State investigators have cited the San Francisco Fire Department for “serious” worker safety violations in the deaths of two firefighters killed battling a Diamond Heights house fire in June. Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE  and HERE.

 Firefighters lost track of Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, after they went into the four-level home at 133 Berkeley Way on June 2 and failed to respond quickly to the men’s last radio communication, investigators with the state Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health said in a report issued Monday.

In recommending that the Fire Department be fined $21,000, the state investigators also said the department had violated state rules requiring that two firefighters be designated outside to assist any two firefighters who venture into a life-threatening environment.

Only one firefighter from Perez and Valerio’s engine company – the first on the scene – was available to come to their help during the blaze, the investigation found.

The state also cited the Fire Department for an incident – evidently before the fatal flareup – in which an unidentified battalion chief ventured into the burning building alone, without keeping in contact with Perez and Valerio. That was also deemed a serious violation of safety rules.

“These are serious in that they had protocols in place, but they weren’t following them,” said Erika Monterroza, spokeswoman for the worker safety agency. “There’s no question that a lack of communications was a big issue here. The investigator found there was a breakdown there.”

Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White said the department would appeal the findings. She said state officials have told her commanders that the violations fell short of finding the department’s actions responsible for the two firefighters’ deaths. “None of the citations involved a direct cause of the line-of-duty deaths,” Hayes-White said. Monterroza confirmed that, saying the exact circumstances of the firefighters’ deaths could not be determined.

Valerio, Perez and a third member of Engine Company 26 in Diamond Heights were the first firefighters to arrive at the mid-morning blaze, which started when a sparking electrical outlet set curtains on fire.

The third firefighter manned the pumper hose while Valerio and Perez went inside to fight the fire, but the safety regulations require a fourth firefighter to be available outside to assist.

A scene commander, identified by firefighters as Battalion Chief Thomas Abbott, ordered a crew from Engine Company 24 to back up Valerio and Perez inside the building. For several minutes, however, scene commanders tried to find the Engine 26 firefighters, without success.

There was an unspecified gap between that last communication and any effort by firefighters to respond over the radio or track down the men, the state investigation found.

The reports goes on to state that Hayes-White said the department’s investigative report – still in draft form – concluded that the fire had melted one of the firefighters’ microphone cords, cutting off communications. She said any delay in firefighters’ response would be addressed in the final report.

Firefighters ultimately found Perez and Valerio in a landing area and carried the injured men outside. Perez was pronounced dead at San Francisco General Hospital, and Valerio died there two days later.

The state probe also faulted the actions of the unnamed battalion chief who went into the building “alone and also did not remain in contact with the firefighters who were inside.”

Hayes-White said the battalion chief had gone inside only briefly, had seen Perez and Valerio alive and had never been out of other firefighters’ view.

Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/02/BANQ1M7JBO.DTL#ixzz1fUEug7hu

Previous Coverage on CommandSafety.com below:

• 2nd San Francisco Firefighter Dies After Diamond Heights Fire
• San Francisco FD: The Diamond Heights Fire Updates
• Flags at the NFFF Memorial; SFFD LODD

Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.   

For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.   

The Worcester Six;   

• Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
• Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
• Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
• Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
• Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
• Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine

On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.   

• From last year’s posting and links here at CommandSafety.com: HERE
• • Take at look at The Worcester Telegram & Gazette which has an archived webpage; http://www.telegram.com/static/fire/video.html
  • Derelict buildings marked after Mass. LODDs
  • Haunting memories spurred Mass. chief to positive action
  • Special 10 Year Anniversary Coverage HERE
  • NIOSH REPORT HERE
  • USFA REPORT HERE

 A video clip of a structure fire occurring in a single family residential occupancy shows, in the first few frames a back draft occurring per-arrival of fire services. It’s apparent there is a developing and progressing fire in the Charlie division which may have originated in the, or vicinity of the detached garage (B-C) which had a breezeway connected to the main house.  

Alpha Street View

The large volume hip style (concealed space) roof may have become rapidly charged with elevated temperatures, superheated gases, products of combustion and possibly the initial stages direct flame extension through the eaves and into the truss loft.  Incident scene operations photos depict an engineered structural roof system.

Aerial View- Divisions

Building Profile

• Single family (SFD), Residential Occupancy
• Built: 1981
• 2, 263  Sq. Ft.
• 4 Bedrooms
• 2 Bathrooms
• 7 Rooms
• Detached Garage
• Wood frame, slab on grade
• Type/Class- V/5
• Brick Veneer
• Divisions:
• A-      Street
• B-       SFD Residential; similar
• C-       Yard, with Detached Garage (B-C) and large room extension
• D-      SFD Residential; similar

Aerial Alpha and Charlie with Roof

Roof Profile

Pre-arrival fire conditions exhibit indicators that suggest the need for the rapid intervention of arriving companies and a coordinated aggressive posture tactically if the incident action plan is formulated to achieve an interior attack. Given the scenario of the backdraft conditions, the likelihood for a degraded or compromised ceiling membrane enclosure (intact ceilings, thus limiting fire extension)  being present will hamper and may be an operational concern for interior operating companies as fire conditions continue to grow in magnitude and severity and full extend and take command of the truss loft enclosure.

These fire conditions will extend into the space, resulting in degradation of the structural components and roof assembly-which will present a high risk potential for isolated or catastrophic collapse. This intrusion into the truss loft would require interior operating company officers to maintain attentiveness towards the effectiveness and progress of tactical suppression and support tasks with the potential for fire quickly dropping into operating areas and affecting firefighter safety.

