Wind blowing into the broken window of a room on fire can turn a “routine room and contents fire” into a floor-to-ceiling firestorm. Historically, this has led to a significant number of firefighter fatalities and injuries, particularly in high-rise buildings where the fire must be fought from the interior of the structure.
Wind-Driven Fire in a Ranch-Style House in Texas, 2009
On April 12, 2009, a fire in a one-story ranch home in Texas claimed the lives of two fire fighters. (NIOSH REPORT HERE) Sustained high winds occurred during the incident. The winds caused a rapid change in the dynamics of the fire after the failure of a large section of glass in the rear of the house.
Wind Driven Fire in Home, Texas, 2009. Aerial view of damage to the structure. Photo credit: Houston Fire Department.
NIST performed computer simulations of the fire using the Fire Dynamic Simulator (FDS) and Smokeview, a visualization tool, to provide insight on the fire development and thermal conditions that may have existed in the residence during the fire.
The FDS simulation that best represents the witnessed fire conditions indicates that the fire that spread throughout the attic and first floor developed a wind driven flow with temperatures in excess of 260 °C (500 °F) between the den and front door. The critical event in this fire was the creation of a wind-driven flow path between the upwind side of the structure and the exit point on the downwind side of the structure, the front door. The flow path was created by the failure of a large span of windows in the den, in the rear of the structure. Floor-to-ceiling temperatures rapidly increased in the flow path where multiple crews were performing interior operations. In a simulation that excluded wind, the flow path was not created, and the thermal environment surrounding the location of interior operations was improved.
Still image from FDS simulation. Temperatures at 1.5 m (5 ft) above the floor throughout the house 10 s after solarium failure. Image credit: NIST.
Wind has been recognized as a contributing factor to fire spread in wildland fires and large-area conflagrations and wildland fire fighters are trained to account for the wind in their tactics. While structural fire departments have recognized the impact of wind on fires, in general, the standard operating guidelines for structural fire fighting have not changed to address the hazards created by a wind driven fire inside a structure. The results of the “no-wind” and “wind” fire simulations demonstrate how wind conditions can rapidly change the thermal environment from tenable to untenable for fire fighters working in a single-story residential structure fire.
The simulation results emphasize the importance of including wind conditions in the scene size-up before beginning and while performing fire fighting operations and adjusting tactics based on the wind conditions. These results are in agreement with NIST studies conducted to examine wind driven fire conditions in high-rise structures.
LESSONS LEARNED
Based on the analysis of this fire incident and results from previous studies, adjusting fire fighting tactics to account for wind conditions in structural fire fighting is critical to enhancing the safety and the effectiveness of fire fighters. Previous studies demonstrated that applying water from the exterior, into the upwind side of the structure can have a significant impact on controlling the fire prior to beginning interior operations. It should be made clear that in a wind-driven fire, it is most important to use the wind to your advantage and attack the fire from the upwind side of the structure, especially if the upwind side is the burned side. Interior operations need to be aware of potentially rapidly changing conditions.
Career Probationary Fire Fighter and Captain Die as a Result of Rapid Fire Progression in a Wind-Driven Residential Structure Fire – Texas
SUMMARY
Shortly after midnight on Sunday, April 12, 2009, a 30-year old male career probationary fire fighter and a 50-year old male career captain were killed when they were trapped by rapid fire progression in a wind-driven residential structure fire. The victims were members of the first arriving company and initiated fast attack offensive interior operations through the front entrance. Less than six minutes after arriving on-scene, the victims became disoriented as high winds pushed the rapidly growing fire through the den and living room areas where interior crews were operating. Seven other fire fighters were driven from the structure but the two victims were unable to escape. Rescue operations were immediately initiated but had to be suspended as conditions deteriorated. The victims were located and removed from the structure approximately 40 minutes after they arrived on location.
Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include: an inadequate size-up prior to committing to tactical operations; lack of understanding of fire behavior and fire dynamics; fire in a void space burning in a ventilation controlled regime; high winds; uncoordinated tactical operations, in particular fire control and tactical ventilation; failure to protect the means of egress with a backup hose line; inadequate fireground communications; and failure to react appropriately to deteriorating conditions.
NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:
ensure that an adequate initial size-up and risk assessment of the incident scene is conducted before beginning interior fire fighting operations
ensure that fire fighters and officers have a sound understanding of fire behavior and the ability to recognize indicators of fire development and the potential for extreme fire behavior (such as smoke color, velocity, density, visible fire, heat)
ensure that fire fighters are trained to recognize the potential impact of windy conditions on fire behavior and implement appropriate tactics to mitigate the potential hazards of wind-driven fire
ensure that fire fighters understand the influence of ventilation on fire behavior and effectively apply ventilation and fire control tactics in a coordinated manner
ensure that fire fighters and officers understand the capabilities and limitations of thermal imaging cameras (TIC) and that a TIC is used as part of the size-up process
ensure that fire fighters are trained to check for fire in overhead voids upon entry and as charged hoselines are advanced
develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to insure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday
ensure fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures
ensure all fire fighters on the fire ground are equipped with radios capable of communicating with the Incident Commander and Dispatch
Additionally, research and standard setting organizations should:
conduct research to more fully characterize the thermal performance of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece lens materials and other personal protective equipment (PPE) components to ensure SCBA and PPE provide an appropriate level of protection.
Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation could have specifically prevented the fatalities, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments:
ensure that all fire fighters recognize the capabilities and limitations of their personal protective equipment when operating in high temperature environments.
NFFF News Release: In an effort to make personal safety a top priority, the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) and the Chicago Fire Department (CFD) today released a new video, Chicago Fire Department – Everyone Goes Home®. Members of the CFD and families of fallen firefighters share their stories in this compelling and moving testimonial of the importance of adhering to safety standards and accepting personal responsibility for following procedures.
Chicago Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff was impressed by a video that the NFFF and the Fire Department of New York produced several years earlier to educate members about the importance of training and safety standards. The FDNY leadership had noticed behavioral improvement among its members following the release of their video. Hoff felt that the members of the CFD could benefit from hearing first-hand accounts of the lessons learned by their colleagues and invited the NFFF to collaborate on a video for Chicago.
“The culture of firefighting requires us to do everything we can to make sound decisions so we can be in a position to help the people we serve when they most need it,” said Ronald J. Siarnicki, executive director of the NFFF. “With this video the firefighters and leadership of the Chicago Fire Department are clearly showing the rest of the fire service you can still be a firefighter and at the same time do your best to make sure Everyone Goes Home®.”
The National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF) and the Chicago Fire Department (CFD) released a new safety video, Chicago Fire Department – Everyone Goes Home®, to help raise awareness of personal safety in the fire service. Nearly two dozen members of the CFD and survivors of fallen firefighters share their stories. See the video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vODww1qwSuE
Take a moment to look back at an incident: On December 18, 1998, Three FDNY Firefighters died in-the line of duty while conducting suppression and rescue operations at fire on the tenth floor of 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. At 0454 hours Brooklyn transmitted box 4080 for a top floor fire at 17 Vandalia Avenue in the Starrett City development complex. The sprawling complex is located on Brooklyn’s south shore in the Spring Creek section. The 10 story 50 x 200 fireproof building is used as a senior citizen’s residence. Engine 257 and ladder 170, both quartered in Canarsie, were assigned 1st due and arrived within 4 minutes. By that time the fire already could be seen blowing through two windows. Second and 3rd alarms were quickly transmitted.
As the 1st due Ladder Company, L170′s duty is to search the fire floor. Lieutenant Joseph Cavalieri, and fire fighters Christopher Bopp and James Bohan ascended 10 flights of stairs with extinguishers and forcible entry tools. Their mission was to rescue the resident of apartment 10-D who was believed trapped inside.
NIOSH INVESIGATIVE REPORT SUMMARY (F99-01) On December 18, 1998, several fire companies and fire fighters responded at 0454 hours to a reported fire on the tenth floor of a 10-story high-rise apartment building for the elderly. The fire had been burning for 20 to 30 minutes before it was called in because the resident attempted to put the fire out with small pans of water. As the fire fighters approached the building from the rear, an orange glow was observed in the window of Apartment 10D. As the fire fighters were arriving in front of the high-rise, a call was received from Central Dispatch that a female resident in the apartment next door to the fire apartment was trapped in her apartment and needed help. Several fire fighters entered the lobby area, and some took the stairs to the ninth floor, while others took the elevator to the ninth floor. A Lieutenant and two fire fighters on Ladder 170 (the victims), along with the Lieutenant on Engine 290, took the B-stairs from the ninth floor to the tenth floor, and entered the hallway, in search of the fire, while 4 fire fighters on Engine 290 were flaking out the hose line on the ninth floor and in the stairwell between the ninth and tenth floor in preparation for hookup.
During this same time period, other fire fighters had gone to the tenth floor A-stairwell landing to attempt a hose line hookup to the standpipe in the landing. Engine Company 257 fire fighters, who were attempting to make a hook-up on the fire floor landing, experienced trouble with the heat, heavy smoke, and heavy insulation on the standpipe and were forced to abandon this hook-up. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 and the victims, who were on the B-side, were approaching the center smoke doors (see diagram), when the Lieutenant radioed his driver on the outside, and asked, “Where is the fire?”
The driver radioed back, the fire is in the rear, towards exposure 4. The Lieutenant on Engine 290 then left the tenth floor, descended the stairs to the ninth floor and helped his men drag the hose to the A-stairwell, where they met up with fire fighters on Engine 257, who assisted them in stretching their line and hook-up on the ninth floor. The victims proceeded through the center smoke doors in search of the fire. From the information obtained during this investigation, it is believed the victims found the fire apartment, with the door partially opened, allowing smoke and hot gases to enter the hallway. They then opened the door fully, the wind pushed the fire and extreme heat in the apartment into the hallway, and a flashover occurred, exposing the victims to extreme radiant heat that potentially elevated their body core temperature.
The last radio transmission from the victims was a Mayday call. When the victims were found, all were unresponsive, they were treated at the scene and taken to the hospital where they were pronounced dead by the attending physician.
This wind-driven fire event and the lessons-learned contributed directly to the current body of research and new insights on emerging strategies and tactics. The NIOSH Investigative Report HERE. NIST References on Wind Driven Fire Research HERE . FDNewYork.com HERE. New York Times Archived Articles, HERE and HERE. Photos and legacy, HERE
Take the time to remember FDNY Lt. Joseph Cavaleiri, FF Christopher Bopp and Firefighter James Bohan from Ladder 170
Remembering Brackenridge, Pennsylvania December 20, 1991: Four Firefighters Killed, Trapped by Floor Collapse
Four volunteer firefighters died when they were trapped by a partial floor collapse during a structure fire in Brackenridge, Pennsylvania, on the morning of December 20, 1991. All four were members of a mutual aid truck company that had responded to the early morning incident and were assigned to prevent fire extension from the basement to the ground floor of a 2-story building.
