Operations at 30 Dowling Circle 01.19.2011 Box 11-09

Mark Gray Falkenhan had dedicated his life to serving others. He perished in the line of duty on January 19, 2011 while performing search and rescue operations at a multi-alarm apartment fire in Hillendale, Baltimore County (Maryland). He was 43 years old. 

Firefighter Mark Falkenhan

Previous coverage from 2011: HERE and here, here, here and here

30 Dowling Circle

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 . Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and his partner became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. The second firefighter was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued.

FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

The Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department published the Line of Duty Death Investgation Report of the 30 Dowling Circle Fire recently. The report was written by a Line of Duty Death Investigation Team comprised of departmental members, including representatives of the local firefighters’ union and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association.

• Baltimore County (MD) Fire Department web site HERE
• Department Overview
• Fire Stations
• Fire-Rescue Academy/Training
• Fire Inspections & Code Enforcement
• Fire and Life Safety
• Safety Fact Sheets
• EMS

The following is and executive narrative of  the final report (PDF) on the apartment fire where Volunteer Firefighter Mark Falkenhan sustained fatal injuries. The entire report can be downloaded HERE .

The Baltimore Sun newspaper published an editorial about the death of Firefighter Falkenhan that is required reading; HERE . An excerpt from the editorial reads as follows:

FF Mark Falkenhan

 

The word “hero” gets used too often to describe the most pedestrian of admirable behaviors, from the star quarterback who marches his team for a winning score to the kid who finds a missing wallet and turns it in. But exceptional bravery, special ability, exceptional deeds and noble qualities — those are what define an authentic hero, and Mr. Falkenhan lacked for none of them.

It was not by accidental circumstance or naiveté that he ended up on the third story of that Hillendale apartment complex in the midst of a fire, searching for missing residents. He knew the risks as well as anyone could. But his selfless desire to help others drove him forward into the flames.

That’s what made him exceptional. That’s why his legacy is important. That’s why the community is in his debt.

 Incident Executive Summary

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011, a fire occurred in an apartment building located in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County, Maryland. This fire resulted in the line of duty death (LODD) of volunteer firefighter Mark G. Falkenhan, who was operating as the acting lieutenant on Squad 303 (for purposes of this report, Mark will be referred to as FF Falkenhan). Upon their arrival, FF Falkenhan and a second firefighter (FF # 2) from Squad 303 deployed to the upper floors of the apartment building to conduct search and rescue operations. Other fire department units were already involved with both firefighting operations and effecting rescues of trapped civilians.

During these operations, FF Falkenhan and FF # 2 became trapped in a third floor apartment by rapidly spreading fire and smoke conditions. FF # 2 was able to self-egress the building by diving headfirst down a ladder on the front (address side) of the building. FF Falkenhan declared a “MAYDAY” and implemented “MAYDAY” procedures, but was unable to escape or be rescued. FF Falkenhan was located and removed via a balcony on the third floor in the rear of the building. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued en route to the hospital. FF Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

Baltimore County Fire Department Standard Operating Procedures, Personnel #16, requires a team to be formed, a detailed investigation to be conducted and a report produced for any incident involving a line of duty life threatening injury or death. The team’s objective is to thoroughly analyze and document all the events leading to the injury or death and to make recommendations aimed at preventing similar occurrences in the future. At a minimum, a Division Chief, the Department’s Health and Safety Officer, a member from the Fire Investigation Division, an IAFF Local 1311 union representative, and the Baltimore County Volunteer Firemen’s Association Vice President of Operations (when a volunteer member is involved) is required (see Acknowledgements section for actual team make-up).

The investigating team examined any and all data available, including independent analysis of the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), turnout gear and autopsy report. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) produced a fire model to assist with evaluating fire behavior. Multiple site inspections were conducted. Extensive interviews were conducted by the team which also attended those conducted by investigators from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Photographic and audio transcripts were also thoroughly analyzed. A comprehensive timeline of events was developed. All information used to make decisions regarding recommendations was corroborated by at least two sources.

• In fairness to those units involved in this incident, the investigating team had the advantage of examining this incident over the period of several months. Furthermore, given the size and nature of the event, and the fact that arriving crews were met with serious fire conditions and several residents trapped and in immediate danger, all personnel should be commended for their efforts for performing several rescues which prevented an even greater tragedy.
• The team did not identify a particular primary reason for FF Falkenhan’s death.
• What were identified were many secondary issues involving but not limited to crew integrity, incident command, strategy and tactics, and communications.
• These issues are identified and discussed, and recommendations are made in appropriate sections of the report, as well as in a consolidated format in the Report Appendix.

Some of the issues identified in this report may require some type of change to current practices, policies, procedures or equipment. Most, however, do not. Specifically, the analysis and recommendations regarding Incident Command and Strategy and Tactics show that if current policies and procedures are adhered to, the opportunity for catastrophic problems may be reduced.

• Mark Falkenhan was a well-respected and experienced firefighter.
• He died performing his duties during a very complex incident with severe fire conditions and unique fire behavior coupled with the immediate need to perform multiple rescues of victims in imminent danger.
• It would be easy if one particular failure of the system could be identified as the cause of this tragedy.
• We could fix it and move on. Unfortunately it is not that simple.
• No incident is “routine”. Mark’s death and this report reinforce that fact.

Incident Summary

On Wednesday, January 19, 2011 at 1816 hours, a call was received at the Baltimore County 911 Center from a female occupant at 30 Dowling Circle in the Hillendale section of Baltimore County. The caller stated that her stove was on fire and the fire was spreading to the surrounding cabinets. Fire box 11-09 was dispatched by Baltimore County Fire Dispatch (Dispatch) at 1818 hours consisting of four engine companies, two truck companies, a floodlight unit, and a battalion chief. All units responded on Talkgroup 1-2.

The location, approximately one mile from the first dispatched engine company, is a three story garden-type apartment complex, with brick construction and a composite shingle, truss supported roof. The fire building contained a total of six apartments divided by a common enclosed stairway in the center with one apartment on the left and one to the right of the stairs.

Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta will be used to designate the clockwise geographic locations of the structure, beginning with Alpha on the address side of the building . Entry is gained through the front split-level stairwell by a common entrance door with individual doors leading to each apartment. Each apartment consists of two bedrooms, a kitchen, bathroom, and a living/dining area. There are sliding doors leading to either a wood joist deck/balcony on the second and third floor apartments, or a concrete patio on the first floor apartments. Utilities consist of gas service to the furnace and hot water heaters located in a utility closet in each apartment, with electric service to the remainder of the appliances, including the stove. Interior walls of the apartments are drywall over wood stud construction.

Floor coverings consist of carpeting over tile and concrete on the terrace/first floor. The second and third floor coverings consist of carpeting covering hardwood floors with a plywood subfloor. Interior doors are hollow wood construction. The door to the common hallway is of solid wood construction. The sliding doors to the deck/patio area are glass.

Building Construction

The development and construction of the Towson Crossing Apartments began in the early 1980’s. The buildings are rated in the existing building code for occupancy as Residential 2 (R2). The building code would describe the construction type as Type III. This construction type includes those buildings where the exterior walls are of non-combustible materials and the interior building elements are of any material permitted by the building code.

Building Construction and Features

The subject apartment building, 30 Dowling Circle, is a three story, middle of the group, apartment building constructed on a reinforced concrete slab. The Alpha and Charlie exterior walls are wood framed construction with brick veneer attached by brick ties. The Bravo and Delta exterior walls are block masonry construction and separate adjoining apartment buildings. The interior partition walls consist of wooden 2″x4″ wall studs covered with sheetrock. Paper faced insulation is found between the exterior walls, ceilings and party-walls that separate the apartments.

The apartment building contains six individual apartment units, which are approximately 1000 square feet in size per apartment unit. Two separate units are located on each floor and consist of two bedrooms, a living area, a dining area, a kitchen, and a bathroom. A utility closet is located in each of the living areas. The closet is located along the Alpha wall, and contains the water heater and furnace.

The building is not equipped with an automatic fire suppression system. Smoke detectors were noted; however, it is unknown if they were operational at the time of the fire. A fire extinguisher was noted on the landing between the second and third floor levels of the building.

Topography

From side Alpha the building has two and a half stories above grade while side Charlie is three stories above grade.

The first floor of the building is approximately five feet below ground level with a 20 foot set back from the apartment building parking lot. Side Charlie of the building is at ground level but slopes upward approximately 8 feet with a set-back of 110 feet from the rear alley.

Roof

The roof is constructed of a lightweight truss assembly consisting of 2″x6″ stringers connected by gusset plates. The truss assembly is covered with 5/8 inch plywood and asphalt shingles.

Floor and Ceiling

The floor assembly consists of 2×10 inch floor joists covered by plywood, wooden tongue and groove planking and finished with carpet. The joists run from Alpha to Charlie and are supported by the interior bearing walls. The kitchen floors in all of the units are covered with vinyl tile.

The ceilings throughout the building are sheetrock nailed to the floor joists of the  apartment above with the exception of the third level in which the sheetrock is nailed to the roof joists.

Balconies

The balconies are located on side Charlie of the building. The balconies located on levels two and three consist of 5/4″ deck boards over 2″x10″ wooden joists. The joists are cantilevered off of the floor/ceiling assemblies of levels one and two. The first floor balconies are made of concrete and are at ground level. All balconies are accessible through a single pane sliding glass door located in each apartment.

 Incident Overview

The first arriving engine, E-11, was staffed with a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. Upon arrival at 1820 hours, the Captain gave a brief initial report describing a three story garden apartment with smoke showing from side Alpha: “The Captain of E-11 will have Command and we are initiating an aggressive interior attack with a 1 ¾” hand line”. Command also instructed the second due engine to bring him a supply line from the hydrant. 

A female resident (victim # 1) appeared in a third floor apartment window, Alpha/Bravo side (Apt. B-1), yelled for assistance, and threatened to jump. Smoke or fire was visible from any of the third floor windows. At 1823 hours, Command advised Dispatch that he had a rescue and that he was establishing Limited Command. Fire Dispatch was in the process of upgrading the response profile to an apartment fire with rescue when the responding Battalion Chief requested that the fire box be upgraded to a fire rescue box. While the Firefighter and Lieutenant prepared for entry into the building, the Captain and Driver/Operator extended a ladder to the 3rd floor apartment window and rescued the resident. The first attempt by the Firefighter and Lieutenant to make entry into the side Alpha entrance was unsuccessful due to the extreme heat and smoke conditions.

Initial Arrival Conditions

The second due engine, E-10, arrived at 1823 with staffing of a Captain, Lieutenant, Driver/Operator, and a Firefighter. At 1823, E-10’s crew brought a 4″ supply line to E-11 from the hydrant at Deanwood Rd. and Dowling Circle and assisted the first-in crew with fire attack.

• The Captain from E-10 conferred with Command and was instructed to advance a second 1 ¾” hand line.
• The window to the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2) was removed, and the second 1 ¾” line was advanced to the building by the crew of E-10.
• Fire attack was initiated through the removed window. At 1827, Command requested a second alarm.

At this time, heat and smoke conditions just inside the front door improved enough to allow the Firefighter and Lieutenant from E-11 to make entry through the front door and into the stairwell. There they encountered heavy, thick black

smoke and high heat conditions coming up the stairs from the terrace level apartment. The Lieutenant reported that the doorway to the first floor apartment was orange with fire and he had to fight his way through heavy heat and smoke conditions to attack the fire in the first floor right apartment (Apt. T-2). Entry was made approximately 3 feet into the doorway when the Firefighter’s low air alarm began to sound, and he exited the building. A member from E-10’s crew replaced the Firefighter from E-11 on the hose line.

At the same time, the Captain from E-11 proceeded to the rear of the structure to complete his initial 360 degree size up. He noted that there was fire emanating from the open sliding doors on the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2), extending to the balcony above. E-1, staffed by a Captain, Driver/Operator, and two Firefighters arrived and completed the hookup of the supply line that had been laid to the hydrant by E-10. The rest of Engine 1’s crew grabbed tools and an extension ladder and reported to the Charlie side of the building.

Personnel stated that at this point fire conditions seemed to improve, suggesting that crews were making progress extinguishing the fire. (The first arriving attack crew reported that they were able to see apparatus lights through the sliding doors on Charlie side, which indicated to them that smoke and fire conditions were improving.)

