, a study conducted at the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute saw many firefighters reporting for duty in a dehydrated state. Dehydration exacerbates the cardiovascular stress associated with thermoregulation and can debilitate even the most fit firefighter.

FIRE SCENE AS A TRIGGER FOR HEART ATTACKS

So, how does the information presented here shed light on the extraordinary number of firefighter line of duty heart attacks? The answer lies in the magnitude of the physiological responses. Recently, a comprehensive examination of the LODD due to heart attack was completed by a group at Harvard University .  

  • The researchers found the primary cause of heart attack deaths associated with firefighting was overexertion in firefighters with existing cardiovascular disease.
  • A 2006 review of research on cardiac deaths indicated that high levels of physical exertion as well as severe emotional stress are triggers for a heart attack. In the case of firefighters, both physical and emotional triggers are present.
  • These researchers also concluded that periods of high physical or emotional stress essentially accelerate an inevitable cardiac event in persons with cardiovascular disease. This is an extremely important point with respect to fire fighters.
  • One of the most alarming facts with respect to on-duty firefighter heart attack fatality is the average age at the time of death is in the early 4th decade of life.
  • If you are a person with cardiovascular disease, death due to heart attack or stroke is probably inevitable.
  • However, if you are a firefighter with cardiovascular disease, that death due to heart attack or stroke is likely to come much sooner.

 Another question asked about firefighter line of duty heart attack deaths is why so many occur after leaving the fire scene.

  • As discussed earlier, there is an essential physical recovery period following any physical activity.
  • The duration of the recovery period is determined by the duration and magnitude of the physical activity combined with the individual’s level of aerobic fitness (all recovery is aerobic).

This is because physical activity raises body temperature and causes the release of many hormones that enable us to do high levels of work. One of these hormones, adrenaline, is also released in response to emotional stimuli. Adrenaline raises the heart rate, blood pressure and increases minute ventilation. The higher the physical demand or emotional stress, the greater the rise in temperature as well as the amount of hormone released. These factors do not simply disappear with the cessation of physical activity or the removal of an emotional stimulus.

  • Substantial time is required to metabolize hormones and to dissipate heat. As a result, stress effects tend to linger.
  • One incident captured by the study involved the rescue of children entrapped on the second floor of a fully involved residence. The incident resulted in severe physical and emotional stress on the firefighters driving heart rates to levels in excess of 100% of their predicted maximum.

Two hours after returning to station (some three hours following the completion of rescue operations), heart rates of individuals involved in the rescue remained in excess of 100 beats per minute. Essentially, the physical and emotional triggers for heart attack stay with the firefighter for some time after an incident. High levels of stress present long after an incident, is a potential trigger for cardiovascular events, especially in individuals with underlying cardiovascular disease.

REDUCING FIREFIGHTER DEATHS DUE TO HEART ATTACK

Unfortunately, many firefighters in the US are not only unfit for fire scene work but are generally unhealthy individuals. The discrepancy between the physical preparedness of firefighters and the high physical demand of firefighting stands at the center of fire service line of duty deaths. Simply to expect to survive fire ground operations, a firefighter needs, as a minimum, to be healthy (including the absence of cardiovascular disease).

The goal of this research is to support a service wide effort to reduce the number of firefighter line of duty deaths. Because heart attacks account for nearly half of these deaths, much attention is focused on elucidating and eliminating the cause of these events. Unfortunately, no substantial improvements in firefighter health have occurred in the last 25 or so years.

As a result, firefighter death statistics (as a result of heart attack) remains virtually unchanged. With improved research funding we are beginning to better understand the etiology of these events and to develop plans that will change the death statistics.

  • Currently, there appear to be two primary approaches to the problem. Some researchers are working on the development of physiology monitoring systems in hope of detecting severely elevated cardiovascular or respiratory responses during fire ground operations.
  • This in turn would allow affected firefighters to be relieved before a catastrophic event is triggered.
  • Unfortunately, the data presented here suggest this approach would not be successful. It is apparent that, in some cases, extreme physiological responses are appropriate on the fire ground.
  • Simply removing a firefighter because his or her heart rate is extremely high would stand in the way of getting the job done.

It is much more important that firefighters be healthy and fit enough to turn the output of their cardiac pumps up (increase heart rate) enough to do what they are expected to do and not experience adverse effects because of it. This seems to negate the utility of a monitoring device that simply alerts to extreme level of heart rate or ventilation.

Programs such as the Wellness/Fitness initiative undertaken by IAFF and IAFC, and the US

Fire Administration’s Life Safety Summit has recognized the need for improving the health of firefighters as a preventative measure. The national fire prevention association has issued guidelines for oversight of firefighter health programs. These programs set the stage for improvement in firefighter health. If successful, they will certainly result in a reduction in firefighter deaths due to heart attack. It is important however, that firefighters take advantage of such programs, either voluntarily or as a requirement for service.

Although there remain unknown factors on the fire ground that may increase a firefighter’s risk of developing heart disease, we know now that the vast majority of heart attack deaths occur in unhealthy, unfit firefighters. This study clearly demonstrates the magnitude of cardiovascular stress placed on working firefighters and indicates firefighting activity can be a trigger for a cardiac event. Essentially, firefighting is triggering a cardiac death that is inevitable in persons with cardiovascular disease.

So how do we stem the tide of heart attack deaths in working firefighters? We must improve firefighter health and reduce their risk factors for heart disease. Whether the responsibility for that improvement lies with the firefighter, their department or their labor organizations is for the fire service to decide.

The fire service is still asking why are firefighters dying of heart attacks and what can we do about it. Academic researchers have been demonstrating since the mid-seventies that firefighting is a substantial trigger for heart attack and preventative physical training should be required of firefighters.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FIREFIGHTER PHYSICAL TRAINING

Development of an effective physical training program begins with the identification of demand levels a job or event presents. Several studies have attempted to quantify the physical demand of firefighting by observation of training or simulated firefighting activity.

Unfortunately, laboratory measures tell us little about the physiology of real world structural firefighting. This was a primary reason the current study was undertaken. Adequate funding, appropriate technology, and an embedded relationship with a large metropolitan fire department enabled us to examine the physiology of real-world firefighting.

With information about the cardiovascular and respiratory demands of structural firefighting, we are now able to make statements about how firefighters should be trained. First, it is important to define what we refer to as physical fitness. The terms healthy and physically fit are not synonymous. Healthy refers to a state of well being and includes both physical and emotional aspects of life. Physical health includes not only the absence of disease but several functional physiological capabilities commonly referred to as health-related components of physical fitness.

These components include aerobic capacity, body composition, muscular strength, muscular endurance and flexibility. Sound physical training programs designed for the general population address all of these components. Programs designed for individuals who regularly endure high levels of physical stress go beyond these health-related components and include some performance-related components of physical fitness. In addition, the goals for health-related components are substantially different for these individuals compared to the general public. Athletes and firefighters fall into this higher-demand category. Sometimes you will even hear firefighters referred to as occupational athletes.

The cardiac and respiratory stress data, in combination with the inferred blood pressure responses described by this study, elucidate the firefighter’s need for a healthy cardiovascular system. The firefighter cardiovascular system will be stressed significantly, sometimes under high ambient heat stress conditions. In addition, the need to exert and maintain large muscular forces, usually from an awkward body position, indicates the need for significant muscular strength, muscular endurance, and joint flexibility compared to civilian counterparts.

Accordingly, standardized guidelines for physical training NFPA 1583, address these components for developing the firefighter’s physical fitness. As fire scene work begins, firefighters typically carry 60-70 pounds of protective clothing, breathing apparatus, and tools. As a result, little of the work executed on the fire ground could be described as having a large aerobic component. Instead, the high levels of power output required on the fire ground places emphasis on non-oxidative (anaerobic) metabolic processes. This anaerobic capacity is not considered a health-related but a performance- related component of physical fitness. An improved anaerobic capacity can significantly reduce cardiovascular stress in individuals executing anaerobic work.

Accordingly, firefighters would benefit from training that improves glycolytic and creatine phosphate metabolic system capacities. Other performance-related components of physical fitness also play a role on the fire ground. Studies conducted by Dr. Denise Smith have shown the effects of firefighting activity on the balance and coordination of firefighters. Training protocols that include agility training would also benefit the firefighter and alleviate some of the risk of trips and falls on the fire ground, a substantial origin of firefighter injury.

Lastly, it is important (from a physiological standpoint) to recognize the wide range in numbers of fires worked between fire service organizations and the effect is has firefighter physical demand.

The physiological demand required to fight a structural fire is primarily determined by the structure. Essentially, the structure sets the demand level without regard to who is coming to fight the fire (career professional, volunteer, paid volunteer etc.). As such, achieving similar goals on the fire ground places the similar physical stresses on all firefighters. However, a firefighter working in a busy company of a large metropolitan department may be required to fight multiple fires in a single shift. This lies in sharp contrast to the rural unpaid volunteer who may only work a handful of structural fires in a year.

As observed in this study, the physical stress placed on the firefighter does not simply disappear when they leave the fire scene. Significant cardiovascular stress may be present for some time following an incident. Unfortunately, this places a substantial burden on firefighters who fight large numbers of fires. These firefighters do need to be held to a higher standard of physical preparedness in order for them to recover quickly and be able to meet the demands of the next incident. Achieving a level of physical preparedness that enables the firefighter to survive and function appropriately on a fire scene should be the starting point for firefighter physical training, not the goal!

As always, the healthier and more physically fit any firefighter is, the better. However, at a minimum, the firefighter needs to a healthy and physically fit citizen. With increasing physical stress (as determined by the number and character of fires they fight), higher fitness goals need to be set to ensure the firefighter is physically prepared. This would include increased levels of all health-related fitness components and the incorporation of performance- related components into physical training programs.

In conclusion, it appears that firefighting activity presents significant cardiovascular and respiratory stress.

  • Recent evidence suggests that a majority of the cardiovascular-related line of duty deaths are caused by underlying heart disease.
  • It is clear from the data collected here that fire scene work exposes the firefighter to a substantial potential for triggering cardiovascular events. Therefore, firefighters with pre-existing cardiovascular disease exposed to the physical and emotional stress of afire scene are in extreme risk of a experiencing a myocardial infarction, stroke or other cardiovascular system collapse.
  • The fire scene is alive with many potential complicating exposure factors (toxic gases, particulates etc.) and it is certainly possible that working on a fire scene may contribute to the progression of the disease state. However, the best defense against the progression of the disease is a health monitoring plan coupled with a sound physical training program, and adequate operating procedures to lessen exposures.
  • The National Fire Protection Association has issued guidelines for such programs and, in the case of physical training program, suggests they be made mandatory.

Although this guideline meets with resistance from every faction of the fire service, departments, unions, and firefighters alike, it is a simple fact that sound physical training programs are the only way line of duty deaths due to heart attacks are going to be reduced.

Download the Indy Physiology Study – Final Report

Video Gallery

You may view or download the below videos for your personal use. Videos can be played on computers using QuickTime and on iPods. Click videos to play in a new Web browser window. Note that the videos may take time open.

Click here to download the entire video. Please note that all downloads and online playing will take time.

 To download parts of the entire video, click on the individual links below. Files will play in QuickTime. If you do not have QuickTime, scroll to the bottom of the page for the QuickTime link. Also for instructions on how to download, scroll to the bottom of the page.

To watch the video from this Web page, click on the image below.

Study Video – This video shows how to assess fitness and design a training program. Videos below are listed in screen size, smallest to largest.

Fitness Assessment – Use this video to assess fitness level. Videos below are listed in screen size, smallest to largest.

Level Specific Workouts – Exercise videos for three different fitness levels. Videos below are listed in screen size, smallest to largest.

Level 1

Level 2

Level 3

Flexibility Training – Exercise video to increase flexibility. Videos below are listed in screen size, smallest to largest.

Download instructions:

To download the video files for personal use, do the following:

  1. Right-click on the file link. For example, if downloading Flexibility-240×180, your mouse pointer should be over the link and the hand should be showing.
  2. Click Save Target As…
  3. The Save As window for the computer will open.
  4. Select a folder. My Videos is a good choice.
  5. Click the Save button in the Save As window.
  6. Wait for the video to download and save to the computer.

The videos will play in the software QuickTime, a free program. To download QuickTime click here: http://www.apple.com/quicktime/download/

Combat Ready and the Fire Service Warrior on Taking it to the Streets

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Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

 

Join in on Tuesday May 17th at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.
 
This edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM  the program is all about being  COMBAT READY and THE FIRE SERVICE WARRIOR
 
Joining the program will be special guest, Christopher Brennan  the author of The Combat Position: Achieving Firefighter Readiness, published by PennWell Books and the author of the notable blogsite, The Fire Service Warrior.

Christopher Brennan

Christopher Brennan is a firefighter in the suburbs outside Chicago; a field instructor for the Illinois Fire Service Institute; and a consultant for local, state, and federal agencies.

He joined the fire service in 1997 as a paid-on-call member of the Calumet Park (IL) Fire Department.

During his career, Chris has worked for the Calumet Park Fire Department, part-time for the Darien-Woodridge (IL) Fire Protection District, and as a career firefighter and engineer with the Harvey (IL) Fire Department.Chris is an active instructor teaching for the Illinois Fire Service Institute, has taught terrorism response training overseas, and has been an instructor for FDIC.

He is a member of the International Association of Fire Fighters, the International Society of Fire Service Instructors, and the Illinois Society of Fire Service Instructors.

He is also the author of numerous articles for fire service magazines, including Fire Engineering. 

Join in on what is certainly going to be an insightful look and discussion of  the path of the fire service warrior.

Discussions on what is meant by embracing the philosophy of the fire service warrior, and striving for the ready position—the synthesis of physical and mental readiness that allows for suggested optimum fireground performance— and its potential application towards reducing firefighter injuries and fatalities

We’ll further explore how as Christopher Brennan states; “Today’s firefighter must be a warrior who will unflinchingly put his very life in harm’s way to accomplish a mission, but who is also fully informed about the path being chosen”.  

LINKS

  • Surviving on the Fireground: Chris Brennan Talks Situational Awareness at FDIC 2011, HERE
  •  A Culture of Excellence – Christopher Brennan , HERE
  • The Fire Service Warrior Blog, HERE

The Combat Position

The Combat Position: Achieving Firefighter Readiness, PennWell Books, HERE

Firefighting is combat and should be viewed as a warrior’s calling.

Firefighters put themselves in harm’s way to protect others, a selflessness rooted in the same noble drive as the military warriors who defend our nation.

This book about combat is meant to be a guide for those who seek to follow a warrior’s path, the path of the fire service warrior.

Today’s firefighter must be a warrior who will unflinchingly put his very life in harm’s way to accomplish a mission, but who is also fully informed about the path being chosen.

Embracing the philosophy of the fire service warrior, and striving for the ready position—the synthesis of physical and mental readiness that allows for optimum fireground performance—can reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities.

The Combat Position: Achieving Firefighter Readiness will be an invaluable tool for firefighters, company officers, chief officers, and instructors.

 

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special  one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing developing concepts, methodologies  and operational perspectives affecting today’s emerging and evolving fire ground operation with Christopher Naum and this emerging  fire service leader.    

 Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

  • Tune in to the Program Tuesday evening May 17th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
  • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

Analytical Study Reveals Patterns in U.S Firefighter Fatalities

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While the number of structural fires in the United States continues to decline, firefighter line of duty deaths (LODD) do not exhibit the same rate of proportion decline. A review of both NFPA and USFA Firefighter LODD annual reports, statistics and retrospective studies and analysis suggest a noted change in the adverse trends noted for a number of previous years, but we are lagging in achieving the goals established by the NFFF’s Everyone Goes Home Program and initiatives.

 A recently published study and research conducted at the University of Georgia may provide insights and help explain why.

 Researchers in the UGA College of Public Health found that cultural factors in the work environment that promote getting the job done as quickly as possible with whatever resources available lead to an increase in line-of-duty firefighter fatalities.

