Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.
As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.
NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.
During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”
The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.
The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.
This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE. NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE
Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170
A five-story building under construction suddenly came down on Monday afternoon in Brooklyn, New York. Three workers became trapped under the rubble after the top two floors fell onto the third, sending it all crashing to the ground, officials said. Published reports indicate that the likelihood of the weight of the concrete caused the 3rd floor to collapse onto the 2nd floor, resulting in a catastrophic and sequential progressive floor collapse.
FDNY companies searched through the pile of concrete, pulling five workers out. Investigators said concrete being poured between the metal pillars buckled the building.
The building, at 2929 Brighton Fifth Street, near Neptune Avenue (Brooklyn) fell just before 2:30 p.m. A concrete worker on the site stated according to reports that the collapse happened immediately after concrete from his truck was pumped up onto the second and third floors of the building.
Four workers were in the building at the time of the collapse, and one was in front of the building. The one in front refused medical attention. Firefighters said the framework of the building had been erected, but not much else. Removing the men from the rubble was a delicate and difficult process because of the risk of further collapse. Even after the men were removed, a large piece of corrugated metal hung in front of the building.
FDNY Twitter Feed
Additional Links
Building Collapse In Brighton Beach Claims Life Of 1 Of 5 Workers Pulled From Rubble, HERE
Accessed from FDNY - Remembering the "23rd Street Fire" October 17, 1966, Facebook Page
On October 17th 1966, Manhattan Box 598 was struck at 21:36 hours for the report of a building fire at 7 East 22nd Street, an art dealer in a four story brownstone. On arrival, the heat and smoke was so intense companies could not make entry through the art dealer, and so attempted to make entry by way of the abutted building 6 East 23rd Street, The Wonder Drug store.
Crews were dealing with a very intense and spreading fire. With companies operating above the fire, little indication of a catastrophic collapse was present. Suddenly, a 16×35 foot section of the floor collapsed at around 22:39 hours causing ten firefighters to fall into the burning cellar. Two other firefighters on the first floor were killed in a burst of heat.
Firefighters evacuated immediately, except for some whom were trapped on the roof with direct flame impingement. Hand lines from the ground and a truck company ladder was able to rescue the group in time. Rescue operation ensued long into the morning. Several evacuations were ordered, and further collapses occurred. Aside from 9/11, this was the largest single line of duty death event in the FDNY’s history.
Stored in the basement of the art dealer were large quantities of highly flammable lacquer, paint, and finished wood frames. The first floor was supported by 3″ x 14″ wood beams. 3/4″ wood planking atop these beams was covered with five inches of concrete finished with terrazzo and insulated against all heat to the firefighters operating above. As part of a recent project, a common cellar under the two buildings was renovated, removing a load-bearing dividing wall that had supported the floor above. The cellar of the art dealer extended under the drug store illegally from this renovation.
The fire burned unknowingly in the Wonder Drug basement for over an hour when it finally collapsed. It took 14 hours to locate all downed firefighters in the rubble; the cause of the fire is unknown.
Building Construction Insights
Location of Fire Origin: Cellar of 7 East 22 St.
Location of Collapse: First floor of Exposure 3 building: 6 East 23 St. “The Wonder Drug Store.”
Fire Building Construction:
7 East 22 St: a brownstone, 20 x 60 brick and joist, four story residence.
The cellar, where the fire started, and first floor were occupied by an art dealer.
The cellar extended under the first floor of Wonder Drug for approximately 35 feet.
Collapse Building Construction:
6 East 23 St: a five story, 45 x 100 commercial building, brick & joist construction.
The rear, 16 x 35 foot, section of the first floor collapsed into the cellar occupied by 7 East 22 St.
The rear and side walls butted up to a 3-story white brick commercial building to the West at 3940-948 Broadway and to a 5-story brown brick building to the North at 6 East 23rd Street
Diagram NY Times (2006) Accessed from the internet 10.18.2011
Building Alteration
(1) The fire building, 7 East 22 St, had a two story extension which abutted the rear of 6 East 23 St.
(2) The Cellar of 7 East 22 St extended under the first floor of 6 East 23 St for approximately 35 feet.
(3) The floor construction of 6 East 23 St was 3″ x 14″ wood beams topped by 3/4″ wood planking. On top of this, five inches of concrete with a terrazzo finish was added.
The firefighters in exposure 3, (6 East 23 St), killed in the collapse did not know they were operating directly over the cellar fire in 7 East 22 St. The five inch concrete terrazzo floor acted as an insulator.
It concealed the severe fire and heat below. The 3 inch x 14 inch floor beams spaced 16 inches on center were reduced in size and strength by the fire.
The first sign of weakness was the sudden collapse of a 15 x 35 foot section, which plunged the ten firefighters to their deaths. Two other firefighters were killed on the first floor by a ball of flame.
The 5-alarm fire wasthe single worst loss of New York City firefighters in the line of duty prior to Sept. 11, 2001.
FDNY LODD Twelve Members of Every Rank
Twelve members of every rank, from a probationary firefighter to a deputy chief, made the Supreme Sacrifice when the ground floor of the Wonder Drug store collapsed. The fire originated in a basement storage area, which was concealed by a four-inch thick cinderblock wall, illegally constructed by the building’s previous owner.
DC Thomas A Reilly, Division .3
BC Walter J Higgins, Battalion. 7
Lt John J Finley, Ladder 7
Lt Joseph Priore, Engine 18
Fr John G Berry, Ladder 7
Fr James V Galanaugh, Engine 18
Fr Rudolph F Kaminsky, Ladder 7
Fr Joseph Kelly, Engine 18
Fr Carl Lee Ladder, 7
Fr William F McCarron, Division 3
Fr Daniel L Rey, Engine 18
Fr Bernard A Tepper, Engine 18
From NYFD.com http://nyfd.com/history/23rd_street/23rd_street.html
Excerpts from the Last Homily of Father Mychal Judge FDNY Chaplain, at Mass for Firefighters: Sept. 10, 2001:
You do what God has called you to do. You get on that rig, you go out and do the job. No matter how big the call, no matter how small, you have no idea of what God is calling you to do, but God needs you. He needs me. He needs all of us.
God needs us to keep supporting each other, to be kind to each other, to love each other…
We love this job, we all do. What a blessing it is! It’s a difficult, difficult job, but God calls you to do it, and indeed, He gives you a love for it so that a difficult job will be well done.
Isn’t God wonderful?! Isn’t He good to you, to each one of you, and to me? Turn to God each day — put your faith, your trust, your hope and your life in His hands.
He’ll take care of you, and you’ll have a good life. And this firehouse will be a great blessing to this neighborhood and to this city. Amen.
Blessed John Paul II offered the day after the events of September 11th, 2001, at his weekly audience of Sept. 12, 2001:
“Yesterday was a dark day in the history of humanity, a terrible affront to human dignity. After receiving the news, I followed with intense concern the developing situation, with heartfelt prayers to the Lord. How is it possible to commit acts of such savage cruelty? The human heart has depths from which schemes of unheard-of ferocity sometimes emerge, capable of destroying in a moment the normal daily life of a people. But faith comes to our aid at these times when words seem to fail. Christ’s word is the only one that can give a response to the questions which trouble our spirit. Even if the forces of darkness appear to prevail, those who believe in God know that evil and death do not have the final say. Christian hope is based on this truth; at this time our prayerful trust draws strength from it.”
Like so many of us, the events of 9|11 have transcended time in a way that makes the events of that day, and the weeks and months that have now turned into years still feel like yesterday in so many ways.
As the increased focus and attention on the 10th anniversary of 9|11 drew near and escalated into the remembrance, recollections and reminders of what 9|11 was ten years ago; and still is today and in the future of our nation’s history and heritage. Each of us has stories, recollections and emotions related to 9|11. Many were directly involved to a degree that all of us certainly desired and to so many who never wished for it. The streaming consciousness of recollections and emotions never seemed to be too far below the surface or recessed in the back of your mind; but have now become discernible with palpable presence.
Each of us in the fire and emergency services carry with us direct or indirect reminders of 9|11; its history, legacy and the accounts and events that manifest themselves into what our place in time, at that time were and are.
Whether we were at Ground Zero physically on 9|11 or there in the ensuing months and years after or emotionally connected in some way; to this day we each have our remembrances that have made us who we are today and that will stay with us forever.
To many of our brothers, the survivors of 9|11; who worked relentlessly at Ground Zero for months that seamlessly flowed into one another, they endured the effects of those days of days well into the next year. The effects of 9|11 continue to this day to impact the fire service, the firehouses, and the families and loved ones. We are only beginning to recognize the extent of what lies in the years ahead for those who gave so much of themselves in the years that have comprised this past decade.
Last night my family and I attended a special mass service that reflected upon this the tenth anniversary of September 11th, 2001. During the prayers and the service, I began to think of so many personal friends; of those who would be called brothers in the tradition of our fire service – all victims of 9|11.