Truck 1, a tiller unit staffed by a Lieutenant, two Driver/Operators, and a Firefighter, arrived on side Alpha and immediately began search and rescue operations. Windows on the second floor Alpha/Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2) were vented and ladders were thrown to gain access. T-8 arrived at the alley on side Charlie. E-1 extended a ground ladder to the third floor balcony on the Charlie/Bravo side of the structure (Apt. B-1), and made access to the apartment to search for additional victims.

• They noted fire venting from the first floor Charlie/Delta apartment (Apt. T-2) out of the sliding glass doors progressing upwards towards the balcony on the second floor. Upon entering the apartment, they conducted a primary search and noted minimal heat with light smoke conditions.
• The crew accessed the hallway via the apartment entry door and noticed an increase in the temperature and the amount of smoke.
• They immediately closed the door and exited the apartment via the ground ladder.
• Upon exiting the apartment, E-1’s crew observed E-292 on the scene with a hand line extending into the apartment of origin, (first floor, Charlie/Delta side, Apt. T-2). The officer on E-1 noted white smoke coming from the unit.

Having already laid a supply line from the intersection of the alley and Deanwood Road, E-292’s crew extended a 1 ¾” hand line into the apartment of origin. Moderate fire conditions with zero visibility were encountered, and they reported feeling a great deal of heat on their knees as they crawled through the apartment.

The Lieutenant and the Firefighter from Truck-1 entered Apartment A-2 via a second floor bedroom window (Alpha/Delta side) and began a search for additional victims. As they traversed the living room area they found an unconscious male resident (victim #2). At 1836 hours, the Lieutenant notified Command via an urgent transmission that a victim had been located and they needed assistance with evacuation. The Lieutenant and Firefighter noted a small fire in the rear corner near the victim as they exited the room. The crew returned to the bedroom from which they had entered and closed the door behind them. Victim #2 was then evacuated from the apartment via a ground ladder through the bedroom window, and transferred to EMS personnel on side Alpha.

Preflashover conditions Alpha Side 18:37 hours

At 1831 hours, Squad 303, a unit staffed by a Driver/Operator, Firefighter Falkenhan (acting Officer in Charge), and 3 other Firefighters had arrived at the Alpha side of the building. Firefighter Falkenhan and two crew members grabbed their tools and immediately entered the building. One Firefighter (Firefighter #1) proceeded to the terrace floor apartment to assist crews with fire attack. Firefighter Falkenhan and the other Firefighter (Firefighter #2) proceeded to the second floor

Bravo side apartment (Apt. A-1) to search for additional victims. They forced the door to the second floor apartment and conducted their search. Finding no one, they reported to Command that they had encountered high heat in the apartment and at 1838 hours, inquired as to which apartment victim #2 had been found. Firefighter Falkenhan advised Command that he and his fellow Firefighter were proceeding to the third floor to continue their search.

At 1840 hours, Battalion Chief 11 (BC-11) arrived on the scene, performed a face-to-face pass on with the Captain on Engine 11, and assumed Command. BC-11 initially observed limited smoke conditions, indicating to him that crews had made progress in extinguishing the fire.

18:41 hours

Meanwhile, the Lieutenant and Firefighter from T-8 entered the second floor apartment that S-303 had just searched (Apt. A-1, second floor, Bravo side). They proceeded through the apartment and went across the hallway to Apartment A-2 where Truck-1 had just made their rescue (second floor, Delta side).

The Lieutenant noted smoky conditions, and saw that the sliding doors to the rear of the apartment were open, and saw a small fire in the rear of the apartment to the left of the open doors. On their way back to their point of entry, T-8’s crew discovered an unconscious female victim (victim #3). At 1837 hours, T-8 attempted to reach Command via radio and was covered by inaudible radio traffic. Dispatch was able to receive the radio transmission from T-8, and advised Command that another victim had been located on the second floor.

• At this point, the crew from S-303 had completed their search of the third floor Bravo side apartment (Apt. B-1).
• Firefighter Falkenhan and Firefighter #2 were able to look out of the sliding doors on side Charlie down to the first floor apartment, Apt. T-2 (Charlie/Delta side) and could see fire.
• Smoke conditions on the third floor were light enough to walk upright in a somewhat crouched position.
• The crew returned to the hallway, forced open the door to the third floor Charlie/Delta side apartment, Apt. B-2, and made entry.
• Firefighter #2 walked down the hallway to the bedroom on the right while Firefighter Falkenhan searched to the left. After checking the bedroom, Firefighter #2 stated that he heard something behind him and turned to see fire in the hallway.

As the crew from S-303 searched the third floor Delta side apartment (Apt. B-2), The Lieutenant and Firefighter from T-8 were attempting to remove victim #3 from the second floor Delta side apartment (Apt. A-2). As they prepared to move their patient, fire conditions changed suddenly.

The Lieutenant from T-8 observed fire, “…rolling over our heads and out of the apartment door.” An immediate increase in heat conditions was noted. Upon exiting the apartment, T-8’s crew described a “tunnel of fire” coming out of the apartment and into the hallway. At 1841 hours, a radio transmission was made by an unknown source that heavy fire was observed in the hallway through a window at the stairwell landing.

At the same time, (1841) one minute after his arrival, Battalion Chief-11 (Command) noted heavy black smoke coming from the building and observed a “flash” through a second floor window. Command immediately ordered an evacuation of the building. Dispatch sounded the evacuation tones over the radio, and repeated the order to evacuate. Engines on the scene sounded their air horns to indicate that the order to evacuate had been given.

Firefighter #2 from S-303 reported hearing the engines on the fire ground sound their air horns, indicating to him that he needed to leave the building. Smoke conditions in the apartment had changed to thick black smoke, and the fire intensified, blocking his means of egress from the bedroom.

Realizing that he needed to get out of the apartment quickly, Firefighter#2 crawled to a window on the Alpha side of the bedroom and signaled Firefighters below with his hand light to move a ladder to the window. Crews immediately moved the ladder, and at 1841, Firefighter#2 dove headfirst out of the window and down the ladder, where he was assisted by crews working on the exterior of the building.

