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“It’s Not Something You Do; It’s Something You Are”

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Remembering the Sacrifices’ of that day in September and all of those who came before us in this the United States Fire Service and those that were with us, in the commission of our sworn duties who didn’t go home…..as we do what we do best, being Fire Fighters.

International Society of Fire Service Instructors; “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.”

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The International Society of Fire Service Instructors is proud to announce the release of “Modern Construction Considerations for Company Officers.” The program is a train-the trainer package that combines the latest research on light weight building construction from National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), Underwriters Laboratories(UL), Michigan State University, The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and the Chicago Fire Department into a single resource tailored for company-level instruction.

The program was made possible through a Prevention & Research Grant from the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program and the Department of Homeland Security. The ISFSI partnered with Eastern Kentucky University’s Fire & Safety Engineering Technology Program to analyze line of duty deaths between 1997 and 2009 to study the impact that lightweight construction has had on firefighters and firefighting operations.

The DVD included in the program package contains all of the instructional resources necessary to provide quality training on this important topic. A wide variety of support materials are included to provide the user a deep understanding of the challenges with modern building construction techniques. Instructors can tailor the program to meet the needs of their audience, including a 2-hour brief up to a week-long program.

The program will be distributed to all members of the ISFSI as a free member benefit. The ISFSI has also partnered with the Safety & Health Section of the IAFC to provide a copy to each of its members. ISFSI President, Eddie Buchanan, was on hand at the Safety & Health Section Meeting at FRI to personally deliver Chief Billy Goldfeder his copy as chair of the section. All members should expect their copy to arrive in their mailboxes over the next week.

“I would like to extend a heartfelt thank you to the ISFSI members and staff who worked so hard to bring this product to firefighters across America and the globe. It is truly a lifesaving program and a fantastic use of grant funds. It is critical that this package get into the hands of every instructor and fire officer to ensure they are educated and prepared to handle the real risk that looms out there on the next call,” said President Buchanan.

Check out the International Society of Fire Service Instructor’s (ISFSI) web site HERE.

Not a member? Take the time to sign up and get connected.

Rules of Engagement 2010

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IAFC Rules of Engagement

Rules of Engagement Project; Increasing Firefighter Survival

Developed by the Safety, Health and Survival Section International Association of Fire Chiefs

The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries.  As part of that effort the nearly 1,000 member Safety, Health and Survival Section of the IAFC has developed the recently approved  “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground. The intent is to provide a set of “model procedures” for Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting to be made available by the IAFC to fire departments as a guide for their own standard operating procedure development.

In August, 2008, following a year of discussion, the Section moved to develop a set of “Rules of Engagement for Structure Firefighting”. A project team was created consisting of Section members and representatives of other several other interested fire service organizations. These included the Fire Department Safety Officer Association (FDSOA), the National Fallen Firefighter Foundation (NFFF), and the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC), the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and other organizations. All draft material has also been shared with representatives of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) who developed a joint IAFF/IAFC “Fire Ground Survival Project”. Three Section members also participated in the IAFF project. The direction provided the project team by the Section leadership was to develop rules of engagement with the following conceptual points;

  • Rules should be a short, specific set of bullets
  • Rules should be easily taught and remembered
  • Rules should define critical risk issues
  • Rules should define “go” or “no‐go” situations
  • A companion lesson plan/explanation section should be provided

Early in development the Rules of Engagement, it was recognized that two separate rules were needed one set for the firefighter, and another set for the incident commander. Thus, the two sets of Rules of Engagement described in the attached document. The ROE were also inserted in the August issue of FireRescue magazine. Each set has several commonly shared bullets and objectives, but the explanations are described somewhat differently based on the level of responsibility (firefighter vs. incident commander).

The attached and linked PDF document reflects nearly two years of public comment and feedback from several presentations at fire service conferences, including the National Fallen Fire Fighters Safety Summit held at the National Fire Academy this past March. The “Rules” were formally adopted by the IAFC Health, Safety and Survival Section at the Fire Rescue International Conference held last week in Chicago.

The development of the rules integrated several nationally recognized programs and principles. They included risk assessment principles from NFPA Standards 1500 and 1561. Also included where concepts and principles from Crew Resource Management (available from iafc.org) and data and lessons from the National Near‐Miss Reporting System (firefighternearmiss.com). The development process also included review of lessons learned from numerous firefighter fatality investigations conducted by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.

It’s incumbent that the fire chief and the Departments management team insure the safety of all firefighters working at structural fires. All command organization officers are responsible for their own safety and the safety of all personnel working with them. All officers and members are responsible are responsible for continually identifying and reporting unsafe conditions or practices. The Rules of Engagement allows both the firefighter and the incident commander to apply and process these principles.

One principle applied in the Rules of Engagement is firefighters and the company officers are the members at most risk for injury or death. The Rules integrate the firefighter into the risk assessment decision making process. These members should be the ultimate decision maker as to whether it’s safe to proceed with assigned objectives. The “Rules” allow a process for that decision to be made while still maintain command unity and discipline. It is well known that firefighting is hazardous with varying levels of risk to the firefighter. However, firefighting is not a military campaign where lives are lost to establish a beach head. No firefighter’s life is a building that eventually will be rebuilt. Keep all members safe so “Everyone Goes Home”!

Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival

  • Size‐Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.
  • Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
  • DO NOT Risk Your Life for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved.
  • Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
  • Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
  • Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together
  • Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions.
  • Constantly Monitor Fireground Communications for Critical Radio Reports.
  • You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
  • You Are Required to Abandon Your Position and Retreat Before Deteriorating Conditions Can Harm You.
  • Declare a May Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger.

The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety

  • Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Size‐Up of the Incident.
  • Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
  • Conduct an Initial Risk Assessment and Implement a SAFE ACTION PLAN.
  • If You Do Not Have The Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
  • DO NOT Risk Firefighter Lives for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
  • Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
  • Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
  • Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Firefighters. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
  • Maintain Frequent Two‐Way Communications and Keep Interior Crews Informed of Changing Conditions.
  • Obtain Frequent Progress Reports and Revise the Action Plan.
  • Ensure Accurate Accountability of All Firefighter Location and Status.
  • If, After Completing the Primary Search, Little or No Progress Towards Fire Control Has Been Achieved ‐ Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
  • Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires
  • Always Have Firefighter Rehab Services in Place at All Working Fires

Rules of Engagement Poster, PDF File ROE 2010

Link to the IAFC Section Page and ROE Concept Paper

Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings Report issued by the USFA

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The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA)has  issued a special report examining the characteristics of fatal fires in residential buildings. The report, Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.

The report is part of the Topical Fire Report Series and is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). According to the report, an estimated 1,800 fatal residential building fires occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss. The leading cause of fatal residential fires is smoking (19 percent) and the leading areas of fire origin are bedrooms (27 percent) and common areas such as living and family rooms (23 percent). In addition, fatal residential fires, which tend to be larger, cause more damage, and have higher injury rates than nonfatal residential fires, occur most frequently in the late evening and early morning hours, peaking from midnight to 5 a.m. Finally, these types of fires are more prevalent in the cooler months, peaking in January (13 percent).

The topical reports are designed to explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in NFIRS. Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.

Findings

■ An estimated 1,800 fatal residential building fires are reported to U.S. fire departments each year and cause an estimated 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss.

■ Fatal residential building fires tend to be larger, cause more damage, and have higher injury rates than nonfatal residential fires.

■ Smoking is the leading cause of fatal residential building fires (19 percent).

■ The leading areas of fire origin in fatal residential building fires are bedrooms (27 percent) and common areas such as living and family rooms (23 percent).

■ Fatal residential building fires are more prevalent in the cooler months, peaking in January (13 percent).

■ Fatal residential building fires occur most frequently in the late evening and early morning hours, peaking from midnight to 5 a.m. One-third (33 percent) of fatal residential fires occur during these 5 hours.

■ About two-thirds (66 percent) of fatal residential building fires are confined to the building of origin or extend beyond the building of origin.

The U.S. fire death rate has gone down dramatically over the past three decades since the creation of the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), from over 30 deaths per million population to 11 deaths per million population. The United States, however, continues to have one of the highest fire death rates per capita among Western Nations.

 The original goal for USFA was to help lead a reduction in fire deaths by 50 percent in a generation. With annual fire deaths dropping from over 9,000 to less than 3,500 in that period of time, USFA’s goal has been achieved. Nevertheless, fire deaths are still high. Approximately 1,800 fatal residential building fires occurred annually in recent years (2006 to 2008). These fires resulted in an annual average of approximately 2,635 deaths, 725 injuries, and $196 million in property loss.

This report is one of a continuing series of topical reports issued by the USFA’s National Fire Data Center and addresses the characteristics of fatal residential building fires reported to the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS) from 2006 to 2008, the most recent data available at the time of the analysis. Because 79 percent of fire deaths occur in residential buildings, they are the focus of this report. The information in this report about fatal residential fires can be used not only to assess progress but also to understand the nature of the fatal fire problem and its implications for targeting of prevention programs. For the purpose of this report, the terms “residential fires” and “fatal residential fires” are synonymous with “residential building fires” and “fatal residential building fires,” respectively. “Fatal residential fires” is used throughout the body of this report; the findings, tables, charts, headings, and footnotes reflect the full category, “fatal residential building fires.”

The report, Fatal Fires in Residential Buildings,HERE 

Thursday 9pm ET: “We Have a Situation; Are You Aware?”

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Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

Check out Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum on Firefighter NetCast.com this Thursday night August 19th at 9pm ET with a live online radio call-in show addressing the most current issues affecting the Fire Service.

This month Christopher Naum’s guests include Battalion Chief Matt Tobia with the Anne Arundel County, MD Fire Department, a metropolitan combination Fire / Rescue / EMS agency in Suburban Baltimore, MD and Battalion Chief Greg W. Collier, Mount Laurel Fire Department, NJ and NFFF/EGH Region II Advocate discussing  the emerging and prevailing issues related to situational awareness on the fireground and incident scene  and its relationship to firefighter safety or operational integrity. The show is titled; “We Have a Situation; Are you Aware?”

Go to www.FirefighterNetCast.com to listen and participate live, with a national and international audience of firefighters, officers and commanders from rural heartlands of Oklahoma to the suburbs of Chicago and the urban streets of DC. Or download the program later in the week for later use. Check out the premiere show with featured guests Chief Billy Hayes (DCFD) and Chief Doug Cline (High Point FD, NC).

Also, if you haven’t taken the time, check out the latest on the FireEMS Blogs Community at CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com. Taking it to the Streets is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter NetCast.com Production

The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio…

Taking it to the Streets

With Christopher Naum

A New Monthly Radio Talkshow on FireFighter Netcast.com

A Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighter Netcast.com Production

Advancing FireFighter Safety and Operational Intergrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.

 

 

FDNY Deutsche Bank Building LODD Fire Report issued by NIOSH

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The NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program has released the investigation report of the line of duty deaths of two career FDNY  firefighters during a 2007 seven-alarm high-rise fire in the former Deutsche Bank building undergoing deconstruction and asbestos abatement.

