Wind Driven Fires

Wind blowing into the broken window of a room on fire can turn a “routine room and contents fire” into a floor-to-ceiling firestorm. Historically, this has led to a significant number of firefighter fatalities and injuries, particularly in high-rise buildings where the fire must be fought from the interior of the structure.

Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House in Texas, 2009

On April 12, 2009, a fire in a one-story ranch home in Texas claimed the lives of two fire fighters.  (NIOSH REPORT HERE) Sustained high winds occurred during the incident.  The winds caused a rapid change in the dynamics of the fire after the failure of a large section of glass in the rear of the house. 

Wind Driven Fire in Home, Texas, 2009. Aerial view of damage to the structure. Photo credit: Houston Fire Department.

NIST performed computer simulations of the fire using the Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS)  and Smokeview, a visualization tool, to provide insight on the fire development and thermal conditions that may have existed in the residence during the fire.

The FDS simulation that best represents the witnessed fire conditions indicates that the fire that spread throughout the attic and first floor developed a wind driven flow with temperatures in excess of 260 °C (500 °F) between the den and front door.  The critical event in this fire was the creation of a wind-driven flow path between the upwind side of the structure and the exit point on the downwind side of the structure, the front door.  The flow path was created by the failure of a large span of windows in the den, in the rear of the structure.  Floor-to-ceiling temperatures rapidly increased in the flow path where multiple crews were performing interior operations.  In a simulation that excluded wind, the flow path was not created, and the thermal environment surrounding the location of interior operations was improved.

Still image from FDS simulation.  Temperatures at 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor throughout the house 10 s after solarium failure. Image credit: NIST.

Wind has been recognized as a contributing factor to fire spread in wildland fires and large-area conflagrations and wildland fire fighters are trained to account for the wind in their tactics.  While structural fire departments have recognized the impact of wind on fires, in general, the standard operating guidelines for structural fire fighting have not changed to address the hazards created by a wind driven fire inside a structure.  The results of the “no-wind” and “wind” fire simulations demonstrate how wind conditions can rapidly change the thermal environment from tenable to untenable for fire fighters working in a single-story residential structure fire.

The simulation results emphasize the importance of including wind conditions in the scene size-up before beginning and while performing fire fighting operations and adjusting tactics based on the wind conditions.  These results are in agreement with NIST studies conducted to examine wind driven fire conditions in high-rise structures.

LESSONS  LEARNED

Based on the analysis of this fire incident and results from previous studies, adjusting fire fighting tactics to account for wind conditions in structural fire fighting is critical to enhancing the safety and the effectiveness of fire fighters.  Previous studies demonstrated that applying water from the exterior, into the upwind side of the structure can have a significant impact on controlling the fire prior to beginning interior operations.  It should be made clear that in a wind-driven fire, it is most important to use the wind to your advantage and attack the fire from the upwind side of the structure, especially if the upwind side is the burned side.  Interior operations need to be aware of potentially rapidly changing conditions.

See full report, Simulation of the Dynamics of a Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House – Texas (NIST TN 1729, January 2012)

F2009-11

Apr 12, 2009

Career probationary fire fighter and captain die as a result of rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire – Texas

PDF

Career Probationary Fire Fighter and Captain Die as a Result of Rapid Fire Progression in a Wind-Driven Residential Structure Fire – Texas

SUMMARY

Shortly after midnight on Sunday, April 12, 2009, a 30-year old male career probationary fire fighter and a 50-year old male career captain were killed when they were trapped by rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire. The victims were members of the first arriving company and initiated fast attack offensive interior operations through the front entrance. Less than six minutes after arriving on-scene, the victims became disoriented as high winds pushed the rapidly growing fire through the den and living room areas where interior crews were operating. Seven other fire fighters were driven from the structure but the two victims were unable to escape. Rescue operations were immediately initiated but had to be suspended as conditions deteriorated. The victims were located and removed from the structure approximately 40 minutes after they arrived on location.

Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: an inadequate size-up prior to committing to tactical operations; lack of understanding of fire behavior and fire dynamics; fire in a void space burning in a ventilation controlled regime; high winds; uncoordinated tactical operations, in particular fire control and tactical ventilation; failure to protect the means of egress with a backup hose line; inadequate fireground communications; and failure to react appropriately to deteriorating conditions.

NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

• ensure that an adequate initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene is conducted before beginning interior fire fighting operations
• ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior (such as smoke color, velocity, density, visible fire, heat)
• ensure that fire fighters are trained to recognize the potential impact of windy conditions on fire behavior and implement appropriate tactics to mitigate the potential hazards of wind-driven fire
• ensure that fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively apply ventilation and fire control tactics in a coordinated manner
• ensure that fire fighters and officers understand the capabilities and limitations of thermal imaging cameras (TIC) and that a TIC is used as part of the size-up process
• ensure that fire fighters are trained to check for fire in overhead voids upon entry and as charged hoselines are advanced
• develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to insure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday
• ensure fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures
• ensure all fire fighters on the fire ground are equipped with radios capable of communicating with the Incident Commander and Dispatch

Additionally, research and standard setting organizations should:

• conduct research to more fully characterize the thermal performance of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece lens materials and other personal protective equipment (PPE) components to ensure SCBA and PPE provide an appropriate level of protection.
• Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation could have specifically prevented the fatalities, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments:
• ensure that all fire fighters recognize the capabilities and limitations of their personal protective equipment when operating in high temperature environments.

Remembering

Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983

Buffalo Box 191

As Buffalo (NY) firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III Ordinary and Type IV Heavy Timber construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically.

The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5′s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1′s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32′s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.

Previously posted on Thecompanyofficer.com HERE

• Remember to think about occupancy risk and not occupancy type and the factors related to the occupancy usage and the nature of the call. Nothing is ever routine.
• WKBW.com Cached video clip, HERE
• Buffalo, NY Propane Gas Explosion, Dec 1983, HERE
• Propane blast death affects son of fireman, HERE and HERE
• PROPANE EXPLOSION 25th  ANNIVERSARY IN BUFFALO,NEW YORK, HERE
• New York Times, HERE and HERE
• Rememberance, HERE and History Repeating Events, HERE
• Insights from Mike Lombardo, HERE
• http://www.wivb.com/dpp/news/buffalo/Firefighters-remember-North-Division-Street-explosion

Firefighters rush into a burning commercial building with too-small hoses and insufficient water. The commander can’t reach them because the captain forgot his radio. Backup crews aren’t sure where to go or what to do. Confusion reigns as the building’s truss roof collapses in an explosion of flames.

This reads like the playbook from the deadly Sofa Super Store fire in June 2007, but it’s not. These dangerous missteps occurred at a March 1 blaze on Daniel Island, according to an internal report obtained by The Post and Courier.

They occurred despite nearly four years of intensive and expensive efforts to instill a culture of safety in the Charleston Fire Department.

What’s more, the commander in charge that day — a man repeatedly faulted in the in-house review of the blaze — was recently promoted to a top position in the department. And that’s causing some dissension in the ranks.

City fire officials stand behind their promotion of Troy Williams to battalion chief, and they said the portion of the draft report that leaked to the newspaper is incomplete, unfair, unofficial and riddled with inaccuracies.

Fire Chief Thomas Carr acknowledged problems at the fire, which gutted a two-story office building at 899 Island Park Drive. That’s why he authorized a six-member committee of firefighters to conduct what’s known as a critical incident review. But Carr said he rejected the resulting draft report when it landed on his desk six weeks ago because it had errors and failed to live up to its intended purpose, which is to be an educational tool, not an instrument for blame.

The 12-page portion obtained by the The Post Courier newspaper describes “major” violations of policy and assigns blame for those mistakes. It raises questions about the handling of the blaze, the effectiveness of the training firefighters have received and the integrity of the promotion process.

It also highlights the continuing conflict between the department’s hard-charging past and its new, risk-sensitive methods.