Although they were wearing full protective clothing and using self-contained breathing apparatus, it appears that they were overwhelmed by the severe fire conditions that erupted when a section of the ground floor collapsed into the basement.
The collapse cut off their primary escape path, and the fire burned through their hose line, leaving them without protection from the flames.
SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES
Situation: Fire in enclosed room in basement. Unable to locate fire because of smoke. Smoke and heat increasing, but no visible fire.
Structure: Appeared to be heavy concrete construction. Actually thin concrete floors supported by unprotected steel.
Contents: Furniture refinishing business. Quantities of flammable finishes and solvents in basement.
Exits: One entrance/ exit on each level; no alternate exits.
Structural Collapse: Floor section collapsed between interior crew and their only exit. Fire overwhelmed crew.
Rescue Attempts: Valiant rescue efforts proved unsuccessful. Unsure if missing members fell into basement or were trapped on ground floor.
Incident Command: No formal command system or personnel accountability in place. Chief of first-due company in command of incident; Assistant Chiefs assigned to basement and ground floor.
Information: No pre-fire plan and no detailed knowledge of occupancy. Clues of structural danger not recognized as fire conditions increased
Communications: Radio system inadequate for current needs.
Response: Independent volunteer companies. Mutual aid requested on arrival and additional companies called in succession.
Weather: Extremely cold night, predawn hours. Problems with frozen hydrants.
Water System: Weak supply. Extensive mutual aid and long relays needed to protect exposures.
The analysis of this incident provides several valuable lessons for the fire service. Unfortunately these are all revisited lessons, not new discoveries. These firefighters died in the line of duty, while conducting operations that appeared to be routine, and were unaware of the situation that was developing below them. They died in spite of the fact that they were experienced, they were operating with a standard approach to operational safety, and they were the object of repeated rescue attempts by highly capable comrades.
There are several factors that could have provided warning or changed the outcome of this situation. Like most accidents, this situation was the result of a number of problems that came together under the worst possible circumstances. Firefighting obviously involves inherent dangers that must be accepted by its practitioners. The important messages for the fire service are to identify risk factors in advance of an incident and to develop mechanisms to react appropriately when critical situations present themselves.
This situation bears distinct similarities to other incidents that have claimed the lives of several firefighters in the past. The lessons that must be derived from this incident are not a condemnation of the actions or judgment of anyone who was involved in the situation; they simply identify information that can help to prevent this type of accident from occurring in the future.
Buffalo Box 191 North Division & Grosvenor Streets; December 27, 1983
Buffalo Box 191
As Buffalo (NY) firefighters arrived at the scene of a reported propane leak in a three-story radiator warehouse (Type III Ordinary and Type IV Heavy Timber construction), a massive explosion occurred, killing five firefighters instantly and injuring nine others, three of them critically.
The force of the blast blew BFD Ladder 5′s tiller aerial 35 feet across the street into the front yard of a dwelling. BFD Engine 1′s pumper was also blown across the street with the captain and driver pinned in the cab with burning debris all around them. Engine 32′s engine was blown up against a warehouse across a side street and covered with rubble.
Remember to think about occupancy risk and not occupancy type and the factors related to the occupancy usage and the nature of the call. Nothing is ever routine.
I’ve been absent a while attending to what was a totally unexpected medical emergency that significantly impacted our family with all of my attention focused in another direction.
My great Dad passed away this past Sunday. Behind all of us, we have or have had those special family members; parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents, wives, husbands, aunts, uncles, cousins, extended family, significant others, life partners and special friends-the list can go on, that have had a significance in our lives and in what we endeavor to do each and every day. You know who I might be referring to.
My father worked very, very hard his entire life and exemplified many of life’s attributes and provided a wealth of examples to learn from in life’s journey. He was an extremely humble man, who lived out his life quietly in the hometown in which he was born. He was the youngest of eight children (four sisters and three brothers) and the son of Greek immigrants who settled in America in the early 1900’s. He was a veteran of World War II, a restaurateur and an executive chef, eventually settling into the role of grandfather and great grandfather. He loved the Yankees, Syracuse University sports and my Mom. He was my Dad.
Being as fortunate to graciously and humbly do what I do; I want to celebrate my Dad’s quiet life, his life’s lessons, the love he gave so freely and his passing in a way he never would have considered, much less allowed. I wanted to share with you a glimpse of one simple quiet man, unlike so many others like him all around us. Thanks Dad for everything, for helping to make me who I am today and for having the chance to say goodbye. I love you.
John "Johnnie" Naum 1928-2011
Without being presumptuous; Take some time to reflect upon the true meaning of this holiday season and in what and how you might celebrate. Think about who and what is really important in our respective lives and all the people who are behind us, around us, and with us-both physically and spiritually. Stay safe.
Firefighters rush into a burning commercial building with too-small hoses and insufficient water. The commander can’t reach them because the captain forgot his radio. Backup crews aren’t sure where to go or what to do. Confusion reigns as the building’s truss roof collapses in an explosion of flames.
This reads like the playbook from the deadly Sofa Super Store fire in June 2007, but it’s not. These dangerous missteps occurred at a March 1 blaze on Daniel Island, according to an internal report obtained by The Post and Courier.
Photo by Andy Paras
This blaze at an office building on Daniel Island on March 1 of this year has led to the demotion of a Charleston fire captain and controversy within the ranks.
They occurred despite nearly four years of intensive and expensive efforts to instill a culture of safety in the Charleston Fire Department.
What’s more, the commander in charge that day — a man repeatedly faulted in the in-house review of the blaze — was recently promoted to a top position in the department. And that’s causing some dissension in the ranks.
City fire officials stand behind their promotion of Troy Williams to battalion chief, and they said the portion of the draft report that leaked to the newspaper is incomplete, unfair, unofficial and riddled with inaccuracies.
Fire Chief Thomas Carr acknowledged problems at the fire, which gutted a two-story office building at 899 Island Park Drive. That’s why he authorized a six-member committee of firefighters to conduct what’s known as a critical incident review. But Carr said he rejected the resulting draft report when it landed on his desk six weeks ago because it had errors and failed to live up to its intended purpose, which is to be an educational tool, not an instrument for blame.
The 12-page portion obtained by the The Post Courier newspaper describes “major” violations of policy and assigns blame for those mistakes. It raises questions about the handling of the blaze, the effectiveness of the training firefighters have received and the integrity of the promotion process.
It also highlights the continuing conflict between the department’s hard-charging past and its new, risk-sensitive methods.
For the Complete Full version Article: The Post and Courier HERE
High-rise fires cause quarter billion dollars of property damage a year
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is reporting that in 2005-2009, there were an average of 15,700 reported structure fires in high-rise buildings per year with an associated $235 million in direct property damage.
The report, “High-Rise Building Fires,” (PDF, 499 KB) cites apartments, hotels, offices, and facilities that care for sick as accounting for roughly half of all high-rise fires. Structure fires in these four property classes resulted in $99 million in direct property damage per year.
There is a downward trend in high-rise fires. In the last few decades, a range of special provisions have migrated into the codes and standards for tall buildings.
Other findings from the report:
In 2005-2009, high-rise fires claimed the lives of 53 civilians and injured 546 others, per year.
The risks of fire, fire death, and direct property damage due to fire tend to be lower in high-rise buildings than in shorter buildings of the same property use.
An estimated three percent of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.
Usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings of the same property use.Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The risk of a fire is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.
In 2005-2009, an estimated 15,700 reported high-rise structure fires per year resulted in associated losses of 53 civilian deaths, 546 civilian injuries, and $235 million in direct property damage per year. An estimated 2.6% of all 2005-2009 reported structure fires were in high-rise buildings.
The trends in high-rise fires and associated losses (inflation-adjusted for property damage) are clearly down, but the sharp post-1998 reduction appears to be mostly due to the change to NFIRS Version 5.0, which is shifting estimates to lower levels that also appear to be more accurate.
Four property classes account for roughly half of high-rise fires: apartments, hotels, facilities that care for the sick, and offices. In 2005-2009, in these four property classes combined, there were 7,800 reported high-rise structure fires per year and associated losses of 30 civilian deaths, 352 civilian injuries, and $99 million in direct property damage per year. The property damage average is inflated by the influence of one 2008 hotel fire, whose $100 million loss projected to nearly $40 million a year in the analysis.
The report emphasizes these four property classes.
Some other property uses – such as stores and restaurants – may represent only a single floor in a tall building primarily devoted to other uses. Some property uses – such as grain elevators and factories – can be as tall as a high-rise building but without a large number of separate floors or stories.
For these reasons, the four property use groups listed above define most of the buildings we think of as high-rise buildings, and their fires come closest to defining what we think of as the high-rise building fire problem.
By most measures of loss, the risks of fire and of associated fire loss are lower in highrise buildings than in other buildings of the same property loss.
This statement applies to risk of fire, civilian fire deaths, civilian fire injuries, and direct property damage due to fire, relative to housing units, for apartments, and risk of fire for hotels, offices, and facilities that care for the sick.
The usage of wet pipe sprinklers and fire detection equipment is higher in high-rise buildings than in other buildings, for each property use group. Even so, considering the extensive requirements in NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, for fire and life safety features in both new and existing high-rise buildings, it seems clear that there are still major gaps, particularly in adoption and enforcement of the provisions requiring retrofit of automatic sprinkler systems and other life safety systems in existing high-rise buildings. NFPA 1®,Fire Code, has sprinkler retrofit requirements.
This has implications for public officials and ordinary citizens in any city. Public officials should make sure that the latest editions of NFPA 1®, Fire Code, and NFPA 101®, Life Safety Code, are in place and that the codes they have are supported by effective code enforcement provisions, including plan review and inspection processes, both for new construction and for continued supervision of code compliance in existing buildings.
The public can take responsibility for their own safety by insisting that their public officials take these steps. As in so many areas of fire safety, we know what to do, but we still need to do it.
The trend had been toward a smaller share of fires being reported each year as occurring in buildings with fire-resistive construction, both for high-rise and other buildings, with the decline being most dramatic in facilities that care for the sick.