On August 18, 2007,  two FDNY firefighters; Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo lost thier lives while operating at this incident. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations. FDNY Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran and FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino,  became trapped in the maze-like conditions of a high-rise building undergoing deconstruction. The building’s standpipe system had been disconnected during the deconstruction and the partitions constructed for asbestos abatement prohibited fire fighters from getting water to the seat of the fire. An hour into the incident, the fire department was able to supply water by running an external hoseline up the side of the structure. Soon after the victims began to operate their hoseline, they ran out of air. The victims suffered severe smoke inhalation and were transported to a metropolitan hospital in cardiac arrest where they succumbed to their injuries.

By the time the fire was extinguished, 115 fire fighters had suffered a variety of injuries.Key contributing factors to this incident include: delayed notification of the fire by building construction personnel, inoperable standpipe and sprinkler system, delay in establishing water supply, inaccurate information about standpipe, unique building conditions with both asbestos abatement and deconstruction occurring simultaneously, extreme fire behavior, uncontrolled fire rapidly progressing and extending below the fire floor, blocked stairwells preventing fire fighter access and egress, maze-like interior conditions from partitions and construction debris, heavy smoke conditions causing numerous fire fighters to become lost or disoriented, failure of fire fighters to always don SCBAs inside structure and to replenish air cylinders, communications overwhelmed with numerous Mayday and urgent radio transmissions, and lack of crew integrity.

NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

  • review and follow existing standard operating procedures on high-rise fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters are not operating in hazardous areas without the protection of a charged hoseline.
  • be prepared to use alternative water supplies when a building’s standpipe system is compromised or inoperable.
  • develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating guidelines for risk management during complex high-rise operations.
  • ensure that crew integrity is maintained during high-rise fire suppression operations.
  • train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning high-rise structure.
  • ensure that fire fighters diligently wear their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) when working in environments that are immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH).
  • train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
  • use exit locators (both visual and audible) or safety ropes to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit.
  • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics.
  • encourage building owners and occupants to report emergency situations as soon as possible and provide accurate information to the fire department.
  • consider additional fire fighter training using a high-rise fire simulator.

Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

  • conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters in high-rise structures.
  • continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communications in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).
Municipalities should:

  • ensure that construction and/or demolition is done in accordance with NFPA 241: Standard for Safeguarding Construction, Alteration, and Demolition Operations.
  • develop a reporting system to inform the fire department of any ongoing, unique building construction activities (such as deconstruction or asbestos abatement) that would adversely affect a fire response.
  • establish a system for property owners to notify the fire department when fire protection/suppression systems are taken out of service.


The Complete NIOSH Report is available HERE

An excellent Training and Awareness PDF file of  the PPT program on Operational Safety and Awareness at Deonstruction and Demolition Sites Structural Anatomy Safety OPS at Demo Sites

Additional Links, HERE and HERE

New York Times Photos of Deutsche Bank Deconstruction Work, HERE

Other References and postings;

  • NY Daily News: Battle to save trapped firefighters
  • WABC: Fatal Deutsche Bank fire report released (2008)
  • FDNY Penalties After Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Lawyers: Evidence Withheld in Deutsche Bank Fire Trial
  • FDNY Disciplines Company Officers Following Tragic Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Attorney Claims Deutsche Bank Contractors Are “Scapegoats”
  • YouTube Preview Image YouTube Preview Image

    The Waldbaum Fire Collapse FDNY 1978 Remembrance

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    The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978  

    The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.  

      

    Thirty-four firefighters, one emergency medical technician and one Emergency Services police officer were injured in the fire and the tragedy is remembered as one of the worst disasters in the New York City Fire Department’s 143-year history.  

    The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
    • Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33
    • Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156
    • Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42
    • Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153
    • Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156
    • Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153 

    The fire started at 8:40 am in Waldbaum’s supermarket located at 2892  Avenue Y and Ocean Avenue in the Sheepshead Bay section of Brooklyn. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers and contractors were renovating the building when the fire was discovered in mezzanine area. Box 3300 was transmitted at 08:39 hours and the All hands transmitted at 08:49 and subsequently a 2nd alarm at 09:02 hrs. Shortly after 09:20 with 20 firefighters operating on the bowstring truss roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the roof fell into the smoke and flames. Some of the firefighters were seen running toward the edge of the roof; some made it, others nearby fell into the gaping hole. The third alarm was transmitted at 09:18 3rd alarm and subsequently escalated to a Fifth alarm assignment during the rescue and recovery operations.  

    Roof Operations prior to collapse

     

    Laborers and firefighters managed to pull out some who were near walls, some crawled out. Several holes were made into the wall to pull out injured survivors and victims.  

    The Building  

    The approximately 120 ft.  x 120 ft. primary building was originally built in 1952 as a supermarket and at the time of the fire was undergoing extensive renovations and was open and operating. Constructed with exterior masonry bearing walls of  with  timber roof trusses with a 100-foot clear span, supported on pilaster columns embedded in the exterior walls, it was classical Type III construction. The truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a conventional suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system.  A two story mezzanine and machine room was located at the north wall of the original building. Access through the truss loft area was accessible through man-doors at the plane of each truss.  

    Waldbaum Supermarket FDNY Box 3300 1978

     

    The heavy timber bowstring arch roof consisted of seven (7) truss units constructed of 4-5 bundled 3 inch x 12 inch attached assemblies.  Two factors contributed to the collapse of the bowstring arch truss system; double roof (rain roof) alterations with concealed spaces and the extent and severity of the fire within the concealed spaces affecting the assembly’s structural stability. The presence of the double concealed ceiling systems; the truss system supported an ornamental tin ceiling and 18 inches below that concealed space a convential suspended acoustic ceiling tile panel system was present. Reports indicated the tin ceiling was attached directly to the bottom cord of the truss system. The failure of  operating companies and command personnel to recognize the signs of an unchecked concealed fire that was propagating at a rapid pace impinging upon critical structural assembly points was a significant contributing factor in the incident outcome. 

    Typical Heavy Timber Bowstring Arch Truss Configuration

     

    This roof collapsed 32 minutes after the initial units arrived. The immediate collapse occurred approximately 85 feet inward from the Alpha side (Ocean Avenue) and approximately 50 feet from the Bravo side (Avenue Y). The immediate failure and loss of structural stability and collapse of truss unit #5 was followed with the subsequent collapse of truss units #6 and #4 that were interdependent on the roof rafter and purlin system to maintain thier structural stability and vertical orientation. This type of interdependent structural system of structural trusses, rafters and roof deck (membrane) result in large area collapses since the primary truss will usually cause the adjacent two truss systems (on either side of the primary compromised truss) to fail by pulling downward.  

    The effects of direct flame impingement on the truss assessmblies, thier connection points of bearing at the outter masonry walls, coupled with the tactical trench cut that had been comopleted by the operating ladder companies resulted in 4,000 sf section of roof to collapse in the truss #5, 6 and 4 bay areas. Rapid and progressing fire travel within the concealed spaces and the degradation of the roof assembly and structural support system, failure to recognize the inherent opertaional risks associated with roof and interior operations on heavy timber truss roof systems and the failure to correlate continued interior suppression operations with simultaneous roof ventilation operations with no significant change in operational progress or mitigation contributed to the tragic outcome of the incident.  

    A short ten years would pass and the lessons from the Waldbaum Fire would soon be forgotten when on July 2, 1988 operations in a Type III building consisting of an auto dealership would lead to the deaths of five (5) Firefighters in Hackensack, New Jersey when operations were being conducted in the truss loft storage area when an 80 foot heavy timber truss collapsed trapping the firefighters. The Hackensack Ford Fire occured less than four weeks short of the tenth anniversary of the Waldbaum Fire right across the Hudson River. More on the Hackensack Ford Fire HERE.  

     
     
     
     
     

    Bravo Side View

     

    Additional References :http://stevespak.com/waldbaums.html  

    Fire Investigation: An Analysis of the Waldbaum Fire, Brooklyn, New York, August 3, 1978. Quintiere, J. G. NISTIR 6030; June 1997 http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID;=18676&  

    NFPA Fire Command Magazine, Brooklyn Roof Collapse Claims six Lives. Demers, David P.; December 1978  

    Waldbaum Fire Facebook page, HERE with numerous photos and recollections honoring those that lost their lives and those that operated at FDNY Brooklyn Box 3300.
       

    Rescue efforts on the Bravo Side

     

      

    2892 Ocean Avenue Today

     

    The lessons learned in the years following the Walbaum’s fire in 1978 and the subsequent Hackensack Ford Fire, NJ in 1988 focused on understanding building construction systems, occupancies and structural assemblies, in both of these cases the timber bowstring truss systems. Over the years the foundation of knowledge necessary to build competencies and knowledgeable firefighters, fire officers and commanders cognizant in the science and technology of building construction has waned and at time has been less than an area of focus.  

    Take the time to learn about the FDNY Walbaum’s fire, its history repeating significance as a major fire service LODD event, the lessons learned from the Hackensack Ford Fire (July 2, 1988) and other related case studies that can be found on the NIOSH, USFA and NFPA web sites.  

    Look at your buildings within your response areas and jurisdiction. Understand how they’re built and more importantly how they are affected by the exposure and impingement of fire and its byproducts. Understand key building performance indicators and appropriate strategic and tactical actions based upon building profiles, occupancies, fire loading, construction features and fire service resources. Take the time to honor the brave brother firefighters from FDNY who made the supreme sacrifice thirty two years ago, and gave a legacy to learn from in this and in future fire service generations.  

    It’s time to think; BUILDING KNOWLEDGE = FIREFIGHTER SAFETY  

    Memorial

     

    Operational Safety at Basement Fires: Close Call

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    Basement fires in both residential and commercial occupancies are one of the most challenging tactical operations that present numerous risk factors that required the highest degree of situational awareness, training skill sets and continuous incident monitoring and assessment to gauge building structural integrity, fire behavior and crew integrity and performance. 

    An explosion rocked a Fairdale, Kentucky neighborhood this past weekend while the homeowner was in the process of doing remodeling his basement. A Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Mark Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel. 

    Fellow firefighters, including his brother-in-law, who was right behind him prior to his fall, were yelling and screaming at Long to hang on.  They managed to get a ladder to the basement and it was up to Long to find the strength to get out.  He says “I started to try to climb up. I got two, I lost my grip, fell flat into the fire.  I was so exhausted.” On his third attempt, he did find the strength and pulled himself up the ladder and out of the flames.  

    According to published reports a coordinated fire suppression effort was undertaken, with heavy fire involvement extending throughout the house and into the roof area. Interior fire attack was commenced, and as crews began moving across the first floor area above the seat of the fire, the floor subassembly failed causing an isolated collapse and compromise of the structural floor system and sub-floor decking, resulting in Captain Long falling into the basement. The fire originating in the basement was the result of the homeowners’ use of acetone as a floor treatment when the chemical vapors were ignited by the hot water heater causing an explosion and resulting fire. 

    Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) 

    • Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
    • Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
    • Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
    • Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
    • Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
    • Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
    • Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
    • Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
    • Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
    • If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
    • Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
    • Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
    • Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner. 
    • Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
    • Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
    • Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
    • Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
    • Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
    • Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
    • Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
    • Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
    • Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment

    Here are some resources and case studies resulting from operations at floor collapses;

    Incident links; HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE 


     

    In the Streets; On the Air

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    Taking it to the Streets had its premier July 21st on Firefighter Netcast.com with a lively and provoking discussion on “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen?” The program theme aligned with a recent posting on the same topic. Join me on the program were two prominent and nationally recognized fire service leaders, who I’m honored to have known for many years, Chief Billy Hayes and Chief Doug Cline; the program explored leading fire service issues affecting firefighter safety, training, credentialing and education; fireground operational variables related to the continuing changes in building construction, engineered systems and extreme fire behavior,  and the emerging need for “Tactical Patience” as I’ve been exploring the relationships towards the need for tactical enhancements to our current fire suppression theory and firefighting models.

    Conversations expanded on the NFFF/Everyone Goes Home Campaign and programs, the newest EGH initiatives on Behavioral Health and the successes achieved through the Courage to be Safe Programs and the Advocacy Program.

    Both our guests provided cutting edge perspectives and commentary on the key issues that the fire service needs to have on their radar screen and the need for emerging and practicing fire officers and commanders to continually strive to increase skill sets and maintain a pulse on the leading issues affecting the fire service and apply emerging research  and studies to increase operational capabilities, improve performance and enhance and promote firefighter safety and survival and operational integrity.

    Although technical difficulties from the live feed coming from the Inner Harbor in Baltimore at the Firehouse Expo, precluded the ability to have the call-in segments of the program to work, the 120 minute program gave the listeners a wealth of information to talk over in the firehouse, at the kitchen table or in the apparatus bays.

    The program is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and a Fire Fighter Netcast.com  production, produced by John Mitchell and Rhett Fleitz.  The live program segment will be edited and available for iTunes download soon. You can check out the other programming and shows produced by Fire Fighter Netcast.com HERE. Stay tuned for announcements on the next program date for Taking it to the Streets coming to you live from the IAFC Fire Rescue International Conference in Chicago in August.  

    Taking it to the Streets; Advancing Fire Fighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service. 

    • Firefighter Netcast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets, HERE, HERE
    • “What’s on your Radar Screen?” July 21, 2010 Program, HERE
    • “What’s on your Radar Screen?” post on Commandsafety.com, HERE

     

    Transmitting the Box for an Alarm of Fire…Taking it to the Streets

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    Taking it to the Streets

    Premiering Wednesday July 21st  9:00pm ET

    Live on Firefighter Netcast.com

    Premiering “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen”?

    Check out what’s on of off your radar screen on CommandSafety.com

    If you’ve never listened to a FirefighterNetcast, visit the site now, sign up for a new user account for BlogTalkRadio, and be prepared to join in the conversation Wednesday night.

    Listen in via the Internet, listen and/or participate by calling in, and join in the live chat that takes place amongst listeners while the show is going on. In case you miss the live show, you can even download the recording after the fact on FirefighterNetcast and iTunes too. It’s free, it’s fun and it’s easy.

    Taking it to the Streets is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter Netcast.com Production

    Check out Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Twitter

    Premiering “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen”? on Fire Fighter Netcast.com

    No comments

    Taking it to the Streets

    Premiering Wednesday July 21st  9:00pm ET

    Live on Firefighter Netcast.com

    Premiering “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen”?

    Check out what’s on of off your radar screen on CommandSafety.com

    If you’ve never listened to a FirefighterNetcast, visit the site now, sign up for a new user account for BlogTalkRadio, and be prepared to join in the conversation Wednesday night.

    Listen in via the Internet, listen and/or participate by calling in, and join in the live chat that takes place amongst listeners while the show is going on. In case you miss the live show, you can even download the recording after the fact on FirefighterNetcast and iTunes too. It’s free, it’s fun and it’s easy.

    Taking it to the Streets is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Fire Fighter Netcast.com Production

    Check out Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Twitter

    Check out FireDaily and The FireCritic

    Newest NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters at Structure Fires

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    NIOSH released it’s latest Alert on Firefighter Risk Reduction. Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures. These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.

    Fire fighters should take the following steps to minimize their risk of death and injury while fighting structure fires:

    • Report conditions and hazards encountered to your officer, incident commander, or incident safety officers
    • Recognize that maintaining your safety is a shared responsibility
    • Comply with your department’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) / standard operating guidelines (SOGs) and safety rules.
    • Be constantly aware of your surroundings and changing conditions.

    Fire departments (chief officers, company officers and policy makers) should take the following steps to protect fire fighters:

    • Develop and enforce risk management plans, policies, and standard operating procedures and guide-lines (SOPs/SOGs) for risk management.
    • Train incident commanders, incident safety officers, and fire fighters in the fire department risk management plans and SOPs/SOGs for risk management.

    Develop and implement fire department policies and SOPs/SOGs for emergency response and fire-fighting activities in and around abandoned, vacant, or unoccupied structures.

    • A thorough size-up and risk analysis should be performed before conducting operations in any burning structure.
    • Fire-fighting operations should be limited to defensive (exterior) strategy if the structure is judged to be unsafe and in any situation where the risks to fire fighter safety are excessive.
    • Offensive (interior attack) operations should only be considered when sufficient resources are on scene to conduct offensive operations with a reasonable degree of safety, including the ability to perform essential support functions (i.e., water supply, ventilation, lighting, utility control, accountability, rapid intervention teams).
    • Additional size-ups and risk analyses should be performed before changing strategies, including any decision to conduct interior overhaul operations following a defensive fire attack.
    • Have adequate resources available on scene to per-form rapid intervention team (RIT) duties anytime personnel are operating at any structure fire.
    • Inspect and preplan buildings within your jurisdiction. Note the type of construction, materials used, presence of trusses and/or lightweight construction in the roof and floor, type of occupancy, fuel load, exit routes, and other distinguishing characteristics.
    • Enter preplan information into the dispatch computer so that when a fire is reported at a preplanned location, the critical information is provided to all responding units. Adopt and enforce a standard system of marking dangerous abandoned, derelict, and vacant buildings, based on a prefire assessment of their structural conditions and other risk factors, in cooperation with municipal agencies and local authorities such as local housing authorities.
    • Train fire fighters and officers to recognize the marking system and incorporate the information into their size-up considerations. Additionally, local authorities should ensure programs are in place that provide for the demolition and removal of structures deemed unsafe by code enforcement.
      • Make sure that the incident commander conducts an initial size-up of critical fireground factors before beginning fire fighting efforts and continuously re-views and reevaluates these factors during all fire-ground operations. A 360-degree size-up should be conducted for all abandoned, vacant, or unoccupied structures.
      • Ensure those in charge of fire incidents (e.g., incident commanders, chief officers, safety officers) are fully trained to fulfill their responsibilities and obligations in the execution of their duties.
      • Educate the public on the need to have home fire drills and designated meeting places in the event of an emergency. The location of designated meeting
      • places should be communicated to the fire department as a way to help confirm and verify building occupancy status.

    Incident commanders (IC) and incident safety officers (ISO) should do the following:

    • The IC should conduct an initial size-up of each incident weighing critical fireground factors (i.e., occupancy status; occupant survivability and rescue potential; vacant building markings or indicators; size, construction and use of the building; age and condition of the building; and the location, size, and extent of the fire in the building) against the department’s risk management profile to determine the initial incident strategy (offensive or defensive). The IC should develop an incident action plan before beginning firefighting efforts and continually review and reevaluate the factors and the risk management plan throughout the operation.
    • The IC should use appropriate risk management criteria to decide whether an offensive or defensive strategy should be employed to attack a fire. The IC should attempt to determine whether the building is occupied or not. Signs to look for include vehicles in garage, driveway, or parked nearby; people at windows of apartment or office buildings calling for help indicates the possibility of other occupants as well; time of day; type of occupancy; and reports from occupants who have escaped the burning structure. Reports from neighbors and bystanders may also provide valuable information.
    • The IC should consider the number of fire fighters, the amount and type of apparatus and equipment available, and the stage of the fire when determining the type of fire attack.
    • Follow departmental policies (risk management plans, SOPs/SOGs) for risk management.
    • Establish, clearly mark, and monitor an exterior collapse zone at structure fires where there is a risk of collapse.
    • Use effective and universal evacuation signals when command personnel determine that all fire fighters should be evacuated from a burning building, as well as during the initiation of defensive operations and during overhaul and salvage operations.

    NIOSH Summary HERE

    NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE

    Taking it to The Streets on FireFighter Netcast.com

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    Taking it to the Streets

    With Christopher Naum

    A New Monthly Radio Talkshow on  FireFighter Netcast.com  Premiering on Wednesday July 21 at 9pm ET

    A Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighter Netcast.com Production 

    Advancing FireFighter Safety and Operational Intergrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service. 

    Watch for More Taking it to the Streets  Annoucements over the next seven days here on CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com and on Firefighter Netcast.com 

    Programming

    Ten Minutes in the Street

    • Presenting an informational recap and discussion on leading topcs, events and issues from the past 30 days.

     Feature Segments Program will have one (1) selected segment based upon topic and guest 

     Buildingsonfire

    • Addressing today’s topical issues within the areas of Firefighting, Building Construction, Dynamic Risk Assessment, and Command & Tactical Safety
      • Open interative discussions and call-in
    • Street Stories
      • Presenting first-hand accounts and insights on an event, response or operation with a featured guest
      • Open interative discussions and call-in
    • Smoke Showin’
      • Featured Guest Interviews and discussions focusing on the NFFF Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives and Everyone Goes Home Campaign 
      • Open interative discussions and call-in

    HRE History Repeating Events  

    • Discussion on recent History Repeating Events, LODD, NIOSH Reports or other
    • Open interative discussions and call-in

     A View from the Street

    • Closing Commentary on timely and relevant issues affecting the Fire Service

    What’s On Your Radar Screen?

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    BuildingsonFire 2010; Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Operational Safety

    Major Influencing Fire Service Reports, Issues or Focus that should be on Your Radar Screen

    The following list is but a modest cross section of pertinent information or focus areas today’s Firefighter, Company or Command Officer MUST be knowledgeable in, have insights and proficiency based technical skills to function with a level of competencies demanded in  today’s  fire service.

    If these are not on your radar screen or you haven’t got a blip of a clue what they’re about; then you are derelict and not doing your job- and the end result could be a less than desirable outcome on the fireground; it’s that simple, it’s that direct.

    Have you read these reports, understand the issues & influences, increased your knowledge, skills and abilities in any gap areas or taken the time to research the cutting edge issues affecting today’s fire service?