• At 1841, Firefighter Falkenhan declared, “Emergency” on his radio, and repeated the same seven seconds later.
• Command immediately queried S-303 for his location and the transmission “I’m down to the floor, heavy fire” was heard. At 1842 hours, Dispatch sounded emergency tones and restricted the Talkgroup to communications only between S-303 and Command.
• Seconds later Firefighter Falkenhan again keyed up his portable radio and advised “…trapped on the 3rd floor, heavy fire on the Alpha/Bravo.”
• Fourteen seconds later he advised “I hear crew members, the third, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY.”
• Command notified Dispatch, “We have a MAYDAY” and was interrupted by a transmission from Firefighter Falkenhan, “urgent.”
• Command made several attempts to contact Falkenhan to ascertain his location and determine resources needed (Location Unit Name Assignment Resources) for rescue.

Upon hearing the MAYDAY, crews on side Charlie threw multiple ladders to the third floor balcony to assist with rescue.

Heavy heat, smoke, and fire conditions made rescue difficult, but Firefighter Falkenhan was located and removed from the apartment via the balcony to the extended aerial ladder from T-8. He was unconscious and unresponsive at this time. Resuscitative efforts began immediately upon removal from the balcony, and continued enroute to the hospital. Firefighter Falkenhan succumbed to his injuries and was pronounced deceased at the hospital.

Consolidated List of Recommendations

Crew Integrity

1. Company officers shall ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times by all personnel operating in an IDLH environment. 2. No personnel shall operate in an IDLH environment without a portable radio.

MAYDAY

1. If possible, the firefighter should activate his/her Emergency button on the portable radio. 2. Once personnel have called a MAYDAY and provided the information needed (LUNAR), they will activate their PASS Device manually and intermittently.

Incident Command

1. Tactical Operations Manual 07 allows Incident Commanders the flexibility to adapt to fast-moving and complex incidents. When re-assuming command, the IC must be identified (verbally through Fire Dispatch) to allow units involved and responding to know who is in command.

2. Incident Commanders must understand that an early initial 360° would give the IC the information needed to develop effective strategy and tactics for incident mitigation.

3. Additional arriving units must give the IC an updated report on fire conditions when noticeably different than those announced in the Brief Initial Report.

4. Arriving units should prompt the IC to assign them supervision of a division when conditions warrant such action.

5. The IC must ensure that all division and group supervisors are properly deployed and verbalize same on the radio for Dispatch and units involved on the incident.

6. Reinforce the importance of the ICS and its functional components for all officers.

7. Ensure a manageable span-of-control is maintained throughout the incident.

8. Evaluate the efficiency of command and control as incidents escalate.

9. A Rapid Intervention Team is a vitally important part of the ICS and its assignment should not be overlooked.

Strategy and Tactics

1. Use caution when passing a hydrant that is in your direction of travel and close to the fire building in an attempt to get a closer one.

2. Consider having the initial backup line proceeding into the same point of entry as the initial crew operating in the IDLH environment. Doing this allows for the line to also aid in protecting the common stairwell (i.e. fire extension/protection for egress). Deploy a third line if needed into another point of access.

3. Consider dialing nozzles up to higher gallons per minute for large structures such as apartment buildings.

4. Consider utilizing a 2-1/2″ attack line for fire attack.

5. The current SOP should be modified to state that when the initial Incident Commander feels that the incident has stabilized to a point where there is no longer a need for him/her to be directly involved with incident operations, a notification through Dispatch shall be made to inform crews on and en route to the scene.

6. The Department should develop training to ensure that Incident Commanders relay changes in modes of operations.

7. Consider attacking fires from other sides of the structure that are on grade.

8. Consider the use of “door control” for protection during search and rescue and exposure protection

9. When deviations to initial orders are made, they must be communicated to Command.

10. IC should consider setting up a division supervisor with the first arriving officer to balance his/her span-of-control early into the incident.

11. Command should initiate group and division supervisors early into an incident and use them to reduce his/her span-of-control. Communicate Conditions, Actions, Needs (CAN) reports early and often.

12. When units are the initial crews deployed to a geographic location, consideration should be given to “prompt” Command to make them a division supervisor (in the absence of direction from Command).

13. Units should request resources, or supply their own as necessary to support the operations that they are undertaking.

14. When given a division assignment, “step back” to take in the overall picture and communicate progress reports to Command.

15. Be clear and concise when setting up division assignments.

16. Utilize the division supervisors for incident operations once assigned.

17. Training on effective use of interior doors to control fire spread should be promoted throughout the department.

18. Consider removing common stairwell windows earlier in fire ground operations when appropriate.

19. While performing operations above the fire, notify Command of changing conditions and immediately request resources to support your function.

20. Set up a command post as early as possible to aid in deploying and accounting for resources as they arrive on the fire ground.

21. Notify Command when entering an IDLH.

22. Request resources to support functions.

23. Set up divisions and groups early to aid in managing the strategic priorities.

24. Be clear in communicating strategy and tactics to companies involved in operations.

25. Command should make it a priority to deploy attack lines on all floors to support the operations of crews working in the area.

Communications

1. A rubberized cover for the radio speaker microphone should be tested by communications and field personnel. This device will cover the push-to-talk (PTT) button and will increase the pressure required for activation. If proved effective, this cover will decrease the likelihood of an accidental activation of the PTT button during vigorous fire ground activity.

2. Continuing study should occur to evaluate methods to control inadvertent radio interference from all units (on the scene, responding, or monitoring) during incident operations. Review PTT logs to identify sources of communications interference.

3. As a result of the investigation, PTT log files will now be saved for 25 days.

4. Fire Communications and field personnel will develop and distribute a mandatory training program outlining proper radio procedures including the importance of radio discipline, MAYDAY procedures, and the procedure for establishing a Command restricted talk group during critical operations.

5. All personnel engaged in operations in an environment immediately dangerous to life and health shall carry a portable radio.

6. The aforementioned mandatory training program shall stress the importance of giving regular updates to Command regarding the extent and location of the fire and other pertinent information.

Recommendations PDF File: HERE

References

• Tactical SOP 07 Incident Command System
• Tactical SOP 08 Fireground Operations
• Tactical SOP 09 MAYDAY Procedures
• Tactical SOP 18 Rapid Intervention Team

Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse

Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building.

Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement.

The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.  

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

• Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
• Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
• Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
• Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
• Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
• Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
• Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
• Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
• Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
• Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
• Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
• Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.

The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.

There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.

This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.

