Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.
As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.
NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.
During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”
The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.
The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.
This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE. NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE
Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170
State investigators have cited the San Francisco Fire Department for “serious” worker safety violations in the deaths of two firefighters killed battling a Diamond Heights house fire in June. Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE and HERE.
Firefighters lost track of Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, after they went into the four-level home at 133 Berkeley Way on June 2 and failed to respond quickly to the men’s last radio communication, investigators with the state Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health said in a report issued Monday.
In recommending that the Fire Department be fined $21,000, the state investigators also said the department had violated state rules requiring that two firefighters be designated outside to assist any two firefighters who venture into a life-threatening environment.
Only one firefighter from Perez and Valerio’s engine company – the first on the scene – was available to come to their help during the blaze, the investigation found.
The state also cited the Fire Department for an incident – evidently before the fatal flareup – in which an unidentified battalion chief ventured into the burning building alone, without keeping in contact with Perez and Valerio. That was also deemed a serious violation of safety rules.
“These are serious in that they had protocols in place, but they weren’t following them,” said Erika Monterroza, spokeswoman for the worker safety agency. “There’s no question that a lack of communications was a big issue here. The investigator found there was a breakdown there.”
Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White said the department would appeal the findings. She said state officials have told her commanders that the violations fell short of finding the department’s actions responsible for the two firefighters’ deaths. “None of the citations involved a direct cause of the line-of-duty deaths,” Hayes-White said. Monterroza confirmed that, saying the exact circumstances of the firefighters’ deaths could not be determined.
Valerio, Perez and a third member of Engine Company 26 in Diamond Heights were the first firefighters to arrive at the mid-morning blaze, which started when a sparking electrical outlet set curtains on fire.
The third firefighter manned the pumper hose while Valerio and Perez went inside to fight the fire, but the safety regulations require a fourth firefighter to be available outside to assist.
A scene commander, identified by firefighters as Battalion Chief Thomas Abbott, ordered a crew from Engine Company 24 to back up Valerio and Perez inside the building. For several minutes, however, scene commanders tried to find the Engine 26 firefighters, without success.
There was an unspecified gap between that last communication and any effort by firefighters to respond over the radio or track down the men, the state investigation found.
The reports goes on to state that Hayes-White said the department’s investigative report – still in draft form – concluded that the fire had melted one of the firefighters’ microphone cords, cutting off communications. She said any delay in firefighters’ response would be addressed in the final report.
Firefighters ultimately found Perez and Valerio in a landing area and carried the injured men outside. Perez was pronounced dead at San Francisco General Hospital, and Valerio died there two days later.
The state probe also faulted the actions of the unnamed battalion chief who went into the building “alone and also did not remain in contact with the firefighters who were inside.”
Hayes-White said the battalion chief had gone inside only briefly, had seen Perez and Valerio alive and had never been out of other firefighters’ view.
Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.
For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.
The Worcester Six;
Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine
On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
From last year’s posting and links here at CommandSafety.com: HERE
A video clip of a structure fire occurring in a single family residential occupancy shows, in the first few frames a back draft occurring per-arrival of fire services. It’s apparent there is a developing and progressing fire in the Charlie division which may have originated in the, or vicinity of the detached garage (B-C) which had a breezeway connected to the main house.
Alpha Street View
The large volume hip style (concealed space) roof may have become rapidly charged with elevated temperatures, superheated gases, products of combustion and possibly the initial stages direct flame extension through the eaves and into the truss loft. Incident scene operations photos depict an engineered structural roof system.
Aerial View- Divisions
Building Profile
Single family (SFD), Residential Occupancy
Built: 1981
2, 263 Sq. Ft.
4 Bedrooms
2 Bathrooms
7 Rooms
Detached Garage
Wood frame, slab on grade
Type/Class- V/5
Brick Veneer
Divisions:
A- Street
B- SFD Residential; similar
C- Yard, with Detached Garage (B-C) and large room extension
D- SFD Residential; similar
Aerial Alpha and Charlie with Roof
Roof Profile
Pre-arrival fire conditions exhibit indicators that suggest the need for the rapid intervention of arriving companies and a coordinated aggressive posture tactically if the incident action plan is formulated to achieve an interior attack. Given the scenario of the backdraft conditions, the likelihood for a degraded or compromised ceiling membrane enclosure (intact ceilings, thus limiting fire extension) being present will hamper and may be an operational concern for interior operating companies as fire conditions continue to grow in magnitude and severity and full extend and take command of the truss loft enclosure.
These fire conditions will extend into the space, resulting in degradation of the structural components and roof assembly-which will present a high risk potential for isolated or catastrophic collapse. This intrusion into the truss loft would require interior operating company officers to maintain attentiveness towards the effectiveness and progress of tactical suppression and support tasks with the potential for fire quickly dropping into operating areas and affecting firefighter safety.
Coordinated and timely vertical ventilation and roof work may be warranted if part of the normal operating parameters of the fire service agencies. In some areas of the county, vertical ventilation is not considered a tactical functional objective and is not implemented.
Adequate fire flow for suppression must be established early on in the operations, if an interior attack is implemented. Projected fire intensity and severity may challenge initial engine companies if hand lines and fire flow rates and the placement of hose streams are ineffective or marginal. In the event of master stream operations it would be crucial to ensure interior fire suppression operations are suspended, a transition to a defensive mode is communicated and acknowledge on the fireground with collapse zone considerations.
Operational Considerations
In viewing the video of pre-arrival conditions and fire parameters and indicators; as an arriving company officer or commanding officer, how would you establish your incident action plan (IAP) and establish operations? Present and discuss why you would make these decisions, what is/are the basis?
What would you be considering in the areas of:
Building Integrity
Collapse Potential
Interior Fire Attack Considerations
Resource Needs: Staffing and Apparatus
Critical Operational Tasks
Apparatus Placement
Hose Line Placement
Safety Considerations
Exposures
Contingency Issues: What can go wrong?
Assuming you are just arriving on scene and observe the backdraft conditions from the front seat; What would your operational IAP be and why?
Identify and discuss the types of mission critical size-up consideration that must be recognized and processed?
How does apparatus placement affect incident operations?
What first-due operational factors have you experienced that were contingent upon other tasks or considerations that were apparent to you or you implemented?
How does extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics affect your fire ground position?
How does this scenario and building size and type relate to similar structures and occupancies in your district or mutual aid/greater alarm response area?
Los Angeles Firefighters Battle Major Emergency at Townhouses Under Construction
Under-construction building fire forces dozens of evacuations
Six Townhouses Under Construction Photo, Onscene.TV
Townhouses Under Construction Aerial Screen capture from CBSLA.com
Operational Divisions with Exposures (Pre-Construction) Bing Maps
A townhouse complex under construction caught fire on November 10, 2011, in the Brentwood neighborhood of Los Angeles (CA). The six-unit, wood-framed complex was in its construction phase, where at least two of the units were fully involved in fire upon arrival of LAFD companies. Four of those six structures were severely damaged as a result of the construction stage and the degree of open wood frame construction resulting in rapid flame spread and extension to a nearby residential buildings.
According to published reports, the Los Angeles Fire Department was called at 3:37 a.m. to 12315 Gorham Avenue which resulted in a major emergency alarm classification decared and resulted in the dispatch and deployment of over 160 firefighters to the site. First arriving companies found a large townhome development with “heavy fire showing.”
Largely due to an aggressive fire attack by the LAFD, the footprint of this blaze was kept in-check and fully extinguished in one hour and 39 minutes. Fortunately, there were no injuries to any civilians or Firefighting personnel.
Additionally, five adjacent structures were evacuated for precaution. Two of those structures- one, a small apartment complex and the other, a single family dwelling, did sustain significant fire damage. As many as 10 families were displaced from those two occupancies.
Following further investigation, the LAFD stated it believed the fire was intentionally set.
Construction Site Operational Considerations (not inclusive)
Pre-Fire Plan Large Construction Projects
Understand the various Phases to a Construction Project and how they affect fire operations
Identify and train for nonconventional Strategic and Tactical operational actions
Ensure predetermined multiple alarm resources are identified and greater alarms are established
Train your Company and Command Officers to address Construction site fires
Maintain an appropriate risk profile balance with operational needs with personnel safety foremost
Clearly establish multiple Safety Offices and establish geographical resources within the incident management system for reconnaissance, communications, and oversight and focused safety monitoring
Know you water supply and system capabilities and limitations
Determine fire flow needs based upon construction phases, as these change over time as the building goes up. Match fire flow demands with resource availability (time of day gaps etc.)
Identify exposures (Physical structures and Civilians) and ensure they are calculated into the incident action plan at the right before there are identified needs or concerns
Companies shall maintain a conservative safety posture; this is not the time for overly aggressive firefighting, it is the time for smart firefighting that can be highly efficient
Always consider collapse zones: partial or complete. Stay out of them!
Respect the wind; it’s not going to help you
Consider current and projected weather conditions in your operational and tactical plans and assignments
Did I already say: Pre-fire Planning?
Be calculated in the placement of your apparatus, especially in larger scale incidents that are defined under greater geographical divisions
The fire usually consumes the available fuel load rapidly; going from a Huge fire, to one that is sometimes much more manageable; just watch and control your exposures and degree of fire extension. Don’t help to make the fire even bigger through ineffective and dysfunctional command and control
Anticipate, Project, Plan and Engage
Respect the Fire: it’s not going to play by the regular rules of combat fire suppression and engagement as in finished and enclosed structures and buildings.
Photo: Firefighters hose down smoldering embers after a large fire gutted a townhouse complex under construction in Brentwood. Credit: Al Seib / Los Angeles Times
In response to numerous requests from our recent posting; Commercials- Got Fire? Anticipate Collapse briefing post (HERE). We have developed and produced a comprehensive download in PDF format of the entire article that can be used for training, distribution and discussions.
Click on the image above and download the PDF file and use accordingly or download HERE
There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.
You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations at commercial building fires.
Commercial Fire and Collapse
Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments.
It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.
A recent video clip making its way around the cyber fireground clearly depicted a very close-call and resulting near miss event to four firefighters at a four alarm fire involving a commercial building that housed an established insulation manufacturer and installation contractor.
The video shows within a very compressed time frame, the progression of rapidly deteriorating interior conditions, the adverse affects on the building’s structural systems and the results from the loss of load transfers that lead to a catastrophic wall collapse narrowly missing the crew of firefighters who were operating a hand line in the vicinity of an exterior overhead door. Fortunately the injuries sustained to the firefighters were minor in nature; however the consequences and results from this collapse could have been far different and significantly more severe.
Following a series of repeated viewings of the video clip and with each successive viewing, it became readily apparent that there was a lot more to these images of the collapse and the cursory focus on the resulting near miss event. Closer examination of the video clip and the still frames brought to light some obvious conditions and indicators that easily become lost in the rapidity of the sequence of the collapse; which really has the true story to be told.
It’s the mechanism and sequence of the collapse, the dynamics of the building’s performance and the building indicators that provide a training opportunity in further examining key factors, presenting insights that could be a focus for operational and command personnel at future incidents with common parameters and gaining some mental models in recognition-primed decision making that contribute to the naturalistic decision-making process.
If you know what to be looking for, then when you see it, you may be able to anticipate, project and implement in rapid succession appropriate measures dictated by the incident.
Four Alarm Commercial Building Fire with Collapse: Fire Photo by Ben Goldberry
In an effort to promote additional insights and bring forward these fundamental observations and experienced-based presumptions extended from these and other news video images, still photographs, additional reporting research and examination, and a review of other published media resources; the following observations presented in this overview brief are being conveyed to increase firefighter, company and command level awareness of key collapse indicators such as those present at this commercial fire and to further the concept of adaptive fireground management principles and increase awareness of fundamental building performance indicators and principles to help you increase your intuitive observations skills and translate them into proactive operational actions on the fireground-before an adverse condition occurs.[ i.e., being five steps ahead of the fire conditions].
Although this briefing makes use of the images and conditions depicted in the video clip and encountered by the fire department evident in the images; the susequent commentary and insights provided are not meant to provide direct or indirect opinions, renderings, criticism or censure towards the conduct of operations or the management of the incident by the respective department and it’s firefighting, command and support personnel who operated at the actual fire and experienced this near miss event first-hand.
We are grateful that the events of this alarm precluded anything worst occurring given the potential seriousness of the prevailing incident conditions and commend the fire department and it’s firefighters that provide these exceptional services each and every day to the citizens they serve and to the community they protect, in mitigating this serious fire; safely and successfully.
This incident and the resulting near-miss captured by the videographer provides the Fire Service with an exceptional opportunity given today’s far reaching capabilities of eMedia, this web site and direct and indirect readers, links, tweets, likes, reposting’s, uploads, downloads and sharing an opportunity to share the consequences of an extreme close-call and learn from it in a positive and constructive manner, so that firefighters, company officers, commanders and support personnel can better predict with knowledge, insight and at times intuition a better understanding of buildings and the structures and occupancies we operate within on the fireground.
There are numerous inherent indicators present at every incident scene we operate at that. As is in this near miss event and building collapse; it’s sometimes the subtle things that need to gain the attention of operationg companies and personnel and the ability to rapidly process, recognize and react.
Remember this: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
As a generality; it’s important to note that given heavy fire involvement in a structure (got fire), adaptive fireground management considerations would promote conservative considerations to anticipate and expect collapse (degraded or compromise; limited or catastrophic).
In the case of fires in commercial occupancies and buildings with;
Large Square footage/Floor areas
Significant fire loads
Large open structural system spans lacking compartmentation,
Unprotected steel components and assemblies
No Sprinkler Systems
Omitted, compromised or degraded passive or active protective or suppression systems
Significant openings along the exterior building envelope
Significant opening on the roof enclosure
Deep seated fires or rapidly escalating and extending fires
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations.
Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. Its alot more than that, with far greater consequences that may be very unforgiving.
Aerial Plan of Building and Collapse Area A-B
The Building
The fire incident involved a single story commercial building occupying approximately 32, 200 square feet of area on a multiple building site with proximal exposures. Manufacturing, warehousing and offices comprised the building’s operational use. An aerial plan view shows the geographical building scene divisions and the location and relationship of the Alpha- Bravo Side collapse zones that affected operations and resulted in the close-call and firefighter near-miss. The proximity of exposures, physical layout and orientation can be further assessed.
A review of public documents and records, incident reports and various media resources provided the following insights;
Overview Details
Alpha Street Side View- Adapted from Google Streetmaps
The view of the alpha street side identifies the building front facade, its main office entrance (center between dual overhead doors on the left and right). Pronounced on the alpha side facade is the presence of four (4) equally spaced overhead (OH) doors that provide direct access into the building’s interior. The subsequent collapse area is depicted at the A-B corner with special attention drawn to relationship of the wall plane and OH door proximity.