    The City of Charleston Sofa Super Store LODD-Routley Fire Report

    Read the report; understand the incident, the building performance, the fire behavior and the operation process deployed. Gain the insights from the overall apparent and contributing causes identified and presented and assess how these relate to your fire service perspective and department’s culture and performance today.

    • City of Charleston Post Incident Assessment and Review Team Phase I Report, HERE
    • Routley Final Phase II Report HERE
    • NIOSH Investigative Report, HERE
    • NIOSH REPORT SUMMARY
    • NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
    • develop, implement and enforce written standard operating procedures (SOPs) for an occupational safety and health program in accordance with NFPA 1500
    • develop, implement, and enforce a written Incident Management System to be followed at all emergency incident operations
    • develop, implement, and enforce written SOPs that identify incident management training standards and requirements for members expected to serve in command roles
    • ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual with overall authority and responsibility for management of all activities at an incident
    • ensure that the Incident Commander conducts an initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene before beginning interior fire fighting operations
    • train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
    • ensure that the Incident Commander establishes a stationary command post, maintains the role of director of fireground operations, and does not become involved in fire-fighting efforts
    • ensure the early implementation of division / group command into the Incident Command System
    • ensure that the Incident Commander continuously evaluates the risk versus gain when determining whether the fire suppression operation will be offensive or defensive
    • ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
    • ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed at each structure fire
    • ensure that crew integrity is maintained during fire suppression operations
    • ensure that a rapid intervention crew (RIC) / rapid intervention team (RIT) is established and available to immediately respond to emergency rescue incidents
    • ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents
    • ensure that ventilation to release heat and smoke is closely coordinated with interior fire suppression operations
    • conduct pre-incident planning inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fireground strategies and tactics
    • consider establishing and enforcing standardized resource deployment approaches and utilize dispatch entities to move resources to fill service gaps
    • develop and coordinate pre-incident planning protocols with mutual aid departments
    • ensure that any offensive attack is conducted using adequate fire streams based on characteristics of the structure and fuel load present
    • ensure that an adequate water supply is established and maintained
    • consider using exit locators such as high intensity floodlights or flashing strobe lights to guide lost or disoriented fire fighters to the exit
    • ensure that Mayday transmissions are received and prioritized by the Incident Commander
    • train fire fighters on actions to take if they become trapped or disoriented inside a burning structure
    • ensure that all fire fighters and line officers receive fundamental and annual refresher training according to NFPA 1001 and NFPA 1021
    • implement joint training on response protocols with mutual aid departments
    • ensure apparatus operators are properly trained and familiar with their apparatus
    • protect stretched hose lines from vehicular traffic and work with law enforcement or other appropriate agencies to provide traffic control
    • ensure that fire fighters wear a full array of turnout clothing and personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned task while participating in fire suppression and overhaul activities
    • ensure that fire fighters are trained in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
    • develop, implement and enforce written SOPS to ensure that SCBA cylinders are fully charged and ready for use
    • use thermal imaging cameras (TICs) during the initial size-up and search phases of a fire
    • develop, implement and enforce written SOPs and provide fire fighters with training on the hazards of truss construction
    • establish a system to facilitate the reporting of unsafe conditions or code violations to the appropriate authorities
    • ensure that fire fighters and emergency responders are provided with effective incident rehabilitation
    • provide fire fighters with station / work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments.

    Additionally, federal and state occupational safety and health administrations should:

    • consider developing additional regulations to improve the safety of fire fighters, including adopting National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) consensus standards.

    Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

    • continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn SCBA
    • conduct research into refining existing and developing new technology to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.

    Additionally, code setting organizations and municipalities should:

    • require the use of sprinkler systems in commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards, and establish retroactive requirements for the installation of fire sprinkler systems when additions to commercial buildings increase the fire and life safety hazards
    • require the use of automatic ventilation systems in large commercial structures, especially ones having high fuel loads and other unique life-safety hazards.

    Additionally, municipalities and local authorities having jurisdiction should:

    • coordinate the collection of building information and the sharing of information between building authorities and fire departments
    • consider establishing one central dispatch center to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions
    • ensure that fire departments responding to mutual aid incidents are equipped with mobile and portable communications equipment that are capable of handling the volume of radio traffic and allow communications among all responding companies within their jurisdiction.

    Everyone Goes Home Campaign

    • Everyone Goes Home® is a national program by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries. In March 2004, a Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held to address the need for change within the fire service. At this summit, the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives were created and a program was born to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
    • Recognizing the need to do more to prevent line-of-duty deaths and injuries, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation has launched a national initiative to bring prevention to the forefront.
    • In March 2004, the Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held in Tampa, Florida to address the need for change within the fire and emergency services. Through this meeting, 16 Life Safety Initiatives were produced to ensure that Everyone Goes Home®.
    • The first major action was to sponsor a national gathering of fire and emergency services leaders. The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation will play a major role in helping the U.S. Fire Administration meet its stated goal to reduce the number of preventable firefighter fatalities. The Foundation sees fire service adoption of the summit’s initiatives as a vital step in meeting this goal.
    • The Courage to Be Safe® On-Line Program , HERE
    • Media CenterUsing variations of the Courage to Be Safe ®…So Everyone Goes Home® field program, along with material from the Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resource Kit we will develop and deploy a new online learning segment each month. These online learning segments will allow you to expand upon your personal and professional development when you want and how you want. Watch them by yourself or integrate them into your organizational training programs. Remember, that safety results from constant training and putting those skills to work everyday, on every call – SO EVERYONE GOES HOME. HERE
    • The Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Advocates Program will play a key role in helping to bring about awareness of the Initiatives and act as a conduit for resources to enable departments to implement and advocate them. HERE
    • The 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives
      1. Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.
      2. Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.
      3. Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.
      4. All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
      5. Develop and implement national standards for training, qualifications, and certification (including regular recertification) that are equally applicable to all firefighters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
      6. Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that are equally applicable to all firefighters, based on the duties they are expected to perform.
      7. Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.
      8. Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety.
      9. Thoroughly investigate all firefighter fatalities, injuries, and near misses.
      10. Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement.
      11. National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should be developed and championed.
      12. National protocols for response to violent incidents should be developed and championed.
      13. Firefighters and their families must have access to counseling and psychological support.
      14. Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a critical fire and life safety program.
      15. Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the installation of home fire sprinklers.
      16. Safety must be a primary consideration in the design of apparatus and equipment.

    NIST Wind Driven Fire Study

    • Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
    • What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented?  Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening.  If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants.  NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
    • This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions.  There are many questions regarding wind driven fires.  For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures?  Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires.  In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
    • Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
    • A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings.  All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set.  All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player.  NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
    • NIST References HERE and HERE

    NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments

    • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
    • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
    • Reference Data HERE

    NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments

    • The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments was recently released to the public providing . A copy of the report is attached.
    • Report Abstract:
    • Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.
    • This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.
    • This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.
    • Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.
    • The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
    • Synopsis HERE

    USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002

    • Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
    • As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
    • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
    • Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies

    UL Fire Academy CBT

    • UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions
    • Base on the UL research and
    • This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
    • This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This self-guided course, which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions, is targeted toward the 1.1 million fire service personnel in the United States and Canada. The knowledge developed and shared in this course is critically important to firefighter and civilian safety.
    • This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
    • Program Objectives:
    • Provide brief history of events leading up to DHS Grant tests
    • Identify the fire test hypothesis, parameters, and steps completed in the testing process
    • Compare tests results (legacy vs. modern construction)
    • Communicate learnings from our partners representing the fire service
    • Discuss code recommendations
    • UL University on-line Program HERE

    USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002

    • Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
    • As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
    • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
    • Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies

    NIOSH LODD Reports

    • Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
    • NIOSH Web Page HERE
    • Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
    • Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports, HERE

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires

    • Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
    • These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
    • Report HERE

    NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors

    • Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
    • Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
    • NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
    • Report HERE

    NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures

    • Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
    • The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
    • NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
    • ALERT Report HERE

    National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience

    • The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
    • Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
    • National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
    • Search Reports, HERE
    • Resources, HERE

    USFA Incident Reports (Stop History Repeating Events-HRE)

    • USFA provides information resources in many formats, including books, pamphlets and DVD’s, free of charge.
    • The U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire–the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are devel­oped to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.
    • The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announce­ments of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters
    • This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas.
    • The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made
    • Technical Reports and On-line Publications, HERE

    Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report

    • The Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire and Rescue published a comprehensive line of duty death report for Technician I Kyle R. Wilson on Saturday, January 26, 2008. Technician I Wilson was the first line of duty death in the Department’s 41-year history. The Department is sharing the LODD Investigative Report to honor Kyle, and in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels.
    • Technician Kyle Robert Wilson was 24-years old and was born in Olney, Maryland. He grew up in Prince William County and graduated from Hylton High School and George Mason University. He was an avid baseball and softball player. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006. Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County. On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive.
    • Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure.
    • Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.
    • The Department of Fire and Rescue immediately formed a multi-dimensional investigation team following the incident. The investigation team was comprised of five Department of Fire and Rescue uniform personnel and two external members from area fire departments. For eight months, the team thoroughly examined the events that occurred at the Marsh Overlook fire incident and identify the factors involved with the line of duty death of Technician I Kyle Wilson. The resulting report represents thousands of hours of effort to analyze fire and rescue operations and is a factual representation of the events that occurred. The report also provides a frame work for organizational level improvements.
    • The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be:
      • The initial arriving fire suppression force size.
      • The size up of fire development and spread.
      • The impact of high winds on fire development and spread.
      • The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials.
      • The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts.
      • The incident control and management.
      • The Marsh Overlook fire incident was an immense fire fueled by extremely flammable building material products and a vicious wind. It was an environment where information gathering and decision making had to be performed in the time measurement of seconds. During the chain of events that occurred and under severe circumstances, fire and rescue personnel performed at exceptional levels.
    • During the repeated attempts to reach and rescue Technician I Wilson, personnel displayed heroic efforts and jeopardized their own safety. The Department will never forget the sacrifice that Technician Wilson made in an attempt to ensure others were safe. By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure his sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire and rescue departments can avoid another similar occurrence.
    • Resources and Report

    Loudoun County (VA) Fire Rescue  Significant Near Miss Event Report

    • On May 25, 2008, fire and rescue personnel from Loudoun County responded to a structure fire at 43238 Meadowood Court in Leesburg, Virginia. During the course of the incident, seven responders were injured. Of those injured, four firefighters received significant burn injuries, two firefighters sustained orthopedic injuries, and one EMS provider was treated for minor respiratory distress. To date, five of the injured personnel have returned to duty. Two firefighters continue to recover from their injuries, including one who was severely burned.
    • Given the severity of the injuries and magnitude of the event, an independent Investigative Team was assembled to review the incident. The Team was comprised of four Loudoun County personnel, three external members from area fire departments, and two resource/support personnel. The Team was tasked with reviewing “the events leading up to the incident, the incident operation(s), the firefighter MAYDAY(s), and incident mitigation.”
    • For three months, the Team thoroughly examined the events surrounding the Meadowood Court fire incident and identified the factors associated with the injury of personnel.
    • The Report contains the results of the Investigative Team’s comprehensive review and analysis.
    • Fact Sheet, HERE
    • SIGNIFICANT INJURY INVESTIGATIVE REPORT 43238 MEADOWOOD COURT MAY 25, 2008 Report HERE

