The Chicago Fire Department: Everyone Goes Home

NFFF News Release: In an effort to  make personal safety a  top priority, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) and the Chicago Fire Department (CFD) today released a new video, Chicago Fire Department – Everyone  Goes Home®.  Members of the CFD and families of fallen firefighters share their stories in this compelling and moving testimonial of the importance of adhering to safety standards and accepting personal responsibility for following procedures.

Chicago Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff was impressed by a video that the NFFF and the Fire Department of New York produced several years earlier to educate members about the importance of training and safety standards. The FDNY leadership had noticed behavioral improvement among its members following the release of their video. Hoff felt that the members of the CFD could benefit from hearing first-hand accounts of the lessons learned by their colleagues and invited the NFFF to collaborate on a video for Chicago.

“The culture of firefighting requires us to do everything we can to make sound decisions so we can be in a position to help the people we serve when they most need it,” said Ronald J. Siarnicki, executive director of the NFFF. “With this video the firefighters and leadership of the Chicago Fire Department are clearly showing the rest of the fire service you can still be a firefighter and at the same time do your best to make sure Everyone Goes Home®.”

Direct Link: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vODww1qwSuE

The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) and the Chicago Fire Department (CFD) released a new safety video, Chicago Fire Department – Everyone Goes Home®, to help raise awareness of personal safety in the fire service. Nearly two dozen members of the CFD and survivors of fallen firefighters share their stories.  See the video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vODww1qwSuE

Got Fire?……Anticipate Collapse..

A recent video clip making its way around the cyber fireground clearly depicted a very close-call and resulting near miss event to four firefighters at a four alarm fire involving a commercial building that housed an established insulation manufacturer and installation contractor.

The video shows within a very compressed time frame, the progression of rapidly deteriorating interior conditions, the adverse affects on the building’s structural systems and the results from the loss of load transfers that lead to a catastrophic wall collapse  narrowly missing the crew of firefighters who were operating a hand line in the vicinity of an exterior overhead door. Fortunately the injuries sustained to the firefighters were minor in nature; however the consequences and results from this collapse could have been far different and significantly more severe.

Following a series of repeated viewings of the video clip and with each successive viewing, it became readily apparent that there was a lot more to these images of the collapse and the cursory focus on the resulting near miss event. Closer examination of the video clip and the still frames brought to light some obvious conditions and indicators that easily become lost in the rapidity of the sequence of the collapse; which really has the true story to be told.

It’s the mechanism and sequence of the collapse, the dynamics of the building’s performance and the building indicators that provide a training opportunity in further examining key factors, presenting insights that could be a focus for operational and command personnel at future incidents with common parameters and gaining some mental models in recognition-primed decision making that contribute to the naturalistic decision-making process.

If you know what to be looking for, then when you see it, you may be able to anticipate, project and implement in rapid succession appropriate measures dictated by the incident.

Four Alarm Commercial Building Fire with Collapse: Fire Photo by Ben Goldberry

In an effort to promote additional insights and bring forward these fundamental observations and experienced-based presumptions extended from these and other news video images, still photographs, additional reporting research and examination, and a review of other published media resources; the following observations presented in this overview brief are being conveyed to increase firefighter, company and command level awareness of key collapse indicators such as those present at this commercial fire  and to further the concept of adaptive fireground management principles and increase awareness of fundamental building performance indicators and principles to help you increase your intuitive observations skills and translate them into proactive operational actions on the fireground-before an adverse condition occurs.[ i.e., being five steps ahead of the fire conditions].

Although this briefing makes use of the images and conditions depicted in the video clip and encountered by the fire department evident in the images; the susequent commentary and  insights provided are not meant to provide  direct or indirect opinions, renderings, criticism or censure  towards the conduct of operations or the management of the incident by the respective department and it’s firefighting, command and support personnel who operated at the actual fire and experienced this near miss event first-hand.

We are grateful that the events of this alarm precluded anything worst occurring given the potential seriousness of the prevailing  incident conditions and commend the  fire department and it’s firefighters that provide these exceptional services each and every day to the citizens they serve and to the community they protect, in mitigating this serious fire; safely and successfully.

This incident and the resulting near-miss captured by the videographer provides the Fire Service with an exceptional opportunity given today’s far reaching capabilities of eMedia, this web site and direct and indirect readers, links, tweets, likes, reposting’s, uploads, downloads and sharing  an opportunity to share the consequences of an extreme close-call and learn from it in a positive and constructive manner, so that firefighters, company officers, commanders and support personnel can better predict with knowledge, insight and at times intuition a better understanding of buildings and the structures and occupancies we operate within on the fireground.  

There are numerous inherent indicators present at every incident scene we operate at that. As is in this near miss event and building collapse; it’s sometimes the subtle things that need to gain the attention of operationg companies and personnel and the ability to rapidly process, recognize and react.

 Remember this: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

As a generality; it’s important to note that given heavy fire involvement in a structure (got fire), adaptive fireground management considerations would promote conservative considerations to anticipate and expect collapse (degraded or compromise; limited or catastrophic).

In the case of fires in commercial occupancies and buildings with;

• Large Square footage/Floor areas
• Significant fire loads
• Large open structural system spans lacking compartmentation, 
• Unprotected steel components and assemblies 
• No Sprinkler Systems
• Omitted, compromised or degraded passive or active protective  or suppression systems
• Significant openings along the exterior building envelope
• Significant opening on the roof enclosure
• Deep seated fires or rapidly escalating and extending fires

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. 

Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. Its alot more than that, with far greater consequences that may be very unforgiving.

Aerial Plan of Building and Collapse Area A-B

The Building

The fire incident involved a single story commercial building occupying approximately 32, 200 square feet of area on a multiple building site with proximal exposures.  Manufacturing, warehousing and offices comprised the building’s operational use.  An aerial plan view shows the geographical building scene divisions and the location and relationship of the Alpha- Bravo Side collapse zones that affected operations and resulted in the close-call and firefighter near-miss. The proximity of exposures, physical layout and orientation can be further assessed.

 A review of public documents and records, incident reports and various media resources  provided the following insights;

Overview Details

Alpha Street Side View- Adapted from Google Streetmaps

The view of the alpha street side identifies the building front facade, its main office entrance (center between dual overhead doors on the left and right). Pronounced on the alpha side facade is the presence of four (4) equally spaced overhead (OH) doors that provide direct access into the building’s interior. The subsequent collapse area is depicted at the A-B corner with special attention drawn to relationship of the wall plane and OH door proximity.

The relationship and this wall surface ( area square footage) and the presence of the OH door opening to the wall/ roof interface area that subsequently became compromised and collapsed is critical in further understanding the mechanism of the collapse sequence and also the positive effect it had on the survivability of the firefighters who were within the collapse zone at the time of the wall failure.

Don’t Always Stress the Corners

It’s been a common practice and fundamental fireground consideration to define the corner of a typical building as having safety considerations and prominence in the context of ladder company operations, laddering and roof work and in the placement of personnel and positioning of fireground operations.

Corner Building Operational considerations have included, but limited to;

• Provides a potentially safe(er) area of operational refuge
• Provides a location to safely position ground ladders for roof access/egress
• Provides a location that has a potential  higher degree of assurance for maintaining structural integrity in the event of a collapse condition of an outer wall
• Will not fail in a catastrophic or monolithic manner due to the postulated presence of structural members on the vicinity of either the wall enclosure and/or the roofing structural system and assemblies
• The design and construction configuration and orientation of the ninety degree angle of the building’s outer wall envelope (at the corner)  provides predicated inherent structural stability
• The  typical type of structural or envelope construction may have a resulting  ninety degree building corner having a more robust resistance to collapse and compromise due to the various types of enclosure systems (methods and materials) and assemblies and needed stability per engineering principles

In this instance (as shown in the Alpha side street view),  the presence of the large overhead door in close proximity to the corner wall intersection and transition ( A-B side), actually makes this position, fireground proximity and travel paths highly prone to early and complete collapse potential in the event of a loss of the wall-roof component or assembly integrity or in the load bearing/transfer capabilities of the wall-roof assembly. 

• The presence and identification of a corner configuration similar to this in a commercial structure should result in a higher degree of considerations and risk assessment when formulation and deploying operational assignments and in the placement of personnel for task assignments in this proximity.
• This operational area should be considered as a candidate for designation as a collapse zone based upon projected or defined operational considerations, incident conditions and predictive building characteristics, systems, materials and fire dynamics and conditions.  

Alpha-Bravo Corner of Subsequent Collapse Aerial View

• The entire perimeter of the alpha side could be considered for a restricted collapse zone just in terms of wall opening alone sans the degree of actual or projected interior fire impingement or fire involvement.

 Aerial Overhead view of the building perimeter walls along the four divisions ( A-D) with the A-B corner that subsequently experienced the wall-roof compromise and resulting collapse.

 The A-B corner and the affected ground areas around the collapse zone. Considerations for a collapse zone area on the A-B corner would have resulted in a minimum distance of twenty five (25) feet from the building base for all operations within this area. The collapse zone on the Bravo side extends into the exposure building due to its close proximity.

Always consider the building envelope materials of construction and systems present on the building. The use of concrete masonry units (CMU) is common, as is the use of pre-cast concrete and cast-in place and tilt-up concrete construction panels.

Variations in collapse dynamics and mechanisms of collapse may result in sizable increases in collapse zone distances from the building base with consideration for monolithic or partial wall collapse as well as safety considerations for bounce and travel over long distances of modular assembly building pieces ( i.e. concrete blocks, brick venner or material chunks).

We have not discussed collapse considerations for other building envelope systems such as metal panelized systems since these have entirely different collapse considerations and profiling, not applicable to this incident and assessment insights. The same is true when considering operating and collapse considerations at commercial buildings with ordinary construction or heavy timber systems (Type or Class III and IV). These to have different rules of predictive building performance and collapse safety considerations.

Typical Interior

Typical Structural System and Components

Interior View with Steel Columns, Open Web Steel bar Joists and Beams

 

 

Typical Open Web Steel Bar Joists w Metal Roof Deck

 

 

Large clear spans provided by the open web steel bar joists allowed for considerable free floor space typical of commercial warehouse occupancies.

Note the use of what appears to be combustible wood storage and staging areas that could have could potentially contribute towards increased fire intensity, extension and further contribute towards adverse affects on the unprotected structural steel components and assemblies.

 

Alpha Side Collapse Area Details: OH Door Pre-Collapse Insights

 

 

 

Pre-Collapse Operations on Alpha side with personnel in close proximty to the building perimeter

 

Pre-Collapse view of Operations on the Alpha side with personnel in close proximity, (within [a] collapse zone) to the building perimeter. It is evident that the degree of interior fire extension and involvement presumes a cautious deployment and placement of personnel in safe operational areas. When operating in such close proximity to the building wall and envelope, it becomes increasingly challenging for company officers and company personnel to monitor overall building performance indicators that may be prevalent or dominant from a view point further away from the building. 

Fire extension, smoke conditions, component or assembly movement or displacement may be readily defined and identified from a vantage point away from the building, requiring additional independent  operational assignments within the division if resources allow.   Otherwise, officers are encouraged to get a big picture view and increase their span of vision of the building and progressing fire conditions and building performance

 

 

 

 

The pre-collapse frame image above identifies the building roof line in relationship to the ground operations, smoke conditions and also the directional flow of the elevated master stream [upper right corner]. The initial  stage of the wall compromise and collapse can be seen in the Bravo wall pulling away. When watching the video, pay close attention first to the stream direction and flow and them at the location and movement of the wall, which is followed in rapid succession with the full wall collapse.

T

 

Close examination of the initial video frames shows the rapid displacement of the portion of the Bravo wall and outward collapse towards the B-Exposure (alleyway) Refer to the Aerial Plan for orientation. The A-B Collapse is progressing from the Bravo side to the Alpha side as loads are being transferred in rapid progression with further collapse expected.