• USFA Report; HERE
• NFPA Summary; HERE
• NFPA Report Order; HERE 
• Issues related to recent trends in floor collapse incidents, HERE

2010 Fire Series

U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) issued the 2010 Fire Estimate Summary Series which presents basic information on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in USFA’s National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). The data summary series was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with the American public, fire departments, and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.

Direct Links to the USFA:

• http://www.usfa.fema.gov/media/press/2011releases/120511.shtm
• http://www.usfa.fema.gov/statistics/estimates/index.shtm

Information from the USFA web site, HERE

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Estimates

Fire Estimate Summaries present basic data on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in the U.S. Fire Administration’s (USFA’s) National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). Each Fire Estimate Summary addresses the size of the specific fire or fire-related issue and highlights important trends in the data.¹

Residential Building Estimates

Definition of Residential Building

A structure is a constructed item of which a building is one type.

The term residential structure commonly refers to buildings where people live. To coincide with this concept, the definition of a residential structure fire includes only those fires confined to an enclosed building or fixed portable or mobile structure with a residential property use.

Such fires are referred to as residential buildings to distinguish these buildings from other structures on residential properties that may include fences, sheds, and other uninhabitable structures.

Fire Estimate Summaries of Residential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)

Residential Building Fires (2006-2010)

Residential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)

Nonresidential Building Estimates

Definition of Nonresidential Building
Nonresidential buildings are a subset of nonresidential structures and refer to buildings on nonresidential properties. Buildings include enclosed structures, subway terminals, underground buildings, and fixed portable or mobile structures.

• The term nonresidential buildings refers to those nonresidential structures that are enclosed.
• Nonresidential buildings include assembly, eating and drinking establishments, educational facilities, stores, offices, basic industry, manufacturing, storage, detached garages, outside properties, and other nonpermanent residential buildings.
• The term nonresidential also includes institutional properties such as prisons, nursing homes, juvenile care facilities, and hospitals, though many people may reside there for short (or long) durations of time.

Fire Estimate Summaries of Nonresidential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)

Nonresidential Building Fires (2006-2010)

Nonresidential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)

¹ Fire Estimate Summaries are based on the USFA’s national estimates methodology. The USFA is committed to providing the best and most current information on the United States’ fire problem and, as a result, continually examines its data and methodology. Because of this commitment, changes to data collection strategies and estimate methodologies occur, causing estimates to change slightly over time. Previous estimates on specific issues (or similar issues) may have been a result of different methodologies or data definitions used and may not be directly comparable to current estimates.

Related Topics

• National Fire Protection Association Estimates
• USFA Residential and Nonresidential Fire Estimate Summaries, 2003-2009 (ZIP, 3.8 Mb – This archive contains files in PDF and XLSX formats.)
• USFA Residential and Nonresidential Fire Estimate Summaries, 2003-2008 (ZIP, 3.8 Mb – This archive contains files in PDF and XLSX formats.)

Links of Interest

• National Fire Protection Association
• World Fire Statistics Centre
• National Center for Health Statistics
• National Center for Injury Prevention and Control

Click charts below to enlarge.

Residential Building Fire Trends: Fires & Deaths

Residential Building Fire Trends: Injuries & Dollar Loss

Residential Building Fires: Causes Of Fires & Deaths

Residential Building Fires: Causes Of Injuries & Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends: Fires & Deaths

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends: Injuries & Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fires: Causes Of Fires & Dollar Loss

State investigators have cited the San Francisco Fire Department for “serious” worker safety violations in the deaths of two firefighters killed battling a Diamond Heights house fire in June. Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE  and HERE.

 Firefighters lost track of Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, after they went into the four-level home at 133 Berkeley Way on June 2 and failed to respond quickly to the men’s last radio communication, investigators with the state Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health said in a report issued Monday.

In recommending that the Fire Department be fined $21,000, the state investigators also said the department had violated state rules requiring that two firefighters be designated outside to assist any two firefighters who venture into a life-threatening environment.

Only one firefighter from Perez and Valerio’s engine company – the first on the scene – was available to come to their help during the blaze, the investigation found.

The state also cited the Fire Department for an incident – evidently before the fatal flareup – in which an unidentified battalion chief ventured into the burning building alone, without keeping in contact with Perez and Valerio. That was also deemed a serious violation of safety rules.

“These are serious in that they had protocols in place, but they weren’t following them,” said Erika Monterroza, spokeswoman for the worker safety agency. “There’s no question that a lack of communications was a big issue here. The investigator found there was a breakdown there.”

Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White said the department would appeal the findings. She said state officials have told her commanders that the violations fell short of finding the department’s actions responsible for the two firefighters’ deaths. “None of the citations involved a direct cause of the line-of-duty deaths,” Hayes-White said. Monterroza confirmed that, saying the exact circumstances of the firefighters’ deaths could not be determined.

Valerio, Perez and a third member of Engine Company 26 in Diamond Heights were the first firefighters to arrive at the mid-morning blaze, which started when a sparking electrical outlet set curtains on fire.

The third firefighter manned the pumper hose while Valerio and Perez went inside to fight the fire, but the safety regulations require a fourth firefighter to be available outside to assist.

A scene commander, identified by firefighters as Battalion Chief Thomas Abbott, ordered a crew from Engine Company 24 to back up Valerio and Perez inside the building. For several minutes, however, scene commanders tried to find the Engine 26 firefighters, without success.

There was an unspecified gap between that last communication and any effort by firefighters to respond over the radio or track down the men, the state investigation found.

The reports goes on to state that Hayes-White said the department’s investigative report – still in draft form – concluded that the fire had melted one of the firefighters’ microphone cords, cutting off communications. She said any delay in firefighters’ response would be addressed in the final report.

Firefighters ultimately found Perez and Valerio in a landing area and carried the injured men outside. Perez was pronounced dead at San Francisco General Hospital, and Valerio died there two days later.

The state probe also faulted the actions of the unnamed battalion chief who went into the building “alone and also did not remain in contact with the firefighters who were inside.”

Hayes-White said the battalion chief had gone inside only briefly, had seen Perez and Valerio alive and had never been out of other firefighters’ view.