    Worcester (MA) Fire Cold Storage Fire LODD Report; Abandoned Cold Storage Warehouse Multi-Firefighter Fatality Fire 1999, Worcester, Massachusetts

    • A technical review of the 1999 Worcester, MA fire that claimed six firefighters concludes that abandoned buildings are a serious threat to firefighters and fire departments must make a concerted effort to use technology to maintain data on buildings in their response districts.
    • On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dis­patched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motor­ist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
    • Eleven minutes into the fire, the owner of the abutting Kenmore Diner advised fire operations of two homeless people who might be living in the warehouse. The rescue company, having divided into two crews, started a building search. Some 22 minutes later the rescue crew searching down from the roof became lost in the vast dark spaces of the fifth floor. They were running low on air and called for help. Interior conditions were deteriorating rapidly despite efforts to extinguish the blaze, and visibility was nearly lost on the upper floors. Investigators have placed these two firefighters over 150 feet from the only available exit.
    • An extensive search was conducted by Worcester Fire crews through the third and fourth alarms. Suppression efforts continued to be ineffective against huge volumes of petroleum based materials, and ultimately two more crews became disoriented on the upper floors and were unable to escape. When the evacuation order was given one hour and forty-five minutes into the event, five firefighters and one officer were missing. None survived.
    • A subsequent exterior attack was set up and lasted for over 20 hours utilizing aerial pieces and del­uge guns from Worcester and neighboring departments. Task force groups from across the State of Massachusetts responded to initial suppression and subsequent recovery efforts. During this time, the four upper floors collapsed onto the second which became known as “the deck”. Over 6 million gallons of water were used during the suppression efforts. According to NFPA records, this is the first loss of six firefighters in a structure fire where neither building collapse nor an explosion was a contributing factor to the fatalities.
    • USFA Report HERE

    Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department Final Report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels Nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths

    • The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter.  This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.
    • Incident Overview, HERE
    • NIOSH Report, HERE
    • Investigative Report, HERE

    Field Trips

    • Take a good look at the structures, occupancies and  buildings in you first, second and third due areas, look around your community and jurisdiction as well as your mutual aid and greater alarm response box areas.
    • Have you stopped for a minute today and taken a good look around? Whether you’re sitting in the front seat at the stop light of an intersection or as you’re peering out the side cab window coming back from an alarm or while running errands in your POV; have you taken a good look around? As the Springsteen song goes; “this is your town”.
    • There’s a lot that can be gleaned from your surroundings on any given day. We sometimes take for granted the subtle changes that are happening all around us as we take care of business on our rounds, runs and calls. We tend to focus in on the immediacy of the events that are happening in front of us that demand our attention but fail to take a look around to pick up on information, data and insights that can help us on that next run or down the road in the future.
    • Take a look at the construction that might be going up in your areas. I’m certain you’re paying close attention to what’s happening in your first-due, but what about that third-due area, that neighboring jurisdiction or the mutual-aid area that you occasionally run in to? When you’re on that next EMS run or an investigation of an odor or alarm bells service call, take a few extra minutes to walk through the occupancy. Conduct your own mini company level pre-plan.
    • Look at the layout, features, access and construction features. If you have a chance, verify the structural support systems employed by the building for the floor and roof systems. If you have time, take the company on a quick site visit to that building that’s under construction or the renovations that are again underway in that commercial or business occupancy around the corner from quarters.
    • These continuing challenging economic times places a great deal of influence on what’s being built, how it might be constructed, the manner in which a building may be operational one day, vacant the other and under renovation the next. Sometimes these transformations occur literally overnight.
    • Take a good look around, this is your town…your district, your response area. Know your buildings, understand their performance profiles, and assess the predictability of performance. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

    Building Construction

    I continue to suggest that it’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned firefighter and company officer knows that at times; it is what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances. However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective, aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

    We can still meet the demands of the job, as firefighters; but do it with Tactical Patience and not at the expense of Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment or worst Operational Recklessness.

    The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics must be adjusted and modified to include intelligent risk assessment, calculated risk analysis, safety and survivability profiling, and strategic operational and tactical value. The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics. We need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling.

    Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must adjusted and enhanced to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a profound need to gain building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Its all about the new formula….Bk=F2S.

    Additionally, think about the following

    • Don’t Treat Your Buildings and Occupancies the Same anymore
    • Increase Situational Awareness
    • Increase Your Competencies
    • Know Your Buildings
    • Be aware of Command Compression
    • Implement Tactical Patience
    • Tactical Entertainment
    • Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety
    • Fire Behavior & Fire Dynamics
    • Situational Awareness
    • Naturalistic Decision Making

    More on these and some additional key reports on a future post…..

    Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know

    2 comments

    The Colerain Township (OH) Fire and EMS Department under the leadership of Director and Chief G. Bruce Smith recently released its final report Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths related to the April 4, 2008 Double Line of Duty Death of a Captain and Firefighter.  This investigative analysis and report, although specific to the events and conditions encountered during the conduct of operation at the residential occupancy at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane has pertinent and relevant insights, recommendations and factors that all Fire Service personnel, regardless of rank should read.

    This is one of those distinctive reports that has influential and critical operational, training and preparedness elements embedded throughout the report. Following my review of the report, having previously read the preliminary report findings, it is apparent there continues to be common threads shared by this and other events and incidents where a single of multiple firefighters have lost their lives due to similarities in the apparent and common cause deficiencies and short comings identified.

    All company and command officers should read and comprehend the lessons learned. Then, take these new found insights and see what the gaps are at the personal level (yours or those you supervise) as well as the shift, group, station, battalion, division or department as a whole. If there are gaps, then identify a way to implement timely changes as necessary so there are No History Repeating (HRE) events.

    I have provided a comprehensive synopsis of the report for your review. Take the time to read the entire report, make the time to improve where you need to.  

    On Friday, April 4, 2008 at 06:13:02 hours, what began as a routine response for Colerain Township Fire and EMS Engine 102 to investigate a fire alarm activation at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane, Colerain Township, Ohio resulted in the deaths of Colerain Township Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira.

    Upon their arrival at the scene of the two-story wood framed, residential building working fire conditions existed in the basement. The initial attack team consisted of Broxterman, Schira, and one other firefighter. The team advanced a 1¾-inch attack hose line through the interior of the building for fire control.

    Even though, they were provided with some of the most technologically advanced protective clothing for structural firefighting and self-contained breathing apparatus, it appeared that Broxterman and Schira were overwhelmed by severe fire conditions in the basement. 

    During their attempt to evacuate the building, the main-level family room flooring system in which the two were traveling on collapsed into the basement trapping the firefighters. Eleven minutes elapsed from time of arrival to the catastrophic chain of events.

    The investigation of this incident provided a number of findings and recommendations that should be considered by Colerain’s fire department, as well as other fire department organizations. The examination encompassed issues that related to building construction, firefighting tactics, command and control, situational awareness, communications, training, firefighting equipment and the individual responsibility of firefighters of the Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services (Colerain Fire & EMS). In addition, a segment of the examination included a review of the individual and group affects following such an event, and the measures initiated that attempted to ensure individual, family and organizational wellness.

    The following factors were believed to have directly contributed to the deaths of Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira:

    • A delayed arrival at the incident scene that allowed the fire to progress significantly;
    • A failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices; and
    • A failure to abide by fundamental firefighter self-rescue and survival concepts

     Although the aforementioned factors were believed to have directly contributed to their deaths, they might have been prevented if:

    • Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident;
    • Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators;
    • The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
    • timely manner relative to the incident;
    • Personnel assigned to Engine 102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their first-due response area;
    • A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis
    • was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations;
    • Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural
    • firefighting existed within the department;
    • The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time;
    • The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
    • Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions;
    • Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
    • Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.

     Incident Reported

    On Friday, April 4, 2008, at 06:11:23, the Hamilton County Communications Center (HCCC) received notification of an automatic alarm activation (smoke detector and carbon monoxide) at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane (LN).

    • An automatic fire alarm response complement of two engine companies (Engines 102 & 109), one ladder company (Ladder 25), and the Battalion Chief (District 25) were dispatched to investigate at 06:13:02.
    • At 06:13:43, a second notification was received from the female homeowner reporting a fire in the basement of the building.
    • At 06:20:43, a third notification by means of a cellular phone from the female homeowner to HCCC routed through the City of Cincinnati’s Fire and Police Communications Center was received.
    • At 06:22:41, the initial response complement was then upgraded to a building fire, also known as a structure fire response complement to include one additional engine company (Engine 25), one rescue company (Rescue 26), and one basic life support transport unit (Squad 25).

    Property and Building Description: The building at 5708 Squirrels nest LN was a single-family residence that set back approximately 450-feet from the street at the end of a private driveway on a heavily wooded lot.

    • The building was two-stories in height, approximately 45-feet wide by 30-feet deep with a finished below-grade (basement) living space and attached two-car garage.
    • For simplicity, the report refers to the living space under the main-level of the building as a basement.
    • From the front (side Alpha), the building was two-stories above grade. The vertical distance between floors was approximately eight-feet. The exterior main entrance was located in the front middle of the building approximately one-foot above grade level.
    • Additional entrances to the first-floor living space were by means of a rear entry door from an upper-level deck area and through the garage area.
    • The interior stairway to the basement was located approximately 15-feet from the front main entry door towards the rear of the building. There were no exposed buildings on the adjacent sides of the fire building.

    The building was located approximately 450-feet from the curb and a driveway leading to the front entrance. The nearest fire hydrant was located approximately 500- feet from the front entrance. To provide for uniform identification of locations and operationalforces at the incident scene, the scene was divided geographically into smaller parts, which were designated as sectors. Specific areas of the incident scene were designated as follows:

    • The side of the building that bears the postal address of the location was designated as Side Alpha or front by the Incident Commander;
    • The property sloped downward towards the rear (side Charlie) of the building with an approximate 13-foot elevation difference from side Alpha to Charlie. The
    • Charlie side of the building was three-stories above the rear grade level with the building’s basement floor approximately five-feet above grade level. The exterior entrance to the building’s’ basement area, also known as a walk-out was by means of a stairway that led to a wooden deck on the Charlie side adjacent to the Delta side. A second stairway led to an upper level deck that served the main level of the building.

     

    Initial Fire Attack Operation: Upon arrival at the incident address, Engine 102 (E102), assigned four personnel (one captain, one fire apparatus operator [FAO], and two firefighters) entered and proceeded down the driveway deploying a five-inch supply hose line.