Coordinated and timely vertical ventilation and roof work may be warranted if part of the normal operating parameters of the fire service agencies. In some areas of the county, vertical ventilation is not considered a tactical functional objective and is not implemented.

Adequate fire flow for suppression must be established early on in the operations, if an interior attack is implemented. Projected fire intensity and severity may challenge initial engine companies if hand lines and fire flow rates and the placement of hose streams are ineffective or marginal.  In the event of master stream operations it would be crucial to ensure interior fire suppression operations are suspended, a transition to a defensive mode is communicated and acknowledge on the fireground with collapse zone considerations.

Operational Considerations

In viewing the video of pre-arrival conditions and fire parameters and indicators; as an arriving company officer or commanding officer, how would you establish your incident action plan (IAP) and establish operations? Present and discuss why you would make these decisions, what is/are the basis?

What would you be considering in the areas of:

• Building Integrity
• Collapse Potential
• Interior Fire Attack Considerations
• Resource Needs: Staffing and Apparatus
• Critical Operational Tasks
• Apparatus Placement
• Hose Line Placement
• Safety Considerations  
• Exposures
• Contingency Issues: What can go wrong?  

 Assuming you are just arriving on scene and observe the backdraft conditions from the front seat; What would your operational IAP be and why?

Identify and discuss the types of mission critical size-up consideration that must be recognized and processed?

How does apparatus placement affect incident operations?

What first-due operational factors have you experienced that were contingent upon other tasks or considerations that were apparent to you or you implemented?

How does extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics affect your fire ground position?

 How does this scenario and building size and type relate to similar structures and occupancies in your district or mutual aid/greater alarm response area?

Link

• Fire ground operational photos: http://www.877famous7.com/HF052311.htm
• Buildingsonfire.com YouTube Channel, HERE

• 

  Charlie Division

Training Download and Discussion Questions

• http://buildingsonfire.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/PreArrivals11.19.11.pdf

Training Download from Buildingsonfire.com

Los Angeles Firefighters Battle Major Emergency at Townhouses Under Construction

Under-construction building fire forces dozens of evacuations

Six Townhouses Under Construction Photo, Onscene.TV

Townhouses Under Construction Aerial Screen capture from CBSLA.com

Operational Divisions with Exposures (Pre-Construction) Bing Maps

A townhouse complex under construction caught fire on November 10, 2011, in the Brentwood neighborhood of Los Angeles (CA).  The six-unit, wood-framed complex was in its construction phase, where at least two of the units were fully involved in fire upon arrival of LAFD companies. Four of those six structures were severely damaged as a result of the construction stage and the degree of open wood frame construction resulting in rapid flame spread and extension to a nearby residential buildings.

According to published reports, the Los Angeles Fire Department was called at 3:37 a.m.  to 12315 Gorham Avenue which resulted in a major emergency alarm classification decared and resulted in the dispatch and deployment of over 160 firefighters to the site. First arriving companies found a large townhome development with “heavy fire showing.”

Largely due to an aggressive fire attack by the LAFD, the footprint of this blaze was kept in-check and fully extinguished in one hour and 39 minutes. Fortunately, there were no injuries to any civilians or Firefighting personnel.

Additionally, five adjacent structures were evacuated for precaution. Two of those structures- one, a small apartment complex and the other, a single family dwelling, did sustain significant fire damage. As many as 10 families were displaced from those two occupancies.

Following further investigation, the LAFD stated it believed the fire was intentionally set. 

According to LAFD.Blogspot.com the following  companies were dispatched with Units: E19 RA19 E237 E37 T37 RA37 EM9 BC9 E59 E261 T61 E26 E292 T92 E71 E269 T69 E62 E263 T63 E43 DC3 SQ21 EM14 BC18 BC10 BC4 BC11 BC14 T88 E288 E88 UR88 RA88 RA827 BC5 E63 H6 RA59 RA92 RA71 EM11 E290 AR2 E94 E226 T26 E93 E210 T10 E15 T66 E266 RT59 EA2 EA1 E229 T29 E203 T3 E233 T33 E68 RA17 RA909 RA867 EM17 AR9 AR17 AR11 AR3 T29 E229 T94 E294 E3 E12

Construction Site Operational Considerations (not inclusive)

• Pre-Fire Plan Large Construction Projects
• Understand the various Phases to a Construction Project and how they affect fire operations
• Identify and train for nonconventional Strategic and Tactical operational actions
• Ensure predetermined multiple alarm resources are identified and greater alarms are established
• Train your Company and Command Officers to address Construction site fires
• Maintain an appropriate risk profile balance with operational needs with personnel safety foremost
• Clearly establish multiple Safety Offices and establish geographical resources within the incident management system for reconnaissance, communications, and oversight and focused safety monitoring
• Know you water supply and system capabilities and limitations
• Determine fire flow needs based upon construction phases, as these change over time as the building goes up. Match fire flow demands with resource availability (time of day gaps etc.)
• Identify exposures (Physical structures and Civilians) and ensure they are calculated into the incident action plan at the right before there are identified needs or concerns
• Companies shall maintain a conservative safety posture; this is not the time for overly aggressive firefighting, it is the time for smart firefighting that can be highly efficient
• Always consider collapse zones: partial or complete. Stay out of them!
• Respect the wind; it’s not going to help you
• Consider current and projected weather conditions in your operational and tactical plans and assignments
• Did I already say: Pre-fire Planning?
• Be calculated in the placement of your apparatus, especially in larger scale incidents that are defined under greater geographical divisions
• The fire usually consumes the available fuel load rapidly; going from a Huge fire, to one that is sometimes much more manageable; just watch and control your exposures and degree of fire extension.  Don’t help to make the fire even bigger through ineffective and dysfunctional command and control
• Anticipate, Project, Plan and Engage
• Respect the Fire: it’s not going to play by the regular rules of combat fire suppression and engagement as in finished and enclosed structures and buildings.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