These were firefighters that I had the privilege and honor of knowing over many, many years, of working with directly in various capacities on state and national level projects, tasks forces or committees, of having the opportunity to run alarms in the various boroughs of New York City back in the day while taking in tours and ride-alongs with their company and the house. There are certainly lots of tremendous memories of those simple days pre- 9|11 and certainly in the recollections and in the tears of the post 9|11 days, certainly up to today.
Each of us has had a journey in our lives in the ten years since that day of September 11th, 2001. We all share a common bond that is defined by who we are and that is; firefighters. We are also defined by our families and loved ones and by the paths these past ten years have given us; and where they may lead us in the years ahead.
September 11, 2002 ~ September 10, 2011
As Father Mychal Judge stated; You do what God has called you to do. You get on that rig, you go out and do the job. No matter how big the call, no matter how small, you have no idea of what God is calling you to do, but God needs you. He needs me. He needs all of us.God needs us to keep supporting each other, to be kind to each other, to love each other…
We love this job, we all do. What a blessing it is! It’s a difficult, difficult job, but God calls you to do it, and indeed, He gives you a love for it so that a difficult job will be well done.
The First Step or our Journey ( first written and published in September, 2001) HERE
We are brothers; we share a rich tradition, of duty, honor, courage, fortitude and family. Let us take pause today and each and every day hence to truly honor the sacrifices made on that day in 2001 and to honor the memories of those we knew and those that were part of the bond of the firefighting brotherhood that defines the American Fire Service. It’s not something you do, It’s something you are; Firefighters.
Remembrance 2011
In Remembrance of my brother firefighters, who made the ultimate sacrifice; who I had the privilege of knowing;
For many of us, the events of September 11th, 2001 will forever be etched into our minds and hearts. The magnitude and severity of the sacrifices made that day by the FDNY as well as the NYPD, EMS and PAPD and numerous other first responders uphold the tradition, beliefs, values and ideals that the Fire, Rescue, EMS and Law Enforcement professions embrace. The tragic loss of lives, the promise of the future; the unfulfilled opportunities and contributions that were yet to be recognized or made by many of those killed and the subsequent loss of completing life’s journey with their families, loved ones and comrades further magnifies the senselessness and grief many of us share to this day.
FDNY Assistant Chief Gerard Barbara , the Citywide Tour Commander on the morning of September 11th whose image was profoundly captured standing in the street within the shadow of the twin towers moments before the first collapse provides a poignant reminder of our sworn duty, obligation and responsibilities as firefighters, and the honor of our proud tradition that compells us to do what we do each and every day, on the job.
Screen Capture from NY Daily News Site. FDNY Assistant Chief Gerard Barbara, City Wide Tour Commander in the shadows of the Towers prior to the first tower collapse. Click on the image to go to the NY Daily News Site for the full image
I’m reposting an article that I had written within the subsequent days of September 11th, 2001 that was published shortly thereafter. It’s difficult to put into perspective and think that ten years have passed, when it seems like only yesterday. Each and everyone of us can recall the vivid emotions and sentiments that were present in such a raw manner on that day and in the days and weeks that followed. And how, now at the ten year anniversary we can reflected on where we’ve been in our own personal journeys, and what the last ten years have given us and what it has done to the fire service in that time frame.
There have been changes, both positive and negative; but change none the less. Each of us has grown older, hopefully wiser and broadened our perspective on the job, who we are, our families and loved ones and remembrance for those we lost on 9|11 and in the preceeding ten years.
This is why we must remember, this is why we must never forget.
The First Steps of Our Journey
(originally written and published September, 2001)
Honor and Remembrance 2001-2011
Tuesday September 11th (2001) began unremarkably like many others. I began my instructional delivery of a course of instruction on Incident Command Management for Structural Collapse Rescue Operations as part of the National Fire Academy’s field delivery programs in Ft. Myers, Florida. The class was comprised of Special Operations Battalion Chiefs, Command and Line Officers from throughout the region. As we began our discussion on the needs for urban search and rescue preparedness and its relationship to strategic incident command management and tactical company level capabilities, the Ft. Myers Chief of Department came into the classroom and directed us immediately to the station day room. The time was 08:55 hours, and so began our journey.
The class immediately became transfixed upon the televised images streaming before us. The live coverage of the evolving sequence of events, the fire and emergency services responses and the devastation inflicted both in New York City and later in Washington, D.C., and the realization that this was a terrorist attack. For the next three hours we watched in disbelief the unfolding events in New York City at the World Trade Center, each of us fully realizing the magnitude and severity of the incident and the impact inflicted upon the fire, rescue, ems and law enforcement personnel operating at the scene.
The transmission of Manhattan Box 55-8087 to the World Trade Center Towers brought New York City’s Bravest and Finest. We witnessed the evolving events of the initial high-rise fires in WTC Tower #1, the vivid images of the second aircraft impacting WTC Tower #2 and shortly thereafter, the horrendous collapse of both towers.
We watched in silence, fully cognizant of the potential toll the resulting collapses could have on the operating personnel and civilians alike. Following numerous telephone calls home and to my fire station, with the impending arrangements and planning being undertaken for our fire department’s possible deployment to NYC, I began a twenty-two hour trek back home. The journey back was consumed with the constant reports filtering through the radio speakers of the ever increasing descriptions of the magnitude and levels of destruction at what has become known as Ground Zero.
The turnpikes I traveled were filled with the passing images of the initial public outpouring of emotions to the day’s tragic events. Lone individuals on overpasses and bridges, waving our nation’s flag. The flags drawn to half staff throughout the communities I passed through and the electronic message boards along the highway, with words of condolence and encouragement in this time of national grief. Still in my Fire Academy shirt with the embroidered words of the NFA and Structural Collapse, I was recognized as a firefighter and approached by numerous people along my route back who questioned the events of the day, who were seeking some sense of understanding for what was becoming recognized as a significant loss of life to unaccounted for fire, rescue, law enforcement and civilians.
There were the unsolicited words of thanks expressed by people at gas pumps and rest areas up the entire east coast, who acknowledged my fire service affiliation and connected to what they may have seen or heard in terms of the of the missing F.D.N.Y. firefighters and N.Y.P.D. law enforcement officers. This level of acknowledgement, seemed so strange, when any other time, we seem to blend into the back ground of everyday life. All for having a fire service emblem on.
During my travel back to Syracuse, New York I listened to every report, every update and the ever increasing numbers of potential missing on the radio. Well after midnight I ran into a colleague of mine at a gas station, an Assistant Fire Chief from the Metro Dade Fire & Rescue Department, Florida who, along with four other urban search and rescue specialists were making their way to Washington, D.C. as part of the deployed FEMA USAR Task Force Team from South Florida. We shared in our grief over the immediate notification at a mayoral press briefing that our close friend FDNY Battalion Chief Ray Downey was identified as one of three chief FDNY Officers who died during the tower collapses.
We also shared in our grief in the initial reports of the over forty FDNY fire, rescue and support companies unaccounted for as a result of the fire suppression, rescue and collapse efforts. The continuing ride gave way to the thoughts and concerns of many of my friends within the FDNY. Were they on shift, are they accounted for, are they safe? I thought about everything that we have tried to prepare for, the years of developing our national urban search and rescue task force system, collapse-rescue training, terrorism preparedness and the images of the WTC events of the morning. I thought deeply of my twenty-six years of fire service involvement, my brother & sister firefighters, and again- the fate of my FDNY brothers and sisters in New York City.
Subsequently in the days that followed, I became glued to the live televised images from Ground Zero and ever increasing reports of the search and rescue efforts deployed at the incident scene. As I watched alone into the early morning hours the images pouring across my television screen or at the fire station with my brother and sister firefighters, I began to contemplate the journey that lay ahead for our nation’s fire and emergency services. We will be forever changed by the events of 9-11. The most recent accounts have identified over three hundred thirty seven confirmed or unaccounted for firefighters, twenty-three law enforcement officers and over five thousand four hundred missing civilians. Rescue efforts remain the focus, with the realization that the probability of live rescues diminishes with each passing hour as the first week of Herculean efforts draws to a close.
The fabric that binds us within the fire and emergency services, the true bonds of brother and sisterhood in this proudest of professions can not be more poignantly depicted than the image of the three brother FDNY firefighters raising the American flag amidst the mountains of rubble and debris where once stood the World Trade Center. Each and every one of us understands the undertakings during the initial stages of operations at the WTC. We, the fire and emergency service providers protect the heart and soul of our respective communities. We understand the risks and challenges affecting our commitment to protect life and property and to meet those challenges armed with our training, preparedness and tools of our trade. We are the first ones in and the last ones out. The challenges ahead will be immense as the rescue efforts at Ground Zero evolve into the recovery mode of operation, and the continued efforts to bring home- back to quarters these missing firefighters.