The relationship and this wall surface ( area square footage) and the presence of the OH door opening to the wall/ roof interface area that subsequently became compromised and collapsed is critical in further understanding the mechanism of the collapse sequence and also the positive effect it had on the survivability of the firefighters who were within the collapse zone at the time of the wall failure.
Don’t Always Stress the Corners
It’s been a common practice and fundamental fireground consideration to define the corner of a typical building as having safety considerations and prominence in the context of ladder company operations, laddering and roof work and in the placement of personnel and positioning of fireground operations.
Corner Building Operational considerations have included, but limited to;
Provides a potentially safe(er) area of operational refuge
Provides a location to safely position ground ladders for roof access/egress
Provides a location that has a potential higher degree of assurance for maintaining structural integrity in the event of a collapse condition of an outer wall
Will not fail in a catastrophic or monolithic manner due to the postulated presence of structural members on the vicinity of either the wall enclosure and/or the roofing structural system and assemblies
The design and construction configuration and orientation of the ninety degree angle of the building’s outer wall envelope (at the corner) provides predicated inherent structural stability
The typical type of structural or envelope construction may have a resulting ninety degree building corner having a more robust resistance to collapse and compromise due to the various types of enclosure systems (methods and materials) and assemblies and needed stability per engineering principles
In this instance (as shown in the Alpha side street view), the presence of the large overhead door in close proximity to the corner wall intersection and transition ( A-B side), actually makes this position, fireground proximity and travel paths highly prone to early and complete collapse potential in the event of a loss of the wall-roof component or assembly integrity or in the load bearing/transfer capabilities of the wall-roof assembly.
The presence and identification of a corner configuration similar to this in a commercial structure should result in a higher degree of considerations and risk assessment when formulation and deploying operational assignments and in the placement of personnel for task assignments in this proximity.
This operational area should be considered as a candidate for designation as a collapse zone based upon projected or defined operational considerations, incident conditions and predictive building characteristics, systems, materials and fire dynamics and conditions.
Alpha-Bravo Corner of Subsequent Collapse Aerial View
The view from the Alpha-Bravo Corner shows the collapse zones at grade and the affected area size.
As noted in the preceding narrative, the presence of the overhead door opening along the perimeter wall enclosure and outer envelope creates a risk area that would require monitoring, periodic reconnaissance and assessment during subsequent operations to determine structural stability and potential adverse conditions.
The proximity of the opening in relationship to the corner wall, roof support and structural span of the opening results in a very delicate balance of forces, loads, reliance and dependence that must be maintained for structural integrity and equilibrium.
The entire perimeter of the alpha side could be considered for a restricted collapse zone just in terms of wall opening alone sans the degree of actual or projected interior fire impingement or fire involvement.
Take some time to view the video clip a few times over before proceeding to the next sequence of fame images.
This videographer of this video was Aaron Dohring. (all rights reserved)
Aerial Overhead view of the building perimeter walls along the four divisions ( A-D) with the A-B corner that subsequently experienced the wall-roof compromise and resulting collapse.
The A-B corner and the affected ground areas around the collapse zone. Considerations for a collapse zone area on the A-B corner would have resulted in a minimum distance of twenty five (25) feet from the building base for all operations within this area. The collapse zone on the Bravo side extends into the exposure building due to its close proximity.
Always consider the building envelope materials of construction and systems present on the building. The use of concrete masonry units (CMU) is common, as is the use of pre-cast concrete and cast-in place and tilt-up concrete construction panels.
Variations in collapse dynamics and mechanisms of collapse may result in sizable increases in collapse zone distances from the building base with consideration for monolithic or partial wall collapse as well as safety considerations for bounce and travel over long distances of modular assembly building pieces ( i.e. concrete blocks, brick venner or material chunks).
We have not discussed collapse considerations for other building envelope systems such as metal panelized systems since these have entirely different collapse considerations and profiling, not applicable to this incident and assessment insights. The same is true when considering operating and collapse considerations at commercial buildings with ordinary construction or heavy timber systems (Type or Class III and IV). These to have different rules of predictive building performance and collapse safety considerations.
Typical Interior
The interior of the building included unprotected steel components and assemblies consisting of steel columns, beams and open web steel joists. These common and conventional structural support systems provided large free clear spans, common for typical warehouse and commercial occupancies. The presence and operability of functional fire suppression sprinkler system coupled with passive and active protective devices and compartmentation can help support proactive and aggressive fire suppression efforts in those conditions that have appropriate risk determinations and balanced risk-gain benefits.
The presence of unprotected steel components ( Truss, column, structural beams etc. ) and assemblies requires an understanding of the effects of flame and heat impingement, rate of heat release and fire dynamics, potential for movement and displacement of structural components and effect on assemblies, systems and connections and the effect on structural stability, integrity and building load transfers and displacement that all can adversely affect building performance, integrity and collapse potential
Typical Structural System and Components
Interior View with Steel Columns, Open Web Steel bar Joists and Beams
Typical Open Web Steel Bar Joists w Metal Roof Deck
Large clear spans provided by the open web steel bar joists allowed for considerable free floor space typical of commercial warehouse occupancies.
Note the use of what appears to be combustible wood storage and staging areas that could have could potentially contribute towards increased fire intensity, extension and further contribute towards adverse affects on the unprotected structural steel components and assemblies.
Alpha Side Collapse Area Details: OH Door Pre-Collapse Insights
Pre-Collapse Operations on Alpha side with personnel in close proximty to the building perimeter
Pre-Collapse view of Operations on the Alpha side with personnel in close proximity, (within [a] collapse zone) to the building perimeter. It is evident that the degree of interior fire extension and involvement presumes a cautious deployment and placement of personnel in safe operational areas. When operating in such close proximity to the building wall and envelope, it becomes increasingly challenging for company officers and company personnel to monitor overall building performance indicators that may be prevalent or dominant from a view point further away from the building.
Fire extension, smoke conditions, component or assembly movement or displacement may be readily defined and identified from a vantage point away from the building, requiring additional independent operational assignments within the division if resources allow. Otherwise, officers are encouraged to get a big picture view and increase their span of vision of the building and progressing fire conditions and building performance
The pre-collapse frame image above identifies the building roof line in relationship to the ground operations, smoke conditions and also the directional flow of the elevated master stream [upper right corner]. The initial stage of the wall compromise and collapse can be seen in the Bravo wall pulling away. When watching the video, pay close attention first to the stream direction and flow and them at the location and movement of the wall, which is followed in rapid succession with the full wall collapse.
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Close examination of the initial video frames shows the rapid displacement of the portion of the Bravo wall and outward collapse towards the B-Exposure (alleyway) Refer to the Aerial Plan for orientation. The A-B Collapse is progressing from the Bravo side to the Alpha side as loads are being transferred in rapid progression with further collapse expected.
The frame image above shows the bravo wall failing outward with the resulting loss in structural support of the roofing deck assembly.
Rapid fire migration and extension is evident after the wall section collapse with increased flames visible. In the video, one firefighter quickly recognizes the imminent collapse and reacts.
A significant section of wall area is present at the A-B side and progressing from the building corner to the left jamb of the overhead (OH) door. This area and the area directly above the OH door opening is calculated to weigh over 20,000 lbs.
The early identification and establishment of collapse zone(s) is mission critical especially at commercial buildings due to the considerations for rapidly changing operational conditions that may be a result of or influenced by the following;
lack of knowledge or understanding of the building’s construction, systems and characteristics
lack of adequate resources, skills and or capabilities for selected phase operations
fire loading, combustibles, flammables and other products
Last of or loss of compartmentation
fire and protective systems failures or inoperability
unapproved alterations, additions and renovations to the building, systems and occupancy
transitions for offensive to defensive operational phases, which at times may results in operating position postures too close to the building
failure to recognize situational factors that will drive appropriate operational phasing and task deployments
lack of building performance knowledge
not considering occupancy risk versus treating the building/fire relationship based upon occupancy type
not recognizing key collapse indicators and failing to implement timely actions [proactively versus reactionary]
being four steps behind the fire conditions evident instead of implementing adaptive fire ground management insights [five steps ahead of the evident fire]
use precise coordination when placing elevated masterstreams into operations with ground personnel operating within close quarters
understand the effects of master streams on the integrity of building features, assemblies and components
The image frame above shows personnel operating within an imminent collapse zone directing hand lines into the interior fire area. Further examination of the video frames clearly shows one firefighter quickly recognizing that a collapse is occurring and attempts to alert the other personnel to retreat. Simultaneously to the collapse progression, the crew immediately retreats away from the collapsing wall and falling building materials.
Within the span of four seconds, the wall compromise occurs and collapses on the ground at the A-B corner and immediate area on the alpha side. The slightly monolithic manner in which the wall plane first peels away and progressively collapsed is interesting for a CMU wall. Possibly due to the outward collapse of the Bravo wall, followed by the rapid succession of failure of the roof-wall connection interface resulted in an transitional downward force that pushed the alpha side wall outward allowing gravity to work its force
When operating in close proximity to a heavily involved forward interior condition [exterior position] it is important to maintain focused situational awareness and either directly maintain or delegate responsibilities for observations of fire and smoke progress and conditions while monitoring key functional building performance indicators and collapse pre-cursors.
Additionally, always re-evaluate the effectiveness of deployed and operational hose lines, streams and in water application to ensure they are adequate for the degree of fire suppression being undertaken and the corresponding fire flow requirements. Don’t just assume, determine with validity. [ Refer to Tactical Entertainment]
Obscured by the rapidly defining smoke which is a result of the developing and extending collapse, the frame image 04 below depicts the beginning of the compromise and collapse sequence commencing as a result of the Bravo wall compromise and collapse sequence at the B-A corner that will subsequently peel towards the Alpha side and continue up to the outermost jamb of the overhead door.
Pay particular attention to the first three to four seconds of the video clip and review the video clip over a few times; looking at the operating elevated master stream that is clearly visible and operating from the upper right part of the screen through the smoke plume; follow the direct orientation and stream flowing directly towards the bravo wall plane, and presumed penetrating into/through the roof deck or impacting through the metal roof deck and wall-roof assembly area at the upper roof edge.
Image 04
Frame image 04 depicts the rapidly deteriorating conditions that are evident as the collapse sequence continues and the overhead door jamb (left) buckling and adjacent wall failing by way of an outward curl or peel away commencing from the upper (left image) A-B corner at the roof line and then peeling and failing from upper left to right.
Image 05
The leading edge of the outward collapsing wall plane ( yellow dotted line) is failing with the greatest material concentration occurring at the A-B edge outward. Fortunately the presence and location of the overhead door opening lessened the amount and location of wall material ( concrete masonry units-CMU) and contributed to a void area being present and not fully impacting the firefighters who were operating within this collapse zone.
In other words, had this been a solid full wall collapse likelihood for significant firefighter injury would have resulted.
The affects of wall/roof compromise should be of focused consideration and monitoring when managing incidents of this size and magnitude in similar occupancies and building features. Flame and heat impingment can and will affect the structural integrity of lintels spans, beams and truss connects along roof lines and connections. Look for signs of impingment, degradation or compromise. watch for signs of probable inward/outward or curtain wall collapse.
Image 06
The remaining images, frames 06 and 07 depict the location of the firefighters to the wall collapse, the relationship to the wall and roof system and the degree of wall area that became compromised and collapsed.
Image 07
This brief video clip and these accompanying briefing insights provided a tremendous opportunity to examine in a non-critical manner an actual near miss collapse event and operational discernments that provide a focused training an awareness opportunity.
When given the time to analyze and assess, some things become so apparent and self-revealing that we might prematurely say why didn’t someone pick up that or those conditions while conducting operations at [an] incident. It is dependent on a wide variety of factors, conditions and parameters that are difficult at times to identify and harder yet to fully identify as common or contributing factors, errors or omissions.
It’s not always that easy; but contradictory – some time it really is (or should be) that easy.
Some things on the fireground may not be prone to being so readily identifiable or recognized.
It all depends what you’re looking for and whether you have the necessary insights, knowledge and skill sets. Incident priorities, demands, situational focus, awareness or disconnect all may have a part in how and incident is managed and mitigated.
It goes back directly on knowing what to look for and when; at what type of building with which type of occupancy and under what stage or stages of fire development and combat operations or engagement you might be in. It complex, it takes time and experience and learning’s.
There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.
You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.
An image from a NIST computer model shows temperature levels during the 2007 Charleston Sofa Super Store fire. Dark blue is ambient temperature; bright red is about 800 degrees C (1500 degrees F). Credit: NIST
Fire Modeling Software
These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Fire Research Division at the NIST. The list of programs is divided into two broad categories below: currently-supported software and archival (unsupported) software. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.
Current Software
These models are being actively developed and supported by the laboratory. Details of the software, including download, development, and support information are included on the individual web pages for each model.
FDS (Fire Dynamics Simulator) is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of fire-driven fluid flow. The software solves numerically a form of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally-driven flow, with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires.
These models are included largely for reference or historical interest and span several decades of development of computational tools in fire research at NIST. As such, they are largely unsupported due to the age of the software.
ALOFT-FTTM (A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain) is a computer based model to predict the downwind distribution of smoke particulate and combustion products from large outdoor fires. It solves the fundamental fluid dynamic equations for the smoke plume and its surroundings with flat terrain. The program contains a graphical user interface for input and output and a user modifiable database of fuel and smoke emission parameters. The output can be displayed as downwind, crosswind and vertical smoke concentration contours. Information on using the program is available with on-line help commands in the program.
ASCOS (Analysis of Smoke Control Systems) is a program for steady air flow analysis of smoke control systems. This program can analyze any smoke control system that produces pressure differences with the intent of limiting smoke movement in building fire situations. The program is also capable of modeling the stack effect created in taller buildings during extreme temperature conditions. The program input consists of the outside and building temperatures, a description of the building flow network and the flows produced by the ventilation or smoke control system. The output consists of the steady state pressures and flows throughout the building. Another newer program, CONTAM, may be more appropriate to some applications than ASCOS.
ASET-B (Available Safe Egress Time – BASIC) is a program for calculating the temperature and position of the hot smoke layer in a single room with closed doors and windows. ASET-B is a compact easy to run program which solves the same equations as ASET. The required program inputs are a heat loss fraction, the height of the fire, the room ceiling height, the room floor area, the maximum time for the simulation, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the temperature and thickness of the hot smoke layer as a function of time.