Photo: Firefighters hose down smoldering embers after a large fire gutted a townhouse complex under construction in Brentwood. Credit: Al Seib / Los Angeles Times

Additional Links

• Refer to Construction Site Fire: Three Alarm Fire: Apartment Complex under Construction ignites October, 2011 LA County (FD) CA HERE
• http://lafd.blogspot.com/2011/11/major-emergency-blaze-at-brentwood.html
• http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/133606123.html
• http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/fire-destroys-townhouse-construction-in-brentwood.html
• Bing Mapping, HERE
• http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-brentwood-apartment-fire,0,2381645.story
• http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/10-families-displaced-in-brentwood-blaze.html

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

Commercials and Collapse Awareness

In response to numerous requests from our recent posting; Commercials- Got Fire? Anticipate Collapse briefing post (HERE). We have developed and produced a comprehensive download in PDF format of the entire article that can be used for training, distribution and discussions.

 Click on the image above and download the PDF file and use accordingly  or download HERE

 There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.

You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations at commercial building fires.

Commercial Fire and Collapse

Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments.

It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.

Got Fire?……Anticipate Collapse..

A recent video clip making its way around the cyber fireground clearly depicted a very close-call and resulting near miss event to four firefighters at a four alarm fire involving a commercial building that housed an established insulation manufacturer and installation contractor.

The video shows within a very compressed time frame, the progression of rapidly deteriorating interior conditions, the adverse affects on the building’s structural systems and the results from the loss of load transfers that lead to a catastrophic wall collapse  narrowly missing the crew of firefighters who were operating a hand line in the vicinity of an exterior overhead door. Fortunately the injuries sustained to the firefighters were minor in nature; however the consequences and results from this collapse could have been far different and significantly more severe.

Following a series of repeated viewings of the video clip and with each successive viewing, it became readily apparent that there was a lot more to these images of the collapse and the cursory focus on the resulting near miss event. Closer examination of the video clip and the still frames brought to light some obvious conditions and indicators that easily become lost in the rapidity of the sequence of the collapse; which really has the true story to be told.

It’s the mechanism and sequence of the collapse, the dynamics of the building’s performance and the building indicators that provide a training opportunity in further examining key factors, presenting insights that could be a focus for operational and command personnel at future incidents with common parameters and gaining some mental models in recognition-primed decision making that contribute to the naturalistic decision-making process.

If you know what to be looking for, then when you see it, you may be able to anticipate, project and implement in rapid succession appropriate measures dictated by the incident.

Four Alarm Commercial Building Fire with Collapse: Fire Photo by Ben Goldberry

In an effort to promote additional insights and bring forward these fundamental observations and experienced-based presumptions extended from these and other news video images, still photographs, additional reporting research and examination, and a review of other published media resources; the following observations presented in this overview brief are being conveyed to increase firefighter, company and command level awareness of key collapse indicators such as those present at this commercial fire  and to further the concept of adaptive fireground management principles and increase awareness of fundamental building performance indicators and principles to help you increase your intuitive observations skills and translate them into proactive operational actions on the fireground-before an adverse condition occurs.[ i.e., being five steps ahead of the fire conditions].

Although this briefing makes use of the images and conditions depicted in the video clip and encountered by the fire department evident in the images; the susequent commentary and  insights provided are not meant to provide  direct or indirect opinions, renderings, criticism or censure  towards the conduct of operations or the management of the incident by the respective department and it’s firefighting, command and support personnel who operated at the actual fire and experienced this near miss event first-hand.

We are grateful that the events of this alarm precluded anything worst occurring given the potential seriousness of the prevailing  incident conditions and commend the  fire department and it’s firefighters that provide these exceptional services each and every day to the citizens they serve and to the community they protect, in mitigating this serious fire; safely and successfully.

This incident and the resulting near-miss captured by the videographer provides the Fire Service with an exceptional opportunity given today’s far reaching capabilities of eMedia, this web site and direct and indirect readers, links, tweets, likes, reposting’s, uploads, downloads and sharing  an opportunity to share the consequences of an extreme close-call and learn from it in a positive and constructive manner, so that firefighters, company officers, commanders and support personnel can better predict with knowledge, insight and at times intuition a better understanding of buildings and the structures and occupancies we operate within on the fireground.  

There are numerous inherent indicators present at every incident scene we operate at that. As is in this near miss event and building collapse; it’s sometimes the subtle things that need to gain the attention of operationg companies and personnel and the ability to rapidly process, recognize and react.

 Remember this: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

As a generality; it’s important to note that given heavy fire involvement in a structure (got fire), adaptive fireground management considerations would promote conservative considerations to anticipate and expect collapse (degraded or compromise; limited or catastrophic).