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/02/BANQ1M7JBO.DTL#ixzz1fUEug7hu

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

• 2nd San Francisco Firefighter Dies After Diamond Heights Fire
• San Francisco FD: The Diamond Heights Fire Updates
• Flags at the NFFF Memorial; SFFD LODD

 A video clip of a structure fire occurring in a single family residential occupancy shows, in the first few frames a back draft occurring per-arrival of fire services. It’s apparent there is a developing and progressing fire in the Charlie division which may have originated in the, or vicinity of the detached garage (B-C) which had a breezeway connected to the main house.  

Alpha Street View

The large volume hip style (concealed space) roof may have become rapidly charged with elevated temperatures, superheated gases, products of combustion and possibly the initial stages direct flame extension through the eaves and into the truss loft.  Incident scene operations photos depict an engineered structural roof system.

Aerial View- Divisions

Building Profile

• Single family (SFD), Residential Occupancy
• Built: 1981
• 2, 263  Sq. Ft.
• 4 Bedrooms
• 2 Bathrooms
• 7 Rooms
• Detached Garage
• Wood frame, slab on grade
• Type/Class- V/5
• Brick Veneer
• Divisions:
• A-      Street
• B-       SFD Residential; similar
• C-       Yard, with Detached Garage (B-C) and large room extension
• D-      SFD Residential; similar

Aerial Alpha and Charlie with Roof

Roof Profile

Pre-arrival fire conditions exhibit indicators that suggest the need for the rapid intervention of arriving companies and a coordinated aggressive posture tactically if the incident action plan is formulated to achieve an interior attack. Given the scenario of the backdraft conditions, the likelihood for a degraded or compromised ceiling membrane enclosure (intact ceilings, thus limiting fire extension)  being present will hamper and may be an operational concern for interior operating companies as fire conditions continue to grow in magnitude and severity and full extend and take command of the truss loft enclosure.

These fire conditions will extend into the space, resulting in degradation of the structural components and roof assembly-which will present a high risk potential for isolated or catastrophic collapse. This intrusion into the truss loft would require interior operating company officers to maintain attentiveness towards the effectiveness and progress of tactical suppression and support tasks with the potential for fire quickly dropping into operating areas and affecting firefighter safety.

Coordinated and timely vertical ventilation and roof work may be warranted if part of the normal operating parameters of the fire service agencies. In some areas of the county, vertical ventilation is not considered a tactical functional objective and is not implemented.

Adequate fire flow for suppression must be established early on in the operations, if an interior attack is implemented. Projected fire intensity and severity may challenge initial engine companies if hand lines and fire flow rates and the placement of hose streams are ineffective or marginal.  In the event of master stream operations it would be crucial to ensure interior fire suppression operations are suspended, a transition to a defensive mode is communicated and acknowledge on the fireground with collapse zone considerations.

Operational Considerations

In viewing the video of pre-arrival conditions and fire parameters and indicators; as an arriving company officer or commanding officer, how would you establish your incident action plan (IAP) and establish operations? Present and discuss why you would make these decisions, what is/are the basis?

What would you be considering in the areas of:

• Building Integrity
• Collapse Potential
• Interior Fire Attack Considerations
• Resource Needs: Staffing and Apparatus
• Critical Operational Tasks
• Apparatus Placement
• Hose Line Placement
• Safety Considerations  
• Exposures
• Contingency Issues: What can go wrong?  

 Assuming you are just arriving on scene and observe the backdraft conditions from the front seat; What would your operational IAP be and why?

Identify and discuss the types of mission critical size-up consideration that must be recognized and processed?

How does apparatus placement affect incident operations?

What first-due operational factors have you experienced that were contingent upon other tasks or considerations that were apparent to you or you implemented?

How does extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics affect your fire ground position?

 How does this scenario and building size and type relate to similar structures and occupancies in your district or mutual aid/greater alarm response area?

Link

• Fire ground operational photos: http://www.877famous7.com/HF052311.htm
• Buildingsonfire.com YouTube Channel, HERE

• 

  Charlie Division

Training Download and Discussion Questions

• http://buildingsonfire.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/PreArrivals11.19.11.pdf

Training Download from Buildingsonfire.com

NFPA releases state-level fire service needs assessment for every U.S. state.  Findings based on Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service with comparisons to earlier studies

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) released a fire service needs assessment for each state based on findings from the Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, a study that looked at the current needs of America’s fire departments as compared to those identified in assessments done in 2001 and 2005. The goal of the project was to identify major gaps in the needs of the U.S. fire service and to determine if the Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (DHS/FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) programs are continuing to reduce the needs of fire departments.

The report looked at personnel and their capabilities, including staffing, training, certification, and wellness/fitness; facilities and apparatus; personal protective equipment, fire prevention and code enforcement; the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents; and communications and new technologies.

Selected Findings:

• Nearly half (46 percent) of all fire departments that are responsible for structural firefighting have not formally trained all their personnel involved in structural firefighting, down from 55 percent in 2001 and 53 percent in 2005.
• Seven out of ten (70 percent) fire departments have no program to maintain basic firefighter fitness and health, down from 80 percent in 2001 and 76 percent in 2005.
• Nearly half (46 percent) of all fire department engines and pumpers were at least 15 years old, down from 51 percent in 2001 and 50 percent in 2005.
• Half (52 percent) of all fire departments cannot equip all firefighters on a shift with self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), down from 70 percent in 2001 and 60 percent in 2005.
• Two out of five (39 percent) fire departments do not have enough personal alert safety system devices (PASS) to equip all emergency responders on a shift, down from 62 percent in 2001 and 48 percent in 2005.
• Except for cities protecting at least 250,000 population, most cities do not assign at least four career firefighters to an engine or pumper and so are probably not in compliance with NFPA 1710, Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, which requires a minimum of four firefighters on an engine or pumper.

Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service conducted by NFPA concluded: 

• Needs have declined to a considerable degree in a number of areas, particularly personal protective and firefighting equipment, two types of resources that received the largest shares of funding from the AFG programs.
• Some innovative technologies that have not been identified as necessary in existing standards but are known to be very useful to today’s fire service – including Internet access and thermal imaging cameras – have also seen large increases in use.
• Declines in needs have been more modest in some other important areas, such as training, which have received much smaller shares of AFG funds.
• Still other areas of need, such as apparatus, stations, and the staffing required to support the stations, have seen either limited reductions in need (e.g., apparatus needs in rural areas) or no reductions at all (e.g., adequacy of stations and personnel to meet standards and other guidance on speed and size of response).
• Fire prevention and code enforcement needs have shown no clear improvement over the past decade.
• In all areas emphasized by the AFG and SAFER (Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response) grants, there is ample evidence of impact from the grants but also considerable residual need still to be addressed, even for needs that have seen considerable need-reduction in the past decade.
• There has been little change in the ability of departments, using only local resources, to handle certain types of unusually challenging incidents, including two types of homeland security scenarios (structural collapse and chem/bio agent attack) and two types of large-scale emergency responses (a wildland/urban interface fire and a developing major flood).