The frame image above shows the bravo wall failing outward with the resulting loss in structural support of the roofing deck assembly.

Rapid fire migration and extension is evident after the wall section collapse with increased flames visible. In the video, one firefighter quickly recognizes the imminent collapse and reacts.

A significant section of wall area is present at the A-B side and progressing from the building corner to the left jamb of the overhead (OH) door. This area and the area directly above the OH door opening is calculated to weigh over 20,000 lbs. 

The early identification and establishment of collapse zone(s) is mission critical especially at commercial buildings due to the considerations for rapidly changing operational conditions that may be a result of or influenced by the following;

• lack of knowledge or understanding of the building’s construction, systems and characteristics
• lack of adequate resources, skills and or capabilities for selected phase operations
• fire loading, combustibles, flammables and other products
• Last of or loss of compartmentation
• fire and protective systems failures or inoperability
• unapproved alterations, additions and renovations to the building, systems and occupancy
• transitions for offensive to defensive operational phases, which at times may results in operating position postures too close to the building
• failure to recognize situational factors that will drive appropriate operational phasing and task deployments
• lack of building performance knowledge
• not considering occupancy risk versus treating the building/fire relationship based upon occupancy type
• not recognizing key collapse indicators and failing to implement timely actions [proactively versus reactionary]
• being four steps behind the fire conditions evident instead of implementing adaptive fire ground management insights [five steps ahead of the evident fire]
• use precise coordination when placing elevated masterstreams into operations with ground personnel operating within close quarters
• understand the effects of master streams on the integrity of building features, assemblies and components

 

 

 

 

 

The image frame above shows personnel operating within an imminent collapse zone directing hand lines into the interior fire area. Further examination of the video  frames clearly shows one firefighter quickly recognizing that a collapse is occurring and attempts to alert the other personnel to retreat. Simultaneously to the collapse progression, the crew immediately retreats away from the collapsing wall and falling building materials.

 

Within the span of four seconds, the wall compromise occurs and collapses on the ground at the A-B corner and immediate area on the alpha side.  The slightly monolithic manner in which the wall plane first peels away and progressively collapsed is interesting for a CMU wall. Possibly due to the outward collapse of the Bravo wall, followed by the rapid succession of failure of the roof-wall connection interface resulted in an transitional downward force that pushed the alpha side wall outward allowing gravity to work its force

 

When operating in close proximity to a heavily involved forward interior condition [exterior position] it is important to maintain focused situational awareness and either directly maintain or delegate responsibilities for observations of fire and smoke progress and conditions while monitoring key functional building performance indicators and collapse pre-cursors. 

 

Additionally, always re-evaluate the effectiveness of deployed and operational hose lines, streams and in water application to ensure they are adequate for the degree of fire suppression being undertaken and the corresponding fire flow requirements. Don’t just assume, determine with validity. [ Refer to Tactical Entertainment]  

 

Obscured by the rapidly defining smoke which is a result of the developing and extending collapse, the frame image 04 below depicts the beginning of the compromise and collapse sequence commencing as a result of the Bravo wall compromise and collapse sequence at the B-A corner that will subsequently peel towards the Alpha side and continue up to the outermost jamb of the overhead door.

 

Pay particular attention to the first three to four seconds of the video clip and review the video clip over a few times;  looking at the operating elevated master stream that is clearly visible and operating from the upper right part of the screen through the smoke plume; follow the direct orientation and stream flowing directly towards the bravo wall plane,  and presumed penetrating into/through the roof deck or impacting through the metal roof deck and wall-roof assembly area at the upper roof edge.

 

 

Image 04

 

 Frame image 04 depicts the rapidly deteriorating conditions that are evident as the collapse sequence continues and the overhead door jamb (left) buckling and adjacent wall failing by way of an outward curl or peel away commencing from the upper (left image) A-B corner at the roof line and then peeling and failing from upper left to right.

 

 

Image 05

 

 

The leading edge of the outward collapsing wall plane ( yellow dotted line) is failing with the greatest material concentration occurring at the A-B edge outward. Fortunately the presence and location of the overhead door opening  lessened the amount and location of wall material ( concrete masonry units-CMU) and contributed to a void area being present and not fully impacting the firefighters who were operating within this collapse zone.

 

In other words, had this been a solid full wall collapse likelihood for significant firefighter injury would have resulted. 

 

The affects of wall/roof compromise should be of focused consideration and monitoring when managing incidents of this size and magnitude in similar occupancies and building features.  Flame and heat  impingment can and will affect the structural integrity of lintels spans, beams and truss connects along roof lines and connections. Look for signs of impingment, degradation or compromise. watch for signs of probable inward/outward or curtain wall collapse.

 

 

 

Image 06

 

The remaining images, frames 06 and 07 depict the location of the firefighters to the wall collapse, the relationship to the wall and roof system and the degree of wall area that became compromised and collapsed.

 

Image 07

 

This brief video clip and these accompanying briefing insights provided a tremendous opportunity to examine in a non-critical manner an actual near miss collapse event and  operational discernments that provide a focused training an awareness opportunity.

When given the time to analyze and assess, some things become so apparent and self-revealing that we might prematurely say why didn’t someone pick up that or those conditions while conducting operations at [an] incident.  It is dependent on a wide variety of factors, conditions and parameters that are difficult at times to identify and harder yet to fully identify as common or contributing factors, errors or omissions.

It’s not always that easy; but contradictory – some time it really is (or should be) that easy.

Some things on the fireground may not be prone to being so readily identifiable or recognized.

It all depends what you’re looking for and whether you have the necessary insights, knowledge and skill sets. Incident priorities, demands, situational focus, awareness or disconnect all may have a part in how and incident is managed and mitigated.

It goes back directly on knowing what to look for and when; at what type of building with which type of occupancy and under what stage or stages of fire development and combat operations or engagement you might be in. It complex, it takes time and experience and learning’s.

There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.

You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.

It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.

Links:

•  http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20111031/LOCAL07/310319957

Check out the new promo video for 2012 from Buildingsonfire.com

Buildingsonfire.com and the Command Institute’s

2012 Training Curriculums and Offerings

Building Construction and Systems Training for

Commanders, Company Officers and Firefighters

• Building Construction for the Company  and Command Officer
• The Rules of Combat Fire Engagement & Tactical Operations 
• Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
• Reading the Building; Size-up and Tactical Risk
• The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction &  Tactics
• Building Construction and Tactical Operations
• Adaptive Fireground Management
• The Anatomy of Buildingsonfire 2012 NEW
• Five Star Command & Fire Fighter Safety
• The Doctrine of Combat Fire Operations 2012 NEW
• Adaptive Strategies and Tactical Patience NEW
• Predictive Management of Today’s Fireground NEW
• Fireground Leadership  for Company & Command Officers
• Extreme Fire Behavior & Fireground Operations NEW
• Firefighter Safety  and Tactical Entertainment
• Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting Operations
• Tactical Renaissance:  Building Construction & Tactical Excellence
• Occupancy Risk Profiling and Firefighting Strategy & Tactics NEW
• Command Institute’s Fire Ground Leadership Series NEW
• CI Fire Ground Leadership for Company Officers (Silver Series) NEW
• CI Fire Ground Leadership for Company Officers (Gold Series) NEW
• Operational Safety at Buildings of Ordinary & HT Construction
• Operational Safety at Residential Occupancies
• Operational Safety at Commercial & Big Box Occupancies
• Operational Safety at Garden Apartment & Townhouses
• Operational Safety at Buildings under Construction
• Keynotes ,Lectures, Special Presentations & Programs Available
• Other Building Construction , Command, Tactics, Fire Fighter Safety and Operations programs available
• Contact us with your special or site specific needs

 Download the NEW 2012 Buildingsonfire PDF  Listing: 2012 Buildingsonfire.com Training Brochure Building Construction and Systems Training for Commanders, Company Officers and Firefighers

We’ll be presenting two of our distinguished programs at the Liberty Fire and Leadership Training Conference in November

Make your plans to attend the newest premiere training conference, offering the latests in integrated eMedia, interactive classroom and hands-on training, education and networking? The Buildingsonfire.com family ( consistings of CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com, Taking it to the Streets Radio and Buildingsonfire.com) will be presenting two cutting edge and timely programs at both the Liberty  Fire and Leadership Training Conference on  November 4-6, 2011 in King of Prussia, PA

Join in on Wednesday August 17th at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

This edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM the program will be looking at the New Fire Ground and the First-Due

Joining the program will be two special guests: Divison Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) providing a great opportunity to listen to perspectives from coast to coast and the heartland.

Join in on what is certainly going to be an insightful look and discussion of the New Fire Ground and the issues affecting the First-Due Officer and Command…

Both Divison Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) are speakers at the Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference brought to you by Go Forward Training and coming to the St. Charles/St.Louis, Missouri metro area on October 21-23. 2011. I also have the honor of lecturing and presenting two programs, one of which one will be co-presented with my good friend and colleague Lt. John Shafer. (The GreenMaltese.com HERE)

• Conference Direct Link HERE.
• Go Forward Training HERE

Incorporating and facilitating the latest training delivery concepts and methodologies and integrating current and emerging technology, social media platforms, eMedia and internet based content management material in order to provide unparalleled fire service curricula, training and education, The Command Institute, Buildingsonfire.com and Fire Fighternetcast.com will be integrating content across a number of platforms to provide you with supportive information and training that will ultimately integrate with the direct training deliveries at the conference.

This segment of Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com is the first step in achieving that goal and process. Look for more integrated materials, exercises and eMedia on CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com

• Check this out before the show on Wednesday on TheCompanyofficer.com; Deployment Decisions: Defining Operations on the First-Due

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing developing concepts, methodologies and operational perspectives affecting today’s emerging and evolving fire ground and the new considerations for the First-Due with Christopher Naum and fire service leaders, Division Chief Ed Hadfield and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann.

Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a 36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and the distinguished leading national authority on building construction and fire ground operations. Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2011 All Rights Reserved

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

• Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening August 17th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
• Firefighternetcast.com HERE
• Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
• Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

 With so many changes (budget cuts, staffing reductions, reduced training, etc.) in so many fire departments, it is critical for fire fighters to focus on their own survival on the fire ground. There is no other call more challenging to fire ground operations than a Mayday call the unthinkable moment when a fire fighter’s personal safety is in imminent danger. Fire fighter fatality data compiled by the United States Fire Administration have shown that fire fighters becoming trapped and disoriented represent the largest portion of structural fire ground fatalities. The incidents in which fire fighters have lost their lives, or lived to tell about it, have a consistent theme inadequate situational awareness put them at risk.

New Rules of Engagement

 Fire fighters don’t plan to be lost, disoriented, injured or trapped during a structure fire or emergency incident. But fires are unpredictable and volatile, and they will not always go according to plan. What a fire fighter knows about a fire before entering a blazing building may radically change within minutes once inside the structure. Smoke, low visibility, lack of oxygen, structural instability and an unpredictable fire ground can cause even the most seasoned fire fighter to be overwhelmed in an instant.

It's Not a Matter of IF, It's a Matter of When

It’s not a matter of IF the MAYDAY happens, it’s WHEN! Thius the reason for the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

Theme: Surviving the Fire Ground Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

• IAFC Safety Week Resources: Firefighter Survival, HERE
• National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System Resources, HERE

With that being said, there must be a means and a method to better defined and more accurately

• Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.
• Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
• There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
• Refer to: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety 
• When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future.
• Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.
• Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports.
• Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.
• If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures.
• This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations.
• You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious

Original IAFC 2001 ROE

• Combat Fire Suppression and Engagement has been dramatically influenced by numerous challenges in terms of effectiveness, methodologies, risk and operational capabilities….yet we implement strategic and tactical models and protocol predicated on past performance of building structures and occupancies and fire fighting successes….
•  It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations
• We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations.
• These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.
• 2009 was a significant and decisive year for the fire service in a number of ways….
• Controversy, debate, argument; enlightenment, knowledge, insights, awareness, comprehension, understanding….
• Which leads me to call this the emerging tactical renaissance….

