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Dangers of Floor Collapse

Take the time to revisit two Firefighter LODD incidents that both occurred in the month of August in 2006 and 2009 respectively. Excerpts from the NIOSH Reports have been included that are part of the NIOSH FIRE FIGHTER FATALITY INVESTIGATION AND PREVENTION PROGRAM (HERE).

Both of these incidents involved a double firefighter line-of-duty death (LODD) and resulted from a floor collapse during the conduct of operations within the fire involved structures. There are numerous lessons learned and recommendations that can be considered and applied in organizations and agencies across the country, both large and small; career or volunteer.

These incidents bring to light the occupancy risks present in some of our most common of building occupancies, and continue to provide the basis for operational considerations and management based upon occupancy risk versus occupancy type. There are numerous operational considerations when addressing fires located in basement or underdeck areas and the subsequent management of those incidents based upon known or assumed building characteristics, occupancy risk and profile, inherent or presumed building stability and potential for structural compromise and the operational risk from isolated or catastrophic of collapse.

Buffalo (NY) Fire Department: August 24, 2009
FDNY: August 27, 2006

Some Other Links related to Floor Collapses and Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE)

Here are some Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) for Operations at Basement Fires that will support fireground operational safety:

Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner.
Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment

REMEMBRANCE

Buffalo (NY) Fire Deparment- August 24, 2009 1815 Genesee Street, Buffalo, NY

Career Lieutenant Dies Following Floor Collapse into Basement Fire and a Career Fire Fighter Dies Attempting to Rescue the Career Lieutenant – New York (REPORT HERE)

The Structure, (pre-fire conditions)

SUMMARY

On August 24, 2009, a 45-year-old male career lieutenant (Victim #1) died following a partial floor collapse into a basement fire, and a 34-year-old male career fire fighter (Victim #2) was fatally injured while attempting to rescue Victim #1. The career fire department was dispatched for “an alarm of fire” with reported civilian(s) entrapment. Arriving units discovered a heavily secured mixed commercial/residential structure with smoke showing. Following failed initial attempts to locate an entry to the basement, crews located a door on Side 2 that provided access down a flight of stairs to a basement entry door. Repeated attempts were made to force open this basement door in order to search for trapped civilians, but crews had difficulty gaining access through this door because it was made of steel and locked and dead-bolted on both sides. Other crews on scene performed primary searches of the 1st and 2nd floors with no civilians found.

Approximately 30 minutes into the basement fire, command ordered all interior crews to exit the structure to regroup because crews were still unable to gain access into the basement from Side 2. Additional manpower was sent with special tools to assist in breaching the basement door on Side 2. Victim #1 and two fire fighters from his crew entered into the structure from Side 1 to verify all fire fighters had exited a 1st floor deli. Victim #1, following a hoseline into the structure, was well ahead of the other two fire fighters when the 1st floor partially collapsed beneath him. Victim #1 fell with the floor into the basement, exposing him to the basement fire. The other two fire fighters immediately exited the deli after fire conditions quickly changed and shelving and displays fell on them; they were unaware of what had just occurred. Victim #1 made several Mayday calls from within the structure and activated his PASS device. Confusion erupted exteriorly on scene when trying to verify who was calling the Mayday, their exact location, and how they got into the basement. The incident commander was aware that he had crews attempting to gain access into the basement from Side 2 but was unaware that there had been a floor collapse within the deli section of the structure.

Simultaneously, Victim #2, a member of the fire fighter assistance and search team (FAST), was standing by outside Victim #1’s point of entry when the Mayday calls came out. It is believed that Victim #2 knew where Victim #1 was since he had gone in the structure with him earlier in the incident. Victim #2 grabbed a tool, went on air, and rushed into the structure. The FAST and additional personnel on scene concentrated on Side 2 initially while other fire fighters followed an unmanned hoseline into the deli. Crews within the deli quickly discovered a floor collapse and reported hearing a PASS device alarming. Victim #1 was immediately identified as missing during the first accountability check, but Victim #2 was not accounted for as missing until the third accountability check, more than 50 minutes after Victim #1’s Mayday. After the fire was controlled, both victims were discovered side-by-side in the basement where the 1st floor had partially collapsed. They were found without their facepieces on and with SCBA bottles empty. Victim #1’s PASS device was still alarming. They were pronounced dead on scene. Four fire fighters and one lieutenant suffered minor injuries during the incident. No civilians were discovered within the structure.

F2009-23

Aug 24, 2009

Career lieutenant dies following floor collapse into basement fire and a career fire fighter dies attempting to rescue the career lieutenant – New York

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Key contributing factors identified in this investigation include working above an uncontrolled, free-burning basement fire; interior condition reports not communicated to command; inadequate risk-versus-gain assessments; and, crew integrity not maintained.

NIOSH has concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

Ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.
Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.
Ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.
Ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.
Ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.
Ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

Additionally, manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should:

Conduct research into refining existing and developing new technologies to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.
Continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
Fire and Rescue Operations

Incident scene.
(Photo courtesy of fire department. From NIOSH REPORT)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.

Discussion: Basement fires can be taxing and test a fire fighter’s knowledge and skill on how to combat it safely and effectively. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.¹ They need to be aware of rapid heat buildup, little or no ventilation, limited accessibility, and whether it is a storage place for unknown hazards (e.g., combustibles, hazardous materials, and flammable liquids). Also of concern for fire departments is how to determine how long a fire has gone undetected. Fire fighters should be aware of what is stored on the floor directly above a basement fire, what the finished floor is comprised of (e.g., terrazzo, plywood, tongue-and-groove, tile, etc.), and what the floor structural members are comprised of (e.g., engineered wood floor joists, concrete, or steel). Structural support members may be directly exposed to fire, causing them to weaken and increase the likelihood of an above-floor collapse. Interior crew(s) intending to operate on the floor above a basement fire should limit their operating time, especially if ventilation, suppression, and accessibility are not progressing. The floor’s structural members will continue to weaken as fire and heat intensify. Specifying an exact length of time for how long suppression crew(s) should operate above a basement fire is questionable, and the IC should make that determination by performing a hazard analysis/risk assessment. The fire department did not have an SOP specifically addressing strategies and tactics when combating basement fires. SOPs should be developed to address structural fire fighting operations specific to basement fires, because these types of fires present a complex set of circumstances and following established SOPs will minimize the risk of serious injury to fire fighters.

During this incident, fire fighters were unable to access the basement, unable to ventilate the basement fire, and unaware of the fire load found within the basement. Initially, the department did not cut a hole in the 1st floor apartment or deli and use their Bresnan distributor, in fear of injuring reported trapped civilians. Note: The Bresnan distributor is a type of cellar nozzle used to suppress fire through steam conversion. The use of a cellar nozzle, like a Bresnan distributor, during the initial stages of the basement fire may have assisted in containing the fire and/or allowing better operating conditions for fire fighters to access the basement.² Attempts were made to flow water on the 1st floor where fire had vented through, but this effort was not successful. Fire fighters should also recognize that fire venting through a floor is a late indication of a weakened floor system.

Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.

Discussion: Among the most important duties of the first officer on the scene is conducting an initial size-up of the incident. A proper size-up begins from the moment the alarm is received, and it continues until the fire is under control. The size-up should also include assessments of risk-versus-gain during incident operations, especially after primary searches have been conducted.^2-7 The size-up should include an evaluation of factors such as the fire size and location, length of time the fire has been burning, conditions on arrival, occupancy, fuel load and presence of combustible or hazardous materials, exposures, time of day, and weather conditions. Information on the structure itself should include size, construction type, age, condition (e.g., evidence of deterioration, weathering), evidence of renovations, lightweight construction, loads on roof and walls (e.g., air conditioning units, ventilation ductwork, utility entrances), and available preplan information are all key information that can affect whether an offensive or defensive strategy is employed. The incident commander should be willing to change his strategy and plan based on continued size-ups and risk assessments until the fire is brought under control. Conducting accurate size-ups and receiving interior/exterior status updates is critical to the safety of fire fighters on the incident, rescue/recovery efforts, and overall control of the incident. “The decision to commit interior firefighting personnel should be made on a case-by-case basis with proper risk-benefit decisions being made by the incident commander. The commitment of firefighters’ lives for saving property and an unknown or marginal risk of civilian life must be balanced appropriately.” ⁸ The fireground is very dynamic, and conditions can either improve or deteriorate based on fire suppression activities, and available resources, and most importantly assessments/size-ups of the incident are necessary to detect a change on the fireground.

During this incident, the fire department was attempting to gain access to reported trapped civilian(s) in a basement. The command post was established at the front of the structure providing views of Side 1 and Side 2. The basement contained heavy smoke and fire and was inaccessible from exterior and interior access doors. The initial IC and the IC who assumed command performed initial size-ups and received radio updates on fire and smoke conditions from personnel working on the incident, but not all interior findings were reported. Crews working in the 1st floor apartment encountered fire venting through the floor on Side 4 as early as 9 minutes after the first apparatus arrived on scene. Ten minutes later, Victim #1 was flowing water on fire that had vented in the corner of Side 3 and Side 4 of the deli. This was the same general area where crews within the 1st floor were working. The only thing separating the apartment and deli was a wall of floor coolers. The basement fire burned uncontrolled for more than 30 minutes while fire fighters continued attempts to gain access to the basement. Incident updates on the radio included transmissions such as “untenable” and “time to get out,” prior to the 1st floor partial collapse. The IC also mistook “water on the fire” as fire fighters actually attacking the basement fire from Side 2. This provided the IC with a false sense of progress on combating the basement fire. Also, during this incident, the IC was at times monitoring multiple radio channels and some additional transmissions may not have been received. Radio transmissions are very important for the IC to hear, acknowledge, and prioritize so that the IC can maintain situational awareness, and accurately and effectively manage and direct fireground operations. A chief’s aid or incident command technician assigned to the IC may have assisted the IC in monitoring the fireground channels and distinguishing key radio traffic and updates. It is reasonable to believe that, as time progressed and basement fire conditions continued to be uncontrolled, that the chances of survival diminished for any potentially trapped civilians exposed to the heat or products of combustion found within the smoke. According to fire investigators with the fire department, only the bodies of Victim #1 and Victim #2 were found within the structure.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.

Discussion: Fire fighters should always work and remain in teams whenever they are operating in a hazardous environment.² Team integrity depends on team members knowing who is on their team and who is the team leader; staying within visual contact at all times (if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of each other); communicating needs and observations to the team leader; and rotating together for team rehab, team staging, and watching out for each other (e.g., practicing a strong buddy system). Following these basic rules helps prevent serious injury or even death by providing personnel with the added safety net of fellow team members. Teams that enter a hazardous environment together should leave together to ensure that team continuity is maintained. ³

During this incident, raw video captured the FAST working on Side 1 of the structure (same side that Victim #1 had entered) during Victim #1’s “Mayday.” At the same time, Victim #2, assigned to the FAST, was seen pointing at Side 1, donning his SCBA, and entering the structure as other fire fighters were exiting from Side 1. The FAST was activated and ordered to Side 2 where it was believed the “Mayday” transmission came from. Victim #2 went missing following the “Mayday” and his whereabouts were unknown until the recovery of Victim #1. Also, Victim #1 entered the deli not realizing that two of his team members from R1 were not following behind. Not verifying your crew is with you and/or working alone increases the risk to individuals and possibly to others during search and rescue efforts. During interviews, the fire department commented on an increase in “freelancing” following the Mayday.

Photo 6. Interior view of deli following partial floor
collapse and recovery operations.
(Photo courtesy of police photographer. From NIOSH REPORT)


Photo 7 . Views of materials stored within basement. (Photos courtesy of police photographer. From NIOSH REPORT)

Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.

Discussion: An important aspect of an accountability system is the personnel accountability report (PAR). A PAR is an organized on-scene roll call in which each supervisor reports the status of his crew when requested by the IC or emergency dispatcher.² The use of an accountability system is recommended by NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program⁹ and NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System.¹⁰ A functional personnel accountability system requires the following:

development of a departmental SOP
training all personnel
strict enforcement during emergency incidents

As the incident escalates, additional staffing and resources may be needed, adding to the burden of tracking personnel. An incident command board should be established at this point with an assigned accountability officer or aide. As a fire escalates and additional fire companies respond, a chief’s aide or accountability officer assists the incident commander with accounting for all fire fighting companies at the fire, at the staging area, and at the rehabilitation area. With an accountability system in place, the incident commander may readily identify the location and time of all fire fighters on the fireground. A properly initiated and enforced accountability system that is consistently integrated into fireground command and control enhances fire fighter safety and survival by helping to ensure a more timely and successful identification and rescue of a disoriented or downed fire fighter. This department has developed and implemented SOPs governing accountability and even assigns an accountability officer to the IC to assist with radio transmissions and PARs.

An accountability officer was assigned to assist the IC during the incident. A PAR was immediately obtained following the rescue attempts for Victim #1. Victim #1 was identified as “missing,” but Victim #2 was incorrectly identified as “accounted for.” Victim #2 was incorrectly “accounted for” during a second separate PAR. Prior to a third PAR, 50 minutes following the floor collapse, Victim #2 could not be visibly accounted for on the fireground and his whereabouts were unknown. Officers need to visually account for their members prior to providing an “all accounted for” to the IC or accountability officer. Quickly being able to account for all personnel at an incident is paramount and can determine how an IC orders search and rescue efforts or other suppression activities.

Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.

Discussion: According to NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System, ¹¹ “The incident commander shall have overall authority for management of the incident and the incident commander shall ensure that adequate safety measures are in place.” This shall include overall responsibility for the safety and health of all personnel and for other persons operating within the incident management system. While the incident commander is in overall command at the scene, certain functions must be delegated to ensure adequate scene management is accomplished. ¹⁰ According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, ⁹ “as incidents escalate in size and complexity, the incident commander shall divide the incident into tactical-level management units and assign an incident safety officer (ISO) to assess the incident scene for hazards or potential hazards.” These standards indicate that the incident commander is in overall command at the scene but acknowledge that oversight of all operations is difficult. On-scene fire fighter health and safety is best preserved by delegating the function of safety and health oversight to the ISO. Additionally, the incident commander relies upon fire fighters and the ISO to relay feedback on fireground conditions in order to make timely, informed decisions regarding risk versus gain and offensive-versus-defensive operations. The safety of all personnel on the fireground is directly impacted by clear, concise, and timely communications among mutual aid fire departments, sector command, the ISO, and the incident commander. NFPA 1521 Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer defines the role of the ISO at an incident scene and identifies duties such as recon of the fireground and reporting pertinent information back to the incident commander; ensuring the department’s accountability system is in place and operational; monitoring radio transmissions and identifying barriers to effective communications; and ensuring established safety zones, collapse zones, hot zones, and other designated hazard areas are communicated to all members on scene.¹¹ Larger fire departments may assign one or more full-time staff officers as safety officers who respond to working fires. In smaller departments, every officer should be prepared to function as the ISO when assigned by the incident commander. The presence of a safety officer does not diminish the responsibility of individual fire fighters and fire officers for their own safety and the safety of others. The ISO adds a higher level of attention and expertise to help the fire fighters and fire officers. The ISO must have particular expertise in analyzing safety hazards and must know the particular uses and limitations of protective equipment. ⁴

During this incident, the designated department ISO was not dispatched until the incident was upgraded to a 2nd alarm because it occurred after the normal duty shift of the ISO. The ISO did not arrive until rescue/recovery operations had begun on breaching the Side 4 wall. The presence of an ISO throughout this incident would have allowed the IC to focus on supervising the incident while the ISO directed safety operations.

Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

Discussion: Fire fighters are tasked at times to operate within environments which pose inhalation hazards (e.g., toxic smoke and oxygen deficiency¹²), defined by OSHA as immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH). Proper training along with an implemented and enforced policy or procedure will assist fire fighters with proper maintenance, use, and removal of a SCBA. OSHA 29 CFR 1910.134 (g)(4)(iii) states, “all employees engaged in interior structural firefighting use SCBAs.”¹³ During this incident, the medical examiner stated both victims died from inhalation of products of combustion. The medical examiner also indicated that the victims’ COHb levels (a measure of carbon monoxide in the bloodstream) were over 50%. Even if nothing but carbon dioxide, water vapor, and nitrogen were present in the fire products and these were to mix with the air being breathed by a fire fighter, then the oxygen percentage would be reduced below the normal 21%. At 15% oxygen, fire fighters can experience lethargy, poor coordination, and confused thinking. The two principal toxins in smoke—carbon monoxide and hydrogen cyanide—act to deprive the brain of oxygen, and their effects would be enhanced due to the lower levels of oxygen in the air.¹⁴ Both victims were discovered without their facepieces on.

Due to the smoke conditions, both victims would have had to have been on air when entering the structure. It has not been determined why both victims were found without their facepieces on, but NIOSH investigators have theorized the following possibilities:

Victim #1 removed his facepiece to transmit his “Mayday.”
Both victims’ facepieces were unintentionally knocked off when falling into the basement.
The facepieces were removed because they ran out-of-air or other emergency situation.

Emergencies created by, or associated with, SCBAs can be overcome in several ways. Fire departments can develop and implement a comprehensive respiratory protection program¹⁵ that includes fire fighter fitness, training, competency, and skill in SCBA and emergency procedures. Firefighters should remember the first rule in any emergency situation, and that is not to panic. Panic causes increased breathing air consumption and inability to focus on emergency procedures. If fire fighters become lost, trapped, or disoriented they need to focus on managing remaining air in their SCBA cylinder until other fire fighters can make a rescue attempt. Removing one’s facepiece in an IDLH atmosphere can immediately expose the respiratory system to a potentially fatal environment, thus incapacitating an individual. Choosing to leave one’s SCBA facepiece on may be the best chance in providing additional time for a fire fighter to be rescued. Fire fighters should follow their department’s SOPs regarding emergency SCBA procedures and emergency communications.

Recommendation #7: Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should conduct research into refining existing and developing new technologies to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.

Discussion: Fire fighter fatalities often are the result of fire fighters becoming lost or disoriented on the fireground. The use of systems for locating lost or disoriented fire fighters could be instrumental in reducing the number of fire fighter deaths on the fireground. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been evaluating the feasibility of real-time fire fighter tracking and locator systems for some time.^16, ¹⁷ Another group researching advanced fire fighter locator and tracking systems is the Maryland Fire Rescue Institute, located at the University of Maryland – College Park.¹⁸ Research into refining existing systems and developing new technologies for tracking the movement of fire fighters on the fireground should continue. While it is not clear that the use of this technology in this incident would have prevented the fatalities, such technology could potentially have reduced the search time by aiding rescue teams in pin-pointing the location of the missing fire fighters. This new technology must function properly in the severe fire conditions often encountered during rescue operations.

During the initial stages of the incident, it was not known who was transmitting the Mayday, where exactly they were in the basement, or how they got into the basement. Victim #2 went accounted for approximately 50 minutes before a determination was made that Victim #2 was also missing. It was not until rescue/recovery crews visually located the victims that they accounted for the location of Victim #2. This technology may have assisted the fire department during this incident in more quickly locating Victim #1 and Victim #2.

Of importance, Victim #1’s PASS device was alarming during the Mayday and when he was discovered, but it was reported to NIOSH investigators that Victim #2’s PASS device was never heard. Victim #2’s PASS device was evaluated as part of NIOSH’S NPPTL SCBA inspection. Victim #2’s PASS device failed to function when tested, but after the batteries were replaced within the PASS device, it alarmed appropriately. It has not been determined if the battery life was exhausted prior to Victim #2 going into the structure. It is important to note that the 2007 revision to NFPA 1982 Standard on Personal Alert Safety Systems (PASS) includes new heat and flame resistance requirements resulting from documented reports where PASS devices were not heard during fatal fireground incidents. ¹⁹ Laboratory testing conducted by NIST determined that exposure to high temperature environments caused the loudness of the tested PASS alarm signal to be reduced. This reduction in loudness can cause the alarm signal to become indistinguishable from background noise at an emergency scene. Initial laboratory testing by NIST highlighted that this sound reduction may begin to occur at temperatures as low as 300°F. Thus the use of PASS devices meeting NFPA 1982, 2007 Edition requirements is highly recommended.

Recommendation #8: Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

Discussion: The use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and an SCBA make it difficult to communicate, with or without a radio.^20-22 Faced with the difficult task of communicating while wearing a SCBA, fire fighters sometimes momentarily remove their facepieces to transmit a message directly or over a portable radio. Considering the toxic and oxygen-deficient hazards posed by a fire and the resulting products of combustion, removing the SCBA facepiece, even briefly, is a dangerous practice that should be prohibited. Even small exposures to carbon monoxide and other toxic agents present during a fire can affect judgment and decision-making abilities. To facilitate communication, equipment manufacturers have designed facepiece-integrated microphones, intercom systems, throat mikes, and bone conduction mikes worn in the ear or on the forehead.^20-22

During this incident, interviewed fire fighters complained of radio transmissions being unintelligible at times or not heard at all. Although NIOSH investigators are not certain why Victim #1 and Victim #2 were found without their facepieces on, one theory is that Victim #1 may have momentarily removed his facepiece to better transmit his Mayday. Fire fighters recall hearing his transmissions as they came across the radio and also emanating clearly from the structure.

Recent testing by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) of portable radios in simulated fire fighting environments has identified that radios are vulnerable to exposures to elevated temperatures. Some degradation of radio performance was measured at elevated temperatures ranging from 100°C to 260°C, with the radios returning to normal function after cooling down. Additional research is needed in this area.^16, ²⁰ Fire service radios also need to be waterproof as normal fireground conditions dictate that radios are frequently exposed to excessive amounts of water during routine use through exposure to hose streams, overspray, water dripping from overhead, etc.

Other Links;

FDNY- August 27, 2006 Walton and East Mount Eden Avenues, Bronx, NY

Floor Collapse at Commercial Structure Fire Claims the Lives of One Career Lieutenant and One Career Fire Fighter – New York (REPORT HERE)

SUMMARY
On August 27, 2006, a 43-year-old male career Lieutenant (victim #1) and a 25-year-old male fire fighter (victim #2) died after the floor they were operating on collapsed at a commercial structure fire. At approximately 1230 hours, crews were dispatched to a fire. The victims’ engine was dispatched at 1236 hours as an additional unit alarm and arrived on the scene at approximately 1240 hours. At approximately 1251 hours, victim #1, victim #2 and fire fighter #1 advanced a 2 ½-inch hand line through the front of the structure and down an aisle toward the rear of the store. The fire was located in the rear interior of the structure (discount store) that sold a variety of numerous small household commodity items. Approximately three minutes later, the structural members supporting the floor directly below the victims failed. The V-shaped collapse of the floor caused victim #1 and victim #2 to fall into the basement and shelving stocked with merchandise to fall in on top of them. Multiple MAYDAYs were transmitted and the fire fighter assist and search team (FAST) was deployed to the front of the structure where they assisted in the rescue of numerous members who had been operating in the interior of the structure at the time of the collapse. Battalion Chief #1, Lieutenant #1 and fire fighter #1 were freed from the debris. At approximately 1415 hours, victim #1 was removed from the debris in the basement and transported to the hospital. He died the next day as a result of his injuries. At approximately 1435 hours, victim #2 was removed from the basement and transported to the hospital where he was pronounced deceased as a result of his injuries.

F2006-27

Aug 27, 2006

Floor collapse at commercial structure fire claims the lives of one career lieutenant and one career fire fighter – New York

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NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should:

consider the possibility of a substandard structure when building information is not available from pre-incident plans
consider the live load of water on the structure and go defensive when water load potentially compromises the structural integrity

Additionally, municipalities should:

explore means of coordinating information sharing between building and fire departments to increase safety for fire fighters and civilians
consider conducting inspections on all commercial structures where a change of occupancy has occurred or renovations are known or suspected, giving special attention to non-sprinklered commercial retail structures

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONS

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should consider the possibility of a substandard structure when building information is not available from pre-incident plans, and implement a defensive strategy when no occupants are at risk.

Discussion: The threat of a collapse of some type (i.e. roof, ceiling, floor or wall) is a possibility in any structural fire due to the effects of fire, water application, age, insects, and alterations. It is a high probability that a fire department is unaware of structural defects caused by age, insects and alterations. To minimize the risk of injury or death to fire fighters during structural operations, the size-up and risk assessment includes many factors, which include: age of the building (deterioration of structural members, evidence of weathering, use of lightweight materials in new construction), occupancy, and renovations or modifications to the building.^3,4,5

Pre-incident plans are an effective tool in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to structural collapse. They allow fire departments to determine factors, such as, age of the structure, structural integrity, type of materials used in the structure, and amount of load on the roof that could weaken the supports, etc. However, in numerous cities and towns where buildings number in the hundreds of thousands, fire departments lack the manpower to pre-plan all buildings under their protection. Often fire departments are limited to targeting buildings that have a unique construction or pose a known hazard.

In floor collapses that have occurred, such as those at a New York City drug store (October 17, 1966) and at a Boston hotel (June 17, 1972), there were no warning signs, and no time to act and withdraw fire fighters to safety. At both of these floor collapses, unauthorized alterations on the structure contributed to the structural failure.⁵

“The potential for structural collapse is one of the most difficult factors to predict during initial size-up and ongoing fire fighting. Structural collapse usually occurs without warning.” ³ When pre-incident plan information on the fire structure is not available, occupants have been evacuated, and evidence of structural deterioration and/or modification cannot be determined, a defensive strategy should be implemented. A defensive strategy would help ensure fire fighter safety and is warranted in structures that lack pre-incident plans, no occupants are at risk, and where the potential for numerous unrecognized hazards exists, such as substandard construction and building deterioration.

Fire departments operating in older businesses and homes should be suspicious of potential alterations and renovations which could result in unsupported loads and unusual voids. These alterations may be hidden by sheetrock (drywall) or flooring and built up flooring which is difficult to detect during inspections and virtually impossible to detect during firefighting operations. The older the structure, the greater the possibility of renovation or remodel.