“Firefighting is always going to be a hazardous activity, but there’s a general consensus among firefighting organizations and among scientific organizations that it can be safer than it is, “according to study co-author David DeJoy, of the Workplace Health Group in the College of Public Health.

The research, published in the May edition of the journal Accident Analysis and Prevention, examined data gathered from 189 firefighter fatality investigations conducted by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health between 2004 and 2009.

Each NIOSH investigation gives recommendations directed at preventing future firefighter injuries and deaths. The researchers looked at the high-frequency recommendations and linked them to important causal and contributing factors of the fatalities.

The following is the Abstract from the Line of duty deaths among U.S. Firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations, published by Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith and David M. Dejoy.

Inadequate preparation for/anticipation of adverse events during operations,

Abstract

More than 100 firefighters die in the line-of-duty in the U.S. each year and over 80,000 are injured. This study examined all firefighter fatality investigations (N=189) completed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for fatalities occurring between 2004 and 2009.

  • These investigations produced a total of 1167 recommendations for corrective actions.
  •  Thirty-five high frequency recommendations were derived from the total set: six related to medical fatalities and 29 to injury-related fatalities.
  • These high frequency recommendations were mapped onto the major operational components of firefighting using a fishbone or cause-effect diagram.
  • Over 70% of the 30 non-external recommendations were categorized within the personnel and incident command components of the fishbone diagram.

Root cause techniques suggested four higher order causes:

  1. under-resourcing,
  2.  inadequate preparation for/anticipation of adverse events during operations,
  3. incomplete adoption of incident command procedures, and
  4. sub-optimal personnel readiness.

These findings are discussed with respect to the core culture of firefighting. (Copyright © 2011, Elsevier Publishing)

Excerpt from the study introduction

The United States depends on about 1.1 million career and volunteer firefighters to protect its citizens and property from losses caused by fire. Firefighting is considered to be one of the most stressful and dangerous occupations. Each year more than 100 firefighters die in the line of duty and over 80,000 are injured (Karter and Molis, 2009; United States Fire Administration, 2009). The fatality rate for firefighters is three times worse than for the general working population (International Association of Firefighters, 2001).

Advances in technology, personal protective equipment, engineering controls, environmental management, medical care, and safety legislation produced substantial reductions in fatalities during the 1970s and 1980s; however, these numbers have not improved during the past 25 years and have been trending upward for the past decade. Without question, firefighting is high hazard work, but it is unique beyond this. In most high hazard work situations, the goal is hazard avoidance. In contrast, for firefighting, the principal work activity is hazard engagement, which is usually further complicated by extreme time pressure.

High hazard work situations

The customary safety strategy in many high hazard work situations is to implement multiple safety measures, or what is sometimes referred to as: “defenses in depth” (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997). That is, several layers of precautions are put in place to protect the workers and the integrity of the overall system, even when components fail or errors occur. There is little protective redundancy in firefighting, and risks to personnel must continually be assessed and reassessed as the fire situation develops and changes, often with little predictability or advanced warning. Most efforts to protect firefighters fall into two general categories: preparative measures and operational measures.

Preparative measures encompass actions that prepare the firefighters to do their work in as safe a manner as possible. This would include personnel selection and placement, training, professional socialization, as well as the provision of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other safety devices. Operational measures focus on maintaining an adequate margin of safety during actual firefighting activities. This would include adherence to various standard operating procedures (SOPs), continued monitoring of risk–benefit ratios, communications, staffing, and other command and control activities.

As part of the effort to reduce firefighter line-of-duty fatalities, the United States Fire Administration (USFA) collects and evaluates information regarding line-of-duty (LODD) firefighter fatalities and publishes the data in the annual firefighter fatality reports (e.g., United States Fire Administration, 2009)

In 1998, Congress appropriated funding to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to conduct independent, onsite investigations of firefighter line-of-duty (LOD) deaths (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2009). The investigations conducted as part of the NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP) are voluntary and not all fatalities are investigated. Cases are selected for investigation using a decision algorithm (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2009), with the primary goal not to find fault or assign blame, but rather to learn from these events and to formulate recommendations directed at preventing future firefighter injuries and deaths.

Since the program’s inception, NIOSH has completed over 470 fatality investigations. There have been several prior efforts to compile and analyze various portions of this accumulated database. Hodous and colleagues (Hodous et al., 2004) reviewed firefighter fatalities from 1998 to 2001 and synthesized NIOSH recommendations for cases involving structural firefighting activities.  

 
 

 
 
 

Risk and Culture

 

These researchers identified eight frequently occurring recommendations that highlighted three general areas of concern:

(1) use and enforcement of standard operating procedures (SOPs) related to structural firefighting techniques and strategies;

(2) adequate staffing and adherence to contemporary incident command practices, and

(3) increased attention to communications and personnel accountability and rescue.

  • Peterson and colleagues (Peterson et al., 2006) examined recommendations from the first five years of fatality investigations (1999–2003).
  • Their analysis identified 31 “key” recommendations, 22 involving traumatic injury fatalities and 9 involving cardiovascular fatalities.
  • These were further reduced to 17 sentinel recommendations involving training, standard operating procedures, safety practices, and the safety environment of fire departments.
  • More recently, Ridenour and associates (Ridenour et al., 2008) reviewed all investigations completed between 1998 and 2005.
  • This analysis highlighted ten categories of recommendations, two focusing on medical cases and the other eight focusing on traumatic injuries.

The clear majority of medically-related fatalities involve cardiovascular events and these have produced two predominant recommendations: the need for improvements in medical screening, and the need for wider adoption of fitness/wellness programming for firefighters.

These are both preparative measures designed to identify and address cardiovascular risk in operational personnel. Trauma cases, on the other hand, have yielded a much more diverse array of recommendations and a less clear picture of high priority needs. These recommendations address both preparative and operational measures, and cover a broad territory that includes command and control functions, operations and tactics, and equipment and resources.

  • The present study continues this line of inquiry but expands it in several ways.
  • The first objective was to determine the extent to which the incidents investigated by NIOSH are representative of all firefighter LOD fatalities.
  • NIOSH investigations are voluntary on the part of the fallen firefighter’s organization and NIOSH does not have sufficient resources to investigate all fatalities.
  • This issue has potentially important implications for the generalizability of any key recommendations extracted from the accumulated database of reports.
  • The second objective was to better describe the procedures used to derive key or sentinel recommendations.

In the analyses described above, only limited procedural details were provided on how the high frequency recommendations were actually determined.

The Fire Service Culture

For example, it would be useful to know how frequent the high frequency recommendations were, not only in absolute terms but also relative to other recommendations. Since most investigations contain several recommendations, it would be useful to know how similar recommendations were handled within and across investigations. The third objective involved the issue of causation.

The recommendations contained in these reports speak primarily to the “what” – that is, what needs to be done, not done, done better, or done differently in the future to reduce risk.

These recommendations almost always draw upon contemporary knowledge and accepted best practices in the firefighting and emergency response professional communities. Logically, it should be possible to link high frequency recommendations to causal factors or clusters of causal factors. Therefore, we were interested in determining whether insights into important causal factors could be extracted from these reports.

Identification of such factors is a requisite step in the development of effective prevention strategies (Higgins et al., 2001). With these objectives forming the organizing framework, the present research sought to examine NIOSH investigations for the years 2004–2009. This time period was chosen to complement the previous analyses and to provide a current perspective.

The study analyzed the investigations in terms of the core culture of the firefighting profession. Firefighting culture should not be construed as one of negligence, said DeJoy, but one based on a long-standing tradition of acceptance of risk. A job that relies on extreme individual efforts and has too few resources leads to the chronic condition of doing too much with too little, he said.

  • “If you get used to taking risks, it’s easy to take a little more risk,” DeJoy said.
  • “Most of the time when we take risks, like walking across the street or driving a car, nothing bad happens.
  • This level of risk gets ratcheted up and becomes part of normal activity.” Acceptance of risk becomes extremely perilous in a situation in which adverse events can happen at any time and margins of safety are very thin, he added.

Firefighter deaths dropped in the 1970s and 1980s, largely due to improvements in protective clothing, breathing equipment and radio communication, explained DeJoy. In the last decades, fatality numbers actually edged upward while the number of fires has gone down, he said.

On average, more than 100 firefighters die on the job in the U.S. each year, which is three times higher than the fatality rate for the general working population. The number one cause of death identified in the study was not smoke inhalation or traumatic injury, but cardiovascular events.

  • Eighty-seven of the 213 deaths examined in the study were cardiac-related.
  • Deaths from cardiovascular events resulted in two predominant recommendations from the researchers: the need for improvements in medical screening and the need for wider adoption of mandatory fitness/wellness programming.

Many of the recommendations can be traced to a lack of finances the report states. Not only does under-resourcing affect the ability of a fire department to acquire innovative technology, it can lead to a shortage of personnel at a fire, compromising rapid intervention and the ability to maintain command and control functions during operations, according to the authors.

The authors also acknowledged that there is a certain amount of subjective interpretation that goes into analyzing incident investigations. In addition, NIOSH investigations are not mandatory and can be refused by a fire department. NIOSH also mostly investigates deaths involving career, or paid, firefighters, although a majority of firefighters in the U.S. are volunteers and a majority of line-of-duty deaths involve volunteers. The authors further stated they hoped NIOSH will do more investigations of volunteer firefighter fatalities, as those organizations may have the greatest need for evaluation and technical assistance.

 The entire report is available at a nominal fee, HERE;

Journal Reference:

  1. Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith, David M. DeJoy. Line-of-duty deaths among U.S. firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2011; 43 (3): 1171 DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2010.12.030
  • Science Daily Article HERE  
  • University of Georgia (2011, April 14). Comprehensive study reveals patterns in firefighter fatalities. ScienceDaily. Retrieved April 16, 2011, from http://www.sciencedaily.com­ /releases/2011/04/110412171208.htm

Other Report Links of Interest

The Strand Theatre Fire Brockton (MA) 1941; 13 Firefighter LODD

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The Strand Theater, Brockton, MA

Strand Theatre Background 

The Strand Theatre was first erected in 1915 on the site of a previous theatre which was destroyed by fire on April 7, 1915. The Strand Theatre opened in March, 1916 on School Street between Main Street and City Hall in Brockton. It replaced another theatre that was destroyed by fire April 7, 1915. With a seating capacity of 1,685, it was the largest playhouse in the City. 

When opened, the Strand Theatre was considered a leader in modern fire safety. The stage area included a dry pipe sprinkler system termed “fireproof” and the surface exits were 20% more than state law requirements. 

Located on an irregular lot, the Theatre measured 139 feet deep and 60 feet tall. The walls were made of brick and the roof was made up of wood boards on joists supported by unprotected steel trusses. The interior walls were metal lath and plaster as was the ceiling, which was suspended from the trusses. The balcony covered a large area above the auditorium and housed a manager’s office, usher’s room and rest rooms. The area under the auditorium was dead space with the exception of the west end of the basement where finished rooms contained the furnace, ventilation equipment and a janitor’s room. The lobby was an open area with two open stairwells on each end providing access to the balcony. A long corridor connected the Theatre lobby to School Street. 

In August, 1937, the Strand Theatre underwent extensive remodeling and improvements under new management. The building remained intact under the new management until the fire occurred in 1941. 

March 10, 1941: The Stand Theatre Fire 

In the heart of Brockton’s business district, people usually flocked to the downtown area to shop or take in a show in what was a busy part of the city. Sunday, March 9, 1941, like all other Sundays, drew large crowds looking for the entertainment of a movie or vaudeville show. That evening the Strand showed the double feature, “Hoosier School Boy” starring Mickey Rooney, followed by “Secret Evidence,” a crime drama. 

Long after the curtain had closed and the crowds had filtered out, a custodian discovered a fire burning in the Theatre basement and instructed his helper to activate the fire alarm box located at Main and High Street. At 12:38 a.m., the fire department received Box 1311 and sent the first alarm apparatus to the scene. A second alarm followed shortly after the first, and finally a general alarm was sounded bringing all of Brockton’s apparatus to the Strand Theatre. 

When firefighters first arrived on the scene, the fire did not seem very serious. However, as time progressed, the fire gained headway. This became more apparent to those on the outside of the theatre than crews working inside. 

Crews knocked down the fire in the basement with cellar pipes while flames raced through the vertical voids in the walls and ventilation ducts. Firefighters worked feverishly to extinguish hidden fire while crews opened walls and ceilings in the lobby and under the balcony. A number of men moved up to the balcony to attack the fire which had made its way to the auditorium ceiling just below the roof. 

The first signs of visible outside fire erupted from the southwest corner of the building as outside crews played a large hose-line on the exposed flames. Firefighters on the balcony continued their efforts to expose the fire within the ceiling as hose streams were directed overhead from the auditorium floor. 

Less than one hour later, the Strand Theatre Fire turned from a routine fire into one of the worst tragedies in Brockton and Massachusetts history when the west section of the roof collapsed, killing 13 firefighters and injuring 20 firefighters. 

Roof Collapse

Uninjured firefighters worked tirelessly to save their fellow brothers despite the danger and fear of another collapse. Eventually, fire departments from neighboring towns relieved Brockton firefighters. 

No definite cause for the fire was ever discovered. Initial reports of arson proved to be inconclusive. Further investigation revealed that the unprotected steel roof trusses played a major role in the collapse. The heat of the fire within the concealed space between the roof and the auditorium ceiling was believed to have distorted the steel trusses, causing them to buckle and separate with ease. Experts questioned the effectiveness of the construction and design used in the roof assembly. Some reports state that the weight of a previous snowfall may have added to the collapse. However, witness accounts and photographs indicate a minimal amount of snow. 

March 10, 1941 Newspaper Headlines

Every year on March 10th a commemorative service is held at Brockton City Hall to honor the 13 Brockton firefighters who made the ultimate sacrifice that winter night: 

  • Captain John F. Carroll –Ladder Company 3
  • Lieutenant Raymond A. Mitchell–Engine Company 4
  • Firefighter Roy A. McKeraghan–Squad A
  • Firefighter Denis P. Murphy–Squad A
  • Firefighter William J. Murphy–Squad A
  • Firefighter Daniel C. O’Brien–Squad A
  • Firefighter George A. Collins–Engine Company 1
  • Firefighter Frederick F. Kelley–Engine Company 1
  • Firefighter Martin E. Lipper–Engine Company 1
  • Firefighter Henry E. Sullivan–Engine Company 1
  • Firefighter Bartholomew Herlihy–Ladder Company 1
  • Firefighter Matthew E. McGeary–Ladder Company 3
  • Firefighter John M. McNeill–Ladder Company 1

 

From Brockton IAFF Local 144 site, The following information is available:  

  • Strand Theatre Memorial Dedication
  •  67th Strand Theatre Tragedy Remembrance
  •  Strand Theater Remembered
  •  History
  •  May 10th Dedication
  •  Strand Theatre Memorial Video
  •  Boston Globe Article.. Strand Theatre Tragedy
  •  Background
  •  Scranton PA Local 60 Memorial Gift 
  •    

     

    Brockton’s Strand Theatre fire disaster recalled, HERE

    Firefighter Memorial

    Brockton Church Street today

     

    Fire-Related Firefighter Injuries Report Issued

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    The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report examining the details of firefighter injuries sustained on the fireground or while responding to or returning from a fire incident.

    The report, Fire-Related Firefighter Injuries Reported to NFIRS , was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s effort to reduce the number of firefighter injuries through an increased awareness and understanding of their causes and how they might be prevented.

    The report is part of the Topical Fire Report Series and is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).

    According to the report:

    • An estimated 81,070 firefighter injuries occur annually in the United States.
    • 49 percent of firefighter injuries occur on the fireground and 6 percent occur while responding to or returning from a fire incident.
    • Overexertion/strain is the leading cause of fire-related firefighter injuries at 25 percent.
    • 38 percent of all fire-related firefighter injuries result in lost work time.
    • The majority of fire-related firefighter injuries (87 percent) occur in structure fires.
    • On average, structure fires have more injuries per fire than nonstructure fires.
    • Firefighter injury fires are more prevalent in July (10 percent) and peak between the hours of 2 and 5 p.m.