The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries. As part of that effort the nearly 1,000 member Safety, Health and Survival Section of the IAFC has developed the NEW  “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground.

The intent was to provide a set of “model procedures” for Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting to be made available by the IAFC to fire departments as a guide for their own standard operating procedure development.

In August, 2008, following a year of discussion, the Section moved to develop a set of “Rules of Engagement for Structure Firefighting”.

A project team was created consisting of Section members and representatives of other several other interested fire service organizations.

These included the;

• Fire Department Safety Officer Association (FDSOA),
• the National Fallen Firefighter Foundation (NFFF),
• the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC), the
• National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and other organizations.
• All draft material has also been shared with representatives of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) who developed a joint IAFF/IAFC “Fire Ground Survival Project”.

 Three Section members also participated in the IAFF project.

The direction provided the project team by the Section leadership was to develop rules of engagement with the following conceptual points;

• Rules should be a short, specific set of bullets
• Rules should be easily taught and remembered
• Rules should define critical risk issues
• Rules should define “go” or “no‐go” situations
• A companion lesson plan/explanation section should be provided

Early in development the Rules of Engagement, it was recognized that two separate rules were needed –one set for the firefighter, and another set for the incident commander.

Thus, the two sets of Rules of Engagement were conceived and developed.

Each set has several commonly shared bullets and objectives, but the explanations are described somewhat differently based on the level of responsibility (firefighter vs. incident commander).

The 2010 Rules of Engagement reflects nearly two years of public comment and feedback from several presentations at fire service conferences, including the National Fallen Fire Fighters Safety Summit held at the National Fire Academy this past March 2010.

The “Rules” was formally adopted by the IAFC Health, Safety and Survival Section at the Fire Rescue International Conference that was held in Chicago this past August 2010

The project team was lead by Chief Gary Morris,

• Document is available:     http://www.iafcsafety.org/Rules_of_Engagement_v8_7.10.pdf
• Charts and write-up with links on the New  ROE on CommandSafety.com:  http://commandsafety.com/2010/09/rules-of-engagement-2010/

Document Description

Section One

• includes introduction statements and background regarding the Rules of Engagement project.

Section Two

• acknowledges the Project team members and others that assisted in the project.

 Section Three

• contains the individual “Bullets” for both the Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival as well as the Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety.

 Section Four

• describes the objectives attached to each of the individual “bullets” for both set of Rules.

 Section Five

• provides an introduction and overview of the lesson plans for the Rules of Engagement.

 Section Six

• includes the lesson plan for the Rules of Engagement of Firefighter Survival.

 Section Seven

• contains the lesson plans for the Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety.

 Section Eight

• serves as appendixes and contains full investigation reports of several significant firefighter fatality incidents.

 The Need for Rules of Engagement

• Firefighter safety must always be a priority for every fire chief and every member. Over the past three decades, the fire service has applied new technology, better protective clothing and equipment, implemented modern standard operating procedures, and improved training.
• According to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data during this same period the fire service has experienced a 58 percent reduction in firefighter line of duty deaths. But, the country has also seen a paralleling 54 percent drop in the number of structural fires over the same period – thus, reducing firefighter exposure to risk.
• With a continued annual average of more than 100 firefighter fatalities, the question remains; have we really made a difference with all these technology improvements? Or, is there more that we can do to improve the safety culture of the American fire service?
• The U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study, conducted by Captain Willie Mora, San Antonio, Texas, Fire Department, conducted a review of 444 firefighter fireground deaths occurring over a recent 16 year period (1990-2006).
  • The project broke out traumatic firefighter fatalities occurring in “open structures” and “enclosed structures”. Open structures was defined as smaller structures with an adequate number of windows and doors (within a short distance) to allow for prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation.
  • Enclosed structures were defined as large buildings with inadequate windows or doors to allow prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation. Research determined that 23 percent occurred when a fast and aggressive interior attack was made on an “opened structure”. When fast, aggressive interior attacks occurred in “enclosed structures” the fatality rate rose to 77 percent. Many occurred in “marginal” or rapidly changing conditions in which the firefighter should not have been in the building.
• The fireground creates a significant risk to firefighters and it is the responsibility of the incident commander and command organization officers to minimize firefighter exposure to unsafe conditions and stop unsafe practices.
• The fire service has always been a para-military organization when it comes to fireground operations. In most cases, the Incident Commander makes a decision, sends the order down to through supervisors to the company officer and crew.
• Fire crews generally view these orders as top down direction. There is often little two‐way discussion about options.
• Where this culture exists, crews have been trained to accept the order and do it – generally without question.
• While these orders may be viewed as valid when issued they may involve inadequate risk assessment.
• There has been little national development of basic “rules” that the incident command should use in defining risk assessment process and what is too high risk that may result in a “no-go” decision.
• Furthermore, for the individual firefighter who is exposed to the greatest risk, we have not defined “rules” for them to follow in assessing their individual risk and when and how to say “no” to unsafe conditions or practices. The “Rules of Engagement” changes that.
• The “Rules of Engagement” have been developed to assist both the incident command (as well as command team officers) in risk assessment and “Go” – “No-Go” decisions. Applying the rules will make the fireground safer for all and reduce injuries and fatalities.

The development of the rules integrated several nationally recognized programs and principles. They included risk assessment principles from NFPA Standards 1500 and 1561.

Also included where concepts and principles from Crew Resource Management (available from iafc.org) and data and lessons from the National Near-Miss Reporting System (firefighternearmiss.com).

The development process also included review of lessons learned from numerous firefighter fatality investigations conducted by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.

It’s incumbent that the fire chief and the Departments management team insure the safety of all firefighters working at structural fires.

• All command organization officers are responsible for their own safety and the safety of all personnel working with them.
• All officers and members are responsible are responsible for continually identifying and reporting unsafe conditions or practices.
• The Rules of Engagement allows both the firefighter and the incident commander to apply and process these principles.
• One principle applied in the Rules of Engagement is firefighters and the company officers are the members at most risk for injury or death.
• The Rules integrate the firefighter into the risk assessment decision making process.
• These members should be the ultimate decision maker as to whether it’s safe to proceed with assigned objectives.
• The “Rules” allow a process for that decision to be made while still maintain command unity and discipline.

Operational Excellence and the ROE

The NEW Rules of Engagement

It is well known that firefighting is hazardous with varying levels of risk to the firefighter.

However, firefighting is not a military campaign where lives are lost to establish a beach head.

No firefighter’s life is a building that eventually will be rebuilt. Keep all members safe so “Everyone Goes Home”!

Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival

• Size-Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.
• Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
• DO NOT Risk Your Life for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved.
• Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
• Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
• Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together
• Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions.
• Constantly Monitor Fireground Communications for Critical Radio Reports.
• You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
• You Are Required to Abandon Your Position and Retreat Before Deteriorating Conditions Can Harm You.
• Declare a May Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger. 

The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety

• Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Size‐Up of the Incident.
• Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
• Conduct an Initial Risk Assessment and Implement a SAFE ACTION PLAN.
• If You Do Not Have The Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
• DO NOT Risk Firefighter Lives for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
• Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
• Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
• Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Firefighters. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
• Maintain Frequent Two‐Way Communications and Keep Interior Crews Informed of Changing Conditions.
• Obtain Frequent Progress Reports and Revise the Action Plan.
• Ensure Accurate Accountability of All Firefighter Location and Status.
• If, After Completing the Primary Search, Little or No Progress Towards Fire Control Has Been Achieved -Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
• Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires
• Always Have Firefighter Rehab Services in Place at All Working Fires

ROE Fire Fighter

ROE Command

Other ROE Insights

Size-Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.

Objective:    To cause the company officer and firefighters to pause for a moment and look over their area of operation and evaluate their individual risk exposure and determine a safe approach to completing their assigned tactical objectives.

Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Situational Size Up of the Incident

Objective:    To cause the incident commander to obtain an early 360 degree survey and risk assessment of the fireground in order to determine the safest approach to tactical operations as part the risk assessment and action plan development and before firefighters are placed at substantial risk.

______________________________________________________________________________

Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.

Objective: To cause the company officer and firefighter to consider fire conditions in relation to possible occupant survival of a rescue event as part of their initial and ongoing individual risk assessment and action plan development.

Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.

Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together

Objective: To ensure that firefighters always enter a burning building as a team of two or more members and no firefighter is allowed to be alone at any time while entering, operating in or exiting a building. 

Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions

Objective: To cause all firefighters and company officers to maintain constant situational awareness their SCBA air supply and where they are in the building and all that is happening in their area of operations and elsewhere on the fireground that may affect their risk and safety.

______________________________________________________________________________

You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate, and Decide.

Objective: To prevent company officers and firefighters from engaging in unsafe practices or exposure to unsafe conditions that can harm them and allowing any member to raise an alert about a safety concern without penalty and mandating the supervisor address the question to ensure safe operations.

Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Them. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.

Objective: To prevent firefighters and supervisors from engaging in unsafe practices or exposure to unsafe conditions that will harm them and allowing any member to raise an alert about a safety concern without penalty and mandating the incident commander and command organization officers promptly address the question to insure safe operations. 

______________________________________________________________________________  

Declare a May-Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger

Objective: To ensure the firefighter is comfortable with, and there is no delay in, declaring a May Day when a firefighter is faced with a life threatening situation and the May Day is declared as soon as they THINK they are in trouble.

Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires.

Objective: To cause the incident commander to have a rapid intervention team in place ready to rescue firefighters at all working fires.

______________________________________________________________________________

Ensure Accurate Accountability of Every Firefighter Location and Status

Objective: To cause the incident commander, and command organization officers, to maintain a constant and accurate accountability of the location and status of all firefighters within a small geographic area of accuracy within the hazard zone and aware of who is presently in or out of the building.

If You Do Not Have the Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters, Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy

Objective: To prevent the commitment of firefighters to high risk tactical objectives that cannot be accomplished safely due to inadequate resources on the scene.

Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting (pdf)

Risk Management

General Order: Two-In, Two-Out Compliance, Rapid Intervention Team, and Firefighter Survival

Emergency Evacuation
This policy identifies a standard system for the emergency evacuation of personnel at an emergency incident or training exercise.

Fire and Rescue Departments of Northern Virginia – Rapid Intervention Team Command and Operational Procedures
A collaborative RIT manual developed by fire and rescue departments in Northern Virginia. Promotes interoperability between multiple fire agencies.

Lost or Trapped Firefighters
This policy identifies the required actions for the search and rescue of lost or trapped firefighter(s).

Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a Biological Threat
Local and world events have placed the nation s emergency service at the forefront of homeland defense. The service must be aware that terrorists, both foreign and domestic, are continually testing the homeland defense system.

Safety Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).

Safety Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)
This policy establishes the department s criteria and procedures for Rapid Intervention Teams.

Taking It To The Streets: My Closing Commentary and The Rules of Combat Fire Suppression  

The essence of fire service suppression operations is predicated upon the deployment and application of water as an extinguishing agent, in sufficient quantities, location and duration to extinguish a fire within an enclosed structural compartment. The universal engine company correlation of: “putting the wet stuff on the red stuff” is fundamental to structural fire suppression operations but is ambiguous at best in the context of today’s modern building construction, occupancies, structural systems and building features. 

We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine engine company operations in order to identify with the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.

Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived…..

However, we now have a new set of Rules for Engagement….