This statistical decline could reflect any or all of the following:
(a) a shift in construction between the two types permitted by codes, from Type I (442 or 332) construction, which is coded as fire-resistive, to Type II (222) construction, which is coded as protected non-combustible;
(b) a shift to acceptable alternative designs using more sprinklers and less fire-resistive construction; or
(c) enough success in containing fires that a rising fraction never are reported to fire departments, because the fires are caught and controlled so early by occupants.
Most high-rise building fires begin on floors no higher than the 6th story. The fraction of 2005-
2009 high-rise fires that began on the 7th floor or higher was 32% for apartments, 22% for hotels and motels, 21% for facilities that care for the sick, and 39% for office buildings. The risk of a fire start is greater on the lower floors for apartments, hotels and motels, and facilities that care for the sick, but greater on the upper floors for office buildings.
High-rise apartments have a slightly larger share of their fires originating in means of egress than do their shorter counterparts (4% vs. 3%).
The same is true of hotels (7% vs. 5%) and facilities that care for the sick (6% vs. 4%).
In offices (4% vs. 6%), the differences in percentages are in the opposite direction, which means that high-rise buildings in those properties have a smaller share of their fires originating in means of egress.
In all four property classes, the differences are so small that one can say there is no evidence that high-rise buildings have a bigger problem with fires starting in means of egress.
NFPA FACT SHEET
More information on Solomon’s NFPA session and the conference can be found at www.nfpa.org/FLSCONF.
U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) issued the 2010 Fire Estimate Summary Series which presents basic information on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in USFA’s National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). The data summary series was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and is further evidence of FEMA’s commitment to sharing information with the American public, fire departments, and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe.
Fire Estimate Summaries present basic data on the size and status of the fire problem in the United States as depicted through data collected in the U.S. Fire Administration’s (USFA’s) National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). Each Fire Estimate Summary addresses the size of the specific fire or fire-related issue and highlights important trends in the data.1
Residential Building Estimates
Definition of Residential Building
A structure is a constructed item of which a building is one type.
The term residential structure commonly refers to buildings where people live. To coincide with this concept, the definition of a residential structure fire includes only those fires confined to an enclosed building or fixed portable or mobile structure with a residential property use.
Such fires are referred to as residential buildings to distinguish these buildings from other structures on residential properties that may include fences, sheds, and other uninhabitable structures.
Residential buildings include, but are not limited to one- or two-family dwellings, multifamily dwellings, manufactured housing, boarding houses or residential hotels, commercial hotels, college dormitories, and sorority/fraternity houses.
Fire Estimate Summaries of Residential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)
Residential Building Fires (2006-2010)
Year
Fires
Deaths
Injuries
Dollar Loss
2006
392,700
2,490
12,550
7,188,000,000
2007
390,300
2,765
13,525
7,527,000,000
2008
378,200
2,650
13,100
8,124,100,000
2009
356,200
2,480
12,600
7,378,800,000
2010
362,100
2,555
13,275
6,646,900,000
Residential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)
Definition of Nonresidential Building Nonresidential buildings are a subset of nonresidential structures and refer to buildings on nonresidential properties. Buildings include enclosed structures, subway terminals, underground buildings, and fixed portable or mobile structures.
The term nonresidential buildings refers to those nonresidential structures that are enclosed.
Nonresidential buildings include assembly, eating and drinking establishments, educational facilities, stores, offices, basic industry, manufacturing, storage, detached garages, outside properties, and other nonpermanent residential buildings.
The term nonresidential also includes institutional properties such as prisons, nursing homes, juvenile care facilities, and hospitals, though many people may reside there for short (or long) durations of time.
Fire Estimate Summaries of Nonresidential Building Fire Trends and Causes (2010)
Nonresidential Building Fires (2006-2010)
Year
Fires
Deaths
Injuries
Dollar Loss
2006
98,900
75
1,350
2,536,100,000
2007
103,000
90
1,275
3,015,900,000
2008
97,100
100
1,250
3,496,300,000
2009
89,200
90
1,500
2,804,700,000
2010
84,900
80
1,375
2,400,700,000
Nonresidential Building National Estimates (2003-2010)
1 Fire Estimate Summaries are based on the USFA’s national estimates methodology. The USFA is committed to providing the best and most current information on the United States’ fire problem and, as a result, continually examines its data and methodology. Because of this commitment, changes to data collection strategies and estimate methodologies occur, causing estimates to change slightly over time. Previous estimates on specific issues (or similar issues) may have been a result of different methodologies or data definitions used and may not be directly comparable to current estimates.
State investigators have cited the San Francisco Fire Department for “serious” worker safety violations in the deaths of two firefighters killed battling a Diamond Heights house fire in June. Reports were published in the San Francisco Chronical, HERE and HERE.
Firefighters lost track of Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, and firefighter-paramedic Anthony Valerio, 53, after they went into the four-level home at 133 Berkeley Way on June 2 and failed to respond quickly to the men’s last radio communication, investigators with the state Department of Industrial Relations’ Division of Occupational Safety and Health said in a report issued Monday.
In recommending that the Fire Department be fined $21,000, the state investigators also said the department had violated state rules requiring that two firefighters be designated outside to assist any two firefighters who venture into a life-threatening environment.
Only one firefighter from Perez and Valerio’s engine company – the first on the scene – was available to come to their help during the blaze, the investigation found.
The state also cited the Fire Department for an incident – evidently before the fatal flareup – in which an unidentified battalion chief ventured into the burning building alone, without keeping in contact with Perez and Valerio. That was also deemed a serious violation of safety rules.
“These are serious in that they had protocols in place, but they weren’t following them,” said Erika Monterroza, spokeswoman for the worker safety agency. “There’s no question that a lack of communications was a big issue here. The investigator found there was a breakdown there.”
Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White said the department would appeal the findings. She said state officials have told her commanders that the violations fell short of finding the department’s actions responsible for the two firefighters’ deaths. “None of the citations involved a direct cause of the line-of-duty deaths,” Hayes-White said. Monterroza confirmed that, saying the exact circumstances of the firefighters’ deaths could not be determined.
Valerio, Perez and a third member of Engine Company 26 in Diamond Heights were the first firefighters to arrive at the mid-morning blaze, which started when a sparking electrical outlet set curtains on fire.
The third firefighter manned the pumper hose while Valerio and Perez went inside to fight the fire, but the safety regulations require a fourth firefighter to be available outside to assist.
A scene commander, identified by firefighters as Battalion Chief Thomas Abbott, ordered a crew from Engine Company 24 to back up Valerio and Perez inside the building. For several minutes, however, scene commanders tried to find the Engine 26 firefighters, without success.
There was an unspecified gap between that last communication and any effort by firefighters to respond over the radio or track down the men, the state investigation found.
The reports goes on to state that Hayes-White said the department’s investigative report – still in draft form – concluded that the fire had melted one of the firefighters’ microphone cords, cutting off communications. She said any delay in firefighters’ response would be addressed in the final report.
Firefighters ultimately found Perez and Valerio in a landing area and carried the injured men outside. Perez was pronounced dead at San Francisco General Hospital, and Valerio died there two days later.
The state probe also faulted the actions of the unnamed battalion chief who went into the building “alone and also did not remain in contact with the firefighters who were inside.”
Hayes-White said the battalion chief had gone inside only briefly, had seen Perez and Valerio alive and had never been out of other firefighters’ view.
Today December 3, 2011 marks the 12th anniversary of the Worcester Cold Storage Warehouse fire that resulted in the line of duty death of six courages brother firefighters.
For those of you who remember this event, take the time to reflect and honor the sacrifice made this day; to those of you who have not heard about the fire before- take the time to learn about the incident, the firefighters, the building, the operational factors and challenges, the courage, fortitude and convictions that define the American Fire Service, it’s honor, tradition and brotherhood.
The Worcester Six;
Firefighter Paul Brotherton Rescue 1
Firefighter Jeremiah Lucey Rescue 1
Lieutenant Thomas Spencer Ladder 2
Firefighter Timothy Jackson Ladder 2
Firefighter James Lyons Engine 3
Firefighter Joseph McGuirk Engine
On Friday, December 3, 1999, at 1813 hours, the Worcester, Massachusetts Fire Department dispatched Box 1438 for 266 Franklin Street, the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Co. A motorist had spotted smoke coming from the roof while driving on an adjacent elevated highway. The original building was constructed in 1906, contained another 43,000 square feet. Both were 6 stories above grade. The building was known to be abandoned for over 10 years.
From last year’s posting and links here at CommandSafety.com: HERE
Bridging The Gap: Fire Safety and Green Buildings Guide
A Fire and Safety Building Guide to Green Construction
The National Association of State Fire Marshals (NASFM) has released its fire and building safety guide to green construction called “Bridging the Gap: Fire Safety and Green Buildings.” This guide identifies some of the key areas where rapidly growing green building construction issues coincide with building and fire safety needs.
“This guide will give both the fire service and the green construction community a reference point for developing buildings and sites that are not only environmentally sound, but also continue to meet fire safety needs,” said NASFM President Alan Shuman. “This will provide a much-needed reference on issues that impact the life safety of building occupants, emergency responders and the larger community.”
Included are topical areas such as Site Selection and Use, Building Envelope and Design Attributes, and Building Systems and Alternative Power Sources. A key feature of the guide is a series of checklists focusing on plan reviews for commercial and residential occupancies. This document is meant as an introductory guide for fire chiefs and firefighters, building and fire code enforcement officials, architects and anyone involved in building design, plan reviews and construction.
Click here to download a copy of the guide, which was developed for NASFM by Jim Tidwell of Tidwell Code Consulting, with Jack Murphy, as part of a larger program under a Department of Homeland Security Fire Prevention and Safety Grant.
A video clip of a structure fire occurring in a single family residential occupancy shows, in the first few frames a back draft occurring per-arrival of fire services. It’s apparent there is a developing and progressing fire in the Charlie division which may have originated in the, or vicinity of the detached garage (B-C) which had a breezeway connected to the main house.
Alpha Street View
The large volume hip style (concealed space) roof may have become rapidly charged with elevated temperatures, superheated gases, products of combustion and possibly the initial stages direct flame extension through the eaves and into the truss loft. Incident scene operations photos depict an engineered structural roof system.
Aerial View- Divisions
Building Profile
Single family (SFD), Residential Occupancy
Built: 1981
2, 263 Sq. Ft.