• For the Complete Full version Article: The Post and Courier HERE
• SConfire HERE
• Draft Fire Report-Read more: Fire report

High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year
  

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is reporting that in 2005-2009, there were an average of 15,700 reported structure fires in high-rise buildings per year with an associated $235 million in direct property damage.

The report, “High-Rise Building Fires,” (PDF, 499 KB) cites apartments, hotels, offices, and facilities that care for sick as accounting for roughly half of all high-rise fires. Structure fires in these four property classes resulted in $99 million in direct property damage per year.

There is a downward trend in high-rise fires. In the last few decades, a range of special provisions have migrated into the codes and standards for tall buildings.

Other findings from the report:

• In 2005-2009, high-rise fires claimed the lives of 53 civilians and injured 546 others, per year.
• The risks of fire, fire death, and direct property damage due to fire tend to be lower in high-rise buildings than in shorter buildings of the same property use.
• An estimated three percent of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.
• Usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings of the same property use.Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story.  The risk of a fire is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

 In 2005-2009, an estimated 15,700 reported high-rise structure fires per year resulted in associated losses of 53 civilian deaths, 546 civilian injuries, and $235 million in direct property damage per year. An estimated 2.6% of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.

The trends in high-rise fires and associated losses (inflation-adjusted for property damage) are clearly down, but the sharp post-1998 reduction appears to be mostly due to the change to NFIRS Version 5.0, which is shifting estimates to lower levels that also appear to be more accurate.

Four property classes account for roughly half of high-rise fires: apartments, hotels, facilities that care for the sick, and offices. In 2005-2009, in these four property classes combined, there were 7,800 reported high-rise structure fires per year and associated losses of 30 civilian deaths, 352 civilian injuries, and $99 million in direct property damage per year. The property damage average is inflated by the influence of one 2008 hotel fire, whose $100 million loss projected to nearly $40 million a year in the analysis.

The report emphasizes these four property classes.

Some other property uses – such as stores and restaurants – may represent only a single floor in a tall building primarily devoted to other uses. Some property uses – such as grain elevators and factories – can be as tall as a high-rise building but without a large number of separate floors or stories.

• For these reasons, the four property use groups listed above define most of the buildings we think of as high-rise buildings, and their fires come closest to defining what we think of as the high-rise building fire problem.
• By most measures of loss, the risks of fire and of associated fire loss are lower in highrise buildings than in other buildings of the same property loss.
• This statement applies to risk of fire, civilian fire deaths, civilian fire injuries, and direct property damage due to fire, relative to housing units, for apartments, and risk of fire for hotels, offices, and facilities that care for the sick.

The usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings, for each property use group. Even so, considering the extensive requirements in NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, for fire and life safety features in both new and existing high-rise buildings, it seems clear that there are still major gaps, particularly in adoption and enforcement of the provisions requiring retrofit of automatic sprinkler systems and other life safety systems in existing high-rise buildings. NFPA 1®,Fire Code, has sprinkler retrofit requirements.

This has implications for public officials and ordinary citizens in any city. Public officials should make sure that the latest editions of NFPA 1®, Fire Code, and NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, are in place and that the codes they have are supported by effective code enforcement provisions, including plan review and inspection processes, both for new construction and for continued supervision of code compliance in existing buildings.

The public can take responsibility for their own safety by insisting that their public officials take these steps. As in so many areas of fire safety, we know what to do, but we still need to do it.

The trend had been toward a smaller share of fires being reported each year as occurring in buildings with fire-resistive construction, both for high-rise and other buildings, with the decline being most dramatic in facilities that care for the sick.

• This statistical decline could reflect any or all of the following:
• (a) a shift in construction between the two types permitted by codes, from Type I (442 or 332) construction, which is coded as fire-resistive, to Type II (222) construction, which is coded as protected non-combustible;
• (b) a shift to acceptable alternative designs using more sprinklers and less fire-resistive construction; or
• (c) enough success in containing fires that a rising fraction never are reported to fire departments, because the fires are caught and controlled so early by occupants.

 Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The fraction of 2005-

2009 high-rise fires that began on the 7th floor or higher was 32% for apartments, 22% for hotels and motels, 21% for facilities that care for the sick, and 39% for office buildings. The risk of a fire start is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.

• High-rise apartments have a slightly larger share of their fires originating in means of egress than do their shorter counterparts (4% vs. 3%).
• The same is true of hotels (7% vs. 5%) and facilities that care for the sick (6% vs. 4%).
• In offices (4% vs. 6%), the differences in percentages are in the opposite direction, which means that high-rise buildings in those properties have a smaller share of their fires originating in means of egress.
• In all four property classes, the differences are so small that one can say there is no evidence that high-rise buildings have a bigger problem with fires starting in means of egress.

NFPA FACT SHEET

• More information on Solomon’s NFPA session and the conference can be found at www.nfpa.org/FLSCONF.
• NFPA Report Download, HERE

2010 Fire Series

U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) issued the 2010 Fire Estimate Summary Series which presents basic information on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in USFA’s National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). The data summary series was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with the American public, fire departments, and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.

Direct Links to the USFA:

• http://www.usfa.fema.gov/media/press/2011releases/120511.shtm
• http://www.usfa.fema.gov/statistics/estimates/index.shtm

Information from the USFA web site, HERE

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Estimates

Fire Estimate Summaries present basic data on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in the U.S. Fire Administration’s (USFA’s) National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). Each Fire Estimate Summary addresses the size of the specific fire or fire-related issue and highlights important trends in the data.¹

Residential Building Estimates

Definition of Residential Building

A structure is a constructed item of which a building is one type.

The term residential structure commonly refers to buildings where people live. To coincide with this concept, the definition of a residential structure fire includes only those fires confined to an enclosed building or fixed portable or mobile structure with a residential property use.

Such fires are referred to as residential buildings to distinguish these buildings from other structures on residential properties that may include fences, sheds, and other uninhabitable structures.

Fire Estimate Summaries of Residential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)

Residential Building Fires (2006-2010)

Residential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)

Nonresidential Building Estimates

Definition of Nonresidential Building
Nonresidential buildings are a subset of nonresidential structures and refer to buildings on nonresidential properties. Buildings include enclosed structures, subway terminals, underground buildings, and fixed portable or mobile structures.

• The term nonresidential buildings refers to those nonresidential structures that are enclosed.
• Nonresidential buildings include assembly, eating and drinking establishments, educational facilities, stores, offices, basic industry, manufacturing, storage, detached garages, outside properties, and other nonpermanent residential buildings.
• The term nonresidential also includes institutional properties such as prisons, nursing homes, juvenile care facilities, and hospitals, though many people may reside there for short (or long) durations of time.

Fire Estimate Summaries of Nonresidential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)

Nonresidential Building Fires (2006-2010)

Nonresidential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)

¹ Fire Estimate Summaries are based on the USFA’s national estimates methodology. The USFA is committed to providing the best and most current information on the United States’ fire problem and, as a result, continually examines its data and methodology. Because of this commitment, changes to data collection strategies and estimate methodologies occur, causing estimates to change slightly over time. Previous estimates on specific issues (or similar issues) may have been a result of different methodologies or data definitions used and may not be directly comparable to current estimates.

Related Topics

• National Fire Protection Association Estimates
• USFA Residential and Nonresidential Fire Estimate Summaries, 2003-2009 (ZIP, 3.8 Mb – This archive contains files in PDF and XLSX formats.)
• USFA Residential and Nonresidential Fire Estimate Summaries, 2003-2008 (ZIP, 3.8 Mb – This archive contains files in PDF and XLSX formats.)

Links of Interest

• National Fire Protection Association
• World Fire Statistics Centre
• National Center for Health Statistics
• National Center for Injury Prevention and Control

Click charts below to enlarge.