In the days, weeks and months ahead, we will be witness to ever changing events in this continuing journey. We will share in the pain, grief and emotions that have become so deeply rooted inside of all of us in the course of these events in NYC and in our nations’ capital. For those who provided direct or support service to the events at the WTC, and those who may yet be called upon to render aide in the weeks and months ahead, each of us understands the calling and we also understand the pain. For each and everyone firefighter, rescue and ems provider would, if they could, would be side by side with those working at Ground Zero.
We must remain vigilant to our own community’s risk potential for future events and incidents and must strive to reduce the gap between our capabilities and those identified deficiencies. We must plan and train for the worst, for it’s not a matter of IF , it’s just a matter of WHEN. Our nation’s fire and emergency services have begun a journey, one that no one could have imagined, yet one that each will meet head- on. Remain safe, stay strong, and meet the challenges of your next alarm, with faith and the foundation of principles that have made our fire services what they are. We are all part of a brotherhood, we share a common belief and mission-we know our duty, we are firefighters, and will answere the call. (Original written and publication; September, 2001)
Waiting for the bell and the next alarm
Remember and honor the sacrifices of September 1th, 2001 and the continuing sacrifices that are being made today by those fire, law enforcement and emergency services workers, support personnel and civilians that worked the recovery efforts at Ground Zero in the weeks and months afterwards who are dying or are afflicted by the lingering effects of exposures at the site and the area.
Remember the surviving families of those lost, remember the firefighters; who they were and remember who we are, and what we do each and every day in the streets of America. May We Never Forget.
Honor and Remembrance 343…the 2,164 civilians and others who lost their lives at the WTC Towers One and Two and let us remember the 184 civilians, military and other personnel from the Pentagon and the 40 civilians and crew from United Flight 93 and Shanksville
Honor and Remembrance...in the streets each day; Photographer unknown
FDNY 9|11 Memorial Page with Links to each of the 343 Firefighters, HERE
The 343 FDNY Firefighters killed on September 11, 2001 during operations at the World Trade Center
This list originally compiled by Don Van Holt, NYFD.com
FDNY 343
A Memorial Wall listing the names of 55 FDNY members who died in the last 10 years due to World Trade Center-related illnesses was unveiled at FDNY Headquarters on Sept. 8. (HERE)
The inscription on the Memorial Wall reads, “DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF THOSE WHO BRAVELY SERVED THIS DEPARTMENT PROTECTING LIFE AND PROPERTY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN THE RESCUE AND RECOVERY EFFORT AT MANHATTAN BOX 5-5-8087 WORLD TRADE CENTER.”
The names included:
Firefighter Robert W. Dillon, Engine Co. 153
Firefighter Vanclive A. Johnson, Ladder Co. 135
Firefighter Russell C. Brinkworth, Ladder Co. 135
Firefighter Edward V. Tietjen, Ladder Co. 48
Firefighter Walter Voight, Ladder Co. 144
Battalion Chief Kevin R. Byrnes, Battalion 7
Firefighter Stephen M. Johnson, Ladder Co. 25
Lieutenant Richard M. Burke, Engine Co. 97
Firefighter Michael Sofia, Engine Co. 165
Firefighter Joseph P. Costello, Battalion Co. 58
Firefighter William R. O’Connor, Ladder Co. 84
Lieutenant Reinaldo Natal, Field Communications Unit
Paramedic Deborah Reeve, EMS Station 20
Fire Marshal William Wilson, Jr., Manhattan Base
Lieutenant Thomas J. Hodges, Engine Co. 313
Firefighter Robert J. Wieber, Engine Co. 262
Lieutenant Joseph P. Colleluori, Jr., Engine Co. 324
Firefighter Michael J. Shagi, Engine Co. 74
Firefighter William R. St. George, Batallion Special Operations Command
Firefighter Raymond W. Hauber, Engine Co. 284
EMS Lieutenant Brian Ellicott, EMS Dispatch
Firefighter William E. Moreau, Engine Co. 166
Lieutenant John P. Murray, Engine Co. 165
Firefighter Sean M. McCarthy, Engine Co. 280
Firefighter Bruce M. Foss, Ladder Co. 108
Firefighter Jacques W. Paultre, Engine Co. 50
Firefighter Kevin M. Delano, Sr., Ladder Co. 142
Lieutenant Vincent J. Tancredi, II, Ladder Co. 47
Paramedic Clyde F. Sealey, Bureau of Health Services
Firefighter Timothy G. Lockwood, Engine Co. 275
Firefighter Edward F. Reilly, Jr., Ladder Co. 160
Firefighter John F. McNamara, Engine Co. 234
Lieutenant Thomas G. Roberts, Ladder Co. 40
Captain Kevin J. Cassidy, Engine Co. 320
Firefighter Joan R. Daley, Engine Co. 63
Firefighter Richard A. Manetta, Ladder Co. 156
Lieutenant Peter J. Farrenkopf, Marine Co. 6
Battalion Chief John J. Vaughan, Battalion Co. 3
Firefighter Robert A. Ford, Engine Co. 284
Paramedic Carene A. Brown, EMS Bureau of Training
Firefighter James J. Ryan, Ladder Co. 167
Lieutenant Robert M. Hess, Ladder Co. 76
EMT Freddie Rosario, EMS Station 4
Lieutenant Harry Wanamaker, Jr., Marine Co. 1
Supv. Commun. Electrician Philip J. Berger, Outside Plant Operations
Firefighter Vincent J. Albanese, Ladder Co. 38
Firefighter John P. Sullivan, Jr., Ladder Co. 34
Firefighter Roy W. Chelsen, Engine Co. 28
Firefighter John F. O’Neill, Ladder Co. 52
Lieutenant Randy J. Wiebicke, Ladder Co. 1
Firefighter Brian C. Malloy, Ladder Co. 80
Lieutenant John A. Garcia, Ladder Co. 5
Firefighter Anthony J. Nuccio, Ladder Co. 175
Fire Marshal Steven C. Mosiello, Chief of Department’s Office
The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978 - 2011
The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.
The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included: • Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33 • Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156 • Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42 • Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153 • Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156 • Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153
Remembrance and Honor
Detailed information and insights previously posted on CommandSafety.com, HERE
Published reports are being stating that the least senior of three construction officials in the Deutsche Bank manslaughter trial was acquitted of all charges today — after telling jurors that he had no idea the giant pipe he helped remove from the basement had anything to do with providing water to firefighters.
A construction foreman charged with the deaths of two firefighters in the Deutsche Bank building blaze was acquitted of all charges. Salvatore DePaola was cleared by a Manhattan jury of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide on the eighth day of deliberations.
According to reports published in a number of NYC newspapers; “It’s a happy day and a sad day,” said DePaola. “We’ve still got two firefighters that are deceased.” Firefighters Robert Beddia, 33, and Joe Graffagnino, 53 perished after they raced into the burning Ground Zero tower in 2007.
Prosecutors argued that DePaola, who works for the John Galt Corporation, and two of his colleagues should have known a key firefighting pipe had been cut. Salvatore DePaola, 56, of Staten Island, broke into tears as he was found not guilty of manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges in the August, 2007, smoke inhalation deaths of firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino.
“I had no idea it was a standpipe,” DePaola insisted of the primary physical evidence in the case — a 42-foot section of pipe that all three defendants were accused of intentionally disregarding and discarding after it crashed to the ground from the basement ceiling nine months before the fire.
The jury is still deliberating in the case of DePaola’s colleague, site safety manager Jeffrey Melofchik.
AP Photo Deutsche Bank office building Fire in New York
Jurors have yet to reach a verdict on identical manslaughter and endangerment charges against their remaining defendant, Jeffrey Melofchik, 48, who worked as site safety manager for the demolition’s general contractor, Bovis Lend Lease. They will continue their deliberations tomorrow.
A third defendant, project asbestos abatement director, Mitchel Alvo, 58, has opted for a non-jury verdict; Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Rena Uviller has not said when she will render that decision.
As to who he thought should have been prosecuted in the defendants’ stead, De Paola — whose own son is a firefighter at Engine 160 in Staten Island — made a reference to “lieutenants” with the FDNY before his lawyer advised him to remain silent on that issue, given that deliberations are continuing.
Today was the seventh full day of deliberations in the three-month-long trial.
An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of the PPT programon Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites
Preparing for the Mayday Event; Not a matter of IF, But a Question of When… Are you ready? Are you Prepared?
As the official Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011 begins to wind down, in many stations around the country this weekend is dedicated to training, drills and evolutions dedicated toward the many facets and functional elements that focus upon Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.
The Safety Planning and Resource Aid and Guide published by the IAFC and IAFF (HERE) and the direct link here 2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries provided resources and planning templates and suggested training and activities to support the focus and emphasis on fire ground survival, increased focus on firefighter operations and mayday elements crucial to company integrity, firefighter safety and operational excellence.