4 Bedrooms
2 Bathrooms
7 Rooms
Detached Garage
Wood frame, slab on grade
Type/Class- V/5
Brick Veneer
Divisions:
A- Street
B- SFD Residential; similar
C- Yard, with Detached Garage (B-C) and large room extension
D- SFD Residential; similar
Aerial Alpha and Charlie with Roof
Roof Profile
Pre-arrival fire conditions exhibit indicators that suggest the need for the rapid intervention of arriving companies and a coordinated aggressive posture tactically if the incident action plan is formulated to achieve an interior attack. Given the scenario of the backdraft conditions, the likelihood for a degraded or compromised ceiling membrane enclosure (intact ceilings, thus limiting fire extension) being present will hamper and may be an operational concern for interior operating companies as fire conditions continue to grow in magnitude and severity and full extend and take command of the truss loft enclosure.
These fire conditions will extend into the space, resulting in degradation of the structural components and roof assembly-which will present a high risk potential for isolated or catastrophic collapse. This intrusion into the truss loft would require interior operating company officers to maintain attentiveness towards the effectiveness and progress of tactical suppression and support tasks with the potential for fire quickly dropping into operating areas and affecting firefighter safety.
Coordinated and timely vertical ventilation and roof work may be warranted if part of the normal operating parameters of the fire service agencies. In some areas of the county, vertical ventilation is not considered a tactical functional objective and is not implemented.
Adequate fire flow for suppression must be established early on in the operations, if an interior attack is implemented. Projected fire intensity and severity may challenge initial engine companies if hand lines and fire flow rates and the placement of hose streams are ineffective or marginal. In the event of master stream operations it would be crucial to ensure interior fire suppression operations are suspended, a transition to a defensive mode is communicated and acknowledge on the fireground with collapse zone considerations.
Operational Considerations
In viewing the video of pre-arrival conditions and fire parameters and indicators; as an arriving company officer or commanding officer, how would you establish your incident action plan (IAP) and establish operations? Present and discuss why you would make these decisions, what is/are the basis?
What would you be considering in the areas of:
Building Integrity
Collapse Potential
Interior Fire Attack Considerations
Resource Needs: Staffing and Apparatus
Critical Operational Tasks
Apparatus Placement
Hose Line Placement
Safety Considerations
Exposures
Contingency Issues: What can go wrong?
Assuming you are just arriving on scene and observe the backdraft conditions from the front seat; What would your operational IAP be and why?
Identify and discuss the types of mission critical size-up consideration that must be recognized and processed?
How does apparatus placement affect incident operations?
What first-due operational factors have you experienced that were contingent upon other tasks or considerations that were apparent to you or you implemented?
How does extreme fire behavior and fire dynamics affect your fire ground position?
How does this scenario and building size and type relate to similar structures and occupancies in your district or mutual aid/greater alarm response area?
The Second National Fire Service Research Agenda Symposium
A new report identifies seven critical areas where more research is needed to further reduce the number of firefighters killed or injured in the line of duty. These priorities were developed during the Second National Fire Service Research Agenda Symposium sponsored by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation (NFFF).
More than 70 representatives from a broad range of fire service-related organizations met over two days at the National Fire Academy in Emmitsburg, Maryland. Their goal, to update the current Research Agenda, a guide for research projects within the fire service. In doing so the following seven areas were identified as research priorities: Community Risk Reduction; Wildland Firefighting; Data Collection; Technology and Fire Service Science; Firefighter Health and Wellness; Emergency Service Delivery; and Tools and Equipment.
More than 70 representatives from a broad range of fire service-related organizations participated
The 2nd National Fire Service Research Agenda
The Second National Fire Service Research Agenda Symposium was conducted on May 20 -22, 2011 and was also hosted by NFFF at the NFA campus in Emmitsburg, MD. The project was funded by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation. The purpose of the second Symposium was to produce an updated edition of the Research Agenda, based on current relevancy, as a guide for future research efforts. Following the model that had been established six years earlier, more than 70 individuals, representing a diverse range of interests participated in the 2011 Symposium.
The participants (who represented 55 different organizations) were asked to self-determine where they would best be able to lend the greatest expertise and guidance, selecting among seven different discussion groups.
Each group was assigned a range of subject matter as their primary area to focus upon; however, it was recognized that the individual domains were broad and the boundaries could not be precisely defined. The groups were encouraged to approach their task with a broad perspective and to seek broad consensus as opposed to narrowly defined priorities. Each group produced a set of recommendations that were reported back to the full assembly for further discussion.
The research areas and the facilitators assigned to each research domain are listed below. The facilitators were chosen based upon their reputations as leaders in their respective areas. They provided leadership for discussion within their groups, and wrote the reports. Kevin Roche of the Phoenix Fire Department was the general facilitator.
Community Risk Reduction (Vickie Pritchett, Shane Ray)
Wildland Firefighting (Stan Gibson, Nelson Bryner)
Data Collection (Lori Moore-Merrell, DrPH)
Technology & Fire Service Science (Gavin Horn, PhD, Daniel Madrzykowski)
Firefighter Health and Wellness (Murrey Loflin, Sara Jahnke, PhD)
Emergency Service Delivery (Christopher Naum, Victor Stagnaro)
Tools and Equipment (Bruce Varner, Robert Tutterow)
Participants were divided into discussion groups based on their expertise within one of the seven areas to develop specific research recommendations for each of the topics. Out of this process came 41 recommendations for potential investigation projects.
“The first Research Agenda Symposium was an outcome of Firefighter Life Safety Initiative #7 which directly links a national research agenda and data collection system to firefighter safety,” said Ronald J. Siarnicki, executive director of the NFFF. “The second symposium was convened to assess the changes and advances that had occurred within the fire service over the previous six year and identify new needs and priorities for potential study.”
The updated Research Agenda is intended to provide a reference source and a starting point on where to direct efforts and funding.
The Symposium planning team asked each group to develop a maximum of ten recommendations for presentation to the plenary session on Sunday morning. The groups were also asked to keep their recommendations broad enough so they could be approached from a number of research perspectives and to include the rationale for recommending those particular subjects as research priorities. This proved to be an efficient process reflecting the high level of expertise represented in each group.
The Sunday session began with a discussion of grant programs and funding sources, led by AFG Branch Chief Cathie Patterson. The recommendations of the seven discussion groups were then presented by the respective facilitators for discussion by the full assembly. All of the 41 recommendations that were presented to the plenary session are included in the 2011 Research Agenda report.
The 2011 edition incorporates one significant departure from the 2005 Research Agenda report; the overall ranking of projects on a Priority 1-2-3 scale was omitted and only the priorities established within the individual discussion groups are included. This decision reflects a consensus of the assembled participants that it is extremely difficult and probably unrealistic to apply this type of prioritization process across such a wide range of subject areas.
There was also concern that a 1-2-3 prioritization might encourage researchers and funding organizations to limit their attention to only the highest priorities and thus to overlook the lower ranked topics. The participants wanted to emphasize that all of the identified projects merit attention and should be considered on their own merits. After considerable discussion the group voted to set aside the overall 1-2-3 ranking and asked each group identify one project that should be recognized as an immediate concern.
The number one recommendations are:
Community Risk Reduction: Creation of a community-scale model that evaluates fire prevention and response programs and quantifies their ability to produce a potentially positive outcome. This may include (but is not limited to) data pertaining to: occupancy types and numbers of each, fire prevention, codes adoption, mitigation, response, and recovery.
Wildland: Development of safe and reliable aircraft operations for suppression and team transportation to reduce Wildland firefighting injuries and fatalities.
Data Collection: Identification of cultural perception of data collection / Identification of barriers to capture of quality data.
Technology and Fire Service Science: Development of data, implementation of transfer mechanisms and updating of standards that will enable firefighters to learn the science and utilize the technology required to respond to the changing fire conditions in our modern built environment.
Health and Wellness: Effectiveness of intervention and screening for health and disease related to firefighter wellness and fitness.
Service Delivery: Development of a scientifically-based community risk assessment tool.
Tools and Equipment: Assessment of current PPE (entire ensemble) performance, functionality and related safety features for today’s fire environment.
Ultimately, the 41 recommendations contained in this report should serve as a roadmap for all researchers and applied scientists who are interested in firefighter safety and survivability. These recommendations must not be limited for use as AFG guidance only, but should serve as a guidance tool for all who seek grants within their various disciplines. It is also hoped that with these recommendations in hand, other potential research sponsors can be identified and successfully petitioned.
The Report of the Second National Fire Service Research Agenda Symposium is available through the EveryoneGoesHome.com website.
A comments section has been added to the site to collect recommendations for future research from members of the fire service.
An arson fire in a vacant home in North Las Vegas (NV) was intention set and devised in a manner to harm firefighters according to Authorities.
Upon arrival of fire companies, the second floor was fully involved with heavy smoke showing from outside the building.
North Las Vegas Firefighters and Las Vegas Fire and Rescue worked together to control the flames in the vacant two story home.
It took seven units and approximately 27 firefighters to contain the fire.
There was no extension of the fire to surrounding homes, it was contained in 15 minutes.
There aren’t specific details released on why authorities believe this fire was set to harm firefighters, but the fire official discussing the incident clearly expressed his concerns of what confronted operating companies at this alarm.
Residential Structure Built in 1997
The two story residential structure was of Type V, wood frame construction, built in 1997 consisting of 1,998 Square feet of space with three (3) beadrooms, seven total rooms and an attached garage.
It’s especially important for companies and company officers to remain highly vigilant upon entering and conducting interior operations for any signs or indications that conditions may not be as characteristic and expected for fires in similar occupancies or under prevailing conditions.
We plan to develop and prepare some safety awareness insights for operations in a few days. We’ll also continue to monitor information that may be forthcoming with further details as to what may have been encountered by firefighters.
Los Angeles Firefighters Battle Major Emergency at Townhouses Under Construction
Under-construction building fire forces dozens of evacuations
Six Townhouses Under Construction Photo, Onscene.TV
Townhouses Under Construction Aerial Screen capture from CBSLA.com
Operational Divisions with Exposures (Pre-Construction) Bing Maps
A townhouse complex under construction caught fire on November 10, 2011, in the Brentwood neighborhood of Los Angeles (CA). The six-unit, wood-framed complex was in its construction phase, where at least two of the units were fully involved in fire upon arrival of LAFD companies. Four of those six structures were severely damaged as a result of the construction stage and the degree of open wood frame construction resulting in rapid flame spread and extension to a nearby residential buildings.
According to published reports, the Los Angeles Fire Department was called at 3:37 a.m. to 12315 Gorham Avenue which resulted in a major emergency alarm classification decared and resulted in the dispatch and deployment of over 160 firefighters to the site. First arriving companies found a large townhome development with “heavy fire showing.”
Largely due to an aggressive fire attack by the LAFD, the footprint of this blaze was kept in-check and fully extinguished in one hour and 39 minutes. Fortunately, there were no injuries to any civilians or Firefighting personnel.