ASMET (Atria Smoke Management Engineering Tools) consists of a set of equations and a zone fire model for analysis of smoke management systems for large spaces such as atria, shopping malls, arcades, sports arenas, exhibition halls and airplane hangers. ASMET is written in C++ language. For program documentation and a description of the input data, the user should refer to NISTIR 5516, Klote, J. H., Method of Predicting Smoke Movement in Atria with Application to Smoke Management, NIST.
BREAK1 (Berkeley Algorithm for Breaking Window Glass in a Compartment Fire) is a program which calculates the temperature history of a glass window exposed to user described fire conditions. The calculations are stopped when the glass breaks. The inputs required are the glass thermal conductivity, thermal diffusivity, absorption length, breaking stress, Young’s modulus, thermal coefficient of linear expansion, thickness, emissivity, shading thickness, half-width of window, the ambient temperature, numerical parameters and the time histories of flame radiation from the fire, hot layer temperature and emissivity, and heat transfer coefficients. The outputs are temperature history of the glass normal to the glass surface, and the window breakage time.
CCFM (Consolidated Compartment Fire Model version VENTS) is a two-layer zone-type compartment fire model computer code. It simulates conditions due to user-specified fires in a multi-room, multi-level facility. The required inputs are a description of room geometry and vent characteristics (up to 9 rooms, 20 vents), initial state of the inside and outside environment, and fire energy release rates as a functions of time (up to 20 fires). If simulation of concentrations of products of combustion is desired, then product release rates must also be specified (up to three products). Vents can be simple openings between adjacent spaces (natural vents) or fan/duct forced ventilation systems between arbitrary pairs of spaces (forced vents). For forced vents, flow rates and direction can be user-specified or included in the simulation by accounting for user-specified fan and duct characteristics. Wind and stack effects can be taken into account. The program outputs for each room are pressure at the floor, layer interface height, upper/lower layer temperature and (optionally) product concentrations.
DETACT-QS and DETACT-T2
DETACT-QS (DETector ACTuation – Quasi Steady) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature heat detectors and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire. DETACT-QS assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the height of the ceiling above the fuel, the distance of the thermal device from the axis of the fire, the actuation temperature of the thermal device, the response time index (RTI) for the device, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the ceiling gas temperature and the device temperature both as a function of time and the time required for device actuation. DETACT-T2 (DETector ACTuation – Time squared) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature and rate of rise heat detectors, and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire which grows as the square of time. CT-T2 assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the ambient temperature, the response time index (RTI) for the device, the activation and rate of rise temperatures of the device, height of the ceiling above the fuel, the device spacing and the fire growth rate. The program outputs are the time to device activation and the heat release rate at activation.
ELVAC (Elevator Evacuation) is an interactive computer program that estimates the time required to evacuate people from a building with the use of elevators and stairs. It is cautioned that elevators generally are not intended as a means of fire evacuation, and they should not be used during fires. However, it is possible to design elevator systems that for fire emergencies, and ELVAC can be used to evaluate the potential performance of such systems. ELVAC calculates the evacuation time for one group of elevators. If a building has more than one group of elevators, ELVAC can be run on each group separately. Input consists of floor to floor heights, number of people on floors, number of elevators in the group, elevator speed, elevator acceleration, elevator capacity, elevator door type and width, and various inefficiency factors. The output is a table of elevator travel time, round trip time, people moved, and number of round trips for each floor plus the total evacuation time.
FIRDEMND simulates the suppression of post flashover charring and non-charring solid-fuel fires in compartments using water sprays from portable hose-nozzle equipment used by the fire departments. The output of the Fire Demand Model (FDM) shows the extinguishing effects of water spray at various flow rates and droplet sizes. The calculations are based on a heat and mass balance accounting for gas and surface cooling, steam-induced smothering, water-spray induced air entrainment, direct extinguishment of the fire by water and the energy transport via inflow and outflow of heat and products of combustion.
FIRST (FIRe Simulation Technique) is the direct descendant of the HARVARD V program developed by Howard Emmons and Henri Mitler. The fire may be entered either as a user-specified time-dependent mass loss rate or in terms of fundamental properties of the fuel. In the latter case, the program will predict the fire growth rate by considering the changing oxygen concentration and smoke layer conditions in the room of fire origin. It can also predict the heating and possible ignition of up to three targets. The original fire and targets may also be user specified fires. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the rooms and openings, and the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, walls, burning fuel, and targets. The generation rate of soot must be specified, and the generation rates of other species may be specified as a yield of the pyrolysis rate. Among the program outputs are the temperature and thickness of, and species concentrations in, the hot upper layer and also in the cooler, lower layer in each compartment. Also given are wall surface temperatures, heat transfer rates and mass flow rates. MASBANK is used to create and maintain a data base of materials and their fire properties for use by the FIRST program. MASBANK can accommodate 20 properties for up to 50 materials. The program has the capability to add, delete, change, alphabetize and view the material properties in the data bank. Material properties from MASBANK may be transferred directly into the FIRST program.
Jet is a model for the prediction of detector activation and gas temperature in the presence of a smoke layer.
FPETool (Software and Documentation) is a set of engineering equations useful in estimating potential fire hazard and the response of the space and fire protection systems to the developing hazard. Version 3.2 incorporates an estimate of smoke conditions developing within a room receiving steady-state smoke leakage from an adjacent space. Estimates of human viability resulting from exposure to developing conditions within the room are calculated based upon the smoke temperature and toxicity.
LAVENT is a program developed to simulate the environment and the response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with draft curtains and fusible link operated ceiling vents. The model, used to calculate the heating of the fusible links, includes the effects of the ceiling jet and the upper layer of hot gases beneath the ceiling. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the compartment, the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, the fire elevation, the time dependent energy release rate of the fire, the fire diameter or energy release rate per area of the fire, the ceiling vent area, the fusible link response-time-index (RTI) and fuse temperature, the fusible link positions along the ceiling, the link assignment to each ceiling vent, and the ambient temperature. A maximum of five ceiling vents and ten fusible links are permitted in the compartment. The program outputs are the temperature, mass and height of the hot upper layer, the temperature of each link, the ceiling jet temperature and velocity at each link, the radial temperature distribution along the interior surface of the ceiling, the radial distribution of the heat flux to the interior and exterior surfaces of the ceiling, the fuse time of each link, and the vent area that has been opened.GRAPH is a graphics program which runs in conjunction with LAVENT. The results for LAVENT are sent to the data file, GRAPH.OUT, after each prescribed time step. GRAPH then allows the user to choose two sets of variables to be plotted on the screen and has the additional capability of hardcopy output.
These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Building and Fire Research Laboratory. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.
ALOFT-FTTM- A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain
FASTLite- A collection of procedures which builds on the core routines of FIREFORM and the computer model CFAST to provide engineering calculations of various fire phenomena,
FPETool- Fire Protection Engineering Tools (equations and fire simulation scenarios)
Jet- A Model for the Prediction of Detector Activation and Gas Temperature in the Presence of a Smoke Layer
LAVENT- Response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with curtains and ceiling vents
NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator and Smokeview – The NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator predicts smoke and/or air flow movement caused by fire, wind, ventilation systems etc. Smokeview visualizes the predictions generated by NIST FDS.
Using Fire Models to Understand Fire BehaviorNIST’s fire modeling capabilities can help firefighters understand and predict fire conditions, HERE
Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page
On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.
Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.
Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.
Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.
The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.
Building Construction Insights
Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”
Fire Building Construction:
7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.
Collapse Building Construction:
6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street
Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011
Building Alteration
(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.
(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.
(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.
The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.
It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.
The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.
The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001.
FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank
Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.
DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18
From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html
Three Franklin (OH) firefighters were caught in what has been determined to be a smoke explosion at a structure fire involving a restaurant occupancy in what appears to be a building of Type III construction that published reports indicated was built in 1892.
Franklin (OH) FD Lt. Kyle Lovelace and firefighters Quincy Pearson and Brad Brown were caught in a smoke explosion while conducting interior fire suppression operations at which time conditions deteriorated and a smoke explosion occurred. Simultaneous with the recognition that something was not good; the crew immediately began to retreat when they were caught in the explosion. All of them luckily made it out unscathed.
According to published reports, “They reverted back to their training and did what they needed to do to get out,” according to Fire Chief Jonathan Westendorf . “We have a flashover simulator and we spend a good amount time talking about it each year.”
Reports have indicated Lt. Lovelace stated that when they arrived on the scene, he noticed smoke coming from left side of the building above the second floor and thought that it may be an attic fire.
They attempted to gain entry through the front door, but before they opened it they noticed a crack in the window and decided to gain entry through the rear. Lt. Lovelace, FF Pearson and FF Brown entered an alley covered by an awning connecting to freestanding structures. Westendorf later said his guys were fortunate to be in that location because they were isolated from the brunt of the blast.
The crew advanced about 25 feet when FF Pearson, who was on the nozzle, saw wisps of smoke and began to feel extreme heat.
Lt. Lovelace used a thermal imaging camera to locate where the heat was coming from, but right before he could tell Person, he started yelling at him to get out. They made it about 20 feet when the thick black smoke started banking down on them. As Lovelace exited under the awning, conditions quickly worsened and the smoke explosion occurred. Video of blast HERE
Links for complete reporting insights and details;
Eric Clark for the Chicago Tribune / August 25, 2011
Four Chicago firefighters have been injured while battling a fire in the city’s West Englewood neighborhood Thursday night according to news media outlets. The fire was located within a 1-1/2 story wood frame residential occupancy in which fire suppression operations were underway.
Fire companies operating within the attic area with attack lines operating, experienced rapidly degrading conditions in which published reports indicated the “room lit up” suggesting a possible flashover condition. It was reported that vertical ventilation had been completed on the gable style roof and that coordinated company operations were well established both on the number one floor, within the attic and on exterior support operations.
Research indicates the house was built in 1905 and has 990 square feet of space. Constructed of balloon wood framing, the 1-1/2 story single family residential occupancy is typical of this vintage style housing.
Chicago’s fire commissioner credited the quick response of rescuers after firefighters were hit by a flash of flames while working in the attic of a home in theWest Englewood neighborhood. “It’s a matter of seconds before we would have had a different outcome,” Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff said at Loyola University Hospital, where two of the four firefighters injured in the blaze remained hospitalized.
As reported by the Chicago Tribune (HERE) The fire started in the basement of a 1 1/2-story home in the 7000 block of South Justine Street and spread through the walls to the attic, Hoff said. As firefighters ventilated the roof and worked to extinguish the blaze, they were not aware of fire burning inside the walls behind them, Hoff said. Flames suddenly “lit up on them,” he said. “This is an example of how extremely dangerous and unpredictable this job is,” said Tom Ryan, president of Chicago Firefighters Union Local 2. “There is no such thing as a routine fire.”
The two firefighters still hospitalized are a 52-year-old captain who suffered burns to his ears and back of the neck; and a 31-year-old firefighter with burns to his left hand and forehead. They suffered the burns when their masks were knocked loose as they tried to escape, Hoff said. Both are from Engine 54 and are stable, Hoff said.
A third firefighter who was taken to Loyola was released early this morning, and a fourth taken to Mount Sinai Hospital Thursday night. Fire Officials credited the Fire Department’s five-person rapid intervention team — which is routinely called to fires — for responding so quickly.
We’ve got an advance look at some of the new training and lecture offerings coming out this fall and for 2012 that will be offered commencing in October for the Buildingsonfire Series produced and offered by the Command Institute and Buildingsonfire.com.
Buildingsonfire -2012 Building Construction and Systems Training for Fire Service Commanders, Company Officers and Fire Fighters
An intense and concentrated series of exceptional training programs examining trends and methods in building construction for the fire service with an emphasize on construction and occupancy risk assessment, structural and construction systems, and their direct relationship on structural combat firefighting operations, firefighter survivability and the command decision-making process. Understand building systems and occupancy performance under fire conditions is mission critical with new and emerging technical information and data that is redefining tactical and operational models and firefighting protocols with new rules of engagement.
Firefighters and Officers will gain a new understanding of inherent construction features and hazards that directly influence effective risk management and decisive strategic and tactical considerations with a focus on key construction features, inherent occupancy profiles that will influence strategic, tactical and task level operations and crucial assembly systems affected by fire dynamics, extreme fire behavior and combat fire suppression operations. These programs & seminars examine crucial considerations for Reading the Building, Occupancy Risk Profiling, Adaptive Fireground Management, Tactical Patience, Predicative Occupancy Performance and Construction Resiliency correlating building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety.
Programs utilize extensive multimedia, interactive activities, case studies and simulations to reinforce course content & subject areas providing exceptional learning opportunities.
New Seminars and Lecture Program Offerings; (Selected Topics)
Building Construction for the Company and Command Officer
The Rules of Combat Fire Engagement & Tactical Operations
Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & Tactics for the Company and Command Officer
Adaptive Fire Ground Management for Command and Company Officers
Building Construction and Tactical Operations
The Anatomy of Buildingsonfire 2012
Five Star Command & Fire Fighter Safety
The Doctrine of Combat Fire Operations 2012
Extreme Fire Behavior & Fireground Operations
Predictive Building and Occupancy Performance
Tactical Entertainment and Firefighter Safety
Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting Operations
Roof Construction for Truck Company Operations
Occupancy Risk Profiling and Firefighting Strategy & Tactics
New Residential Construction and Operational Considerations
Tactical Renaissance: Combat Fire Engagement and the New Fire Ground
The Anatomy of Buildingsonfire; LODD Case Studies and Near Miss Lessons Learned
Building Construction and Operational Safety in Buildings of Ordinary Construction
Building Construction and Tactical Safety in Commercial Buildings
Keynotes ,Lectures, Special Presentations & Programs Available
Other Building Construction , Command, Tactic, Fire Fighter Safety and Operations programs available
Download the Program Announcement for Building Construction for the Fire Service Training Programs HERE
Keynote and General Session Programs that will be available for 2012 include;
Keynote Topics:
The New Adaptive Fire Ground in 2012
Tactical Patience
Buildingsonfire 2012
What’s on YOUR Radar Screen?
Achieving Operational Excellence and Safety
Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment
The Evolving Fireground: Are You Ready for the Changes?
Command Resiliency for Operational Excellence
Tactical Renaissance and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement
Upcoming:
Check out the program presentations we’ll be making at the Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference ( Missouri) and at the Liberty Regional Fire & Leadership Training Conference (PA) this fall.
Take the time to check out the new Training Program Offerings from Go>Forward Training’s Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference, HERE and the Liberty Regional Fire & Leadership Training Conference HERE
Apparent delays with establishing a sustained water supply via the building standpipe system are being published in the Asheville Citizens-Times.com today. Direct link HERE
Published reports are indicating possible problems with water delivery to the standpipe system designed to supply water from a street hydrant system to the fifth floor of a burning medical office building likely delayed firefighters as they battled the deadly blaze, according to Fire Department radio transmissions.