Being ready for a mayday (mentally and physically), self-rescue and self-survival training and methodologies are mission critical when engaging in structural firefighting operations. Proficiencies, capabilities, rigor, demeanor and performance must be orchestrated in a manner that requires optimum execution of required actions and engagements to enable a successful outcome to a reported single or multiple mayday calls.
On a crisp fall day in October, 2009 two fires, both in residential occupancies but over 350 miles apart had similar operational needs, deployment and fire suppression and rescue engagement consistent with modern firefighting practices, methodologies and expectations.
In one, three firefighters become trapped, resulting in a mayday, bailout and resulting LODD of a 16 year fire service veteran. City of Yonkers (NY) Firefighter Patrick Joyce died during the operations at a 3-Alarm fire in a three story residential occupancy while conducting search and rescue operations for reported trapped civilians. Incident overviews; HERE and HERE .
The other structure fire in a residential occupancy in Syracuse, NY, results in a fire fighter mayday and successful RIT extraction that is captured on video. Two structure fires with common elements, each with projected predictable outcomes based upon past fire department operational experiences at similar structures, occupancies and fire conditions and reports; however with two different outcomes.
The program information from The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)which forms a major component of thsis year’s Safety Weeks activities with the focus on comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention programming incorporating incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, with the FGS program objectives aimed to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.
For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE
Here’s a recap of the Self-Survial Procedure insights from the FGS Chapter 3 Section;
Self-Survival Procedures
FGS Online Program Chapter 3
To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:
First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall.
The following video clip depicting FDNY Rescue Co. 1 operations at a Mayday, and provides some insightful and subtle commentary that should put some things in proper perspective about the job its hazards and the unexpected that can occur in the blink of an eye.
Another exceptional training piece that we are providing again here on CommandSafety.com are the two part video clips provided by TheBravestOnline.com that covers the mayday distress cakk an subsequent RIT extraction of HFD Captain Joel Eric Abbt at a four alarm fire with civilian fatalities in a six story high rise office building on March 28, 2007.
This video along with the information obtained from the FGS program can provide substantial opportunites for training, discussions and dialog. Take the time to watch the HFD vdeo and the elapsed time, communications and actions deployed. This mayday event had a successful outcome due to a variety of factors.
The question is how prepared are you, your firefighters, the officers and commanders? Surviving the fire ground requires a wide variety of skills, knowledge , training and experience.
Training is the foundation from which proficiencies are developed. If your organization has invested in supporting this weeks activities, don’t stop here. There are additional day ahead to take teh momentum gathered from this week and use it to chart a new course of actions and committments for the weeks and months ahead. If you didn’t have the opportunity to engage or involve, its not a missed opportuity- just find the right time and place to have your own safety day of week.
Houston FD Mayday Part 1
Houston FD Mayday Part 2
Other Training and Drill Opportunties
Suggested Considerations include the follow, as well as encouraging Departments to identify and integrate local issues, needs and identified gaps or enhancements that can contribute towards operational excellence and safety integration
Review and Select a Near Miss Event Report from the National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System or the Report of the Week (ROTW) series related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
Review and Select a NIOSH LODD Report from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/
Take out your Rapid Intervention Equipment and review the purpose and function of each piece of equipment. Identify and discuss alternative uses or tools that can be obtained or used in the event of unavailability, malfunction or additional resource needs. Discuss protocols, procedures, safety awareness and operational hazards, expectations and precautions. Inspection the equipment for operability and integrity.
Identify and select a recent departmental or local/regional incident event that was either a near-miss/close-call or transitioned into a mayday event. Discuss and facilitate dialog on lessons learned, gaps, enhancements or operational successes, achievements and positive elements. Identify any factors or elements that were presented in the FGS training series that are applicable to the event, strategies, tactics or operations: can anything be improved or enhanced?
Lead a discussion on how to call and initiate a Mayday. Discuss the factors and insights from FGS Program Chapter 3 Self-Survival Procedures and Chapter 4 Self-Survival Skills.
Select and lead a discussion on a pertinent incident case study from either the list provided or your own selection and discuss the relevancy of the event in terms of mayday operations, fire ground survival, incident outcome and relationship to your Department or agency. What is the relevancy, similarities or differences? Can this event or circumstances occur in your jurisdiction? What can be done to prevent a history repeating event (HRE)?
Review and discuss Roles and Responsibilities for mayday events and operations. How do they match up with your operating procedures, policies and expectations?
Develop and facilitate a table top exercise (TTE) on a mayday event scenario utilizing a building in your first-due or response jurisdiction. Take photographs and integrate into your program. Refer to example of a simple TTE attached or go to Fire Fighternation.com for an example here; http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an
Visit a residential or commercial construction site (with pre-arrival authorization and approvals) and tour the stage of construction, looking critically at the type of construction and structural systems being implemented, materials used, workmanship and signs of deficient or adverse conditions that may affect operational integrity, safety or collapse and compromise once the building is occupied. Discuss issues such as structural integrity, collapse risk, occupancy risk versus occupancy type considerations, avenues for fire travel, effects on fire load package and rate of heat release and projected fire intensity. How would you fire a fire in the occupancy? What will define the strategy and tactics that would be or should be selected and used?
In a controlled setting with or without PPE, Practice calling a mayday with the identified communication attributes defined in the FGS training program. Critique and practice the evolution until the group feels that it is acceptable.
Here are some additional Resource Links to Support your training and drill needs;
Selected References
IAFC: The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety, HERE and HERE
NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE
Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors
Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
Report HERE
NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience
The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE
NIOSH LODD REPORT: Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire – Virginia, HERE
NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire. The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
Analytical Study Reveals Patterns in U.S Firefighter Fatalities Report
The entire report is available at a nominal fee, HERE;
Journal Reference:
For a detailed summary of the Sofa Super Store study, its findings and recommendations, and links to supporting materials such as graphics and video segments from computer simulations of the fire, go to “NIST Study on Charleston Furniture Store Fire Calls for National Safety Improvements” at www.nist.gov/el/fire_research/charleston_102810.cfm.
Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith, David M. DeJoy. Line-of-duty deaths among U.S. firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2011; 43 (3): 1171 DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2010.12.030
University of Georgia (2011, April 14). Comprehensive study reveals patterns in firefighter fatalities. ScienceDaily. Retrieved April 16, 2011, from http://www.sciencedaily.com /releases/2011/04/110412171208.htm
Other Report Links of Interest
Reducing Firefighter Deaths and Injuries: Changes in Concept, Policy, and Practice Contributing Factors in Firefighter Line-of-Duty Deaths in the United States. HERE
This Training Schedule Template utilizes a Three Hour, Thirty minute (3.5) Hour Format integrating Suggested basic Functional Area Topics as a lead-in introduction that can be interchanged based on local needs and incorporates two (2) primary modules of the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS). Please note you can select any modules determined to be of local need or interests. An optional Weekend Session is attached for FGS Chapter 3 and 4 Module Deliveries and a Hands-on Field Exercise Component.
In support of recent program on Taking it to the Streetsregarding Survivability Profiling with our special guest Captain Stephen Marsars, FDNY we are posting some of the research and articles to aid in your own individual research and increased awareness on this emerging concept and refined methodology expanding traditional size-up into a new element.
The radio program, presentation, dialog and discussions added richly to the continuing efforts to improve and challenge the fires service into exploring new directions in an effort to increase our proficiencies, capabilities and operations.
You can download or listen to the the full program HERE.
Here are those reference links;
National Fire Academy, Executive Fire Officer Program: EFO Paper: Can They Be Saved? Utilizing Civilian Survivability Profiling to Enhance Size-up and Reduce Firefighter Fatalities in the Fire Department, City of New York http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/pdf/efop/efo44310.pdf
Live and Online Taking it to the Streets with your host Christopher Naum will present another timely and insightful look at an emerging element of today’s evolving fire ground.
Join in on Wednesday April 20th at 9pm ET for a very special and exciting program discussing the concepts and theory of Survivability Profiling.
Captain Marsar, FDNY has researched and developed insights into the theory and application of Survivability Profiling.
The Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Fire Administration announced on April 4 that Capt. Stephen Marsar, Engine 8, is one of three fire service executives from across the country who was selected to receive the National Fire Academy’s 2010 Annual Outstanding Research Award.
The award recognizes Executive Fire Officer Program students for exceptional research projects.
Capt. Marsar’s project, titled Can They Be Saved? Utilizing Civilian Survivability Profiling to Enhance Size-Up and Reduce Firefighter Fatalities in the Fire Department, City of New York, was selected as the Executive Leadership Course award winner. The National Fire Academy said it was chosen from among the more than 60 Applied Research Projects submitted this year, the highest number in the program’s 26-year history.
