Archives for fire-suppression
International Society of Fire Service Instructors; “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.”
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The International Society of Fire Service Instructors is proud to announce the release of “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.” The program is a train-the trainer package that combines the latest research on light weight building construction from National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), Underwriters Laboratories(UL), Michigan State University, The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and the Chicago Fire Department into a single resource tailored for company-level instruction.
The program was made possible through a Prevention & Research Grant from the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program and the Department of Homeland Security. The ISFSI partnered with Eastern Kentucky University’s Fire & Safety Engineering Technology Program to analyze line of duty deaths between 1997 and 2009 to study the impact that lightweight construction has had on firefighters and firefighting operations.
The DVD included in the program package contains all of the instructional resources necessary to provide quality training on this important topic. A wide variety of support materials are included to provide the user a deep understanding of the challenges with modern building construction techniques. Instructors can tailor the program to meet the needs of their audience, including a 2-hour brief up to a week-long program.
The program will be distributed to all members of the ISFSI as a free member benefit. The ISFSI has also partnered with the Safety & Health Section of the IAFC to provide a copy to each of its members. ISFSI President, Eddie Buchanan, was on hand at the Safety & Health Section Meeting at FRI to personally deliver Chief Billy Goldfeder his copy as chair of the section. All members should expect their copy to arrive in their mailboxes over the next week.
“I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to the ISFSI members and staff who worked so hard to bring this product to firefighters across America and the globe. It is truly a lifesaving program and a fantastic use of grant funds. It is critical that this package get into the hands of every instructor and fire officer to ensure they are educated and prepared to handle the real risk that looms out there on the next call,” said President Buchanan.
Check out the International Society of Fire Service Instructor’s (ISFSI) web site HERE.
Not a member? Take the time to sign up and get connected.
IAFC Rules of Engagement
Rules of Engagement Project; Increasing Firefighter Survival
Developed by the Safety, Health and Survival Section International Association of Fire Chiefs
The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries. As part of that effort the nearly 1,000 member Safety, Health and Survival Section of the IAFC has developed the recently approved “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground. The intent is to provide a set of “model procedures” for Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting to be made available by the IAFC to fire departments as a guide for their own standard operating procedure development.
In August, 2008, following a year of discussion, the Section moved to develop a set of “Rules of Engagement for Structure Firefighting”. A project team was created consisting of Section members and representatives of other several other interested fire service organizations. These included the Fire Department Safety Officer Association (FDSOA), the National Fallen Firefighter Foundation (NFFF), and the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC), the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and other organizations. All draft material has also been shared with representatives of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) who developed a joint IAFF/IAFC “Fire Ground Survival Project”. Three Section members also participated in the IAFF project. The direction provided the project team by the Section leadership was to develop rules of engagement with the following conceptual points;
- Rules should be a short, specific set of bullets
- Rules should be easily taught and remembered
- Rules should define critical risk issues
- Rules should define “go” or “no‐go” situations
- A companion lesson plan/explanation section should be provided
Early in development the Rules of Engagement, it was recognized that two separate rules were needed one set for the firefighter, and another set for the incident commander. Thus, the two sets of Rules of Engagement described in the attached document. The ROE were also inserted in the August issue of FireRescue magazine. Each set has several commonly shared bullets and objectives, but the explanations are described somewhat differently based on the level of responsibility (firefighter vs. incident commander).
The attached and linked PDF document reflects nearly two years of public comment and feedback from several presentations at fire service conferences, including the National Fallen Fire Fighters Safety Summit held at the National Fire Academy this past March. The “Rules” were formally adopted by the IAFC Health, Safety and Survival Section at the Fire Rescue International Conference held last week in Chicago.
The development of the rules integrated several nationally recognized programs and principles. They included risk assessment principles from NFPA Standards 1500 and 1561. Also included where concepts and principles from Crew Resource Management (available from iafc.org) and data and lessons from the National Near‐Miss Reporting System (firefighternearmiss.com). The development process also included review of lessons learned from numerous firefighter fatality investigations conducted by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.
It’s incumbent that the fire chief and the Departments management team insure the safety of all firefighters working at structural fires. All command organization officers are responsible for their own safety and the safety of all personnel working with them. All officers and members are responsible are responsible for continually identifying and reporting unsafe conditions or practices. The Rules of Engagement allows both the firefighter and the incident commander to apply and process these principles.
One principle applied in the Rules of Engagement is firefighters and the company officers are the members at most risk for injury or death. The Rules integrate the firefighter into the risk assessment decision making process. These members should be the ultimate decision maker as to whether it’s safe to proceed with assigned objectives. The “Rules” allow a process for that decision to be made while still maintain command unity and discipline. It is well known that firefighting is hazardous with varying levels of risk to the firefighter. However, firefighting is not a military campaign where lives are lost to establish a beach head. No firefighter’s life is a building that eventually will be rebuilt. Keep all members safe so “Everyone Goes Home”!
Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival
- Size‐Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.
- Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
- DO NOT Risk Your Life for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved.
- Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
- Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
- Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together
- Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions.
- Constantly Monitor Fireground Communications for Critical Radio Reports.
- You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
- You Are Required to Abandon Your Position and Retreat Before Deteriorating Conditions Can Harm You.
- Declare a May Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger.
The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
- Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Size‐Up of the Incident.
- Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
- Conduct an Initial Risk Assessment and Implement a SAFE ACTION PLAN.
- If You Do Not Have The Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
- DO NOT Risk Firefighter Lives for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
- Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
- Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
- Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Firefighters. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
- Maintain Frequent Two‐Way Communications and Keep Interior Crews Informed of Changing Conditions.
- Obtain Frequent Progress Reports and Revise the Action Plan.
- Ensure Accurate Accountability of All Firefighter Location and Status.
- If, After Completing the Primary Search, Little or No Progress Towards Fire Control Has Been Achieved ‐ Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
- Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires
- Always Have Firefighter Rehab Services in Place at All Working Fires
Rules of Engagement Poster, PDF File ROE 2010
- Link to the IAFC Section Page and ROE Concept Paper
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA)has issued a special report examining the characteristics of fatal fires in residential buildings. The report, Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.
The report is part of the Topical Fire Report Series and is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). According to the report, an estimated 1,800 fatal residential building fires occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss. The leading cause of fatal residential fires is smoking (19 percent) and the leading areas of fire origin are bedrooms (27 percent) and common areas such as living and family rooms (23 percent). In addition, fatal residential fires, which tend to be larger, cause more damage, and have higher injury rates than nonfatal residential fires, occur most frequently in the late evening and early morning hours, peaking from midnight to 5 a.m. Finally, these types of fires are more prevalent in the cooler months, peaking in January (13 percent).
The topical reports are designed to explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS. Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.
Findings
■ An estimated 1,800 fatal residential building fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss.
■ Fatal residential building fires tend to be larger, cause more damage, and have higher injury rates than nonfatal residential fires.
■ Smoking is the leading cause of fatal residential building fires (19 percent).
■ The leading areas of fire origin in fatal residential building fires are bedrooms (27 percent) and common areas such as living and family rooms (23 percent).
■ Fatal residential building fires are more prevalent in the cooler months, peaking in January (13 percent).
■ Fatal residential building fires occur most frequently in the late evening and early morning hours, peaking from midnight to 5 a.m. One-third (33 percent) of fatal residential fires occur during these 5 hours.