Nearly 25 minutes passed from the time the first trucks left their stations about 12:30 p.m. Thursday until a company reported they were finally putting water on the blaze at 445 Biltmore Center from a ladder truck.
Typical Standpipe Stairwell Valve Connection
Firefighters repeatedly made references to a lack of water, even as they reached the fourth floor and made their way toward flames one floor above according to same publication. They are referencing transcripts from fireground radio transmissions. HERE.
Asheville NC Fatal FF Mayday Audio 7/28/11; The audio has been edited and most of the Mayday audio from the FF has been edited out
The lack of timely application of water as a suppression agent to disrupt the progressing fire growth and magnitude could contribute towards increased fire severity based upon the fire load package and heat release rate and likely contribute towards untenable interior conditions in the absence of a vent path and confinement of the escalating products of combustion due to fire growth.
Refer to the CommandSafety.com posting HEREwith a typical floor layout plan and interior photos
Reports indicating delays and challenges in gaining access into various rooms and locations are also being reported whcih should be expected based upon typical medical office layouts and configurations.
Vent path considerations, when addressing interior suppression operations, ventilation profiles and avenues and fire and heat propagation all have considerations and applications when working a seated fire within a compartment fire in a commercial occupancy
Refer to the following links for some further insights on the aforementioned elements and factors;
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
A multiple 4-alarm fire took command of a medical office suite located in a five story non-sprinklered Medical Center Office Building in the City of Asheville, North Carolina on Thursday July 28, 2011.
The mid-day fire was reported on the fifth floor at 445 Biltmore Center medical offices and was found extending from exterior perimeter windows as arriving companies went to work.
According to published reports, companies encountered heavy smoke and heat conditions. As initial suppression operations were being conducted, coordinated search and rescue operations were assigned and being conducted. AFD Capt. Jeff Bowen was among the first alarm assignment of firefighters to reach the building’s fire floor as unabated fire development and growth caused the perimeter windows to fail causing fire extension to the exterior and the induction of fresh air onto the fire floor. The intensity of the flame front and extension was evident as photographed out fifth-floor windows.
During primary search and rescue operations, approximately 45 minutes into the operations Captain Bowen transmitted a mayday for reasons undetermined at the present time. Heavy smoke and pronounced heat conditions filled that top floor, where he and fellow firefighter Jay Bettencourt were conducting search efforts. Command quickly directed efforts to manage the mayday with companies deployed to support the RIT and mayday. There were reported sixty fire fighters assigned the suppression and rescue operations for the multiple alarms. About 200 patients and staff were in the building at the time of the fire.
Preliminary information suggests that Captain Bowen went into cardiac arrest after succumbing to intense smoke and heat, the city said in a statement released on Friday. Firefighter Bettencourt was transported to the Joseph M. Still Burn Center at Doctors Hospital in Augusta, Ga., for treatment. He was listed in critical condition Thursday night. Nine other firefighters were taken to the hospital in connection with the blaze. Six remained hospitalized late Thursday. Three were treated and released, according to Mission spokeswoman Merrell Gregory and published reports. Captain Bowen was a thirteen year fire service veteran and was a husband and father of three children. He was 37 years of age.
The Building comprising the occupancy at 445 Biltmore Center medical offices was occupied by the Cancer Care of WNC which had its laboratory and information and technology offices on the fifth floor.
The building was constructed in 1982 and was not required by codes to have a sprinkler system at the time of occupancy. Since that time, state code provisions have changed that mandate sprinkler system protection. There were no requirements for retrofitting according to published reports.
The five story building with non-combustible construction classification consisted of approximate 120,000 square feet of space with approximately 20,000 SF per floor level.
Fire vented through the roof. Note: NIOSH investigators believe this photo shows conditions very close to the time that the Mayday was called for Victim #2 by FF4. Wind was pushing the smoke plume from right to left. (Photo courtesy of Keith Muratori.)
Bridgeport (CT) fire officials’ failure on nearly ever level led to the line-of-duty deaths of two firefighters battling a fire in a residential occupancy in Bridgeport, CT on July 24, 2010.
Among the findings of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) released Wednesday:
the deputy fire chief and his assistant at the scene of the Elmwood Street fire were having a discussion about whether they heard a mayday call from the two fallen firefighters instead of taking immediate action to rescue them.
The report also stated firefighters failed to immediately treat one of the firefighters who managed to make it to relative safety before collapsing.
Officials also did not properly managed firefighters’ air supplies — both firefighter’s air cylinders were empty when they were found, the report stated.
The department’s incident safety officer, who is required to be on scene for assistance in a fire also did not arrive more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch.
Lt. Steven Velasquez and Firefighter Michel Baik were on the third-floor of the wood-frame home at 41 Elmwood Ave. checking for hot spots and making sure there were no people in the smoldering blaze. Then trouble hit. The two sent mayday signals back to dispatch. Within minutes, the fire department’s rapid intervention team found the pair on the floor, unconscious, and gave them CPR. The two men could not be revived.
On July 24, 2010, a 40-year-old male career fire lieutenant and a 49-year-old male career fire fighter were found unresponsive at a residential structure fire. The victims and two additional crew members were tasked with conducting a primary search for civilians and fire extension on the 3rd floor of a multifamily residential structure. The fire had been extinguished on the 2nd floor upon their entry into the structure.
While pulling walls and the ceiling on the 3rd floor, smoke and heat conditions changed rapidly. The first firefighter transmitted a Mayday (audibly under duress) that was not acknowledged or acted upon. Minutes later the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the 3rd floor. As a fire fighter exited the 3rd floor, the lieutenant was discovered unconscious and not breathing, sitting on the stairs to the 3rd floor.
Approximately 7 minutes later, the second firefighter was discovered on the 3rd floor in thick, black smoke conditions. Both victims were removed by the rapid intervention team (RIT) and other fire fighters who assisted them. Both victims were pronounced dead at local hospitals.
Contributing Factors
Failure to effectively monitor and respond to Mayday transmissions
Less than effective Mayday procedures and training
Inadequate air management
Removal and/or dislodgement of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
Incident safety officer (ISO) and rapid intervention team (RIT) not readily available on scene
Possible underlying medical condition(s) (coronary artery disease)
Command, control, and accountability.
Aerial View of House and Exposures
Key Recommendations
Ensure that radio transmissions are effectively monitored and quickly acted upon, especially when a Mayday is called
Ensure that Mayday training program(s) and department procedures adequately prepare fire fighters to call a Mayday
Train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their SCBA
Ensure that fire fighters use their SCBA during all stages of a fire and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures
Ensure that a separate incident safety officer (ISO), independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire with the initial dispatch
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is readily available and prepared to respond to fire fighter emergencies
Consider adopting a comprehensive wellness and fitness program, provide annual medical evaluations consistent with NFPA standards, and perform annual physical performance (physical ability) evaluations for all fire fighters.
Timeline
This timeline is provided to set out, to the extent possible, the sequence of events according to recorded and intelligible radio transmissions. Two channels were used during this incident: the main dispatch channel and channel 2 (fireground). Times are approximate and were obtained from review of the dispatch records, witness interviews, photographs of the scene, and other available information. Times have been rounded to the nearest minute. NIOSH investigators have attempted to include all intelligible radio transmissions, but some may be missing. This timeline is not intended, nor should it be used, as a formal record of events.
1544 Hours E3 and L5 dispatched to a report of an elevator rescue.
1546 Hours While en route, E3 contacted the dispatcher on the main dispatch channel and advised them they needed to redirect all companies to a possible house fire.
1547 Hours L5 copied E3‘s transmission on the main dispatch channel and redirected to the possible house fire. E3 advised the dispatcher, on the main dispatch channel, that they had a fire on the 2nd floor and that they did not have a hydrant. Note: It is unclear whether E3 established command, but L5 arrived just after E3 and established command.
1548 Hours E3, E4, E1, E7 as RIT, L11, L5, R5, and B1 were dispatched on the main dispatch channel to the house fire.
1549 Hours L5 arrived on scene and their officer stated over the main dispatch channel, ―2½-story wood frame with heavy fire coming from the 2nd floor, Alpha/Bravo side, L5 is now command.‖
1550 Hours E7 en route.
1551-1552 Hours E4 arrived on scene and laid a supply line in from the hydrant. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer (initial arriving IC) advised the dispatcher that the bulk of the fire was knocked down by E3 and the primary search was in progress. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised L11 and E7 which way they should approach the scene. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer requested an ambulance for an injured fire fighter (ankle injury). Over the main dispatch channel, B1 advised the dispatcher that he was on scene, and he confirmed the first report of heavy fire with the bulk of the fire knocked down. B1 then took command of the incident.
1553 Hours L11 arrived on scene. E1 took an additional hydrant. A7116 dispatched to the incident for an injured fire fighter. Note: Dispatch of A7116 was not part of the initial fire assignment. The 9-1-1 center contacted the EMS dispatch center via landline to request an ambulance for the injured fire fighter on scene after the request from the L5 officer.
1554 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the BA advised the dispatcher that the command post would be in front of the fire building and tag collection would be at the command post. On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 to charge the second hoseline. E7 (RIT) arrived on scene.
1555 Hours On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 again to charge the second hoseline. Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested the dispatcher to have the safety officer respond to the incident. IC checked on the status of the ambulance. Fire dispatch advised the IC that the ambulance was en route.
1556 Hours E3 advised the IC (on the main dispatch channel) that he needed hooks on the 2nd floor in the room of origin; the IC acknowledged the request. Over the main dispatch channel, IC advised all companies, ―Channel 2 fireground, channel 2 fireground.‖ Note: Up to this point, companies on scene were operating on the main dispatch and channel 2. Fire dispatch assigned fireground operations to channel 2 for the incident.
1557-1558 Hours IC called L11 on channel 2. IC (on the main dispatch channel) confirmed with the dispatcher who was RIT (which was E7) on scene and advised them that their equipment was available at the command post. Victim#1 acknowledged the IC‘s request for L11 on channel 2, but the IC did not respond. E3 officer, who incorrectly identified himself as ―E4,‖ called command on channel 2 and stated they had a slight extension into the A/B corner. Note: He was working overtime the day of the incident at the station that houses E3 and E4, which is also his normal duty station. The IC copied the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2 and asked him if he had enough hooks available; the E3 officer stated he did. A7116 arrived on scene.
1559 Hours E3 officer on channel 2 advised the IC that they needed a hoseline to the 3rd floor because they could not reach it (fire extension) from the 2nd floor. The IC acknowledged the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2. The IC, on channel 2, advised Victim #1 that E1 was bringing a hoseline to the 3rd floor. Victim #1 acknowledged the IC‘s transmission on channel 2 and advised, ―A primary is in progress, which is negative; and, they are still checking for extension.‖ The IC acknowledged Victim #1‘s transmission.
1600 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the ISO advised the dispatcher that he was responding (from home). A7116 contacted EMS dispatch requesting a single ambulance to standby at the incident per the IC. A7110 dispatched and en route to fire to standby. On channel 2, the IC (at the command post) advised the E4 officer that he could see fire extending up the A/B corner. Note: NIOSH investigators were not sure if this transmission was meant for the E4 officer or the officer from E3 who identified himself as E4. At 1559 hours, the E3 officer advised the IC of the extension to the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the E4 officer advised the IC that he was working on getting a line up to the 3rd floor.
1601 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised the IC that the ISO and DC were responding. On channel 2, the L5 officer contacted ―L5-Alpha‖ (believed to be L5‘s aerial ladder) to assist in the bucket; L5-Alpha acknowledged the transmission.
1602-1603 Hours On channel 2, the IC contacted the L5 officer to verify whether he thought he could make the roof with L5. On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, ―…line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
The IC called the L11 officer (Victim #1) on channel 2 (no response).
1615 Hours On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to all companies on the 3rd floor, vacate the 3rd floor; I repeat, command to L11 and E1, vacate the 3rd floor.‖
1616-1619 Hours (2nd Mayday Call) The IC attempted to contact L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The IC, on channel 2, then stated, ―Command to E1.‖ (1616.50 hours) On channel 2, FF2 stated, ―Mayday, Mayday…Rescue 5 Bravo command we have a downed fire fighter rear steps. Mayday-Mayday-Mayday fire fighter down rear steps, 2nd floor.‖ IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11‖ (no response). Note: An apparatus air horn is heard sounding in the background of this transmission. FF2 on channel 2 stated, ―Rescue 5 Bravo command, Rescue 5 Bravo command we need help 2nd floor, send the RIT, we need fresh bodies.‖ Note: No audio transmissions or emergency tones are heard on channel 2 or the main dispatch channel advising that the Mayday call had been acknowledged. DC contacted the IC on channel 2 to have him send the RIT to the rear stairs; the IC acknowledged. Note: The RIT may have already been advancing up the rear stairs, but they ran into difficulty accessing the 2nd floor landing off the rear stairs because a charged hoseline was against the closed door. Dispatch attempted to contact command on channel 2 (no response). The IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The DC contacted the IC requesting the ambulance on scene to come to the rear of the house. Victim #1 was extricated out the rear of the house.
1620 Hours A7110 began medical care for the downed fire fighter (Victim #1). Over the main dispatch channel, the BA requested an advanced life support ambulance to the fire scene. A7126 was dispatched to intercept A7110 at the fire scene to provide advanced life support. (~1620.35 Hours) The following transmission is heard on channel 2, ―…Ladder 11 ‗mayday‘ (very quick transmission)…Ladder 11 (unintelligible word(s)).‖ Note: The dispatch caller ID for this radio is designated as “L-11 FF3,” which was assigned to the fire fighter (designated as FF4 for this report) who later finds Victim #2 (see below 1624 hours). FF4 had not found Victim #2 at the time of this transmission. On channel 2, FF4 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11 can‖ (no response). Note: “Ladder 11 can” was Victim #2’s designation that shift.
1621 Hours A7126 en route to fire scene.
1622 Hours On channel 2, the ISO advised the IC that the fire fighter (Victim #1) was removed and they needed to do a roll call for everyone on scene. On channel 2, the IC advised all company officers that the ―incident is taking a PAR‖ (personnel accountability report). Officers began calling in their respective PARs.