Residential Building Fire Trends: Fires & Deaths

Residential Building Fire Trends: Injuries & Dollar Loss

Residential Building Fires: Causes Of Fires & Deaths

Residential Building Fires: Causes Of Injuries & Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends: Fires & Deaths

Nonresidential Building Fire Trends: Injuries & Dollar Loss

Nonresidential Building Fires: Causes Of Fires & Dollar Loss

Bridging The Gap: Fire Safety and Green Buildings Guide

A Fire and Safety Building Guide to Green Construction

The National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) has released its fire and building safety guide to green construction called “Bridging the Gap: Fire Safety and Green Buildings.” This guide identifies some of the key areas where rapidly growing green building construction issues coincide with building and fire safety needs.

“This guide will give both the fire service and the green construction community a reference point for developing buildings and sites that are not only environmentally sound, but also continue to meet fire safety needs,” said NASFM President Alan Shuman. “This will provide a much-needed reference on issues that impact the life safety of building occupants, emergency responders and the larger community.”

Included are topical areas such as Site Selection and Use, Building Envelope and Design Attributes, and Building Systems and Alternative Power Sources. A key feature of the guide is a series of checklists focusing on plan reviews for commercial and residential occupancies. This document is meant as an introductory guide for fire chiefs and firefighters, building and fire code enforcement officials, architects and anyone involved in building design, plan reviews and construction.

Click here to download a copy of the guide, which was developed for NASFM by Jim Tidwell of Tidwell Code Consulting, with Jack Murphy, as part of a larger program under a Department of Homeland Security Fire Prevention and Safety Grant.

Direct Link:  http://www.firemarshals.org/programs/green-buildings-fire-safety-project/guide/

http://www.firemarshals.org/

 A video clip of a structure fire occurring in a single family residential occupancy shows, in the first few frames a back draft occurring per-arrival of fire services. It’s apparent there is a developing and progressing fire in the Charlie division which may have originated in the, or vicinity of the detached garage (B-C) which had a breezeway connected to the main house.  

Alpha Street View

The large volume hip style (concealed space) roof may have become rapidly charged with elevated temperatures, superheated gases, products of combustion and possibly the initial stages direct flame extension through the eaves and into the truss loft.  Incident scene operations photos depict an engineered structural roof system.

Aerial View- Divisions

Building Profile

• Single family (SFD), Residential Occupancy
• Built: 1981
• 2, 263  Sq. Ft.
• 4 Bedrooms
• 2 Bathrooms
• 7 Rooms
• Detached Garage
• Wood frame, slab on grade
• Type/Class- V/5
• Brick Veneer
• Divisions:
• A-      Street
• B-       SFD Residential; similar
• C-       Yard, with Detached Garage (B-C) and large room extension
• D-      SFD Residential; similar

Aerial Alpha and Charlie with Roof

Roof Profile

Pre-arrival fire conditions exhibit indicators that suggest the need for the rapid intervention of arriving companies and a coordinated aggressive posture tactically if the incident action plan is formulated to achieve an interior attack. Given the scenario of the backdraft conditions, the likelihood for a degraded or compromised ceiling membrane enclosure (intact ceilings, thus limiting fire extension)  being present will hamper and may be an operational concern for interior operating companies as fire conditions continue to grow in magnitude and severity and full extend and take command of the truss loft enclosure.

These fire conditions will extend into the space, resulting in degradation of the structural components and roof assembly-which will present a high risk potential for isolated or catastrophic collapse. This intrusion into the truss loft would require interior operating company officers to maintain attentiveness towards the effectiveness and progress of tactical suppression and support tasks with the potential for fire quickly dropping into operating areas and affecting firefighter safety.

Coordinated and timely vertical ventilation and roof work may be warranted if part of the normal operating parameters of the fire service agencies. In some areas of the county, vertical ventilation is not considered a tactical functional objective and is not implemented.

Adequate fire flow for suppression must be established early on in the operations, if an interior attack is implemented. Projected fire intensity and severity may challenge initial engine companies if hand lines and fire flow rates and the placement of hose streams are ineffective or marginal.  In the event of master stream operations it would be crucial to ensure interior fire suppression operations are suspended, a transition to a defensive mode is communicated and acknowledge on the fireground with collapse zone considerations.