The Executive Fire Officer Program provides senior fire officers with information and education on various facets of fire administration. After a four-year course of study, participants are required to complete an applied research project that attempts to resolve a problem in their own organization.
Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the concept, research and application of Survivability Profiling with Captain Marsar and the manner in which it might be implemented in today’s emerging and evolving fire ground operational methodologies with Christopher Naum and this outstanding fire service leader.
Capt. Stephen Marsar, FDNY
STEPHEN MARSAR is a captain in the Fire Department of New York, covering in Engine Company 8 in Manhattan. He has previously served in Engine Company 16 and Ladder Companies 7 and 11. An ex-commissioner in the Bellmore (NY) Fire Department, he has certifications as a national and New York State fire instructor, NY instructor coordinator, and NY State Department of Health regional faculty member.
He serves on the adjunct faculty for the Nassau Community College, NY Fire Science Degree Program, and teaches for the FDNY and Nassau County, Long Island, Fire and EMS academies. He has a bachelor’s degree in fire science and emergency services administration and is enrolled in the Executive Fire Officer Program at the National Fire Academy.
Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country. Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.
Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening April 20th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
Published reports from various NYC eMedia outlets indicated that two FDNY firefighters battling a three-alarm fire on Saturday April 9th in the Rockaways section of the Borough of Queens (NY) transmitted Maydays signals during fire suppression operations after a fire officer was partially trapped in a compromised floor collapse and in another area of the occupancy a firefighter route was blocked due to fire extension resulting in the need to deploy this personal safety system (PSS) to bail from a window. Reports indicated that FDNY Fire Lt. Richard Barnes fell through the second floor of the three-story Rockaways taxpayer building, but managed to hang on by his armpits until FAST firefighters could pull the 22-year veteran to safety, officials stated.
FDNY Firefighter Evan Davis transmitted a mayday signal when he was trapped by flames in another part of the building’s second floor, resulting in the eight-year veteran deploying his personal escape rope to lower himself out a window, unaware there was an adjacent roof less than 10 feet below.
The first mayday was transmitted 27 minutes into the operations, the second mayday was transmitted 43 minutes elapsed time into the operations
10:36 hours – Duration 27 minutes elapsed incident time: First Mayday, Trapped firefighter due to partial floor collapse
Sixteen minutes later;
10:54 hours – Duration 43 minutes elapsed incident time: Second Mayday, Firefighter bailout of window
A dozen of the 138 firefighters who responded to the fire suffered minor injuries.
Fire Officials reported the fire started about 10:oo hours near an oil burner in the basement of the building.
The building (Fire Building) consisting of a single story commerical occupancy on the Alpha (street side) that was attached to a three story wood frame multiple occupancy (MO) structure 30 x 100 (ft)
From FirefighterSpot.com
Aerial From Bing Maps
Alpha Side Street View from GoogleStreets
Surrounding Properties consisted of the following based upon radio transmissions;
Exposure #1: Is a street
Exposure #2: Is a 2 Story Similar attach (structure)
Exposure #3: Is a Rear Yard
Exposure #4: Is an Alleyway
All – Hands transmitted:
7 – 5 – 1407 @ 10:19
Batt. 47 reports: Box 1407, All – Hands on arrival.
Extra Engine & truck. We have a heavy fire condition in a 3 Story Commercial.
Engine 309 & Lad. 134 are s/c
2nd Alarm:
2 – 2 – 1407 @ 10:21
Engs. 264, 328, 323
T. Lad. 153
Eng. 284 w / Satellite 4
Batt. 39 “Safety Officer”
Batt. 43 “Resource Unit Leader”
Rescue Battalion / Safety Battalion
Fieldcom 1 / Tactical Support Unit #2
Links and coverage;
Take a look at Bill Carey’s the post at BackStepFirefighter.com, HERE
Take a good look at Safefirefighter.com for some suburban issues related to mayday, RIT and FAST; HERE
Here’s the incident particulars based upon radio transmssions and transcript : From the Nassau FD Rant (HERE) NassauFDrant.com
FDNY Belle Harbor, Queens, New York April 9th, 2011
Address: 424 Beach 129 st between Cronston and Newport Aves10:10 hours Phone Box 1407 – Report of fire in a restaurant Engs. 268, 329, 266 L137, TL121 Battalion 4710-75-1407 – 10:13 hours
E265
TL159 (FAST Truck)
Battalion 33
Division 13
Squad 270
Rescue 4
CIDS for 420 Beach 129 st:
Restaurant 1 story 30×100 class 3. Partial sprinkler siamese on exposure 1 for cellar and kitchen areas
7-5-1407 – 10:19 hours
Battalion 47: We have a heavy fire condition, extra engine and truck. All-Hands on Arrival.
E309, L134 S/C
RAC2
10:23 hours – Duration 14 minutes
BC47: Box 1407, the address 424 Beach 129 st, we have fire on the 1st and 2nd floor extended to the 3rd floor, check the basement for extension. Exposure 1 is a street, 2 is a similar attached, 3 is a rear yard, 4 is an alley, k.
10:27 hours
TL157 S/C
10:29 hours
The staging area is Cronston Ave and Beach 131 st
10:29 hours – Duration 22 minutes
Division 13: 2nd Alarm Box 1407, we’ve got 4 lines stretched, 2 in operation, we have heavy fire on the 2nd floor of a 2 1/2 story commercial. You’ve got a 30×100, fire on the 2nd floor. 1st floor commercial occupancy, 2nd floor multiple dwelling, 3rd floor possibly apartments also.
10:31 hours – Duration 23 minutes
DC13: 2nd Alarm Box Box 1407, we have 4 lines stretched, 2 in operation. We’re going to change it from a 2 1/2 story to a 3 story building. Fire’s Doubtful, searches in progress, trucks are opening up, the 2nd Alarm is still Doubtful.
10:36 hours – Duration 27 minutes
DC13: 2nd Alarm Box 1407, a MAYDAY has been transmitted, the MAYDAY has been recovered and removed from the building. We put the FAST Truck to work, special call another FAST Truck. We’re Doubtful on the 2nd Alarm.
L173 (FAST Truck) S/C
10:38 hours – Duration 30 minutes
E321 S/C
3-3-1407 – 10:40 hours
Division 13 to Queens, URGENT, 3rd Alarm, as soon as you get the companies give me a rundown.
Engs. 254, 331, 225
Battalion 50
Battalion 58 (Staging Manager)
Battalion 42 (Air-Recon Chief)
Mask Service Unit
Car 4A( AC James Manahan, Assistant Chief of Operations)
10:41 hours
Car 1E (Commissioner’s Liaison) is responding
10:52 hours
Car 36A (Department Chaplain) is responding
10:54 hours – Duration 43 minutes
DC13: 3rd Alarm Box 1407, we had a 2nd MAYDAY, he used his PSS to escape the building.
10:55 hours
Car 11A (BC Thomas J. Richardson, Chief of Rescue Operations) is responding
11:00 hours – Duration 52 minutes
FieldCom: Progress report on the Queens 3rd Alarm Box 1407, the address 424 Beach 129 st near Cronston Ave, fire on the 2nd and 3rd floor of a 3 story commercial 30×100. Division 13 reports he has 6 handlines stretched in operation, truck companies continuing to open up and they’re in the process of setting up the tower ladder operation. Fire is Doubtful.
11:14 hours – Duration 1 hour 5 minutes
FC: Special call 1 additional truck, have them respond to the staging area.
TL107 S/C
11:18 hours – Duration 1 hour 9 minutes
FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, at this time Car 4A, Assistant Chief Manahan reports: a roll call has been conducted and all members are accounted for. Members have been backed out of the building and a tower ladder operation is in progress, and the fire remains Doubtful.
11:20 hours – Duration 1 hour 11 minutes
FC: Notify the Buildings Dept. to respond, they want to check the stability of the building.
11:25 hours
FC: By authority of the Incident Commander you can 10-2 the Air-Recon Chief.
11:33 hours – Duration 1 hour 24 minutes
FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, at this time Car 4A, Chief Manahan reports that they have 4 handlines in operation, they have 1 tower ladder in operation on exposure 1. Conditions remain the same and searches will be delayed. Fire remains Doubtful.
11:58 hours – Duration 1 hour 49 minutes
FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, at this time Car 4A, Chief Manahan reports that the safety chief is going to enter the building to assess the stability, searches are delayed, and the fire is now Probably Will Hold.
12:02 hours
Car 14C (Fire Marshal) is 10-84
12:09 hours
Car 14 (Chief Fire Marshal Robert Byrnes) is 10-84
12:11 hours
Car 4A is 10-8, Division 13 is Incident Commander.
12:32 hours – Duration 2 hours 23 minutes
FC: Progress report on Box 1407, primary searches on the 2nd and 3rd floors are complete and negative, k, the secondaries are in progress.
12:36 hours – Duration 2 hours 27 minutes
FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, Division 13 reports: The primary searches throughout the fire building are complete and negative, the secondaries are underway, and the fire is Under Control.