    Topical reports are designed to explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS. Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.

     

    •  Eighty-seven percent of firefighter injuries reported to NFIRS from 2006 to 2008 were associated with structure fires
    • Three times as many firefighter injuries occur in residential structures than in nonresidential structures, tracking with overall residential/nonresidential fire incidence.
    • Overall, firefighter injuries in residential struc-tures account for 65 percent of firefighter injuries, a majority of which occur in residential building fires.
    • Building fires also make up more than half of the firefighter injuries in structure fires on nonresidential properties.
    • Outside, vehicle, and other fires combined represent 13 percent of firefighter injuries from 2006 to 2008.

     

    Fire-Related Firefighter Injuries by Affiliation and Age

    • Injuries to career firefighters are the largest share (66 percent) of the reported injuries. Nationally, only 28 percent of the fire service is career firefighters.
    • Injuries to career firefighters tend to occur in midcareer (ages 30–45) with the peak between ages 35 and 39. Injuries to volunteers, on the other hand, are sustained predominately by the younger members of the organization. Firefighters under the age of 25 account for 29 percent of injuries in the volunteer service.
    • Career firefighters also experience proportionally more lost-time injuries than their volunteer counterparts (approximately 2 to 1). Volunteer firefighters, on the other hand, receive far more no lost-time injuries.

    Gypsum Board Ceiling Systems and Firefigher Safety

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    The recent events in Los Angeles and the line of duty death of veteran LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen who died Friday from injuries he sustained when a ceiling collapsed on him in a house fire late Wednesday night in the Hollywood Hills again gives us pause to reflect on the demands and hazards present at all fire suppression operations in buildings on fire. The past two months have borne consist reports of floor, roof, wall and ceiling collapses leading to firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.  

    The importance of maintaining heightened situational awareness, identifying and monitoring suspected or inherent building construction hazards coupled with inherent occupancy risk factors, and aligning those with strategic objectives, incident actions plans and tactical deployment operations. Building Knowledge equating to firefighter safety is still a driving principle that is formulative to all firefighting operations in buildings, occupancies and structures. Let’s take this opportunity to gain some insights into the material that compromises nearly all wall and ceiling membrane systems and assemblies in nearly all buildings, occupancies and structures; that is gypsum board components. I’ve included a number of video clips that center on our discussion, as the videos center on the operation parameters at this extremely large (floor area/square footage) residential occupancy. Most clips have good coverage of the structure and firefighting efforts. Take a few moments to review these clips before you proceed; 

         

        

        

    Aeria Overview of the massive residential structure Ventilation Cuts in the Roof Assembly

    Helicopter View of the Collapse Area from the Exterior

    Fire ground Roof Ventilation Operations and extension

     

    Interior Operations Pre-collapse

     

    Handlines being stretched into the interior

     

     

    Post Collapse Interior

     

     

     

    Gypsum board is the generic name for a family of panel-type products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges.    

    In 1888, Augustine Sackett used plaster of Paris sandwiched between several layers of paper to produce what would eventually become “Sackett Board,” the original gypsum board. By the 1950s, many innovations in gypsum board technology had been developed, including the listing of many fire-resistance rated designs, rounded edges, specialized nails, curved partitions, studless partitions, sound control systems, lightweight gypsum lath, plaster, and gypsum board systems that fueled a boom period for the use of gypsum products in both the residential and commercial construction industries.    

    By 1955, an estimated 50 percent of new homes were built using gypsum wallboard. Lightweight gypsum board systems permitted the use of lightweight steel in steel framed buildings, which enabled the widespread growth of high-rise residential and commercial construction during the 1960s and 1970s.    

    Today gypsum board, along with a variety of other gypsum panel products, continues to serve as a preferred building material in both residential and commercial construction for interior walls and ceilings, exterior sheathing, fire-resistant partitions and membranes, and liner material for elevator shafts and stairwells. These properties make gypsum board well suited for building and space types requiring cost-effectiveness as well as fire resistiveness and maintainability.    

    Gypsum board is often called drywall, wallboard, or plasterboard and differs from products such as plywood, hardboard, and fiberboard, because of its noncombustible core. It is designed to provide a monolithic surface when joints and fastener heads are covered with a joint treatment system.    

    Gypsum is a mineral found in sedimentary rock formations in a crystalline form known as calcium sulfate dehydrate. One hundred pounds of gypsum rock contains approximately 21 pounds (or 10 quarts) of chemically combined water. Gypsum rock is mined or quarried and then crushed. The crushed rock is then ground into a fine powder and heated to about 350 degrees F, driving off three fourths of the chemically combined water in a process called calcining. The calcined gypsum (or hemihydrate) is then used as the base for gypsum plaster, gypsum board and other gypsum products.    

    To produce gypsum board, the calcined gypsum is mixed with water and additives to form a slurry which is fed between continuous layers of paper on a board machine. As the board moves down a conveyer line, the calcium sulfate recrystallizes or rehydrates, reverting to its original rock state. The paper becomes chemically and mechanically bonded to the core. The board is then cut to length and conveyed through dryers to remove any free moisture.    

    Gypsum manufacturers also rely increasingly on “synthetic” gypsum as an effective alternative to natural gypsum ore. Synthetic gypsum is a byproduct primarily from the desulfurization of the flue gases in fossil-fueled power plants. Gypsum board is an excellent fire resistive material. It is the most commonly used interior finish where fire resistance classifications are required. Its noncombustible core contains chemically combined water which, under high heat, is slowly released as steam, effectively retarding heat transfer. Even after complete calcination, when all the water has been released, it continues to act as a heat insulating barrier. In addition, tests conducted in accordance with ASTM E 84 show that gypsum board has a low flame spread index and smoke density index. When installed in combination with other materials it serves to effectively protect building elements from fire for prescribed time periods.    

    Developed through modern technology as a result of specific requirements, gypsum board is mainly used as the surface layer of interior walls and ceilings; as a base for ceramic, plastic, and metal tile; for exterior soffits; for elevator and other shaft enclosures; as area separation walls between occupancies; and to provide fire protection to structural elements. Most gypsum board is available with aluminum foil backing which provides an effective vapor retarder for exterior walls when applied with the foil surface against the framing.    

     
        

    Standard size gypsum boards are 4ft. wide and 8, 10, 12, or 14 ft. long. The width is compatible with the standard framing of studs or joists spaced 16 in. and 24 in. on center. Some thicknesses and types of gypsum board are also produced as a standard 54 in. width material. Other lengths and widths are available as special order materials.   

    • Depending on thickness and type of gypsum board, the weight can vary from 2 – 4 lbs./ per square foot
    • A typical 4 ft. x 8 ft. sheet of 5/8-in gypsum board can weigh 96 lbs.
    • A 4ft. x 12ft. sheet can weigh upwards of 150 lbs.
    • In large span designs with attachments varying from 16 inches on center to 24 inches on center with z-strips or resilient channels attached to the structural members; these ceiling panels and assemblies can fail and collapse in a monolithic manner creating a significant safety concern to operating companies below.
    • As an example a 12ft x 12ft. monolithic assembly collapse ( single layer-gypsum board only) could have a collapse weight of 500 lbs.
    • Add the weight of compromised and attached structural members components, fixtures and insulation and the absorption of added water into the gypsum board from hose streams the combined weight of the collapse area may increase to 800-1000 lbs. Increase the size of the collapse area and the weight impacting operating companies is significant.

    The various thicknesses of gypsum board available in regular, type X, improved type X and pre-decorated board are as follows:  

    • ¼-in. A low cost gypsum board used as a base in a multi-layer application for improving sound control, or to cover existing walls and ceilings in remodeling.
    • 5/16-in. A gypsum board used in manufactured housing.
    • 3/8-in. A gypsum board principally applied in a double-layer system over wood framing and as a face layer in repair or remodeling.
    • ½-in. Generally used as a single-layer wall and ceiling material in residential work and in double-layer systems for greater sound and fire ratings.
    • 5/8-in. Used in quality single-layer and double-layer wall systems. The greater thickness provides additional fire resistance, higher rigidity, and better impact resistance.
    • ¾-in. Used in a similar manner to 5/8-in.
    • 1 in. Used in interior partitions, shaft walls, stairwells, chaseways, area separation walls and corridor ceilings. Manufactured only in 24 in. wide panels and usually installed as an integral part of a system.

         

        

        

    Depending on the type and the use, gypsum board is manufactured with a tapered, square, beveled, rounded, or tongue and groove edge. Some gypsum board types may incorporate a combination of different edge types.  The fire resistance of gypsum board can be described using three distinct terms: regular core, type ‘X’ core and improved type ‘X’ core.   

    Regular core gypsum board is made of a noncombustible core material composed mainly of gypsum. Although it does not have the specially enhanced fire-resistive properties of type ‘X’, regular core gypsum board affords a degree of natural fire resistance.   

    In the 1940s different gypsum board formulations were investigated to increase the naturally occurring fire resistance of regular core gypsum board. A new product was eventually introduced that clearly demonstrated “eXtra” fire resistance, hence the name “type X.” The basic components of type ‘X’ that give it a superior fire resistance are gypsum, glass fibers, and vermiculite.   

    In the 1960s, further modifications were made to the original successful type ‘X’ formulations of gypsum board used in some systems – particularly ceiling systems – without compromising the fire-resistive qualities. The new product demonstrates additional fire resistance over type ‘X’ core, and thus the term “improved type X” was coined. Gypsum board products make up the predominant portion of a family of materials identified as gypsum panel products. Gypsum panel products are defined as sheet materials consisting essentially of gypsum. They can be faced with paper or another material, or may be unfaced. Gypsum board, glass-faced sheathing materials with a gypsum core and unfaced gypsum-based products are all considered to be gypsum panel products. Technically, gypsum board is defined as the generic name for a family of sheet products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges. In recent years the family of gypsum-based panel materials has grown to include panel products other than those with the familiar paper facers. A number of specialized gypsum panel products and gypsum boards have been developed for specific uses which include:  

    • Gypsum Wallboard for interior walls and ceilings
    • Gypsum Ceiling Board for interior ceilings
    • Type X Gypsum Board for fire-resistance-rated building systems
    • Fiber Reinforced Gypsum Panels for interior and exterior walls, ceilings, and tile base
    • Gypsum Sheathing for exterior walls and roof systems
    • Glass Mat Gypsum Substrate for use as sheathing on exterior walls and ceilings
    • Gypsum Soffit Board for use on exterior soffits and ceilings
    • Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
    • Glass Mat Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
    • Gypsum Backing Board for use as a base for multi-ply systems
    • Gypsum Lath for use as a base for gypsum plaster
    • Gypsum Plaster Base for use as a base for veneer plaster
    • Gypsum Shaft Liner Board for shaft, stairway, and duct enclosures
    • Pre-decorated Gypsum Board for accent walls, office and movable partitions
    • Foil backed gypsum board for use as a vapor retardent

       

       

        

    Identified by their technically correct names, gypsum board products are as follows:  Gypsum Wallboard is produced primarily for use as an interior surfacing for buildings. It is the most often used commodity gypsum board and annually accounts for over 50 percent of all the gypsum board manufactured and sold in North America. Gypsum wallboard has a manila-colored face paper and is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.   

     Gypsum Ceiling Board is an interior surfacing material with the same physical appearance as gypsum wallboard. Gypsum ceiling board is manufactured as a ½-inch thick material; it is designed for application on interior ceilings, primarily those intended to receive a water-based texture finish. It has a sag resistance equal to 5/8-inch thick gypsum wallboard.   

     Predecorated Gypsum Board has a decorative surface which does not require further treatment. The surfaces may be coated or painted, printed, textured, or have a film – such as vinyl wallcovering – applied. It is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.   

     Water-resistant Gypsum Board is a gypsum board designed for use on walls primarily as a base for the application of ceramic or plastic tile. It is readily identified by its green-tinted face paper and is commonly referred to as “Greenboard.” It has a water-resistant core and a water-repellent face and back paper; it is generally installed in bath, kitchen, and laundry areas.   

     Gypsum Backing Board, Gypsum Coreboard, and Gypsum Shaftliner Panel are all designed to be used as base materials in multi-layer, solid and semi-solid, and shaftwall systems. Gypsum backing board is used as a base layer for other gypsum board materials in systems or as a base for dry claddings such as acoustic tile. Gypsum coreboard and gypsum shaftliner are manufactured with a type X core, using a specific edge configuration to facilitate installation into specialized stud systems and a type X core.   

     Exterior Gypsum Soffit Board is designed for use on the underside of eaves, canopies, carports, soffits, and other horizontal exterior surfaces that are indirectly exposed to the weather. It has water-repellent face and back paper and is more sag-resistant than regular wallboard. Exterior gypsum soffit board can be manufactured with a type X core and typically has a light brown face paper.    

    Gypsum Sheathing Board is used as a backing under exterior siding or cladding. It has a water-repellent face and back paper and can be manufactured with a water-resistant core. Depending on the thickness of the board, gypsum sheathing board is manufactured with either a square or a tongue-and-groove edge and a fire-resistive core. It generally has a brown or light black face paper.

    Gypsum Base for Veneer Plaster
    has a distinctive blue-tinted face paper that is treated to facilitate the adhesion of thin coats of hard, high strength gypsum veneer plaster. It is produced in sheets that are the same width as gypsum wallboard and can be manufactured with a fire-resistive core.  Application of Gypsum Board   

    A wide variety of gypsum board application methods are available to meet virtually any need in building design and construction. Gypsum board is applied in either single-layer or multi-layer systems to achieve specific fire or sound ratings. Gypsum board is applied over wood or steel framing or furring. It is also applied to masonry or concrete surfaces, either laminated directly or attached to wood furring strips or steel furring channels. Gypsum board ceilings can be directly attached to joists or trusses or attached to furring or grid systems suspended below structural members. Gypsum board is generally attached to the framing with nails, screws, or staples. Although nails are commonly used in wood frame construction, screws are often preferred because they are applied with automatic screw guns, have excellent holding power, and reduce the possibility of nail pops. A combination of nails and screws may also be used, with nails along edges and screws in the field. Staples are used because they are economical and can be quickly applied with staple guns; however, the use of staples should be limited to the base-layer in multi-layer systems or to gypsum sheathing on wood framing. Gypsum board wall and ceiling surfaces are typically decorated with paint, texture, wallpaper, tile, or paneling. When pre-decorated gypsum board is used, joints are generally covered with matching molding or battens; no additional finishing or decoration is necessary. Single-Layer Application  

    • Single-layer gypsum board applications are the most common in light commercial and in residential construction.
    • These systems rely on one layer of gypsum board attached to framing or furring.
    • Although single-layer gypsum board systems are generally adequate to meet most minimum requirements for fire resistance and sound control, multi-layer systems are preferred for higher quality construction and to upgrade beyond the “bare minimums” of many code requirements.

    Multi-Layer Application  

    • Multi-layer systems have two or more layers of gypsum board and are used to meet higher sound and fire resistance requirements or to enhance these comfort and safety qualities beyond minimum code requirements.
    • They also provide better surface quality because face layers can often be laminated over base layers eliminating many or all of the fasteners in the face layer. In addition, face-layer joints are stronger by virtue of the continuous backing provided by the base layers.
    • Nail pops and ridging are less frequent and imperfectly aligned framing has less effect on the quality of the finished surface.

    GYPSUM BOARD TYPICAL MECHANICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES (GA-235-10)  A common misconception is that there are just two basic types of drywall—regular and type X—and beyond this difference, drywall products from various manufacturers are about the same. However, laboratory fire tests by United States Gypsum Company and various independent testing organizations provide strong evidence that there are significant fire-performance differences between drywall products from various manufacturers. It is well known in the construction industry that the single most important characteristic of gypsum drywall is its fire resistance. This is provided by the principal raw material used in its manufacture, CaSO4- 2H2O (gypsum). As the chemical formula shows, gypsum contains chemically combined water (about 50% by volume). When gypsum drywall panels are exposed to fire, the heat converts a portion of the combined water to steam. The heat energy that converts water to steam is thus used up, keeping the opposite side of the gypsum panel cool as long as there is water left in the gypsum, or until the gypsum panel is breached.  