1624 Hours (3rd and 4th Mayday Calls) FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Mayday-Mayday, I have a fire fighter trapped on the 3rd floor, Mayday-Mayday-Mayday 3rd floor.‖ Note: This Mayday is for Victim #2. A PASS device is heard alarming during FF4‘s transmission. On channel 2, the IC stated, ―This is command to all companies, vacate the building, I report, command to all companies, vacate the building.‖ FF4 on channel 2 stated again, ―Mayday-Mayday-Mayday, I‘ve got another fire fighter down, another one, 3rd floor, hurry!‖
1625 Hours Over channel 2, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones. Note: It is unknown why the evacuation tones were sounded instead of the Mayday tones. Their evacuation tone is an alternating, high-low sound, similar to a European siren. Their Mayday tone is a rapid, high to low pitch, chirping sound. This was dispatch’s first acknowledgement of a Mayday over the radio. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on channel 2. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones as well. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on the main dispatch channel.
1626 Hours The IC contacted the DC on channel 2. DC acknowledged with no further traffic from the IC. The IC on channel 2 again advised all companies to vacate the building. The dispatcher then activated the emergency tones on channel 2 and the main dispatch channel, and stated, ―All companies per command vacate the building, all companies vacate the building.‖
1627 Hours The ISO contacted the IC on channel 2 and stated, ―We need to make contact with that Mayday, we need more information, we have not heard from them since the initial call.‖ On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to company declaring a Mayday; I repeat, command to the company declaring a Mayday sound off, sound off.‖ A fire fighter from the RIT advised the IC on channel 2 that they were moving the fire fighter off the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the dispatcher advised the IC that the Mayday call was for the 3rd floor. A7126 arrived at the fire scene.
1628 Hours RIT advised the IC that they have the fire fighter (Victim #2) on the 3rd floor and will be bringing him down the rear stairs from the 3rd floor.
1630 Hours A7110 en route to the hospital with Victim #1 without assistance from A7126.
1632 Hours ISO asked for a progress report from the RIT on the Mayday. RIT replied, ―Coming down…3rd floor.‖ ISO asked RIT to repeat their traffic. A radio was keyed, but there was no transmission.
1634 Hours RIT personnel advised the IC that they had the fire fighter (Victim #2) down to the 2nd floor landing.
1640 Hours A7110 arrived at local hospital with Victim #1.
1643 Hours A7126 began medical care on second downed fire fighter (Victim #2). Note: This time was taken from Victim #2’s patient care report and may not be accurate.
1703 Hours A7126 arrived at local hospital with Victim #2.
Fire Behavior
The room and contents fire was determined to have originated in a bedroom on the 2nd floor, A/B corner; it was quickly knocked down by E3 (see Photo 2). It is believed that the fire got into the eves when it was lapping out the A/B corner windows, and then spread within the large void spaces in the ceiling and walls of the 3rd floor. The fire was situated toward the A/B corner of the 3rd floor, but the open void areas allowed smoke to accumulate within the ceilings and walls before they were opened.
Operating on the 3rd floor at varying times were members from L5, R5, L11, E4, and E7. Initially, light-to-moderate smoke conditions were observed on the 3rd floor, depending on how close fire fighters were to the A-side of the 3rd floor. Fire fighters recalled the 3rd floor being very hot. TICs used by different individuals on the 3rd floor showed the room to be hot on the A-side and ceiling. Windows on the A-, B-, and D-sides were opened, allowing most of the smoke to self ventilate. Light smoke remained within the 3rd floor, with good visibility.
Extension was checked around A- and B-side baseboards. Some fire fighters recall Victim #1 telling them the fire was in the ceiling and possibly the walls, and to not open those areas until a hoseline was in place. Even after providing horizontal ventilation on the 3rd floor, smoke conditions worsened, banking down to fire fighters‘ chin levels and becoming denser.
While waiting for the hoseline, L5 members were reassigned by the IC to ventilate the roof to provide additional relief to the 3rd floor. The IC reported to NIOSH investigators that he ordered the roof vented because he saw smoke pushing out the B-side windows. Personnel from E4 advanced the charged hoseline to the 3rd floor, allowing the ceilings and walls to be opened. A mixture of thick, brown/black smoke quickly filled the room, reducing visibility.
Initial conditions observed when the BC arrived on scene at approximately 1551 hours. Note: Fire was under control on the 2nd floor and fire fighters were checking for extension. White-to-gray smoke can be seen flowing in the direction of right to left from the gables. The A-side window on the 3rd floor had been opened for ventilation (unsure at what stage of the fire or by whom).
Structure
Built in the early 1900s, the two-and-half-story house (see Photo 1) was purchased approximately 4 years prior to the incident as a multifamily rental occupancy. One family lived in the 1st floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.); a second family lived in the 2nd floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.) and the owner occupied the finished half-story or attic space (approx. 700 sq. ft.). The house also contained an unfinished basement (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.).
The common front entrance contained access to the 1st floor apartment and a private stairwell, located at the A/D corner of the house, which provided access to the 2nd floor apartment. The house also had a single rear-entry door that provided access to a stairwell that led up to the owner‘s apartment and had landings to access all the apartments from the rear. According to the owner of the house, smoke detectors were installed within the house about a year prior to the incident. These smoke detectors were installed in every bedroom, in each hallway, and in the stairwells.
The house did not have an installed sprinkler system and had been inspected in accordance with Department of Housing and Urban Development Section 8a guidelines, according to the homeowner. The house was Type V wood frame construction, but, during the initial stages of the fire, was presumed by arriving fire fighters to be balloon-framed due to the era when it was constructed. State fire investigators were able to confirm Type V construction after closer inspection.
The Office of the State Fire Marshal‘s building code compliance inspection showed that the house did not meet certain Connecticut Fire Safety Code requirements for this type of structure. NIOSH investigators do not believe that these non-compliance issues contributed to the deaths of the two fire fighters.
NIOSH Released its report (F2010-18) on the July 24, 2010 house fire that resulted in the two fire fighter LODDs. Bridgeport fire officials’ failure on nearly every level led to the deaths of two firefighters battling a West Side blaze last July, the NIOSH report has concluded.
Among the findings of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health report released Wednesday:
The deputy fire chief and his assistant at the scene of the Elmwood Street fire had a discussion about whether they heard a mayday call from the two fallen firefighters instead of taking immediate action to rescue them.
There was no rapid intervention team readily available to come to the firefighters’ aid.
The report stated firefighters failed to immediately treat one of the firefighters who managed to make it to relative safety before collapsing.
Officials also did not properly manage firefighters’ air supplies — both firefighters’ air cylinders were empty when they were found, the report stated.
The department’s incident safety officer, who is required to be on scene for assistance in a fire, also did not arrive until more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch.
According to the NIOSH report, the 40-year-old Velasquez and the 49-year-old Baik, along with two other firefighters, had been assigned to conduct a search for victims and hot spots on the third floor of the multi-family house. The fire already had been extinguished on the second floor.
While the two were pulling the walls and ceiling on the third floor, the fire suddenly reignited. Velasquez transmitted a mayday that was not acknowledged or acted on, the report states. Minutes later, the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the third floor. As a firefighter exited the third floor he discovered Velasquez sitting on the stairs unconscious and not breathing. Baik was found about seven minutes later on the third floor in heavy smoke conditions.
The investigation of this fatal fire by CT State Fire Marshal’s Office remains ongoing.
The NIOSH report details will be published following a more detailed review of the findings and recommendations.
Preparing for the Mayday Event; Not a matter of IF, But a Question of When… Are you ready? Are you Prepared?
As the official Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011 begins to wind down, in many stations around the country this weekend is dedicated to training, drills and evolutions dedicated toward the many facets and functional elements that focus upon Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.
The Safety Planning and Resource Aid and Guide published by the IAFC and IAFF (HERE) and the direct link here 2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries provided resources and planning templates and suggested training and activities to support the focus and emphasis on fire ground survival, increased focus on firefighter operations and mayday elements crucial to company integrity, firefighter safety and operational excellence.
Being ready for a mayday (mentally and physically), self-rescue and self-survival training and methodologies are mission critical when engaging in structural firefighting operations. Proficiencies, capabilities, rigor, demeanor and performance must be orchestrated in a manner that requires optimum execution of required actions and engagements to enable a successful outcome to a reported single or multiple mayday calls.
On a crisp fall day in October, 2009 two fires, both in residential occupancies but over 350 miles apart had similar operational needs, deployment and fire suppression and rescue engagement consistent with modern firefighting practices, methodologies and expectations.
In one, three firefighters become trapped, resulting in a mayday, bailout and resulting LODD of a 16 year fire service veteran. City of Yonkers (NY) Firefighter Patrick Joyce died during the operations at a 3-Alarm fire in a three story residential occupancy while conducting search and rescue operations for reported trapped civilians. Incident overviews; HERE and HERE .
The other structure fire in a residential occupancy in Syracuse, NY, results in a fire fighter mayday and successful RIT extraction that is captured on video. Two structure fires with common elements, each with projected predictable outcomes based upon past fire department operational experiences at similar structures, occupancies and fire conditions and reports; however with two different outcomes.
The program information from The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)which forms a major component of thsis year’s Safety Weeks activities with the focus on comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention programming incorporating incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, with the FGS program objectives aimed to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
Here’s a recap of the Self-Survial Procedure insights from the FGS Chapter 3 Section;
Self-Survival Procedures
FGS Online Program Chapter 3
To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:
First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall.
The following video clip depicting FDNY Rescue Co. 1 operations at a Mayday, and provides some insightful and subtle commentary that should put some things in proper perspective about the job its hazards and the unexpected that can occur in the blink of an eye.
Another exceptional training piece that we are providing again here on CommandSafety.com are the two part video clips provided by TheBravestOnline.com that covers the mayday distress cakk an subsequent RIT extraction of HFD Captain Joel Eric Abbt at a four alarm fire with civilian fatalities in a six story high rise office building on March 28, 2007.
This video along with the information obtained from the FGS program can provide substantial opportunites for training, discussions and dialog. Take the time to watch the HFD vdeo and the elapsed time, communications and actions deployed. This mayday event had a successful outcome due to a variety of factors.
The question is how prepared are you, your firefighters, the officers and commanders? Surviving the fire ground requires a wide variety of skills, knowledge , training and experience.
Training is the foundation from which proficiencies are developed. If your organization has invested in supporting this weeks activities, don’t stop here. There are additional day ahead to take teh momentum gathered from this week and use it to chart a new course of actions and committments for the weeks and months ahead. If you didn’t have the opportunity to engage or involve, its not a missed opportuity- just find the right time and place to have your own safety day of week.
Houston FD Mayday Part 1
Houston FD Mayday Part 2
Other Training and Drill Opportunties
Suggested Considerations include the follow, as well as encouraging Departments to identify and integrate local issues, needs and identified gaps or enhancements that can contribute towards operational excellence and safety integration
Review and Select a Near Miss Event Report from the National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System or the Report of the Week (ROTW) series related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
Review and Select a NIOSH LODD Report from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/
Take out your Rapid Intervention Equipment and review the purpose and function of each piece of equipment. Identify and discuss alternative uses or tools that can be obtained or used in the event of unavailability, malfunction or additional resource needs. Discuss protocols, procedures, safety awareness and operational hazards, expectations and precautions. Inspection the equipment for operability and integrity.
Identify and select a recent departmental or local/regional incident event that was either a near-miss/close-call or transitioned into a mayday event. Discuss and facilitate dialog on lessons learned, gaps, enhancements or operational successes, achievements and positive elements. Identify any factors or elements that were presented in the FGS training series that are applicable to the event, strategies, tactics or operations: can anything be improved or enhanced?
Lead a discussion on how to call and initiate a Mayday. Discuss the factors and insights from FGS Program Chapter 3 Self-Survival Procedures and Chapter 4 Self-Survival Skills.
Select and lead a discussion on a pertinent incident case study from either the list provided or your own selection and discuss the relevancy of the event in terms of mayday operations, fire ground survival, incident outcome and relationship to your Department or agency. What is the relevancy, similarities or differences? Can this event or circumstances occur in your jurisdiction? What can be done to prevent a history repeating event (HRE)?
Review and discuss Roles and Responsibilities for mayday events and operations. How do they match up with your operating procedures, policies and expectations?
Develop and facilitate a table top exercise (TTE) on a mayday event scenario utilizing a building in your first-due or response jurisdiction. Take photographs and integrate into your program. Refer to example of a simple TTE attached or go to Fire Fighternation.com for an example here; http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an
Visit a residential or commercial construction site (with pre-arrival authorization and approvals) and tour the stage of construction, looking critically at the type of construction and structural systems being implemented, materials used, workmanship and signs of deficient or adverse conditions that may affect operational integrity, safety or collapse and compromise once the building is occupied. Discuss issues such as structural integrity, collapse risk, occupancy risk versus occupancy type considerations, avenues for fire travel, effects on fire load package and rate of heat release and projected fire intensity. How would you fire a fire in the occupancy? What will define the strategy and tactics that would be or should be selected and used?
In a controlled setting with or without PPE, Practice calling a mayday with the identified communication attributes defined in the FGS training program. Critique and practice the evolution until the group feels that it is acceptable.
Here are some additional Resource Links to Support your training and drill needs;
Selected References
IAFC: The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety, HERE and HERE
NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE
Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors
Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
Report HERE
NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience
The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE
NIOSH LODD REPORT: Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire – Virginia, HERE
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
Analytical Study Reveals Patterns in U.S Firefighter Fatalities Report
The entire report is available at a nominal fee, HERE;
Journal Reference:
For a detailed summary of the Sofa Super Store study, its findings and recommendations, and links to supporting materials such as graphics and video segments from computer simulations of the fire, go to “NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements” at www.nist.gov/el/fire_research/charleston_102810.cfm.
Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith, David M. DeJoy. Line-of-duty deaths among U.S. firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2011; 43 (3): 1171 DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2010.12.030
University of Georgia (2011, April 14). Comprehensive study reveals patterns in firefighter fatalities. ScienceDaily. Retrieved April 16, 2011, from http://www.sciencedaily.com /releases/2011/04/110412171208.htm
Other Report Links of Interest
Reducing Firefighter Deaths and Injuries: Changes in Concept, Policy, and Practice Contributing Factors in Firefighter Line-of-Duty Deaths in the United States. HERE
This Training Schedule Template utilizes a Three Hour, Thirty minute (3.5) Hour Format integrating Suggested basic Functional Area Topics as a lead-in introduction that can be interchanged based on local needs and incorporates two (2) primary modules of the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS). Please note you can select any modules determined to be of local need or interests. An optional Weekend Session is attached for FGS Chapter 3 and 4 Module Deliveries and a Hands-on Field Exercise Component.
Do you know what's underneath you as you're making entry?
During the last quarter of 2010 and leading well into the second quarter of 2011 there has been a significant emerging trend developing in basement fires, compromised floor systems and assemblies leading to collapse and numerous near-miss events, close calls and unfortunatly, line of duty deaths during fire operations.