In the case of fires in commercial occupancies and buildings with;

• Large Square footage/Floor areas
• Significant fire loads
• Large open structural system spans lacking compartmentation, 
• Unprotected steel components and assemblies 
• No Sprinkler Systems
• Omitted, compromised or degraded passive or active protective  or suppression systems
• Significant openings along the exterior building envelope
• Significant opening on the roof enclosure
• Deep seated fires or rapidly escalating and extending fires

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. 

Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. Its alot more than that, with far greater consequences that may be very unforgiving.

Aerial Plan of Building and Collapse Area A-B

The Building

The fire incident involved a single story commercial building occupying approximately 32, 200 square feet of area on a multiple building site with proximal exposures.  Manufacturing, warehousing and offices comprised the building’s operational use.  An aerial plan view shows the geographical building scene divisions and the location and relationship of the Alpha- Bravo Side collapse zones that affected operations and resulted in the close-call and firefighter near-miss. The proximity of exposures, physical layout and orientation can be further assessed.

 A review of public documents and records, incident reports and various media resources  provided the following insights;

Overview Details

Alpha Street Side View- Adapted from Google Streetmaps

The view of the alpha street side identifies the building front facade, its main office entrance (center between dual overhead doors on the left and right). Pronounced on the alpha side facade is the presence of four (4) equally spaced overhead (OH) doors that provide direct access into the building’s interior. The subsequent collapse area is depicted at the A-B corner with special attention drawn to relationship of the wall plane and OH door proximity.

The relationship and this wall surface ( area square footage) and the presence of the OH door opening to the wall/ roof interface area that subsequently became compromised and collapsed is critical in further understanding the mechanism of the collapse sequence and also the positive effect it had on the survivability of the firefighters who were within the collapse zone at the time of the wall failure.

Don’t Always Stress the Corners

It’s been a common practice and fundamental fireground consideration to define the corner of a typical building as having safety considerations and prominence in the context of ladder company operations, laddering and roof work and in the placement of personnel and positioning of fireground operations.

Corner Building Operational considerations have included, but limited to;

• Provides a potentially safe(er) area of operational refuge
• Provides a location to safely position ground ladders for roof access/egress
• Provides a location that has a potential  higher degree of assurance for maintaining structural integrity in the event of a collapse condition of an outer wall
• Will not fail in a catastrophic or monolithic manner due to the postulated presence of structural members on the vicinity of either the wall enclosure and/or the roofing structural system and assemblies
• The design and construction configuration and orientation of the ninety degree angle of the building’s outer wall envelope (at the corner)  provides predicated inherent structural stability
• The  typical type of structural or envelope construction may have a resulting  ninety degree building corner having a more robust resistance to collapse and compromise due to the various types of enclosure systems (methods and materials) and assemblies and needed stability per engineering principles

In this instance (as shown in the Alpha side street view),  the presence of the large overhead door in close proximity to the corner wall intersection and transition ( A-B side), actually makes this position, fireground proximity and travel paths highly prone to early and complete collapse potential in the event of a loss of the wall-roof component or assembly integrity or in the load bearing/transfer capabilities of the wall-roof assembly. 

• The presence and identification of a corner configuration similar to this in a commercial structure should result in a higher degree of considerations and risk assessment when formulation and deploying operational assignments and in the placement of personnel for task assignments in this proximity.
• This operational area should be considered as a candidate for designation as a collapse zone based upon projected or defined operational considerations, incident conditions and predictive building characteristics, systems, materials and fire dynamics and conditions.  

Alpha-Bravo Corner of Subsequent Collapse Aerial View

• The entire perimeter of the alpha side could be considered for a restricted collapse zone just in terms of wall opening alone sans the degree of actual or projected interior fire impingement or fire involvement.

 Aerial Overhead view of the building perimeter walls along the four divisions ( A-D) with the A-B corner that subsequently experienced the wall-roof compromise and resulting collapse.

 The A-B corner and the affected ground areas around the collapse zone. Considerations for a collapse zone area on the A-B corner would have resulted in a minimum distance of twenty five (25) feet from the building base for all operations within this area. The collapse zone on the Bravo side extends into the exposure building due to its close proximity.

Always consider the building envelope materials of construction and systems present on the building. The use of concrete masonry units (CMU) is common, as is the use of pre-cast concrete and cast-in place and tilt-up concrete construction panels.

Variations in collapse dynamics and mechanisms of collapse may result in sizable increases in collapse zone distances from the building base with consideration for monolithic or partial wall collapse as well as safety considerations for bounce and travel over long distances of modular assembly building pieces ( i.e. concrete blocks, brick venner or material chunks).

We have not discussed collapse considerations for other building envelope systems such as metal panelized systems since these have entirely different collapse considerations and profiling, not applicable to this incident and assessment insights. The same is true when considering operating and collapse considerations at commercial buildings with ordinary construction or heavy timber systems (Type or Class III and IV). These to have different rules of predictive building performance and collapse safety considerations.

Typical Interior

Typical Structural System and Components

Interior View with Steel Columns, Open Web Steel bar Joists and Beams

 

 

Typical Open Web Steel Bar Joists w Metal Roof Deck

 

 

Large clear spans provided by the open web steel bar joists allowed for considerable free floor space typical of commercial warehouse occupancies.

Note the use of what appears to be combustible wood storage and staging areas that could have could potentially contribute towards increased fire intensity, extension and further contribute towards adverse affects on the unprotected structural steel components and assemblies.