    • In the case of regular gypsum panels, as the water is driven off by heat, the reduction in volume within the gypsum causes large cracks to form, eventually causing the panel to fail.
    • In a special fire test designed to demonstrate the relative performance of different types of gypsum cores (described later in this section), it was shown that in a fire with a temperature of 1,850ºF, a 5/8″ thickness of regular-core gypsum panels would fail in this manner in 10 to 15 minutes.
    • Type X gypsum panels, such as Sheetrock brand Firecode gypsum panels, have glass fibers mixed with the gypsum to reinforce the core of the panels.
    • These fibers have the effect of reducing the extent of and size of the cracks that form as the water is driven off, thereby extending the length of time the gypsum panel can resist the heat without failure.
    • Fire test results indicate that the same thickness of the type X gypsum drywall exposed to the same temperature (1,850ºF) will last 45 to 60 minutes.

    USG has developed a third-generation gypsum drywall product called Sheetrock brand Firecode C gypsum panels that provides even greater resistance to the heat of fire. The core of Firecode C contains more glass fibers than type X—but also a shrinkage-compensating additive, a form of vermiculite that expands in the presence of heat at about the same rate as the gypsum in the core shrinks (from loss of water). Thus the core becomes highly stable in the presence of fire and remains intact even after the combined water is driven off. Tests have shown that this third-generation product resisted the fire for more than two hours, as compared to 45 to 60 minutes for the type X, and 10 to 15minutes for the regular panel under the same test conditions.  

      

    In a future posting we’ll discuss the issues facing the fire service related to the newest generation of impact resistant gypsum board that will restrict or preclude entirely our ability to breach walls in residential or commercial occupancies. Here are  some links and Spec Sheets to look at in advance, HERE , HERE, HERE and HERE  

       

    LAFD FF Glenn Allen Associated Press / February 18, 2011

    References and Links Summarizing the many different types of gypsum board used in the industry, this quick reference gives typical uses of, and the ASTM and CSA standards for, each type. Also included is the appropriate industry standard designation for the installation of each type of gypsum board, along with the sizes and thicknesses generally available.    Download  


      

    APPLICATION OF GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-253-07)    

    This publication describes the industry’s latest recommendations for handling, storing, and installing gypsum sheathing under a variety of conditions. A must for anyone hanging gypsum sheathing or involved in EIFS work.    Download  

     

     FIRE-RESISTANT GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-254-07)  

    This publication describes the advantages, recommended uses, limitations, and properties of gypsum sheathing in exterior walls.    

       Download    

    Gypsum Construction Handbook    

    • Reference guide of construction procedures for gypsum drywall, cement board, veneer plaster and conventional plaster.

    Trade Associations and other Organizations

    • Association of the Wall and Ceiling Industry (AWCI)—Provides services and undertake activities that enhance the members’ ability to operate a successful business. AWCI represents acoustics systems, ceiling systems, drywall systems, exterior insulation and finishing systems, fireproofing, flooring systems, insulation, and stucco contractors, suppliers and manufacturers, and allied trades.
    • ASTM International (ASTM)—Provides a global forum for the development and publication of voluntary consensus standards for materials, products, systems, and services. In over 130 varied industry areas, ASTM standards serve as the basis for manufacturing, procurement, and regulatory activities. Provides standards that are accepted and used in research and development, product testing, quality systems, and commercial transactions around the globe.
    • Ceilings and Interior Systems Construction Association (CISCA)—Association for the advancement interior commercial construction, providing education, technical guidance and related resources. CISCA membership includes over 600 of the leading contractors, distributors, manufacturers and independent manufacturer’s representatives worldwide.
    • Gypsum Association (GA)—Founded in 1930, GA promotes the use of gypsum while advancing the development, growth, and general welfare of the gypsum industry in the United States and Canada on behalf of its member companies.
    • ICC Evaluation Service (ICC-ES)—Provides technical evaluations of building products, components, methods, and materials and issues reports on code compliance to building regulators, contractors, specifiers, architects, engineers, and the public.

    Relevant Codes and Standards   

    Guide Specifications   

      

    Remembering FDNY Black Sunday…Multiple Firefighter LODDs January 23, 2005

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    FDNY: Remembering FDNY Black Sunday…LODD 2005   

    The call had come at 7:59 on a Sunday morning, the day after a January blizzard had shut down the city. There was still more than a foot of unplowed snow on East 178th Street off the Grand Concourse, and some of it was still swirling in 45-mile-an-hour gusts. Wind like that has a habit of working like gasoline on even the tiniest fires.  

    Five trucks from five companies inched through the snow to converge on the tenement, a cookie-cutter version of thousands of other old buildings in the South Bronx. Engine 42 got there first; its men were stretching hoses from their truck and running them upstairs. Ladder 33 got there next, and a number of its men were sent to the third floor, where the fire was burning. The firefighters from Ladder 27 and Rescue 3 had arrived next; they were sent to the floor above the fire to clear it and keep the flames from spreading upward.  

    When the six men got to the fourth floor, they started searching from apartment to apartment, but they’d found no civilians (except the skinny guy and naked fat lady one of the guys saw hightailing it out of there just as they came up the stairs). Now they were in Apartment 4-L, feeling their way along the walls from room to room—six men loaded down with gear, sucking in air from their tanks—and soon they got turned around, lost in the smoke. Brendan Cawley, the probie with just a month on the job, kept seeing padlocks on the doors of every room and was confused; he hadn’t been around long enough to know how many apartments in this neighborhood had been converted into cheap, crowded rooming houses. This place had been chopped up, probably illegally. Random walls and carelessly thrown-up partitions created a maze.  

    The men were trying to make their way to the source of the heat surge, but among the locks and the walls and the smoke, they couldn’t seem to get there. And there was another problem: The men didn’t have working hoses. First, there was a frozen hydrant; then, something seemed wrong with some of the hoses themselves. The six men on the fourth floor couldn’t fight a fire they couldn’t find—and if any fire did come, they had nothing to fight it with.  

    At 8:26 a.m., Curt Meyran, the lieutenant in charge of the Ladder 27 crew, checked in on his radio. He was asked about the status of the fire on the fourth floor. “Slight extension, slight extension,” Meyran said—meaning they still saw just smoke, no fire.“Ten-four,” came the response.Somewhere between 18 and 23 seconds later—still 8:26 a.m., maybe even as the responder was talking—a turret of flame roared up though the floorboards. None of them saw it coming—in an instant, all six were pinned against the windows that faced the back. “We need a line on the floor above,” someone barked into the radio. “We have heavy fire on the floor above. Rescue to Battalion. Urgent.”  

    In the background, another voice—no one’s sure whose—could be heard: “We got no water!”  

    The flames formed a wall between the men and the apartment door. Walking out was no longer an option. Meyran called in a Mayday and he and Gene Stolowski and Cawley stuck their heads outside for air. At the windows next to them were two guys from Rescue 3, Jeff Cool and Joe DiBernardo. They had lost track of the sixth man, John Bellew. It was 17 degrees outside, but even as their faces were freezing, the men felt a scorching heat on their backs. Leaning out, they could see a fire escape two windows away—but it was too far for them to jump.  

    Meyran called in a Mayday at 8:29. Seconds later, DiBernardo radioed an outfit on the roof: “Brothers on the roof, you’re gonna need to send a rope over the side. Roof team—send a rope over the side to the two-four side of the building.” The flames were closer now. Jeff Cool could feel them at his neck. Cool had a wife and two kids. Meyran had a wife and three kids. Bellew had a wife and four kids. Stolowski had a daughter, and his wife was expecting twin girls in June. DiBernardo’s dad was a retired deputy fire chief. Cawley had an older brother who had died on 9/11.    

    Take the time to read both NIOSH reports and remember the sacrafice…
     
    Three veteran FDNY firefighters died in the LODD in Brooklyn, New York and the Bronx on Sunday January 23, 2005, a day that has become known as “Black Sunday” and called one of the saddest in fire department history. Two firefighters were killed and four others were badly hurt when they were forced to jump from a fourth-floor window of a burning building in the Bronx. Later, a third firefighter died after tackling a basement blaze in Brooklyn.Lt. Curtis Meyran, 46, of Battalion 26, and Firefighter John Bellew, 37, of Ladder 27, died after battling the Bronx blaze on East 178th Street in the Morris Heights section.
     
    Three firefighters were in critical condition at St. Barnabas, and a fourth was in serious condition at Jacobi Medical Center. Six Bronx firefighters became trapped in the building while searching for people on the fourth floor. When the fire from the third floor broke through to the fourth, they were faced with a horrifying choice. They jumped out a fourth-floor window, knowing that they would be critically injured.
     
    Firefighters Jeffrey Cool, Joseph DiBernardo, Eugene Stolowski, and Cawley were badly hurt in the Bronx fire. They were trapped on the fourth floor and were left with the life-or-death choice of leaping 50 feet or burning up. The Brooklyn firefighter, Richard Sclafani, 37, died at a hospital after being injured at a two-alarm fire in the East New York section.

    It will forever be remembered as Black Sunday – and now a highly-critical FDNY report into the double-fatal fire reveals how so many things went wrong on that day.  

    Two firefighters died and four were critically injured when fire and smoke in an illegally partitioned apartment forced them to jump from a fourth floor window.  

    Jeanette Meyran, Firefighter’s Widow: “You have to envision that it turned badly in seconds.”  

    The FDNY Internal Report of the event documented details of a long list of mistakes made from the top brass down to the front line. 

    Its key findings include:  

  • Failure to provide firefighters with escape ropes.
  • Failure to update operational procedures.
  • Inadequate training.
  • Failure to communicate level of danger to command.
  • Failure to thaw two frozen hydrants.
  • Water loss in main hose line.
  • Partitioned walls.
  •    

    Audio Radio Transmissions
       

    NIOSH REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONS
     
    Recommendation #1: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for structural fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters operating in hazardous areas have charged hoselines.
    Discussion: It is department policy to initiate an aggressive interior attack (offensive strategy) whenever possible. Fire departments should ensure that a hoseline is in position prior to entering hazardous or potentially hazardous areas. At this point, the hoseline can be charged and entry made. If the hoseline doesn’t charge or flow is restricted, fire fighters will still have time and space to escape.According to Dunn, the most important fire fighting operation at a structure fire is stretching the first attack hoseline to the fire.
    A properly positioned and functional fire attack line saves the most lives during a fire.“It confines the fire and reduces property damage. Searches will proceed quickly, rescues will be accomplished under less threat, sufficient personnel will be available for laddering, ventilation will be effective, and overhaul above the fire room will be unimpeded.”Firefighters should continually train on SOPs including but not limited to establishing effective water supply, proper hose deployment, and advancing and operating hoselines to ensure successful interior attacks.
     
    Refresher training should be provided to all fire fighters on a regular basis or as needed to ensure effective fire fighting skills are maintained.
     
    Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained on the hazards of operating on the floor above the fire without a charged hoseline and follow associated standard operating procedures (SOPs).
    Discussion: The most dangerous location on the fire ground is operating above the fire, especially during operations without the protection of a hoseline. Before operating above a fire, it is a good practice to deploy a hoseline. Where there is risk of extension to concealed spaces, additional precautionary hoselines are needed. According to Dunn, fire fighters are most often trapped on a floor above a fire because they fail to size-up the fire below them.Fire fighters should make certain that they take all necessary precautions and size-up the fire before making entry above it. Fire fighters should determine whether suppression teams are capable of extinguishing the fire and notify command.
    If not, then command should not permit fire fighters above the fire until conditions change. In this incident, operations continued above the fire on the 4th floor after the withdrawal of Engine 75’s hoseline.
      
    Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations provide the incident commander with progress reports.
      
    Discussion: Frequent progress reports to the IC are essential in the continuous size-up and assessment of an incident. Interior crews working in areas not visible to the IC are the IC’s eyes and ears during an incident. Progress reports also provide everyone on the fireground with information on aspects of the incident that relate to their activities (primary search, suppression, ventilation, etc.).
      
    Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that team continuity is maintained during interior operations.
      
    Discussion: Fire fighters should always work and remain in teams whenever they are operating inside a burning structure. Team continuity means knowing your team members and who is the team leader, staying within visual contact at all times (if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of each other), communicating needs and observations to the team leader, staging as a team, and watching out for other team members. Teams that enter burning structures should enter and leave together to ensure that team continuity is maintained. Working in teams and maintaining team continuity provides an added safety net of fellow team members.
     
    Recommendation #5: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for incident commanders to divide up functions during complex incidents.
      
    Discussion: Incident commanders have to address multiple tasks simultaneou
    sly during high stress activities.Incident commanders can only manage so much information and should divide up functions to make the span of control more manageable. During complex events, the IC should assign other personnel to functions such as accountability, radio communications, incident safety, company tracking, and resident evacuation in order for the IC to effectively focus on fire command.
      
    Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that Mayday transmissions are prioritized and fire fighters are trained on initiating Mayday radio transmissions immediately when they become trapped inside a structure.
      
    Discussion: In this incident, there was an initial delay in determining who made the initial Mayday transmission. The incident commander must monitor and prioritize every message, but only respond to those that are critical during a period of heavy communications on the fire ground. A radio transmission reporting a trapped firefighter is the highest priority transmission that command can receive. Mayday transmissions must always be acknowledged and immediate action must be taken. As soon as fire fighters become lost or disoriented, trapped or unsuccessful at finding their way out of the interior of structural fire, they must initiate emergency radio transmissions. They should manually activate their personal alarm safety system (PASS) device and announce “Mayday-Mayday” over the radio.
     
    A Mayday call will receive the highest communications priority from dispatch, the IC, and all other units. The sooner the IC is notified and a RIT is activated, the greater the chance of the fire fighter being rescued. A transmission of the Mayday situation should be followed by the fire fighter providing his last known location. A crew member who initiates a Mayday call for another person should quickly try to communicate with the missing member via radio and, if unsuccessful, initiate a Mayday providing relevant information.
     
    Recommendation #7: Fire departments should develop standard operating procedures (SOP’s) for fire fighting operations during high wind conditions.
    Discussion: Fire departments should develop SOPs to protect firefighters, including using defensive tactics if necessary, during incidents when high wind affects fire conditions. According to Dunn, “when the exterior wind velocity is in excess of 30 miles per hour, the chances of a conflagration are great; however, against such forceful winds the chances of successfully advancing an initial hoseline attack on the structure are diminished. The firefighter won’t be able to make forward hoseline progress because the flame and heat under the wind’s additional force will blow into the path of advancement.” The wind at the time of the incident was gusting up to 45 miles per hour, blowing from the northwest, speeding the fire extension to the 4th floor.Fire fighters encountering high wind conditions should change their strategy. According to Dunn, “the interior line should be withdrawn and the door to the fire area closed.
     
    The officer in command must be notified of the inability to advance the interior attack hoseline due to the strong wind. A second hoseline should be advanced on the fire from the opposite end, the window or door through which the wind is blowing. This method may require the firefighters to stretch the line up an aerial ladder, fire escape or portable ladder. The second attack line will advance on the fire from the upwind side.”
      
    Recommendation #8: Fire departments should provide fire fighters with the appropriate safety equipment, such as escape ropes, and associated training in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely.
      
    Discussion: According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Programs, 2007 Edition, Section 7.1.1, “the fire department shall provide each member with appropriate protective clothing and protective equipment to provide protection from the hazards to which the member is or is likely be exposed.”
    In this incident, aerials and ground ladders were unable to access the rear of the apartment. When fire fighters are beyond the reach of ladders, aerials, or elevated platforms, an option of last resort is a rope rescue. NFPA 1500, Section 7.16 Life Safety Rope and System Components states “all life safety ropes, harnesses, and hardware used by fire departments shall meet the applicable requirements of NFPA 1983, Standard on Life Safety Rope and Equipment for Emergency Services.” NFPA 1983 specifies the minimum design, performance, testing, and certification requirements for life safety rope, water rescue throwlines, life safety harnesses, belts, and auxiliary equipment for emergency services personnel. Fire departments in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely should provide all fire fighters with escape ropes per NFPA 1983 and the appropriate training to effectively utilize their escape ropes during emergencies.