Operational Considerations

In viewing the video of pre-arrival conditions and fire parameters and indicators; as an arriving company officer or commanding officer, how would you establish your incident action plan (IAP) and establish operations? Present and discuss why you would make these decisions, what is/are the basis?

What would you be considering in the areas of:

• Building Integrity
• Collapse Potential
• Interior Fire Attack Considerations
• Resource Needs: Staffing and Apparatus
• Critical Operational Tasks
• Apparatus Placement
• Hose Line Placement
• Safety Considerations  
• Exposures
• Contingency Issues: What can go wrong?  

 Assuming you are just arriving on scene and observe the backdraft conditions from the front seat; What would your operational IAP be and why?

Identify and discuss the types of mission critical size-up consideration that must be recognized and processed?

How does apparatus placement affect incident operations?

What first-due operational factors have you experienced that were contingent upon other tasks or considerations that were apparent to you or you implemented?

How does extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics affect your fire ground position?

 How does this scenario and building size and type relate to similar structures and occupancies in your district or mutual aid/greater alarm response area?

Link

• Fire ground operational photos: http://www.877famous7.com/HF052311.htm
• Buildingsonfire.com YouTube Channel, HERE

• 

  Charlie Division

Training Download and Discussion Questions

• http://buildingsonfire.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/PreArrivals11.19.11.pdf

Training Download from Buildingsonfire.com

Updated 11/16/2011; SEE    North Las Vegas Arson No Longer Considered a Booby-Trap

An arson fire in a vacant home in North Las Vegas (NV)  was intention set and devised in a manner to harm firefighters according to Authorities.

Upon arrival of fire companies, the second floor was fully involved with heavy smoke showing from outside the building. 

North Las Vegas Firefighters and Las Vegas Fire and Rescue worked together to control the flames in the vacant two story home.

It took seven units and approximately 27 firefighters to contain the fire.

There was no extension of the fire to surrounding homes, it was contained in 15 minutes.

There aren’t specific details released on why authorities believe this fire was set to harm firefighters, but the fire official discussing the incident clearly expressed his concerns of what confronted operating companies at this alarm.

Residential Structure Built in 1997

The two story residential structure was of Type V, wood frame construction, built in 1997 consisting of 1,998 Square feet of space with three (3) beadrooms, seven total rooms and an attached garage.

It’s especially important for companies and company officers to remain highly vigilant upon entering and conducting interior operations for any signs or indications that conditions may not be as characteristic and expected for fires in similar occupancies or under prevailing conditions.

We plan to develop and prepare some safety awareness insights for operations in a few days. We’ll also continue to monitor information that may be forthcoming with further details as to what may have been encountered by firefighters.

Los Angeles Firefighters Battle Major Emergency at Townhouses Under Construction

Under-construction building fire forces dozens of evacuations

Six Townhouses Under Construction Photo, Onscene.TV

Townhouses Under Construction Aerial Screen capture from CBSLA.com

Operational Divisions with Exposures (Pre-Construction) Bing Maps

A townhouse complex under construction caught fire on November 10, 2011, in the Brentwood neighborhood of Los Angeles (CA).  The six-unit, wood-framed complex was in its construction phase, where at least two of the units were fully involved in fire upon arrival of LAFD companies. Four of those six structures were severely damaged as a result of the construction stage and the degree of open wood frame construction resulting in rapid flame spread and extension to a nearby residential buildings.

According to published reports, the Los Angeles Fire Department was called at 3:37 a.m.  to 12315 Gorham Avenue which resulted in a major emergency alarm classification decared and resulted in the dispatch and deployment of over 160 firefighters to the site. First arriving companies found a large townhome development with “heavy fire showing.”

Largely due to an aggressive fire attack by the LAFD, the footprint of this blaze was kept in-check and fully extinguished in one hour and 39 minutes. Fortunately, there were no injuries to any civilians or Firefighting personnel.