 

Alpha Side Collapse Area Details: OH Door Pre-Collapse Insights

 

 

 

Pre-Collapse Operations on Alpha side with personnel in close proximty to the building perimeter

 

Pre-Collapse view of Operations on the Alpha side with personnel in close proximity, (within [a] collapse zone) to the building perimeter. It is evident that the degree of interior fire extension and involvement presumes a cautious deployment and placement of personnel in safe operational areas. When operating in such close proximity to the building wall and envelope, it becomes increasingly challenging for company officers and company personnel to monitor overall building performance indicators that may be prevalent or dominant from a view point further away from the building. 

Fire extension, smoke conditions, component or assembly movement or displacement may be readily defined and identified from a vantage point away from the building, requiring additional independent  operational assignments within the division if resources allow.   Otherwise, officers are encouraged to get a big picture view and increase their span of vision of the building and progressing fire conditions and building performance

 

 

 

 

The pre-collapse frame image above identifies the building roof line in relationship to the ground operations, smoke conditions and also the directional flow of the elevated master stream [upper right corner]. The initial  stage of the wall compromise and collapse can be seen in the Bravo wall pulling away. When watching the video, pay close attention first to the stream direction and flow and them at the location and movement of the wall, which is followed in rapid succession with the full wall collapse.

T

 

Close examination of the initial video frames shows the rapid displacement of the portion of the Bravo wall and outward collapse towards the B-Exposure (alleyway) Refer to the Aerial Plan for orientation. The A-B Collapse is progressing from the Bravo side to the Alpha side as loads are being transferred in rapid progression with further collapse expected.

The frame image above shows the bravo wall failing outward with the resulting loss in structural support of the roofing deck assembly.

Rapid fire migration and extension is evident after the wall section collapse with increased flames visible. In the video, one firefighter quickly recognizes the imminent collapse and reacts.

A significant section of wall area is present at the A-B side and progressing from the building corner to the left jamb of the overhead (OH) door. This area and the area directly above the OH door opening is calculated to weigh over 20,000 lbs. 

The early identification and establishment of collapse zone(s) is mission critical especially at commercial buildings due to the considerations for rapidly changing operational conditions that may be a result of or influenced by the following;

• lack of knowledge or understanding of the building’s construction, systems and characteristics
• lack of adequate resources, skills and or capabilities for selected phase operations
• fire loading, combustibles, flammables and other products
• Last of or loss of compartmentation
• fire and protective systems failures or inoperability
• unapproved alterations, additions and renovations to the building, systems and occupancy
• transitions for offensive to defensive operational phases, which at times may results in operating position postures too close to the building
• failure to recognize situational factors that will drive appropriate operational phasing and task deployments
• lack of building performance knowledge
• not considering occupancy risk versus treating the building/fire relationship based upon occupancy type
• not recognizing key collapse indicators and failing to implement timely actions [proactively versus reactionary]
• being four steps behind the fire conditions evident instead of implementing adaptive fire ground management insights [five steps ahead of the evident fire]
• use precise coordination when placing elevated masterstreams into operations with ground personnel operating within close quarters
• understand the effects of master streams on the integrity of building features, assemblies and components

 

 

 

 

 

The image frame above shows personnel operating within an imminent collapse zone directing hand lines into the interior fire area. Further examination of the video  frames clearly shows one firefighter quickly recognizing that a collapse is occurring and attempts to alert the other personnel to retreat. Simultaneously to the collapse progression, the crew immediately retreats away from the collapsing wall and falling building materials.

 

Within the span of four seconds, the wall compromise occurs and collapses on the ground at the A-B corner and immediate area on the alpha side.  The slightly monolithic manner in which the wall plane first peels away and progressively collapsed is interesting for a CMU wall. Possibly due to the outward collapse of the Bravo wall, followed by the rapid succession of failure of the roof-wall connection interface resulted in an transitional downward force that pushed the alpha side wall outward allowing gravity to work its force

 

When operating in close proximity to a heavily involved forward interior condition [exterior position] it is important to maintain focused situational awareness and either directly maintain or delegate responsibilities for observations of fire and smoke progress and conditions while monitoring key functional building performance indicators and collapse pre-cursors. 

 

Additionally, always re-evaluate the effectiveness of deployed and operational hose lines, streams and in water application to ensure they are adequate for the degree of fire suppression being undertaken and the corresponding fire flow requirements. Don’t just assume, determine with validity. [ Refer to Tactical Entertainment]  

 

Obscured by the rapidly defining smoke which is a result of the developing and extending collapse, the frame image 04 below depicts the beginning of the compromise and collapse sequence commencing as a result of the Bravo wall compromise and collapse sequence at the B-A corner that will subsequently peel towards the Alpha side and continue up to the outermost jamb of the overhead door.

 

Pay particular attention to the first three to four seconds of the video clip and review the video clip over a few times;  looking at the operating elevated master stream that is clearly visible and operating from the upper right part of the screen through the smoke plume; follow the direct orientation and stream flowing directly towards the bravo wall plane,  and presumed penetrating into/through the roof deck or impacting through the metal roof deck and wall-roof assembly area at the upper roof edge.

 

 

Image 04

 

 Frame image 04 depicts the rapidly deteriorating conditions that are evident as the collapse sequence continues and the overhead door jamb (left) buckling and adjacent wall failing by way of an outward curl or peel away commencing from the upper (left image) A-B corner at the roof line and then peeling and failing from upper left to right.