• The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
• Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival
• Tactical Renaissance ……….Tactical Patience

…….integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and Integrating the RULES OF ENGAGEMENT for Structural Firefighting much more.  

It’s really all about Fighting Fire with More Knowledge and smartly

Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

   

Taking it to the Streets^TM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

 

Taking it to the Streets “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement”

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This is the netcast which was offered live on September 22, 2010. Taking it to the Streets “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department, and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA join Chris Naum as they discuss the emerging Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations [...]

Taking it to the Streets^TM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the Streets^TM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

• Firefighternetcast.com HERE
• Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
• Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production

  Looking Back at The Cherry Road Townhouse Fire, Double LODD; DCFD  May 30th, 1999

DCFD Phillips and Matthews

 On May 30, 1999, (DCFD) fire fighters responded to a box alarm involving a townhouse fire at 3146 Cherry Rd NE, Washington, DC 20018-1612.

DCFD FireFighter Anthony Phillips, Engine 10

DCFD FireFighter Louis Matthews, Engine 26

From the NIOSH Report:  The initial report came in as a house fire, and it was later reported that the fire was in the basement (all fire fighters did not receive the follow-up report of fire in the basement). Engine 26 (Lieutenant and 3 fire fighters) was the first to arrive on the scene and reported smoke showing on the front (side 1) of a row of townhouses (see Diagram 1). A fire fighter (Victim #1) from Engine 26 advanced a 1½-inch attack line through the front door (1st floor). Soon after, the layout man from Engine 26 entered to back up Victim #1. Engine 17 (Lieutenant and 3 fire fighters) arrived shortly after and stretched a 350-foot 1½-inch hose line to the rear (side 3) (see Diagram 1).

Truck 15 (Captain and 3 fire Engine 26 and Engine 10 advanced their lines through the front door in a search for the fire and the basement door (at the top of the basement steps). As the two crews searched, Truck 4 made forcible entry through a sliding-glass door in the rear (basement entrance door at ground level). Engine 17 (at the basement door with a charged line) reported to the IC that they were on the first floor, in the rear, with a small fire showing (Engine 17 was actually at the basement level). Engine 17 radioed the IC for permission to open their line and knock down the fire.

Knowing that he had two engine crews on the first floor in the front, the IC denied Engine 17’s request until he could locate the interior crews’ positions. He radioed the officer from Engine 26 several times for their position, but received no response.Engine 17 asked a second time for permission to hit the fire, as it began to grow. The IC denied the request a second time and again tried unsuccessfully to radio the officer from Engine 26. Conditions in the interior rapidly deteriorated, forcing the fire fighters on the first floor to search for an exit. A fire fighter in the interior recalled seeing fire appear from a doorway on the first floor.

Flashover Room Photo by DCFD.com

NIOSH investigators concluded in their 1999 report that, to minimize the risk of similar incidents, fire departments should:

• ensure that the department’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) are followed and refresher training is provided

• provide the Incident Commander with a Command Aide

• ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts

• ensure that when a piece of equipment is taken out of service, appropriate back up equipment is identified and readily available

• ensure that personnel equipped with a radio position the radio to receive and respond to radio transmissions

• consider using a radio communication system that is equipped with an emergency signal button, is reliable, and does not produce interference

• ensure that all companies responding are aware of any follow-up reports from dispatch

• ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is established and in position immediately upon arrival

• ensure that any hose line taken into the structure remains inside until all crews have exited

• consider providing all fire fighters with a Personal Alert Safety System (PASS) integrated into their Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)

• develop and implement a preventive maintenance program to ensure that all SCBAs are adequately maintained.

Aerial Alpha Side

Street Side-Alpha from Parking Lot

Aerial From the Delta Side

Aerial Charlie Side

Fire Intensity at the Front Door after the flashover on the Alpha Side

Post Flashover on the Charlie Side

INCIDENT INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

On May 30, 1999, two fire fighters died and two were injured while battling a townhouse basement fire. Two fire fighters—Victim #1, a 30-year-old nozzleman from Engine 26, and Victim #2, a 29-year-old nozzleman from Engine 10—had to be rescued when interior crews were hit by an intense blast of heat and flames. Victim #1 was rescued and transported to a nearby hospital where he was pronounced dead the following day. Victim #2 was rescued and pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.

On June 1, 1999, the International Association of Fire Fighters notified NIOSH of the incident, and on June 21, 1999, a Safety and Occupational Health Specialist, the Senior Investigator, and the Team Leader of the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, initially investigated this incident. On July 21, 1999, a Safety and Occupational Health Specialist and a Safety Engineer conducted additional interviews.

An Engineer and a Physical Scientist from NIOSH also completed an evaluation of the department’s SCBA maintenance program on July 21, 1999. On August 31, 1999, a Safety and Occupational Health Specialist returned to interview the seriously injured fire fighter.

Meetings and interviews were conducted with: the Chief, the Assistant Chief, the two Battalion Chiefs on the scene (one of whom was the Incident Commander), fire fighters on the box alarm, the department safety officer, and the investigation team from the fire department involved in the incident. Representatives from the personal protective equipment manufacturer, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) who evaluated the victims’ personal protective equipment and will be developing the fire growth data for the department, the metropolitan police, and the owner of the townhouse were also interviewed.

Copies of photographs, training records, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), the reports completed by fire department investigators, the autopsy reports, and the floor plan of the townhouse were obtained. A site visit was conducted and photographs of the fire scene were taken.The fire department involved in this incident is comprised of 1,764 total employees, of whom 1,182 are uniformed fire fighters. The department serves a population of approximately 1 million in a geographic area of 69 square miles. The fire department requires all new fire fighters to complete fire fighter level I and fire fighter level II requirements, Emergency Medical Technician courses, hazmat, driver and vehicle operations, first aid, search and rescue, live fire training, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Fire fighters are then assigned to a department where they are placed on probation for 1 year.

Each fire fighter is also certified as an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT). Refresher training courses are continued throughout the year. The victims’ training records were reviewed and appeared to be adequate. Victim #1 had 6½ years of experience as a fire fighter and EMT, while Victim #2 had 3½ years of experience as a fire fighter and EMT.Additional companies responded to this incident; however, only those directly involved are included in this report.

First due, Engine 26 laid a 3″ (76 mm) supply line from a hydrant at the intersection of Banneker Drive and Cherry Road NE, positioned in the parking lot on Side A, and advanced a 200′ 1-1/2″ ( 61 m 38 mm) pre-connected hoseline to the first floor doorway of the fire unit on Side A (see Figures 1 and 2). A bi-directional air track was evident at the door on Floor 1, Side A , with thick (optically dense) black smoke from the upper area of the open doorway. Engine 26′s entry was delayed due to a breathing apparatus facepiece malfunction. The crew of Engine 26 (Firefighters Mathews and Morgan and the Engine 26 Officer) made at approximately 00:24.

Figure 1. Plot and Floor Plan-3146 Cherry Road NE

INVESTIGATION

On May 30, 1999, at 0017 hours, Central Dispatch received a call of a house fire. Dispatch toned out a box alarm which consisted of the following:

• 1st due Engine 26 (Lieutenant and 3 fire fighters [including Victim #1])
• 2nd due Engine 17 (Captain and 3 fire fighters)
• 3rd due Engine 10 (Lieutenant and 3 fire fighters [including Victim #2])
• 4th due Engine 12 (Lieutenant and 3 fire fighters)
• 1st due Truck 15 (Captain and 3 fire fighters)
• 2nd due Truck 4 (Lieutenant and 3 fire fighters)
• Rescue 1 (Lieutenant and 4 fire fighters)
• Battalion Chief 1 (the Incident Commander) (BC-1)

The working fire alarm was dispatched at 0023 hours and consisted of the following:

The Hazmat Unit was also dispatched at the same time as the working fire alarm.At 0029 hours, a task force alarm was toned with the following response:

• Engine 6 (Lieutenant and 3 fire fighters)
• Engine 4 (Lieutenant and 3 fire fighters)
• Truck 7 (Lieutenant and 3 fire fighters)
• Battalion Chief 4

As companies responded to the call of a house fire, dispatch made a second report that the fire was in the basement. During the investigation, it became clear that all companies did not receive the second report of a basement fire. Engine 26 was first to arrive on the scene at 0023 hours and reported smoke showing from the front of the building. Being the first-due engine, they positioned the engine in the small parking area in front of the row of townhouses (see Diagram 1). Engine 10 arrived behind Engine 26 as the third-due engine company and stretched a 400-foot, 1½-inch line to the front entrance (see Photo 1).

Engine 17 was the second-due engine company, also arriving at 0023 hours. Upon arrival, Engine 17 stretched a 350-foot, 1½ -inch line around the adjacent units (see Diagram 1) to the rear of the burning townhouse. Arriving at 0024 hours was Engine 12, as the fourth-due engine company, which by department Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), required them to back up Engine 17 in the rear. Instead of backing up Engine 17, the crew of Engine 12 went to the front. The IC (BC-1) was en route to the scene, and from the report he received from Engine 26, he requested a working-fire dispatch. The working-fire alarm dispatched Engine 14, Battalion Chief 2 (BC-2), Air 2, Fire Investigation Unit (Car 43), the Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) unit (Car 83), Medic 17, and the department’s Safety Officer. The Hazmat Unit was also dispatched at the same time. The IC ordered BC-2 to take command of the rear when he arrived on the scene.The front door of the townhouse was open and emitting thick, black smoke. With a charged line, a fire fighter from Engine 26 (Victim #1) approached the front door, as his layout man and officer donned their SCBAs. Preparing to enter, Victim #1 experienced a problem with his SCBA facepiece. He returned to the engine and switched facepieces with his Wagon Driver. After switching facepieces, he told his officer at the front door that everything was working properly and he was taking in a line. With a charged line, he entered through the front door. Shortly after, the layout man entered, followed the line, and met the fire fighter (Victim #1).

The officer of Engine 26 entered last and proceeded into the structure to locate his crew. With a charged line, a fire fighter (Victim #2) and the Lieutenant from Engine 10 entered behind the officer from Engine 26 to provide back up. The layout man from Engine 10 was ordered by his Lieutenant to stay at the front door and feed the line inside.Truck 15 arrived on scene at 0024 hours as the first-due truck company, and started ventilation in the front according to department SOP requirements. The officer and a fire fighter on Truck 15 threw a ladder to the roof and the officer began to ventilate the large front window at ground level. Security bars were blocking the window, so a fire fighter from Truck 15 entered the structure, approximately 10 feet into the kitchen area, to vent the window from the interior. The fire fighter then exited the structure (see Floor Plan A-1).

Next, the officer from Truck 15 climbed the ladder and stopped at a window on the second floor to knock it out. After knocking out the window, he returned to the ground as the driver and Tillerman from Truck 15 climbed the ladder to the roof. The two of them cut approximately three vent holes in the roof and stated that thick, black smoke was emitting from the holes. Truck 4 arrived at 0025 hours as the second-due truck company and began ventilation in the rear of the structure. [NOTE: Truck 4 was responding for Truck 13, which was out of service at the time of this incident. Truck 13 was housed in the same station as Engine 10 and would have arrived on the scene at the same time as Engine 10 (approximately 2 minutes earlier) if it had been in service.] On arrival, a fire fighter and the officer from Truck 4 began forcible entry to the rear basement sliding-glass door (which was protected by an iron security gate (see photo 2)) as the driver and the Tillerman from Truck 4 threw ladders to the windows above the door (see Floor Plan A-2). The fire fighters stated that they saw small spot fires all over the basement floor.

The driver and the Tillerman tried to knock out the windows on the second floor, but felt they were unsuccessful because they could not feel the ladders breaking the glass. They also tried to break the sliding-glass door on the first floor with the ladder, but could not. [NOTE: The windows on the second floor were left open by the homeowner, which is why the fire fighters could not feel the glass break. The sliding-glass door on the first floor was a two-panel sliding-glass door, which fire fighters could not break with the ladder they were using. The sliding-glass door on the first floor had no security gate over it.]