    Additionally,Recommendation #9: Building owners should follow current building codes for the safety of occupants and fire fighters.  

    Discussion: State building codes require that single room occupancies (SROs) in non-fireproof tenement buildings have automatic fire sprinklers in every hall or passage within the apartment and at least one sprinkler head in every room. This apartment building did not have sprinklers. The transformation of the 4th floor apartment into a SRO led to the construction of an interior partition wall that impeded the discovery of the fire and hindered the fire fighters’ searches. It also prevented fire fighters from reaching the rear fire escape, their secondary means of egress.  

    FDNY Report Says “Black Sunday” Deaths May Have Been Avoided  

     Anatomy of a Fall from NY1 

    Anatomy of the Mayday

     

      

    (1) Firefighters Curt Meyran, Gene Stolowski, Brendan Cawley, and John Bellew, all from FDNY Ladder 27, arrive at 236 East 178th Street in the Bronx at approximately 8:05 a.m. on Sunday, January 23, 2005. Firefighters Jeff Cool and Joe DiBernardo, from the FDNY’s Rescue 3 unit, arrive soon after that.  

    (2) With firefighters from other companies already battling the blaze on the third floor, the main site of the fire, Meyran, Stolowski, Cawley, Bellew, Cool, and DiBernardo are sent to the fourth floor to clear it and prevent the fire from spreading. The six men case the area, but their efforts are made difficult by dense smoke and the mazelike structure of the chopped-up tenement building. Because of problems with a hydrant and other equipment, the men are also operating without working hoses.  

    (3) A burst of fire erupts through the third floor, trapping the six firefighters in Apartment 4-L. Their attempts to find a safe way out are thwarted by an illegal partition wall (in red, above) that hampers their efforts to find a fire escape.  

    (4) With the flames inches from their backs, the six men are forced to jump from four windows—a 50-foot drop. Meyran and Bellew die from the fall. They are survived by their wives and seven children, ranging in age from 5 months to 16 years old. The four other men suffer multiple critical injuries, are left with permanent disabilities, and are forced to retire from duty. The four survivors and two widows later sue the city for not supplying the firefighters with personal-safety ropes. Pinning the blame on the partition walls, the Bronx district attorney charges the building’s landlord and two tenants with manslaughter, criminal negligence, and reckless endangerment. Both legal actions are ongoing.  

    No Way Out

      

      

    Then came the transmissions:  

    8:30:43: “Mayday! Mayday 56! Man down, fell out the window!” 

    8:30:48: “Mayday! Mayday!”  

    8:30:49: “Fireman down in the rear! Two firemen down in the rear!”  

    8:30:51: “Two firemen down in the rear—let’s go!”  

    8:30:54: “Seventy-five, put your pumps…”  

    8:30:58: “Mayday! Mayday! Two firemen jumped from the top floor in the rear. We need a…”  

    8:31:09: “Brother in the…”  

    “Oh, man!”  

    8:31:15: “Start a mixer off—we got a whole company in the rear, they had to jump.”  

    8:31:23: “No way, no…”  

    “We got six guys…”  

    8:31:35: “Roof, let the rope down!”  

    8:31:40: “Mayday! Mayday in the rear! We need EMS in the rear.”  

    8:32:20: “One, two, three, four, five, six who jumped in the rear! We need massive EMS here! Massive injuries!”  

    On the morning of January 23, 2005, six firefighters jumped out of four fourth-story windows of a tenement at 236 East 178th Street in the Bronx, falling 50 feet to the pavement. Two of them, Curt Meyran and John Bellew, died from their injuries; another four—Gene Stolowski, Brendan Cawley, Joe DiBernardo, and Jeff Cool—barely survived, sustaining massive injuries of their own that left several of them in the hospital for months and effectively ended their careers. Another firefighter, Richard Sclafani, died at an unrelated fire in Brooklyn that same afternoon, making that day the first since 1918 that men had died in two separate incidents in the city; the dual tragedies have come to be known as Black Sunday.  

    Now the surviving firefighters are telling their version of the story for the first time. To date, the men have spoken publicly only briefly, but because of litigation they’ve filed against the city, they’ve avoided giving a full account of what happened that day. In the past few months, however, the four of them have begun appearing at private firefighter gatherings to tell their story, and three of them sat with New York Magazine for their first extensive interviews, speaking out about controversies that have surrounded the fire for two years. Shouldn’t the department have outfitted the firefighters with personal-safety ropes—a piece of equipment that was once standard issue but was not provided at the time? Is the building’s landlord primarily to blame, for blocking off access to the fire escape with an illegal subdivision?  

    Should the department have kept the six men on the fourth floor that long, given the problems with the hydrants and hoses? Or were the men themselves in part at fault for not making their situation clear to the officers on the ground? The survivors’ stories also reveal for the first time something much more personal: just how deeply the tragedy has affected them and their families. Their lives—once centered around straightforward concepts like action and adrenaline, honor and bravery—are more complicated than they once were. They are heroes, but they are lost.  

    It took the Ladder 27 crew longer than they expected—about six minutes—to make it just ten blocks. The blizzard was part of the problem, as was a double-parked truck on East Tremont Avenue. It didn’t help that they had the wrong address, though that was quickly corrected. When Gene Stolowski saw Engine 42 and Ladder 33 stretching hoses up to the third floor of the building, he knew this one was real. “I think we got something,” he told Brendan Cawley. “Let’s go.”  

    Curt Meyran, Stolowski, and Cawley walked into the front entryway, a wide foyer where they saw the first signs of smoke (John Bellew, the driver, came up a few minutes later). Up they marched, passing the guys from Ladder 33 on the third floor. But already, things had started going wrong.  

    At 8:05 a.m., about the same time that Ladder 27 had arrived, the driver from Engine 42 had reported the frozen hydrant. Outside, firefighters hustled to connect hoses to a booster tank on their truck, while others stretched hoses to hydrants farther away. For a moment, the third floor got water back, then lost it again; then the water came back but the pressure was too weak and the nozzle would shut. Now the hoses seemed to be frozen or ruptured: No one knew which. Without water, the fire was spreading unchecked.  

    When the Ladder 27 crew reached the fourth floor, Meyran told Stolowski to prop open the stairway door with his maul. Meyran, Stolowski, and Cawley slipped on their oxygen masks and walked into Apartment 4-L. Everything was pitch-black—no lights, no windows, nothing but smoke. Clothes and furniture were everywhere. Cawley had to feel his way around so he wouldn’t trip. In one of the bedrooms, he ran into another firefighter, knocking him to the floor; he looked at the uniform and saw a number three. He later guessed it was Jeff Cool, who’d made it upstairs with Joe DiBernardo and others from Rescue 3.  

       

    Attic Fires in Residential Buildings Report

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    The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) has recently issued a special report examining the characteristics of Attic Fires in Residential Buildings (PDF, 884 Kb). Developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center, the report is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).

    According to the report:   

    • An estimated 10,000 attic fires in residential buildings occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 30 deaths, 125 injuries, and $477 million in property damage.
    • The leading cause of all attic fires is electrical malfunction (43 percent).
    • The most common heat source is electrical arcing (37 percent).
    • Almost all residential building attic fires are nonconfined (99 percent) and a third of all residential building attic fires spread to involve the entire building.
    • Ninety percent of residential attic fires occur in one- and two-family residential buildings.
    • Residential building attic fires are most prevalent in December (12 percent) and January (11 percent) and peak between the hours of 4 and 8 p.m. 

    Attic Fires in Residential Buildings is part of the USFA’s Topical Fire Report Series. Topical reports explore facets of the U.S. fire problem that USFA shares with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe. Each report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.   

    • The location of the attic provides many difficulties for firefighters when extinguishing the fire. Careful planning goes into deciding the best way to extinguish an attic fire.
    • Firefighters must decide whether to fight the fire from above or below, both of which present many difficulties. In both instances, firefighters have to consider that roofs or ceilings may collapse. The large amounts of water used to extinguish the blaze causes the insulation and wood beams to become saturated. Firefighters have been known to fall through the roof into the attic or through the attic into the floor(s) below.
    • In addition, not all attics have flooring. If firefighters enter the attic, they must be careful not to step outside the flooring area since they risk falling through the ceiling.
    • The construction of the attic is another area that presents difficulties to firefighters. Older and newer homes are constructed using different techniques. Older homes tend to have roofs that are framed with larger sized lumber, 2 by 6 inches.
    • These attics usually provide a continuous attic space with a peak as high as 8 feet. Conventional attics are not generally compartmentalized like many new home attics. Newer home attics typically employ a truss-framed construction that involves smaller wood boards placed in “A” (or triangular) shapes throughout the attic from the ceiling to the floor.
    • This construction can be difficult for a firefighter to navigate.
    • In addition, wood members in truss-framed construction can conceal fires and make extinguishing the fire more difficult.  In large new homes and multifamily dwellings, many attics are constructed with fire stops, which can be as substantial as 2-hour, fire-resistance rated walls.
    • These help limit the spread of the fire from the attic to surrounding areas.

        

    Attic Truss Loft Space

     

         

    Download the Report Here; Attic Fires in Residential Buildings (PDF, 884 Kb).    

         

         

        

            

       

       

    Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse-PDF Download

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    Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse PDF Training Aid

    The recent post titled: Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse has been receiving a considerable amount of attention as the post makes its way throughout the fire service eMedia sites, links, likes, shares and commentary circles, with over 6,000 views in the past 24 hours on various sites.

    It furthers the premise that I have advocated my entire career and that is the fire service continues to recognize the need for increased knowledge, training, insights and skill sets related to building construction and its diametric relationship to firefighter, command risk management and operational safety.  

    And that we need to learn from each and every incident response,operation and run….Let’s continue to gain learnings and insights from not only this event,  but from the vast resources of published LODD investigations, after-action reports, case studies, near-miss events and close-calls; for each has a lesson that we can use on our next call.

    In order to provide support for continuing training and insight opportunities, I’ve developed a PDF download of the Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse article in its entirety.
    A power point program will be forthcoming to accompany both media items.

    Remember: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

    Chicago Firefighters; Double LODD, 17 hurt during 3-11 alarm Blaze and Building Collapse

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    Chicago fire personnel evacuate an injured firefighter at a extra-alarm fire at 1700 East 75th Street. (E. Jason Wambsgans/ Chicago Tribune)

    From emerging published reports, Two Chicago firefighters died after a wall collapsed during a 3-11 alarm fire at an abandoned South Side commercial building this morning, authorities said. Fourteen other firefighters were injured, including two who were trapped with the ones who died.    

    Police squad cars escorted two ambulances north on Lake Shore Drive to Northwestern as ramps were closed to clear it of traffic, according to fire communications. One of the firefighters taken there has died, sources said. The condition of the other one was not known.    

    A third trapped firefighter was taken to Christ Medical Center in Oak Lawn, where he died.  Late this morning, dozens of firefighters stood at attention, removing their caps and saluting, as the body of their fallen colleague was taken from the hospital and put in an ambulance.  A police escort led the ambulance to the medical examiner’s office    

    The fourth firefighter buried in the rubble, and as many as 12 other firefighters with undisclosed injuries, were also taken to hospitals. Fire officials and sources said 10 were stable and six were taken to hospitals in serious to critical condition, including the two who later diedThe firefighters’ deaths came on the 100th anniversary of a huge fire at the Union Stockyards that claimed the life of 21 Chicago firefighters, the single greatest loss in U.S. history of professional big-city firefighters until Sept. 11, 2001.    

    A dozen or fewer firefighters were in the building when the roof above them collapsed, said Fire Department spokesman Larry Langford. Firefighters searched through rubble for more than an hour as four trapped firefighters were pulled out and rushed to hospitals.    

    “They worked hard, got them out fast,” said Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff at the scene.    

    He said the search was continued, with dozens of firefighters digging through rubble, because of the possibility that homeless people may have been in the building seeking shelter from the cold. Neighbors reported that squatters have been staying in the building, but no others were found in the rubble.    

    The fire broke out about 6:54 a.m. in the abandoned one-story brick building in the 1700 block of East 75th Street.    

    The fire was raised to two and then three alarms to save the trapped firefighters. A “mayday” was called. Firefighters also reported having problems with frozen hydrants.    

    Aerial View of the Buildings along 1700 East 75th Street

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    Informational Update- The two Chicago Firefighters have been identified;

      

    • FF Edward Stringer:    

    • FF Corey Ankum:     

    • According to published reports; Initial incident reports are that FF Stringer and FF Ankum had been on or near the roof of the building in the 1700 block of East 75th Street this morning with other Firefighters when it collapsed. The building had a bow string truss in the rear and a flat roof in front. 34-year-old Cory Ankum from Engine 72, had been on the department only sixteen months.  Corey had previously served as a Chicago Police officer before joining the city’s fire department.  His wife is Mayor Richard Daley’s personal secretary.  He is a father of three children under 12 years old, including a  one-year old child.    

    • FF Edward Stringer, a 12-year veteran of the CFD and is reported to have several grown children and lives alone.  Published sources are indicating, he was working as a “relief Lieutenant”, covering for another Lieutenant for an unknown reason .   

    • Before Stringer went in with the hoseline, the normally-assigned Lieutenant showed up told him he could leave now.  Stringer declined the offer, saying “I got it”, and went inside.  The ensuing collapse killed him and Ankum.   

    CHICAGO FD TERMINOLOGY:   

    HERE IS THE RECORDED RADIO TRAFFIC INCLUDING THE BC TRANSMITTING THE MAYDAY:   

    OFFICIAL UPDATES WILL BE POSTED HERE:    

     

    Some additional Insight Materials for discussion;  

      

    Firefighters and friends stand at attention as an ambulance carrying the body of Corey Ankum leaves Christ Medical Center in Oak Lawn for the Cook County medical examiner’s office. (Zbigniew Bzdak/Tribune)
    • Latest posted reports state Seventeen (17) Firefighters were injured: HERE 
    • Firefighter followed brother into ranks, HERE
    • Firefighter ‘loved his job’; HERE
    • Photos from the scene, aftermath

      

      

    YouTube Preview Image  

     

     

     

    Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

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    UL Ventilation and Fire Behavior Full Scale Testing

    Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

    For many of you that have been following my writings and perspectives on building construction, firefighting, command risk management and operational excellence for firefighter safety have long recognized that I have been promoting and advocating the fact the fireground is changining, our stratgies and tactics demand change adn does the demand for increased knowledge within the areas of building construction, fire dynamics, while integrating the art and science of firefighting. The most recent release of the testing report from Underwriters Laboratories; Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction and the accompaning emphirical data further validates assumptions and presmises that many of us shared based upon field obervations and first hand incident operations related to the dramatic changes being witnessed as a result of operational challenges in a wide varity of occupanies and building types. This material is a must read for all emerging and practicing company and command officers ( for starters) to being grasping the magnitude and extent of quantifiable data that supports the premise that combat fire engagement and suppression operations and the rules of engagement are going to change and that change is fast approaching. Considerations for Tactical Patience and Adaptive Fireground Management are continued themes I will expand upon in future postings….

    Here’s the executive summary of the report and findings from UL. For an download of the entire UL Report, go HERE.

    Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.  There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades.  These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads.  This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.  This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

    Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.  The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.  The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.  The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two-story great room and open foyer.   Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings.  Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.  One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability.

    The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content.  Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

    Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.

    There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.

    This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

    • Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.
    • The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.
    • The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, and 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.
    • The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two story great room and open foyer.

    Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.