Additionally, five adjacent structures were evacuated for precaution. Two of those structures- one, a small apartment complex and the other, a single family dwelling, did sustain significant fire damage. As many as 10 families were displaced from those two occupancies.
Following further investigation, the LAFD stated it believed the fire was intentionally set.
Construction Site Operational Considerations (not inclusive)
Pre-Fire Plan Large Construction Projects
Understand the various Phases to a Construction Project and how they affect fire operations
Identify and train for nonconventional Strategic and Tactical operational actions
Ensure predetermined multiple alarm resources are identified and greater alarms are established
Train your Company and Command Officers to address Construction site fires
Maintain an appropriate risk profile balance with operational needs with personnel safety foremost
Clearly establish multiple Safety Offices and establish geographical resources within the incident management system for reconnaissance, communications, and oversight and focused safety monitoring
Know you water supply and system capabilities and limitations
Determine fire flow needs based upon construction phases, as these change over time as the building goes up. Match fire flow demands with resource availability (time of day gaps etc.)
Identify exposures (Physical structures and Civilians) and ensure they are calculated into the incident action plan at the right before there are identified needs or concerns
Companies shall maintain a conservative safety posture; this is not the time for overly aggressive firefighting, it is the time for smart firefighting that can be highly efficient
Always consider collapse zones: partial or complete. Stay out of them!
Respect the wind; it’s not going to help you
Consider current and projected weather conditions in your operational and tactical plans and assignments
Did I already say: Pre-fire Planning?
Be calculated in the placement of your apparatus, especially in larger scale incidents that are defined under greater geographical divisions
The fire usually consumes the available fuel load rapidly; going from a Huge fire, to one that is sometimes much more manageable; just watch and control your exposures and degree of fire extension. Don’t help to make the fire even bigger through ineffective and dysfunctional command and control
Anticipate, Project, Plan and Engage
Respect the Fire: it’s not going to play by the regular rules of combat fire suppression and engagement as in finished and enclosed structures and buildings.
Photo: Firefighters hose down smoldering embers after a large fire gutted a townhouse complex under construction in Brentwood. Credit: Al Seib / Los Angeles Times
A five-story building under construction suddenly came down on Monday afternoon in Brooklyn, New York. Three workers became trapped under the rubble after the top two floors fell onto the third, sending it all crashing to the ground, officials said. Published reports indicate that the likelihood of the weight of the concrete caused the 3rd floor to collapse onto the 2nd floor, resulting in a catastrophic and sequential progressive floor collapse.
FDNY companies searched through the pile of concrete, pulling five workers out. Investigators said concrete being poured between the metal pillars buckled the building.
The building, at 2929 Brighton Fifth Street, near Neptune Avenue (Brooklyn) fell just before 2:30 p.m. A concrete worker on the site stated according to reports that the collapse happened immediately after concrete from his truck was pumped up onto the second and third floors of the building.
Four workers were in the building at the time of the collapse, and one was in front of the building. The one in front refused medical attention. Firefighters said the framework of the building had been erected, but not much else. Removing the men from the rubble was a delicate and difficult process because of the risk of further collapse. Even after the men were removed, a large piece of corrugated metal hung in front of the building.
FDNY Twitter Feed
Additional Links
Building Collapse In Brighton Beach Claims Life Of 1 Of 5 Workers Pulled From Rubble, HERE
In response to numerous requests from our recent posting; Commercials- Got Fire? Anticipate Collapse briefing post (HERE). We have developed and produced a comprehensive download in PDF format of the entire article that can be used for training, distribution and discussions.
Click on the image above and download the PDF file and use accordingly or download HERE
There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.
You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations at commercial building fires.
Commercial Fire and Collapse
Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments.
It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.
“Hal Bruno is one of the most important figures in the history of this country’s fire service. Hal died last night (November 8, 2011) at age 83. I imagine that many of the younger firefighters and a few older ones who read this site aren’t familiar with the name Hal Bruno. Hal wasn’t a fire chief and his expertise wasn’t in fireground tactics, hazardous materials, truck company or engine company operations. Hal’s specialty was firefighters. He was the best friend a firefighter and the fire service could have. But Hal Bruno wasn’t the friend who just slapped you on the back and told you what you wanted to hear. Hal cared enough to tell us all what we needed to hear. ” Dave Statter, STATter911.com Posted 11/09/2011 HERE
For more than 60 years, Hal Bruno served as an active member of the fire service community, giving selflessly as a dedicated volunteer firefighter, advocate, commentator and leader. He is renowned for his commitment to fire safety initiatives and his compassion for the members of the fire service and their families. From the NFFF Memorial Page, HERE
A recent video clip making its way around the cyber fireground clearly depicted a very close-call and resulting near miss event to four firefighters at a four alarm fire involving a commercial building that housed an established insulation manufacturer and installation contractor.
The video shows within a very compressed time frame, the progression of rapidly deteriorating interior conditions, the adverse affects on the building’s structural systems and the results from the loss of load transfers that lead to a catastrophic wall collapse narrowly missing the crew of firefighters who were operating a hand line in the vicinity of an exterior overhead door. Fortunately the injuries sustained to the firefighters were minor in nature; however the consequences and results from this collapse could have been far different and significantly more severe.
Following a series of repeated viewings of the video clip and with each successive viewing, it became readily apparent that there was a lot more to these images of the collapse and the cursory focus on the resulting near miss event. Closer examination of the video clip and the still frames brought to light some obvious conditions and indicators that easily become lost in the rapidity of the sequence of the collapse; which really has the true story to be told.
It’s the mechanism and sequence of the collapse, the dynamics of the building’s performance and the building indicators that provide a training opportunity in further examining key factors, presenting insights that could be a focus for operational and command personnel at future incidents with common parameters and gaining some mental models in recognition-primed decision making that contribute to the naturalistic decision-making process.
If you know what to be looking for, then when you see it, you may be able to anticipate, project and implement in rapid succession appropriate measures dictated by the incident.
Four Alarm Commercial Building Fire with Collapse: Fire Photo by Ben Goldberry
In an effort to promote additional insights and bring forward these fundamental observations and experienced-based presumptions extended from these and other news video images, still photographs, additional reporting research and examination, and a review of other published media resources; the following observations presented in this overview brief are being conveyed to increase firefighter, company and command level awareness of key collapse indicators such as those present at this commercial fire and to further the concept of adaptive fireground management principles and increase awareness of fundamental building performance indicators and principles to help you increase your intuitive observations skills and translate them into proactive operational actions on the fireground-before an adverse condition occurs.[ i.e., being five steps ahead of the fire conditions].
Although this briefing makes use of the images and conditions depicted in the video clip and encountered by the fire department evident in the images; the susequent commentary and insights provided are not meant to provide direct or indirect opinions, renderings, criticism or censure towards the conduct of operations or the management of the incident by the respective department and it’s firefighting, command and support personnel who operated at the actual fire and experienced this near miss event first-hand.
We are grateful that the events of this alarm precluded anything worst occurring given the potential seriousness of the prevailing incident conditions and commend the fire department and it’s firefighters that provide these exceptional services each and every day to the citizens they serve and to the community they protect, in mitigating this serious fire; safely and successfully.
This incident and the resulting near-miss captured by the videographer provides the Fire Service with an exceptional opportunity given today’s far reaching capabilities of eMedia, this web site and direct and indirect readers, links, tweets, likes, reposting’s, uploads, downloads and sharing an opportunity to share the consequences of an extreme close-call and learn from it in a positive and constructive manner, so that firefighters, company officers, commanders and support personnel can better predict with knowledge, insight and at times intuition a better understanding of buildings and the structures and occupancies we operate within on the fireground.
There are numerous inherent indicators present at every incident scene we operate at that. As is in this near miss event and building collapse; it’s sometimes the subtle things that need to gain the attention of operationg companies and personnel and the ability to rapidly process, recognize and react.
Remember this: Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
As a generality; it’s important to note that given heavy fire involvement in a structure (got fire), adaptive fireground management considerations would promote conservative considerations to anticipate and expect collapse (degraded or compromise; limited or catastrophic).
In the case of fires in commercial occupancies and buildings with;
Large Square footage/Floor areas
Significant fire loads
Large open structural system spans lacking compartmentation,
Unprotected steel components and assemblies
No Sprinkler Systems
Omitted, compromised or degraded passive or active protective or suppression systems
Significant openings along the exterior building envelope
Significant opening on the roof enclosure
Deep seated fires or rapidly escalating and extending fires
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations.
Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. Its alot more than that, with far greater consequences that may be very unforgiving.
Aerial Plan of Building and Collapse Area A-B
The Building
The fire incident involved a single story commercial building occupying approximately 32, 200 square feet of area on a multiple building site with proximal exposures. Manufacturing, warehousing and offices comprised the building’s operational use. An aerial plan view shows the geographical building scene divisions and the location and relationship of the Alpha- Bravo Side collapse zones that affected operations and resulted in the close-call and firefighter near-miss. The proximity of exposures, physical layout and orientation can be further assessed.
A review of public documents and records, incident reports and various media resources provided the following insights;
Overview Details
Alpha Street Side View- Adapted from Google Streetmaps
The view of the alpha street side identifies the building front facade, its main office entrance (center between dual overhead doors on the left and right). Pronounced on the alpha side facade is the presence of four (4) equally spaced overhead (OH) doors that provide direct access into the building’s interior. The subsequent collapse area is depicted at the A-B corner with special attention drawn to relationship of the wall plane and OH door proximity.
The relationship and this wall surface ( area square footage) and the presence of the OH door opening to the wall/ roof interface area that subsequently became compromised and collapsed is critical in further understanding the mechanism of the collapse sequence and also the positive effect it had on the survivability of the firefighters who were within the collapse zone at the time of the wall failure.
Don’t Always Stress the Corners
It’s been a common practice and fundamental fireground consideration to define the corner of a typical building as having safety considerations and prominence in the context of ladder company operations, laddering and roof work and in the placement of personnel and positioning of fireground operations.
Corner Building Operational considerations have included, but limited to;
Provides a potentially safe(er) area of operational refuge
Provides a location to safely position ground ladders for roof access/egress
Provides a location that has a potential higher degree of assurance for maintaining structural integrity in the event of a collapse condition of an outer wall
Will not fail in a catastrophic or monolithic manner due to the postulated presence of structural members on the vicinity of either the wall enclosure and/or the roofing structural system and assemblies
The design and construction configuration and orientation of the ninety degree angle of the building’s outer wall envelope (at the corner) provides predicated inherent structural stability
The typical type of structural or envelope construction may have a resulting ninety degree building corner having a more robust resistance to collapse and compromise due to the various types of enclosure systems (methods and materials) and assemblies and needed stability per engineering principles
In this instance (as shown in the Alpha side street view), the presence of the large overhead door in close proximity to the corner wall intersection and transition ( A-B side), actually makes this position, fireground proximity and travel paths highly prone to early and complete collapse potential in the event of a loss of the wall-roof component or assembly integrity or in the load bearing/transfer capabilities of the wall-roof assembly.