The driver and Tillerman from Truck 4 left the ladder at the window on the second floor and returned to the truck to get a second ladder to go to the roof.Engine 17 was now positioned at the rear sliding-glass door as Truck 4 prepared entry (basement level). Using a gas-powered saw and a sledge hammer, the officer and fire fighter from Truck 4 removed the iron security gate and broke open the glass door at 0026 hours (see Photo 2). Members of Truck 4 and Engine 17 stated that when the sliding-glass door was opened, air began to be sucked inside by the fire. They also saw small fires on the floor and stated that when the door was opened the fires grew larger. The Lieutenant from Engine 17 reported to the IC that they had fire on the first floor and requested permission to hit the fire. [NOTE: Engine 17 was unaware that they were at the basement level due to the route they took to get to the rear. As they proceeded to the rear, they noticed the row houses they went between were only two stories, which caused confusion (see Diagram 1).]

The IC denied their request in fear of opposing hose lines. He then radioed the officer from Engine 26 to locate their position. He received no response from them. The IC knew that the crews from Engine 26 and Engine 10 had entered through the front door on the first floor.Rescue 1 arrived on the scene at approximately the same time that Truck 4 made entry. They were required to complete search and rescue operations. Two fire fighters from Rescue 1 and a fire fighter from Truck 4 entered the basement to search the interior for any civilians. Shortly after they entered, the Lieutenant from Engine 17 ordered them out as conditions began to deteriorate. One of the fire fighters who exited stated that they were able to follow a small path (limited fire) to the exterior before the entire basement erupted into flames.

The driver and Tillerman from Truck 4, who returned to the truck to retrieve a second ladder, saw that the basement was fully engulfed with fire. They decided to pull a line from Engine 12 to provide back up for Engine 17. Engine 12 was supplying Engine 17 and had positioned their engine towards the rear of the structure, but Engine 12’s crew proceeded to the front of the structure (see Diagram 1). The officer and a fire fighter from Engine 12 entered the front of the structure advancing approximately 2 to 3 feet, where they remained throughout the attack. The Lieutenant from Engine 17 requested to hit the fire a second time and was denied.

The IC denied their request because he still had not received a response from the officer of Engine 26. The IC radioed the officer of Engine 26 a second time and received no response.At this point Engine 26 and Engine 10 were inside the structure searching for the basement door. Department SOPs required them to locate the basement door and close it or hold off at the stairs with a fog spray. The fire fighter on Engine 26, who entered the structure to back up the Nozzleman (Victim #1) stated that it was extremely hot, but tolerable, when he met up with Victim #1. He stated that the floor was solid and as they proceeded further into the structure, and visibility was improving. He recalled seeing the sliding-glass door to the rear of the first floor, a table, and a sofa on his right side. This would position Victim #1 and the fire fighter in the living room, in front of the basement-stairs door (see Floor Plan A-1). He also stated there were no signs of fire and the heat remained constant. He could not recall his officer joining the two fire fighters, but did recall hearing a radio transmission. [NOTE: Only officers carry radios and he did not know whose radio he heard.]

It was determined that Engine 10 was inside backing them up at this time, however, the two fire fighters from Engine 26 were unaware of any other fire fighters inside.After hearing the radio transmission, the fire fighter from Engine 26, backing up Victim #1, looked over his left shoulder and saw fire appear, filling up what looked to be a doorway. He stated the fire came out of the doorway, then disappeared, and everything went black. At that point he felt an intense blast of heat. He dropped the line and immediately started squirming around in his turnouts, in an attempt to release the heat. He asked Victim #1 where the hose line was and related to him that something was wrong and they had to get out. Victim #1 responded by saying that he did not know where the hose line was. The fire fighter stated that Victim #1 sounded as if he was in a crouched position waiting to be rescued.

He then heard a loud scream from his left side, which lasted approximately 15 seconds. The scream was clear and not muffled by an SCBA. He stated that the scream was getting closer when he heard a loud thump, as if someone dropped to the floor, and then complete silence.

He then crawled forward and found the nozzle of a hose line. [NOTE: Victim #2 was found not wearing his SCBA facepiece. It is believed the scream was from Victim #2.] The Lieutenant on Engine 10 recalled that as they backed up Engine 26, he turned back towards the front door and could see some light from the front doorway (entrance). He also stated that it was very hot inside the structure. As he turned back around, he felt an intense blast of heat and was knocked backward by a frantic fire fighter attempting to exit. The lieutenant then exited through the front door. When the heat hit the fire fighters, the Lieutenant thought that he was in the hallway, next to the basement door (see Floor Plan A-1). The officer of Engine 26 stated that as he made his way toward the rear of the structure to join his crew, he also encountered an intense blast of heat. Feeling that he was being burned, he quickly turned, and exited through the front door. The layout man from Engine 10 started pulling out the hose line from Engine 10, in an attempt to assist Victim #2 in his exit. As he pulled the hose line out, he noticed there was no one on the end, which meant Victim #1, Victim #2, and the fire fighter from Engine 26 remained inside.As the officers from Engine 26 and Engine 10 exited, the IC was walking up to the structure to get a better position.

The IC was unaware of any problems until he got close enough to see the fire fighters exiting. He immediately ran to the front and saw the officer from Engine 26, who related to him that Victim #1 was still inside. The IC then saw the Lieutenant from Engine 10 and ordered him to go back inside with his crew and search for Victim #1. The IC later recalled that the Lieutenant from Engine 10 appeared to be dazed and did not relate to him that anyone else was missing. The IC only became aware that Victim #1 was missing at this time.The fire fighter from Engine 26, who was still inside, stated that as he grabbed the nozzle he rolled on his back and opened it on the ceiling in a straight stream circular pattern. He felt the room was going to flash and wanted to cool it down. As he applied water, he recalled seeing fire on the ceiling. He stated that the water reduced the heat, but it was still very hot. He opened the line a second time on the ceiling and did not see any fire. He then followed the line, exiting the structure. He did not hear any other fire fighters inside or any Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS) alarming at that time. He stated that he was inside for approximately 1½ minutes from the time the blast of heat hit them until his exit. He exited the structure at approximately 0031 hours. He asked if Victim #1 had made it out and was told that he had not.

He communicated to the IC that he thought Victim #1 was still inside, straight back through the hall, and to the right by a sofa (see Floor Plan A-1).The IC received an additional request from Engine 17 in the rear, this time stating they were at the basement level and had heavy fire inside the basement. Engine 17 requested permission to hit the fire and the IC responded by telling them that they had a fire fighter down inside, on the first floor, and to hit the fire with a straight stream. Engine 17 opened the straight stream on the fire in the basement and quickly knocked it down.

At approximately 0032 hours, the Lieutenant from Engine 10 reentered the townhouse to begin his search.Joining the Lieutenant was the Lieutenant and a fire fighter from Rescue 1. They entered through the front door to begin their search, stating the heat was tolerable, and visibility was improving. As they got inside the structure they could hear a PASS alarm going off. They immediately followed the shrill alarm to locate a downed fire fighter. The fire fighter was lying under a table, unconscious, and with his SCBA facepiece off. His SCBA was equipped with an integrated PASS alarm, which was automatically activated when the victim turned on his SCBA. After locating the downed fire fighter, they called for assistance to remove him. The IC ordered the Hazmat crew to enter and assist removing the downed fire fighter. Engine 14’s crew was already on their way inside to provide assistance. Additional fire fighters from Engine 6 and Engine 4 also entered the townhouse and helped remove the victim to the front lawn, at approximately 0045 hours. They immediately started cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and provided medical treatment to the victim’s burns. The victim, who was later identified as Victim #2, was severely burned and the IC could not determine if it was the fire fighter they were searching for, or another fire fighter.

A fire fighter standing nearby related to the IC that he could tell by the size of the victim that it was not Victim #1. The IC continued the search efforts, and at approximately 0049 hours, Victim #1 was found and removed. He was found slumped over the couch face down.He was found equipped with a PASS device (manually operated) attached to his turnout gear. The PASS device was not activated and was found in the off position. [NOTE: The PASS device was later inspected and was determined to be working properly.] Fire fighters removed the victim to the front lawn of the structure where they located a pulse and immediately provided medical treatment. All three fire fighters, along with the Lieutenant from Engine 26, were transported to a nearby hospital.Victim #1 was treated for his burns and was admitted to the burn unit. He was pronounced dead the following day, May 31,1999, at 1450 hours. Victim #2 was pronounced dead on arrival to the hospital on May 30,1999, at 0108 hours. The injured fire fighter from Engine 26 received first-, second-, and third-degree burns to over 60 percent of his body.

He was admitted to the burn unit where he was treated for his burns. He has been released from the burn unit and is currently undergoing rehabilitation. The Lieutenant from Engine 26 received treatment for burns to his hands and head area and was released the following day.

CAUSE OF DEATH

According to the Medical Examiner, Victim #1 died due to thermal injuries involving 60% of total body surface area and airways. Victim #2 died due to thermal injuries involving 90% of total body surface area and airways.

Firefighting Operations

DC Fire and EMS Department standard operating procedures (SOP) specify apparatus placement and company assignments based on dispatch (anticipated arrival) order. Note that dispatch order (i.e., first due, second due) may de different than order of arrival if companies are delayed by traffic or are out of quarters.

Standard Operating ProceduresOperations from Side A

• The first due engine lays a supply line to Side A, and in the case of basement fires, the first line is positioned to protect companies performing primary search on upper floors by placing a line to cover the interior stairway to the basement.
• The first due engine is backed up by the third due engine.
• The apparatus operator of the third due engine takes over the hydrant and pumps supply line(s) laid by the first due engine, while the crew advances a backup line to support protection of interior exposures and fire attack from Side A.
• The first due truck takes a position on Side A and is responsible for utility control and placement of ladders for access, egress, and rescue on Side A.
• If not needed for rescue, the aerial is raised to the roof to provide access for ventilation.
• The rescue squad positions on Side A (unless otherwise ordered by Command) and is assigned to primary search using two teams of two. One team searches the fire floor, the other searches above the fire floor.
• The apparatus operator assists by performing forcible entry, exterior ventilation, monitoring search progress, and providing emergency medical care as necessary.

Operations from Side C

• The second due engine lays a supply line to the rear of the building (Side C), and in the case of basement fires, is assigned to fire attack if exterior access to the basement is available and if it is determined that the first and third due engines are in a tenable position on Floor 1.
• The second due engine is responsible for checking conditions in the basement, control of utilities (on Side C), and notifying Command of conditions on Side C.
• Command must verify that the first and third due engines can maintain tenable positions before directing the second due engine to attack basement fires from the exterior access on Side C.
• The second due truck takes a position on Side C and is responsible for placement of ladders for access, egress, and rescue on Side C.
• The aerial is raised to the roof to provide secondary access for ventilation (unless other tasks take priority).

Command and Control

• The battalion chief positions to have an unobstructed view of the incident (if possible) and uses his vehicle as the command post.
• On greater alarms, the command post is moved to the field command unit.
• Notes: This summary of DC Fire & EMS standard operating procedures for structure fires is based on information provided in the reconstruction report and reflects procedures in place at the time of the incident. DC Fire & EMS did not use alpha designations for the sides of a building at the time of this incident. However, this approach is used here (and throughout the case) to provide consistency in terminology.