    • With their apparatus positioned in front of the building Captain (Capt.) Broxterman radioed, “Moderate smoke showing. E102 will be Squirrelsnest Command.” at 06:24:01.
    • Verification was made by the E102’s FAO through face-to-face communication with the male homeowner that all occupants were out of the building, which was then relayed to Capt. Broxterman.

    District 25 (D25) arrived at the scene at 06:26:35 and assumed Command from Capt. Broxterman. Capt. Broxterman, Firefighter (Ffr.) Schira and E102’s Ffr. #2 advanced a 1¾-inch pre-connected hose line through the front main entrance. The fire was determined to be located in the basement of the building.

    • At 06:27:52, Capt. Broxterman radioed, “E102 making entry into the basement, heavy smoke”.
    • At 06:30:35, E109′s captain radioed, “Command from E109, contact 102,have them pull out of the first floor, redeploy to the back. It’s easy access. Conditions are changing at the front door.”
    • At 06:34:48, Engine 25 (E25), the designated Rapid Assistance Team, had just completed their 360-degree size-up around the building, and encountered E102’s Ffr. #2 in front of the building, whom reported that he had lost contact with his crew.
    • During the time period between 06:29:24 and 06:34:48, the investigation committee believed that one or more catastrophic events occurred including a failure of the main-level flooring system near the Beta – Charlie corner of the building.

     Rescue and Recovery Operations

    • At 06:35:34, the Incident Commander (IC) identified a potential Mayday operation, which indicates a life threatening situation to a firefighter.  
    • RAT25 was deployed at 06:36:48. The actual Mayday operation was initiated by the IC at 06:37:41 followed by a request at 06:37:53 to the HCCC for a second alarm complement of firefighting resources.  
    • At 06:42:01, RAT25 entered the basement from the rear of the building. At 07:00:27, E26’s personnel entered through the front main entrance of the building and into the basement by means of the interior stairway.  
    • Both missing firefighters were located in the basement near the Charlie side wall adjacent to the Beta side following a floor collapse. Capt. Broxterman and Ffr. Schira were obviously deceased as a result of their injuries. 

    Fire Origin and Cause: Information from the property owners was that the female had smelled an odor in the house. She told her husband, who went to investigate. Neither of them observed any smoke or flames at that time. The husband went to the basement, and located a fire near a cedar wood lined closet used to cultivate orchids in the unfinished utility room. He attempted to extinguish the fire with portable fire extinguishers and pans of water. As the fire alarm activated, the husband had his wife call 9-1-1 to report the fire. The state of Ohio Fire Marshal’s Office Fire and Explosion Investigation Bureau ruled the fire to be accidental in nature. The fire was determined to have originated in the unfinished utility room of the basement level in or near the cedar closet. This area was directly below the family room on the first floor. The probable ignition source for this fire was determined to be at and about a plastic air circulation fan and the associated electrical wiring.

    Cause of Deaths

    Capt. Broxterman was a 37-year old employee of the Colerain Fire & EMS with approximately 17-years of certified firefighting experience. Capt. Broxterman became trapped in the basement area for a prolonged amount of time following the sudden floor collapse. Capt. Broxterman was found positioned face down over top of Ffr. Schira. The majority of her protective clothing ensemble and equipment were heavily damaged as a result of exposure to heat and direct flame impingement. She was pronounced deceased following her removal from the building. Her body was transported to the Hamilton County Coroner’s Office for autopsy. The Coroner’s report cited the manner of death as “accidental” and the cause of death as “burns and inhalation of smoke and superheated and noxious gases.” Capt. Broxterman sustained burns to 100% of her body surface, which ranged from first to fourth degree in severity as described in the coroner’s autopsy report. Postmortem carboxyhemoglobin (COHb), which is a measure of carbon monoxide exposure, was measured at 22% saturation and soot was observed in portions of her upper and lower respiratory system.

    • Based on the injuries sustained and the damage to Capt. Broxterman’s protective clothing ensemble and equipment, it is likely that she was exposed to a rapid intensification of heat and flames in the building’s basement that overwhelmed her protective ensemble and equipment, exposing her body and respiratory system to intense heat and toxic products of combustion.

     Ffr. Schira was a 29-year old employee of Colerain Fire & EMS with approximately 3½-years of certified firefighting experience. He also became trapped in the basement area for a prolonged amount of time following the sudden floor collapse. Ffr. Schira was found positioned on his right side and back, face-up beneath Capt. Broxterman. The majority of his protective clothing ensemble and equipment was heavily damaged as a result of exposure to heat and direct flame impingement. Ffr. Schira was pronounced deceased following his removal from the building. His body was transported to the Hamilton County Coroner’s Office for autopsy. The Coroner’s report cited the manner of death as “accidental” and the cause of death as “burns and inhalation of smoke and superheated and noxious gases”. Ffr. Schira sustained burns to 100% of his body surface, which ranged from first to fourth degree in severity as described in the coroner’s autopsy report. Postmortem COhb was measured at 8% saturation and soot was observed in portions of his upper and lower respiratory system.

    • Based on the injuries sustained and the damage to Ffr. Schira’s protective equipment, it is likely that that he was exposed to a rapid intensification of heat and flames in the building’s basement that overwhelmed his protective ensemble and equipment, exposing his body and respiratory system to intense heat and toxic products of combustion.

    Select Findings and Recommendations

    Findings, Discussions and Recommendations

    FINDING #3.1: The area of fire origin had no finished ceiling, which exposed the floor joists and the underside of the floor decking to direct fire impingement causing rapid deterioration and failure of the flooring system directly underneath the main-level family room.

    During this incident, based on communications transcripts (telephone and radio) it’s probable that the fire had advanced from its incipient stage to a free burning stage in approximately 18 to 20-minutes by the time Capt. Broxterman radioed that they were making entry into the basement.

    • As stated in the Incident Overview section, during the time period between 06:29:24 and 06:34:48, it is believed that one or more catastrophic events occurred within the building, which included a failure of the flooring system near the Beta-Charlie corner of the building’s first floor.

    It has been widely believed in the firefighting profession that traditional sawn lumber is far superior to some of the more innovative lightweight construction components (e.g., wood I-joist) in use today. With dimensional lumber, two-inch by eight-inch and larger, there is a greater surface to mass ratio to resist the damaging effects of fire and the structural components will maintain their integrity for a longer period of time. While this has traditionally been accurate, this incident clearly shows that this may not always be the case. Heavy charring was evident to structural members in the fire area of origin. Notice the burn damage shows how the wooden floor joists had been burned to and away from the band joist. A band joist is a vertical member that forms the perimeter of a floor system in which the floor joists tie in to. Also known as the rim joist. Early platform framed homes very likely used solid, dimensional lumber and plywood, which provided a reasonable surface to mass ratio. But the later the home was built, the less mass even dimensional lumber has due to the reduction in the actual thickness of solid dimensional lumber provided by the lumber industry through the mid-1900’s. As the years go by, building materials will likely keep getting lighter and lighter and introduce more resins and other chemicals.

     Laboratory tests that exposed structural wood components to the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E119 Assembly Test indicated that a traditional two-inch by ten-inch structural member failed in 12-minutes and six-seconds. ASTM E119 test is the standard test method for evaluating building and construction materials exposed to fire. Unlike the standardized ASTM test fires, it is widely recognized that real building fires are highly variable in their size, rate of growth and intensity. Responding firefighters are unlikely to know when a given fire started, how hot it had been prior to arrival, how long it had been at any given temperature, the design capacity and actual loads on the floors over the fire or the amount of actual damage that the fire may have done to the joists. All of these factors make it impossible to predict the remaining capacity of a floor by even the most knowledgeable, professional fire experts.

    RECOMMENDATION #3.1a: Fire departments should ensure that firefighters and incident commanders are aware that unprotected floor and ceiling joist systems, no matter the type, may fail at a faster rate when exposed to direct fire impingement.

    Unfinished basement ceilings and other areas that have exposed joists or trusses jeopardize flooring and roof systems unnecessarily during a fire, causing premature failure. Often, a weakened floor and ceiling joist system can be difficult to detect from above as the floor surface above may still appear intact. Firefighters operating on floors above fire-damaged joist systems may fall through a weakened area and become trapped in a fire below. IC’s and firefighters must be aware that these systems can fail rapidly and without warning, and plan interior operations accordingly.

    Firefighters must also be aware that while floor sag may be a widely accepted warning of an impending structural failure, floor sag is not always present or visible prior to a catastrophic collapse in a fire, regardless of the joist type, due to floor coverings, the fire’s intensity, the combination of joist spans and loads present, the location of serious structural fire damage or simply because it is too dark and smoky to see a sag in the floor. This is true for all types of structural joists, including materials such as sawn lumber, wood I-joists, and open web wood trusses and noncombustible members such as lightweight steel joists. The floor covering in this area was carpeting that transitioned to ceramic tile. When unprotected, any traditional or lightweight residential floor or ceiling assembly material, either combustible or noncombustible, may fail within several minutes of the fire’s ignition. It makes sense, therefore, that when there is a serious fire beneath a floor, there is no predictable safe amount of time that anyone can remain on that floor. Any floor system protected or not, can fail unpredictably when exposed to a substantial fire beneath.

    FINDING # 4.2: E102′s officer failed to properly analyze the scene by not performing a 360-degree scene size-up to determine an overall strategy, and implement safe and effective firefighting tactics.

    After the apparatus was positioned in front of the building, E102’s FAO was ordered by Capt. Broxterman to, “Ask the homeowner where the fire [location] was”, which was indicated to be in the basement by the male homeowner. As this was taking place, Capt. Broxterman continued donning her protective clothing ensemble (coat, helmet and self-contained breathing apparatus). Although E102′s officer provided a brief radio report of conditions observed upon arrival, she did not properly evaluate the scene so as to develop a basic strategy for implementation of safe and effective firefighting tactics. Had the officer visually evaluated the Charlie side of the building, the advanced fire conditions may have been noted, and that the lower level fire area was accessible by means of an exterior entry door for a more direct fire attack from the interior unburned side.

    This means that firefighters enter a building and position the attack hose line between the fire and the uninvolved portions of the building. This direction of fire attack is preferred because it is likely to contain the fire, protect occupants, and push heat and gases out of the building if ventilation has been performed. On the other hand, danger increases significantly when attacking from the unburned side and is not always practical based on fire location, intensity, and building construction.

    It cannot be conclusively known as to why Capt. Broxterman and Ffr. Schira proceeded into the area of the building that eventually collapsed resulting in their deaths. The investigation committee has concluded that the most probable explanation is that E102′s three-person interior team was successful in advancing their uncharged attack hose line into the basement recreation room area; reaching a point approximately 10 to15-feet from the bottom of the basement stairway as shown in the Incident Overview chapter. Once the team reached this area, it was realized they did not have sufficient hose line to continue advancing towards the seat of the fire. The team’s third member (Ffr. #2) reversed his travel and made his way back to the exterior of the building to advance additional hose line. As the team of two waited for additional hose line to be stretched and the hose line to be charged by the pump operator, the interior conditions rapidly deteriorated to a stage that it became untenable for them to hold their position.