The presence and identification of a corner configuration similar to this in a commercial structure should result in a higher degree of considerations and risk assessment when formulation and deploying operational assignments and in the placement of personnel for task assignments in this proximity.
This operational area should be considered as a candidate for designation as a collapse zone based upon projected or defined operational considerations, incident conditions and predictive building characteristics, systems, materials and fire dynamics and conditions.
Alpha-Bravo Corner of Subsequent Collapse Aerial View
The view from the Alpha-Bravo Corner shows the collapse zones at grade and the affected area size.
As noted in the preceding narrative, the presence of the overhead door opening along the perimeter wall enclosure and outer envelope creates a risk area that would require monitoring, periodic reconnaissance and assessment during subsequent operations to determine structural stability and potential adverse conditions.
The proximity of the opening in relationship to the corner wall, roof support and structural span of the opening results in a very delicate balance of forces, loads, reliance and dependence that must be maintained for structural integrity and equilibrium.
The entire perimeter of the alpha side could be considered for a restricted collapse zone just in terms of wall opening alone sans the degree of actual or projected interior fire impingement or fire involvement.
Take some time to view the video clip a few times over before proceeding to the next sequence of fame images.
This videographer of this video was Aaron Dohring. (all rights reserved)
Aerial Overhead view of the building perimeter walls along the four divisions ( A-D) with the A-B corner that subsequently experienced the wall-roof compromise and resulting collapse.
The A-B corner and the affected ground areas around the collapse zone. Considerations for a collapse zone area on the A-B corner would have resulted in a minimum distance of twenty five (25) feet from the building base for all operations within this area. The collapse zone on the Bravo side extends into the exposure building due to its close proximity.
Always consider the building envelope materials of construction and systems present on the building. The use of concrete masonry units (CMU) is common, as is the use of pre-cast concrete and cast-in place and tilt-up concrete construction panels.
Variations in collapse dynamics and mechanisms of collapse may result in sizable increases in collapse zone distances from the building base with consideration for monolithic or partial wall collapse as well as safety considerations for bounce and travel over long distances of modular assembly building pieces ( i.e. concrete blocks, brick venner or material chunks).
We have not discussed collapse considerations for other building envelope systems such as metal panelized systems since these have entirely different collapse considerations and profiling, not applicable to this incident and assessment insights. The same is true when considering operating and collapse considerations at commercial buildings with ordinary construction or heavy timber systems (Type or Class III and IV). These to have different rules of predictive building performance and collapse safety considerations.
Typical Interior
The interior of the building included unprotected steel components and assemblies consisting of steel columns, beams and open web steel joists. These common and conventional structural support systems provided large free clear spans, common for typical warehouse and commercial occupancies. The presence and operability of functional fire suppression sprinkler system coupled with passive and active protective devices and compartmentation can help support proactive and aggressive fire suppression efforts in those conditions that have appropriate risk determinations and balanced risk-gain benefits.
The presence of unprotected steel components ( Truss, column, structural beams etc. ) and assemblies requires an understanding of the effects of flame and heat impingement, rate of heat release and fire dynamics, potential for movement and displacement of structural components and effect on assemblies, systems and connections and the effect on structural stability, integrity and building load transfers and displacement that all can adversely affect building performance, integrity and collapse potential
Typical Structural System and Components
Interior View with Steel Columns, Open Web Steel bar Joists and Beams
Typical Open Web Steel Bar Joists w Metal Roof Deck
Large clear spans provided by the open web steel bar joists allowed for considerable free floor space typical of commercial warehouse occupancies.
Note the use of what appears to be combustible wood storage and staging areas that could have could potentially contribute towards increased fire intensity, extension and further contribute towards adverse affects on the unprotected structural steel components and assemblies.
Alpha Side Collapse Area Details: OH Door Pre-Collapse Insights
Pre-Collapse Operations on Alpha side with personnel in close proximty to the building perimeter
Pre-Collapse view of Operations on the Alpha side with personnel in close proximity, (within [a] collapse zone) to the building perimeter. It is evident that the degree of interior fire extension and involvement presumes a cautious deployment and placement of personnel in safe operational areas. When operating in such close proximity to the building wall and envelope, it becomes increasingly challenging for company officers and company personnel to monitor overall building performance indicators that may be prevalent or dominant from a view point further away from the building.
Fire extension, smoke conditions, component or assembly movement or displacement may be readily defined and identified from a vantage point away from the building, requiring additional independent operational assignments within the division if resources allow. Otherwise, officers are encouraged to get a big picture view and increase their span of vision of the building and progressing fire conditions and building performance
The pre-collapse frame image above identifies the building roof line in relationship to the ground operations, smoke conditions and also the directional flow of the elevated master stream [upper right corner]. The initial stage of the wall compromise and collapse can be seen in the Bravo wall pulling away. When watching the video, pay close attention first to the stream direction and flow and them at the location and movement of the wall, which is followed in rapid succession with the full wall collapse.
T
Close examination of the initial video frames shows the rapid displacement of the portion of the Bravo wall and outward collapse towards the B-Exposure (alleyway) Refer to the Aerial Plan for orientation. The A-B Collapse is progressing from the Bravo side to the Alpha side as loads are being transferred in rapid progression with further collapse expected.
The frame image above shows the bravo wall failing outward with the resulting loss in structural support of the roofing deck assembly.
Rapid fire migration and extension is evident after the wall section collapse with increased flames visible. In the video, one firefighter quickly recognizes the imminent collapse and reacts.
A significant section of wall area is present at the A-B side and progressing from the building corner to the left jamb of the overhead (OH) door. This area and the area directly above the OH door opening is calculated to weigh over 20,000 lbs.
The early identification and establishment of collapse zone(s) is mission critical especially at commercial buildings due to the considerations for rapidly changing operational conditions that may be a result of or influenced by the following;
lack of knowledge or understanding of the building’s construction, systems and characteristics
lack of adequate resources, skills and or capabilities for selected phase operations
fire loading, combustibles, flammables and other products
Last of or loss of compartmentation
fire and protective systems failures or inoperability
unapproved alterations, additions and renovations to the building, systems and occupancy
transitions for offensive to defensive operational phases, which at times may results in operating position postures too close to the building
failure to recognize situational factors that will drive appropriate operational phasing and task deployments
lack of building performance knowledge
not considering occupancy risk versus treating the building/fire relationship based upon occupancy type
not recognizing key collapse indicators and failing to implement timely actions [proactively versus reactionary]
being four steps behind the fire conditions evident instead of implementing adaptive fire ground management insights [five steps ahead of the evident fire]
use precise coordination when placing elevated masterstreams into operations with ground personnel operating within close quarters
understand the effects of master streams on the integrity of building features, assemblies and components
The image frame above shows personnel operating within an imminent collapse zone directing hand lines into the interior fire area. Further examination of the video frames clearly shows one firefighter quickly recognizing that a collapse is occurring and attempts to alert the other personnel to retreat. Simultaneously to the collapse progression, the crew immediately retreats away from the collapsing wall and falling building materials.
Within the span of four seconds, the wall compromise occurs and collapses on the ground at the A-B corner and immediate area on the alpha side. The slightly monolithic manner in which the wall plane first peels away and progressively collapsed is interesting for a CMU wall. Possibly due to the outward collapse of the Bravo wall, followed by the rapid succession of failure of the roof-wall connection interface resulted in an transitional downward force that pushed the alpha side wall outward allowing gravity to work its force
When operating in close proximity to a heavily involved forward interior condition [exterior position] it is important to maintain focused situational awareness and either directly maintain or delegate responsibilities for observations of fire and smoke progress and conditions while monitoring key functional building performance indicators and collapse pre-cursors.
Additionally, always re-evaluate the effectiveness of deployed and operational hose lines, streams and in water application to ensure they are adequate for the degree of fire suppression being undertaken and the corresponding fire flow requirements. Don’t just assume, determine with validity. [ Refer to Tactical Entertainment]
Obscured by the rapidly defining smoke which is a result of the developing and extending collapse, the frame image 04 below depicts the beginning of the compromise and collapse sequence commencing as a result of the Bravo wall compromise and collapse sequence at the B-A corner that will subsequently peel towards the Alpha side and continue up to the outermost jamb of the overhead door.
Pay particular attention to the first three to four seconds of the video clip and review the video clip over a few times; looking at the operating elevated master stream that is clearly visible and operating from the upper right part of the screen through the smoke plume; follow the direct orientation and stream flowing directly towards the bravo wall plane, and presumed penetrating into/through the roof deck or impacting through the metal roof deck and wall-roof assembly area at the upper roof edge.
Image 04
Frame image 04 depicts the rapidly deteriorating conditions that are evident as the collapse sequence continues and the overhead door jamb (left) buckling and adjacent wall failing by way of an outward curl or peel away commencing from the upper (left image) A-B corner at the roof line and then peeling and failing from upper left to right.
Image 05
The leading edge of the outward collapsing wall plane ( yellow dotted line) is failing with the greatest material concentration occurring at the A-B edge outward. Fortunately the presence and location of the overhead door opening lessened the amount and location of wall material ( concrete masonry units-CMU) and contributed to a void area being present and not fully impacting the firefighters who were operating within this collapse zone.
In other words, had this been a solid full wall collapse likelihood for significant firefighter injury would have resulted.
The affects of wall/roof compromise should be of focused consideration and monitoring when managing incidents of this size and magnitude in similar occupancies and building features. Flame and heat impingment can and will affect the structural integrity of lintels spans, beams and truss connects along roof lines and connections. Look for signs of impingment, degradation or compromise. watch for signs of probable inward/outward or curtain wall collapse.
Image 06
The remaining images, frames 06 and 07 depict the location of the firefighters to the wall collapse, the relationship to the wall and roof system and the degree of wall area that became compromised and collapsed.
Image 07
This brief video clip and these accompanying briefing insights provided a tremendous opportunity to examine in a non-critical manner an actual near miss collapse event and operational discernments that provide a focused training an awareness opportunity.
When given the time to analyze and assess, some things become so apparent and self-revealing that we might prematurely say why didn’t someone pick up that or those conditions while conducting operations at [an] incident. It is dependent on a wide variety of factors, conditions and parameters that are difficult at times to identify and harder yet to fully identify as common or contributing factors, errors or omissions.