    One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability. The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

    The tactical considerations addressed include:

    • Stages of fire development: The stages of fire development change when a fire becomes ventilation limited.
      • It is common with today’s fire environment to have a decay period prior to flashover which emphasizes the importance of ventilation.
    • Forcing the front door is ventilation: Forcing entry has to be thought of as ventilation as well.
      • While forcing entry is necessary to fight the fire it must also trigger the thought that air is being fed to the fire and the clock is ticking before either the fire gets extinguished or it grows until an untenable condition exists jeopardizing the safety of everyone in the structure.
    • No smoke showing: A common event during the experiments was that once the fire became ventilation limited the smoke being forced out of the gaps of the houses greatly diminished or stopped all together.
      • No some showing during size-up should increase awareness of the potential conditions inside.
    • Coordination: If you add air to the fire and don’t apply water in the appropriate time frame the fire gets larger and safety decreases.
      • Examining the times to untenability gives the best case scenario of how coordinated the attack needs to be.
      • Taking the average time for every experiment from the time of ventilation to the time of the onset of firefighter untenability conditions yields 100 seconds for the one-story house and 200 seconds for the two-story house
      • In many of the experiments from the onset of firefighter untenability until flashover was less than 10 seconds.
      • These times should be treated as being very conservative. If a vent location already exists because the homeowner left a window or door open then the fire is going to respond faster to additional ventilation opening because the temperatures in the house are going to be higher.
      • Coordination of fire attack crew is essential for a positive outcome in today’s fire environment.
    • Smoke tunneling and rapid air movement through the front door: Once the front door is opened attention should be given to the flow through the front door.
      • A rapid in rush of air or a tunneling effect could indicate a ventilation limited fire.
    • Vent Enter Search (VES): During a VES operation, primary importance should be given to closing the door to the room.
      • This eliminates the impact of the open vent and increases tenability for potential occupants and firefighters while the smoke ventilates from the now isolated room.
    • Flow paths: Every new ventilation opening provides a new flow path to the fire and vice versa.
      • This could create very dangerous conditions when there is a ventilation limited fire.
    • Can you vent enough?: In the experiments where multiple ventilation locations were made it was not possible to create fuel limited fires.
      • The fire responded to all the additional air provided.
      • That means that even with a ventilation location open the fire is still ventilation limited and will respond just as fast or faster to any additional air.
      • It is more likely that the fire will respond faster because the already open ventilation location is allowing the fire to maintain a higher temperature than if everything was closed. In these cases rapid fire progression if highly probable and coordination of fire attack with ventilation is paramount.
    • Impact of shut door on occupant tenability and firefighter tenability: Conditions in every experiment for the closed bedroom remained tenable for temperature and oxygen concentration thresholds.
      • This means that the act of closing a door between the occupant and the fire or a firefighter and the fire can increase the chance of survivability.
      • During firefighter operations if a firefighter is searching ahead of a hoseline or becomes separated from his crew and conditions deteriorate then a good choice of actions would be to get in a room with a closed door until the fire is knocked down or escape out of the room’s window with more time provided by the closed door
    • Potential impact of open vent already on flashover time: All of these experiments were designed to examine the first ventilation actions by an arriving crew when there are no ventilation openings.
      • It is possible that the fire will fail a window prior to fire department arrival or that a door or window was left open by the occupant while exiting.
      • It is important to understand that an already open ventilation location is providing air to the fire, allowing it to sustain or grow.
    • Pushing fire: There were no temperature spikes in any of the rooms, especially the rooms adjacent to the fire room when water was applied from the outside. It appears that in most cases the fire was slowed down by the water application and that external water application had no negative impacts to occupant survivability.
      • While the fog stream “pushed” steam along the flow path there was no fire “pushed”.
    • No damage to surrounding rooms: Just as the fire triangle depicts, fire needs oxygen to burn.
      • A condition that existed in every experiment was that the fire (living room or family room) grew until oxygen was reduced below levels to sustain it.
      • This means that it decreased the oxygen in the entire house by lowering the oxygen in surrounding rooms and the more remote bedrooms until combustion was not possible.
      • In most cases surrounding rooms such as the dining room and kitchen had no fire in them even when the fire room was fully involved in flames and was ventilating out of the structure.

    Online Training Program

    In order to make the results of this study more user friendly for the fire service to examine, UL developed an online interactive training module that can be viewed by clicking here.  The program includes a professionally narrated description of all of the experiments, their results and the tactical considerations.  Experimental video is used and graphical data is explained in a way that brings science to the street level firefighter.

    UL University On-Line CBT

    Comparison of Modern and Legacy Home Furnishings

    An experiment was conducted with two side by side living room fires.   The purpose was to gain knowledge on the difference between modern and legacy furnishings.  The rooms measured 12 ft by 12 ft, with an 8 ft ceiling and had an 8 ft wide by 7 ft tall opening on the front wall.  Both rooms contained similar amounts of like furnishings.

    The modern room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted gypsum board and the floor was covered with carpet and padding.

    • The furnishings included a microfiber covered polyurethane foam filled sectional sofa, engineered wood coffee table, end table, television stand and book case.
    • The sofa had a polyester throw placed on its right side.  The end table had a lamp with polyester shade on top of it and a wicker basket inside it.
    • The coffee table had six color magazines, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
    • The television stand had a color magazine and a 37 inch flat panel television.
    • The book case had two small plastic bins, two picture frames and two glass vases on it.
    • The right rear corner of the room had a plastic toy bin, a plastic toy tub and four stuffed toys.
    • The rear wall had polyester curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.

    The legacy room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted cement board and the floor was covered with unfinished hardwood flooring.

    • The furnishings included a cotton covered, cotton batting filled sectional sofa, solid wood coffee table, two end tables, and television stand.
    • The sofa had a cotton throw placed on its right side.
    • Both end tables had a lamp with polyester shade on top of them.
    • The one on the left side of the sofa had two paperback books on it.
    • A wicker basket was located on the floor in front of the right side of the sofa at the floor level.
    • The coffee table had three hard-covered books, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
    • The television stand had a 27 inch tube television.
    • The right front corner of the room had a wood toy bin, and multiple wood toys.
    • The rear wall had cotton curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.

    Both rooms were ignited by placing a lit stick candle on the right side of the sofa.  The fires were allowed to grow until flashover.  The modern room transitioned to flashover in 3 minutes and 30 seconds and the legacy room at 29 minutes and 30 seconds.

    View the entire video, or you may also download the video:

    Collapse of Bowstring Truss Roof Seriously Injures Fire Fighter

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    Fire suppression operations on Alpha side prior to collapse. Firefighter is seen in the immediate collapse zone

    The NIOSH Fire fighter Investigation and Prevention Program, Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports  recently released Report # F2009-12 for a Near-Miss event that seriously injured a firefighter  wih significant learnings;   HERE   

    Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.  

    On May 21, 2009, a 36-year-old male career fire fighter was seriously injured while operating in a non-designated collapse zone of a commercial structure when an overhang of a bowstring truss roof system collapsed and struck him. The first arriving company officer reported a working fire in a single story Type II warehouse.  

    The officer looked under a steel roll-up door that was raised approximately three feet off of the ground and saw heavy fire towards the rear of the structure from floor to ceiling. Per department procedures, the first arriving companies went into a “Fast Attack” mode. Crews attempted but were unable to enter the structure because the steel roll-up door wasn’t functioning and the man door was heavily secured.  

    The department’s Deputy Chief arrived on the scene 9 minutes after the initial crew and determined that the fire should be fought defensively, however, this command was not relayed over the radio or verified with all crews. A crew was operating a 2 ½-inch handline just outside the structure approximately 20 minutes after the first apparatus arrived when the overhang collapsed and trapped the nozzleman.  

    Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include:  

    • scene management and risk analysis,
    • a well-involved fire in a structure with hazardous construction features, and
    • fire fighters operating within a potential collapse area.

    STRUCTURE

    The building was constructed in 1954 and was a single-story warehouse of Type IV construction. The dimensions of the building were 110 feet deep by 50 feet wide, covering approximately 5,500 square feet. The height of the building was approximately 20 feet. The occupancy use of the building was commercial and it operated as a warehouse. The building’s structural system consisted of masonry block bearing walls with four heavy timber wood bowstring trusses for a roof system.  

    The heavy timber wood trusses had a 50-foot clear span to the bearing walls and were located 19 feet 9 inches on center. The heavy timber wood truss assemblies were 48 feet 7 inches in depth and were constructed of 4-inch x 6-inch timber cords and webs connected with bolt fasteners with a metal splice plate and bolt configuration at the bottom chord span. Solid 2-inch x 10-inch wood purlins located on 24-inch centering spanned perpendicular to the truss assembly with a ¾-inch plywood roofing deck. The roofing system assembly was exposed and did not have a membrane or other passive fire protection features.  

    Aerial view of Building

    Structural stability to the heavy timber truss units was provided by 2-inch x 6-inch wood cross bracing in conjunction with the stability provided by the wood purlins and plywood deck roofing membrane. The structure contained six skylights that were 3 feet by 6 feet .  

    The overall integrity and structural stability of this type of structural support and roofing system is contingent upon all components maintaining their connections and load bearing or load transferring capacity.  

    The A-side was a non-load bearing wall that showed the traditional arched roof profile that is consistent with bowstring roof construction. The A-side wall also consisted of what appeared to be an overhanging or cantilevered façade that was covered by stucco.  The overhang was part of the original construction that tied back into the bowstring truss system. The fire building was integrated into a block of commercial occupancies so that only the A-side was accessible for interior fire fighting activities.  

    The B-side exposure of the building was adjacent to a parking lot and was of masonry construction without any windows or doors. The C-side and D-side exposures were of similar size and construction and shared party walls between their respective sides. A pre-plan had not been completed for this structure.  

    Similar Interior Construction Features

    At the time of the fire, the building was used as a place to grow marijuana illegally. The man door was heavily barricaded and a false wall was constructed to shield the operations from the exterior when the roll-up door was lifted. The electric service was severed and rerouted to circumvent the electric meter in order to conceal the operations.  

    TRAINING and EXPERIENCE

    The state requires all career fire fighters to complete training equivalent to NFPA, 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications, Fire Fighter 1. The department provides up to 17 months of training to certify fire fighters to NFPA Fire Fighter 1 and 2 qualifications, and a one year probationary period of supervised training for department fire fighter certification. The additional training during this probationary time focuses on driver training, pump operations, aerial ladder operations, and specialized equipment training.  

      

    Alpha Side

    Injured Fire Fighter
    The injured fire fighter had more than six years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training on topics such as: live fire training, rapid intervention crew (RIC) procedures, and hazardous materials.  

    Initial Incident Commander (IC)
    The first due company officer had more than 15 years of experience with the department. Six of those years were as a fire fighter, seven years as a cross-trained paramedic, and 18 months as a lieutenant in an acting and permanent appointment at the time of the incident. The initial IC had completed the department provided five four-day sessions on critical fireground topics that were required for newly appointed lieutenants. This training included the following topics: building construction, incident management system (IMS), size-up, company operations, and rapid intervention company (RIC) operations.  

    Incident Commander (IC)
    The IC had more than 30 years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training in topics such as: health and safety 1, 2, 3 & 4; fire command; fire instructor; fire investigation; fire management; fire officer; fire prevention; incident command; incident safety officer;  and RIC procedures.  

    Incident Safety Officer (ISO)
    The battalion chief who was assigned as the ISO for this incident had more than 20 years of experience and had completed department provided classroom/field training in topics such as: health and safety 1,2,3,and 4; fire command; fire instructor; RIC procedures; hazardous materials; heavy rescue 1 and 2; training officer development; wildland training; and emergency vehicle operations.  

    INVESTIGATION INSIGHTS

    At 0446 hours central dispatch received an alarm for a reported structure fire with fire and smoke showing at a commercial occupancy. Engine 42 (E42) was the first apparatus on the scene at 0449 hours and the officer reported on the radio a working fire in a single story Type II warehouse. Note: The classification of Type II was incorrect. This building was a Type IV construction due to the heavy timber bowstring trusses.   

    The E42 Lieutenant and a fire fighter ran to a steel garage roll-up door that was raised approximately three feet off of the ground on the left of the A-side wall. The E42 Lieutenant looked under the door and saw heavy fire towards the rear of the structure from floor to ceiling. The E42 Lieutenant and the fire fighter attempted to raise the door but could not due to the door being dislodged from its track. Note: The door frame had been compromised by the fire and the tracks were not attached to the wall. They immediately went to a man door to the right of the A-side. It was locked and had heavy security bars. The E42 Lieutenant called Battalion Chief 6 for a truck company to perform forcible entry.  

    The E42 Lieutenant ordered the crew to prepare the multiversal, which is a master stream appliance that can be used on the ground, and 2 ½-inch handlines to attempt to attack the fire through the roll-up door. Note: Per department policy, all first arriving companies and officers go to work in a “fast attack” mode. At approximately 0452 hours Engine 32 (E32) and Engine 17 (E17) pulled onto the road leading to the structure within a block from the structure.  

    Both the E32 and E17 officers immediately radioed dispatch and requested a second alarm due to the heavy fire self-venting from the roof of the structure. E32 proceeded to the front of the structure, dropped off two 3-inch supply lines for E42, and went to hook up to a hydrant to supply E42. E32 used a 10-foot section of 3-inch supply line to hook up to one side of the hydrant. They used another 50-foot section of 3-inch supply line to hook up to the other side of the hydrant.  

    During this same time, at approximately 0452 hours, BC6 arrived on the scene, called to ensure a second alarm, and conducted a size-up of the front of the building and the operations taking place. A division chief arrived on the scene at 0453 hours, assumed incident command (IC), and ordered BC6 to protect Exposure D. The E17 officer and fire fighters [including the injured fire fighter (IFF)] walked up to the front of the structure and saw the E42 and E32 crews attempting to deploy the multiversal and two 2 ½-inch handlines off of E42. Note: The crews were having difficulty due to having to assemble the three 50-foot sections of 2 ½-handlines from a bag stored on top of each apparatus. The crew also removed the multiversal from on top of E42 and placed it on the ground for operation.   

    The IFF took the nozzle of one of the 2 ½-inch handlines and was backed up by an E17 fire fighter. Two additional fire fighters manned the other 2 ½-inch handline and were protecting the D-exposure by shooting water onto the roof from over 20 feet away from the structure. The E17 officer and E17 fire fighter operated the multiversal over 20 feet back from the roll-up door and attempted to shoot water through the opening where the door had pulled away from the wall. The E17 officer noticed that both handlines were ineffective and he went to check on the IFF. The IFF’s handline stream was ricocheting off of the man door and the four windows above it.  

    The L7 crew had assembled handtools on the ground in front of the Command Post. The E17 officer took a saw to the man door in an attempt to open it so that the handline could be effective. He quickly determined that the saw would not work due to the door being so heavily protected. Battalion Chief 09 arrived on the scene at 0500 hours and was designated by the IC as the Incident Safety Officer (ISO) at approximately 0504 hours. He instructed the E17 officer to attempt to open the door with a rabbit tool; the E17 officer informed the ISO he wasn’t sure where the truck company kept it. Immediately after, BC6 ordered the E17 officer to take his saw to the roll-up door and cut an opening for access.  

    He cut a three foot by six foot hole in the door and was attempting to cut across the door when he was tapped on the shoulder by the Deputy Chief which he assumed meant he was to quit. During this time, BC6 had received orders from the Deputy Chief to pull everyone back from the front of the building and to ensure that no one went inside. Note: According to interviews conducted by NIOSH investigators, this is the first time that anyone on the scene communicated the need to go defensive to the initial arriving officers. It was reported to the NIOSH investigators that every officer who reported to the command post was given face-to-face directions that the fire was defensive and that no one was to enter the building. This tactical decision was not relayed over the radio.   

    BC6 ordered the crews from E42 and E17 to set up and direct a master stream into the hole through the roll-up door from a distance. The crews fought fire from a distance with the master stream for several minutes. The IFF and the E17 fire fighter continued to fight fire with the handline moving from the roll-up door to the man door several times. Note: This crew, along with many other members that were interviewed, reported not receiving any orders regarding a defensive operation.  

    BC6 noticed that the fire had compromised an electrical weather head and that the power lines were going to come down soon. He turned to order crews to vacate the area where the power lines would possibly fall when he heard a large crash. He turned back and saw that the roof overhang had fallen onto the sidewalk. The collapse trapped the IFF who was operating the handline into the windows along with the E17 fire fighter. Members immediately rushed to the scene to rescue the trapped fire fighter.  