CFBT-US LLC ( Chief Ed Hartin’s exceptional blogg)  Has an excellent post and analysis of the Cherry Road Fire that was posted a few years ago, Check it out HERE

More from CFBT- US LLC HERE;

• Fire Behavior Case Study Townhouse Fire: Washington, DC
• Townhouse Fire: Washington DC-What Happened
• Townhouse Fire: Washington DC-Extreme Fire Behavior
• Townhouse Fire: Washington DC-Computer Modeling

From wrightstyle.com.uk (HERE)

They call it the House of Pain, and the fire fighters of Engine Company 10 and Truck Company 13 experience quite a lot of it.  Theirs is one of the busiest fire station in the United States, serving a large residential area of northeast Washington DC. It gained its nickname in 1991, when fire crews were called out 9,947 times.  Between 1991 and 2000, the House of Pain responded to 75,526 fire and other emergencies.

Like all fire fighters, Anthony Phillips also had a nickname.  On his first day with Engine Company 10 he turned up wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words Hot Sauce.  No one had told him the cardinal rule of nicknames: you don’t get to pick your own. But it’s not all hard work in the House of Pain.  On the Sunday of Memorial Day Weekend 1999, Anthony “Sauce” Phillips’ wife, Lysa, and their two children, aged six and 21 months, came to the station for a holiday visit.  Unusually for the fire station, it had been a quiet day.

The House of Pain lies in the Trinidad district of Fort Lincoln, where a civil war fort was built for the defense of Washington.  Nearby is the town of Bladensburg, the site of a battle in which American forces were heavily defeated by the British during the country’s revolution.

But the day didn’t end quietly for the fire fighters of the House of Pain.  Early on May 30th at seventeen minutes past midnight, the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Communications Center received a 911 telephone call reporting a fire at 3150 Cherry Road.

The residents of the property had been woken by their smoke alarm, gone downstairs to the first floor, and found smoke and heat.  Wisely, they left the house through the front door, leaving the front door open.

In response, Communications dispatched four engine and two truck companies, a battalion fire chief and a rescue squad.  A second 911 call less than two minutes later provided a corrected address of 3146 Cherry Road, and reported that there was fire in the basement.

Communications passed on the change of address, although only one of the responding fire companies acknowledged it.  However, the first units were on the scene within four minutes of dispatch, and at approximately 00:24:00 fire fighters began entering the first floor via the front door, through which was coming heavy smoke.

Among the fire fighters from Engines 10 and 26, the first to arrive on the scene, were Anthony Phillips and Louis Matthews, a 29-year-old divorced father who had celebrated his son’s second birthday only the week before.  Matthews was a seven-year veteran of the fire service.

Within two minutes, the front window on the first floor was taken out by the fire fighters to provide additional ventilation.  The window was removed from the inside, due to obstructions from security bars on the outside.  Fire fighters also opened windows on the second story at the front of the house.

Another fire team positioned by sliding glass doors at the basement level reported that the basement was full of smoke but that there seemed to be very little fire.  Despite significant confusion over the exact location of the fire fighters upstairs, a decision was taken to break out the basement’s sliding glass.

This was achieved in two stages.  First the right half was taken out at approximately 00:26:20.  Then the left side was removed approximately 20 seconds later.  Once again, there were obstructions from security bars.  After the sliding glass door was broken out, fire fighters entered the basement to conduct a search.

They reported that there were a number of small fires on the floor of the basement.  However, these rapidly increased in size after the sliding glass door was opened.  The fire fighters were ordered out of the basement as the fire quickly intensified.

Luckily, the team saw a tunnel through the smoke and it was that safe pathway that allowed them to find their way out of the basement, just before it became engulfed in a fully-fledged inferno.  Seconds later, from upstairs, came the first report of a fire fighter down.

It was worse.  District of Columbia Fire Fighter Anthony Phillips was pronounced dead on arrival at hospital, becoming the 96th fire fighter to die in the line of duty.  F/F Louis Mathews, the 97th, died the following day as a result of his injuries, the first double line-of-duty deaths in almost 90 years for the city’s fire service.

Two other fire fighters sustained minor injuries but a third, Fire Sergeant Joe Morgan, 36, also from Engine 26, spent 180 days in hospital and underwent over 21 surgical procedures for 60% burns.  On admission, the father of four was given only a 5% chance of survival, and one doctor described his recovery as a miracle.  Joe Morgan returned to work as an instructor, never again as a front-line fire fighter, but soon afterwards was forced to retire because of disability.

It was the very routine nature of the fire and its tragic outcome that prompted the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department Reconstruction Committee to request a full investigation into the fire dynamics of the incident. This was carried out by the Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), whose mission is to conduct basic and applied fire research, including fire investigations, for the purposes of understanding fundamental fire behavior and to reduce loss of life.

The investigation made use of the NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), a computer modeling program that looked at data from three sources: the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department Reconstruction Committee, photographs and measurements taken by NIST staff, and from material properties taken from the FDS database.

The investigating team wanted to know how the opening of windows and doors had affected the dynamics of the fire. By using sophisticated modeling techniques, the investigators were able to run different scenarios and see the different computer predictions.  They could then match what the simulator showed with information they had collected from the scene and from witnesses.

Investigators identified what is referred to as the fuel package or fuel load that was involved in the fire, the total quantity of combustible contents of the space. NIST’s simulator was then plugged into a database of the heat release rates of different types of furniture and furnishings, expressed as British Thermal Units (BTUs) or Kilowatts (kW) per second.

The model divides the space involved in the fire into thousands of “cells.”  In the Cherry Road simulations, the cells measured just eight inches by four inches high.  Once the physical data was entered into the computer, it was able to model the conditions for each cell, and then combine all of them together to provide an overall simulation of the fire.

Investigators determined that the fire started near an electrical fixture in the ceiling of the basement, and that the actual fire may have taken several hours to develop to a flaming stage.  As the fire spread from the ignition source, first along the ceiling and then to other items in the basement, it first developed quickly but then depleted the supply of oxygen necessary for combustion.

This lack of oxygen had the effect of rapidly decreasing the heat release rate or energy being produced by the fire.  It was at this point, when the fire’s heat release rate was being constrained, that fire fighters made their entry on the first floor of the building.  However, and against some expectations, opening windows on the front of the townhouse on the first and second floors seemed to have had no noticeable impact on the fire development.

It was the breaking open of the basement door that created the firestorm.  The FDS calculations were that the opening of the basement sliding glass doors provided outside air into a pre-heated but under ventilated fire compartment, which then developed into a post-flashover fire within 60 seconds.

Some of the resulting fire gases flowed up the basement stairwell with a high velocity and collected in a pre-heated, oxygen depleted first floor living room with limited ventilation.  More precisely, the model showed that the superheated gases moved up the stairs at approximately 18 miles per hour.

As the townhouse was only 33 feet high, it meant that the extremely hot gases moved through the townhouse in less than two seconds.  F/F Anthony Phillips’ autopsy revealed that he died of “asphyxiation due to inhalation of superheated air, soot, and smoke.”  It some respects, it was remarkable that the loss of life wasn’t greater.

What makes the Cherry Road fire so important is that it was a catastrophic fire that took place in a relatively small area so that its fire dynamics were capable of analysis, using techniques at the forefront of forensic science.  Two facts were immediately clear.

• First, it underlined how a relatively insignificant fire can become an inferno in a matter of seconds and that, when it does, flashover can engulf a whole building in a few moments.  Many of the lessons of the Cherry Road fire are now part of US fire training program. 
• Second, the inferno was caused by breaking open the compartment within which the fire was contained.

From the NIST

Fire Safety Engineering Division  Building and Fire Research Laboratory
National Institute of Standards and Technology
NISTIR 6510

Simulation of the Dynamics of the Fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE, Washington D.C., May 30, 1999

Report by: Daniel Madrzykowski and Robert L. Vettori  April 2000

This report describes the results of calculations using the NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) that were performed to provide insight on the thermal conditions that occurred during the fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE, Washington D.C. on May 30, 1999.  Input to the computer model was developed from 3 sources; the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department Reconstruction Committee, photographs and measurements taken by NIST staff during a June 3, 1999 site visit, and from material properties taken from the FDS database.

An FDS model scenario was developed that best represented the actual building geometry, material thermal properties, and fire behavior based on information from the Reconstruction Committee and Physical Evidence.  The results from this model scenario are provided with this report.  Results from an additional model scenario, which included the opening of the sliding glass door on the first floor prior to opening of the sliding glass door in the basement, are also presented.

The FDS calculations that best represent the actual fire conditions indicated that the opening of the basement sliding glass doors provided outside air (oxygen) to a pre-heated, under ventilated fire compartment, which then developed into a post-flashover fire within 60 s.  Some of the resulting fire gases flowed up the basement stairwell with high velocity and collected in a pre-heated, oxygen depleted first floor living room with limited ventilation. 

Introduction

Part of the mission of the Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is to conduct basic and applied fire research, including fire investigations, for the purposes of understanding fundamental fire behavior and to reduce losses from fire. 

On May 30, 1999 a fire in a townhouse at 3146 Cherry Road NE, Washington D.C. claimed the lives of two District of Columbia firefighters and burned other firefighters.  The District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department Reconstruction Committee requested the assistance of NIST for the purpose of examining the fire dynamics of this incident.  NIST has performed computer simulations of the fire using the newly developed, NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) and Smokeview, a visualization tool, to provide insight on the fire development and thermal conditions that may have existed in the townhouse during the fire.  This document describes the input and the results of the NIST FDS calculations.

Fire Summary

This account of the events relevant to the fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE is based on information provided to NIST by the Reconstruction Committee.  Shortly after midnight, on May 30^th, 1999, occupants at 3146 Cherry Road, NE awoke to a smoke alarm that had activated in the residence.  The occupants went downstairs to the first floor, found hot smoky conditions, and exited the residence via the front door, leaving the front door open.  At 00:17:00 hrs, the first 911 call was received.  The first engine arrived on the fire scene in approximately 6 minutes.  At approximately 00:24:00, firefighters began entering the first floor via the front door.  Conditions on the first floor were described as “heavy smoke,” with thick black smoke coming from the doorway.  Within two minutes, the front window on first floor was taken out by firefighters to provide ventilation.  The window was removed from the inside, due to obstructions from security bars on the outside.  Firefighters were also opening the second story windows on the front of the house.  The occupants had left the second story windows on the backside of the house open.

Firefighters positioned by the sliding glass doors on the basement level, reported that the basement was fully charged with smoke and that upon arrival a few flames appeared briefly.  The sliding glass door was broken out in two stages.  First the right half was taken out at approximately 00:26:20.  Then the left side was removed approximately 20 seconds later, due to obstructions from security bars.  After the sliding glass door was broken out, firefighters entered the basement to conduct a search.  They reported that there were a number of small fires on the floor of the basement, and that the fires began to increase in size after the sliding glass door was opened.  The firefighters were ordered out of the basement as the fire rapidly increased in size.  The firefighters reported that a tunnel or path was open in the smoke that enabled them to find their way out of the basement to the exterior, just prior to the basement becoming fully involved with fire.  Within two minutes after entering the basement, flames from the basement extended up the backside of the townhouse.  Seconds later there was a report that a firefighter was down.  Firefighters that were working on the first floor reported that they felt an intense blast of heat prior to exiting the building.  Two of the firefighters working on the first floor, one positioned near the open doorway to the basement stairs and the other located near the sofa on the back wall of the townhouse, died from injuries caused by the fire.  A third firefighter, positioned between the two firefighters that died, survived the fire, but sustained substantial burn injuries.  

The post fire investigation determined that the fire started near an electrical fixture in the ceiling of the basement.  The basement had severe fire damage throughout, indicating a well-mixed, post-flashover fire environment.  The stairway from the basement to the first floor also showed signs of flame impingement on the ceiling and walls.  The door at the top of the basement stairs was open during the fire and had been partially burned away.  The basement stairway opened into the living room on the first floor.  The living room had significant deposits of soot throughout, with limited thermal damage.  Most of the paper on the gypsum board walls and ceiling remained intact and sofas in the room only showed signs of pyrolization or limited burning on the upper portions of the back cushions and top surfaces of the seat cushions.  Areas in the living room away from the basement door opening had less thermal damage.

NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator  (FDS) 

NIST has developed a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) fire model using large eddy simulation (LES) techniques [1].  This model, called the NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS), has been demonstrated to predict the thermal conditions resulting from a compartment fire [2,3].  A CFD model requires that the room or building of interest be divided into small rectangular control volumes or computational cells.  The CFD model computes the density, velocity, temperature, pressure and species concentration of the gas in each cell based on the conservation laws of mass, momentum, and energy to model the movement of fire gases.  FDS utilizes material properties of the furnishings, walls, floors, and ceilings to simulate fire spread.  A complete description of the FDS model is given in reference 1.

In large scale fire tests reported in [2], FDS temperature predictions were found to be within 15 % of the measured temperatures and the FDS heat release rates were predicted to within 20 % of the measured values [2].  For relatively simple fire driven flows, such as buoyant plumes and flows through doorways, FDS predictions are within experimental uncertainties [3].  Therefore the results are presented as ranges to account for this uncertainty.

Smokeview

Smokeview is a visualization program that was developed to display the results of a FDS model simulation.  Smokeview produces animations or snapshots of FDS results [4].

Estimated time that firefighters from Engine 26 & Engine 10 are burned on first floor

FDS Input

FDS requires as inputs the geometry of the building compartments being modeled, the computational cell size, the location of the ignition source, the ignition source, thermal properties of walls, furnishings and the size, location, and timing of vent openings to the outside which critically influence fire growth and spread.  The timing of the vent openings, Table 2, used in the simulation based on an approximate timeline of the fire fighting activities in Table 1. 

 Table 1.  Approximate Timeline Based on Reconstruction Committee Input

Note: Direct comparison of simulation conditions with the actual incident conditions begin atapproximately 100 seconds of simulation time.GeometryThe floor plan of the basement and first floor of the townhouse are shown in Figures 1 and 2.  The two levels of the townhouse are modeled by a 10.0 m (32.8 ft) x 6.0 m (19.7 ft) x 5.1m (16.8 ft) tall rectangular volume.  For the FDS simulation this volume was divided into 76,500 computational cells.  Each cell had dimensions 0.2 m (7.9 in) x 0.2 m (7.9 in) x 0.1 m (3.9 in).  The placement and size of the interior walls, doorways, and windows were taken from the dimensioned floor plans drawn by personnel of the DC Fire and EMS Department.  FDS adjusts the dimensions to the nearest computational cell.  Therefore the cell size is the resolution limit of vents, openings, furnishings, or walls within the model.

 The cell size was selected to give the best approximation of the actual dimensions of the townhouse geometry.VentsThe basement was vented to the outside by a pair of sliding glass doors 1.7 m (5.6 ft) x 2.0 m (6.6 ft) high.  For the simulation, the door vent was divided into two parts.  The right half of the sliding glass door was opened at 140 s into the simulation and the left half was opened at 160 s into the simulation. The basement was open to the first floor by a 0.8 m (2.6 ft) x 2.0 m (6.6 ft) high doorway at the top of the stairs.  As in the fire incident, this door was fully open during the simulation. 

The front door to the first floor was fully open during the fire and the simulation.  The door was 0.9 m (3.0 ft) wide and 2.0 m (6.6 ft) high.  The front window on the first floor was 1.7 m (5.6 ft) wide and 0.9 m (3.0 ft) high with a 0.9 (3.0 ft) sill height. This window was opened at 120 s into the simulation.  The other opening to the outside from the first floor was a sliding glass door at the rear of the house.  This sliding glass door was located directly above the basement sliding glass door.  This door remained closed and intact during the entire simulation.The stairway opening from the first floor to the second floor was 0.9 m (3.0 ft) wide and 3.4 m (11.2 ft) deep. 

This vent remained open during the entire simulation due to the windows in the front and rear of the second floor being open.  The exact position of the open rear windows on the second floor is not known; therefore, the stairway opening was used to represent the assumed area of the open second floor windows.  The details of the second floor were not modeled in the simulation.At the time of the fire, there was no wind, therefore for the simulation it was assumed that openings to the exterior were at ambient pressure. Table 2.  Time of Ventilation Events for FDS Simulation

Table 4.  Furniture Materials and Size

 Figure 3.  Heat release rate from FDS Simulation. 

Figure 4.  Perspective view of townhouse.

Figure 4. Animation (1.6 Mbytes) (click here)

Figure 5.  Grid layout in the xz plane.

Figure 5.  Animation (760 Kbytes) (click here)

Figure 6.  Temperature slice along basement sliding glass door, at 200 s of simulation.

Figure 6.  Animation (530 Kbytes) (click here)

Figure 7.  Vector representation of velocity slice along basement sliding glass door, at 200 s of simulation.  

Figure 8.  Temperature slice along front door, at 200 s of simulation.

Figure 8.  Animation (1.3 Mbytes) (click here)

Figure 9.  Vector representation of velocity slice along front door, at 200 s of simulation.  

Figure 10.  Temperature slice along centerline of stairway, at 200 s of simulation.

Figure 10.  Animation (1.7 Mbytes) (click here)

Figure 11.  Vector representation of velocity along centerline of stairway, at 200 s of simulation.  

Figure 12.  Percent oxygen along basement sliding glass door, at 200 s of simulation.

Figure 12.  Animation (560 Kbytes) (click here)

Figure 13.  Percent oxygen along centerline of stairway, at 200 s of simulation.

Figure 13.  Animation (1.1 Mbytes) (click here)

Figure 14.  Vector representation of velocity at the ceiling, at 200 s of simulation.  

Figure 15.  Vector representation of velocity at first floor window, 1.6 m off the floor, at 200 s of simulation. 

Figure 16.  Temperature slice along center line of stairway with first floor sliding glass door vented, at 200 s of simulation.

Figure 16. (1.1 Mbytes) Animation (click here)

Figure 17.  Vector representation of velocity at the ceiling with first floor sliding glass door vented, at 200 s of simulation

Other LINKS

• DCFD Engine 10 (E-10) REMEMBER ANTHONY “SAUCE” PHILLIPS HERE and HERE
• Matt Miles Photography HERE
• Hyattsville FD page, HERE
• DCFD.com, HERE
• NISTIR 6510 Report,  HERE
• DCFD Cherry Road Incident Investigative Report, HERE
• NIST Simulation of the Dynamics of the Fire at 3146 Cherry Road NE Washington D.C., May 30, 1999, HERE

Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

Join in on Tuesday May 17th at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Christopher Brennan

Christopher Brennan is a firefighter in the suburbs outside Chicago; a field instructor for the Illinois Fire Service Institute; and a consultant for local, state, and federal agencies.

He joined the fire service in 1997 as a paid-on-call member of the Calumet Park (IL) Fire Department.

During his career, Chris has worked for the Calumet Park Fire Department, part-time for the Darien-Woodridge (IL) Fire Protection District, and as a career firefighter and engineer with the Harvey (IL) Fire Department.Chris is an active instructor teaching for the Illinois Fire Service Institute, has taught terrorism response training overseas, and has been an instructor for FDIC.

He is a member of the International Association of Fire Fighters, the International Society of Fire Service Instructors, and the Illinois Society of Fire Service Instructors.

He is also the author of numerous articles for fire service magazines, including Fire Engineering. 

Join in on what is certainly going to be an insightful look and discussion of  the path of the fire service warrior.

Discussions on what is meant by embracing the philosophy of the fire service warrior, and striving for the ready position—the synthesis of physical and mental readiness that allows for suggested optimum fireground performance— and its potential application towards reducing firefighter injuries and fatalities

We’ll further explore how as Christopher Brennan states; “Today’s firefighter must be a warrior who will unflinchingly put his very life in harm’s way to accomplish a mission, but who is also fully informed about the path being chosen”.  

LINKS

• Surviving on the Fireground: Chris Brennan Talks Situational Awareness at FDIC 2011, HERE
•  A Culture of Excellence – Christopher Brennan , HERE
• The Fire Service Warrior Blog, HERE

The Combat Position

Firefighting is combat and should be viewed as a warrior’s calling.

Firefighters put themselves in harm’s way to protect others, a selflessness rooted in the same noble drive as the military warriors who defend our nation.

This book about combat is meant to be a guide for those who seek to follow a warrior’s path, the path of the fire service warrior.

Today’s firefighter must be a warrior who will unflinchingly put his very life in harm’s way to accomplish a mission, but who is also fully informed about the path being chosen.

Embracing the philosophy of the fire service warrior, and striving for the ready position—the synthesis of physical and mental readiness that allows for optimum fireground performance—can reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities.

The Combat Position: Achieving Firefighter Readiness will be an invaluable tool for firefighters, company officers, chief officers, and instructors.

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special  one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing developing concepts, methodologies  and operational perspectives affecting today’s emerging and evolving fire ground operation with Christopher Naum and this emerging  fire service leader.    

 Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.

Taking it to the Streets^TM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the Streets^TM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

• Tune in to the Program Tuesday evening May 17^th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
• Firefighternetcast.com HERE
• Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
• Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

In support of recent program on Taking it to the Streets regarding Survivability Profiling with our  special guest Captain Stephen Marsars, FDNY we are posting some of the research and articles to aid in your own individual research and increased awareness on this emerging concept and refined methodology expanding traditional size-up into a new element.

The radio program, presentation, dialog and discussions added richly to the continuing efforts to improve and challenge the fires service into exploring new directions in an effort to increase our proficiencies, capabilities and operations.

You can download or listen to the the full program HERE.

Here are those reference links;

• National Fire Academy, Executive Fire Officer Program: EFO Paper: Can They Be Saved? Utilizing Civilian Survivability Profiling to Enhance Size-up and Reduce Firefighter Fatalities in the Fire Department, City of New York  http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/pdf/efop/efo44310.pdf

• USFA Announces 2009 Outstanding Research Award Winners, EFO …Mar 18, 2010
• NYC.gov Announcement:  FDNY Captain Receives USFA Outstanding Research Award http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/events/2011/040411a.shtml
• Size-Up: How Do We Use It? – Fire Engineering Dec 1, 2007 … BY STEPHEN MARSAR.
• Survivability Profiling: Are the Victims Savable? – Fire Engineering Dec 1, 2009 … BY STEPHEN MARSAR.
• Survivability Profiling: How Long Can Victims Survive in a Fire …Jul 1, 2010 … BY STEPHEN MARSAR.
• Survivability profiling: another perspective – Fire Engineering Christopher Brennan  Feb 1, 2011
• The Fire Service Warrior: %$#@ “Victim Survivability Profiling .http://www.fireservicewarrior.com/2010/10/victim-survivability-profiling-do-your.html
• NPR September 11, 2006: After Sept. 11, a Firefighter Answers Call to Lead  http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6054085
• Back Step FireFighter: Courage And Valor…Understated  http://backstepfirefighter.com/2011/03/24/courage-and-valor-understated/
• http://www.fireservicewarrior.com/2010/10/victim-survivability-profiling-do-your.html

Other Links from CommandSafety.com

• Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction  http://commandsafety.com/2010/12/tactical-patience-and-the-new-considerations-of-ventilation-on-fire-behavior-in-legacy-and-contemporary-residential-construction/
• Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Types http://commandsafety.com/2010/11/occupancy-risks-versus-occupancy-types/
• Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement http://commandsafety.com/2010/09/tactical-renaissance-and-the-rules-of-engagement/
• Taking it to the Streets Downloads on FireFighterNetcast.com http://www.firefighternetcast.com/category/our-shows/taking-it-to-the-streets-our-shows/
• IAFC Rules of Engagement http://www.iafcsafety.org/downloads/Rules_of_Engagement.pdf

Three fire service managers in charge of the operation at a south Warwickshire vegetable packing warehouse in which four firefighters died are to face prosecution for manslaughter. 