    The team evacuated back-up the stairway without following the hose line, which by all indications was tight up against the stairway wall and tightly wrapped around the stairway door entry. Once at the top of the stairway, one of the two deceased, if not both were likely in some form of distress; became disoriented and proceeded into the family room in a direction opposite the route of travel from which they entered the building. As the two moved across the family room floor, the flooring system collapsed into the utility room area of the basement. When the third team member re-entered the building, he was unable to locate the other two members.

    The inability of Ffr. #2 to locate his team and the loss of radio communications contact with the interior team prompted the IC to declare a Mayday and activation of the RATs. This incident resulted in tragedy primarily due to the concealment of several burned-through floor joists under the carpet covered flooring system, which was nearly impossible to recognize due to heavy smoke conditions inside the burning building.

    The following factors are believed to have directly contributed to the deaths that occurred in this incident:

    • The delayed arrival at the incident scene allowed the fire to progress significantly and the hazardous conditions to exponentially increase;
    • The failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices (e.g., entry into an enclosed building with obvious working fire conditions without a charged attack hose line)
    • The failure to abide by the fundamental concepts of fire fighter self-rescue and survival (e.g., following of the hose line in the direction of travel back to the building’s entrance or exit).

     Although the aforementioned factors are believed to have directly contributed to the deaths reported here, they might have been prevented if:

    • Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident which eventually led to being overwhelmed in their response to their initial findings;
    • Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators, and the potential threats and risks that presented themselves;
    • The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
    • timely manner relative to the incident, especially critical was the information  given to the emergency communications center from the homeowners reporting an actual fire
    • Personnel assigned to E102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their firstdue response area specifically related to road and street locations, and any particular characteristics related to those areas.
    • A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations; the risk of an action must be weighed against the probable benefit that may be reasonably and realistically expected.
    • Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural firefighting existed within the department;
    • The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time. This competition led to missed and distorted messages and less than efficient use of resources, which exacerbated the problems of already taxed communications.
    • The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
    • Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions as encountered with an emphasis placed on fire ground tactical priorities (i.e., life safety, incident stabilization and property conservation);
    • Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
    •  Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.

    In Memory

    The Colerain Township (OH) Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services’s report examined the events of April 4th, 2008 with the benefit of hindsight, while seeking to be independent, impartial, and thorough. From the beginning, Colerain Fire & EMS has been committed to share our findings with others in the hope that it may prevent another such event.

    The deaths of Captain Robin M. Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira had a profound loss not only to their parents, family and this organization, but also to the larger fire service community. In order to prevent these tragic losses in the future, we must first understand how and why our sister and brother firefighters died. We must learn from their incident and take that knowledge forward. If it was possible, what would these firefighters tell us today that might prevent a similar death of a firefighter in the future? What would they want us as firefighters, company officers and chief officers to know about the circumstances that lead to their deaths and the things we (and they) might have done to alter the most tragic of outcomes?  

    From the information that was made available for review, it was evident that these two individuals were well-loved in life, and greatly missed in death. Every line of duty death of a firefighter in the United States is significant. This investigative analysis document is dedicated to Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira, their families, friends and the community whose lives were forever changed. In working to improve the health and safety of all United States firefighters, we have much to learn from the supreme sacrifice of these two individuals, who they were in life and in death. We honor their memories.

      

    References

    • Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Web Site HERE
    • Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths April, 2010 Full Report HERE
    • NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
    • WLTW.com news report Summary HERE

      

     

    No More History Repeating Events-Remembrance

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    As we approach the July 4th holiday period, two significant LODD incidents previously occurred during this time frame that hold a number of lessons learned related to command management, operations, building construction principles and building performance, fire behavior and the ever present dangers of the job. Take the opportunity to learn more about these events, and expand your insights and knowledge base.  Those events being the 1988 Hackensack (NJ) Ford Fire which resulted in five (5) LODD and the 2002 Gloucester City (NJ) Fire that resulted in three (3) LODD along with three children.

    Take a moment to reflect upon the supreme sacrifice made by these heroic firefighters and the messages that lay within the pages of the incident case studies, reports and summaries.  Our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com   has a comprehensive overview of both events with report links and a must see video on the Gloucester City (NJ) 2002 LODD event. For Remembering Hackensack and Gloucester follow the link HERE

    Remembrance (1988)

    Hackensack (NJ) Fire Department
    • CAPT. RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, Engine Co. No. 304
    • LIEUT. RICHARD REINHAGEN, Engine Co. No. 302
    • F/F WILLIAM KREJSA, Engine Co. No. 301
    • F/F LEONARD RADUMSKI, Engine Co. No. 302
    • F/F STEPHEN ENNIS, Rescue Co. No. 308
      

    Remember (2002)

    Gloucester City (NJ) Fire
    • James Sylvester Fire Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
    • John West Deputy Chief, Mount Ephraim Fire Department
    • Thomas G. Stewart III Paid Firefighter, Gloucester City Fire Department

    Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety

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    Commandsafety.com is pleased to make available the latest update to the Buildingsonfire.com’s Building Construction Training and Lecture Series for 2010. Recently updated with a series of new seminar and training program topics addressing the emerging training and educational needs of the fire service, these programs provide timely and relevant information and insights on Building Construction, Command Risk Management, Dynamic and Extreme Fire Behavior, Occupancy Situational Awareness, Engineered Structural Systems and Fire Fighter Safety.

    These programs also present and integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and much more.  

    These programs, lectures and seminars examine crucial construction elements and occupancy types and correlates building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety. These fast paced programs will utilize extensive multimedia materials, interactive activities, case study activities and simulations to reinforce course content and subject areas, providing exceptional learning opportunities.

    Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”. Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)

    Down load the program files from the link below for more information.

    Building Construction Training Programs 2010

    Taking it to the Streets

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    Coming July 2010

    The Summer Tour is about to Begin..

    Taking it to the Streets

    With Christopher Naum

    A New Monthly Radio Talkshow on FireFighter Netcast.com

    A Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighter Netcast.com Production

    Advancing FireFighter Safety and Operational Intergrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.

    Watch for the Latest Announcements here on CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com and on Firefighter Netcast.com

    Programming

    Ten Minutes in the Street

    • Presenting an informational recap and discussion on leading topcs, events and issues from the past 30 days.

    Feature Segments Program will have one (1) selected segment based upon topic and guest

    Buildingsonfire

    • Addressing today’s topical issues within the areas of Firefighting, Building Construction, Dynamic Risk Assessment, and Command & Tactical Safety
      • Open interative discussions and call-in
    • Street Stories
      • Presenting first-hand accounts and insights on an event, response or operation with a featured guest
      • Open interative discussions and call-in
    • Smoke Showin’
      • Featured Guest Interviews and discussions focusing on the NFFF Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives and Everyone Goes Home Campaign
      • Open interative discussions and call-in

    HRE History Repeating Events

    • Discussion on recent History Repeating Events, LODD, NIOSH Reports or other
    • Open interative discussions and call-in

    A View from the Street

    • Closing Commentary on timely and relevant issues affecting the Fire Service

    Reflecting on These Days of June

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    Over the next few days, much will be written up reflecting on a number of past historical events that resonate with the rich heritage, honor and tradition that makes this Fire Service what it is.  Anniversaries come and go; remembrance, sorrow, grief and respect; the good and the bad all seem to come streaming back-or these emotions and the lessons from these events seem to diminish and fade over even the shortest spans of time that may have passed.  Or may have been all but forgotten as a new generation comes through the firehouse doors. Yes it does happen.

    We need to learn, remember and implement the lessons from the past, especially when we refer to or are confronted with History Repeating Events (HRE) or similar situational profiles. We must develop an inherent understanding on the Predictability of Performance of our building and occupancies and truly understand and apply effective strategic and tactical plans under combat structural fire engagement. There are legacies for operational safety; do you know what they where, who was affected and what the outcomes where?

    We must implement a process of Tactical Patience that correlates to  the manner in which our building perform, the dynamics and behavior of fire that affects them and defines our firefighting methodologies when we engage in our missions of operations within the built environment. I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this emerging concept out at my lecture program presentation at the upcoming Southeastern Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SEAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken. Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures. This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.

    • Modern building construction is no longer predicable
    • Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
    • Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
    • Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
    • Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
    • Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
    • Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
    • Command & Company Officer dereliction
    • Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

    STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT
    There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.

    These behaviors include;
    • Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment.

    • Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.

    • Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.

    Here’s the expanded versions in case this is th first time you’ve seen them;

    TACTICAL AMUSEMENT *tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt
    1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk
    3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL DIVERSION *tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən
    1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk
    2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION *tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən
    1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience after I roll this out at the upcoming Southeast Association of Fire Chief’s Conference (SAFC) in Louisville later this month.

    If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.

    The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change. Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities. It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.

    Check out these links;

    If you haven’t read Chief Mayers’s discerning reflections on Firehouse Zen, this is a MUST read. Where Were You That Night?

    The Lessons Learned from the Past

    From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack- Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

    Predictability of Occupancy Performance during Suppression Operations

    Combat Fire Engagement

    Situations, Size-Up, Actions and Entertainment

    Changes in Building Construction and Fire Behavior

    Ten Minutes in the Street: Interactive Scenarios Returning to Firefighter Nation

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    Ten Minutes in the Street

     After a bit of an extended hiatus on the lecture circuit, Ten Minutes in the Street is returning to the Firefighter Nation Forums with more of what you came to expect with high quality scenarios and thought provoking discussions to get you engaged and thinking: strategically and tactically with a balanced risk approach.

     We launch the summer series of Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios during this year’s Safety, Health & Survival Week starting on June 21.

    These interactive scenario programs will be featured weekly on the FFN Fire Ground Tactics and FireFighter Safety Forum, HERE

    In the mean time, here are some great Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios that we presented, take some time to look these over if you’re new to the content and interactive participation.

    • Ten Minutes in the Street: Read “through” the Smoke, HERE
    • Ten Minutes in the Street; “But its only a Garage..!”, HERE
    • Ten Minutes in the Street; Pipin’ Hot First Due..30 Minutes or Less, HERE
    • Ten Minutes in the Street; “Here’s lookin’ at You”, HERE
    • Ten Minutes in the Street; Stretchin’ the line on the First-Due, HERE

    Also, take a moment to check out our other activity and postings at Fire EMS Blogs at TheCompanyOfficer.com. You can also follow the latest informational links on Facebook at Buildingsonfire.com 

    Can you keep a secret? Stay tuned for some great upcoming  announcements regarding a new program series that will be brought to you by some very familiar names…..”The Summer Tour is about to begin..”

    NIST Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments ISSUED

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    4-28-2010 5-18-34 PMReport-on-Residential-Fireground-Field-Experiments

    The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiements was issued this morning. A copy of the report is attached. The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE

    Report Abstract:

    Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.

    This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.

    This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.