In this case, there were no current pre-incident plans for the structure; the occupants had evacuated upon the fire department’s arrival, and compromised structural integrity was not immediately evident. Structural alterations had been made to the girders, columns, and floor in order to presumably level and support the floor. A post incident inspection showed 2 x 4 boards being used inappropriately (in orientation and stability) as a floor joist. A cluster of nails were used in lieu of bolts to attach gusset plates to the columns and girders. Sheets of plywood were added to the floor with no structural support around the sheet’s edges nor at 12”, 16” or even 24” intervals in accordance with standard building codes. Subflooring (i.e., plywood, wafer board, etc.) needs to be fastened around the sheet’s edges and at interval spacing (generally every 16 inches, but spacing may vary according to load requirements) to support floor joists. The interior support members of the structure suffered from severe rot at the base of the timber columns.

Recommendation #2 : Fire departments should consider the live load of water on the structure and go defensive when water load potentially compromises the structural integrity.

Discussion: A forensic engineering analysis of the fire building demonstrated that the weight of water added to the building from the fire fighting operations was approximately 50% of the rated structural capacity of the floor.² As noted previously, however, timbers that supported the ground floor had rotted. Thus, the actual structural capacity of the floor was less than rated. Although the ultimate cause of the collapse was the rotted timbers, the weight of the water applied during the fire fighting operations, in addition to the weight of fire fighters, store merchandise, etc., likely contributed to the collapse. Given the many unknowns during fire fighting operations, including in most incidents the rated capacity of floors, incident commanders need to continuously consider the impact of water weight on structural integrity, and shift to defensive strategies when structural integrity is potentially compromised.

Firefighting operations can drastically increase the live load on the fire building. This can be due to the weight of:

the firefighters with their protective equipment and tools,
the hose-line brought into the fire building, and
the water used to attack the fire⁶.

A 2 ½ -inch hose-line can deliver approximately 250 gallons of water per minute. ⁵ This adds about 2,082 pounds per minute into the fire building. If multiple hose-lines are operating, the weight of the water can be tremendous.

When operating in an offensive mode, a buildup of water within a building requires that immediate action be taken to alleviate these conditions. ⁶ The remedy may be as simple as controlling the excess flow from the hose-line or moving fire debris that is restricting runoff. When using large amounts of water, it is always advisable to provide for drainage when necessary. This can be accomplished any number of ways from chutes with traps to actual holes drilled to provide relief. ⁶

It must be recognized that at the same time that this additional weight is being introduced into the fire building, the fire and water are weakening the structure. Under these conditions, a defensive strategy is best when no civilians are in the structure. ⁵

In this case, civilians had evacuated the fire building upon the fire department’s arrival. The structures’ configuration only enabled an initial attack through the front of the structure and down narrow aisle ways to the rear of the structure where the origin of the fire was located. Prior to the collapse, three 2 ½-inch hose-lines (operating 17 minutes, 8 minutes, and 2 minutes, respectively) were flowing water through and into the rear of the structure. The added weight and flow of the water could have contributed to the floor collapse because of the rotted support columns decreasing the timber frame system’s ability to equalize the water load across the floor.

Diagram 2. Shows location of victims on the structure’s floor above the girder that failed. From the NIOSH REPORT

Additionally,

Recommendation #3 : Municipalities should explore means of coordinating information sharing between building and fire departments to increase safety for fire fighters and civilians

Discussion: Information on building construction, renovations, and alterations can help Incident Commanders develop strategies and tactics that effectively fight fires while attending to fire fighter safety. Pre-incident plans are a useful tool for ensuring that fire departments and Incident Commanders have information on building construction and contents to guide decision-making on the fireground. In urban areas with large numbers of existing structures, it may not be feasible to develop pre-incident plans for all or most structures, and for fire departments to regularly revisit structures to update pre-incident plans. Municipal building departments that issue building permits and conduct code inspections may collect, or be in position to collect, information that may be useful to fire departments. Municipalities should consider exploring mechanisms by which building information relevant to fire fighter and civilian safety can be collected and shared between building and fire departments. As one example, building departments could notify fire departments when building permits are issued. This would result in fire departments being aware of these building alterations, and to possibly target these buildings for a pre-incident plan. Priority should be given to sharing such information for targeted hazards identified by fire departments.

Recommendation #4: Municipalities should consider conducting inspections on all commercial structures where a change of occupancy has occurred or renovations are known or suspected, giving special attention to non-sprinklered commercial retail structures

Discussion: Occupancy changes understandably occur with great frequency. However, every effort should be made as new permits are issued to aggressively inspect any occupancy change. It is critical that municipalities assess that any renovations or remodeling meets current codes, and that original and renovated supports are capable of supporting the new occupancies. These building inspections should specifically consider the loading or redistribution of stock to ensure that flooring can handle dead and live loads.

Other Links;

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 30, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", assemblies, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, close-call, Collapse, construction, Engineered Structural Systems, failures, firefighting-operations, floors • Tagged: "firefighter safety", Buffalo FD, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Building Construction Training presented by Christopher Naum, buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, FDNY, firefighter close-call floor collapse, firefighter line-of-duty death (LODD) and resulting from a floor collapse, firefighting, Firefighting and floor failures, floor Collapse, Floor collapse and compromise, Floor Collapse and Maydays, Floor collapse during firefighting operations, floor load transfer, floor loading, floor renovations, floor structural modifications, floor systems, floors, NIOSH, NIOSH F2006-27 Report, NIOSH F2009-23 Report, NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Reports, Occupancy Risk, Remembrance: FDNY and Buffalo(NY) Double LODD from Floor Collapse, Safety recommendations for Firefighting and floor collapse, Structural Floor System Failures

Chicago Fire Fighters Battle 3 Alarm Apartment Fire on the City’s North Side

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Laura Thome Photo

Chicago Firefighters battled an (3-11) extra-alarm blaze saturday afternoon in the Lakeview neighborhood on the City’s North Side.

The extra alarm was called around 14:00 h0urs for a building on the 800 block of West Cornelia Avenue, bringing more than 100 CFD firefighters to the scene, according to preliminary information from Fire Media Affairs and reports publishedon Chicagoland media outlets.

About 15:00 hours the alarm was raised to a 3-11 alarm, and added an Emergency Medical Services Plan 1 mostly as a precaution, according to published erports.

At least one firefighter was checked over because of the extreme heat, but there were no immediate reports of other injuries, he said.

The fire has affected at least two buildings, including one 3-story courtyard apartment building.

View more videos at: http://www.nbcchicago.com.

ALSO: Earlier Fire sends several firefighters in for Heat Exhaustion; HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 27, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, fire suppression, firefighting-operations • Tagged: 800 block of West Cornelia Avenue, 855 West Cornelai Avenue Chicago Illinois, apartment building, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Chicago 3-11 fire, Chicago Fire Department, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, fier extension, fire suppression, greater alarm, Wood Rear Porches

Tabletop Training for the Weekend “Rubbish Fire”

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Ten Minutes in the Street: “Rubbish Fire- Fill the Box”

Ten Minutes in the Street with Christopher Naum

This special weekend edition of Ten Minutes in the Street ^TMis being offered on CommandSafety.com and is taking advantage of a training video produced by the LAFD in 2009 that involved a basis initial dispatch to a report of a rubbish fire that escalates into two structure fires and resulted in multiple alarm operations.

Take the opportunity to view the video clip and stop at various hold points to discuss and dialog operational considerations and issues affecting strategic command level management as well as tactical company level operational and safety issues.

Ten Minutes in the Street Weekend Edition

Consider operational factors that would affect your organization profile and resources. Take the time to entertain open dialog and discussions in a group setting. Deliberate and debate the operational issues, roles and responsibilities, safety considerations, as well as tactical deployment demands and incident priorities.

This version of “On the Fireground” uses live fire footage and talking points to illustrate some lessons learned at a recent fire incident in South Los Angeles.

A Training Aide PDF File is provided to support your company level drill or group tabletop training, HERE and Ten Minutes in the Street Volume 11 Number 09

“On the Fireground”-61st Street Fire from Los Angeles Fire Department on Vimeo.
LAFD Link HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 27, 2011 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, decision-making, firefighter, firefighting-operations, risk-based assessment, size-up, Skills, Ten Minutes in the Street, training, training-development • Tagged: "Situational Awareness" assessment, Buildingonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Command and Control of Mulitple Alarm Operations, commandsafety.com, defining operations on the first-due, Dynamic Risk Assessment, First-Due Officer responsibilities, multiple alarm, Predicative Strategic Process, residential Fire, situational awareness, size-up, Strategy and tactics, Tactical Deployment Models, Ten Minutes in the Street Scenarios, The 360 degree size-up, The Company Officer, thecompanyofficer.com

Chicago Attic Fire: Firefighter Maydays, Four Injured UPDATED

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Eric Clark for the Chicago Tribune / August 25, 2011

Four Chicago firefighters have been injured while battling a fire in the city’s West Englewood neighborhood Thursday night according to news media outlets. The fire was located within a 1-1/2 story wood frame residential occupancy in which fire suppression operations were underway.

Fire companies operating within the attic area with attack lines operating, experienced rapidly degrading conditions in which published reports indicated the “room lit up” suggesting a possible flashover condition. It was reported that vertical ventilation had been completed on the gable style roof and that coordinated company operations were well established both on the number one floor, within the attic and on exterior support operations.

Research indicates the house was built in 1905 and has 990 square feet of space. Constructed of balloon wood framing, the 1-1/2 story single family residential occupancy is typical of this vintage style housing.

Division Alpha Street Side (Google Maps)

Aerial of House and Exposures (Google Maps)

A series of links and videos are attached;

ABC WLS-TV HERE
Chicago Tribune, HERE
Chicago Tribune Photo Gallery, HERE
USFA Report: Attic Fires in Residential Buildings Report
CommandSafety.com: Roof and Ceiling Collapses DCFD and Gary FD
NIOSH: Career fire fighter dies after being trapped in a roof collapse during overhaul of a vacant/abandoned building – Michigan

UPDATED: “Fire commissioner credits quick rescue: ‘It’s a matter of seconds ‘

Chicago’s fire commissioner credited the quick response of rescuers after firefighters were hit by a flash of flames while working in the attic of a home in theWest Englewood neighborhood. “It’s a matter of seconds before we would have had a different outcome,” Fire Commissioner Robert Hoff said at Loyola University Hospital, where two of the four firefighters injured in the blaze remained hospitalized.

As reported by the Chicago Tribune (HERE) The fire started in the basement of a 1 1/2-story home in the 7000 block of South Justine Street and spread through the walls to the attic, Hoff said. As firefighters ventilated the roof and worked to extinguish the blaze, they were not aware of fire burning inside the walls behind them, Hoff said. Flames suddenly “lit up on them,” he said. “This is an example of how extremely dangerous and unpredictable this job is,” said Tom Ryan, president of Chicago Firefighters Union Local 2. “There is no such thing as a routine fire.”

The two firefighters still hospitalized are a 52-year-old captain who suffered burns to his ears and back of the neck; and a 31-year-old firefighter with burns to his left hand and forehead. They suffered the burns when their masks were knocked loose as they tried to escape, Hoff said. Both are from Engine 54 and are stable, Hoff said.

A third firefighter who was taken to Loyola was released early this morning, and a fourth taken to Mount Sinai Hospital Thursday night. Fire Officials credited the Fire Department’s five-person rapid intervention team — which is routinely called to fires — for responding so quickly.

View more videos at: http://nbcchicago.com.

Construction Insights for Typical Gabled Roof Attic with enclosed knee wall voids (typical examples) Occupied or Storage Attic Space Enclosure

Typical Enclosed Attic Voids and Kneewalls

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 26, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting, firefighting-operations • Tagged: Attic Fire, attic fire flashover, Attic fire maydays, Attic Fires in Residential Buildings Report, Ballon Frame Construction, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, CFD, Chicago Attic Fire August 25 2011, Chicago Fire Department, Chicago Illinois Fire Department, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, engine company operations, fire behavior, fire extension, Fire Suppression operations, firefighter injuries, Four Chicago Firefighters Injured Attic Fire, knee walls, Maydays, Residential house fire

Fire Death Rate Trends: An International Perspective

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Fire Death Rate Trends: An International Perspective

The United States still has one of the highest fire death rates in the industrialized world, but our standing has greatly improved. Falling from among the top three nations in terms of the fire death rate two decades ago, the United States now has the tenth highest fire death rate, putting the Nation in the upper half of the countries reviewed.

The report, Fire Death Rate Trends: An International Perspective (PDF, 584 Kb), was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center. The analyses in this report reveal the magnitude of the fire death problem; trends in overall rates and differences between the countries are also explored.

The report is part of the Topical Fire Report Series and is based on fire death data from the World Fire Statistics Centre and U.N. Demographic Yearbook population estimate data.

According to the report:

From 1979 to 2007, fire death rates per million population have consistently fallen throughout the industrialized world. The North American and Eastern European regions’ fire death rates have fallen faster than other regions.
From 1979 to 2007, the fire death rate in the United States declined by 66 percent. Today, the United States still has one of the higher fire death rates in the industrialized world, however, its standing has greatly improved.
Japan, a leader in fire safety, shows a slight worsening of fire death rates over the years studied.