■ About two-thirds (66 percent) of fatal residential building fires are confined to the building of origin or extend beyond the building of origin.
The U.S. fire death rate has gone down dramatically over the past three decades since the creation of the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), from over 30 deaths per million population to 11 deaths per million population. The United States, however, continues to have one of the highest fire death rates per capita among Western Nations.
The original goal for USFA was to help lead a reduction in fire deaths by 50 percent in a generation. With annual fire deaths dropping from over 9,000 to less than 3,500 in that period of time, USFA’s goal has been achieved. Nevertheless, fire deaths are still high. Approximately 1,800 fatal residential building fires occurred annually in recent years (2006 to 2008). These fires resulted in an annual average of approximately 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss.
This report is one of a continuing series of topical reports issued by the USFA’s National Fire Data Center and addresses the characteristics of fatal residential building fires reported to the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) from 2006 to 2008, the most recent data available at the time of the analysis. Because 79 percent of fire deaths occur in residential buildings, they are the focus of this report. The information in this report about fatal residential fires can be used not only to assess progress but also to understand the nature of the fatal fire problem and its implications for targeting of prevention programs. For the purpose of this report, the terms “residential fires” and “fatal residential fires” are synonymous with “residential building fires” and “fatal residential building fires,” respectively. “Fatal residential fires” is used throughout the body of this report; the findings, tables, charts, headings, and footnotes reflect the full category, “fatal residential building fires.”
The report, Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings,HERE
The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program has released the investigation report of the line of duty deaths of two career FDNY firefighters during a 2007 seven-alarm high-rise fire in the former Deutsche Bank building undergoing deconstruction and asbestos abatement.
On August 18, 2007, two FDNY firefighters; Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo lost thier lives while operating at this incident. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations. FDNY Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran and FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, became trapped in the maze-like conditions of a high-rise building undergoing deconstruction. The building’s standpipe system had been disconnected during the deconstruction and the partitions constructed for asbestos abatement prohibited fire fighters from getting water to the seat of the fire. An hour into the incident, the fire department was able to supply water by running an external hoseline up the side of the structure. Soon after the victims began to operate their hoseline, they ran out of air. The victims suffered severe smoke inhalation and were transported to a metropolitan hospital in cardiac arrest where they succumbed to their injuries.
By the time the fire was extinguished, 115 fire fighters had suffered a variety of injuries.Key contributing factors to this incident include: delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel, inoperable standpipe and sprinkler system, delay in establishing water supply, inaccurate information about standpipe, unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously, extreme fire behavior, uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor, blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress, maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris, heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented, failure of fire fighters to always don SCBAs inside structure and to replenish air cylinders, communications overwhelmed with numerous Mayday and urgent radio transmissions, and lack of crew integrity.
NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
- review and follow existing standard operating procedures on high-rise fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters are not operating in hazardous areas without the protection of a charged hoseline.
- be prepared to use alternative water supplies when a building’s standpipe system is compromised or inoperable.
- develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating guidelines for risk management during complex high-rise operations.
- ensure that crew integrity is maintained during high-rise fire suppression operations.
- train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning high-rise structure.
- ensure that fire fighters diligently wear their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) when working in environments that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).
- train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
- use exit locators (both visual and audible) or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit.
- conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
- encourage building owners and occupants to report emergency situations as soon as possible and provide accurate information to the fire department.
- consider additional fire fighter training using a high-rise fire simulator.
Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:
- conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters in high-rise structures.
- continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communications in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Municipalities should:
- ensure that construction and/or demolition is done in accordance with NFPA 241: Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations.
- develop a reporting system to inform the fire department of any ongoing, unique building construction activities (such as deconstruction or asbestos abatement) that would adversely affect a fire response.
- establish a system for property owners to notify the fire department when fire protection/suppression systems are taken out of service.
The Complete NIOSH Report is available HERE
An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of the PPT program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites
Additional Links, HERE and HERE
New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work, HERE
Other References and postings;
Basement fires in both residential and commercial occupancies are one of the most challenging tactical operations that present numerous risk factors that required the highest degree of situational awareness, training skill sets and continuous incident monitoring and assessment to gauge building structural integrity, fire behavior and crew integrity and performance.
An explosion rocked a Fairdale, Kentucky neighborhood this past weekend while the homeowner was in the process of doing remodeling his basement. A Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Mark Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel.
Fellow firefighters, including his brother-in-law, who was right behind him prior to his fall, were yelling and screaming at Long to hang on. They managed to get a ladder to the basement and it was up to Long to find the strength to get out. He says “I started to try to climb up. I got two, I lost my grip, fell flat into the fire. I was so exhausted.” On his third attempt, he did find the strength and pulled himself up the ladder and out of the flames.
According to published reports a coordinated fire suppression effort was undertaken, with heavy fire involvement extending throughout the house and into the roof area. Interior fire attack was commenced, and as crews began moving across the first floor area above the seat of the fire, the floor subassembly failed causing an isolated collapse and compromise of the structural floor system and sub-floor decking, resulting in Captain Long falling into the basement. The fire originating in the basement was the result of the homeowners’ use of acetone as a floor treatment when the chemical vapors were ignited by the hot water heater causing an explosion and resulting fire.
Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive)
- Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
- Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
- Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
- Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
- Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
- Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
- Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
- Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
- Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
- If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
- Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
- Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
- Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner.
- Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
- Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
- Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
- Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
- Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
- Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
- Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
- Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
- Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment
Here are some resources and case studies resulting from operations at floor collapses;
- Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know, Here
- NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
- Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report
- NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE
- Remembering Brackenridge 1991 Floor Collapse and LODD
- Brackenridge-USFA Report; HERE
- Brackenridge-NFPA Summary; HERE
- Maintaining Situational Awareness
- NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors
- Career Fire Fighter Dies While Exiting Residential Basement Fire – New York, HERE
- First-Floor Collapse During Residential Basement Fire Claims the Life of Two Fire Fighters (Career and Volunteer) and Injures a Career Fire Fighter Captain – New York, HERE
- Career Engineer Dies and Fire Fighter Injured After Falling Through Floor While Conducting a Primary Search at a Residential Structure Fire – Wisconsin, HERE
- Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE
- Floor Collapse Claims the Life of One Fire Fighter and Injures Two-California, HERE
- UL University CBT: “Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions”
Incident links; HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE
BuildingsonFire 2010; Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Operational Safety
Major Influencing Fire Service Reports, Issues or Focus that should be on Your Radar Screen
The following list is but a modest cross section of pertinent information or focus areas today’s Firefighter, Company or Command Officer MUST be knowledgeable in, have insights and proficiency based technical skills to function with a level of competencies demanded in today’s fire service.
If these are not on your radar screen or you haven’t got a blip of a clue what they’re about; then you are derelict and not doing your job- and the end result could be a less than desirable outcome on the fireground; it’s that simple, it’s that direct.
Have you read these reports, understand the issues & influences, increased your knowledge, skills and abilities in any gap areas or taken the time to research the cutting edge issues affecting today’s fire service?
The City of Charleston Sofa Super Store LODD-Routley Fire Report
Read the report; understand the incident, the building performance, the fire behavior and the operation process deployed. Gain the insights from the overall apparent and contributing causes identified and presented and assess how these relate to your fire service perspective and department’s culture and performance today.