08:30 – 8:45 Welcome and Introduction by FDNY Commissioner and Chief of Department.
08:45 – 10:00 The latest building trends in construction and technology including ‘Green Buildings” and how they impact on firefighting operations -Assistant Chief Ronald Spadafora
10:00 – 12:00 FDNY Firefighting Procedures and the different tactics used for Residential versus Commercial high rise fires. Case study of recent multiple alarm. Specialty units unique assignments at high rise fires.- Deputy Chief James Daly and Lieutenant Chris Flatley
12:00 – 13:00 Lunch
13:00 – 14:00 Managing building systems. How Building Personnel and Fire Department members work together in protecting life using the building systems and Fire Safety/Emergency Action Plans. -Captain Joseph Evangelista and Mr. John C. Santora, President & CEO Americas, Cushman & Wakefield, Inc.
14:00 – 15:00 Firefighting operations, focusing on Command procedures. Importance of effective training from a candid discussion of a difficult fire. Lessons Learned: Importance of situational, reality based training.
Fire Departments can evaluate their own strategies, tactics and training methods from a Chief Officers point of view.-Deputy Assistant Chief Jack Mooney
15:00 – 16:30 New Terrorist trends, extreme fires as a weapon and their implications for safety and incident management. Plus technology and command procedures that are improving firefighting accountability.16:30 – Assistant Chief Joseph Pfeifer
17:00 A guided tour of the FDNY Training Academy
Wednesday March 16
08:30 – 10:00 High Angle Rescue Operations. All the tactics, equipment and Command procedures required to perform life saving operations on the upper floors of buildings- Battalion Chief Joseph Downey
10:00 – 11:00 Command and control at major emergencies and a critique of the Times Square terrorist event. The presentation will identify Command methods for First Responders under your immediate control and the public. Street Management, Staging areas, Sharing information, Unified Command following Federal NIMS standards will be defined. -Deputy Chief James Hodgens
11:00 – 12:00 Overcoming Water supply problems. Learn Standpipe and Sprinkler systems capabilities and understand how to use these systems effectively when problems occur. -Battalion Chief Thomas Meara
12:00 – 13:00 Lunch
13:00 – 14:00 Medical triage Operations defining Command and control at multi-causality events. Medical operations at the Times Square Bombing will be reviewed.- EMS Division Chief James Booth
Staffing at dozens of the city’s busiest FDNY engine companies will be cut starting February 1st, in a cost-saving move that the firefighters union argues will compromise public safety.
One firefighter will be removed from 60 of the city’s 194 engine companies once an agreement with the Uniformed Firefighters Association expires at midnight Tuesday.
The agreement – in place since 1996 – provided for those 60 engine companies to have a fifth firefighter plus a lieutenant – an arrangement that the union says allows crews to get water on a fire quicker.
Those 60 engine companies, which have a high volume of emergencies, will now be left with four firefighters and an officer – the same staffing as the FDNY’s 134 other engine companies.
FDNY expects to save about $30 million a year by not having to pay overtime to staff the extra firefighters, officials said. No firefighters will be laid off as a result of the change.
The UFA is fighting to reverse the staffing reduction by filing a petition with the city’s Office of Labor Relations.
UFA President Steve Cassidy stated, “Reducing staffing levels in firehouses costs the city more than it saves,” he said in a statement Monday.”We will have larger, more expansive fires that will cost the city of New York more money in the end–and that is unacceptable for public safety and firefighter safety.”
FDNY Commissioner Salvatore Cassano defended the staffing reduction according to published sources. “We just recorded the fewest fire deaths on record, and our response time to fires is the fastest ever,” he said, citing data from 2010.
The Commissioner stated FDNY has systems in place to address reduced staffing, including a protocol that calls for two engine companies, not one, to operate a hose line at a fire and went on to state that FDNY’s number one commitment to this city has always been and continues to be the safety of New Yorkers
The FDNY Press Release issued on January 31, 2011 read as follows:
Beginning tomorrow, February 1, the FDNY will reduce staffing by one firefighter on 60 of its engine companies so that all 194 engines in the city will be staffed with four firefighters and one officer. No firefighters will be laid off as a result of this change, which will provide savings of approximately $30 million in overtime that is currently needed to staff the fifth firefighter position. The change comes as the FDNY’s 15-year agreement with the Uniformed Firefighters Association (UFA) expires at midnight tonight.
“We just recorded the fewest fire deaths on record and our response time to fires is the fastest ever,” Fire Commissioner Salvatore J. Cassano said. “Our number one commitment to this city has always been and continues to be the safety of New Yorkers.”
The Department proposed the staffing reduction in last year’s budget and the city gave notice to the UFA months ago that it would not be continuing the agreement, known as “Roster Staffing,” that provided for the “fifth” firefighter on 60 engines.
The FDNY has existing operational protocols to address reduced staffing on engine and ladder companies, including when firefighters go on medical leave during a tour. The city’s 143 ladder companies will continue to be staffed with five firefighters and an officer at the start of the tour. Also, Department protocol calls for two engine companies – not one – to stretch and operate a hose line at a fire.
The city has in the last seven years reduced the 60 engine staffing level four times due to high rates of firefighter medical leave, a change provided for in the original 1996 Roster Staffing agreement.
No other fire department in the country operates with five firefighters on an engine.
The call had come at 7:59 on a Sunday morning, the day after a January blizzard had shut down the city. There was still more than a foot of unplowed snow on East 178th Street off the Grand Concourse, and some of it was still swirling in 45-mile-an-hour gusts. Wind like that has a habit of working like gasoline on even the tiniest fires.
Five trucks from five companies inched through the snow to converge on the tenement, a cookie-cutter version of thousands of other old buildings in the South Bronx. Engine 42 got there first; its men were stretching hoses from their truck and running them upstairs. Ladder 33 got there next, and a number of its men were sent to the third floor, where the fire was burning. The firefighters from Ladder 27 and Rescue 3 had arrived next; they were sent to the floor above the fire to clear it and keep the flames from spreading upward.
When the six men got to the fourth floor, they started searching from apartment to apartment, but they’d found no civilians (except the skinny guy and naked fat lady one of the guys saw hightailing it out of there just as they came up the stairs). Now they were in Apartment 4-L, feeling their way along the walls from room to room—six men loaded down with gear, sucking in air from their tanks—and soon they got turned around, lost in the smoke. Brendan Cawley, the probie with just a month on the job, kept seeing padlocks on the doors of every room and was confused; he hadn’t been around long enough to know how many apartments in this neighborhood had been converted into cheap, crowded rooming houses. This place had been chopped up, probably illegally. Random walls and carelessly thrown-up partitions created a maze.
The men were trying to make their way to the source of the heat surge, but among the locks and the walls and the smoke, they couldn’t seem to get there. And there was another problem: The men didn’t have working hoses. First, there was a frozen hydrant; then, something seemed wrong with some of the hoses themselves. The six men on the fourth floor couldn’t fight a fire they couldn’t find—and if any fire did come, they had nothing to fight it with.
At 8:26 a.m., Curt Meyran, the lieutenant in charge of the Ladder 27 crew, checked in on his radio. He was asked about the status of the fire on the fourth floor. “Slight extension, slight extension,” Meyran said—meaning they still saw just smoke, no fire.“Ten-four,” came the response.Somewhere between 18 and 23 seconds later—still 8:26 a.m., maybe even as the responder was talking—a turret of flame roared up though the floorboards. None of them saw it coming—in an instant, all six were pinned against the windows that faced the back. “We need a line on the floor above,” someone barked into the radio. “We have heavy fire on the floor above. Rescue to Battalion. Urgent.”
In the background, another voice—no one’s sure whose—could be heard: “We got no water!”
The flames formed a wall between the men and the apartment door. Walking out was no longer an option. Meyran called in a Mayday and he and Gene Stolowski and Cawley stuck their heads outside for air. At the windows next to them were two guys from Rescue 3, Jeff Cool and Joe DiBernardo. They had lost track of the sixth man, John Bellew. It was 17 degrees outside, but even as their faces were freezing, the men felt a scorching heat on their backs. Leaning out, they could see a fire escape two windows away—but it was too far for them to jump.
Meyran called in a Mayday at 8:29. Seconds later, DiBernardo radioed an outfit on the roof: “Brothers on the roof, you’re gonna need to send a rope over the side. Roof team—send a rope over the side to the two-four side of the building.” The flames were closer now. Jeff Cool could feel them at his neck. Cool had a wife and two kids. Meyran had a wife and three kids. Bellew had a wife and four kids. Stolowski had a daughter, and his wife was expecting twin girls in June. DiBernardo’s dad was a retired deputy fire chief. Cawley had an older brother who had died on 9/11.