Topical reports generally explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted through data collected in the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information.

References and Links

Fire Death Rate Trends: An International Perspective (PDF, 584 Kb)
World Fire Statistics Centre (WFSC)
World Fire Statistics Report 2010: http://www.genevaassociation.org/PDF/WFSC/GA2010-FIRE26.pdf
USFA Statistics: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/statistics/

Fire in the United States Fifteenth Edition (2003-2007) (PDF, 5 Mb)

14th Edition (PDF, 4.1 Mb)
13th Edition (PDF, 1.3 Mb)
12th Edition (PDF, 2.3 Mb)
11th Edition (PDF, 1.7 Mb)
10th Edition (PDF, 2.0 Mb)
9th Edition (PDF, 3.7 Mb)

Profile of Fire in the United States Fifteenth Edition (2003-2007) (PDF, 1.3 Mb)

14th Edition (PDF, 2.7 Mb)
13th Edition (PDF, 806 Kb)
12th Edition (PDF, 1.7 Mb)

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 25, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Codes, fire-prevention-education, fires, risk, statistics, USFA • Tagged: buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, fire death data, Fire Death Rate Trends: An International Perspective, Fire in the United States Fifteenth Edition (2003-2007), Fire Prevention, Profile of Fire in the United States Fifteenth Edition (2003-2007), thecompanyofficer.com, Topical Fire Report Series, U.N. Demographic Yearbook, USFA Statistics, USFA's National Fire Data Center, World Fire Statistics Centre, World Fire Statistics Centre (WFSC), World Fire Statistics Report 2010

NIOSH Report addresses Operational Issues at Metal Recycling Facility Fire

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NIOSH Report Issue: Seven Career Fire Fighters Injured at a Metal Recycling Facility Fire – California

NIOSH Exective Summary

On July 13, 2010, seven career fire fighters were injured while fighting a fire at a large commercial structure containing recyclable combustible metals. At 2345 hours, 3 engines, 2 trucks, 2 rescue ambulances, an emergency medical service (EMS) officer and a battalion chief responded to a large commercial structure with heavy fire showing. Within minutes, a division chief, 2 battalion chiefs, 3 engines, 3 trucks, 4 rescue ambulances, 2 EMS officers and an urban search and rescue team were also dispatched.

An offensive fire attack was initially implemented but because of rapidly deteriorating conditions, operations switched to a defensive attack after about 12 minutes on scene. Ladder pipe operations were established on the 3 street accessible sides of the structure. Approximately 40 minutes into the incident, a large explosion propelled burning shrapnel into the air, causing small fires north and south of structure, injuring 7 fire fighters, and damaging apparatus and equipment. Realizing that combustible metals may be present, the incident commander ordered fire fighters to fight the fire with unmanned ladder pipes while directing the water away from burning metals. Approximately 2 ½ hours later, two small concentrated areas remained burning and a second explosion occurred when water contacted the burning combustible metals. This time no fire fighters were injured.

Contributing Factors

Unrecognized presence of combustible metals
Unknown building contents
Unrecognized presence of combustible metals
Use of traditional fire suppression tactics
Darkness

Key Recommendations

Ensure that pre-incident plans are updated and available to responding fire crews
Ensure that fire fighters are rigorously trained in combustible metal fire recognition and tactics
Ensure that policies are updated for the proper handling of fires involving combustible metals
Ensure that first arriving personnel and fire officers look for occupancy hazard placards on commercial structures during size-up
Ensure that all fire fighters communicate fireground observations to incident command
Ensure that fire fighters wear all personal protective equipment when operating in an immediately dangerous to life and health environment
Ensure that an Incident Safety Officer is dispatched on the first alarm of commercial structure fires
Ensure that collapse/hazards zones are established on the fireground.

The fire department had a comprehensive list of SOGs and policies. However, the policy for the extinguishment of combustible metal fires was out dated. This policy called for copious amounts of water to be put on the combustible metal fire. The SOG for pre-incident planning was followed at this incident. However, due to the constantly changing business environment, the company had submitted a business plan that identified hazards to the city but this information did not get updated in the computer-aided dispatching (CAD) database for the fire department or dispatch.

A month prior to this incident on June 11, 2010, at 11:00 a.m., the same business owner’s metal processing facility located diagonally across the street from this incident, had several small explosions and fire. This incident required 36 fire department companies, 16 rescue ambulances, 1 USAR team, 2 hazardous material teams, 7 BCs, 1 DC, and a DDC, totaling 248 fire department personnel, in addition to mutual aid. Approximately 2 ½ hours of fire suppression operations with water brought the fire under control, which encompassed a 150′ x 100′ area of combustible metal shavings.

The company had metal –X (a brand of combustible metal fire extinguishing agent) available, but not enough of it to be effective. No fire fighters were injured. However, a civilian worker was critically injured and a police officer received minor injuries.

NIOSH REPORT 2010-30 Direct Link HERE

Fom the LAFD Press Release on July 15, 2010

On Tuesday, July 13th, 2010 at 11:43 PM, 41 Companies of Los Angeles Firefighters, 21 LAFD Rescue Ambulances, 3 Arson Units, 1 Urban Search and Rescue Unit, 1 Rehab Unit, 1 Hazardous Materials Team, 3 EMS Battalion Captains, 8 Battalion Chief Officer Command Teams, 1 Division Chief Officer Command Team and 2 Bulldozers under the direction of Deputy Chief Mario Rueda responded to a Major Emergency Structure Fire at 761 East Slauson Avenue in South Los Angeles (CA).

More than 200 Los Angeles Firefighters were requested over the course of the incident to help battle a blaze at a large two-story commercial structure that encompassed six occupancies over an entire city block. Firefighters quickly arrived at United Alloys and Metals to find heavy fire at an industrial facility known for processing titanium and super alloy scrap.

The 73 year-old structures between Paloma Avenue and Mckinley Avenue, were quickly engulfed in flames and forced firefighters into a defensive attack early during this huge fire fight. Shortly after midnight the decision was made to pull all Firefighters out of the structure and attack the flames from the exterior.

Approximately 20 minutes following this decision a partial wall collapse, roof collapse, and a total of three explosions took place. These massive blasts rained down debris of concrete and titanium on Firefighters and even shattered windows of emergency vehicles.

From this point forward it became a heavy stream operation with ladder pipes and portable monitors that provided huge volumes of water against the intense flames. Despite the challenges of extinguishing burning titanium and the devastating explosions, the blaze was controlled in just five hours. Exhausted Firefighters were relieved the next morning by their colleagues who continued the extended overhaul and detailed salvage procedure. Link HERE

LAFD News and Information Web Site; HERE

The at the time of the fire LAFD stated damage was estimated at $5,000,000 ($4,000,000 structure & $1,000,000 contents).

The LAFD battled a similar blaze at 900 East Slauson Avenue on Friday, June 11th in 2010.

Fire Scene Photo from LAFD News HERE

The Structure

The incident involved a 45,000 square foot multiple business commercial structure that measured approximately 300′ x 150′ and was built in 1939. The commercial structure was divided into 3 sections with both Type III and Type V (metal clad) construction. The A-side (west) of the structure measured 60′ x 100′ under a heavy timber bowstring truss roof and exterior block walls covered with a stucco finish. This section of the structure contained denim fabric altering machinery.

The larger 210′ x 150′ open warehouse middle section of the structure was under a metal sawtooth roof (a roof composed of a series of small parallel roofs of triangular cross section, usually asymmetrical with the vertical slope glazed or windowed to allow for light) with concrete reinforced metal beam exterior walls covered with an exterior stucco finish. This section of the structure contained bins, bales, and piles of recyclable metals. The C-side of the structure was an office area that measured approximately 30′ x 150′. It was comprised of two stories with a conventional flat roof, wood framed interior walls, and concrete reinforced metal beam exterior walls covered with an exterior stucco finish.

Occupancy hazard placards existed at the A and C/D corner of the structure. The placards had a 3 health rating (a serious hazard) in the blue quadrant, a 4 flammability rating (flammable gases, violate liquids, pyrophoric materials) in the red quadrant, a 2 instability rating (a violent chemical change possible at elevated temperatures and pressure) in the yellow quadrant, and an OX (material is an oxidizer) in the white quadrant.

The commercial structure had been recently acquired, within the past year or two, by a local metal recycling company. The company had submitted the annual business plan to the city, which identified potential hazards, but this information had not been updated in the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) database for the dispatch center or fire department. The construction features of the occupancy such as the bowstring trusses, presence of combustible metals, and access restrictions would have been critical information to the fire department for fighting a fire at this location. The fire department had pre-planned the structure prior to the metal recycling company acquiring the commercial structure.

Approximate Placement of Key Fireground Apparatus, Hoselines and Explosion Areas Relative to Commercial Fire Structure.

BC11 left the command post and was walking towards T10 and T66 when an upper section of wall on the D-side near the C/D corner collapsed followed by a larger upper midsection of wall on the D-side. BC11 recalled seeing white hot metal and was about to instruct the trucks to direct water away from the white burning metals. Seconds later, approximately 40 minutes into the incident, at 0026 hours, a large explosion propelled burning shrapnel into the air and caused small fires north and south of the structure. T33 and E66′s hoseline crews were blown backwards by the blast. T10 and mutual aid E9 were hit with flaming debris which broke through E9′s driver-side door window and ignited the seat.

T10 received several large dents and wooden ground ladders were ignited. Approximately 10 feet away, T10′s hoseline crew was blown approximately 20′ back and off the 2 ½” hoseline by the explosion. T10′s captain was backing up the nozzleman and was hit with burning debris causing serious burns on his hand and ear. T66′s captain jumped on the hoseline to stop it from whipping around. T10′s fire fighter operating the ladderpipe had seen 2 white flashes and greenish plumes just prior to explosion. When the explosion occurred he turned his head to the left causing pain and ringing in his right ear as white hot debris went all around him. Multiple hose beds and hoses on the ground were burned through. The explosion was reported to have been broadcast up and out in all directions .

The IC called for a personnel accountability report (PAR) which accounted for all personnel and indentified 2 injured fire fighters and a captain. Note: The other 4 fire fighters injuries were not made apparent until after the incident. Minutes later, the Division C chief (BC13) reported to the IC that he identified a National Fire Protection Association 704 placard above the entrance door on the C/D corner of the structure.

BC13 relayed to command the placard classifications of Health – 3, Flammability – 4, Reactivity – 2, and Special Hazards – OXIDIZER. The command team discussed the current fire department policy of using copious amounts of water on combustible metals and decided to alter the tactical plan based on information learned through the 704 placard and the fire conditions. The IC called for aerial ladderpipe personnel to move from the tip of the aerial to the aerial turntable. Note: When the decision is made to go defensive, ladderpipe personnel should be removed from the tip of the aerial to minimize any risk associated with being at an elevated height, such as explosions or falling. On Division C, two monitors and a 2 ½” hoseline were directed on the office area of the structure.

NIOSH Report Photo Image

Recommendations

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that pre-incident plans are updated and available to responding fire crews.

Discussion: NFPA 1620 Standard for Pre-Incident Planning, states “The purpose of this document shall be to develop pre-incident plans to assist responding personnel in effectively managing emergencies for the protection of occupants, responding personnel, property, and the environment.” A pre-incident plan identifies deviations from normal operations and can be complex and formal, or simply a notation about a particular problem such as the presence of flammable liquids, explosive hazards, modifications to structural building components, or structural damage from a previous fire.

Building characteristics including type (or more importantly risk) of construction, materials used, occupancy, fuel load, roof and floor design, and unusual or distinguishing characteristics should be recorded, shared with other departments who provide mutual aid, and if possible, entered into the dispatcher’s computer so that the information is readily available if an incident is reported at the noted address.

Since many fire departments have thousands to hundreds of thousands of structures within their jurisdiction, it is a challenge to establish an effective preplanning system that addresses all structures and hazards. Priority should be given to those locations having elevated or unusual fire hazards and life safety considerations.

Written SOGs enable individual fire department members an opportunity to read and maintain a level of assumed understanding of operational procedures. Conversely, fire departments can suffer when there is an absence of well developed SOGs. The NIOSH Alert: “Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters” identifies the need to establish and follow fire fighting policies and procedures. Guidelines and procedures should be developed, fully implemented and enforced to be effective. Periodic refresher training should also be provided to ensure fire fighters know and understand departmental guidelines and procedures.

One tool for fire departments to use in assessing their risks for structures within their jurisdictions is the mnemonic, BECOME SAFE:

Building
Evaluation
Construction/occupancy
Operational hazards
Manage time and elements
Engagement
Situational awareness
Assessment and risk analysis
Fire behavior and effects
Evaluate and execute ⁷

A pre-planning process should integrate the BECOME SAFE concepts and include updated information from the annually submitted business plans and any other pertinent fire safety information needs to be developed by involving fire department personnel, dispatch center personnel, and building and fire code officials. NFPA 1, Fire Code, Annex Q, Fire Fighter Safety Building Marking System, makes direct reference to potential resolution towards identifying structures and contents.