- City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team Phase I Report, HERE
- Routley Final Phase II Report HERE
- NIOSH Investigative Report, HERE
- NIOSH REPORT SUMMARY
- NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
- develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for an occupational safety and health program in accordance with NFPA 1500
- develop, implement, and enforce a written Incident Management System to be followed at all emergency incident operations
- develop, implement, and enforce written SOPs that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
- ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual with overall authority and responsibility for management of all activities at an incident
- ensure that the Incident Commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior fire fighting operations
- train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
- ensure that the Incident Commander establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in fire-fighting efforts
- ensure the early implementation of division / group command into the Incident Command System
- ensure that the Incident Commander continuously evaluates the risk versus gain when determining whether the fire suppression operation will be offensive or defensive
- ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
- ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed at each structure fire
- ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
- ensure that a rapid intervention crew (RIC) / rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents
- ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents
- ensure that ventilation to release heat and smoke is closely coordinated with interior fire suppression operations
- conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics
- consider establishing and enforcing standardized resource deployment approaches and utilize dispatch entities to move resources to fill service gaps
- develop and coordinate pre-incident planning protocols with mutual aid departments
- ensure that any offensive attack is conducted using adequate fire streams based on characteristics of the structure and fuel load present
- ensure that an adequate water supply is established and maintained
- consider using exit locators such as high intensity floodlights or flashing strobe lights to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit
- ensure that Mayday transmissions are received and prioritized by the Incident Commander
- train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure
- ensure that all fire fighters and line officers receive fundamental and annual refresher training according to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021
- implement joint training on response protocols with mutual aid departments
- ensure apparatus operators are properly trained and familiar with their apparatus
- protect stretched hose lines from vehicular traffic and work with law enforcement or other appropriate agencies to provide traffic control
- ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression and overhaul activities
- ensure that fire fighters are trained in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
- develop, implement and enforce written SOPS to ensure that SCBA cylinders are fully charged and ready for use
- use thermal imaging cameras (TICs) during the initial size-up and search phases of a fire
- develop, implement and enforce written SOPs and provide fire fighters with training on the hazards of truss construction
- establish a system to facilitate the reporting of unsafe conditions or code violations to the appropriate authorities
- ensure that fire fighters and emergency responders are provided with effective incident rehabilitation
- provide fire fighters with station / work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments.
Additionally, federal and state occupational safety and health administrations should:
- consider developing additional regulations to improve the safety of fire fighters, including adopting National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus standards.
Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:
- continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn SCBA
- conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.
Additionally, code setting organizations and municipalities should:
- require the use of sprinkler systems in commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards, and establish retroactive requirements for the installation of fire sprinkler systems when additions to commercial buildings increase the fire and life safety hazards
- require the use of automatic ventilation systems in large commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards.
Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:
- coordinate the collection of building information and the sharing of information between building authorities and fire departments
- consider establishing one central dispatch center to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions
- ensure that fire departments responding to mutual aid incidents are equipped with mobile and portable communications equipment that are capable of handling the volume of radio traffic and allow communications among all responding companies within their jurisdiction.
Everyone Goes Home Campaign
- Everyone Goes Home® is a national program by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries. In March 2004, a Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held to address the need for change within the fire service. At this summit, the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives were created and a program was born to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
- Recognizing the need to do more to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation has launched a national initiative to bring prevention to the forefront.
- In March 2004, the Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held in Tampa, Florida to address the need for change within the fire and emergency services. Through this meeting, 16 Life Safety Initiatives were produced to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
- The first major action was to sponsor a national gathering of fire and emergency services leaders. The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation will play a major role in helping the U.S. Fire Administration meet its stated goal to reduce the number of preventable firefighter fatalities. The Foundation sees fire service adoption of the summit’s initiatives as a vital step in meeting this goal.
- The Courage to Be Safe® On-Line Program , HERE
- Media CenterUsing variations of the Courage to Be Safe ®…So Everyone Goes Home® field program, along with material from the Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resource Kit we will develop and deploy a new online learning segment each month. These online learning segments will allow you to expand upon your personal and professional development when you want and how you want. Watch them by yourself or integrate them into your organizational training programs. Remember, that safety results from constant training and putting those skills to work everyday, on every call – SO EVERYONE GOES HOME. HERE
- The Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Advocates Program will play a key role in helping to bring about awareness of the Initiatives and act as a conduit for resources to enable departments to implement and advocate them. HERE
- The 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives
- Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.
- Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.
- Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.
- All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
- Develop and implement national standards for training, qualifications, and certification (including regular recertification) that are equally applicable to all firefighters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
- Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that are equally applicable to all firefighters, based on the duties they are expected to perform.
- Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.
- Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety.
- Thoroughly investigate all firefighter fatalities, injuries, and near misses.
- Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement.
- National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should be developed and championed.
- National protocols for response to violent incidents should be developed and championed.
- Firefighters and their families must have access to counseling and psychological support.
- Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a critical fire and life safety program.
- Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the installation of home fire sprinklers.
- Safety must be a primary consideration in the design of apparatus and equipment.
NIST Wind Driven Fire Study
- Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them. Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire. This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building. In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure. This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway. The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
- What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented? Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening. If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants. NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
- This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions. There are many questions regarding wind driven fires. For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures? Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires. In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
- Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
- A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings. All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set. All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player. NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
- NIST References HERE and HERE
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
- A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
- Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
- Reference Data HERE
NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments
- The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments was recently released to the public providing . A copy of the report is attached.
- Report Abstract:
- Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.
- This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.
- This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.
- Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.
- The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
- Synopsis HERE
USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002
- Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
- As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
- Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
- Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies
UL Fire Academy CBT
- UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions
- Base on the UL research and
- This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
- This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This self-guided course, which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions, is targeted toward the 1.1 million fire service personnel in the United States and Canada. The knowledge developed and shared in this course is critically important to firefighter and civilian safety.
- This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
- Program Objectives:
- Provide brief history of events leading up to DHS Grant tests
- Identify the fire test hypothesis, parameters, and steps completed in the testing process
- Compare tests results (legacy vs. modern construction)
- Communicate learnings from our partners representing the fire service
- Discuss code recommendations
- UL University on-line Program HERE
USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002
- Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
- As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
- Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
- Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies
NIOSH LODD Reports
- Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
- NIOSH Web Page HERE
- Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
- Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports, HERE
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
- Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
- These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
- Report HERE
NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors
- Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
- Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
- NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
- Report HERE
NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
- Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
- The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
- NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
- ALERT Report HERE
National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience
- The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
- Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
- National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
- Search Reports, HERE
- Resources, HERE
USFA Incident Reports (Stop History Repeating Events-HRE)
- USFA provides information resources in many formats, including books, pamphlets and DVD’s, free of charge.
- The U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire–the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.
- The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters
- This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas.
- The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made
- Technical Reports and On-line Publications, HERE
Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report
- The Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire and Rescue published a comprehensive line of duty death report for Technician I Kyle R. Wilson on Saturday, January 26, 2008. Technician I Wilson was the first line of duty death in the Department’s 41-year history. The Department is sharing the LODD Investigative Report to honor Kyle, and in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels.
- Technician Kyle Robert Wilson was 24-years old and was born in Olney, Maryland. He grew up in Prince William County and graduated from Hylton High School and George Mason University. He was an avid baseball and softball player. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006. Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive.
- Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure.
- Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.