 

 

Image 05

 

 

The leading edge of the outward collapsing wall plane ( yellow dotted line) is failing with the greatest material concentration occurring at the A-B edge outward. Fortunately the presence and location of the overhead door opening  lessened the amount and location of wall material ( concrete masonry units-CMU) and contributed to a void area being present and not fully impacting the firefighters who were operating within this collapse zone.

 

In other words, had this been a solid full wall collapse likelihood for significant firefighter injury would have resulted. 

 

The affects of wall/roof compromise should be of focused consideration and monitoring when managing incidents of this size and magnitude in similar occupancies and building features.  Flame and heat  impingment can and will affect the structural integrity of lintels spans, beams and truss connects along roof lines and connections. Look for signs of impingment, degradation or compromise. watch for signs of probable inward/outward or curtain wall collapse.

 

 

 

Image 06

 

The remaining images, frames 06 and 07 depict the location of the firefighters to the wall collapse, the relationship to the wall and roof system and the degree of wall area that became compromised and collapsed.

 

Image 07

 

This brief video clip and these accompanying briefing insights provided a tremendous opportunity to examine in a non-critical manner an actual near miss collapse event and  operational discernments that provide a focused training an awareness opportunity.

When given the time to analyze and assess, some things become so apparent and self-revealing that we might prematurely say why didn’t someone pick up that or those conditions while conducting operations at [an] incident.  It is dependent on a wide variety of factors, conditions and parameters that are difficult at times to identify and harder yet to fully identify as common or contributing factors, errors or omissions.

It’s not always that easy; but contradictory – some time it really is (or should be) that easy.

Some things on the fireground may not be prone to being so readily identifiable or recognized.

It all depends what you’re looking for and whether you have the necessary insights, knowledge and skill sets. Incident priorities, demands, situational focus, awareness or disconnect all may have a part in how and incident is managed and mitigated.

It goes back directly on knowing what to look for and when; at what type of building with which type of occupancy and under what stage or stages of fire development and combat operations or engagement you might be in. It complex, it takes time and experience and learning’s.

There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.

You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.

Links:

•  http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20111031/LOCAL07/310319957

An image from a NIST computer model shows temperature levels during the 2007 Charleston Sofa Super Store fire. Dark blue is ambient temperature; bright red is about 800 degrees C (1500 degrees F). Credit: NIST

Fire Modeling Software

These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Fire Research Division at the NIST. The list of programs is divided into two broad categories below: currently-supported software and archival (unsupported) software. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.

Current Software

These models are being actively developed and supported by the laboratory. Details of the software, including download, development, and support information are included on the individual web pages for each model.

• FDS (Fire Dynamics Simulator) is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of fire-driven fluid flow. The software solves numerically a form of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally-driven flow, with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires.
• CFAST (Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport) is a two-zone fire model used to calculate the evolving distribution of smoke, fire gases and temperature throughout compartments of a building during a fire.

Archival Software

These models are included largely for reference or historical interest and span several decades of development of computational tools in fire research at NIST. As such, they are largely unsupported due to the age of the software.