Take the time to read both NIOSH reports and remember the sacrafice…
Three veteran FDNY firefighters died in the LODD in Brooklyn, New York and the Bronx on Sunday January 23, 2005, a day that has become known as “Black Sunday” and called one of the saddest in fire department history. Two firefighters were killed and four others were badly hurt when they were forced to jump from a fourth-floor window of a burning building in the Bronx. Later, a third firefighter died after tackling a basement blaze in Brooklyn.Lt. Curtis Meyran, 46, of Battalion 26, and Firefighter John Bellew, 37, of Ladder 27, died after battling the Bronx blaze on East 178th Street in the Morris Heights section.
Three firefighters were in critical condition at St. Barnabas, and a fourth was in serious condition at Jacobi Medical Center. Six Bronx firefighters became trapped in the building while searching for people on the fourth floor. When the fire from the third floor broke through to the fourth, they were faced with a horrifying choice. They jumped out a fourth-floor window, knowing that they would be critically injured.
Firefighters Jeffrey Cool, Joseph DiBernardo, Eugene Stolowski, and Cawley were badly hurt in the Bronx fire. They were trapped on the fourth floor and were left with the life-or-death choice of leaping 50 feet or burning up. The Brooklyn firefighter, Richard Sclafani, 37, died at a hospital after being injured at a two-alarm fire in the East New York section.
It will forever be remembered as Black Sunday – and now a highly-critical FDNY report into the double-fatal fire reveals how so many things went wrong on that day.
Two firefighters died and four were critically injured when fire and smoke in an illegally partitioned apartment forced them to jump from a fourth floor window.
Jeanette Meyran, Firefighter’s Widow: “You have to envision that it turned badly in seconds.”
The FDNY Internal Report of the event documented details of a long list of mistakes made from the top brass down to the front line.
Its key findings include:
Failure to provide firefighters with escape ropes.
Failure to update operational procedures.
Inadequate training.
Failure to communicate level of danger to command.
Failure to thaw two frozen hydrants.
Water loss in main hose line.
Partitioned walls.
Audio Radio Transmissions
NIOSH REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONS
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for structural fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters operating in hazardous areas have charged hoselines.
Discussion: It is department policy to initiate an aggressive interior attack (offensive strategy) whenever possible. Fire departments should ensure that a hoseline is in position prior to entering hazardous or potentially hazardous areas. At this point, the hoseline can be charged and entry made. If the hoseline doesn’t charge or flow is restricted, fire fighters will still have time and space to escape.According to Dunn, the most important fire fighting operation at a structure fire is stretching the first attack hoseline to the fire.
A properly positioned and functional fire attack line saves the most lives during a fire.“It confines the fire and reduces property damage. Searches will proceed quickly, rescues will be accomplished under less threat, sufficient personnel will be available for laddering, ventilation will be effective, and overhaul above the fire room will be unimpeded.”Firefighters should continually train on SOPs including but not limited to establishing effective water supply, proper hose deployment, and advancing and operating hoselines to ensure successful interior attacks.
Refresher training should be provided to all fire fighters on a regular basis or as needed to ensure effective fire fighting skills are maintained.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained on the hazards of operating on the floor above the fire without a charged hoseline and follow associated standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Discussion: The most dangerous location on the fire ground is operating above the fire, especially during operations without the protection of a hoseline. Before operating above a fire, it is a good practice to deploy a hoseline. Where there is risk of extension to concealed spaces, additional precautionary hoselines are needed. According to Dunn, fire fighters are most often trapped on a floor above a fire because they fail to size-up the fire below them.Fire fighters should make certain that they take all necessary precautions and size-up the fire before making entry above it. Fire fighters should determine whether suppression teams are capable of extinguishing the fire and notify command.
If not, then command should not permit fire fighters above the fire until conditions change. In this incident, operations continued above the fire on the 4th floor after the withdrawal of Engine 75’s hoseline.
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations provide the incident commander with progress reports.
Discussion: Frequent progress reports to the IC are essential in the continuous size-up and assessment of an incident. Interior crews working in areas not visible to the IC are the IC’s eyes and ears during an incident. Progress reports also provide everyone on the fireground with information on aspects of the incident that relate to their activities (primary search, suppression, ventilation, etc.).
Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that team continuity is maintained during interior operations.
Discussion: Fire fighters should always work and remain in teams whenever they are operating inside a burning structure. Team continuity means knowing your team members and who is the team leader, staying within visual contact at all times (if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of each other), communicating needs and observations to the team leader, staging as a team, and watching out for other team members. Teams that enter burning structures should enter and leave together to ensure that team continuity is maintained. Working in teams and maintaining team continuity provides an added safety net of fellow team members.
Recommendation #5: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for incident commanders to divide up functions during complex incidents.
Discussion: Incident commanders have to address multiple tasks simultaneou
sly during high stress activities.Incident commanders can only manage so much information and should divide up functions to make the span of control more manageable. During complex events, the IC should assign other personnel to functions such as accountability, radio communications, incident safety, company tracking, and resident evacuation in order for the IC to effectively focus on fire command.
Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that Mayday transmissions are prioritized and fire fighters are trained on initiating Mayday radio transmissions immediately when they become trapped inside a structure.
Discussion: In this incident, there was an initial delay in determining who made the initial Mayday transmission. The incident commander must monitor and prioritize every message, but only respond to those that are critical during a period of heavy communications on the fire ground. A radio transmission reporting a trapped firefighter is the highest priority transmission that command can receive. Mayday transmissions must always be acknowledged and immediate action must be taken. As soon as fire fighters become lost or disoriented, trapped or unsuccessful at finding their way out of the interior of structural fire, they must initiate emergency radio transmissions. They should manually activate their personal alarm safety system (PASS) device and announce “Mayday-Mayday” over the radio.
A Mayday call will receive the highest communications priority from dispatch, the IC, and all other units. The sooner the IC is notified and a RIT is activated, the greater the chance of the fire fighter being rescued. A transmission of the Mayday situation should be followed by the fire fighter providing his last known location. A crew member who initiates a Mayday call for another person should quickly try to communicate with the missing member via radio and, if unsuccessful, initiate a Mayday providing relevant information.
Recommendation #7: Fire departments should develop standard operating procedures (SOP’s) for fire fighting operations during high wind conditions.
Discussion: Fire departments should develop SOPs to protect firefighters, including using defensive tactics if necessary, during incidents when high wind affects fire conditions. According to Dunn, “when the exterior wind velocity is in excess of 30 miles per hour, the chances of a conflagration are great; however, against such forceful winds the chances of successfully advancing an initial hoseline attack on the structure are diminished. The firefighter won’t be able to make forward hoseline progress because the flame and heat under the wind’s additional force will blow into the path of advancement.” The wind at the time of the incident was gusting up to 45 miles per hour, blowing from the northwest, speeding the fire extension to the 4th floor.Fire fighters encountering high wind conditions should change their strategy. According to Dunn, “the interior line should be withdrawn and the door to the fire area closed.
The officer in command must be notified of the inability to advance the interior attack hoseline due to the strong wind. A second hoseline should be advanced on the fire from the opposite end, the window or door through which the wind is blowing. This method may require the firefighters to stretch the line up an aerial ladder, fire escape or portable ladder. The second attack line will advance on the fire from the upwind side.”
Recommendation #8: Fire departments should provide fire fighters with the appropriate safety equipment, such as escape ropes, and associated training in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely.
Discussion: According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Programs, 2007 Edition, Section 7.1.1, “the fire department shall provide each member with appropriate protective clothing and protective equipment to provide protection from the hazards to which the member is or is likely be exposed.”
In this incident, aerials and ground ladders were unable to access the rear of the apartment. When fire fighters are beyond the reach of ladders, aerials, or elevated platforms, an option of last resort is a rope rescue. NFPA 1500, Section 7.16 Life Safety Rope and System Components states “all life safety ropes, harnesses, and hardware used by fire departments shall meet the applicable requirements of NFPA 1983, Standard on Life Safety Rope and Equipment for Emergency Services.” NFPA 1983 specifies the minimum design, performance, testing, and certification requirements for life safety rope, water rescue throwlines, life safety harnesses, belts, and auxiliary equipment for emergency services personnel. Fire departments in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely should provide all fire fighters with escape ropes per NFPA 1983 and the appropriate training to effectively utilize their escape ropes during emergencies.
Additionally,Recommendation #9: Building owners should follow current building codes for the safety of occupants and fire fighters.
Discussion: State building codes require that single room occupancies (SROs) in non-fireproof tenement buildings have automatic fire sprinklers in every hall or passage within the apartment and at least one sprinkler head in every room. This apartment building did not have sprinklers. The transformation of the 4th floor apartment into a SRO led to the construction of an interior partition wall that impeded the discovery of the fire and hindered the fire fighters’ searches. It also prevented fire fighters from reaching the rear fire escape, their secondary means of egress.