- The Department of Fire and Rescue immediately formed a multi-dimensional investigation team following the incident. The investigation team was comprised of five Department of Fire and Rescue uniform personnel and two external members from area fire departments. For eight months, the team thoroughly examined the events that occurred at the Marsh Overlook fire incident and identify the factors involved with the line of duty death of Technician I Kyle Wilson. The resulting report represents thousands of hours of effort to analyze fire and rescue operations and is a factual representation of the events that occurred. The report also provides a frame work for organizational level improvements.
- The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be:
- The initial arriving fire suppression force size.
- The size up of fire development and spread.
- The impact of high winds on fire development and spread.
- The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials.
- The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts.
- The incident control and management.
- The Marsh Overlook fire incident was an immense fire fueled by extremely flammable building material products and a vicious wind. It was an environment where information gathering and decision making had to be performed in the time measurement of seconds. During the chain of events that occurred and under severe circumstances, fire and rescue personnel performed at exceptional levels.
- During the repeated attempts to reach and rescue Technician I Wilson, personnel displayed heroic efforts and jeopardized their own safety. The Department will never forget the sacrifice that Technician Wilson made in an attempt to ensure others were safe. By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure his sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire and rescue departments can avoid another similar occurrence.
- Resources and Report
- LODD Report Fact Sheet (23.9kb)
- LODD Investigative Report (9.16 mb)
- LODD Report Presentation (6.65 mb)
- LODD Report Basic House Model (Section 1) (1.87 mb)
- LODD Report Fire Model (Section 3) (5.16 mb)
- LODD Flashover Chart (60 kb)
- Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE
Loudoun County (VA) Fire Rescue Significant Near Miss Event Report
- On May 25, 2008, fire and rescue personnel from Loudoun County responded to a structure fire at 43238 Meadowood Court in Leesburg, Virginia. During the course of the incident, seven responders were injured. Of those injured, four firefighters received significant burn injuries, two firefighters sustained orthopedic injuries, and one EMS provider was treated for minor respiratory distress. To date, five of the injured personnel have returned to duty. Two firefighters continue to recover from their injuries, including one who was severely burned.
- Given the severity of the injuries and magnitude of the event, an independent Investigative Team was assembled to review the incident. The Team was comprised of four Loudoun County personnel, three external members from area fire departments, and two resource/support personnel. The Team was tasked with reviewing “the events leading up to the incident, the incident operation(s), the firefighter MAYDAY(s), and incident mitigation.”
- For three months, the Team thoroughly examined the events surrounding the Meadowood Court fire incident and identified the factors associated with the injury of personnel.
- The Report contains the results of the Investigative Team’s comprehensive review and analysis.
- Fact Sheet, HERE
- SIGNIFICANT INJURY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 43238 MEADOWOOD COURT MAY 25, 2008 Report HERE
Worcester (MA) Fire Cold Storage Fire LODD Report; Abandoned Cold Storage Warehouse Multi-Firefighter Fatality Fire 1999, Worcester, Massachusetts
- A technical review of the 1999 Worcester, MA fire that claimed six firefighters concludes that abandoned buildings are a serious threat to firefighters and fire departments must make a concerted effort to use technology to maintain data on buildings in their response districts.
- On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
- Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors. Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.
- An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.
- A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and deluge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts. According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities.
- USFA Report HERE
Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department Final Report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels Nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths
- The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter. This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.
- Incident Overview, HERE
- NIOSH Report, HERE
- Investigative Report, HERE
Field Trips
- Take a good look at the structures, occupancies and buildings in you first, second and third due areas, look around your community and jurisdiction as well as your mutual aid and greater alarm response box areas.
- Have you stopped for a minute today and taken a good look around? Whether you’re sitting in the front seat at the stop light of an intersection or as you’re peering out the side cab window coming back from an alarm or while running errands in your POV; have you taken a good look around? As the Springsteen song goes; “this is your town”.
- There’s a lot that can be gleaned from your surroundings on any given day. We sometimes take for granted the subtle changes that are happening all around us as we take care of business on our rounds, runs and calls. We tend to focus in on the immediacy of the events that are happening in front of us that demand our attention but fail to take a look around to pick up on information, data and insights that can help us on that next run or down the road in the future.
- Take a look at the construction that might be going up in your areas. I’m certain you’re paying close attention to what’s happening in your first-due, but what about that third-due area, that neighboring jurisdiction or the mutual-aid area that you occasionally run in to? When you’re on that next EMS run or an investigation of an odor or alarm bells service call, take a few extra minutes to walk through the occupancy. Conduct your own mini company level pre-plan.
- Look at the layout, features, access and construction features. If you have a chance, verify the structural support systems employed by the building for the floor and roof systems. If you have time, take the company on a quick site visit to that building that’s under construction or the renovations that are again underway in that commercial or business occupancy around the corner from quarters.
- These continuing challenging economic times places a great deal of influence on what’s being built, how it might be constructed, the manner in which a building may be operational one day, vacant the other and under renovation the next. Sometimes these transformations occur literally overnight.
- Take a good look around, this is your town…your district, your response area. Know your buildings, understand their performance profiles, and assess the predictability of performance. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
Building Construction
I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.
We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.
The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must adjusted and enhanced to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a profound need to gain building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Its all about the new formula….Bk=F2S.
Additionally, think about the following
- Don’t Treat Your Buildings and Occupancies the Same anymore
- Increase Situational Awareness
- Increase Your Competencies
- Know Your Buildings
- Be aware of Command Compression
- Implement Tactical Patience
- Tactical Entertainment
- Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety
- Fire Behavior & Fire Dynamics
- Situational Awareness
- Naturalistic Decision Making
More on these and some additional key reports on a future post…..
Report-on-Residential-Fireground-Field-Experiments
The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiements was issued this morning. A copy of the report is attached. The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
Report Abstract:
Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.
This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.
This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.
A were deployed in response to live fires within this facility. In addition to systematically controlling for the arrival times of the first and subsequent fire apparatus, crew size was varied to consider two-, three-, four-, and five-person staffing. Each deployment performed a series of 22 tasks that were timed, while the thermal and toxic environment inside the structure was measured. Additional experiments with larger fuel loads as well as fire modeling produced additional insight. Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.
We will review the report findings and provide insights over the upcoming weekend.
Addition project information and insights, HERE
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is scheduled to issue the results of a multi-institutional landmark national study on the effects of firefighter staffing levels and crew arrival times on residential firefighting operations. This landmark report will provide scientific data that will help inform fire chiefs and public officials in making decisions on firefighting budgets, crew sizes and placement of fire stations. The study was funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program and will be released Wednesday April 28, 2010 in Washington, D.C., before the start of the annual Congressional Fire Services Institute (CFSI) meeting. Speakers will include principal investigators from NIST, the U.S. Fire Administrator, representatives from NFPA, IAFC, IAFF, Metropolitan Fire Chiefs, CFAI, and Worcester Polytechnic Institute. The Press Event will take place at the Washington Hilton, Jefferson East (Concourse Level) 1919 Connecticut Avenue NW. Washington, D.C. at 9:00 a.m. EDT
The significance of this much awaited study is certain to provide critical data and benchmarks that will influence operational deployment, firefighter safety and strategic and tactical considerations related to combat fire suppression. I recall a series of studies and evolutions that were last dome in the mid-1980’s that looked at cursory functional deployment considerations related to engine company efficiency for six, five, four and three personnel staffed units.