    • The IC ordered BC6 to command the rescue crew and complete a personnel accountability report (PAR) for the fireground.
    • A full PAR was completed and the trapped fire fighter was removed and transported to a local hospital. 

    Collapse into the street on Alpha Side

     

    NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:  

    • ensure that they have consistent policies and training on an incident management system
    • develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
    • ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning fire fighting operations
    • ensure that the first due company officer establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in firefighting efforts
    • implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that define a defensive strategy
    • ensure that policies are followed to establish and monitor a collapse zone when conditions indicate the potential for structural collapse
    • train all fire fighting personnel on building construction and the risks and hazards related to structural collapse
    • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics

    NIOSH RECOMMENDATIONS  

    • Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that they have consistent policies and training on an incident management system.
    • Recommendation #2: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
    • Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning fire fighting operations
    • Recommendati on #4: Fire departments should ensure that the first due company officer establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in firefighting efforts.
    • Recommendation #5: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures that define defensive fire fighting operations.
    • Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that policies are followed to establish and monitor a collapse zone when conditions indicate the potential for structural collapse.
    • Recommendation #7: Fire departments should train all fire fighting personnel in building construction and in the risks and hazards related to structural collapse.
    • Recommendation #8: Fire departments should conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
    • Discussion: NFPA 1620 Standard for Pre-Incident Planning, states “The purpose of this document shall be to develop pre-incident plans to assist responding personnel in effectively managing emergencies for the protection of occupants, responding personnel, property, and the environment.” A pre-incident plan identifies deviations from normal operations and can be complex and formal, or simply a notation about a particular problem such as the presence of flammable liquids, explosive hazards, modifications to structural building components, or structural damage from a previous fire.
    • Building characteristics including type (or more importantly risk) of construction, materials used, occupancy, fuel load, roof and floor design, and unusual or distinguishing characteristics should be recorded, shared with other departments who provide mutual aid, and if possible, entered into the dispatcher’s computer so that the information is readily available if an incident is reported at the noted address.
    • Since many fire departments have tens and hundreds of thousands of structures within their jurisdiction, it is a challenge to establish an effective preplanning system. Priority should be given to those having elevated or unusual fire hazards and life safety considerations.
    • One tool for fire departments to use in assessing their risks for structures within their jurisdictions is the mnemonic, BECOME SAFE: (HERE) 
      • Building
      • Evaluation
      • Construction/occupancy
      • Operational hazards
      • Manage time and elements
      • Engagement
      • Situational awareness
      • Assessment and risk analysis
      • Fire behavior and effects
      • Evaluate and execute  
     
     

    BECOME SAFE by CJ Naum

    In this incident, the presence of the bowstring truss presented an elevated life safety consideration in the event of a fire. A thorough building inspection and pre-incident plan for a single-story, bowstring truss occupancy in this area could have potentially identified the hazards typically associated with this type of construction such as: ceiling voids, fuel loads, non-permitted renovations, roof construction, HVAC location, and exit locations. Evaluating the construction features and layout of the structure allows the fire department the opportunity to determine a response protocol for the specific identified hazards and to develop fireground strategies and tactics (ventilation strategies, avenues of fire spread, proper attack line selection, etc.) before an incident occurs.  

    The construction features of occupancy (bowstring truss), possible commercial fuel loads and access restrictions suggested large volumes of water would be necessary to fight a major fire at the site. A more complete pre-planning process, involving individual fire companies within their response territory could have noted this information which may have aided the IC in developing a safer and more effective offensive or defensive strategy. In order to facilitate open communication, fire department personnel and building code officials should be cross-trained on each-others’ duties and responsibilities.  

    Fire fighters should have a basic understanding of what a code violation is and how to report them during a pre-plan, and building code inspectors should have a basic understanding of fire fighter safety issues during their inspections. The relay of this information could be used to facilitate dynamic risk management and enhanced command and control. 

    • See Report Insights related to Bowstring Truss Roof Operations on the FDNY Waldbaum’s Fire August 1978; HERE 

      

    Near-Misses, Maydays and Floor Collapses

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    Do you know what's underneath you as you're making entry?

    If you’ve been paying attention to the latest news and on the job reports these past few days, you may have noticed there’s been an emerging trend evident in near miss, close-calls resulting in maydays, RIT deployments and self-rescue resulting from floor compromise and floor collapse. 

    As I was doing some research and posting links related to the first one or two events on Buildingsonfire on Facebook, HERE, it became evident that there was an immediate opportunity to get some learning’s and insights out. If you have a chance head over to Facebook and link into Buildingsonfire and check out the incident links posted as well as some immediate report links.

    I’ll plan to develop some operational safety and awareness insights related to building construction, floor systems and operational integrity in the next few days. I’ll get a comprehensive list of events and incident parameters compiled and posted also.

    In the meantime here are some links I pulled together that you should take the time to read and share with your companies, personnel and staff…..

    This seems like a good time to have a ten minute drill on these events as Operating Expeeince (OE) on floor systems and operational safety.

    Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE)

    Here’s some screen shots from Buildingsonfire on Facebook. Go HERE or follow the link at the left column. Join the growing list of 3500 fans with Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Buildingsonfire.com (fully launching in January, 2011)

    1980 MGM Grand Hotel Fire-Thirty Years Ago

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    Thirty years ago on the morning of November 21, 1980, 85 people died and more than 700 were injured as a result of a fire at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. This was the second largest life-loss hotel fire in United States history. It was determined during the investigation that the fire originated in the wall soffit of the side stand in the Deli, one of five restaurants located on the casino level. The investigators concluded that several factors contributed to the cause of the fire but the primary source of ignition was an electrical ground fault. 

    Once the fire ignited, it quickly traveled to the ceiling and the giant air-circulation system above the casino. In the casino, flames fed on flammable furnishings, including wall coverings, PVC piping, glue, fixtures, and even the mirrors on the walls, which were made of plastic.  

    The fire burned undetected for hours until it flashed over just after 7 a.m. and began spreading at a rate of 19 feet (5.8 meters) per second through the casino. As fire companies and firefighters were arriving, according to published reports, an estimated one-million-cubic-foot wall of flames was rushing through the casino, melting slot machines and sending a cyanide-laced cloud of killer smoke pouring upward.  

    The investigation determined that the rapid fire spread was due to a series of installation and building design flaws. A wire at the point of fire origin that had been improperly grounded could’ve been discovered had the area been inspected. A compressor wasn’t properly installed. A piece of copper wasn’t insulated correctly. A fire alarm never sounded. A stairwell that was a crucial escape route filled with smoke. The laundry chutes failed to seal and defects existed in the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems. All of these factors contributed to the spread of smoke.  

    Photo: AP/World Wide

    This fire provided a wake-up call for the industry to improve fire safety standards in hotels around the country. As a result, hotels today are safer than ever.  

    • About 5,000 people were in the resort when the blaze started to burn in earnest.
    • Many were trapped in their rooms, in the corridors, and in stairwells, and most of the victims died at the scene or in Las Vegas Valley hospitals.
    • Another handful of victims succumbed to fire-related injuries within a year.
    • Fourteen firefighters were hospitalized, most suffering from smoke inhalation.
    • According to the newspapers reports, NFPA’s Fire Investigation Manager, David Demers, concluded that “with sprinklers, it would have been a one or two sprinkler fire, and we would never have heard about it.”
    • An employee cutting through the closed Deli on the way to work was the first to see the fire. The worker, not identified by name in the fire investigation report, called security, then tried to put it out. The worker wasn’t trained and the proper equipment wasn’t there, the NFPA investigation said.
    • A visiting firefighter from Illinois breakfasting in an adjacent coffee shop also tried to help a security guard find an extinguisher to put out the electrical fire, but they couldn’t locate one.
    • A flame front moved into the casino, where the fire gained speed and strength, fueled by more flammable materials, including the highly flammable adhesive used to attach ceiling tiles.
    • Again, sprinklers would have put the fire out there.
    • Without them, within minutes, the fireball tore through the casino, blowing out the doors leading to the valet area.
    • Soon, killer smoke rose through the 26-floor high-rise tower via ventilation ducts.
    • While the lack of sprinklers was a major factor contributing to the severity of the MGM fire, it’s not that simple. Blame also has to be given to code violations, design flaws, installation errors, and materials that made the fire worse.
    • The fire alarms didn’t sound because they were manual and nobody pulled them. However, the disaster might have been worse if the alarms had prompted more people to rush into smoke-filled hallways.
    • Despite the discovery of 83 building code violations, nobody was ever charged criminally with any wrongdoing

     To make matters worse, fire marshals had insisted sprinklers be installed in the casino during the building’s construction in 1972, but the hotel refused to pay for the $192,000 system, and a Clark County building official sided with the resort. Authorities later said the sprinkler system could have prevented the disaster at the hotel, which is now Bally’s Las Vegas Hilton Casino Resort. The fallout was $223 million in legal settlements, in addition to the lives lost.   

    • Construction of the 26-story MGM Grand Hotel and Casino (currently Bally’s) started in 1972 and it opened in December of 1973.
    • There were 2,078 rooms at the hotel and the total area of the hotel and casino was approximately two million square feet.
    • Fire sprinkler systems were not installed in the high-rise hotel, the casino (approximately 380 by 1200 feet, or 450,000 square feet), and the restaurant areas.
    • Only partial fire sprinkler protection was provided for limited areas (arcade, showrooms and convention areas) on the ground level.
    • Where the sprinklers had been installed, they clearly worked. But sprinklers weren’t anywhere near where the fire broke out behind a wall near a serving station at The Deli that Friday morning about 7:10 a.m.
    • The Deli had received an exemption for sprinklers because it was supposed to be a 24-hour restaurant. It was assumed someone would always be there to put out a fire.
    • But then the hours changed and The Deli wasn’t open all the time. It was closed when the fire erupted.
    • The fire, caused by an electrical ground-fault, smoldered for hours before breaking through the wall.

       

    • According to NFPA’s final investigation report , several major factors contributed to the large loss of life in this fire. Among them was the rapid fire and smoke development in the casino in the early stages of the fire due, in part, to the lack of sprinklers and adequate fire barriers.
    • The fire generated massive amounts of smoke that spread up the hotel’s 23-story high-rise tower through unprotected vertical seismic joints and elevator hoistways and the substandard interior stair enclosures and exit passages.
    • In addition, the hotel’s heating, ventilating, and air conditioning continued to operate during the fire, pushing smoke throughout the high-rise.
    • Investigators found no evidence that the hotel had executed an emergency plan or sounded an evacuation alarm signal. Nor was there any evidence of manual fire alarm pull stations in the natural escape path in the casino.
    • The number and capacity of the exits from the casino were deficient, and the travel distances from certain areas of the casino to the exits were too long.
    • Finally, there was no automatic means of recalling the elevators to the main floor during the fire to prevent people from boarding them. Ten of the MGM Grand victims were found in the hotel’s elevators.
    • As a result of this fire, NFPA Life Safety Code® requirements for stairwell re-entry onto building floors if the exit stair enclosure becomes untenable were changed to include three options.
    • Stairwell doors must now remain unlocked on the inside of the stairwell so that people can get from the stairwell back to guest room floor.
    • Or they may be locked, but they must automatically unlock when the building’s fire alarm system activates.
    • Or hotels may use selected re-entry, in which there may be no more than four intervening floors between unlocked doors and signs must be provided to direct occupants to the floors with unlocked doors

    Graphic by Mike Johnson.

      On the night of February 10, 1981, just 90 days after the devastating MGM Grand fire, an arson fire started at the Las Vegas Hilton, which at the time was being retrofitted with modern fire safety equipment. Firefighters, using the knowledge they had learned from the MGM fire, used local television networks to notify people to stay in their rooms and not go out to the halls and stairwells. Because of the lessons learned, only eight people died in this fire compared with the 84 people who died in the MGM Grand fire 

       

       

    Reference Links: HERE, HERE, HERE , HERE and HERE   

    Clark County (NV) Fire Department Report: HERE and Link to FD Page HERE   

    NFPA Summary Report, HERE and HERE  and Article Link HERE 

    NFPA Looking back at the MGM Fire, HERE   

    RELATED NFPA INFORMATION
     NFPA Investigation Report: Las Vegas MGM Grand Fire  

     U.S. Hotel Fire Incident With 10 Or More Fatalities (PDF, 17KB)
     Additional Hotel/Motel Safety Information and Statistics
     Looking Back: The MGM Grand Hotel Fire (NFPA Journal, May/June 2010)
     NFPA remembers the 1980 MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas (NFPA Journal, March/April 2001) 

    Las Vegas Review Journal Media Research: Here   

    USFA Topical Fire Report Series; Hotel and Motel Fires, HERE 

    Lessons from the Past: MGM Grand Fire on Firehouse.com, HERE   

    Las Vegas and Nevada history as told by those who lived it- The MGM Fire 1980. This six part series was broadcast in 2000 and produced by KNPR’s Tim Anderson with support from the Nevada Humanities Committee. HERE   

    These links from the Las Vegas Review Journal Media covered the 25th Anniversary of the event;   

    IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER
    IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Disaster didn’t have to be
    IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Officer recalls eerie scene at burned hotel   

    MGM Grand Fire Photos, HERE   

    Current Data from the USFA:  

    • An estimated 3,900 hotel and motel fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 15 deaths, 150 injuries, and $76 million in property loss.
    • Hotel and motel fires are considered part of the residential fire problem. However, they comprise only approximately 1 percent of residential building fires.
    • Half of hotel and motel fires are small, confined fires.
    • Cooking is the leading cause of hotel and motel fires (46 percent). Almost all hotel and motel cooking fires are small, confined fires (97 percent).
    • Eighteen percent of non-confined hotel and motel fires extend beyond the room of origin. The leading causes of these larger fires are electrical malfunctions (24 percent), intentionally set fires (15 percent), and fires caused by open flames (12 percent). In contrast, 42 percent of all non-confined residential building fires extend beyond the room of origin.
    • While bedrooms are the primary origin of non-confined fires (23 percent), when confined cooking fires are considered, the kitchen or other cooking area is the most prevalent area of fire origin.
    • Hotel and motel fires are more prevalent in the cooler months due to increases in heating fires and peak in February (9 percent).

    Bally's Las Vegas, formerly the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino today

    Taking it to the Streets: The First-Due Officer

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    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum on Firefighernetcast.com

    Taking it to the Streets: The First-Due Officer

    On Your Street, In Your City, Across the Country, Around the WorldTM

    Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for an hour with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll discuss the street level issues affecting the First-Due Officer on Wednesday night November 17th at 9:00 pm EST.

    Regardless if you’re the First-Due Company Officer or the First-Due Commanding Officer, you have a tremendous level of responsibilities and immediate actions that require effective and efficient; identification, assessment, analysis and implementation in the evolving fireground. Or is it just; “pullin’ the line”, or “opening up” or “arriving on scene and assuming the command?”

    The First-Due Officer has many facets, functions and pitfalls. Leadership, determination, fortitude, skills, resilience, strength, conviction, temperance, restraint and the courage to be safe. Or could it be recklessness, ineptitude, incompetent, self-indulging, careless or dangerous: all in the name of tactical entertainment.

    Join in on the live open discussion with fire service personnel from around the country. Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

    • Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening November 17th at 9:00 pm EST, HERE
    • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets Radio Program, HERE and HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2010 All Rights Reserved

    Taking it to the Streets; “Redefining the Fire Ground” Rescheduled

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    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

    Wednesday Night’s Program has been postponed due to Emergent Server issues at BlogTalkRadio.

    The Program has been rescheduled for Thursday November 4th at 9:00pm EDT

    Turn Out to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

    If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

    The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued.  Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

    Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention?  Join the live broadcast on Thursday night November 4th at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

    • For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
    • Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the WorldTM ©2010

    Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

    Taking it to the Streets; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

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    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

    For a Rockin’ Hot Time, Tune in this coming Wednesday night, November 3rd  to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Redefining the Fire Ground”

    If you missed last month’s program on the Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement, with Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA, then you missed out a some great insights and discussion. This month Taking it to the Streets is looking to further the dialog and look at “Redefining the Fire Ground”. Many would argue that the fire ground doesn’t need to be “redefined”; that the way we do business in the Streets is just fine and that the American Fire Service knows how to get the job done, at any cost.