The Crown Prosecution Service has decided that that Warwickshire Fire and Rescue Service managers Paul Simmons, Adrian Ashley and Timothy Woodward will face charges of manslaughter by gross negligence for the deaths at Atherstone-on-Stour in November 2007. 

In addition, Warwickshire County Council will face a charge of failing to ensure the health and safety at work of its employees, under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 

John Averis, 27, of Tredington near Shipston, Darren Yates-Bradley, 24, of Alcester, Ashley Stephens, 20, from Alcester and Ian Reid, 44, from Stratford, all died while fighteing the fire on November 2, 2007. 

Four UK Firefighters Died in the Line of Duty

Darren had married his sweetheart Fay Beesley from Chipping Campden only a month before he died. 

Michael Gregory, reviewing lawyer in the CPS Special Crime Division, said: “Following a thorough investigation by Warwickshire Police and the Health and Safety Executive, I have reviewed the evidence in this case very carefully and I have decided that there is sufficient evidence and it is in the public interest to charge Paul Simmons, Adrian Ashley and Timothy Woodward with gross negligence manslaughter. 

“Mr Simmons and Mr Ashley were Watch Managers and Mr Woodward was a Station Manager at the time of the fire, but they all acted as incident commanders before, during and after their colleagues were sent into the burning building. In that role they were responsible for making the operational decisions while their colleagues tried to put out the fire. 

“I have also decided that there is sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction against Warwickshire County Council for failing to protect the health and safety of its employees and that it is in the public interest to prosecute. 

“I send my sincere condolences to the families of these four men who died in such terrible circumstances.” 

Nine other people investigated by Warwickshire Police in connection with the incident have been told there was insufficient evidence to take any action against them. 

• Daily Mail: Brigade Bosses Charged With Manslaughter Over Deaths
• The Sun: Three Chiefs To Go On Trial
• FireGeezer Coverage, HERE and HERE
• More Firegeezer coverage of  the tragedy HERE and HERE.
• UK: Bosses Charged Over Firefighter Deaths: HERE

Related stories

• Fatal fire inquiry ‘nearing end’ 22 OCTOBER 2010, COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE
• Further arrests over fatal fire 26 MAY 2010, COVENTRY & WARWICKSHIRE
• Pair held over fatal fire bailed 06 MAY 2010, COVENTRY_WARWICKSHIRE
• Father arrested over fire deaths 29 MARCH 2010, COVENTRY_WARWICKSHIRE
• Trio to be quizzed on fire deaths 08 MARCH 2010, COVENTRY_WARWICKSHIRE
• Firefighter dies tackling blaze 03 NOVEMBER 2007, COVENTRY_WARWICKSHIRE

Previous Posting 

CPS decision on Atherstone fire deaths 

Three Warwickshire Fire and Rescue Service managers will face charges of manslaughter by gross negligence for the deaths of four firefighters in a warehouse in Atherstone-on-Stour in 2007, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has decided. 

In addition, Warwickshire County Council will face a charge of failing to ensure the health and safety at work of its employees, under section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. 

Ian Reid, John Averis, Ashley Stephens and Darren Yates-Badley tragically lost their lives in a fire at the premises of Wealmoor (Atherstone) Ltd on 2 November 2007. 

Michael Gregory, reviewing lawyer in the CPS Special Crime Division, said: 

“Following a thorough investigation by Warwickshire Police and the Health and Safety Executive, I have reviewed the evidence in this case very carefully and I have decided that there is sufficient evidence and it is in the public interest to charge Paul Simmons, Adrian Ashley and Timothy Woodward with gross negligence manslaughter.  

“Mr Simmons and Mr Ashley were Watch Managers and Mr Woodward was a Station Manager at the time of the fire, but they all acted as incident commanders before, during and after their colleagues were sent into the burning building. In that role they were responsible for making the operational decisions while their colleagues tried to put out the fire.  

“I have also decided that there is sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction against Warwickshire County Council for failing to protect the health and safety of its employees and that it is in the public interest to prosecute.  

“I send my sincere condolences to the families of these four men who died in such terrible circumstances.”  

Nine other individuals, who were investigated by Warwickshire Police, have been told that there was insufficient evidence to take any action against them. 

The defendants will appear at Leamington Spa Magistrates’ Court on 1 April 2011. 

• The CPS provided advice to Warwickshire Police and the Health and Safety Executive during the course of their investigations. Warwickshire Police passed a file of evidence to the CPS in August 2010 and submitted an outstanding expert report at the end of October 2010. The CPS received further expert advice at the end of January 2011, and received advice from a Queen’s Counsel on 14 February 2011 before reaching its decision. 

• The CPS has not received any evidence from the police relating to any suspects for deliberately starting the fire. 

• The decision whether any prosecutions should be brought under the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 is one for the Health and Safety Executive. 

From 2007 Incident Reporting:

Firefighter dies tackling blaze

Hopes were fading for the wellbeing of the three missing firefighters Scene of the fire A firefighter has died and three others are missing after a suspected arson attack at a warehouse in Warwickshire.The crew member’s body was recovered during the blaze at the vegetable packing plant in Atherstone on Stour, near Stratford-upon-Avon.The fire, on Atherstone Industrial Estate, started at 1845 GMT on Friday.Hopes were fading for the fate of the missing firefighters and union leaders said the incident may be the worst loss of life for more than 30 years. Andy Dark, assistant general secretary of the Fire Brigades Union (FBU), told BBC News the potential loss of four lives would make the incident the worst loss of life among its members since 1972.It is believed that warehouse staff were in the building when fire broke out and Mr Dark said crews would have been sent in if they thought more civilians may be inside.He said: “If there is any doubt in the mind of the firefighting crews, and particularly the officers in charge of those crews, that there may be a risk to life in that building they will commit crews where they believe it is safe to do so.”That is primarily what we are – our core and primary function is to save life and to rescue.”‘Worst night’Up to 100 firefighters and five ambulance crews were called to the scene and up to 16 fire engines were used to tackle the blaze, which was still alight on Saturday morning.  Crews were still fighting the fatal fire 12 hours after it began A search of the building for the missing firefighters is to get under way as soon as colleagues can enter the building, which suffered a partial collapse during the fire.Police said they were treating the blaze as suspicious and the county’s chief fire officer said it was a building “where we would not expect a fire to start”.Fire crews from Warwickshire, Herefordshire and Worcestershire and the West Midlands were called to the blaze.West Midlands Ambulance spokesman Murray MacGregor said he understood “large parts” of the roof had collapsed and said the three firefighters who were unaccounted for had not been seen since early in the evening.He said: “We were all hoping against hope that the situation we found ourselves in wouldn’t turn out to be true.  The firefighters tonight were heroically doing their job William Brown, chief fire officer, Warwickshire County Council He added that hopes of finding the three missing firefighters safe and well had “pretty much faded now”.Mr McGregor said the firefighter who died had been taken to Warwick Hospital following attempts to resuscitate him as soon as he was brought out of the building.‘Heroic firefighters’William Brown, Warwickshire Fire and Rescue’s chief fire officer, said: “We are deeply shocked by tonight’s tragedy.”Our hearts, thoughts and prayers go out to the families and friends of our firefighters.  Firefighters from across the West Midlands were called to the scene “The firefighters tonight were heroically doing their job.”Our thanks go to our colleagues in the emergency services, the police, ambulance and of course our cross-border firefighters, who have worked with us and supported us through this terrible night.”Tonight has been one of those events that firefighters all over the world dread and it’s happened to us here in Warwickshire.”Asked why the fire was being treated as suspicious, he said: “This fire has started in a building where we would not expect a fire to start.  Our thoughts are with our colleagues in the fire service today and with the family and friends of the firefighter who has died and those who are missing Ch Supt Mak Chishty, Warwickshire Police “We don’t know what has caused the fire.”And we just approach it from that position – treat it as suspicious to start with and find out why this fire started.”Ch Supt Mak Chishty of Warwickshire Police said a full investigation into the cause of the fire had already begun and investigators from the police and fire service would be examining the scene after daylight on Saturday.He said: “Our thoughts are with our colleagues in the fire service today and with the family and friends of the firefighter who has died and those who are missing.”Local resident Ben Shimmin, who lives in a village near the scene of the fire, said the warehouse was on the site of a disused airfield, with the nearest houses about three-quarters of a mile away, but there were other industrial buildings nearby.He said he became aware of the fire when he lost his water supply, with water being diverted to use to fight the flames.He said: “From the road you can quite clearly see the blaze above the tree line and above the roof line of the building.”There’s a lot of smoke, and obviously a lot of police presence.”

2011 FDNY Symposium

Schedule/Topics

Tuesday March 15

08:30 – 8:45  Welcome and Introduction by FDNY Commissioner and Chief of Department.

08:45 – 10:00   The latest building trends in construction and technology including ‘Green Buildings” and how they impact on firefighting operations -Assistant Chief Ronald Spadafora

10:00 – 12:00  FDNY Firefighting Procedures and the different tactics used for Residential versus Commercial high rise fires. Case study of recent multiple alarm.  Specialty units unique assignments at high rise fires.- Deputy Chief James Daly  and Lieutenant Chris Flatley

12:00 – 13:00  Lunch

13:00 – 14:00  Managing building systems.  How Building Personnel and Fire Department members work together in protecting life using the building systems and Fire Safety/Emergency Action Plans. -Captain Joseph Evangelista and Mr. John C. Santora, President & CEO Americas, Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. 

14:00 – 15:00  Firefighting operations, focusing on Command procedures.  Importance of effective training from a candid discussion of a difficult fire. Lessons Learned: Importance of situational, reality based training.
Fire Departments can evaluate their own strategies, tactics and training methods from a Chief Officers point of view.-Deputy Assistant Chief Jack Mooney

15:00 – 16:30    New Terrorist trends, extreme fires as a weapon and their implications for safety and incident management.  Plus technology and command procedures that are improving firefighting accountability.16:30 – Assistant Chief Joseph Pfeifer

17:00  A guided tour of the FDNY Training Academy

Wednesday March 16

08:30 – 10:00  High Angle Rescue Operations.  All the tactics, equipment and Command procedures required to perform life saving operations on the upper floors of buildings- Battalion Chief Joseph Downey

10:00 – 11:00  Command and control at major emergencies and a critique of the Times Square terrorist event.  The presentation will identify Command methods for First Responders under your immediate control and the public.  Street Management, Staging areas, Sharing information, Unified Command following Federal NIMS standards will be defined.  -Deputy Chief James Hodgens

11:00 – 12:00  Overcoming Water supply problems. Learn Standpipe and Sprinkler systems capabilities and understand how to use these systems effectively when problems occur. -Battalion Chief Thomas Meara

12:00 – 13:00 Lunch

13:00 – 14:00 Medical triage Operations defining Command and control at multi-causality events.  Medical operations at the Times Square Bombing will be reviewed.- EMS Division Chief James Booth

 
14:00 – 15:00. New tools on how to overcome intense fires in buildings. Learn how the FDNY has adapted to maintain effective procedures using these new tools and innovations: Fire blanket, high-rise nozzle, Fire curtain.-Division Commander James DiDomenico , Battalion Chief George Healy and Lieutenant John Ceriello

15:00 – 16:30 Controlling Mayday situations. Newest Safety initiatives in protecting Firefighters when Mayday messages are transmitted.  Programs to increase Safety while responding into and operating at the scene of fires and emergencies.  -Chief of Safety Stephen Raynis , Battalion Chief Thomas Riley , Lieutenant Michael Wilbur and Lieutenant Thomas Woska

16:30 – 17:00  A guided tour of the FDNY Training Academy

 
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