If you’ve been paying attention to the various news and on the job reports these past number of months, you may have noticed the increasing numbers of emerging trend evident in near miss, close-calls resulting in maydays, RIT deployments and self-rescue resulting from floor compromise and floor collapse. The double line of duty deaths of two San Francisco (CA) Fire fighers while operating in a Terraced (Hillside construction) residential occupancy while operating below the base level diaphragm (upper street level access). (HERE)
In December 2010, I was doing some research and posting links related to the first one or two events on Buildingsonfire on Facebook, HERE, it became evident at the time that there was an immediate opportunity to get some learning’s and insights out. If you have a chance head over to Facebook and link into Buildingsonfire and check out the incident links posted as well as some immediate report links. (Demember 2010 time frame)
In a coincidential posting on July 28, 2010, I posted on CommandSafety.com an interesting incident that I came across while preparing for a new post related to a near-miss event that occured in which a Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel after calling a mayday.
This event has all the ingrediants the the 2011 Safety Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground and managing the Mayday. Little did I know that later, in February 2011, while participating in the National FireFighter Near-Miss Reporting System Stakeholders meeting in California, would I have the chance to hear Captain Long’s story first hand, and then also have the opportunity to have him as a guest, sharing his story live on the Taking it to the Streets Radio program in February. (HERE)
Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long’s near-miss and story of survival resonates with this year’s theme of Surviving the Fire Ground- Firefighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness and Managing the Mayday and provides an opportunity to focus on the event in this, Day Five of the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Surival Week activities. The details of Captain Long’s story can be found on the National FireFighter Near Miss Reporting System web site (HERE) as well as in the June 2011 issue of Fire Engineering Magazine titled, Floor Collapse: A Survivors Story. Let me state upfront also the Captain Michael Long will be presenting the accounts of his near miss event and the lessons-learned at IAFC Fire-Rescue International Conference in Atlanta in August (HERE).
On July 25, 2010, Captain Michael Long of the Camp Taylor (Ky.) Fire Protection District fell through the floor of a house during a four-alarm fire and suffered severe burn injuries. On Aug. 30, 2010, Capt. Long submitted a near-miss report based on this event. The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is an anonymous and confidential reporting system; however, Capt. Long wanted to have his name associated with this report so that others would understand the value of sharing near-miss events. What follows is an excerpt from his report and excerpts from a recent phone interview. To read his full report, including an extensive lessons learned section, search by report number for report #10-1072 on the Search Reports page of www.firefighternearmiss.com.
Near Miss Report Event #2010-1072
“I made sure my crew was ready to enter, sounded the floor for stability and then crossedover the threshold, entering the structure. When I was approximately 5 feet inside the structure, I felt the floor start to give way. I turned toward the front door to try to bail out, and at the same time yelled at others to get out, when the floor system collapsed. This was no ordinary collapse. More than two-thirds of the first floor collapsed simultaneously. The living room, dining room, kitchen, bathroom and foyer all fell at once. “When the collapse happened, I was the only one who fell into the basement, right into the heart of the fire. All I could see around me were flames.
I could not see the hole that I had fallen through. I could not see my fellow firefighters above me. All I could see was fire. I began to try to find something to use to climb back up with. Since I did not know what type of collapse had occurred, I just started clawing away at anything as I was trying to climb. During this time, my legs were burning.
Fire was burning up between my boots and my bunker pants. The pain was intense. My deputy chief was trying to put a line on me for protection, but the fire was extremely intense. He was lying on the porch with fire shooting out over his head. He stated he could occasionally see the top of my helmet and the reflective stripes on my coat sleeves.
By a bit of luck, a roof ladder was laying in the front yard that had just been taken off the roof after the completion of a ventilation operation.
My deputy chief directed the crew to put the ladder into the hole for my escape. “By this time, I was burned on my legs and struggling with exhaustion and the intense heat. I was screaming both from pain and due to fear. I could hear screaming coming from above, butwas unable to make out the majority of it. I finally heard the word “ladder” and then felt something across my back. Once they got the ladder into the basement, I had to get around to it. I still could not see anything but fire, so this was all by feel. As I started up the ladder, I got two rungs up, reached for the third rung, and lost my grip and fell back into the basement landing on my back. I was so exhausted that I started making my peace with God that this was where I was going to die.
For the full excerpt from Captain Long’s near miss report go to the NFF Near Miss Reporting Site and Resource Link, HERE
Captain Long
Incident Lessons Learned from Captain Long:
Train as if it is real. Train, train, train, and then train some more. Take advantage of every opportunity to train. The better we are trained, the less our chance of injury. The training must be physically and mentally. Crews must focus on more hands-on scenario-based training that allows for problem solving. If crews are taught that the outcome to every scenario is static, they are not being encouraged to think. Every run is different; no single solution applies to every situation. Adaptations or decisions that are not in step with changing conditions can actually be disadvantageous. We must make the right decisions based on the correct interpretation of the environment and blend those observations with our knowledge, skills, and abilities to map a course of action that will lead us to a successful outcome. Read reality and come up with the best possible plan. In my situation, quick thinking and adapting to the problem that presented itself saved my life.
Mutual-aid training is a must. We must train more with our neighboring departments to improve operations. It is occasionally difficult to work in situations where you do not really know with whom you will be working or where the command structure and tactics differ from those of your department. We all learn from the same book; however, the interpretations and tactics differ from person to person and department to department. I am not saying anyone is right or wrong in the way they do things—we all just need to do a better job of understanding that there is more than one way to get the job done.
We cannot know exactly how everyone on an emergency scene will perform because each person has a different interpretation of his surroundings and role in the system. Standard operating guidelines (SOGs) can assist in this area, but SOGs rely on perceptions and interpretations by individuals to be implemented as intended. Accidents often happen because everyone has a unique perspective on the environment, and each makes different decisions based on their perception.
We must perceive the environment correctly to ensure we make the right move. If these actions are not communicated and coordinated in the intricate system that is the fireground, accidents will be the inevitable and regrettable results. Training and frequent reviewing of SOGs are vital to our safety.
Risk assessment. Sounding the floor prior to entry is not always a good indicator of the floor’s stability. Less than two minutes before I made entry, there were three other firefighters, at least the same weight as I, in the same area where the collapse occurred. Everything changed in a very short time. There was no warning. Adkins told me at the hospital that all he heard was a “whoosh” sound when the floor collapsed. Then I disappeared. Within two minutes, the floor assembly went from being able to sustain a live load of at least 900 pounds in that area (accounting for gear, equipment, SCBA, and so on) to collapsing with about a 300-pound load, and I was close to a load-bearing wall. A good way to evaluate risk vs. gain is to get the most accurate report on burn time as possible to help determine structural integrity.
Rapid intervention. RIT is a critical fireground benchmark and is very important for safety, but it would have been ineffective in this situation. Had my crew not reacted the way they did immediately, I would not have been able to last long enough to wait for the RIT. In the time it would have taken for the RIT to gear up, come up with a plan, and enter, I would have died. The stars aligned in my favor that night. The person calling the Mayday or a nearby crew often mitigates personnel emergencies. My crew was able to act decisively at the correct time, and I am alive because of it. It is important to remember that a large percentage of Maydays are mitigated by the crew to which the lost firefighter is assigned or a nearby crew. RIT deployments account for a small number of rescues; we must always be alert and ready for the “incident within the incident.”
Manage your emotional response. From a personal standpoint, you must rely on your training and try not to panic. Know your equipment and procedures well. I did panic, but I was still able to keep myself together enough to know not to leave the area since I had been told that the stairs had burned away. Keeping my SCBA on, resisting the emotional reaction to remove my mask because of claustrophobia, was a huge factor in my survival. If I had tried to find another way out, my crew could not have gotten to me with the ladder. Had I removed my mask, the story would have ended quite differently. When I teach, I try to train as if it is the real thing. Never take a run for granted. Always expect the worst; you will be better prepared to deal with the unexpected.
If we continually study accident reports and learn from them, the likelihood of being surprised will be diminished. Peter Leschak writes in Ghosts of the Fireground: ”In fire and other emergency operations, you must not only tolerate uncertainty; you must savor it, or you won’t last long. The most efficient preparation is a general mental, physical, and professional readiness nurtured over years of training and experience. You live to live. Preparing is itself an activity, and action is preparation.”
Talk about it. Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) is important for ensuring that personnel from all departments on scene are taken care of emotionally. CISD needs to extend beyond just one or two briefings. Personnel involved in a highly emotional event must be given the opportunity to speak to a trained CISD team member early and be given as much time as is needed to work through their issue. Some firefighters have a macho attitude and try to deal with their emotions on their own, or maybe they don’t deal with them at all. Others self-medicate with alcohol or, worse, these difficult emotional events are allowed to fester with no relief. People should be accepting of those who deal with issues up front and tell their stories. Telling these stories makes us better and helps to keep us safe. This reduces the possibility of “snapping” because you have too much pent-up emotion.
My fellow firefighters are still affected by this event, even those who were not there. Department personnel must be open-minded and receptive to the fact that emotional events will affect your performance and your personal life and that it is acceptable to be open and deal with them. When difficult emotional situations present themselves, members should attempt to deal with them as soon as possible.
Know what is possible and what is not. Know the experience level of your crew. Going into a bad situation with a crew that may not have exposure to a lot of different situations or that you aren’t that familiar with could make operations more difficult. I had everything from a 30-year veteran to a one-year recruit, so the experience level was all across the board. I knew that the situation we were going into was getting worse and required quick action, so I took the lead to ensure that the operation would be completed as quickly as possible. I knew my deputy chief would be watching us to ensure things were proceeding safely. I knew my crew could get the job done; however, this was an operation that is not often practiced and I wanted to make sure it was done correctly. I will not send my crew into an area that I am not comfortable going into. The more you train and the more people you can train with, the better you will understand your capabilities.
Listen or download the special interview I had with Captain Mike Long as well as
Taking it to the Streets Radio Program and Interview with Capt. Long
The line-up of Program guests included, Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret), Captain CJ Haberkorn Denver (CO) Fire Department and Special Guest Captain Michael Long, Camp Taylor (KY) Fire Protection District.
Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the National Near-Miss Reporting System and the untapped resources that the program and system provides with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire service leaders. The second part of the program will dedicated to the personal account of Captain Long’s Close Call event from July 25, 2010 (NMR #10-1072) when a catastrophic floor collapse at a residential occupancy plunged him into a fire involved basement.
Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.
Taking it to the StreetsTM, is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production, in affiliation with the Command Institute
A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
In the meantime here are some links I pulled together that you should take the time to read and share with your companies, personnel and staff…..
This seems like a good time to have a ten minute drill on these events as Operating Experience (OE) on floor systems and operational safety, calling or commanding the mayday.
Or take some time to visit the The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)site which has the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens. (Day One: Are you ready, HERE)
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
Self-Survival Procedures
FGS Online Program Chapter 3
To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:
First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall.
Fires inside an enclosed structure create a mess for fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters often encounter debris that has fallen off shelves, and ceiling and wall fixtures that have burned and are left hanging to the floor. These hazards, coupled with the mess a fire fighter creates when searching for victims in smoky environments, can create egress problems for a fire fighter.
As fire burns draperies, blinds, lighting fixtures, computer wiring, and HVAC ducting, the possibility of encountering an entanglement hazard increases. The overhead ducting of the HVAC system contains wires that give the ducting its stability.
If a fire breaches the ceiling and burns the ducting, the wires within the ducting fall to the floor. These wires can cause a dangerous entanglement hazard to fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters must anticipate these hazards and have a plan to follow when egress is cut off.
FGS Online Program Chapter 5
A discussion of what command must communicate to the distressed fire fighter, dispatch, the RIT group supervisor and all others assigned to the incident to assure a successful rescue.
Here are Some Mission Critical Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE) to support Your Training and Operational Needs not only this week, but through the entire year.
Here are some Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) for Operations at Basement Fires that will support fireground operational safety:
Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner.
Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment
Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week:Day Four -The New Fire Ground
There is an immediate need for today’s emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their foundation of knowledge and insights related to the modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to adjust and modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions.
Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk, not occupancy type, and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire and building profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumptive fire behavior. It is not your old method of size-up and operational deployment.
The dramatic changes in buildings and occupancies over the past ten years have resulted inadequate fire suppression methodologies based upon conventional practices that do not align with the manner in which we used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. These past presumptions, which many of us debated with our esteemed colleagues, are being validated through empirical data resulting from the cutting edge research and testing being conducted today by UL and NIST.
Predicting Fire Behavior and Building Stability
We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system and given an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions, we can safely and effectively mitigate a structural fire situation in any given building type and occupancy.
Past operational experiences, both favorable and negative; gave us experiences that define and determine how the fireground is assessed, react and how we expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future; this formed the basis for the naturalistic decision-making process.
Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built upon nine decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.
Are you aware of the defining changes in structural systems and support, the degree of compartmentation,
the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of the fire-loading package in today’s buildings and occupancies?
When was the last time you were out in the street with the companies, or spent some time doing a walk-through of construction or renovations site?
Have you asked you commanding officers, division or battalion chief or your company officers for insights into what operational demands and risks are being imposed upon them while operating in the street and within the buildings, occupancies and structures that comprise your jurisdiction?
The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.
It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned command and company officer knows that at times. It’s what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances.
However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective; aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal-oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed strategic processes that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.
The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics.
Today’s incident commanders need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling, while implementing Tactical Patience.
Think about the following;
Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
Take a tour of your response area, district, community or city.
Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that are affecting your incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory
Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type and align your operations and deployments to match those risks
Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling
Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of conducting fire service operations
Think about Adaptive Fire Ground Management and Command Resiliency
Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going to do about that gap?
If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures.
This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at risk. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies … You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.
It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production
Taking it to the Streets had its premier July 21st on Firefighter Netcast.com with a lively and provoking discussion on “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen?” The program theme aligned with a recent posting on the same topic. Joining me on the program were two prominent and nationally recognized fire service leaders, who I’m honored to have known for many years, Chief Billy Hayes and Chief Doug Cline; the program explored leading fire service issues affecting firefighter safety, training, credentialing and education; fireground operational variables related to the continuing changes in building construction, engineered systems and extreme fire behavior, and the emerging need for “Tactical Patience” as I’ve been exploring the relationships towards the need for tactical enhancements to our current fire suppression theory and firefighting models.
Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them. Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire. This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building. In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure. This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway. The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented? Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening. If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants. NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions. There are many questions regarding wind driven fires. For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures? Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires. In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings. All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set. All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player. NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments
The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments was recently released to the public providing . A copy of the report is attached.
Report Abstract:
Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.
This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.
This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.
Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.
The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002
Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions
Base on the UL research and
This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This self-guided course, which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions, is targeted toward the 1.1 million fire service personnel in the United States and Canada. The knowledge developed and shared in this course is critically important to firefighter and civilian safety.
This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
Program Objectives:
Provide brief history of events leading up to DHS Grant tests
Identify the fire test hypothesis, parameters, and steps completed in the testing process
Compare tests results (legacy vs. modern construction)
Communicate learnings from our partners representing the fire service
Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction
For many of you that have been following my writings and perspectives on building construction, firefighting, command risk management and operational excellence for firefighter safety have long recognized that I have been promoting and advocating the fact the fireground is changing, our strategies and tactics demand change and does the demand for increased knowledge within the areas of building construction, fire dynamics, while integrating the art and science of firefighting. The most recent release of the testing report from Underwriters Laboratories; Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction and the accompanying empirical data further validates assumptions and premises that many of us shared based upon field observations and first hand incident operations related to the dramatic changes being witnessed as a result of operational challenges in a wide variety of occupancies and building types.
This material is a must read for all emerging and practicing company and command officers ( for starters) to being grasping the magnitude and extent of quantifiable data that supports the premise that combat fire engagement and suppression operations and the rules of engagement are going to change and that change is fast approaching.
Here’s the executive summary of the report and findings from UL. For an download of the entire UL Report, go HERE.
The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.
Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.
There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.
This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.
Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.
The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.
The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, and 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.
The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two story great room and open foyer.
Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.
One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability. The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.
The tactical considerations addressed include:
Stages of fire development: The stages of fire development change when a fire becomes ventilation limited.
It is common with today’s fire environment to have a decay period prior to flashover which emphasizes the importance of ventilation
Forcing the front door is ventilation: Forcing entry has to be thought of as ventilation as well.
While forcing entry is necessary to fight the fire it must also trigger the thought that air is being fed to the fire and the clock is ticking before either the fire gets extinguished or it grows until an untenable condition exists jeopardizing the safety of everyone in the structure.
No smoke showing: A common event during the experiments was that once the fire became ventilation limited the smoke being forced out of the gaps of the houses greatly diminished or stopped all together.
No some showing during size-up should increase awareness of the potential conditions inside.
Coordination: If you add air to the fire and don’t apply water in the appropriate time frame the fire gets larger and safety decreases.
Examining the times to untenability gives the best case scenario of how coordinated the attack needs to be.
Taking the average time for every experiment from the time of ventilation to the time of the onset of firefighter untenability conditions yields 100 seconds for the one-story house and 200 seconds for the two-story house
In many of the experiments from the onset of firefighter untenability until flashover was less than 10 seconds.
These times should be treated as being very conservative. If a vent location already exists because the homeowner left a window or door open then the fire is going to respond faster to additional ventilation opening because the temperatures in the house are going to be higher.
Coordination of fire attack crew is essential for a positive outcome in today’s fire environment.
Smoke tunneling and rapid air movement through the front door: Once the front door is opened attention should be given to the flow through the front door.
A rapid in rush of air or a tunneling effect could indicate a ventilation limited fire.
Vent Enter Search (VES): During a VES operation, primary importance should be given to closing the door to the room.
This eliminates the impact of the open vent and increases tenability for potential occupants and firefighters while the smoke ventilates from the now isolated room.
Flow paths: Every new ventilation opening provides a new flow path to the fire and vice versa.
This could create very dangerous conditions when there is a ventilation limited fire.
Can you vent enough?: In the experiments where multiple ventilation locations were made it was not possible to create fuel limited fires.
The fire responded to all the additional air provided.
That means that even with a ventilation location open the fire is still ventilation limited and will respond just as fast or faster to any additional air.
It is more likely that the fire will respond faster because the already open ventilation location is allowing the fire to maintain a higher temperature than if everything was closed. In these cases rapid fire progression if highly probable and coordination of fire attack with ventilation is paramount.
Impact of shut door on occupant tenability and firefighter tenability: Conditions in every experiment for the closed bedroom remained tenable for temperature and oxygen concentration thresholds.
This means that the act of closing a door between the occupant and the fire or a firefighter and the fire can increase the chance of survivability.
During firefighter operations if a firefighter is searching ahead of a hoseline or becomes separated from his crew and conditions deteriorate then a good choice of actions would be to get in a room with a closed door until the fire is knocked down or escape out of the room’s window with more time provided by the closed door
Potential impact of open vent already on flashover time: All of these experiments were designed to examine the first ventilation actions by an arriving crew when there are no ventilation openings.
It is possible that the fire will fail a window prior to fire department arrival or that a door or window was left open by the occupant while exiting.
It is important to understand that an already open ventilation location is providing air to the fire, allowing it to sustain or grow.
Pushing fire: There were no temperature spikes in any of the rooms, especially the rooms adjacent to the fire room when water was applied from the outside. It appears that in most cases the fire was slowed down by the water application and that external water application had no negative impacts to occupant survivability.
While the fog stream “pushed” steam along the flow path there was no fire “pushed”.
No damage to surrounding rooms: Just as the fire triangle depicts, fire needs oxygen to burn.
A condition that existed in every experiment was that the fire (living room or family room) grew until oxygen was reduced below levels to sustain it.
This means that it decreased the oxygen in the entire house by lowering the oxygen in surrounding rooms and the more remote bedrooms until combustion was not possible.
In most cases surrounding rooms such as the dining room and kitchen had no fire in them even when the fire room was fully involved in flames and was ventilating out of the structure.
Online Training Program
In order to make the results of this study more user friendly for the fire service to examine, UL developed an online interactive training module that can be viewed by clicking here. The program includes a professionally narrated description of all of the experiments, their results and the tactical considerations. Experimental video is used and graphical data is explained in a way that brings science to the street level firefighter.
It’s being reported that San Francisco Fire Fighter Anthony Valerio passed away this morning as a result of injuries sustained while operating the Diamond Heights fire on Thursday June 2nd. This becomes the second line of duty death from this incident that also resulted in the LODD of Lt. Vincent Perez. Anthony “Tony” Valerio, a 53-year-old firefighter and paramedic critically injured in the Thursday blaze, died at San Francisco General Hospital at about 7:40 a.m., city officials said.
San Francisco firefighter Anthony Valerio is the second firefighter to die from Thursday’s Diamond Heights fire. According to San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White, Valerio had “significant damage to his respiratory system” and burns across his body after Thursday’s fire. Valerio has burns to 12 percent of his body.
WKGO TV ABC7 reports that according to San Francisco Fire Deputy Chief Mike Gardner said most of Fire Fighter Valerio’s burns were from steam and not from fire, adding that the temperature inside the structure was between 500 and 700 degrees.
Coincidentially, we posted a remembrance to the DCFD Cherry Road Townhouse Fire and Double FireFighter LODD from May, 1999 that is worth another look as it has similar connotations related to fire behavior, flashover conditions and multiple floor level construction factors during initial fire suppression operations, HERE
San Francisco firefighters carry one of their own from the scene of a house blaze today in the Diamond Heights neighborhood. Patty Stanton / Special to The Chronicle
San Francisco (CA) Fire Department Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, died in the line of duty during fire suppression operations trying to extinguish a fire at a four-story residential occupancy in the Diamond Heights section of San Francisco. FF Anthony Valerio, 53, is reported in critical condition at San Francisco General Hospital’s intensive care unit with severe burns.
According to published reports, a third firefighter was treated and released for minor burns and smoke inhalation, Talmadge said. Her name was not released.
The single family home was constructed in 1975 and has 2058 square foot of living space, 3 bedrooms and 3.0 bathrooms.
Fire Dynamics is the study of how chemistry, fire science, material science and the mechanical engineering disciplines of fluid mechanics and heat transfer interact to influence fire behavior.
In other words, Fire Dynamics is the study of how fires start, spread and develop. But what exactly is a fire?
Defining Fire
Fire can be described in many ways – here are a few:
NFPA 921: ”A rapid oxidation process, which is a chemical reaction resulting in the evolution of light and heat in varying intensities.”
Webster’s Dictionary: “A fire is an exothermic chemical reaction that emits heat and light”
Fire can also be explained in terms of the Fire Tetrahedron – a geometric representation of what is required for fire to exist, namely, fuel, an oxidizing agent, heat, and an uninhibited chemical reaction.
Measuring Fire
Heat Energy is a form of energy characterized by vibration of molecules and capable of initiating and supporting chemical changes and changes of state (NFPA 921).
In other words, it is the energy needed to change the temperature of an object – add heat, temperature increases; remove heat, temperature decreases.
Heat energy is measured in units of Joules (J), however it can also be measured in Calories (1 Calorie = 4.184 J) and BTU’s (1 BTU = 1055 J).
Temperature is a measure of the degree of molecular activity of a material compared to a reference point.
Temperature is measured in degrees Farenheit (melting point of ice = 32 º F, boiling point of water = 212 º F) or degrees Celsius (melting point of ice = 0 º C, boiling point of water = 100 º C).
º C
º F
Response
37
98.6
Normal human oral/body temperature
44
111
Human skin begins to feel pain
48
118
Human skin receives a first degree burn injury
55
131
Human skin receives a second degree burn injury
62
140
A phase where burned human tissue becomes numb
72
162
Human skin is instantly destroyed
100
212
Water boils and produces steam
140
284
Glass transition temperature of polycarbonate
230
446
Melting temperature of polycarbonate
250
482
Charring of natural cotton begins
>300
>572
Charring of modern protective clothing fabrics begins
>600
>1112
Temperatures inside a post-flashover room fire
Heat Release Rate (HRR) is the rate at which fire releases energy – this is also known as power. HRR is measured in units of Watts (W), which is an International System unit equal to one Joule per second.
Depending on the size of the fire, HRR is also measured in Kilowatts (equal to 1,000 Watts) or Megawatts (equal 1,000,000 Watts).
Heat Flux is the rate of heat energy transferred per surface unit area – kW/m2.
Heat Flux (kW/m2)
Example
1
Sunny day
2.5
Typical firefighter exposure
3-5
Pain to skin within seconds
20
Threshold flux to floor at flashover
84
Thermal Protective Performance Test (NFPA 1971)
60 – 200
Flames over surface
Temperature vs. Heat Release Rate
One candle vs. ten candles – same flame temperature but 10 times the heat release rate!
HRR: ~ 80 W Temperature: 500 C - 1400 C
(930 F - 2500 F)
HRR: ~ 800 W
Heat Transfer
Heat transfer is a major factor in the ignition, growth, spread, decay and extinction of a fire.
It is important to note that heat is always transferred from the hotter object to the cooler object - heat energy transferred to and object increases the object’s temperature, and heat energy transferred from and object decreases the object’s temperature.
CONDUCTION
Conduction is heat transfer within solids or between contacting solids.
The governing equation for heat transfer by conduction is:
Where T is temperature (in Kelvin), A is the exposure area (meters squared), L is the depth of the solid (meters), and k is a constant that unique for different materials know as the thermal conductivity and has units of (Watts/meters*Kelvin).
Thermal Conductivity of Common Materials
Copper = 387
Gypsum = 0.48
Steel = 45.8
Oak = 0.17
Glass = 0.76
Pine = 0.14
Brick = 0.69
PPE = 0.034 – 0.136
Water = 0.58
Air = 0.026
CONVECTION
Convection is heat transfer by the movement of liquids or gasses.
The governing equation for heat transfer by convection is:
Where T is temperature (in Kelvin), A is the area of exposure (in meters squared), and h is a constant that is unique for different materials known as the convective heat transfer coefficient, with units of W/m2*K.
These values are found empirically, or, by experiment.
For free convection, values usually range between 5 and 25. But for forced convection, values can range anywhere from 10 to 500.
RADIATION
Radiation is heat transfer by electromagnetic waves.
The governing equation for heat transfer by radiation is:
Where T is temperature (in Kelvin), A is the area of exposure (in meters squared), α is the thermal diffusivity (a measure of how quickly a material will adjust it’s temperature to the surroundings, in meters squared per second) and ε is the emissivity (a measure of the ability of a materials surface to emit energy by radiation).
Fire Phenomena
Fire Development is a function of many factors including: fuel properties, fuel quantity, ventilation (natural or mechanical), compartment geometry (volume and ceiling height), location of fire, and ambient conditions (temperature, wind, etc).
Traditional Fire Development The Traditional Fire Development curve shows the time history of a fuel limited fire. In other words, the fire growth is not limited by a lack of oxygen. As more fuel becomes involved in the fire, the energy level continues to increase until all of the fuel available is burning (fully developed).
Then as the fuel is burned away, the energy level begins to decay.
The key is that oxygen is available to mix with the heated gases (fuel) to enable the completion of the fire triangle and the generation of energy.
Fire Behavior in a Structure The Fire Behavior in a Structure curve demonstrates the time history of a ventilation limited fire. In this case the fire starts in a structure which has the doors and windows closed.Early in the fire growth stage there is adequate oxygen to mix with the heated gases, which results in flaming combustion. As the oxygen level within the structure is depleted, the fire decays, the heat release from the fire decreases and as a result the temperature decreases.
When a vent is opened, such as when the fire department enters a door, oxygen is introduced.
The oxygen mixes with the heated gases in the structure and the energy level begins to increase.
This change in ventilation can result in a rapid increase in fire growth potentially leading to a flashover (fully developed compartment fire) condition.
Flashover is the transition phase in the development of a contained fire in which surfaces exposed to the thermal radiation, from fire gases in excess of 600° C,
reach ignition temperature more or less simultaneously and fire spreads rapidly through the space.
This is the most dangerous stage of fire development.
Informational Source: The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. (HERE)
Predictability of Performance: Its Occupancy Risk NOT Occupancy Type
Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction
UL Ventilation and Fire Behavior Full Scale Testing
Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction
For many of you that have been following my writings and perspectives on building construction, firefighting, command risk management and operational excellence for firefighter safety have long recognized that I have been promoting and advocating the fact the fireground is changining, our stratgies and tactics demand change adn does the demand for increased knowledge within the areas of building construction, fire dynamics, while integrating the art and science of firefighting. The most recent release of the testing report from Underwriters Laboratories; Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction and the accompaning emphirical data further validates assumptions and presmises that many of us shared based upon field obervations and first hand incident operations related to the dramatic changes being witnessed as a result of operational challenges in a wide varity of occupanies and building types.
This material is a must read for all emerging and practicing company and command officers ( for starters) to being grasping the magnitude and extent of quantifiable data that supports the premise that combat fire engagement and suppression operations and the rules of engagement are going to change and that change is fast approaching.
Considerations for Tactical Patience and Adaptive Fireground Management are continued themes I will expand upon in future postings….