It’s not always that easy; but contradictory – some time it really is (or should be) that easy.
Some things on the fireground may not be prone to being so readily identifiable or recognized.
It all depends what you’re looking for and whether you have the necessary insights, knowledge and skill sets. Incident priorities, demands, situational focus, awareness or disconnect all may have a part in how and incident is managed and mitigated.
It goes back directly on knowing what to look for and when; at what type of building with which type of occupancy and under what stage or stages of fire development and combat operations or engagement you might be in. It complex, it takes time and experience and learning’s.
There are numerous factors to be cognizant of in operations involving commercial buildings and occupancies; with special considerations and a diligent focus on a wide degree of facets on the fireground during combat fire engagement.
You need to start somewhere, thus the investment in these observations and insights for this event. Open your eyes on the fireground, there is so much to take in and respond to; if you know what to look for and can process what you’re seeing.
It is mission critical to comprehend and understand your department’s operational capabilities and the necessary deployment demands for fire suppression, fire flow and phased operations. Respect these buildings for the occupancy risk they present and not the typical occupancy type that we develop our conventional strategies, incident action plans and tactical deployments. It’s a lot more than that, with far greater consequences; that may be very unforgiving.
An image from a NIST computer model shows temperature levels during the 2007 Charleston Sofa Super Store fire. Dark blue is ambient temperature; bright red is about 800 degrees C (1500 degrees F). Credit: NIST
Fire Modeling Software
These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Fire Research Division at the NIST. The list of programs is divided into two broad categories below: currently-supported software and archival (unsupported) software. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.
Current Software
These models are being actively developed and supported by the laboratory. Details of the software, including download, development, and support information are included on the individual web pages for each model.
FDS (Fire Dynamics Simulator) is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model of fire-driven fluid flow. The software solves numerically a form of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally-driven flow, with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires.
These models are included largely for reference or historical interest and span several decades of development of computational tools in fire research at NIST. As such, they are largely unsupported due to the age of the software.
ALOFT-FTTM (A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain) is a computer based model to predict the downwind distribution of smoke particulate and combustion products from large outdoor fires. It solves the fundamental fluid dynamic equations for the smoke plume and its surroundings with flat terrain. The program contains a graphical user interface for input and output and a user modifiable database of fuel and smoke emission parameters. The output can be displayed as downwind, crosswind and vertical smoke concentration contours. Information on using the program is available with on-line help commands in the program.
ASCOS (Analysis of Smoke Control Systems) is a program for steady air flow analysis of smoke control systems. This program can analyze any smoke control system that produces pressure differences with the intent of limiting smoke movement in building fire situations. The program is also capable of modeling the stack effect created in taller buildings during extreme temperature conditions. The program input consists of the outside and building temperatures, a description of the building flow network and the flows produced by the ventilation or smoke control system. The output consists of the steady state pressures and flows throughout the building. Another newer program, CONTAM, may be more appropriate to some applications than ASCOS.
ASET-B (Available Safe Egress Time – BASIC) is a program for calculating the temperature and position of the hot smoke layer in a single room with closed doors and windows. ASET-B is a compact easy to run program which solves the same equations as ASET. The required program inputs are a heat loss fraction, the height of the fire, the room ceiling height, the room floor area, the maximum time for the simulation, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the temperature and thickness of the hot smoke layer as a function of time.
ASMET (Atria Smoke Management Engineering Tools) consists of a set of equations and a zone fire model for analysis of smoke management systems for large spaces such as atria, shopping malls, arcades, sports arenas, exhibition halls and airplane hangers. ASMET is written in C++ language. For program documentation and a description of the input data, the user should refer to NISTIR 5516, Klote, J. H., Method of Predicting Smoke Movement in Atria with Application to Smoke Management, NIST.
BREAK1 (Berkeley Algorithm for Breaking Window Glass in a Compartment Fire) is a program which calculates the temperature history of a glass window exposed to user described fire conditions. The calculations are stopped when the glass breaks. The inputs required are the glass thermal conductivity, thermal diffusivity, absorption length, breaking stress, Young’s modulus, thermal coefficient of linear expansion, thickness, emissivity, shading thickness, half-width of window, the ambient temperature, numerical parameters and the time histories of flame radiation from the fire, hot layer temperature and emissivity, and heat transfer coefficients. The outputs are temperature history of the glass normal to the glass surface, and the window breakage time.
CCFM (Consolidated Compartment Fire Model version VENTS) is a two-layer zone-type compartment fire model computer code. It simulates conditions due to user-specified fires in a multi-room, multi-level facility. The required inputs are a description of room geometry and vent characteristics (up to 9 rooms, 20 vents), initial state of the inside and outside environment, and fire energy release rates as a functions of time (up to 20 fires). If simulation of concentrations of products of combustion is desired, then product release rates must also be specified (up to three products). Vents can be simple openings between adjacent spaces (natural vents) or fan/duct forced ventilation systems between arbitrary pairs of spaces (forced vents). For forced vents, flow rates and direction can be user-specified or included in the simulation by accounting for user-specified fan and duct characteristics. Wind and stack effects can be taken into account. The program outputs for each room are pressure at the floor, layer interface height, upper/lower layer temperature and (optionally) product concentrations.
DETACT-QS and DETACT-T2
DETACT-QS (DETector ACTuation – Quasi Steady) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature heat detectors and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire. DETACT-QS assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the height of the ceiling above the fuel, the distance of the thermal device from the axis of the fire, the actuation temperature of the thermal device, the response time index (RTI) for the device, and the rate of heat release of the fire. The program outputs are the ceiling gas temperature and the device temperature both as a function of time and the time required for device actuation. DETACT-T2 (DETector ACTuation – Time squared) is a program for calculating the actuation time of thermal devices below unconfined ceilings. It can be used to predict the actuation time of fixed temperature and rate of rise heat detectors, and sprinkler heads subject to a user specified fire which grows as the square of time. CT-T2 assumes that the thermal device is located in a relatively large area, that is only the fire ceiling flow heats the device and there is no heating from the accumulated hot gases in the room. The required program inputs are the ambient temperature, the response time index (RTI) for the device, the activation and rate of rise temperatures of the device, height of the ceiling above the fuel, the device spacing and the fire growth rate. The program outputs are the time to device activation and the heat release rate at activation.
ELVAC (Elevator Evacuation) is an interactive computer program that estimates the time required to evacuate people from a building with the use of elevators and stairs. It is cautioned that elevators generally are not intended as a means of fire evacuation, and they should not be used during fires. However, it is possible to design elevator systems that for fire emergencies, and ELVAC can be used to evaluate the potential performance of such systems. ELVAC calculates the evacuation time for one group of elevators. If a building has more than one group of elevators, ELVAC can be run on each group separately. Input consists of floor to floor heights, number of people on floors, number of elevators in the group, elevator speed, elevator acceleration, elevator capacity, elevator door type and width, and various inefficiency factors. The output is a table of elevator travel time, round trip time, people moved, and number of round trips for each floor plus the total evacuation time.
FIRDEMND simulates the suppression of post flashover charring and non-charring solid-fuel fires in compartments using water sprays from portable hose-nozzle equipment used by the fire departments. The output of the Fire Demand Model (FDM) shows the extinguishing effects of water spray at various flow rates and droplet sizes. The calculations are based on a heat and mass balance accounting for gas and surface cooling, steam-induced smothering, water-spray induced air entrainment, direct extinguishment of the fire by water and the energy transport via inflow and outflow of heat and products of combustion.
FIRST (FIRe Simulation Technique) is the direct descendant of the HARVARD V program developed by Howard Emmons and Henri Mitler. The fire may be entered either as a user-specified time-dependent mass loss rate or in terms of fundamental properties of the fuel. In the latter case, the program will predict the fire growth rate by considering the changing oxygen concentration and smoke layer conditions in the room of fire origin. It can also predict the heating and possible ignition of up to three targets. The original fire and targets may also be user specified fires. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the rooms and openings, and the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, walls, burning fuel, and targets. The generation rate of soot must be specified, and the generation rates of other species may be specified as a yield of the pyrolysis rate. Among the program outputs are the temperature and thickness of, and species concentrations in, the hot upper layer and also in the cooler, lower layer in each compartment. Also given are wall surface temperatures, heat transfer rates and mass flow rates. MASBANK is used to create and maintain a data base of materials and their fire properties for use by the FIRST program. MASBANK can accommodate 20 properties for up to 50 materials. The program has the capability to add, delete, change, alphabetize and view the material properties in the data bank. Material properties from MASBANK may be transferred directly into the FIRST program.
Jet is a model for the prediction of detector activation and gas temperature in the presence of a smoke layer.
FPETool (Software and Documentation) is a set of engineering equations useful in estimating potential fire hazard and the response of the space and fire protection systems to the developing hazard. Version 3.2 incorporates an estimate of smoke conditions developing within a room receiving steady-state smoke leakage from an adjacent space. Estimates of human viability resulting from exposure to developing conditions within the room are calculated based upon the smoke temperature and toxicity.
LAVENT is a program developed to simulate the environment and the response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with draft curtains and fusible link operated ceiling vents. The model, used to calculate the heating of the fusible links, includes the effects of the ceiling jet and the upper layer of hot gases beneath the ceiling. The required program inputs are the geometrical data describing the compartment, the thermophysical properties of the ceiling, the fire elevation, the time dependent energy release rate of the fire, the fire diameter or energy release rate per area of the fire, the ceiling vent area, the fusible link response-time-index (RTI) and fuse temperature, the fusible link positions along the ceiling, the link assignment to each ceiling vent, and the ambient temperature. A maximum of five ceiling vents and ten fusible links are permitted in the compartment. The program outputs are the temperature, mass and height of the hot upper layer, the temperature of each link, the ceiling jet temperature and velocity at each link, the radial temperature distribution along the interior surface of the ceiling, the radial distribution of the heat flux to the interior and exterior surfaces of the ceiling, the fuse time of each link, and the vent area that has been opened.GRAPH is a graphics program which runs in conjunction with LAVENT. The results for LAVENT are sent to the data file, GRAPH.OUT, after each prescribed time step. GRAPH then allows the user to choose two sets of variables to be plotted on the screen and has the additional capability of hardcopy output.
These fire simulation programs were developed or sponsored by the Building and Fire Research Laboratory. In order to get further information or to obtain one of the programs, click on the appropriate name.