Additionally, five adjacent structures were evacuated for precaution. Two of those structures- one, a small apartment complex and the other, a single family dwelling, did sustain significant fire damage. As many as 10 families were displaced from those two occupancies.

Following further investigation, the LAFD stated it believed the fire was intentionally set. 

According to LAFD.Blogspot.com the following  companies were dispatched with Units: E19 RA19 E237 E37 T37 RA37 EM9 BC9 E59 E261 T61 E26 E292 T92 E71 E269 T69 E62 E263 T63 E43 DC3 SQ21 EM14 BC18 BC10 BC4 BC11 BC14 T88 E288 E88 UR88 RA88 RA827 BC5 E63 H6 RA59 RA92 RA71 EM11 E290 AR2 E94 E226 T26 E93 E210 T10 E15 T66 E266 RT59 EA2 EA1 E229 T29 E203 T3 E233 T33 E68 RA17 RA909 RA867 EM17 AR9 AR17 AR11 AR3 T29 E229 T94 E294 E3 E12

Construction Site Operational Considerations (not inclusive)

• Pre-Fire Plan Large Construction Projects
• Understand the various Phases to a Construction Project and how they affect fire operations
• Identify and train for nonconventional Strategic and Tactical operational actions
• Ensure predetermined multiple alarm resources are identified and greater alarms are established
• Train your Company and Command Officers to address Construction site fires
• Maintain an appropriate risk profile balance with operational needs with personnel safety foremost
• Clearly establish multiple Safety Offices and establish geographical resources within the incident management system for reconnaissance, communications, and oversight and focused safety monitoring
• Know you water supply and system capabilities and limitations
• Determine fire flow needs based upon construction phases, as these change over time as the building goes up. Match fire flow demands with resource availability (time of day gaps etc.)
• Identify exposures (Physical structures and Civilians) and ensure they are calculated into the incident action plan at the right before there are identified needs or concerns
• Companies shall maintain a conservative safety posture; this is not the time for overly aggressive firefighting, it is the time for smart firefighting that can be highly efficient
• Always consider collapse zones: partial or complete. Stay out of them!
• Respect the wind; it’s not going to help you
• Consider current and projected weather conditions in your operational and tactical plans and assignments
• Did I already say: Pre-fire Planning?
• Be calculated in the placement of your apparatus, especially in larger scale incidents that are defined under greater geographical divisions
• The fire usually consumes the available fuel load rapidly; going from a Huge fire, to one that is sometimes much more manageable; just watch and control your exposures and degree of fire extension.  Don’t help to make the fire even bigger through ineffective and dysfunctional command and control
• Anticipate, Project, Plan and Engage
• Respect the Fire: it’s not going to play by the regular rules of combat fire suppression and engagement as in finished and enclosed structures and buildings.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

Photo: Firefighters hose down smoldering embers after a large fire gutted a townhouse complex under construction in Brentwood. Credit: Al Seib / Los Angeles Times

Additional Links

• Refer to Construction Site Fire: Three Alarm Fire: Apartment Complex under Construction ignites October, 2011 LA County (FD) CA HERE
• http://lafd.blogspot.com/2011/11/major-emergency-blaze-at-brentwood.html
• http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/133606123.html
• http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/fire-destroys-townhouse-construction-in-brentwood.html
• Bing Mapping, HERE
• http://www.ktla.com/news/landing/ktla-brentwood-apartment-fire,0,2381645.story
• http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/10-families-displaced-in-brentwood-blaze.html

View more videos at: http://nbclosangeles.com.

Robert Mecea/Associated Press

FDNY Twitter Feed

 Additional Links

• Building Collapse In Brighton Beach Claims Life Of 1 Of 5 Workers Pulled From Rubble, HERE
• http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/building-collapses-in-brighton-beach-with-people-trapped-inside/
• http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/building-collapse-brighton-beach-brooklyn-gallery-1.974623
• http://gothamist.com/2011/11/08/fdny_reports_major_building_collaps.php