    A were deployed in response to live fires within this facility. In addition to systematically controlling for the arrival times of the first and subsequent fire apparatus, crew size was varied to consider two-, three-, four-, and five-person staffing. Each deployment performed a series of 22 tasks that were timed, while the thermal and toxic environment inside the structure was measured. Additional experiments with larger fuel loads as well as fire modeling produced additional insight. Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.

    We will review the report findings and provide insights over the upcoming weekend.

    Addition project information and insights, HERE

    Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report

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    8-26-2009 7-07-53 AMNIOSH released it’s report on the August 24, 2009 three alarm fire at 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo, New York that resulted in the LODD of Lt. Charles McCarthy and FF Jonathan Croom. On August 24, 2009, 45-year-old career Lieutenant Charles McCarthy died following a partial floor collapse into a basement fire, and  34-year-old career fire fighter Jonathan Croom was fatally injured while attempting to rescue the Lieutenant.  The Buffalo Fire Department was dispatched for “an alarm of fire” with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. Repeated attempts were made to force open this basement door in order to search for trapped civilians, but crews had difficulty gaining access through this door because it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the 1st and 2nd floors with no civilians found.

    Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional manpower was sent with special tools to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2. Lieutenant Charles McCarthy and two fire fighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify all fire fighters had exited a 1st floor deli. Lt. McCarthy following a hoseline into the structure, was well ahead of the other two fire fighters when the 1st floor partially collapsed beneath him. McCarthy fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire. The other two fire fighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. Lt. McCarthy made several Mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device. Confusion erupted exteriorly on scene when trying to verify who was calling the Mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement.

    The incident commander was aware that he had crews attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure. Simultaneously, FF Croom, a member of the fire fighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside  Lieutenant McCarthy’s point of entry when the Mayday calls came out. It is believed that FF Croom  knew where the Lt., was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. FF Croom grabbed a tool, went on air, and rushed into the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other fire fighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device alarming. Lt. McCarthy was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but FF Croom was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after Lt. McCarthy’s Mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the 1st floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. the Lt’s. PASS device was still alarming. They were pronounced dead on scene. Four fire fighters and one lieutenant suffered minor injuries during the incident. No civilians were discovered within the structure.

    Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity not maintained.

    NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

    • Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
    • Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
    • Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
    • Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
    • Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
    • Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.
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    1815 Genesee Street 1815 Genesee Street

    CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 

    Occupational injuries and fatalities are often the result of one or more contributing factors or key events in a larger sequence of events that ultimately result in the injury or fatality. NIOSH investigators identified the following items as key contributing factors in this incident that may have led to the fatalities:

    • Working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire.
    • Interior condition reports not communicated to command.
    • Inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments.
    • Crew integrity not maintained.

    Time Line from the Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report

    3:51 a.m. – fire crews were sent to 1815 Genesee Street in Buffalo. When they arrived, they were met by a resident who said he heard people trapped inside. Crews began searching the building, but were eventually ordered out as conditions deteriorated.

    4:22 a.m. – Members of Rescue 1 entered the building to make sure all firefighters had evacuated the building. Less than two minutes later the floor in the rear of the building collapsed. Lt. McCarthy of Rescue 1 fell into the basement as the floor collapsed. according to the report, other members of Rescue 1 were unaware of the collapse and only reported hearing a loud noise. McCarthy began calling for help on his radio, but other members of Rescue 1 were unable to determine where the calls were coming from and left the building unaware that Lt. McCarthy was trapped.

    4:23 a.m. – Firefighter Croom entered the building after hearing the calls for help. the report says he did not exit the building, apparently falling into the basement near Lt. McCarthy.

    4:31 a.m. – An emergency head count was ordered to determine the identity of the missing firefighter. Lt. McCarthy was reported missing at that time, but FF Croom was not. Firefighters in the front of the store reported hearing a pass alarm, but could not reach it due to extreme fire conditions, a weakened floor and continuing collapse.

    4:48 a.m. – all crews were ordered out of the building because it had become unsafe.

    Later, concerns began to arise that FF Croom was missing. the report says he was erroneously reported in a remote area.

    5:46 a.m. – On scene personal realize FF Croom is missing and likely inside the building.

    6:10 a.m. – Another head count is taken and FF Croom is reported missing.

    9:18 a.m. – the Recovery Group reports that the two missing firefighters had been located in the basement, covered in fallen debris.

    9:32 a.m. – the debris is cleared and Recovery Group firefighters reach Lt. McCarthy and FF Croom.

    Buffalo (NY) Fire Department Investigative Report, issued December 2, 2009, HERE

    For a comprehensive Power Point Program on Operational Safety at Heavy Timber and Ordinary Construction Occupancys that you can down load, go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting Web Site HERE.

    I produced an informational training PPT program and support information that aligned with a previoulsy reported Near Miss Event Report. You can download the PPT Training Program HERE and the PDF File HERE

    NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Report 2009-23, HERE

    Buildingsonfire reaches Milestone

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    Buildingsonfire on Face Book reaches 3,000 fan milestone, are you one? Sign up and follow Buildingsonfire on Facebook today

    Remember, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety

    Follow Commandsafety on Twitter, HERE and Buildingsonfire on Twitter, HERE

    3-26-2010 9-31-01 PM

    Operational Safety at Buildings Under Renovation

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    A multiple alarm fire consumed the county courthouse in downtown Pittsboro, North Carolina yesterday. The building was undergoing renovations at the time of the fire and was occupied and operational. The fire started in the clock tower of the 130-yr.-old building and is believed to have been caused by welders.  The entire building was undergoing renovation with the outside enclosed with scaffolding. 

    The clock tower had a protective tarp wrapped around it that preventing outside hose streams from reaching the seat of the fire. The fire broke out at 4:45 p.m., according to county and court officials, shortly after court sessions had ended. All who worked in the building were evacuated safely, according to county officials, and no injuries had been reported late Thursday. According to published reports, the courthouse, the centerpiece of the Pittsboro downtown, was built in stages. It was initially constructed in 1881 at a cost of $10,666, according to Paul Shield Crane’s first edition of “North Carolina Taproots: Courthouses of North Carolina.” In 1930, another story was added to the brick building and, in 1959, there was an extensive renovation that cost $130,000.

    Bottom line, buildings undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations can pose significant risk to suppression operations and lead to firefighter injuries and fatalities. This can not be stressed enough.

    The unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences, requires a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation. You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.

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    The following are assessment considerations that may provide insights in the assessment, risk profile and development of pre-fire plans, operational procedures and field directives to prevent history repeating events (HRE) with similar conditions and attributes;

     Construction Type

    • What is the construction type or mixed application? How does this affect suppression, rescue, special operations and typical daily operations?
    • Stage and/or Phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
    • The Stage and/or phase of construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovation has, SIGNIFICANT impact on firefighter safety and operational integrity.
    • Understanding these stages and phases can provide mission critical decision-making considerations to incident management teams and company officers.

     Site conditions and accessibility

    • Considerations for both horizontal, vertical and grade conditions.
    • Considerations during changes in stages and phases. Expect changes
    • Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s

     Exposures

    • These will be specific to the commonality or uniqueness of the structure and occupancy.

     Resources

    • Do you have enough of what’s going to be needed? Plan for it now, before you’re in the street needing it “yesterday”.
    • Think BIG, as the adage goes, you can always send the companies back. Don’t under estimate the types and kind of resources needs, based upon the structure profile and the potential of undetermined conditions. (reinforces need for pre-planning)
    • Share the Knowledge, Situational Awareness and Pre-planning inf
      ormation with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

     Operating procedures
    Again, response and operations at these types of structures demands that pre-fire plan considerations, dialog, discussions, communications and what ever else is appropriate to you organization is identified and disseminated BEFORE an alarm response occurs. Take advantage of pre-gaming and table top a target occupancy, to increase preparedness and reduce risk potential.

    • Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
    • Update the plans as conditions change
    • Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

     Knowledge and Situational Awareness

    • Understand, explore, research and obtain ALL the necessary information on the structure(s) undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations
    • Conduct periodic command and company level inspections and walk-through’s
    • Communicate the observations, findings, conditions and considerations.

     Communications

    • What ever you identify- COMMUNICATE this throughout the organization.
      Share the information with other agencies (resources) you may call upon to support escalating or multiple alarm events.

     Special and Unique Conditions

    • Identify and plan for the Special and Unique Conditions that may exclusive to you jurisdiction’s structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations.

     Contingency Plans

    • Plan of the unexpected and have contingent plans in place.

     The magnitude and complexity of an incident involving a structure undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations will be directly proportional to the size of the building/construction site and corresponding age profile (vintage) of the existing building, if under renovation, and degree of construction. Operational deployment and the Incident Action Plan- IAP must be addressed during strategic and tactical incident management, risk profiling and pre-incident and on-scene intelligence, reconnaissance and planning considerations: More HERE

    Maintaining Situational Awareness

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    00-EOY-ss-buildingcollapseMaintaining focused situational awareness while recognizing and processing a wide latitude of incoming information and observations at complex and multiple alarm incidents is a significant challenge to even the most experienced of incident command teams. However, things can go wrong and they can go wrong in a rapidly escalating manner with little time to recover. A prominent double LODD incident from six years ago provides poignant lessons learned as does another history repeating event (HRE) from 1972.

    The Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972) have a number of commonalities related to extended multi-alarm operations, building compromise and collapse and multiple line-of-duty deaths of operating fire service personnel. Although building type, construction features and systems are unique for each incident as are the circumstances that lead to the events, there are mission critical lessons to be reexamined or newly introduced if you’re not familiar with either event. This is especially true when we talk about operational challenges and adverse conditions that result in firefighter injuries and fatalities during overhaul and take-up phases of an incident.

    Remember Situation Awareness, [SA], is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.

    Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported. Situation Awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991) (Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Situation Awareness becomes especially important in work related domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions can lead to serious consequences.

    To the Incident commander, Fire Officer or firefighter, knowing what’s going on around you, and understanding the consequences is mission critical to incident stabilization and mitigation and profoundly crucial in terms of personnel safety. The integration of Situational Awareness and Dynamic Risk Assessment is a mission critical element in strategic incident command management and company level tactical operations as we go forward into the next decade. We’ll expand on some posting in the near future and address Dynamic Risk Assessment in the context of building and occupancy profiling and operations. Additionally, maintaining a heightened sense of risk and safety integrity when operating within non-combat fire suppression modes or phases also requires due diligence, focused and fluid situational awareness coupled with concise monitoring of building conditions, indicators (both evident and projected) and taking conservative actions and postures to ensure personnel are not placed in high risk, no value positions that have a high potential for error likely outcomes.

    Check out the detailed posting at our sister site TheCompanyOfficer.com for insights into both the Ebenezer Baptist Church fire in Pittsburg, PA (2004) and the Hotel Vendome Fire in Boston, MA (1972) HERE. Think about the questioned posed related to complex multi-company operations, command safety and operational integrity of compromised buildings and structural systems. Remember; Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.