It contains a standard symbol that integrates information about building construction features, content hazards, life safety systems and NFPA 704 placards into one placard. High hazard and life safety considerations for the storage, handling, and manufacturing of chemicals should be indicators to prioritize processing of the information and expediting it to the CAD system.

Current and correct information is needed to adequately address risk management issues and to comply with NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, Annex A, Section 8, that addresses guidelines for the IC to consider when evaluating risk versus gain.

In this incident, the construction features of the occupancy, such as the bowstring trusses, presence of combustible metals, and access restrictions, would have been critical information to the fire department for fighting a fire at this location. A more complete pre-planning process and/or business plan updating process, involving fire department personnel, dispatch center personnel, and building code officials could have noted this information which may have aided the IC in developing a safer and more effective offensive or defensive strategy. In order to facilitate open communication, fire department personnel, dispatch center personnel, and building and fire code officials should develop a process to effectively update building information and to share this information in a timely manner. The relay of this information could be used to facilitate dynamic risk management and enhanced command and control. (Note: The fire department did a business survey following this incident and found 68 business sites that had combustible metals.)

Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are rigorously trained in combustible metal fire recognition and tactics.

Discussion: Fire departments often respond to complex or unique hazards which require specialized/advanced knowledge and/or training in dealing with that hazard. Combustible metal fires present unique and dangerous hazards to fire fighters which are not commonly encountered in conventional structure fire fighting operations. The temperatures encountered in a combustible metal fire far exceed those of a structure fire.A block wall near the first explosion had an appearance of brown and black glass, suggesting that temperatures exceeded 3000 degrees F

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 484, Standard for Combustible Metals, states that it is extremely important to conduct a good size-up by identifying the combustible metals involved, the physical state of the metals (e.g., shavings, chips, fine dust, etc.), the location relative to other combustible materials, and the quantity of the product involved. NFPA 484, A.13.3.3.10.3, states that the application of a wet extinguishing agent (particularly water hose streams) accelerates a combustible metal fire and could result in an explosion.

This is due to the water reacting with the combustible metal and giving off highly flammable hydrogen gas and oxygen. This conversion of water into hydrogen has a heat value (British Thermal Units per pound (Btu/lb)) of about 2.8 times that of gasoline, assuming 100 percent conversion of the hydrogen in the water. This equates to flowing 42.8 gallons per minute (gpm) of gasoline on the fire for every 100 gpm of water. NFPA 484, A.13.3.3.5, states that the following agents shall not be used as extinguishing agents on a combustible metal fire because of adverse reactions or ineffectiveness: water, foams, halon, carbon dioxide, nitrogen (except on iron, steel, and alkali metals, excluding lithium), and halon replacement agents.

Thus, in lieu of using a wet extinguishing agent, primarily water, it is recommended that a bulk dry extinguishing agent compatible with the product involved, such as dry sand, dry soda ash, or dry sodium chloride, be used. In most cases for large fires beyond the incipient stage, the application of a dry agent is not feasible. In these cases the best approach is to isolate the material as much as possible, protect exposures, and allow the fire to burn out naturally. Thorough training is a must to properly identify and handle these unique fires. Businesses that manufacture, use or store combustible metals, and fire departments with combustible metals in their jurisdiction, should review Chapter 13 of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 484: Standard on Combustible Metals.¹²

Combustible metal fire training should only occur in the classroom since combustible metals are not a practical substance to use for live exercises. The excessive temperatures and the unstable nature of combustible metals when burning would put fire fighters in an unnecessary and dangerous situation, if used in live exercises.

In this incident, several fire fighters noticed the unusually bright white hot fire, white sparks, bluish green hues of the fire, and white smoke but did not recognize that this could be indicative of burning combustible metals. The fire department did not suspect that combustible metals were present until after the first explosion and the discovery of the placard indicating oxidizers were in the structure. Once identified, command directed water away from areas of suspected burning combustible metals. Later in the incident, a few concentrated areas remained burning, and copious amounts of water were directed on these areas to extinguish them. This caused a second explosion, in which no one was hurt. The titanium that was involved in the second explosion had developed a protective crust during the fire which was over 2 feet thick and contributed to the shaped charge effect when the molten metal under the protective crust came in contact with the water being applied by the ladderpipes and exploded. The development of the protective crust is a normal occurrence in combustible metal fires which actually limits open burning of the combustible metal and will result in control and extinguishment of the fire, if no actions are taken which disturb the protective crust.

In June, an incident had occurred diagonally across the street at different structure, owned by the same company, where the fire department had a combustible metal fire and was informed by employees not to use water. The fire department updated their training bulletin addressing tactics for combustible metals and removed the use of copious amounts of water.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that policies are updated for the proper handling of fires involving combustible metals.

Discussion: The fire department had an outdated policy on the handling of combustible metal fires which primarily called for copious amounts of water to be put on a metal fire. The policy had been based on a training scenario in which burning magnesium Volkswagen engine blocks, when hit with water, would spark, but the water cooled the large mass of magnesium enough to put the fire out. Numerous fire departments across the country remember this training scenario and have not kept up with the increasing and varied uses of combustible metals in everyday products. Manufacturing and recycling facilities for these combustible metal products have been on the rise. This poses a new and different hazard for fire fighters. Combustible metals in smaller pieces and particle sizes burn at much higher temperatures, 5000 degrees F for magnesium to 8500 degrees F for zirconium, and present an explosion hazard when water comes into contact with these burning metals. When applied to burning combustible metals, water and carbon dioxide will disassociate into their base chemical elements. For example, water disassociates into hydrogen and oxygen. The added fuel and oxygen increases burning and causes extreme reactions, such as explosions. An example standard operating procedure (SOP) for the proper handling of combustible metal fires that reflects modern day hazards is provided in

Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that first arriving personnel and fire officers look for occupancy hazard placards on commercial structures during size-up.

Discussion: NFPA 704, Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response, states that all buildings or areas storing, using, or handling hazardous materials should be marked by use of a standardized placard system. The placard system identifies hazard categories for health, flammability, reactivity and special hazards, including water reactivity and oxidizers.

When conducting a size-up at commercial structures, fire officers should look for such placards. Placard locations should be located at or near entrances and unobstructed by landscaping, fencing, etc.

In this incident, placards existed at the A and C/D corner of the structure. However, they were not identified until after the explosion. The late night hour, poor lighting, angled corners of structure, and fire attack from doorways other than the front entrance may have contributed to first arriving personnel and fire officers not seeing and acting upon the information on the placard.

Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters communicate fireground observations to incident command.

Discussion: National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1561, Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System, Section 6.3 Emergency Traffic states: To enable responders to be notified of an emergency condition or situation when they are assigned to an area designated as immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH), at least one responder on each crew or company shall be equipped with a portable radio and each responder on the crew or company shall be equipped with either a portable radio or another means of electronic communication.The U.S. Fire Administration report, Voice Radio Communications Guide for the Fire Service, provides an overview of radio communication issues involving the fire service. Effective fireground radio communication is an important tool to ensure fireground command and control as well as helping to enhance fire fighter safety and health. It is every fire fighter and company officer’s responsibility to ensure radios are properly used. Ensuring appropriate radio use involves both taking personal responsibility (to have your radio, having it on, and on the correct channel) and a crew-based responsibility to ensure that the other members of your crew (subordinates, peers, and supervisor) are doing so as well.

Receiving interior/exterior status updates is critical to the safety of fire fighters on the incident, rescue/recovery efforts, and overall control of the incident. The decision to commit interior fire fighting personnel or establishing a collapse/hazard zone for exterior fire fighting personnel should be made on a case-by-case basis with proper risk-benefit decisions being made by the incident commander.

The fireground is very dynamic, and conditions can either improve or deteriorate based on fire suppression activities, and available resources, and most importantly assessments/size-ups of the incident are necessary to detect a change on the fireground.

In this incident, several fire fighters noticed the unusually bright white hot fire, white sparks, bluish green hues of the fire, and white smoke (all potential signs of combustible metal involvement), but did not communicate it to command.

Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters wear all personal protective equipment when operating in an immediately dangerous to life and health environment.

Discussion: NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program states, “the fire department shall provide each member with protective clothing and protective equipment that is designed to provide protection from the hazards to which the member is likely to be exposed and is suitable for the tasks that the member is expected to perform…protective clothing and protective equipment shall be used whenever a member is exposed or potentially exposed to the hazards for which the protective clothing (and equipment) is provided.”

NFPA 1971 Standard on Protective Ensembles for Structural Fire Fighting and Proximity Fire Fighting has established minimum requirements for structural fire fighting protective ensembles and ensemble elements designed to provide fire fighting personnel limited protection from thermal, physical, environmental, and bloodborne pathogen hazards encountered during structural fire fighting operations.

These requirements will assist in protecting firefighters, but only if they wear the PPE as recommended by the manufacturer. The potential for injury at all incidents exists when fire fighters do not wear the full PPE ensemble, including gloves.

In this incident, numerous fire fighters did not don their facepiece and/or wear hoods or gloves. The potential for unknown toxic gases and flying debris as evidenced by the 2 explosions makes wearing full PPE critical for protecting fire fighters from immediate and chronic hazards. If gloves and hoods had been worn, the hand and ear burn injuries would have been less severe or perhaps totally eliminated.

Recommendation #7: Fire departments should ensure that an Incident Safety Officer is dispatched on first alarm of commercial structure fires.

Discussion: According to NFPA 1561 Standard on Emergency Services Incident Management System, “The incident commander shall have overall authority for management of the incident and the incident commander shall ensure that adequate safety measures are in place.” This shall include overall responsibility for the safety and health of all personnel and for other persons operating within the incident management system. While the incident commander is in overall command at the scene, certain functions must be delegated to ensure adequate scene management is accomplished.According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Program, “as incidents escalate in size and complexity, the incident commander shall divide the incident into tactical-level management units and assign an incident safety officer (ISO) to assess the incident scene for hazards or potential hazards.” These standards indicate that the incident commander is in overall command at the scene, but acknowledge that oversight of all operations is difficult. On-scene fire fighter health and safety is best preserved by delegating the function of safety and health oversight to the ISO. Additionally, the incident commander relies upon fire fighters and the ISO to relay feedback on fireground conditions in order to make timely, informed decisions regarding risk versus gain and offensive-versus-defensive operations. The safety of all personnel on the fireground is directly impacted by clear, concise, and timely communications among mutual aid fire departments, sector command, the ISO, and the incident commander. NFPA 1521 Standard for Fire Department Safety Officer defines the role of the ISO at an incident scene and identifies duties such as recon of the fireground and reporting pertinent information back to the incident commander; ensuring the department’s accountability system is in place and operational; monitoring radio transmissions and identifying barriers to effective communications; and ensuring established safety zones, collapse zones, hot zones, and other designated hazard areas are communicated to all members on scene.

Larger fire departments may assign one or more full-time staff officers as incident safety officers who respond to working fires. In smaller departments, every officer should be prepared to function as the ISO when assigned by the incident commander. The presence of an incident safety officer does not diminish the responsibility of individual fire fighters and fire officers for their own safety and the safety of others. The ISO adds a higher level of attention and expertise to help the fire fighters and fire officers. The ISO must have particular expertise in analyzing safety hazards and must know the particular uses and limitations of protective equipment.

In this incident, for the size of the fire department and responsible coverage area, there is an insufficient number of incident safety officers (ISO) and/or qualified personnel (certified to NFPA 1521) to act as an ISO. The ISO should be of a rank worthy of the significant responsibility.

Recommendation #8: Fire departments should ensure that collapse/hazard zones are established on the fireground.

Discussion: During fire operations, two rules exist about structural collapse: (1) the potential for structural failure always exists during and after a fire, and (2) a collapse danger zone must be established.

A collapse zone is an area around and away from a structure in which debris might land if a structure fails. The collapse zone area should be at least 1½ times the height of the building—the height of the building plus an additional allowance for debris scatter. For example, if the wall was 20 feet high, the collapse zone would be established at least 30 feet away from the wall. In this incident, the structure was approximately 18 feet high at the top of the parapet wall, and the collapse zone extended at least 27 feet from the structure.

Fire fighters must recognize the dangers and take immediate safety precautions if factors indicate the potential for a building collapse. An external load—such as a parapet wall, steeple, overhanging porch, awning, sign, or large electrical service connections—reacting on a wall weakened by fire conditions may cause the wall to collapse. Other factors include fuel loads, building damage, renovation work, pre-existing deterioration as well as deterioration caused by the fire, support systems, and truss construction.

Whenever these contributing factors are identified, all persons operating inside the structure must be evacuated immediately and a collapse zone should be established around the perimeter. Once a collapse zone has been established, the area should be clearly marked and monitored to make certain that no fire fighters enter the danger zone. Positioning companies at the corners of the building is usually safer than a frontal attack. In this incident, a collapse zone should have been established given the age of the structure and deteriorating fire conditions.