The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study is a multi-year project, being conducted jointly by the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI), the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), whose purpose is to establish a technical basis for risk evaluation and deployment of resources by local fire departments and create tools the departments can use to better assess the risks and hazards in their communities; plan adequate resource deployment to respond to and mitigate emergency events; and measure their effectiveness in responding to and handling events.
The first two phases of the study were to establish a technical basis for risk evaluation and deployment of resources by local fire departments and to create tools fire departments can use to better assess the risks and hazards in their communities. This would allow the Fire Department to plan adequate resource deployment to respond to and mitigate emergency events. The final phase of the NIST study will assist departments to measure their effectiveness in responding to and handling events.
Study Details
Within the past fifteen years, studies have advanced in the sophistication of their methods but nonetheless have continued to support the finding that crew size per piece of apparatus clearly affects the effectiveness and safety of fire department personnel during emergency response and fire suppression. In an effort to supplement the scientific evidence available, the intent of this study was to determine how well the fire service decision makers match resources to risk and what factors are important in making better decisions about these matches in the future recognizing that decisions must be made in light of available funding in the community and the level of service the community expects.
The overall goal is to reduce firefighter injury and death by making better decisions about resource deployment in a risk filled environment. The study is delineated into three phases.
- Phase I – Develop a scientifically-based community risk assessment and resource deployment model;
- Phase II – Conduct field experiments to assess resource deployment including crew size and time to task analysis;
- Phase III – Develop performance evaluation tools to be used by departments to assess how well they match their community risk level to resources deployed.
Based on analysis of data collected in phase I, investigators will address three outcomes; 1) firefighter injury and death, 2) civilian injury and death; and 3) economic impact. They will work to identify the most important factors in determining appropriate deployment to varied levels of adverse risk events occurring in a community. It is their hope to use those data to program a predictive model to be converted into software.
We’ll issue and update this post with the latest information as it’s released Wednesday.
Progress Reports Issued
A series of program progress reports were issued and are available from the following links;
- Project Year One, Progress Report, HERE
- In September, 2008, the Two-Year Progress Report was issued; The Multi-Phased Study on Firefighter Safety and the Deployment of Resource, HERE
- DHL, Phase II Report, HERE
Other related links for further insights;
- The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), HERE
- Firereportingsystem.org, HERE
- Field Experiment Photos, HERE
- Worcester Polytechnic Institute, HERE
- Live Fire Experiments Provide Data on the Effects of Fire Resources, HERE
- Fire Service Leaders to Conduct Study to Improve Fire Fighter Safety and Deployment, FFN 2009; HERE
- STATter911 and WUSA9 Postings,HERE and HERE
- Commandsafety.com, HERE
Here’s some details on the incident and the building profile from our good friend Wayne Powell with the Vigilant Hose Company of Emmitsburg and a long time former staff member of the National Fire Academy. The excerpt that was posted on Dave’s STATter911 blog: Fire units were alerted at 0559 hours to a reported building fire with people trapped in an apartment building on the Square (southeast corner) above a popular Pizza Restaurant known as Stavro’s and which many from around the country and beyond have visited. Being Easter Weekend, all NETC classes had ended yesterday. For those who admire good “truck work” – in the photos you’ll note multiple ground ladders were placed around the building in addition to the 5 aerials which were quickly summoned to the scene where 4 were actively used.
President Frank Davis of Vigilant Hose Company (the community’s all volunteer fire department // which is located 4 doors west of the fire building) was out back of the fire station, while it was still dark out, cleaning up items from a major 2-day fund-raiser, VHC’s annual Easter Seafood Bonanza, when his pager alerted for the fire – he looked up at the rear portion of the building (easily seen from the fire station’s rear parking lot) and nothing was obvious. Upon reaching the station’s front overhead doors he could see the glow reflecting on windows across the street plus smoke started coming into the firehouse as the overhead doors were going up. He quickly radioed in that he had fire showing (designated the sides, etc.) and immediately requested that a 2nd alarm be transmitted.
The fully occupied 145-year old unsprinklered (pre-existing) building had fire extending out windows on the South Seton Avenue side (Side D) and as apparatus was arriving fire began extending out the front (Side A) meaning that the main interior stairwell had already become compromised as it was heavily involved in fire. Fortunately, there were no deaths and only one injury (a civilian with a cut to the hand) and equally amazing was that the structure did not collapse during the fire as had been potentially feared by generations of area firefighters. As can be seen in the photos heavy fire conditions were present as fire personnel arrived.
The circa 1865 fire building, whose construction was completed at the end of the Great Civil War, sits at the corner of East Main Street (MD Route 140) and South Seton Avenue (the road that passes in front of NETC). The “Old Hotel on the Square” as it commonly known today went by various names over the years – Eagle Hotel, Slagle Hotel and Western Maryland Hotel – and had always been of special concern to firefighters as well as state and local fire marshals for decades due to limited egress and its construction. Used in the modern era for rental apartments, all or nearly all of those displaced today reportedly had no insurance.
Although fought via aggressive interior firefighting efforts, operations were shifted from offensive to defensive given the age of the building and the numerous structural renovations that have occurred over the years. Authorities from the Frederick County Sheriffs Office (trained in fire investigations) plus fire investigators from the Frederick County Department of Fire and Rescue Services and the Maryland State Fire Marshal’s Office worked together to determine the actual cause of the fire and further interactions. The building was condemned by building inspectors with further review by structural inspectors planned to determine structure stability. A civilian living in the building is credited with saving lives by her actions of quickly alerting residents.
Here’s the link to theVigilant Hose Company of Emmitsburg’s web ite for some great photo series of the incident, HERE
For those of you that have attended courses at the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland; many of you have eaten at Stavro’s Pizza or passed this building onthe way into town in the four corners of Emmitsburg. A major fire broke out early Saturday morning. Here’s a link to a series of photographs thanks to the USFA’s Mark Aaron Whitney, HERE . The fire building is a few doors down from both the Ott House and the Fire Station. No information on any injuries or status of the occupants as this posting. Latest Here
NIOSH released it’s report on the August 24, 2009 three alarm fire at 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo, New York that resulted in the LODD of Lt. Charles McCarthy and FF Jonathan Croom. On August 24, 2009, 45-year-old career Lieutenant Charles McCarthy died following a partial floor collapse into a basement fire, and 34-year-old career fire fighter Jonathan Croom was fatally injured while attempting to rescue the Lieutenant. The Buffalo Fire Department was dispatched for “an alarm of fire” with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. Repeated attempts were made to force open this basement door in order to search for trapped civilians, but crews had difficulty gaining access through this door because it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the 1st and 2nd floors with no civilians found.
Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional manpower was sent with special tools to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2. Lieutenant Charles McCarthy and two fire fighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify all fire fighters had exited a 1st floor deli. Lt. McCarthy following a hoseline into the structure, was well ahead of the other two fire fighters when the 1st floor partially collapsed beneath him. McCarthy fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire. The other two fire fighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. Lt. McCarthy made several Mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device. Confusion erupted exteriorly on scene when trying to verify who was calling the Mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement.
The incident commander was aware that he had crews attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure. Simultaneously, FF Croom, a member of the fire fighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside Lieutenant McCarthy’s point of entry when the Mayday calls came out. It is believed that FF Croom knew where the Lt., was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. FF Croom grabbed a tool, went on air, and rushed into the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other fire fighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device alarming. Lt. McCarthy was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but FF Croom was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after Lt. McCarthy’s Mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the 1st floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. the Lt’s. PASS device was still alarming. They were pronounced dead on scene. Four fire fighters and one lieutenant suffered minor injuries during the incident. No civilians were discovered within the structure.
Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity not maintained.
NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
- Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
- Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
- Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
- Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
- Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
- Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
1815 Genesee StreetCONTRIBUTING FACTORS
Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that may have led to the fatalities:
- Working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire.
- Interior condition reports not communicated to command.
- Inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments.
- Crew integrity not maintained.
Time Line from the Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report
3:51 a.m. – fire crews were sent to 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo. When they arrived, they were met by a resident who said he heard people trapped inside. Crews began searching the building, but were eventually ordered out as conditions deteriorated.
4:22 a.m. – Members of Rescue 1 entered the building to make sure all firefighters had evacuated the building. Less than two minutes later the floor in the rear of the building collapsed. Lt. McCarthy of Rescue 1 fell into the basement as the floor collapsed. according to the report, other members of Rescue 1 were unaware of the collapse and only reported hearing a loud noise. McCarthy began calling for help on his radio, but other members of Rescue 1 were unable to determine where the calls were coming from and left the building unaware that Lt. McCarthy was trapped.
4:23 a.m. – Firefighter Croom entered the building after hearing the calls for help. the report says he did not exit the building, apparently falling into the basement near Lt. McCarthy.
4:31 a.m. – An emergency head count was ordered to determine the identity of the missing firefighter. Lt. McCarthy was reported missing at that time, but FF Croom was not. Firefighters in the front of the store reported hearing a pass alarm, but could not reach it due to extreme fire conditions, a weakened floor and continuing collapse.
4:48 a.m. – all crews were ordered out of the building because it had become unsafe.
Later, concerns began to arise that FF Croom was missing. the report says he was erroneously reported in a remote area.
5:46 a.m. – On scene personal realize FF Croom is missing and likely inside the building.
6:10 a.m. – Another head count is taken and FF Croom is reported missing.
9:18 a.m. – the Recovery Group reports that the two missing firefighters had been located in the basement, covered in fallen debris.
9:32 a.m. – the debris is cleared and Recovery Group firefighters reach Lt. McCarthy and FF Croom.
Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report, issued December 2, 2009, HERE
For a comprehensive Power Point Program on Operational Safety at Heavy Timber and Ordinary Construction Occupancys that you can down load, go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting Web Site HERE.
I produced an informational training PPT program and support information that aligned with a previoulsy reported Near Miss Event Report. You can download the PPT Training Program HERE and the PDF File HERE
NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE
It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and traditions that defines the fire service.”- Christopher Naum
The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine coordinated suppression operations in order to identify with; the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations, thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.
Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of Compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.
It begs to suggest that many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies and the need for refined suppression operations within the modern building construction setting.
We assume that the routiness or successes of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel. Does your company, your officers, your commanders, your department treat all things as equals when addressing the variables of structural combat fire operations? Is the equation of Occupancy Risk balanced with Occupancy Type? Are inherent structural stability and compromise conditions adequately identified and considered in the evolving progression of an incident action plan? Or do SOP and SOG’s drive the manner in which fire ground strategies and tactics are orchestrated and implemented at the company task level?
How does this fit into your “culture, values and philosophy as a firefighter, officer or commander?”
The essence of fire service suppression operations is predicated upon the deployment and application of water as an extinguishing agent, in sufficient quantities, location and duration to extinguish a fire within an enclosed structural compartment. The universal engine company correlation of: “putting the wet stuff on the red stuff” is fundamental to structural fire suppression operations but is ambiguous at best in the context of today’s modern building construction, occupancies, structural systems and building features.
We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.
The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine engine company operations in order to identify with the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.
Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.
Considerations for changing fire flow rates, the sizing of hose line and the adequacies for fire flow demand and application rates, staffing needs for safe operations, considerations for defensive positioning and defensive operating postures must be considered, and it warrants repeating again;
Reckless-Aggressive firefighting must be redefined in the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments- with determined, effective and proactive firefighting; New Terminology and operational perspectivies to meet today’s challenges….Here’s your introduction to the new lexicon;
- Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement
- Predictive Strategic Process
- Tactical Deployment Model
- Dynamic Tactical Deployment
- Performance Indicators and Street Aides
- Fire Dynamics
- Resistance
- Resilience
- Structural Systems
- Occupancy Hazard Profiles
The Doctrine of Combat Fire Engagement, coming soon with a new persepctive and outlook on firefighting operations…are you going to be ready?
CNN recently presented an informative piece on the continuing trends in the design and use of engineered structural systems (ESS) . CNN correspondant Gerri Willis provides an informative and insightful look at something the fire service knows all too well. Here’s some additional information for you; According to the Wood Truss Council of America (WTCA), wooden trusses are used in roof systems in more than 60% of all buildings in the United States [SBCMAG 2004]. Truss and related engineered wooden floor systems are also becoming more common. Today, more engineered structures use lighter weight materials, producing …larger spans and clear openings. Trusses can be designed to carry expected loads, be produced economically, be safely handled, and reduce construction costs.
Engineered building components may provide adequate strength under normal loading; but under fire conditions, these truss systems can become weakened and fail, leading to the collapse of roofs, floors, and possibly the entire structure. Truss systems are usually hidden, and fires within truss systems may go unnoticed for long periods of time, resulting in loss of integrity.
Structural design codes often do not factor in this decreased system integrity, as fire degrades the structural members. Fire fighters typically rely on warning signs to indicate imminent truss failure such as roofs and floors that feel spongy or are visibly sagging. Quite often, these warning signs are not good predictors of truss system failures. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) reports that during 1990-2000, structural fires and explosions accounted for 46.1% of all reported fire fighter fatalities (500 of 1,085) [USFA 2002]. Statistics compiled by the WTCA suggest that 4.7% of the total fatalities (108 of 2,286) during 1980-2001 were due to structural collapse [Grundahl 2003b]. Fifteen separate incidents investigated by NIOSH identified at least 20 fatalities and 12 injuries that have occurred from 1998-2003 during fire-fighting operations in buildings containing truss systems.
http://us.cnn.com/video/?/video/living/2009/12/18/willis.new.housing.fire.danger.cnn CNN Reports on ESS Dangers
At least three scenarios can occur in which fire fighters suffer fatalities and injuries while operating at fires involving truss roof and floor systems:
1. While fire fighters are operating above a burning roof or floor truss , they may fall into a fire as the sheathing or the truss system collapses below them.
2. While fire fighters are operating below the roof or floor inside a building with burning truss floor or roof structures , the trusses may collapse onto them.
3. While fire fighters are operating outside a building with burning trusses , the floor or roof trusses may collapse and cause a secondary wall collapse.
Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse
Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building. Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement. The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
- Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
- Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
- Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
- Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
- Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
- Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
- Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
- Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
- Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
- Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
- Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
- Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.
The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.
There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.
This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.
USFA Report; HERE
NFPA Summary; HERE
NFPA Report Order; HERE
Brackenridge Pioneer Hose Co. Memorial, Pennsylvania, HERE
December 3, 2009 marks the 10th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.
The Worcester Six;
Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine 3
Overview
On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dis¬patched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motor¬ist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years. Due to these and other factors, the responding District Chief ordered a second alarm within 4 minutes of the initial dispatch.