Here’s the executive summary of the report and findings from UL. For an download of the entire UL Report, go HERE.
Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries. There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics. This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.
Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL. The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms. The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms. The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two-story great room and open foyer. Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house. One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability.
The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.
Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.
There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.
This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.
Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.
The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.
The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, and 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.
The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two story great room and open foyer.
Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.
One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability. The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.
The tactical considerations addressed include:
Stages of fire development:The stages of fire development change when a fire becomes ventilation limited.
It is common with today’s fire environment to have a decay period prior to flashover which emphasizes the importance of ventilatio
Forcing the front door is ventilation: Forcing entry has to be thought of as ventilation as well.
While forcing entry is necessary to fight the fire it must also trigger the thought that air is being fed to the fire and the clock is ticking before either the fire gets extinguished or it grows until an untenable condition exists jeopardizing the safety of everyone in the structure.
No smoke showing:A common event during the experiments was that once the fire became ventilation limited the smoke being forced out of the gaps of the houses greatly diminished or stopped all together.
No some showing during size-up should increase awareness of the potential conditions inside.
Coordination:If you add air to the fire and don’t apply water in the appropriate time frame the fire gets larger and safety decreases.
Examining the times to untenability gives the best case scenario of how coordinated the attack needs to be.
Taking the average time for every experiment from the time of ventilation to the time of the onset of firefighter untenability conditions yields 100 seconds for the one-story house and 200 seconds for the two-story house
In many of the experiments from the onset of firefighter untenability until flashover was less than 10 seconds.
These times should be treated as being very conservative. If a vent location already exists because the homeowner left a window or door open then the fire is going to respond faster to additional ventilation opening because the temperatures in the house are going to be higher.
Coordination of fire attack crew is essential for a positive outcome in today’s fire environment.
Smoke tunneling and rapid air movement through the front door:Once the front door is opened attention should be given to the flow through the front door.
A rapid in rush of air or a tunneling effect could indicate a ventilation limited fire.
Vent Enter Search (VES):During a VES operation, primary importance should be given to closing the door to the room.
This eliminates the impact of the open vent and increases tenability for potential occupants and firefighters while the smoke ventilates from the now isolated room.
Flow paths: Every new ventilation opening provides a new flow path to the fire and vice versa.
This could create very dangerous conditions when there is a ventilation limited fire.
Can you vent enough?:In the experiments where multiple ventilation locations were made it was not possible to create fuel limited fires.
The fire responded to all the additional air provided.
That means that even with a ventilation location open the fire is still ventilation limited and will respond just as fast or faster to any additional air.
It is more likely that the fire will respond faster because the already open ventilation location is allowing the fire to maintain a higher temperature than if everything was closed. In these cases rapid fire progression if highly probable and coordination of fire attack with ventilation is paramount.
Impact of shut door on occupant tenability and firefighter tenability:Conditions in every experiment for the closed bedroom remained tenable for temperature and oxygen concentration thresholds.
This means that the act of closing a door between the occupant and the fire or a firefighter and the fire can increase the chance of survivability.
During firefighter operations if a firefighter is searching ahead of a hoseline or becomes separated from his crew and conditions deteriorate then a good choice of actions would be to get in a room with a closed door until the fire is knocked down or escape out of the room’s window with more time provided by the closed door
Potential impact of open vent already on flashover time:All of these experiments were designed to examine the first ventilation actions by an arriving crew when there are no ventilation openings.
It is possible that the fire will fail a window prior to fire department arrival or that a door or window was left open by the occupant while exiting.
It is important to understand that an already open ventilation location is providing air to the fire, allowing it to sustain or grow.
Pushing fire:There were no temperature spikes in any of the rooms, especially the rooms adjacent to the fire room when water was applied from the outside. It appears that in most cases the fire was slowed down by the water application and that external water application had no negative impacts to occupant survivability.
While the fog stream “pushed” steam along the flow path there was no fire “pushed”.
No damage to surrounding rooms:Just as the fire triangle depicts, fire needs oxygen to burn.
A condition that existed in every experiment was that the fire (living room or family room) grew until oxygen was reduced below levels to sustain it.
This means that it decreased the oxygen in the entire house by lowering the oxygen in surrounding rooms and the more remote bedrooms until combustion was not possible.
In most cases surrounding rooms such as the dining room and kitchen had no fire in them even when the fire room was fully involved in flames and was ventilating out of the structure.
Online Training Program
In order to make the results of this study more user friendly for the fire service to examine, UL developed an online interactive training module that can be viewed by clicking here. The program includes a professionally narrated description of all of the experiments, their results and the tactical considerations. Experimental video is used and graphical data is explained in a way that brings science to the street level firefighter.
UL University On-Line CBT
Comparison of Modern and Legacy Home Furnishings
An experiment was conducted with two side by side living room fires. The purpose was to gain knowledge on the difference between modern and legacy furnishings. The rooms measured 12 ft by 12 ft, with an 8 ft ceiling and had an 8 ft wide by 7 ft tall opening on the front wall. Both rooms contained similar amounts of like furnishings.
The modern room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted gypsum board and the floor was covered with carpet and padding.
The furnishings included a microfiber covered polyurethane foam filled sectional sofa, engineered wood coffee table, end table, television stand and book case.
The sofa had a polyester throw placed on its right side. The end table had a lamp with polyester shade on top of it and a wicker basket inside it.
The coffee table had six color magazines, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
The television stand had a color magazine and a 37 inch flat panel television.
The book case had two small plastic bins, two picture frames and two glass vases on it.
The right rear corner of the room had a plastic toy bin, a plastic toy tub and four stuffed toys.
The rear wall had polyester curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.
The legacy room was lined with a layer of ½ inch painted cement board and the floor was covered with unfinished hardwood flooring.
The furnishings included a cotton covered, cotton batting filled sectional sofa, solid wood coffee table, two end tables, and television stand.
The sofa had a cotton throw placed on its right side.
Both end tables had a lamp with polyester shade on top of them.
The one on the left side of the sofa had two paperback books on it.
A wicker basket was located on the floor in front of the right side of the sofa at the floor level.
The coffee table had three hard-covered books, a television remote and a synthetic plant on it.
The television stand had a 27 inch tube television.
The right front corner of the room had a wood toy bin, and multiple wood toys.
The rear wall had cotton curtains hanging from a metal rod and the side walls had wood framed pictures hung on them.
Both rooms were ignited by placing a lit stick candle on the right side of the sofa. The fires were allowed to grow until flashover. The modern room transitioned to flashover in 3 minutes and 30 seconds and the legacy room at 29 minutes and 30 seconds.
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April 20, 2011 Show 9:00 pm – 10:15 pm ET
Live and Online Taking it to the Streets with your host Christopher Naum will present another timely and insightful look at an emerging element of today’s evolving fire ground.
Join in on Wednesday April 20th at 9pm ET for a very special and exciting program discussing the concepts and theory of Survivability Profiling.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released its final report on its study of the June 18, 2007, fire at the Sofa Super Store in Charleston, S.C., that trapped and killed nine firefighters, the highest number of firefighter deaths in a single event since 9/11. The final report was strengthened by clarifications and supplemental text based on comments provided by organizations and individuals in response to the draft report of the study, released for public comment on Oct. 28, 2010. (HERE)
The revisions did not alter the study team’s main finding: the major factors contributing to the rapid spread of the fire at the Sofa Super Store were large open spaces with furniture providing high-fuel loads, the inward rush of air following the breaking of windows, and a lack of sprinklers.
Based on its findings, the study team made 11 recommendations for enhancing building, occupant and firefighter safety nationwide. In particular, the team urged state and local communities to adopt and strictly adhere to current national model building and fire safety codes. These codes are used as models for building and fire regulations promulgated and enforced by U.S. state and local jurisdictions. Those jurisdictions have the option of incorporating some or all of the code’s provisions but often adopt most provisions.
If today’s model codes had been in place and rigorously followed in Charleston in 2007, the study authors said, the conditions that led to the rapid fire spread in the Sofa Super Store probably would have been prevented.
Specifically, the NIST report calls for national model building and fire codes to require sprinklers for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size, and for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).
Other recommendations include adopting model codes that cover high fuel load situations (such as a furniture store), ensuring proper fire inspections and building plan examinations, and encouraging research for a better understanding of fire situations such as venting of smoke from burning buildings and the spread of fire on furniture.
Two of the recommendations in the draft report were slightly modified to increase their effectiveness.
The recommendation “that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard” was improved by listing three nationally accepted certification examinations as examples of “how professional qualification may be demonstrated.”
Another recommendation has been enhanced by urging state and local jurisdictions to “provide education to firefighters on the science of fire behavior in vented and non-vented structures and how the addition of air can impact the burning characteristics of the fuel.”
Based on their model and the data collected, the NIST researchers determined the following sequence of events on June 18, 2007, at the Sofa Super Store:
The fire began in trash outside the loading dock and spread into the enclosed loading dock. The fire spread from the exterior to the interior of the loading dock, which was used for staging furniture for delivery and repair. The fire spread quickly within the loading dock and moved into both the retail showroom and warehouse spaces.
During the early stages of this fire, the fire was unable to access enough air, a state that slowed its growth. However, the lack of sufficient air for complete combustion did result in large volumes of smoke and combustible gases flowing into the space below the roof and above the drop ceiling of the main retail showroom.
The fire spread to the rear of the main showroom through the holding area and ignited additional fuel in the rear of the main showroom, at which time it became more visible to firefighters in the main showroom.
The growth of the fire at the back of the main showroom was still slowed by the lack of air. As the fire burned in the rear of the main showroom, the fire pumped more hot unburned fuel into the smoke layer below the drop ceiling. The lack of air prevented the unburned fuel in the smoke layer from igniting.
When the front windows were broken (approximately 24 minutes after firefighters arrived at the store), additional air flowed in the front windows, along the floor and to the rear of the showroom, and became available to the fire. The additional air allowed the burning rate of the fire to increase rapidly and ignite the layer of unburned fuel below the drop ceiling.
The fire swept from the rear to the front of the main showroom extremely quickly, then into the west and east showrooms, trapping six firefighters in the main showroom and three firefighters in the west showroom.
Furniture and merchandise in the showrooms and warehouse continued to burn for an additional 140 minutes before the fire was extinguished.
NIST is working with various public and private groups toward implementing changes to practices, standards, and building and fire codes based on the findings from this study.
The complete text of the final report, Volumes I and II, may be downloaded as Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) files from the links below;
For a detailed summary of the Sofa Super Store study, its findings and recommendations, and links to supporting materials such as graphics and video segments from computer simulations of the fire, go to “NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements” at www.nist.gov/el/fire_research/charleston_102810.cfm.
jurisdictions have the option of incorporating some or all of the code’s provisions but generally adopt most provisions.
Recommendations from the NIST Study of the Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire
1. High Fuel-Load Mercantile Occupancies: NIST recommends that, at a minimum, all state and local jurisdictions adopt a building and fire code based upon one of the model codes, covering new and existing high fuel-load mercantile occupancies, and update local codes as the model codes are revised.
2. Model Code Adoption and Enforcement: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions implement aggressive and effective fire inspection and enforcement programs that address:
a) all aspects of the building and fire codes;
b) adequate documentation of building permits and alterations;
c) the means of inspecting fire protection systems and detailing record keeping;
d) the frequency and rigor of fire inspections, including follow-up and auditing procedures; and
e) guidelines for remedial requirements when inspections identify deviations from code provisions.
3. Qualified Fire Inspectors and Building Plan Examiners: NIST recommends that all state and local jurisdictions ensure that fire inspectors and building plan examiners are professionally qualified to a national standard such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1031.
4. Sprinklers: NIST recommends that model codes require sprinkler systems and that state and local authorities adopt and aggressively enforce this provision:
a) for all new commercial retail furniture stores regardless of size; and
b) for existing retail furniture stores with any single display area of greater than 190 square meters (2,000 square feet).
5. Comprehensive Risk Management Plans: NIST recommends that state and local jurisdictions use comprehensive risk management plans to:
a) identify low, medium, and high hazard occupancies;
b) allocate resources according to risk identified; and
c) develop operating procedures that respond to specific risks.
6. Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that state and local authorities:
a) develop guidelines as to how and when ventilation should be implemented during a fire; and
b) provide training to fire fighters on different types of ventilation—vertical, horizontal and positive-pressure—and integrate into daily operations on the fire ground.
7. Research on Upholstered Furniture Flame Spread: NIST recommends that research be conducted to better understand ignition and fire spread on upholstered furniture in order to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the fire performance of furniture. The specific areas requiring research are:
a) prediction of ignition of natural and synthetic coverings for current furniture, wall, ceiling and floor lining materials, and room furnishings;
b) prediction of fire spread over actual furniture with and without fire barriers, fire retardants and fire resistive materials; and
c) quantification of smoke and toxic gas production in realistic room fires.
8. Research on Improving Fire Barriers: NIST recommends that research be conducted to provide the tools needed by design professionals to improve the performance of compartmentalization. The specific areas requiring research are:
a) prediction of fire spread through walls constructed of wood, metal and gypsum wallboard;
b) prediction of fire spread through doors constructed of glass, wood, and metal;
c) prediction of fire spread through penetrations; and
d) prediction of performance of roll-up fire doors in actual fires and after extended service.
9. Research on Decision Aids for Allocation of Resources: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:
a) refine computer-aided decision tools for determining the costs and benefits of alternative code changes and fire safety technologies; and
b) develop computer models to assist communities in allocating resources (money and staff) to ensure that their response to an emergency with a large number of potential casualties is effective.
10. Research on Ventilation of Burning Structures: NIST recommends that additional research be conducted to:
a) improve characterization of how ventilation affects the growth and spread of fire within structures; and
b) provide the fire service with guidance on when and how to use ventilation to improve the fire environment during fire service operations.
11. Research on Performance Metrics for Fire Protection: NIST recommends that research be conducted to:
a) develop performance and effectiveness metrics for community fire protection;
b) survey effectiveness of existing fire services; and
c) use metrics to optimize development of new technologies.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum. On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com. A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production. Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.
Preliminary information suggests that Captain Bowen went into cardiac arrest after succumbing to intense smoke and heat, the city said in a statement released on Friday. Firefighter Bettencourt was transported to the Joseph M. Still Burn Center at Doctors Hospital in Augusta, Ga., for treatment. He was listed in critical condition Thursday night. Nine other firefighters were taken to the hospital in connection with the blaze. Six remained hospitalized late Thursday. Three were treated and released, according to Mission spokeswoman Merrell Gregory and published reports. Captain Bowen was a thirteen year fire service veteran and was a husband and father of three children. He was 37 years of age.
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