Recommendation #9: Vendors/Training Organizations should develop and offer a training program on combustible metal fires.

Discussion: There are a limited amount of training materials/programs that exist on combustible metal fires. There have been a small number of presentations and workshops conducted at fire conferences over the years but nothing offered by outside training organizations that pertains to what the fire service needs to know. Programs should be developed to highlight the characteristics of a combustible metal fire, tactics, and strategies for handling them.

Fire Engineering [2008]. Proper Handling of Combustible Metal Fires.
Refer to the NIOSH Report for a Referenced SOP for Metal Fires, HERE
Dangers of combustible metals

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 20, 2011 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, command-leadership, construction, explosion, fire suppression, firefighting-operations, fires • Tagged: Building Constuction, buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, commerical occuapany, Commerical Structure, explosion, fighting a fire at a large commercial structure containing recyclable combustible metals, firefighter injuries, Firefighter Near Miss, firefighting tactics, heavy timber bowstring truss roof, Incident Command, LAFD, LAFD News and Information Web Site, Los Angeles Fire Department, Manufacturing, Metal Fires Firefighting Tactics, metal sawtooth roof, Metals Fire and Explosion, NIOSH FFFIPP, NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Reports, NIOSH Report 2010-30, NIOSH Report Issue: Seven Career Fire Fighters Injured at a Metal Recycling Facility Fire - California, occupancy hazard placards, partial wall collapse, pre-incident plans, prefire planning, processing titanium and super alloy scrap, Proper Handling of Combustible Metal Fires., Roof Collapse, SOG for pre-incident planning, strategies and tactics, Unrecognized presence of combustible metals, Use of traditional fire suppression tactics on combustible metals

The New Fire Ground and the First-Due

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Join in on Wednesday August 17th at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

This edition of Taking it to the StreetsTM the program will be looking at the New Fire Ground and the First-Due

Joining the program will be two special guests: Divison Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) providing a great opportunity to listen to perspectives from coast to coast and the heartland.

Join in on what is certainly going to be an insightful look and discussion of the New Fire Ground and the issues affecting the First-Due Officer and Command…

Both Divison Chief Ed Hadfield (CA) and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann (MO) are speakers at the Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference brought to you by Go Forward Training and coming to the St. Charles/St.Louis, Missouri metro area on October 21-23. 2011. I also have the honor of lecturing and presenting two programs, one of which one will be co-presented with my good friend and colleague Lt. John Shafer. (The GreenMaltese.com HERE)

Conference Direct Link HERE.
Go Forward Training HERE

Incorporating and facilitating the latest training delivery concepts and methodologies and integrating current and emerging technology, social media platforms, eMedia and internet based content management material in order to provide unparalleled fire service curricula, training and education, The Command Institute, Buildingsonfire.com and Fire Fighternetcast.com will be integrating content across a number of platforms to provide you with supportive information and training that will ultimately integrate with the direct training deliveries at the conference.

This segment of Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com is the first step in achieving that goal and process. Look for more integrated materials, exercises and eMedia on CommandSafety.com, TheCompanyOfficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com

Check this out before the show on Wednesday on TheCompanyofficer.com; Deployment Decisions: Defining Operations on the First-Due

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing developing concepts, methodologies and operational perspectives affecting today’s emerging and evolving fire ground and the new considerations for the First-Due with Christopher Naum and fire service leaders, Division Chief Ed Hadfield and Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann.

Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country.

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a 36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and the distinguished leading national authority on building construction and fire ground operations. Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production, © 2011 All Rights Reserved

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.

Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening August 17th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
Firefighternetcast.com HERE
Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE
Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 15, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, compentencies, Deployment, firefighting, firefighting-operations, fires, first-due, Taking it to the Streets • Tagged: Adaptive Fireground Management, building construction, Buildingonfire.com, Chief Ed Hadfield, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, commandsafety.com, Deputy Chief Jason Hoevelmann, Emerging Fire Suppression Theory, fire, fire behavior, fire dynamics, fire dynamics and fire behavior, Fire Ground Operations, Fire Research, Firefighternetcast.com, Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference Naum, Go Forward Fire, Go Forward Media, Tactical Patience, Taking it to the Streets Radio Program, Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum, The First-Due, The new Fire Ground

Building Construction Training for Fire Service Commanders, Company Officers and Firefighters

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We’ve got an advance look at some of the new training and lecture offerings coming out this fall and for 2012 that will be offered commencing in October for the Buildingsonfire Series produced and offered by the Command Institute and Buildingsonfire.com.

Buildingsonfire -2012 Building Construction and Systems Training for Fire Service Commanders, Company Officers and Fire Fighters

An intense and concentrated series of exceptional training programs examining trends and methods in building construction for the fire service with an emphasize on construction and occupancy risk assessment, structural and construction systems, and their direct relationship on structural combat firefighting operations, firefighter survivability and the command decision-making process. Understand building systems and occupancy performance under fire conditions is mission critical with new and emerging technical information and data that is redefining tactical and operational models and firefighting protocols with new rules of engagement.

Firefighters and Officers will gain a new understanding of inherent construction features and hazards that directly influence effective risk management and decisive strategic and tactical considerations with a focus on key construction features, inherent occupancy profiles that will influence strategic, tactical and task level operations and crucial assembly systems affected by fire dynamics, extreme fire behavior and combat fire suppression operations. These programs & seminars examine crucial considerations for Reading the Building, Occupancy Risk Profiling, Adaptive Fireground Management, Tactical Patience, Predicative Occupancy Performance and Construction Resiliency correlating building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked open discussion and dialog on building construction and operational safety.

Programs utilize extensive multimedia, interactive activities, case studies and simulations to reinforce course content & subject areas providing exceptional learning opportunities.

New Seminars and Lecture Program Offerings; (Selected Topics)

Building Construction for the Company and Command Officer
The Rules of Combat Fire Engagement & Tactical Operations
Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & Tactics for the Company and Command Officer
Adaptive Fire Ground Management for Command and Company Officers
Building Construction and Tactical Operations
The Anatomy of Buildingsonfire 2012
Five Star Command & Fire Fighter Safety
The Doctrine of Combat Fire Operations 2012
Extreme Fire Behavior & Fireground Operations
Predictive Building and Occupancy Performance
Tactical Entertainment and Firefighter Safety
Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting Operations
Roof Construction for Truck Company Operations
Occupancy Risk Profiling and Firefighting Strategy & Tactics
New Residential Construction and Operational Considerations
Tactical Renaissance: Combat Fire Engagement and the New Fire Ground
The Anatomy of Buildingsonfire; LODD Case Studies and Near Miss Lessons Learned
Building Construction and Operational Safety in Buildings of Ordinary Construction
Building Construction and Tactical Safety in Commercial Buildings
Keynotes ,Lectures, Special Presentations & Programs Available
Other Building Construction , Command, Tactic, Fire Fighter Safety and Operations programs available

Download the Program Announcement for Building Construction for the Fire Service Training Programs HERE

Building Construction for the Fire Service Training Programs for 2012 by Buildingsonfire.com

Keynote and General Session Programs that will be available for 2012 include;

Keynote Topics:

The New Adaptive Fire Ground in 2012
Tactical Patience
Buildingsonfire 2012
What’s on YOUR Radar Screen?
Achieving Operational Excellence and Safety
Command Compression and Tactical Entertainment
The Evolving Fireground: Are You Ready for the Changes?
Command Resiliency for Operational Excellence
Tactical Renaissance and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement

Upcoming:

Check out the program presentations we’ll be making at the Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference ( Missouri) and at the Liberty Regional Fire & Leadership Training Conference (PA) this fall.

Take the time to check out the new Training Program Offerings from Go>Forward Training’s Gateway Midwest Fire & Leadership Training Conference, HERE and the Liberty Regional Fire & Leadership Training Conference HERE

About Go>Forward Training, HERE

Gypsum Board Ceiling Systems, Ceiling Collapse and Firefighter Safety

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In this week's issue of the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System's Report of the Week (ROTW) an informative focus was provided on near-miss reports related to ceiling collapse. We're posting the ROTW alert in it's entirety below and are expanding upon this discussion to include materials previously posted on Buildingsonfire.com from the posts that surrounded the LAFD LODD of Firefighter Glenn L. Allen who was killed in the line of duty as a result of being trapped beneath rubble when the roof and ceiling collapsed during a blaze at a 12,000-square-foot mansion in the Hollywood Hills on Feb. 17, 2011. (HERE and HERE)

Included in that reporting was expanded information on gypsum wall board ceiling systems. If you don't know about the National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System and the Report of the Week (ROTW) follow these links HERE , HERE and HERE. More importantly, get involved and post some of your current OR past near-miss experiences and close calls, so the fire service can learn and everyone can go home. www.firefighternearmiss.com. Check out the extensive resources and materials avaiable on the site to support your training and operational needs.

Near-Miss Report of the Week

From the NMRS & ROTW;

The collapse of a ceiling is one of the more disorienting situations a firefighter can face. Sixty near-miss reports are returned when the keyword "ceiling collapse" is typed into the text box on www.firefighternearmiss.com. Each of these accounts provides lessons on the value of heightened situational awareness, correct use of PPE, rigorous training, and recognizing the effect of fire on building materials. The National Fire Fighter's Near-Miss Reporting System'ss Report of the Week (ROTW) featured report this week, 11-025, recounts one example.

"Our station was dispatched for a residential structure fire and we responded with two engines and four on-duty personnel… The near-miss happened about 30 minutes into the fire and there were two hoselines in place. One hoseline was on the second floor and one hoseline was on the first floor. Most of the fire was extinguished and overhaul was in progress. There were three members of my crew pulling ceiling to reach hot spots. The lieutenant stated to be careful because the floor above was moving when pulling down on overhead material. The firefighter and the lieutenant continued to pull down the ceiling. This is when the second floor collapsed down into the first floor and the room that we were in…"

The overhead world of a fire scene is fraught with hazards. Many of the hazards we can dispassionately discuss at the kitchen table, but seem to overlook when we are engaged in firefighting. Electrical wiring, telecommunication cables, structural support systems and storage are all elements hidden behind the drywall. Whether you are looking up at a ceiling that covers an attic or an upper floor, shoving your hook through the drywall is usually a benign act that simply pulls down a section of sheetrock to expose the hidden area above. However, it can also be a catastrophic act that brings down an entrapment hazard that has you fighting for survival.

Once you have read the entire account of 11-025, and the related reports, consider the following:

Before ceiling pulling begins, is there an assessment of the structural stability and review of what might be behind the drywall before the first piece is removed?
Do you and your crews observe best practices when pulling ceilings (i.e., starting at the doorway and working into the room, noting the location of structural members through visual notation of nails, "shadowing" or "ghosting" of studs, etc.) before pulling ceilings?
Do you consider limiting the number of personnel in a room when ceilings and walls are being pulled?
Who is responsible for ensuring utilities have been controlled before pulling ceilings and walls? How is utility control documented and confirmed before ceiling pulling begins?
What is the likelihood that the space above the ceiling you are pulling is being used for storage? If storage is noted, can you determine what effect pulling down the ceiling will have on the structural members resisting the weight of the storage?

Overhaul activities occur during a transitional time in the firefighting process. The adrenaline and effort of the fire attack begins to fade, but there is still enough pent up energy that some members of the crews are propelled from one action to another without an assessment of conditions. The thinking officer and crew make periodic assessments, or benchmarks, to ensure the incident reality still matches the company's perception.

Related Reports- Topical Relation: Ceiling Collapse
05-553
06-292
07-889
08-305
09-465
10-847

Have you escaped a ceiling collapse due to exceptional vigilance? Have you ever gotten caught in a ceiling collapse? Submit your report to www.firefighternearmiss.com today so everyone goes home tomorrow.

Note: The questions posed above from the NFFNMRS-ROTW by the reviewers are designed to generate discussion and thought in the name of promoting firefighter safety. They are not intended to pass judgment on the actions and performance of individuals in the reports.

The Following is reposted from Buildingsonfire.com ; ( The LAFD LODD link is HERE)

Gypsum Board Ceiling Systems and Firefigher Safety

The recent events in Los Angeles and the line of duty death of veteran LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen who died Friday from injuries he sustained when a ceiling collapsed on him in a house fire late Wednesday night in the Hollywood Hills again gives us pause to reflect on the demands and hazards present at all fire suppression operations in buildings on fire. The past two months have borne consist reports of floor, roof, wall and ceiling collapses leading to firefighter injuries and line of duty deaths.

Incident event coverage from this past week HERE, HERE and HERE

The importance of maintaining heightened situational awareness, identifying and monitoring suspected or inherent building construction hazards coupled with inherent occupancy risk factors, and aligning those with strategic objectives, incident actions plans and tactical deployment operations. Building Knowledge equating to firefighter safety is still a driving principle that is formulative to all firefighting operations in buildings, occupancies and structures. Let’s take this opportunity to gain some insights into the material that compromises nearly all wall and ceiling membrane systems and assemblies in nearly all buildings, occupancies and structures; that is gypsum board components.