The first alarm assignment brought 30 firefighters and officers and 7 pieces of apparatus to the scene. The second provided an additional 12 men and 3 trucks as well as a Deputy Chief. Firefighters encountered a light smoke condition throughout the warehouse, and crews found a large fire in the former office area of the second floor. An aggressive interior attack was started within the second floor and ventilation was conducted on the roof. There were no windows or other openings in the warehousing space above the second floor.
Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors.
Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.
An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.
A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and del¬uge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts.
According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities. (Excerpt from USFA report )
Take a moment to reflect on the events of December 3, 1999 and what they may mean to you. Consider your knowledge and understanding of buildings and structures within your district and surrounding response areas. Remember; “Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety”. For those of you who do not know about this incident, attached is the USFA Incident Report that provides insights into the event and the lessons learned. Also check out the NIOSH Report and numerous archived articles on the web and within various journals.
Take at look at The Worcester Telegram & Gazette which has an archived webpage; http://www.telegram.com/static/fire/video.html
HERE ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 1999 USFA REPORT
1. Abandoned buildings remain a serious threat to the fire service and a danger to the communities in which they stand.
Fire departments have long recognized the danger of abandoned buildings in their communities, and fires in these structures have to be approached with a certain amount of caution and restraint. If questionable structural integrity, unknown hazardous materials, unusual dangers to firefighters, or other extreme risks exist, the buildings should not be entered. It is paramount that the fire service apply tactical risk assessment in its daily operations.
Because of the building design, the fire’s magnitude and location could not be ascertained from the exterior, and the Incident Commander had to assess the risks of sending in teams to evaluate the fire and sending in firefighters for suppression. Initial interior reports did not indicate a serious threat to personnel, and operations were conducted accordingly. To assist arriving crews, a placard system should be instituted which clearly defines the risks at an abandoned building. Subsequent to the fire, Worcester Fire put such a system in place. The process has an added benefit of placing firefighters and/or inspectors on locations which might be at risk and where prefire planning should be initiated.
Risks are not limited to the fire service. Homeless people and drug addicts have been known to inhabit such buildings out of necessity. Ordinary citizens can be impacted by increased crime, and these properties can become a very dangerous playground for inquisitive children. Efforts should be made to renovate or demolish such places even if public funding is not required.
2. Firefighters must make a concerted effort to know the buildings in their response districts.
Commercial buildings, by their very nature, pose additional dangers to firefighters, and their familiarity with any given fire building will help to lower these dangers. Company tours are an excellent way to accomplish this goal, and can serve to strengthen the bonds between firefighters and business owners. Such efforts must be conducted with sensitivity, and observed conditions or problems within a business should be conveyed in a helpful rather than confrontational manner.
3. Fire prevention efforts should be maximized in abandoned and temporarily vacated building to avoid fires in the first place.
Even temporarily vacated properties can be at risk if utilities like water for a sprinkler system or electricity for an alarm system are disconnected. Although service cessation often occurs when properties are the subject of financial problems it may also take place at the end of a lease or during the sale or renovation of a commercial building. Every effort should be made to forward change of occupancy or use information to first response stations.
4. Fire departments should continue to grown their file information on buildings in their communities.
Through the use of mobile computer systems, much information can be forwarded to responding companies and Incident Command during an emergency. Data could include floor plans, occupancies, hazardous materials, water supplies, special hazards, and much more. A system of this type would certainly not be limited to abandoned buildings, but it could be invaluable at such a scene since the probability of an owner showing up is unlikely.
Although this is laborious process, it may also be a valid use of on duty personnel who can gather information during regular shift time and either forward it to fire prevention or enter it themselves on provided computer terminals. Data could be gathered during in-service inspections and tours.
5. Delayed reporting allowed the fire growth to exceed the capabilities of aggressive interior attack suppression.
The exact time of ignition remains an unknown, but it has been established that the fire was burning for a minimum of 25 minutes before smoke was observed venting from the roof. It could have been burning for over an hour and a half. The huge volume of air in the warehouse could supports a large fire without any additional air from the outside.
Because flames weren’t visible from the exterior, passers-by did not recognize the presence of the fire, and it wasn’t discovered until smoke vented from the roof. Even that was apparently not enough to motivate the hundred of average citizens driving on I-290 that evening to call 9-1-1.
The trained eyes of public safety professionals were needed to separate this from “the ordinary” and then react appropriately. By this time, however, most of the second floor of B-building was burning, and few barriers were present to prevent further growth.
The initial report from Ladder 1 on the second floor describes a “room full of fire” in B-building beyond the door in the party wall. This location is some 30 feet from the room or origin, so a one room fire had enough time to engulf the entire floor. A sustained flow of 1000 GPM for 20 minutes had virtually no effect on the fire, and conditions deteriorated around attack crews.
6. Combustible interior finishes contributed to the rapid fire spread.
The concept of having 18 inches of combustible materials on the inside of all exterior walls of a building is almost unthinkable to firefighters. The original cork insulation which appears to have been attached with a tar-like substance provided a large volume of fuel, and additional layers of polystyrene and polyurethane with there ferocious burn characteristics gave this fire enormous intensity.
The area of origin was office space converted from a cold storage area. Under its original design and intent, insulation would only have been placed on exterior walls since the third floor was also cooled. Large amounts of insulation were put into place during the transition and would have included heavy insulation above the suspended ceiling on the underside of the third floor deck. An easily applied insulation would have been sprayed-on polyurethane foam which would have adhered to the wood joists and girders. Once the ceiling tiles were in place, it would not be noticed. The southern wall of the office space would have also required substantial insulation to keep out the cold and to retain the forced hot water heat from the radiators.
The fire fed on ordinary combustibles during its initial growth, but once the ceiling tiles were breached, flame contacted combustible wire insulation and ceiling insulation. The stubborn flames observed by fire crews and the smoke conditions described on upper floors are consistent with the sustained burning of petroleum based products including rigid polystyrene, polyurethane, tar, and glass board.
Proper permitting and on going inspections for construction changes within business occupan¬cies can help reduce non-complaint interior finishes.
7. The fire service should initiate life safety activities early on at a fire scene.
The concept of a Rapid Intervention Team was known to the Worcester Fire Department and was being implemented before the Worcester Cold Storage Fire, but it was not put into place until the 5th alarm on December 3rd. Firefighters had entered an unknown structure over one hour before the team was assigned. It is now standard procedure in Worcester to assign a RIT at the onset of each structure fire attack.
The first radio transmission by the Safety Officer was 10 minutes after the RIT was assigned. For control and monitoring of personnel, structural integrity, and other safety concerns, this position should also be filled early on. In an ideal fire scene, the Safety Officer and RIT would be in place before the first firefighters enter the building. Command should strive to have these jobs filled as early as possible even if doing so escalates the event to a higher alarm level to provide sufficient personnel. A system of personnel accountability should be in place. Someone should be tracking who enters the building, the time of entry, and time of exit. Firefighters who are nearing expected times of air exhaustion could then be contacted to ascertain their safety. The establishment of a Safety Officer at the onset of an event can work towards the goal of accountability. The Safety Officer need not be a department officer but could be a chief’s aide or available firefighter familiar with the duties and responsibilities of the assignment.
8. Large buildings such as warehouses and highrise merit unique search techniques and tools.
While the standard air bottle for SCBA has a 30 minute capacity, it might be necessary to have available 60 minute bottles for extended search situations and/ or RIT use. Some fire depart¬ments have obtained 60 minute systems for use in confined space rescues or other unusually long events. The 30 minute system has remained the norm in recent years as the necessity of Rehab time has gained prominence, and it would not be advisable to use longer air supplies on a regular basis.