ALOFT-FTTM- A Large Outdoor Fire plume Trajectory model – Flat Terrain
FASTLite- A collection of procedures which builds on the core routines of FIREFORM and the computer model CFAST to provide engineering calculations of various fire phenomena,
FPETool- Fire Protection Engineering Tools (equations and fire simulation scenarios)
Jet- A Model for the Prediction of Detector Activation and Gas Temperature in the Presence of a Smoke Layer
LAVENT- Response of sprinkler links in compartment fires with curtains and ceiling vents
NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator and Smokeview – The NIST Fire Dynamics Simulator predicts smoke and/or air flow movement caused by fire, wind, ventilation systems etc. Smokeview visualizes the predictions generated by NIST FDS.
Using Fire Models to Understand Fire BehaviorNIST’s fire modeling capabilities can help firefighters understand and predict fire conditions, HERE
On FirefighterNetcast.com Wednesday November 2, 2011 Postponed from October
On Live Tonight November 2, 2011 at 9 PM ET on FireFighterNetcast.com
Taking it From the Streets and Delivering it From the Chief’s Office;
An exciting and dynamic discussion that integrates the insights from Christopher Naum’s Taking it to the Streets perspectives to Chief Doug Cline’s Chief’s Bugle visions. FirefighterNetcast.com is proud to present an insightful look at today’s leading issues affecting the American Fire Service from the perspective of the street firefighter, officer and commander and the perspective from the executive and chief officers and commanders- the Chief’s perspective.
This program’s theme and discussion will concentrate on the challenges of maintaining a balanced approach towards integrating effective risk management, with the demands for effective and highly efficient firefighting; while promoting safety, hazard reduction and injury and LODD reduction with conventional decision-making.
Tune in Wednesday night October 26, 2011, 9pm ET on FirefighterNetcast.com for a 10-Alarm Discussion with these visionary national fire service leaders and their special guests.
Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.
NFPA releases state-level fire service needs assessment for every U.S. state. Findings based on Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service with comparisons to earlier studies
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) released a fire service needs assessment for each state based on findings from the Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service, a study that looked at the current needs of America’s fire departments as compared to those identified in assessments done in 2001 and 2005. The goal of the project was to identify major gaps in the needs of the U.S. fire service and to determine if the Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (DHS/FEMA) Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) programs are continuing to reduce the needs of fire departments.
The report looked at personnel and their capabilities, including staffing, training, certification, and wellness/fitness; facilities and apparatus; personal protective equipment, fire prevention and code enforcement; the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents; and communications and new technologies.
Selected Findings:
Nearly half (46 percent) of all fire departments that are responsible for structural firefighting have not formally trained all their personnel involved in structural firefighting, down from 55 percent in 2001 and 53 percent in 2005.
Seven out of ten (70 percent) fire departments have no program to maintain basic firefighter fitness and health, down from 80 percent in 2001 and 76 percent in 2005.
Nearly half (46 percent) of all fire department engines and pumpers were at least 15 years old, down from 51 percent in 2001 and 50 percent in 2005.
Half (52 percent) of all fire departments cannot equip all firefighters on a shift with self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), down from 70 percent in 2001 and 60 percent in 2005.
Two out of five (39 percent) fire departments do not have enough personal alert safety system devices (PASS) to equip all emergency responders on a shift, down from 62 percent in 2001 and 48 percent in 2005.
Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service conducted by NFPA concluded:
Needs have declined to a considerable degree in a number of areas, particularly personal protective and firefighting equipment, two types of resources that received the largest shares of funding from the AFG programs.
Some innovative technologies that have not been identified as necessary in existing standards but are known to be very useful to today’s fire service – including Internet access and thermal imaging cameras – have also seen large increases in use.
Declines in needs have been more modest in some other important areas, such as training, which have received much smaller shares of AFG funds.
Still other areas of need, such as apparatus, stations, and the staffing required to support the stations, have seen either limited reductions in need (e.g., apparatus needs in rural areas) or no reductions at all (e.g., adequacy of stations and personnel to meet standards and other guidance on speed and size of response).
Fire prevention and code enforcement needs have shown no clear improvement over the past decade.
In all areas emphasized by the AFG and SAFER (Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response) grants, there is ample evidence of impact from the grants but also considerable residual need still to be addressed, even for needs that have seen considerable need-reduction in the past decade.
There has been little change in the ability of departments, using only local resources, to handle certain types of unusually challenging incidents, including two types of homeland security scenarios (structural collapse and chem/bio agent attack) and two types of large-scale emergency responses (a wildland/urban interface fire and a developing major flood).
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Web Site, HERE
NFPA 1710: Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments, 2010 Edition, Order HERE
Additional Supplemental
NFPA has conducted a series of national surveys to identify the needs of the fire service for resources required to safely and effectively carry out their responsibilities. The surveys indicated the resources fire departments had, while NFPA codes and standards and other national guidance documents defined the requirements. The gaps between resources in hand and resources required defined the needs.
These reports look at personnel and their capabilities, including staffing, training, certification, and wellness/fitness; facilities and apparatus; personal protective equipment; fire prevention and code enforcement; the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents; and communications and new technologies.
All three studies began with requests from Congress, and the first two studies were conducted with and sponsored by the U.S. Fire Administration and its parent agencies.
2011 A Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (PDF, 1 MB)
June 2011. 216 pages
Updated study examining the needs of the U.S. fire service in such areas as training, certification, personnel, apparatus, equipment, and fire prevention, with particular attention to homeland security type incidents.
State-by-state reports
The following are state-level reports based on the findings in each of NFPA’s needs assessment reports.
2006 Four Years Later – A Second Needs Assessment of the U.S.Fire Service (PDF, 4 MB)
Department of Homeland Security, USFA, and NFPA, October 2006. 159 pages
Updated assessment of needs of U.S. fire service in such areas as training, certification, personnel, apparatus, equipment, and fire prevention, with particular attention to homeland security type incidents.
Also see: Download an errata for this report. (PDF, 16 KB)
Matching Assistance to Firefighters Grants to the Reported Needs of the U.S.Fire Service (PDF, 2 MB)
Department of Homeland Security, USFA, and NFPA, October 2006. 41 pages
Analysis of whether grants requested and received have addressed reported needs, by type of need, and whether popular types of grants have resulted in significant change in the overall national level of need.
2002 A Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service (PDF, 1 MB)
FEMA, USFA, and NFPA, December 2002. 160 pages
A comprehensive study done by FEMA, USFA and NFPA examining the needs and response capabilities of the U.S. fire service. Among the factors examined are personnel and their capabilities; fire prevention and code enforcement; stations, apparatus and equipment; and the ability to handle unusually challenging incidents. Results are reported by nationwide and community size.
Taking it From the Streets and Delivering it From the Chief’s Office;
An exciting and dynamic discussion that integrates the insights from Christopher Naum’s Taking it to the Streets perspectives to Chief Doug Cline’s Chief’s Bugle visions. FirefighterNetcast.com is proud to present an insightful look at today’s leading issues affecting the American Fire Service from the perspective of the street firefighter, officer and commander and the perspective from the executive and chief officers and commanders- the Chief’s perspective.
This program’s theme and discussion will concentrate on the challenges of maintaining a balanced approach towards integrating effective risk management, with the demands for effective and highly efficient firefighting; while promoting safety, hazard reduction and injury and LODD reduction with conventional decision-making.
Tune in Wednesday night October 26, 2011, 9pm ET on FirefighterNetcast.com for a 10-Alarm Discussion with these visionary national fire service leaders and their special guests.
Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.
While doing some research on UK and US Strategic Leadership and Operational issues, I came across an article published on FireChief .com on April 28, 2011 and written by By Glenn Bischoff titled: The Argument for European, North American Unification. After reading through the piece, I thought this had some interesting connotations worthy of reposting on CommandSafety.com.
The information contained in the article points out the highlights from John Chubb, a battalion chief for the Dublin Fire Brigade, who spoke on the topic at the 2011 Fire Department Instructors Conference (FDIC) held in Indianapolis. Take some time to read the excerpt here and follow the link for the complete article on FireChief.comHERE. I’m certain there can be some interesting dialog that can evolve from it.
Both the European and North American fire services would benefit greatly from a unified approach to firefighting for a very simple and straightforward reason: the former is well-schooled in the theories of fire dynamics, while the latter is expert on fireground tactics. So said John Chubb, a battalion chief for the Dublin Fire Brigade, who spoke on the topic last month at the Fire Department Instructors Conference (FDIC) held in Indianapolis.
Indeed, many sound North American tactics — such as technical rescue, hazmat response, positive pressure ventilation, tactical ventilation and forcible entry techniques, particularly the use of the Halligan tool — largely are being ignored by European fire departments, according to Chubb. “There is a level of ignorance towards the way in which North American departments operate, and even a level of arrogance,” Chubb said. “People in Europe feel that we have superior firefighting technology and a superior [knowledge of] firefighting science in the average firefighter. But I would suggest that such a belief is very close-minded.”
Chubb added that such beliefs are fueled by misconceptions about the number of line-of-duty deaths in North America, particularly in the United States, which at first glance are considerably higher than they are in Europe. “When you drill down into the American statistics, however, you find that they are taken from a much broader spectrum of deaths than the European statistics, particularly the United Kingdom,” he said.
“In other words, if you went home from work [in the U.S.] and 12 hours later you had a cardiac event, that would be associated with your job. That wouldn’t happen in the U.K.”
Chubb cited a couple of examples during the session where an application of North American tactics might have saved lives. In one, a fire started on the 14th floor of an apartment building in the U.K., when a tea light that had been left burning on top of a television set in a bedroom had burned through its container. One of the occupants awoke to the smell of smoke and raced to the kitchen to get a towel, thinking that he could somehow smother the fire. Unfortunately, he couldn’t get back to the bedroom where he had left his girlfriend because the smoke and heat was too oppressive. By this time, he also couldn’t find his way to the front door of the apartment, so he opened a window to call for help. Passerby placed the emergency call.
Two pumpers arrived to the incident about three minutes after the call was received, Chubb said. What they found when they arrived was a building that had no sprinkler system. It did have a hydrant/standpipe, but that was padlocked because of previous vandalism. Unfortunately, neither of the pumpers was equipped with a bolt cutter. Two firefighters raced to the 14th floor and kicked in the door of the apartment. When they were told that the girlfriend still was inside the unit, they decided to perform a rescue — despite having no water.
Published on FireChief .com on April 28, 2011 and written by By Glenn Bischoff: The Argument for European, North American Unification, all rights reserved.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum. On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com. A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production. Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.
Residential Building National Estimates by Property Use
USFA Residential and Nonresidential Fire Estimate Summaries, 2003-2009