I’ve included a number of video clips that center on our discussion, as the videos center on the operation parameters at this extremely large (floor area/square footage) residential occupancy. Most clips have good coverage of the structure and firefighting efforts. Take a few moments to review these clips before you proceed;

Gypsum board is the generic name for a family of panel-type products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges.

In 1888, Augustine Sackett used plaster of Paris sandwiched between several layers of paper to produce what would eventually become "Sackett Board," the original gypsum board. By the 1950s, many innovations in gypsum board technology had been developed, including the listing of many fire-resistance rated designs, rounded edges, specialized nails, curved partitions, studless partitions, sound control systems, lightweight gypsum lath, plaster, and gypsum board systems that fueled a boom period for the use of gypsum products in both the residential and commercial construction industries.

By 1955, an estimated 50 percent of new homes were built using gypsum wallboard. Lightweight gypsum board systems permitted the use of lightweight steel in steel framed buildings, which enabled the widespread growth of high-rise residential and commercial construction during the 1960s and 1970s.

Today gypsum board, along with a variety of other gypsum panel products, continues to serve as a preferred building material in both residential and commercial construction for interior walls and ceilings, exterior sheathing, fire-resistant partitions and membranes, and liner material for elevator shafts and stairwells. These properties make gypsum board well suited for building and space types requiring cost-effectiveness as well as fire resistiveness and maintainability.

Gypsum board is often called drywall, wallboard, or plasterboard and differs from products such as plywood, hardboard, and fiberboard, because of its noncombustible core. It is designed to provide a monolithic surface when joints and fastener heads are covered with a joint treatment system.

Gypsum is a mineral found in sedimentary rock formations in a crystalline form known as calcium sulfate dehydrate. One hundred pounds of gypsum rock contains approximately 21 pounds (or 10 quarts) of chemically combined water. Gypsum rock is mined or quarried and then crushed. The crushed rock is then ground into a fine powder and heated to about 350 degrees F, driving off three fourths of the chemically combined water in a process called calcining. The calcined gypsum (or hemihydrate) is then used as the base for gypsum plaster, gypsum board and other gypsum products.

To produce gypsum board, the calcined gypsum is mixed with water and additives to form a slurry which is fed between continuous layers of paper on a board machine. As the board moves down a conveyer line, the calcium sulfate recrystallizes or rehydrates, reverting to its original rock state. The paper becomes chemically and mechanically bonded to the core. The board is then cut to length and conveyed through dryers to remove any free moisture.

Gypsum manufacturers also rely increasingly on “synthetic” gypsum as an effective alternative to natural gypsum ore. Synthetic gypsum is a byproduct primarily from the desulfurization of the flue gases in fossil-fueled power plants. Gypsum board is an excellent fire resistive material. It is the most commonly used interior finish where fire resistance classifications are required. Its noncombustible core contains chemically combined water which, under high heat, is slowly released as steam, effectively retarding heat transfer. Even after complete calcination, when all the water has been released, it continues to act as a heat insulating barrier. In addition, tests conducted in accordance with ASTM E 84 show that gypsum board has a low flame spread index and smoke density index. When installed in combination with other materials it serves to effectively protect building elements from fire for prescribed time periods.

Developed through modern technology as a result of specific requirements, gypsum board is mainly used as the surface layer of interior walls and ceilings; as a base for ceramic, plastic, and metal tile; for exterior soffits; for elevator and other shaft enclosures; as area separation walls between occupancies; and to provide fire protection to structural elements. Most gypsum board is available with aluminum foil backing which provides an effective vapor retarder for exterior walls when applied with the foil surface against the framing.

Standard size gypsum boards are 4ft. wide and 8, 10, 12, or 14 ft. long. The width is compatible with the standard framing of studs or joists spaced 16 in. and 24 in. on center. Some thicknesses and types of gypsum board are also produced as a standard 54 in. width material. Other lengths and widths are available as special order materials.

Depending on thickness and type of gypsum board, the weight can vary from 2 – 4 lbs./ per square foot
A typical 4 ft. x 8 ft. sheet of 5/8-in gypsum board can weigh 96 lbs.
A 4ft. x 12ft. sheet can weigh upwards of 150 lbs.
In large span designs with attachments varying from 16 inches on center to 24 inches on center with z-strips or resilient channels attached to the structural members; these ceiling panels and assemblies can fail and collapse in a monolithic manner creating a significant safety concern to operating companies below.
As an example a 12ft x 12ft. monolithic assembly collapse ( single layer-gypsum board only) could have a collapse weight of 500 lbs.
Add the weight of compromised and attached structural members components, fixtures and insulation and the absorption of added water into the gypsum board from hose streams the combined weight of the collapse area may increase to 800-1000 lbs. Increase the size of the collapse area and the weight impacting operating companies is significant.

The various thicknesses of gypsum board available in regular, type X, improved type X and pre-decorated board are as follows:

¼-in. A low cost gypsum board used as a base in a multi-layer application for improving sound control, or to cover existing walls and ceilings in remodeling.
5/16-in. A gypsum board used in manufactured housing.
3/8-in. A gypsum board principally applied in a double-layer system over wood framing and as a face layer in repair or remodeling.
½-in. Generally used as a single-layer wall and ceiling material in residential work and in double-layer systems for greater sound and fire ratings.
5/8-in. Used in quality single-layer and double-layer wall systems. The greater thickness provides additional fire resistance, higher rigidity, and better impact resistance.
¾-in. Used in a similar manner to 5/8-in.
1 in. Used in interior partitions, shaft walls, stairwells, chaseways, area separation walls and corridor ceilings. Manufactured only in 24 in. wide panels and usually installed as an integral part of a system.

Depending on the type and the use, gypsum board is manufactured with a tapered, square, beveled, rounded, or tongue and groove edge. Some gypsum board types may incorporate a combination of different edge types. The fire resistance of gypsum board can be described using three distinct terms: regular core, type ‘X’ core and improved type ‘X’ core.

Regular core gypsum board is made of a noncombustible core material composed mainly of gypsum. Although it does not have the specially enhanced fire-resistive properties of type ‘X’, regular core gypsum board affords a degree of natural fire resistance.

In the 1940s different gypsum board formulations were investigated to increase the naturally occurring fire resistance of regular core gypsum board. A new product was eventually introduced that clearly demonstrated “eXtra” fire resistance, hence the name “type X.” The basic components of type ‘X’ that give it a superior fire resistance are gypsum, glass fibers, and vermiculite.

In the 1960s, further modifications were made to the original successful type ‘X’ formulations of gypsum board used in some systems – particularly ceiling systems – without compromising the fire-resistive qualities. The new product demonstrates additional fire resistance over type ‘X’ core, and thus the term “improved type X” was coined. Gypsum board products make up the predominant portion of a family of materials identified as gypsum panel products. Gypsum panel products are defined as sheet materials consisting essentially of gypsum. They can be faced with paper or another material, or may be unfaced. Gypsum board, glass-faced sheathing materials with a gypsum core and unfaced gypsum-based products are all considered to be gypsum panel products. Technically, gypsum board is defined as the generic name for a family of sheet products consisting of a noncombustible core, primarily of gypsum, with a paper surfacing on the face, back, and long edges. In recent years the family of gypsum-based panel materials has grown to include panel products other than those with the familiar paper facers. A number of specialized gypsum panel products and gypsum boards have been developed for specific uses which include:

Gypsum Wallboard for interior walls and ceilings
Gypsum Ceiling Board for interior ceilings
Type X Gypsum Board for fire-resistance-rated building systems
Fiber Reinforced Gypsum Panels for interior and exterior walls, ceilings, and tile base
Gypsum Sheathing for exterior walls and roof systems
Glass Mat Gypsum Substrate for use as sheathing on exterior walls and ceilings
Gypsum Soffit Board for use on exterior soffits and ceilings
Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
Glass Mat Water-Resistant Gypsum Backing Board for use as a tile base
Gypsum Backing Board for use as a base for multi-ply systems
Gypsum Lath for use as a base for gypsum plaster
Gypsum Plaster Base for use as a base for veneer plaster
Gypsum Shaft Liner Board for shaft, stairway, and duct enclosures
Pre-decorated Gypsum Board for accent walls, office and movable partitions
Foil backed gypsum board for use as a vapor retardent

Identified by their technically correct names, gypsum board products are as follows: Gypsum Wallboard is produced primarily for use as an interior surfacing for buildings. It is the most often used commodity gypsum board and annually accounts for over 50 percent of all the gypsum board manufactured and sold in North America. Gypsum wallboard has a manila-colored face paper and is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.

Gypsum Ceiling Board is an interior surfacing material with the same physical appearance as gypsum wallboard. Gypsum ceiling board is manufactured as a ½-inch thick material; it is designed for application on interior ceilings, primarily those intended to receive a water-based texture finish. It has a sag resistance equal to 5/8-inch thick gypsum wallboard.

Predecorated Gypsum Board has a decorative surface which does not require further treatment. The surfaces may be coated or painted, printed, textured, or have a film – such as vinyl wallcovering – applied. It is manufactured in a variety of thicknesses as both a regular- and a fire-resistant core material.

Water-resistant Gypsum Board is a gypsum board designed for use on walls primarily as a base for the application of ceramic or plastic tile. It is readily identified by its green-tinted face paper and is commonly referred to as “Greenboard.” It has a water-resistant core and a water-repellent face and back paper; it is generally installed in bath, kitchen, and laundry areas.

Gypsum Backing Board, Gypsum Coreboard, and Gypsum Shaftliner Panel are all designed to be used as base materials in multi-layer, solid and semi-solid, and shaftwall systems. Gypsum backing board is used as a base layer for other gypsum board materials in systems or as a base for dry claddings such as acoustic tile. Gypsum coreboard and gypsum shaftliner are manufactured with a type X core, using a specific edge configuration to facilitate installation into specialized stud systems and a type X core.

Exterior Gypsum Soffit Board is designed for use on the underside of eaves, canopies, carports, soffits, and other horizontal exterior surfaces that are indirectly exposed to the weather. It has water-repellent face and back paper and is more sag-resistant than regular wallboard. Exterior gypsum soffit board can be manufactured with a type X core and typically has a light brown face paper.

Gypsum Sheathing Board is used as a backing under exterior siding or cladding. It has a water-repellent face and back paper and can be manufactured with a water-resistant core. Depending on the thickness of the board, gypsum sheathing board is manufactured with either a square or a tongue-and-groove edge and a fire-resistive core. It generally has a brown or light black face paper.

Gypsum Base for Veneer Plaster has a distinctive blue-tinted face paper that is treated to facilitate the adhesion of thin coats of hard, high strength gypsum veneer plaster. It is produced in sheets that are the same width as gypsum wallboard and can be manufactured with a fire-resistive core. Application of Gypsum Board

A wide variety of gypsum board application methods are available to meet virtually any need in building design and construction. Gypsum board is applied in either single-layer or multi-layer systems to achieve specific fire or sound ratings. Gypsum board is applied over wood or steel framing or furring. It is also applied to masonry or concrete surfaces, either laminated directly or attached to wood furring strips or steel furring channels. Gypsum board ceilings can be directly attached to joists or trusses or attached to furring or grid systems suspended below structural members. Gypsum board is generally attached to the framing with nails, screws, or staples. Although nails are commonly used in wood frame construction, screws are often preferred because they are applied with automatic screw guns, have excellent holding power, and reduce the possibility of nail pops. A combination of nails and screws may also be used, with nails along edges and screws in the field. Staples are used because they are economical and can be quickly applied with staple guns; however, the use of staples should be limited to the base-layer in multi-layer systems or to gypsum sheathing on wood framing. Gypsum board wall and ceiling surfaces are typically decorated with paint, texture, wallpaper, tile, or paneling. When pre-decorated gypsum board is used, joints are generally covered with matching molding or battens; no additional finishing or decoration is necessary. Single-Layer Application

Single-layer gypsum board applications are the most common in light commercial and in residential construction.
These systems rely on one layer of gypsum board attached to framing or furring.
Although single-layer gypsum board systems are generally adequate to meet most minimum requirements for fire resistance and sound control, multi-layer systems are preferred for higher quality construction and to upgrade beyond the "bare minimums" of many code requirements.

Multi-Layer Application

Multi-layer systems have two or more layers of gypsum board and are used to meet higher sound and fire resistance requirements or to enhance these comfort and safety qualities beyond minimum code requirements.
They also provide better surface quality because face layers can often be laminated over base layers eliminating many or all of the fasteners in the face layer. In addition, face-layer joints are stronger by virtue of the continuous backing provided by the base layers.
Nail pops and ridging are less frequent and imperfectly aligned framing has less effect on the quality of the finished surface.

GYPSUM BOARD TYPICAL MECHANICAL AND PHYSICAL PROPERTIES (GA-235-10) A common misconception is that there are just two basic types of drywall—regular and type X—and beyond this difference, drywall products from various manufacturers are about the same. However, laboratory fire tests by United States Gypsum Company and various independent testing organizations provide strong evidence that there are significant fire-performance differences between drywall products from various manufacturers. It is well known in the construction industry that the single most important characteristic of gypsum drywall is its fire resistance. This is provided by the principal raw material used in its manufacture, CaSO4- 2H2O (gypsum). As the chemical formula shows, gypsum contains chemically combined water (about 50% by volume). When gypsum drywall panels are exposed to fire, the heat converts a portion of the combined water to steam. The heat energy that converts water to steam is thus used up, keeping the opposite side of the gypsum panel cool as long as there is water left in the gypsum, or until the gypsum panel is breached.