The full report and state reports are available at www.nfpa.org/needsassessment.

• National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Web Site, HERE
• NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, 2010 Edition, Order HERE

Additional Supplemental

NFPA has conducted a series of national surveys to identify the needs of the fire service for resources required to safely and effectively carry out their responsibilities. The surveys indicated the resources fire departments had, while NFPA codes and standards and other national guidance documents defined the requirements. The gaps between resources in hand and resources required defined the needs. 

These reports look at personnel and their capabilities, including staffing, training, certification, and wellness/fitness; facilities and apparatus; personal protective equipment; fire prevention and code enforcement; the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents; and communications and new technologies. 

All three studies began with requests from Congress, and the first two studies were conducted with and sponsored by the U.S. Fire Administration and its parent agencies. 

2011
A Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (PDF, 1 MB)
June 2011. 216 pages
Updated study examining the needs of the U.S. fire service in such areas as training, certification, personnel, apparatus, equipment, and fire prevention, with particular attention to homeland security type incidents.

State-by-state reports

The following are state-level reports based on the findings in each of NFPA’s needs assessment reports.

From the NFPA Web site, link  above

2006
Four Years Later – A Second Needs Assessment of the U.S.Fire Service (PDF, 4 MB)
Department of Homeland Security, USFA, and NFPA, October 2006. 159 pages
Updated assessment of needs of U.S. fire service in such areas as training, certification, personnel, apparatus, equipment, and fire prevention, with particular attention to homeland security type incidents.
Also see: Download an errata for this report. (PDF, 16 KB)  

Matching Assistance to Firefighters Grants to the Reported Needs of the U.S.Fire Service (PDF, 2 MB)
Department of Homeland Security, USFA, and NFPA, October 2006. 41 pages
Analysis of whether grants requested and received have addressed reported needs, by type of need, and whether popular types of grants have resulted in significant change in the overall national level of need.

2002
A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (PDF, 1 MB)
FEMA, USFA, and NFPA, December 2002. 160 pages
A comprehensive study done by FEMA, USFA and NFPA examining the needs and response capabilities of the U.S. fire service. Among the factors examined are personnel and their capabilities; fire prevention and code enforcement; stations, apparatus and equipment; and the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents. Results are reported by nationwide and community size.

Also see: “Underfunded, Understaffed, and Undertrained”: Read NFPA President Jim Shannon’s and others’ reactions to the study in an NFPA Journal® Special Report (March/April 2003)

Size-Up and Risk Assessment Skills: How are yours?

In this week’s issue of the National Fire Fighter’s Near-Miss Reporting System’s Report of the Week (ROTW) an informative focus was provided on near-miss reports related to Size-Up. We’re posting the ROTW alert in it’s entirety below.

Go over to the National Fire Fighter’s Near-Miss Reporting System and check out the resources and subcribe to the weekly ROTW today.

Sizing up a structure for a fire attack is a skill that takes time, practice and experience to fully develop. When the first arriving (and any other arriving) officer surveys the structure, the process needs to be rapid and thorough. In some cases, if the size-up is too rapid, critical points can be overlooked. This oversight can result in unintended consequences for the initial attack team.

As seen in ROTW 11-216, it is worthwhile to take an extra minute to process the situation prior to attack.

“We were dispatched to an attic fire in a single-family home. Initial arrival was an on duty engine and ladder truck with two firefighters and one officer, who gave an on scene report of a two-story wood frame residential structure with heavy smoke showing from the rear…After seeing three sides of the building, the officer (myself) ran around to back side and found heavy flames venting from the second floor gable end off the rear of the structure. At the time it was not known if this area was an attic over a first floor addition or a room on the second floor. The officer decided a quick interior search and fire attack, pushing the fire out the already vented hole, would be the initial strategy…After searching the first floor and finding no stairs, the initial team exited the first floor and went to the rear of the structure where an exterior stairwell was found to the second floor. On initial size-up, the stairwell and two mailboxes on the house were missed, causing approximately a one minute delay to fire attack…Upon entry to the second floor, conditions were a light haze with complete visibility of the occupied area…A small pike pole was used to breach the wall while the nozzleman stood ready and the third firefighter moved hose. After an area between the studs and about two feet tall was opened, the attack line was discharged. Conditions went from almost clear to black and steamy instantly. After spraying the nozzle for less than 30 seconds (maybe even sooner) the room became too hot to occupy. All three of us announced we had to get out, almost at the same time…”

Reading the structure is as important as reading the smoke and fire conditions prior to mounting an interior attack. Aesthetics can play a large role in the building design, and what appears to be structural may truly not be safe to load. As 11-216 illustrates, the fire blowing from an upper floor window may not be as visible on the inside as it is on the outside. Once you have read the entire account of 11-216, and the related reports, consider the following:

1. The report notes that, “…exterior stairwell and two mailboxes on the house were missed”. What situational loss factor would best describe why that occurred? Go to our Facebook Page and record your answer and the reason why you selected the factor.   
• a. Distraction
• b. Fixation  
• c. Overload
2. What fire behavior phenomenon occurred when the crew opened the interior wall and experienced conditions that went from “clear to black”?
3. If you were dispatched for fire in the attic and arrive to find heavy smoke and fire showing, what attack line would you select and why?
4. Based solely on the information provided in 11-216, would a two out be necessary before the interior attack could commence?
5. The reporter states “heavy smoke” was observed. Jot down a few factors that mean “heavy smoke” to you. Discuss what you wrote down with your colleagues. 

The time pressure to go into action when we arrive at a working fire will often cause the size-up to be hurried. Remembering the lessons learned from 11-216 will make your next size-up more complete. The NMRS staff expressed thier thanks to the lieutenant from Region V for sharing what was learned.