FDNY Report Says “Black Sunday” Deaths May Have Been Avoided
Anatomy of a Fall from NY1
Anatomy of the Mayday
(1) Firefighters Curt Meyran, Gene Stolowski, Brendan Cawley, and John Bellew, all from FDNY Ladder 27, arrive at 236 East 178th Street in the Bronx at approximately 8:05 a.m. on Sunday, January 23, 2005. Firefighters Jeff Cool and Joe DiBernardo, from the FDNY’s Rescue 3 unit, arrive soon after that.
(2) With firefighters from other companies already battling the blaze on the third floor, the main site of the fire, Meyran, Stolowski, Cawley, Bellew, Cool, and DiBernardo are sent to the fourth floor to clear it and prevent the fire from spreading. The six men case the area, but their efforts are made difficult by dense smoke and the mazelike structure of the chopped-up tenement building. Because of problems with a hydrant and other equipment, the men are also operating without working hoses.
(3) A burst of fire erupts through the third floor, trapping the six firefighters in Apartment 4-L. Their attempts to find a safe way out are thwarted by an illegal partition wall (in red, above) that hampers their efforts to find a fire escape.
(4) With the flames inches from their backs, the six men are forced to jump from four windows—a 50-foot drop. Meyran and Bellew die from the fall. They are survived by their wives and seven children, ranging in age from 5 months to 16 years old. The four other men suffer multiple critical injuries, are left with permanent disabilities, and are forced to retire from duty. The four survivors and two widows later sue the city for not supplying the firefighters with personal-safety ropes. Pinning the blame on the partition walls, the Bronx district attorney charges the building’s landlord and two tenants with manslaughter, criminal negligence, and reckless endangerment. Both legal actions are ongoing.
No Way Out
Then came the transmissions:
8:30:43: “Mayday! Mayday 56!Man down, fell out the window!”
8:30:48: “Mayday! Mayday!”
8:30:49: “Fireman down in the rear! Two firemen down in the rear!”
8:30:51: “Two firemen down in the rear—let’s go!”
8:30:54: “Seventy-five, put your pumps…”
8:30:58: “Mayday! Mayday! Two firemen jumped from the top floor in the rear. We need a…”
8:31:09: “Brother in the…”
“Oh, man!”
8:31:15: “Start a mixer off—we got a whole company in the rear, they had to jump.”
8:31:23: “No way, no…”
“We got six guys…”
8:31:35: “Roof, let the rope down!”
8:31:40: “Mayday! Mayday in the rear! We need EMS in the rear.”
8:32:20: “One, two, three, four, five, six who jumped in the rear! We need massive EMS here! Massive injuries!”
On the morning of January 23, 2005, six firefighters jumped out of four fourth-story windows of a tenement at 236 East 178th Street in the Bronx, falling 50 feet to the pavement. Two of them, Curt Meyran and John Bellew, died from their injuries; another four—Gene Stolowski, Brendan Cawley, Joe DiBernardo, and Jeff Cool—barely survived, sustaining massive injuries of their own that left several of them in the hospital for months and effectively ended their careers. Another firefighter, Richard Sclafani, died at an unrelated fire in Brooklyn that same afternoon, making that day the first since 1918 that men had died in two separate incidents in the city; the dual tragedies have come to be known as Black Sunday.
Now the surviving firefighters are telling their version of the story for the first time. To date, the men have spoken publicly only briefly, but because of litigation they’ve filed against the city, they’ve avoided giving a full account of what happened that day. In the past few months, however, the four of them have begun appearing at private firefighter gatherings to tell their story, and three of them sat with New York Magazine for their first extensive interviews, speaking out about controversies that have surrounded the fire for two years. Shouldn’t the department have outfitted the firefighters with personal-safety ropes—a piece of equipment that was once standard issue but was not provided at the time? Is the building’s landlord primarily to blame, for blocking off access to the fire escape with an illegal subdivision?
Should the department have kept the six men on the fourth floor that long, given the problems with the hydrants and hoses? Or were the men themselves in part at fault for not making their situation clear to the officers on the ground? The survivors’ stories also reveal for the first time something much more personal: just how deeply the tragedy has affected them and their families. Their lives—once centered around straightforward concepts like action and adrenaline, honor and bravery—are more complicated than they once were. They are heroes, but they are lost.
It took the Ladder 27 crew longer than they expected—about six minutes—to make it just ten blocks. The blizzard was part of the problem, as was a double-parked truck on East Tremont Avenue. It didn’t help that they had the wrong address, though that was quickly corrected. When Gene Stolowski saw Engine 42 and Ladder 33 stretching hoses up to the third floor of the building, he knew this one was real. “I think we got something,” he told Brendan Cawley. “Let’s go.”
Curt Meyran, Stolowski, and Cawley walked into the front entryway, a wide foyer where they saw the first signs of smoke (John Bellew, the driver, came up a few minutes later). Up they marched, passing the guys from Ladder 33 on the third floor. But already, things had started going wrong.
At 8:05 a.m., about the same time that Ladder 27 had arrived, the driver from Engine 42 had reported the frozen hydrant. Outside, firefighters hustled to connect hoses to a booster tank on their truck, while others stretched hoses to hydrants farther away. For a moment, the third floor got water back, then lost it again; then the water came back but the pressure was too weak and the nozzle would shut. Now the hoses seemed to be frozen or ruptured: No one knew which. Without water, the fire was spreading unchecked.
When the Ladder 27 crew reached the fourth floor, Meyran told Stolowski to prop open the stairway door with his maul. Meyran, Stolowski, and Cawley slipped on their oxygen masks and walked into Apartment 4-L. Everything was pitch-black—no lights, no windows, nothing but smoke. Clothes and furniture were everywhere. Cawley had to feel his way around so he wouldn’t trip. In one of the bedrooms, he ran into another firefighter, knocking him to the floor; he looked at the uniform and saw a number three. He later guessed it was Jeff Cool, who’d made it upstairs with Joe DiBernardo and others from Rescue 3.
Remembering the Sacrifices’ of that day in September and all of those who came before us in this the United States Fire Service and those that were with us, in the commission of our sworn duties who didn’t go home…..as we do what we do best, being Fire Fighters.
The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program has released the investigation report of the line of duty deaths of two career FDNY firefighters during a 2007 seven-alarm high-rise fire in the former Deutsche Bank building undergoing deconstruction and asbestos abatement.
On August 18, 2007, two FDNY firefighters; Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo lost thier lives while operating at this incident. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations. FDNY Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran and FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, became trapped in the maze-like conditions of a high-rise building undergoing deconstruction. The building’s standpipe system had been disconnected during the deconstruction and the partitions constructed for asbestos abatement prohibited fire fighters from getting water to the seat of the fire. An hour into the incident, the fire department was able to supply water by running an external hoseline up the side of the structure. Soon after the victims began to operate their hoseline, they ran out of air. The victims suffered severe smoke inhalation and were transported to a metropolitan hospital in cardiac arrest where they succumbed to their injuries.
By the time the fire was extinguished, 115 fire fighters had suffered a variety of injuries.Key contributing factors to this incident include: delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel, inoperable standpipe and sprinkler system, delay in establishing water supply, inaccurate information about standpipe, unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously, extreme fire behavior, uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor, blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress, maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris, heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented, failure of fire fighters to always don SCBAs inside structure and to replenish air cylinders, communications overwhelmed with numerous Mayday and urgent radio transmissions, and lack of crew integrity.
NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
review and follow existing standard operating procedures on high-rise fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters are not operating in hazardous areas without the protection of a charged hoseline.
be prepared to use alternative water supplies when a building’s standpipe system is compromised or inoperable.
develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating guidelines for risk management during complex high-rise operations.
ensure that crew integrity is maintained during high-rise fire suppression operations.
train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning high-rise structure.
ensure that fire fighters diligently wear their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) when working in environments that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).
train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
use exit locators (both visual and audible) or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit.
conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
encourage building owners and occupants to report emergency situations as soon as possible and provide accurate information to the fire department.
consider additional fire fighter training using a high-rise fire simulator.
Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:
conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters in high-rise structures.
continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communications in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Municipalities should:
ensure that construction and/or demolition is done in accordance with NFPA 241: Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations.
develop a reporting system to inform the fire department of any ongoing, unique building construction activities (such as deconstruction or asbestos abatement) that would adversely affect a fire response.
establish a system for property owners to notify the fire department when fire protection/suppression systems are taken out of service.
An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of the PPT programon Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites
Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is. Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed. Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.
We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?
We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.
The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.
Modern building construction is no longer predicable
Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
Command & Company Officer dereliction
Nothing is going to happen to me (us)
STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.
These behaviors include; • Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.
• Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.
• Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.
Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;
TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk
TACTICAL PATIENCE(NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.
If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.
The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.
Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.
As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.
NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup. During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?” The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature. The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.
This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE. NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE
Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
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