• ALOFT-FT^TM (A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain) is a computer based model to predict the downwind distribution of smoke particulate and combustion products from large outdoor fires. It solves the fundamental fluid dynamic equations for the smoke plume and its surroundings with flat terrain. The program contains a graphical user interface for input and output and a user modifiable database of fuel and smoke emission parameters. The output can be displayed as downwind, crosswind and vertical smoke concentration contours. Information on using the program is available with on-line help commands in the program.
• ASCOS (Analysis of Smoke Control Systems) is a program for steady air flow analysis of smoke control systems. This program can analyze any smoke control system that produces pressure differences with the intent of limiting smoke movement in building fire situations. The program is also capable of modeling the stack effect created in taller buildings during extreme temperature conditions. The program input consists of the outside and building temperatures, a description of the building flow network and the flows produced by the ventilation or smoke control system. The output consists of the steady state pressures and flows throughout the building. Another newer program, CONTAM, may be more appropriate to some applications than ASCOS.
• ASET-B (Available Safe Egress Time – BASIC) is a program for calculating the temperature and position of the hot smoke layer in a single room with closed doors and windows. ASET-B is a compact easy to run program which solves the same equations as ASET. The required program inputs are a heat loss fraction, the height of the fire, the room ceiling height, the room floor area, the maximum time for the simulation, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the temperature and thickness of the hot smoke layer as a function of time.
• ASMET (Atria Smoke Management Engineering Tools) consists of a set of equations and a zone fire model for analysis of smoke management systems for large spaces such as atria, shopping malls, arcades, sports arenas, exhibition halls and airplane hangers. ASMET is written in C++ language. For program documentation and a description of the input data, the user should refer to NISTIR 5516, Klote, J. H., Method of Predicting Smoke Movement in Atria with Application to Smoke Management, NIST.
• BREAK1 (Berkeley Algorithm for Breaking Window Glass in a Compartment Fire) is a program which calculates the temperature history of a glass window exposed to user described fire conditions. The calculations are stopped when the glass breaks. The inputs required are the glass thermal conductivity, thermal diffusivity, absorption length, breaking stress, Young’s modulus, thermal coefficient of linear expansion, thickness, emissivity, shading thickness, half-width of window, the ambient temperature, numerical parameters and the time histories of flame radiation from the fire, hot layer temperature and emissivity, and heat transfer coefficients. The outputs are temperature history of the glass normal to the glass surface, and the window breakage time.
• CCFM (Consolidated Compartment Fire Model version VENTS) is a two-layer zone-type compartment fire model computer code. It simulates conditions due to user-specified fires in a multi-room, multi-level facility. The required inputs are a description of room geometry and vent characteristics (up to 9 rooms, 20 vents), initial state of the inside and outside environment, and fire energy release rates as a functions of time (up to 20 fires). If simulation of concentrations of products of combustion is desired, then product release rates must also be specified (up to three products). Vents can be simple openings between adjacent spaces (natural vents) or fan/duct forced ventilation systems between arbitrary pairs of spaces (forced vents). For forced vents, flow rates and direction can be user-specified or included in the simulation by accounting for user-specified fan and duct characteristics. Wind and stack effects can be taken into account. The program outputs for each room are pressure at the floor, layer interface height, upper/lower layer temperature and (optionally) product concentrations.
• DETACT-QS and DETACT-T2
  DETACT-QS (DETector ACTuation – Quasi Steady) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature heat detectors and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire. DETACT-QS assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the height of the ceiling above the fuel, the distance of the thermal device from the axis of the fire, the actuation temperature of the thermal device, the response time index (RTI) for the device, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the ceiling gas temperature and the device temperature both as a function of time and the time required for device actuation. DETACT-T2 (DETector ACTuation – Time squared) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature and rate of rise heat detectors, and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire which grows as the square of time. CT-T2 assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the ambient temperature, the response time index (RTI) for the device, the activation and rate of rise temperatures of the device, height of the ceiling above the fuel, the device spacing and the fire growth rate. The program outputs are the time to device activation and the heat release rate at activation.
• ELVAC (Elevator Evacuation) is an interactive computer program that estimates the time required to evacuate people from a building with the use of elevators and stairs. It is cautioned that elevators generally are not intended as a means of fire evacuation, and they should not be used during fires. However, it is possible to design elevator systems that for fire emergencies, and ELVAC can be used to evaluate the potential performance of such systems. ELVAC calculates the evacuation time for one group of elevators. If a building has more than one group of elevators, ELVAC can be run on each group separately. Input consists of floor to floor heights, number of people on floors, number of elevators in the group, elevator speed, elevator acceleration, elevator capacity, elevator door type and width, and various inefficiency factors. The output is a table of elevator travel time, round trip time, people moved, and number of round trips for each floor plus the total evacuation time.
• FIRDEMND simulates the suppression of post flashover charring and non-charring solid-fuel fires in compartments using water sprays from portable hose-nozzle equipment used by the fire departments. The output of the Fire Demand Model (FDM) shows the extinguishing effects of water spray at various flow rates and droplet sizes. The calculations are based on a heat and mass balance accounting for gas and surface cooling, steam-induced smothering, water-spray induced air entrainment, direct extinguishment of the fire by water and the energy transport via inflow and outflow of heat and products of combustion.
• FIRST (FIRe Simulation Technique) is the direct descendant of the HARVARD V program developed by Howard Emmons and Henri Mitler. The fire may be entered either as a user-specified time-dependent mass loss rate or in terms of fundamental properties of the fuel. In the latter case, the program will predict the fire growth rate by considering the changing oxygen concentration and smoke layer conditions in the room of fire origin. It can also predict the heating and possible ignition of up to three targets. The original fire and targets may also be user specified fires. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the rooms and openings, and the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, walls, burning fuel, and targets. The generation rate of soot must be specified, and the generation rates of other species may be specified as a yield of the pyrolysis rate. Among the program outputs are the temperature and thickness of, and species concentrations in, the hot upper layer and also in the cooler, lower layer in each compartment. Also given are wall surface temperatures, heat transfer rates and mass flow rates. MASBANK is used to create and maintain a data base of materials and their fire properties for use by the FIRST program. MASBANK can accommodate 20 properties for up to 50 materials. The program has the capability to add, delete, change, alphabetize and view the material properties in the data bank. Material properties from MASBANK may be transferred directly into the FIRST program.
• Jet is a model for the prediction of detector activation and gas temperature in the presence of a smoke layer.
• FPETool (Software and Documentation) is a set of engineering equations useful in estimating potential fire hazard and the response of the space and fire protection systems to the developing hazard. Version 3.2 incorporates an estimate of smoke conditions developing within a room receiving steady-state smoke leakage from an adjacent space. Estimates of human viability resulting from exposure to developing conditions within the room are calculated based upon the smoke temperature and toxicity.
• LAVENT is a program developed to simulate the environment and the response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with draft curtains and fusible link operated ceiling vents. The model, used to calculate the heating of the fusible links, includes the effects of the ceiling jet and the upper layer of hot gases beneath the ceiling. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the compartment, the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, the fire elevation, the time dependent energy release rate of the fire, the fire diameter or energy release rate per area of the fire, the ceiling vent area, the fusible link response-time-index (RTI) and fuse temperature, the fusible link positions along the ceiling, the link assignment to each ceiling vent, and the ambient temperature. A maximum of five ceiling vents and ten fusible links are permitted in the compartment. The program outputs are the temperature, mass and height of the hot upper layer, the temperature of each link, the ceiling jet temperature and velocity at each link, the radial temperature distribution along the interior surface of the ceiling, the radial distribution of the heat flux to the interior and exterior surfaces of the ceiling, the fuse time of each link, and the vent area that has been opened.GRAPH is a graphics program which runs in conjunction with LAVENT. The results for LAVENT are sent to the data file, GRAPH.OUT, after each prescribed time step. GRAPH then allows the user to choose two sets of variables to be plotted on the screen and has the additional capability of hardcopy output.