Related Reports- Topical Relation: Size-up    

• 05-398
• 06-111
• 07-1180
• 08-399
• 09-366
• 10-689

Have you avoided a disaster because of a good size-up? Submit your report to www.firefighternearmiss.com today to pass on your experience.

• NFFNMRS Facebook Page, HERE
• Past Report of the Week Library, HERE
• 2011 Calendar and Annual Report, HERE

Got a Near-Miss Report to Submit? Click on the button for a direct link to the NFNMRS here

 Don’t forget to go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System for  number of exceptional training aids, resources, PPT and more. NFFNMRS, HERE

Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page

On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.

Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.

Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.

Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.

The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.

Building Construction Insights

• Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
• Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”

Fire Building Construction:

• 7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
• The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
• The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.

Collapse Building Construction:

• 6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
• The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
• The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street
  

  Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011

Building Alteration

(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.

(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.

(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.

 The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.

It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.

The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.

The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001. 
 

FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank

Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.

• DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
• BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
• Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
• Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
• Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
• Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
• Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
• Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
• Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
• Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
• Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
• Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18

From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html

• NYFD.com Insights and Photos HERE
• FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary, HERE

• FDNY – Remembering the “23rd Street Fire” October 17, 1966, Facebook Page, HERE

• Personal Account: http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/box598.pdf

• http://ephemeralnewyork.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/the-second-worst-fire-in-new-york-city-history/

• http://www.fdnye16l7.com/History/23rdstreetfire.html

•  New York Times (2006): Oct. 17, 1966, When 12 Firemen Died HERE

• http://firehistory.org/2011/02/october-17th-1966-new-york-ny-23rd-street-fire/

• The Site Today, HERE and HERE

A wreath is laid at the new plaque honoring the 12 FDNY members killed at the 23rd Street fire on Oct. 17, 1966. © FDNY Photo Unit.

FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary

NFPA 2010 Report and Analysis

The NFPA recently released its report on Fire Loss in the United States During 2010. According to the report, public fire departments responded to 1,331,500 fires last year, a decrease of 1.3 percent from the year before.

U.S. fire departments responded to an estimated 1,331,500 fires. These fires resulted in 3,120 civilian fire fatalities, 17,720 civilian fire injuries and an estimated $11,593,000,000 in direct property loss. There was a civilian fire death every 169 minutes and a civilian fire injury every 30 minutes in 2010. Home fires caused 2,640, or 85%, of the civilian fire deaths. Fires accounted for five percent of the 28,205,000 total calls. Eight percent of the calls were false alarms; sixty-six percent of the calls were for aid such as EMS.

• Download the “Fire Loss in the United States During 2010″ report
• NFPA.org:  http://www.nfpa.org/publicJournalDetail.asp?categoryID=2249&itemID=53060&src=NFPAJournal

In 2010, public fire departments responded to 1,331,500 fires in the United States, according to estimates based on data NFPA received from fire departments responding to its 2010 National Fire Experience Survey. This represents a slight decrease of 1.3 percent from the previous year and is the lowest since NFPA started using its current survey methodology in 1977 – 78.

An estimated 482,000 structure fires were reported to fire departments in 2010, an increase of 0.3 percent, or virtually no change from the year before. For the period from 1977 to 2010, inclusive, the number of structure fires peaked in 1977 when 1,098,000 structure fires occurred. The number of structure fires then decreased steadily, particularly in the 1980s, to 688,000 by the end of 1989, for an overall decrease of 37.3 percent from 1977. Since 1989, structure fires again decreased steadily for an overall decrease of 24.7 percent to 517,500 by the end of 1998. They stayed in the 505,000 to 530,500 range from 1999 to 2008, before dropping to 480,500 in 2009, and increasing in 2010.

Of the 2010 structure fires, 384,000 were residential fires, accounting for 79.7 percent of all structure fires, an increase of 1.9 percent from the year before. Of these residential structure fires, 279,000 occurred in one- and two-family homes, accounting for 57.9 percent of structure fires. Another 90,500 occurred in apartments, accounting for 18.8 percent of all structure fires.

NFPA 2010 Overview

For nonresidential structure fires, some property types showed notable changes. In public assembly occupancies, such fires decreased 17.2 percent to 12,000. In stores and offices, they increased 9.1 percent to 18,000. And in special structure properties, they dropped 11.1 percent to 20,000.

2010 Report Overview

• 1,331,500 fires were responded to by public fire departments, a decrease of 1.3 percent from the year before.
• 482,000 fires occurred in structures, an increase of 0.3 percent from 2009.
• 384,000 fires, or 80 percent of all structure fires, occurred in residential properties.
• 215,500 fires occurred in vehicles, a decrease of 1.6 percent from the year before.
• 634,000 fires occurred in outside properties, a decrease of 2.3 percent from 2009.

CIVILIAN FIRE DEATHS

•  3,120 civilian fire deaths occurred in 2010, an increase of 3.7 percent from 2009.
• About 85 percent of all fire deaths occurred in the home.
• 2,640 civilian fire deaths occurred in the home, an increase of 2.9 percent from 2009.
• 285 civilians died in highway vehicle fires.
• 90 civilians died in nonresidential structure fires.

 CIVILIAN FIRE INJURIES

•  17,720 civilian fire injuries occurred in 2010, an increase of 3.9 percent from the year before.
• 13,800 of all civilian injuries occurred in residential properties, while 1,620 occurred in non-residential structure fires.

 PROPERTY DAMAGE

•  An estimated $11.6 billion in property damage occurred as a result of fire in 2010, a decrease of 7.5 percent from 2009.
• $9.7 billion of property damage occurred in structure fires.
• $7.1 billion of property loss occurred in residential properties.

 INTENTIONALLY SET FIRES

•  An estimated 27,500 intentionally set structure fires occurred in 2010, an increase of 3.8 percent from 2009.
• Intentionally set fires in structures resulted in 200 civilian deaths, an increase of 17.7 percent from the year before.
• Intentionally set structure fires also resulted in $585,000,000 in property loss, a decrease of 14.5 percent from 2009.
• 14,000 intentionally set vehicle fires occurred, a decrease of 6.7 percent from the year before, and caused $89,000,000 in property damage, a decrease of 17.6 percent.

Estimate of Fires by Type in the United States (1977-2010) NFPA Statistics