In high rise incidents, it is common practice to carry in extra SCBA bottles. The same can be done in large space searches. Development of equipment and techniques to change bottles in a hot environment would give extra range to rescuers, and it could prolong their survival should their own rescue be required.
Long lifelines should be maintained for entry crews in these types of structures as well as marking devises for the interior. These devices include luminescent stickers to show direction, labels to signify searched areas, and other commercially available products. Their effectiveness, how¬ever, depends on their use. And the fire service should incorporate these procedures into more common firegrounds, such as single family houses. The time to try out a new technique is not during a major fire scene.
For searches involving extended distances, it might be helpful to position secondary search teams part way into a search area. They can wait in reserve in case they are needed, and they can serve as a rescue team for civilians or firefighters.
Finally, all firefighters who enter a structure must be wearing an SCBA. Worcester Fire has such a policy. Although the facemask and air may not be needed, it must be available. This includes chief officers, aides, and ladder personnel. Even firefighters who are outside structure like apparatus drivers should have SCBA protection available in case of wind shifts or air born particles and debris. With the preponderance of hazardous materials in businesses and residences, SCBA’s use is an essential.
9. Techniques must be improved to better track the movements of firefighters within a structure.
Under current technology limitations, Incident Command is essentially limited voice communication/radio to track the movements of firefighters once they enter a building and disappear from sight. IC normally knows where a crew entered and possibly what their destination is, but without good radio reports, the exact movements and locations of crews are uncertain at best.
Rescue 1’s crew and Engine 3’s Lieutenant both had difficulty communicating their positions which complicated and delayed rescue attempts. Crews continued to search multiple floors in the warehouse because of this uncertainty tying up precious personnel resources and adding more congestion to Stairway 3.
Despite all lost firefighters wearing integral PASS alarms on their SCBA’s, no surviving firefighters recalled hearing them at any time. The building insulation may have absorbed much of their sound, and the ever present background noise of the fire scene itself may have obscured the rest.
10. Radio channels are often overloaded at multiple alarm fires, and alternatives must be explored.
The 800 Mhz trunked radio system used by the Worcester Fire Department had several major failures during this event. Mechanical failure of individual units occurred when the “emergency alert” button on the hand microphone shorted out on contact with water. Fire Alarm repeatedly ordered individual radio operators to shut down, and this took precious air time during an escalating multiple alarm event. In some cases the microphones were detached in the field at which time they functioned normally. Microphones without the alert button were placed on all radios after the conclusion of this fire. During interior operations, there were 1,000 “push-to-talks” registered for the Operations A talk group, the assigned fireground channel.
Like many progressive fire departments, Worcester has taken steps to insure that all crews enter¬ing a fire building have radio communications. A typical piece of apparatus carries one portable for the officer and one for a second firefighting crew. All members of the Rescue Company carry portables. Having multiple radios is good for safety, but their use requires significant training and discipline. It is all too easy to clog up the air with nonessential transmissions.
In some events it may even be necessary to use more than one radio and frequency to properly manage the incident. This would require someone to assist the Incident Commander and keep communications in order. If nothing else, a fireground frequency must be adopted by Command and all working units. One possible way to limit talk time would be to have a staging officer communicate with, and pass along assignments to incoming companies on a frequency other than those used for dispatch and fireground command. Once an assignment was initiated, the company would switch over to the fire- ground channel.
Departments must also choose their radio equipment carefully. The band used must be the best for the standard physical environment in which operations are conducted. Urban departments working inside cement buildings have requirements that contrast greatly with a rural department operating over long geographical distances. If transmission quality continues to suffer, the use of mobile repeaters or other devices might need to be explored.
11. The use of Thermal Imaging Cameras should be further developed.
The Thermal Imaging Camera has become a useful rescue and investigative tool for the fire ser¬vice over the past six years. Although early models had some operational problems, the latest versions are reliable and offer more options such as transmission capabilities. It is a device that belongs in every fire department, but its high cost has prevented the purchase by many agencies. Sales volume will hopefully bring down the price of this beneficial tool.
The camera used at the Worcester fire failed to operate properly, and the manufacturer attributed the problem to thermal overload. This was an early model, and the rescue crew using it was nearly prevented from entering the warehouse by the high heat. Their attempt to enter was one of the last, and no other crews made significant interior progress.
Under this high heat, the effectiveness of the device is questionable. Thermal imaging devices work well in cooler environments where the body temperature of a victim is higher than the surrounding air or a hot spot within a wall is warmer than the abutting construction. At high heat levels, these cameras will often “white out” because everything in its view is hot enough to affect the imager. If a victim was down in elevated heat, he would absorb the thermal energy of his environment. The turnout gear, for instance, would get hotter and the camera would not be able to differentiate between it and its surrounds. The survivability of a person in high heat for an extended time is negligible.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should
ensure that inspections of vacant buildings and pre-fire planning are conducted which cover all potential hazards, structural building materials (type and age), and renovations that may be encountered during a fire, so that the Incident Commander will have the necessary structural information to make informed decisions and implement an appropriate plan of attack
ensure that the incident command system is fully implemented at the fire scene
ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed when activities, size of fire, or need occurs, such as during multiple alarm fires, or responds automatically to pre-designated fires
ensure that standard operating procedures (SOPs) and equipment are adequate and sufficient to support the volume of radio traffic at multiple-alarm fires
ensure that Incident Command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene
use guide ropes/tag lines securely attached to permanent objects at entry portals and place high-intensity floodlights at entry portals to assist lost or disoriented fire fighters in emergency escape
ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position upon their arrival at the fire scene
implement an overall health and safety program such as the one recommended in NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program
consider using a marking system when conducting searches
identify dangerous vacant buildings by affixing warning placards to entrance doorways or other openings where fire fighters may enter
ensure that officers enforce and fire fighters follow the mandatory mask rule per administrative guidelines established by the department
explore the use of thermal imaging cameras to locate lost or downed fire fighters and civilians in fire environments
In addition,
manufacturers and research organizations should conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters on the fireground.
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9947.html
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The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel. We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.
You should make time this weekend and slide on over to the United States Fire Administration (USFA) web site HERE. USFA Report HERE. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) released the report Firefighter Fatalities in the United States in 2008.
An overview of the 118 firefighters that died while on duty in 2008:
The total breakdown included 66 volunteer, 34 career, and 18 Wildland agency firefighters. There were 5 firefighter fatality incidents where 2 or more firefighters were killed, claiming a total of 18 firefighters’ lives.26 firefighters were killed during activities involving brush, grass or Wildland firefighting, more than twice the number killed the previous year. Activities related to emergency incidents resulted in the deaths of 75 firefighters;
- 28 firefighters died while engaging in activities at the scene of a fire.
- 21 firefighters died while responding to, and 3 while returning from, emergency incidents.
- 12 firefighters died while they were engaged in training activities.
- 13 firefighters died after the conclusion of their on-duty activity.
- Heart attacks were the most frequent cause of death for 2008 with 45 firefighter deaths
Take a look at the issues, the factors and the causes.
Take the time to think about what you can personally do to make a change, and what your company or agency must do, to support LODD reduction. Especially for those situations that are in OUR control.