Direct Link to NIST: http://www.nist.gov/el/fire_protection/buildings/fire-modeling-programs.cfm

These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Building and Fire Research Laboratory. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.

• ALOFT-FT^TM- A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain
• ASCOS- Analysis of Smoke Control Systems
• ASET-B- Available Safe Egree Time – BASIC
• ASMET- Atria Smoke Management Engineering Tools
• BREAK1- Berkeley Algorithm for Breaking Window Glass in a Compartment Fire
• CCFM- Consolidated Compartment Fire Model version VENTS
• CFAST- Consolidated Fire and Smoke Transport Model
• DETACT-QS- Detector Actuation – Quasi Steady
• DETACT-T2- Detector Actuation – Time squared
• ELVAC- Elevator Evacuation
• FASTLite- A collection of procedures which builds on the core routines of FIREFORM and the computer model CFAST to provide engineering calculations of various fire phenomena,
• FIRDEMND- Handheld Hosestream Suppression Model
• FIRST- FIRe Simulation Technique
• FPETool- Fire Protection Engineering Tools (equations and fire simulation scenarios)
• Jet- A Model for the Prediction of Detector Activation and Gas Temperature in the Presence of a Smoke Layer
• LAVENT- Response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with curtains and ceiling vents
• NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator and Smokeview – The NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator predicts smoke and/or air flow movement caused by fire, wind, ventilation systems etc. Smokeview visualizes the predictions generated by NIST FDS.

Using Fire Models to Understand Fire Behavior NIST’s fire modeling capabilities can help firefighters understand and predict fire conditions, HERE

Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page

On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.

Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.

Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.

Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.

The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.

Building Construction Insights

• Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
• Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”

Fire Building Construction:

• 7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
• The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
• The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.

Collapse Building Construction:

• 6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
• The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
• The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street
  

  Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011

Building Alteration

(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.

(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.

(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.

 The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.

It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.

The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.

The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001. 
 

FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank

Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.

• DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
• BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
• Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
• Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
• Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
• Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
• Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
• Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
• Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
• Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
• Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
• Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18

From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html

• NYFD.com Insights and Photos HERE
• FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary, HERE

• FDNY – Remembering the “23rd Street Fire” October 17, 1966, Facebook Page, HERE

• Personal Account: http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/box598.pdf

• http://ephemeralnewyork.wordpress.com/2009/09/11/the-second-worst-fire-in-new-york-city-history/

• http://www.fdnye16l7.com/History/23rdstreetfire.html

•  New York Times (2006): Oct. 17, 1966, When 12 Firemen Died HERE

• http://firehistory.org/2011/02/october-17th-1966-new-york-ny-23rd-street-fire/

• The Site Today, HERE and HERE

A wreath is laid at the new plaque honoring the 12 FDNY members killed at the 23rd Street fire on Oct. 17, 1966. © FDNY Photo Unit.

FDNY Remembers the 23rd Street Fire on its 45th Anniversary

 Three Franklin (OH) firefighters were caught in what has been determined to be a smoke explosion at a structure fire involving a restaurant occupancy in what appears to be a building of Type III construction that published reports indicated was built in 1892.

Franklin (OH) FD Lt. Kyle Lovelace and firefighters Quincy Pearson and Brad Brown were caught in a smoke explosion while conducting interior fire suppression operations at which time conditions deteriorated and a smoke explosion occurred. Simultaneous with the recognition that something was not good; the crew immediately began to retreat when they were caught in the explosion. All of them luckily made it out unscathed.

According to published reports, “They reverted back to their training and did what they needed to do to get out,” according to Fire Chief Jonathan Westendorf . “We have a flashover simulator and we spend a good amount time talking about it each year.”

Reports have indicated Lt. Lovelace stated that when they arrived on the scene, he noticed smoke coming from left side of the building above the second floor and thought that it may be an attic fire.

They attempted to gain entry through the front door, but before they opened it they noticed a crack in the window and decided to gain entry through the rear. Lt. Lovelace, FF Pearson and FF Brown entered an alley covered by an awning connecting to freestanding structures. Westendorf  later said his guys were fortunate to be in that location because they were isolated from the brunt of the blast.

The crew advanced about 25 feet when FF Pearson, who was on the nozzle, saw wisps of smoke and began to feel extreme heat.

Lt. Lovelace used a thermal imaging camera to locate where the heat was coming from, but right before he could tell Person, he started yelling at him to get out. They made it about 20 feet when the thick black smoke started banking down on them. As Lovelace exited under the awning, conditions quickly worsened and the smoke explosion occurred. Video of blast HERE

Links for complete reporting insights and details;

• http://www.newsnet5.com/dpp/news/backdraft-explosion-puts-ohio-firefighters-in-danger
• Ohio Firefighters Narrowly Escape Smoke Explosion
•  http://www.middletownjournal.com/news/middletown-news/fire-destroys-restaurant-in-downtown-franklin-1263107.html
• http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/44806177/ns/local_news-cincinnati_oh/t/firefighter-veterans-experience-saved-us-backdraft/
• http://www.firefighterclosecalls.com/news/fullstory/newsid/146829

• Flashover Simulator Training Helped Ohio Crew Survive

Photo by Nick Graham Middletown Journal

Alpha side from the Street, Image Capture from Google Street Maps

 

Aerial Image along South Main Street of the Building

Screenshot from video as smoke explosion occurs