    The recent release of the NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007 has presented compelling data and information that provides further discernments of how our buildings react under fire conditions and how our tactical assumptions and deployments continue to be willfully miscued.  Joining Chris will be Chief Douglas Cline, from the City of High Point FD, North Carolina, a highly regarded national instructor, author, advocate, tactician and incident command.

    Don’t miss out on debating and dialoging the transitional fire ground. It is here and it’s here to stay; you just didn’t know that it was changing. But then again, was anyone paying attention?  Join the live broadcast on Wednesday night November 3rd at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

    • For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
    • Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the WorldTM ©2010

    Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

    NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements

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    Major factors contributing to a rapid spread of fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., on June 18, 2007, included large open spaces with furniture providing high fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows and a lack of sprinklers, according to a draft report released for public comment today by the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The fire trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter fatalities in a single event since 9/11.

    Based on its findings, the NIST technical study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes.1 If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented.

    “Furniture stores typically have large amounts of combustible material and represent a significant fire hazard,” said NIST study leader Nelson Bryner. “Model building codes should require both new and existing furniture stores to have automatic sprinklers, especially if those stores include large, open display areas.”

    Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet). Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.

    Using a state-of-the-art computer model to simulate the fire, the study team found that the addition of automatic sprinklers inside the loading dock could have significantly slowed the fire (which began just outside the dock area), prevented it from spreading beyond the dock, and eventually, extinguished it completely. The model also showed that sprinklers on the loading dock likely would have maintained what firefighters call tenability conditions, the ability for individuals in a fire event to escape unassisted.

    Factors identified as contributing to the fire’s progress include: (1) the high fuel loads—especially furniture—present throughout the building; (2) the lack of sprinklers throughout the Sofa Super Store; (3) the open floor plan of the facility; (4) the hidden build-up of combustible smoke and gases in the area between the drop ceiling and the roof of the main showroom; (5) the non-fire-activated roll-up door that was open between the loading dock and the holding area; (6) the four fire-activated roll-up doors (out of seven) that activated but did not close during the fire; (7) the metal walls in the warehouse and west showroom that allowed heat from the fire to ignite items next to the walls; and (8) the breaking of windows at the front of the store that supplied air to the fire.

    NIST’s team of experts traveled to Charleston to gather data within 36 hours of the Sofa Super Store fire. Using these data and other information collected in the following months (such as building design documents, records, plans, video and photographic data, radio transmissions, interviews with emergency responders, and informal discussions with store employees), the NIST study team developed its computer model to simulate and analyze the characteristics of the fire, including fire spread, smoke movement, tenability, and the operation of active and passive fire protection systems.

    Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:

    • The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
    • During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
    • The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
    • The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
    • When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
    • The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
    • Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.

    The complete draft report is available online at http://www.nist/gov/el

    NIST welcomes comments on the draft report and its recommendations. To be considered for the final report, comments must be received by noon EST on Dec. 2, 2010. Comments may be submitted via e-mail to firesafety@nist.gov; fax to (301) 975-4052; or mail to the attention of NIST Technical Study: Sofa Super Store, NIST, 100 Bureau Dr., Stop 8660, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8660.

    Once the final report is published, NIST will work with the appropriate committees of the International Code Council (ICC) on using the study’s recommendations to improve provisions in model building and fire codes. NIST also will work with the major organizations representing state and local governments—including building and fire officials—and firefighters to encourage them to seriously consider its recommendations.

    Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire

    1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised.

    2.   Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address:

    a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
    b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
    c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
    d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
    e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.

    3.  Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031.

    4.  Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision:

    a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
    b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).

    5.  Comprehensive Risk Management Plans:  NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to:

    a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
    b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
    c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.

    6.  Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities: 

    a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
    b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground.

    7.  Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are:

    a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
    b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
    c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires.

    8.  Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are:

    a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
    b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
    c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
    d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service. 

    9.  Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

    a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
    b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective.

    10.  Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to:

    a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
    b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations.

    11.  Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:

    a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
    b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
    c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies.

    NIST has more than 40 years of experience conducting building and fire safety studies and researching the aftermath of disasters and failures. By understanding the technical causes for such incidents and making the information available to the public, NIST scientists and engineers strive to improve the safety of buildings, their occupants and emergency responders. NIST’s technical building failure and fire studies do not address fault.

  • Volume I: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
  • Volume II: NIST Technical Study of the Sofa Super Store Fire – South Carolina, June 18, 2007
    (Note: The reports are presented in .pdf. To read these files, you can download Adobe Acrobat Reader free.)
  • Statement to the Media Delivered at NIST Charleston Fire Study Press Briefing, Oct. 28, 2010, by Nelson Bryner, Lead, Study Team
  • PowerPoint Presentation Accompanying Statement at Press Briefing
  • Video B-Roll on the NIST Charleston Fire Study (mp4)
  • Graphic Showing Floor Plan of Charleston Sofa Super Store
  • Graphic Showing Smoke and Fire Movement at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Temperature Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • Graphic Showing Oxygen Levels at Six Points During Charleston Fire
  • NIST Residential Fire Study Education Kit Now Available

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    Researchers from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the International Association of Fire Fighters have prepared an educational resource for fire chiefs, firefighters, and public officials to summarize and explain the key results of a landmark study on the effect of the size of firefighting crews on the ability of the fire service to protect lives and property in residential fires.

    The study, Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments, was published by NIST last April. The study is the first to quantify the effects of crew sizes and arrival times on the fire service’s lifesaving and firefighting operations for residential fires. Little scientific data on the topic had been previously available. The research demonstrated that four-person firefighting crews were able to complete 22 essential firefighting and rescue tasks in a typical residential structure 30 percent faster than two-person crews and 25 percent faster than three-person crews.  More information on the study is available at http://www.nist.gov/bfrl/fire_research/residential-fire-report_042810.cfm

    “The results from this rigorous scientific study on the most common and deadly fire scenarios in the country—those in single-family residences—provide quantitative data to fire chiefs and public officials responsible for determining safe staffing levels, station locations and appropriate funding for community and firefighter safety,” says NIST’s Jason Averill, one of the study’s principal investigators.

    The educational toolkit was developed to provide policymakers with a quantitative and qualitative understanding of the research. The toolkit was funded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Assistance to Firefighters (FIRE Act) grant program. The toolkit contains a bound copy of the report, a brochure of the executive summary for use in public meetings, a DVD with side-by-side video comparing the timing of various tasks for different crew sizes, fact sheets on key findings, time-to-task results, and results on the effect of crew size on the time to apply water on a fire, the fire growth rate, and occupant exposure to toxins. A press release describing the study, stakeholder quotes, and public statements by principal investigators are also included in the toolkit.

    The toolkit may be requested by sending email to shildebrant@iaff.org or jason.averill@nist.gov. The partner organizations contributing to this study— the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the Commission on Fire Accreditation International, and Worcester Polytechnic Institute—also will make the toolkits available.

    The Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments, NIST Technical Note 1661, can be downloaded at: (http://www.nist.gov/manuscript-publication-search.cfm?pub_id=904607)

    FireFighter Fatalities in 2009

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    The USFA recently issued the Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the Undited States for the year 2009. Ninety (90) on-duty firefighters from 33 states lost their lives as the result of incidents that occurred in 2009. Pennsylvania experienced the highest number of fatalities (8). In addition to Pennsylvania, only New York (7), North Carolina (6), Louisiana (5), and Texas (5), respectively, had 5 or more firefighter fatalities. This compares favorably to 2008′s firefighter losses where 9 states experienced 5 or more on-duty fatalities. The total number of fatalities in 2009 was one of the lowest totals in more than 30 years of record.

    The unique and specific objective of Firefighter Fatalities in the United States is to identify all on-duty firefighter fatalities that occurred in the United States and its protectorates during the calendar year and to present in summary narrative form the circumstances surrounding each occurrence.

    An overview of the 90 firefighters that died while on duty in 2009:

    • The total break down included 47 volunteer, 36 career, and 7 wildland agency firefighters.
    • There were 6 firefighter fatality incidents where 2 or more firefighters were killed, claiming a total of 13 firefighters’ lives.
    • 16 firefighters died in duties associated with wildland fires, compared to 26 such fatalities in 2008.
    • Activities related to emergency incidents resulted in the deaths of 57 firefighters.
    • 30 firefighters died while engaging in activities at the scene of a fire.
    • 15 firefighters died while responding to or returning from 13 emergency incidents in 2009. This compares to 24 responding/returning fatalities in 2008.
    • 10 firefighters died while they were engaged in training activities.
    • 14 firefighters died after the conclusion of their on-duty activity.
    • Heart attacks were the most frequent cause of death with 39 firefighter deaths.

    Heart attacks were the most frequent cause of death with 39 firefighter deaths. For 33 years, USFA has tracked the number of firefighter fatalities and conducted an annual analysis. Through the collection of information on the causes of firefighter deaths, the USFA is able to focus on specific problems and direct efforts toward finding solutions to reduce the number of firefighter fatalities in the future. This information is also used by many organizations to measure the effectiveness of their current efforts directed toward firefighter health and safety.

    Type of Duty Activities related to emergency incidents resulted in the deaths of 57 firefighters in 2009. (This includes all firefighters who died responding to an emergency or at an emergency scene, returning from an emergency incident, and during other emergency-related activities. Nonemergency activities accounted for 33 fatalities. Nonemergency duties include training, administrative activities, performing other functions that are not related to an emergency incident, and post incident fatalities where the firefighter does not experience the illness or injury during the emergency. Non-Emergency Type of Duty LODD accounted for 36.6% (33) versus Emergency Type of Duty which accounted for 63.3% (57) LODD.

    In 2009, 49 firefighters died while responding to or working on the scene of an emergency. This number includes deaths resulting from injuries sustained on the incident scene or en route to the incident scene and firefighters who became ill on an incident scene and later died. It does not include firefighters who became ill or died after or while returning from an incident, e.g., a vehicle collision.

    Thirty-nine firefighters were killed during firefighting duties; 3 firefighters were killed on emergency medical services (EMS) calls; 5 on motor vehicle accidents; 1 firefighter was killed in association with a weather incident; and 1 was killed during other emergency circumstances.

    Of the 30 firefighters killed during fireground operations in 2009, 19 firefighters died while on the scene of a structure fire, 9 firefighters died while en route or at the scene of a wildland or outside fire, and 1 firefighter at the scene of a vehicle fire. One other firefighter fell ill while at the scene of an alarm in an apartment building and later died from a cerebrovascular accident (CVA) after being transported to the hospital.

    Types of fireground activities in which firefighters were engaged at the time they sustained their fatal injuries or illnesses identified Fire Fighting duty accounting for 79.6% (39), with Motor Vehicle Accidents accounting for 10.2% (5). This total includes all firefighting duties, such as wildland fire-fighting and structural firefighting. There were 19 fatalities in 2009 where firefighters be-came ill or injured while on the scene of a structure fire.

    The distribution of LODD deaths by fixed property use identified residential property use as the leading occupancy resulting in a LODD with 13 events, followed by commercial occupancy use resulting in six events. As in most years, residential occupancies accounted for the highest number of these fireground fatalities in 2009.

    In 2009, there were nine firefighter fatalities where the type of emergency duty was not related to a fire. Four were from motor vehicle accidents, four from EMS incidents, and one fatality was related to an in-clement weather incident. In 2009, 14 firefighters died after the conclusion of their on-duty activity. Six deaths were due to heart at-tacks, five were due to CVA/strokes, and three were due to other causes (one aortic separation, one from asthma, and one unknown).

    Firefighting is extremely strenuous physical work and is likely one of the most physically demanding activities that the human body performs. Stress or overexertion is a general category that includes all firefighter deaths that are cardiac or cerebrovascular in nature such as heart attacks, strokes, and other events such as extreme climatic thermal expo-sure. Classification of a firefighter fatality in this cause of fatal injury category does not necessarily indicate that a firefighter was in poor physical condition.

    Fifty firefighters died in 2009 as a result of stress/ overexertion:

    • Thirty-nine firefighters died due to a heart attack.
    • Eight firefighters died due to CVAs.
    • One firefighter died from heat exhaustion.
    • One firefighter died from a pulmonary embolism.
    • One firefighter died from damage to a heart valve, an acute event caused by the extreme physical exertion. 

    Lost or Disoriented Two firefighters died in 2009 when they became lost or disoriented inside of a manufactured home next to a camper where the fire had originated. The fire-fighters advanced an attack line into the home as other firefighters attacked the fire in the camper. Five to 10 minutes after their entry, the pump operator sounded an evacuation signal, concerned that he was running out of water. When the two firefighters did not emerge from the home, firefighters called out for them, at-tempted to contact them on the radio, and tugged on the attack line to no avail. The firefighters were eventually discovered in the front room of the home un-conscious. Both firefighters were pronounced dead at the scene.

    Caught or Trapped  Three firefighters were killed in 2009 in two separate incidents when they were caught or trapped. This classification covers firefighters trapped in wildland and structural fires who were unable to escape due to rapid fire progression and the byproducts of smoke, heat, toxic gases, and flame. This classification also includes firefighters who drowned, and those who were trapped and crushed.

    • The cause of death for one firefighter was listed as asphyxiation due to probable carbon monoxide toxicity after he had re-entered a large grain silo to assist a fellow firefighter attempt an exit from the structure. Both firefighters subsequently lost conscious-ness. Firefighters on the exterior cut a hole in the metal wall of the bin and extricated the firefighters, saving one.
    • Two firefighters were caught and trapped after they advanced an attack line to the interior of the residence and fire conditions changed rapidly.

    Collapse Two firefighters died in 2009 while they were searching a burning commercial structure and the main floor collapsed trapping the firefighters.

    For a copy of the entire USFA Firefighter Fatalities in the United States in 2009 Report, HERE

    USFA Statistics, HERE

    Adobe PDF, 215 KbU.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study (PDF, 215 Kb)

    Adobe PDF, 2.5 MbFire-Related Firefighter Injuries in 2004 (PDF, 2.5 Mb)

    Adobe PDF, 3.0 MbFirefighter Fatality Retrospective Study 1990-2000 (PDF, 3.0 Mb)

    Adobe PDF, 1.1 MbFire in the United States, Chapter 5: Firefighter Casualties (PDF, 1.1 Mb)

    Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement

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    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

    For a Rockin’ Hot Time, Tune in this coming Wednesday night to FireFighter NetCast.com and Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement”.

    Joining Christopher Naum will be Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department, Deputy Chief John Sullivan, Worcester (MA) Fire Department, along with Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA. We will be discussing the emerging Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations and the new Rules of Engagement. Don’t miss out for what will certainly be an insightful look at what the fire ground is transitioning to in 2010 and beyond. Join the live broadcast on Wednesday night September 22nd at 9:00pm ET, or download the post production podcast from Firefighter NetCast.com.

    In the weeks ahead we’ll be publishing a six month schedule of upcoming guests and topics along within integrating post production podcast resources, training aides and supplemental reference links to make both the live broadcast program and downloads value added.

    Taking it to the Streets is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production.

    • Check out the IAFC Safety Health & Survival Section HERE and the newly published Rules of Engagement
    • For additional Taking it to the Streets programming, HERE
    • Firefighter NetCast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets for; “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Show Link, HERE

    Taking it to the StreetsTM On Your Street, In Your City, Across the County, Around the WorldTM ©2010

    The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries. As part of that effort the Safety, Health and Survival Section has developed “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground. These rules are available in a poster which can be downloaded or ordered from http://fireservicebooks.com

    “It’s Not Something You Do; It’s Something You Are”

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    Remembering the Sacrifices’ of that day in September and all of those who came before us in this the United States Fire Service and those that were with us, in the commission of our sworn duties who didn’t go home…..as we do what we do best, being Fire Fighters.