In the case of regular gypsum panels, as the water is driven off by heat, the reduction in volume within the gypsum causes large cracks to form, eventually causing the panel to fail.
In a special fire test designed to demonstrate the relative performance of different types of gypsum cores (described later in this section), it was shown that in a fire with a temperature of 1,850ºF, a 5/8" thickness of regular-core gypsum panels would fail in this manner in 10 to 15 minutes.
Type X gypsum panels, such as Sheetrock brand Firecode gypsum panels, have glass fibers mixed with the gypsum to reinforce the core of the panels.
These fibers have the effect of reducing the extent of and size of the cracks that form as the water is driven off, thereby extending the length of time the gypsum panel can resist the heat without failure.
Fire test results indicate that the same thickness of the type X gypsum drywall exposed to the same temperature (1,850ºF) will last 45 to 60 minutes.

USG has developed a third-generation gypsum drywall product called Sheetrock brand Firecode C gypsum panels that provides even greater resistance to the heat of fire. The core of Firecode C contains more glass fibers than type X—but also a shrinkage-compensating additive, a form of vermiculite that expands in the presence of heat at about the same rate as the gypsum in the core shrinks (from loss of water). Thus the core becomes highly stable in the presence of fire and remains intact even after the combined water is driven off. Tests have shown that this third-generation product resisted the fire for more than two hours, as compared to 45 to 60 minutes for the type X, and 10 to 15minutes for the regular panel under the same test conditions.

In a future posting we’ll discuss the issues facing the fire service related to the newest generation of impact resistant gypsum board that will restrict or preclude entirely our ability to breach walls in residential or commercial occupancies. Here are some links and Spec Sheets to look at in advance, HERE , HERE, HERE and HERE

References and Links Summarizing the many different types of gypsum board used in the industry, this quick reference gives typical uses of, and the ASTM and CSA standards for, each type. Also included is the appropriate industry standard designation for the installation of each type of gypsum board, along with the sizes and thicknesses generally available. Download

APPLICATION OF GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-253-07)

This publication describes the industry's latest recommendations for handling, storing, and installing gypsum sheathing under a variety of conditions. A must for anyone hanging gypsum sheathing or involved in EIFS work. Download

FIRE-RESISTANT GYPSUM SHEATHING (GA-254-07)

This publication describes the advantages, recommended uses, limitations, and properties of gypsum sheathing in exterior walls.

Download

Gypsum Construction Handbook

Reference guide of construction procedures for gypsum drywall, cement board, veneer plaster and conventional plaster.

Trade Associations and other Organizations

Association of the Wall and Ceiling Industry (AWCI)—Provides services and undertake activities that enhance the members' ability to operate a successful business. AWCI represents acoustics systems, ceiling systems, drywall systems, exterior insulation and finishing systems, fireproofing, flooring systems, insulation, and stucco contractors, suppliers and manufacturers, and allied trades.
ASTM International (ASTM)—Provides a global forum for the development and publication of voluntary consensus standards for materials, products, systems, and services. In over 130 varied industry areas, ASTM standards serve as the basis for manufacturing, procurement, and regulatory activities. Provides standards that are accepted and used in research and development, product testing, quality systems, and commercial transactions around the globe.
Ceilings and Interior Systems Construction Association (CISCA)—Association for the advancement interior commercial construction, providing education, technical guidance and related resources. CISCA membership includes over 600 of the leading contractors, distributors, manufacturers and independent manufacturer's representatives worldwide.
Gypsum Association (GA)—Founded in 1930, GA promotes the use of gypsum while advancing the development, growth, and general welfare of the gypsum industry in the United States and Canada on behalf of its member companies.
ICC Evaluation Service (ICC-ES)—Provides technical evaluations of building products, components, methods, and materials and issues reports on code compliance to building regulators, contractors, specifiers, architects, engineers, and the public.

Relevant Codes and Standards

Guide Specifications

Department of Defense (DoD) Unified Facilities Guide Specifications (UFGS)
- UFGS 09 23 00 Gypsum Plaster
- UFGS 09 29 00 Gypsum Board
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
- VA 09 23 00 Gypsum Plastering
- VA 09 29 00 Gypsum Board
Green Construction Specs
- 09250 Gypsum Board
MasterSpec®

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 12, 2011 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, assemblies, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, firefighting-operations • Tagged: building construction, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety, buildingsonfire.com, Ceiling assemblies, Ceiling collapse, Christopher Naum, Christopher Naum. Thecompanyofficer.com, commandsafety.com, concealed spaces, construction, Firefighter LODD, firefighter near-miss reporting, Firefighter Safety & Health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, fires, Glenn Allen, Glenn L. Allen, Gypsum board, Gypsum Board Ceiling Systems Ceiling Collapse and Firefighter Safety, gypsum wall board firefighter safety, IAFC, In the Line of Duty, interior truck operations, LAFD, Line of Duty, Los Angeles Fire Department, National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System, National FireFighter Near Miss Reporting System, National Near Miss Reporting System, Near-Miss Reporting, Near-Miss Reporting Tool Box, NFFNMRS, Report of the Week, Rescue, residential, RIT, roof operations, ROTW, thecompanyofficer.com, Type V Construction, ventilation, water, water absorption

NIOSH LODD Report Released on Fire and Collapse Which Killed Two Chicago Firefighters

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NIOSH LODD Report Released on Fire and Collapse Which Killed Two Chicago Firefighters
F2010-38 Two Career Fire Fighters Die and 19 Injured in Roof Collapse during Rubbish Fire at an Abandoned Commercial Structure – Illinois

NIOSH Executive Summary
On December 22, 2010, a 47-year-old male (Victim # 1) and a 34-year old male (Victim # 2), both career fire fighters, died when the roof collapsed during suppression operations at a rubbish fire in an abandoned and unsecured commercial structure. The bowstring truss roof collapsed at the rear of the 84-year old structure approximately 16 minutes after the initial companies arrived on-scene and within minutes after the Incident Commander reported that the fire was under control. The structure, the former site of a commercial laundry, had been abandoned for over 5 years and city officials had previously cited the building owners for the deteriorated condition of the structure and ordered the owner to either repair or demolish the structure. The victims were members of the first alarm assignment and were working inside the structure. A total of 19 other fire fighters were hurt during the collapse.

Contributing Factors

Lack of a vacant / hazardous building marking program within the city
Vacant / hazardous building information not part of automatic dispatch system
Dilapidated condition of the structure
Dispatch occurred during shift change resulting in fragmented crews
Weather conditions including snow accumulation on roof and frozen water hydrants
Not all fire fighters equipped with radios.

Key Recommendations

Identify and mark buildings that present hazards to fire fighters and the public
Use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially abandoned or vacant unsecured structures
Train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates
Provide battalion chiefs with a staff assistant or chief's aide to help manage information and communication
Provide all fire fighters with radios and train them on their proper use
Develop, train on, and enforce the use of standard operating procedures that specifically address operations in abandoned and vacant structures

NIOSH Recommendations

Recommendation #1: Fire departments and city building departments should work together to identify and mark buildings that present hazards to fire fighters and the public.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially abandoned or vacant unsecured structures.
Recommendation # 3: Fire departments should train fire fighters to communicate interior conditions to the Incident Commander as soon as possible and to provide regular updates.
Recommendation # 4: Fire departments should consider providing battalion chiefs with a staff assistant or chief's aide to help manage information and communication.
Recommendation # 5: Fire departments should provide all fire fighters with radios and train them on their proper use.
Recommendation # 6: Fire departments should develop, train on and enforce the use of standard operating procedures that specifically address operations in abandoned and vacant structures.
Recommendation # 7: Fire departments should develop, implement and enforce a detailed Mayday Doctrine to ensure that fire fighters can effectively declare a Mayday.
Recommendation # 8: Fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander maintains close accountability for all personnel operating on the fireground
Recommendation # 9: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained in fireground survival procedures.
Recommendation #10: Fire departments should ensure that all fire fighters are trained in and understand the hazards associated with bowstring truss construction.

FULL NIOSH LODD REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS, HERE

The tragic events in the City of Chicago on Wednesday December 22, 2010, when Chicago Firefighter Edward J. Stringer – Engine Co.63 and Firefighter/EMT Corey D. Ankum, Truck Co.34 were killed in the line of duty while operating at a structure fire in an abandoned one-story brick building in the 1700 block of East 75th Street on the City’s South side, exemplifies the demands, challenges and sacrifice that come with responsibilities, duty and sworn obligation that distinguishes the honorable profession of being a firefighter.

The fire was first reported at about 06:48 hours during the night and day tour shift change, with companies arriving at 06:52 hours reporting moderate fire in the buildings northeast corner. The single story commercial structure was vacant, however it was readily known that squatters were known to seek shelter in the abandoned structure especially give the harsh weather being experienced in the city. The fire was quickly contained at approximately 07:00 hours according to published reports, and radio communications, with coordinated suppression, search and rescue and ventilation operations being conduction by companied both within the interior and on the roof.

Other Operational Safety Insights and Considerations from CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com

During all operations involving actual or suspected Bowstring Truss Roofing Support Systems Command and Company Officers should be sensitive to risk assessment indicators related to both fire induced conditions as well as environmental and age induced factors.
Pre-plan your buildings look at the construction, components, features and condition of the building; there is a tremendous amount of information out there. Understand and comprehend what to look for, what it is that you’re looking at and more importantly make sure the information is retrievable for on-scene application and that the information is utilized when formulating IAP and in the dynamic risk assessment process
During Dynamic Risk Assessment, special attention should be focused on Predicated Building Performance common to identified building systems, features and structural systems that are based upon Occupancy Performance and NOT Occupancy Type.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) United States Fire Administration (USFA) issued a special report examining the characteristics of fires in vacant residential buildings. The report, Vacant Residential Building Fires, was developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center and provides useful insights and recommendations. Link HERE
When developing incident action plans and operational assignments at incidents involving possible Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures, command and company officers shall implement a formulative risk -benefit assessment consistent with departmental procedures, policies and expectations.
Be knowledgable of operational factors and considerations related to operations at Vacant, Unoccupied or Abandoned structures; HERE and HERE
Read the Newest NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters at Structure Fires, HERE
Start considering building; age, deterioration, environmental impacts and influences in your IAP and tactical considerations, we at times forget to consider these performance indicators effectively during initial or sustained operations.
Learn more about Building Construction, Occupancy Profiling, Reading a Building, Occupancy Risk versus Occupancy Type and always consider Tactical Patience.
Increase your knowledge on Structural Collapse indicators especially for buildings of masonry construction in both Type III and Type IV construction.
There is a Predictability of Performance in all Buildings and Occupancies with Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural Systems; Know what they are.
Understand what to look for in Heavy Timber or Built-up Bowstring Truss Structural System integrity related to; Age and Deterioration, Gravity, Cross Grain Shrinkage, Wood Defects that are self-evident in chords and web members, Upper Chord Buckling, Lower Chord splitting or failure points, web splitting or pull-outs, multiple roofing systems or membranes, multiple void spaces, compromised bearing walls or pilasters, compromised or degraded bearing points or truss ends.
Learn to identify masonry wall features and what they mean towards tactical operations
In smaller single story occupancies; any loss of structural integrity of a single truss component would likely cause the compromise or collapse of adjacent truss components and connective decking planks due to the interdependence and connectivity of the roofing support (trusses), purlins, rafters and roofing planks and outer membrane system.
Typically the failure of one bowstring truss span will compromise or cause the collapse of each adjacent truss to either side of the original affected truss causing the failure of a sizeable roof area.
Companies operating on such affected roof area areas are subject to high risk and vulnerability should the roof area fail. Refer to the incident conditions and structural collapse from the Waldbaum’s Collapse, FDNY August 2, 1978. Go to the incident overview at Commandsafety.com HERE.
In smaller square foot commercial occupancies that have shallow depth bowstring truss components and both limited spans (less than 100 linear feet clear span) and number of trusses (six or less) the likelihood of a catastrophic roof collapse should be considered highly predicable in all incident action plans and during incident status monitoring.
The loss of load bearing and load transfer capabilities at these wall connections can contribute towards failure and collapse conditions. The end connections points (end cap or end shoe) of a bowstring truss are critical towards maintain truss performance and structural integrity.
The loss of truss axial orientation, resultant excessive deflection, loss of integrity of chord/ web geometry and connection points can lead to failure mechanisms and a cascading effect due to transferring of loads and possible overstressing and directly lead to subsequent failures.
It should be noted that fire service personnel should have a high degree of respect for the danger and susceptible risk imposed by compromised or failing bearing and non-load bearing walls.
Collapse zones must be established and access controlled based upon physical incident scene layout, access and proximal exposure structures.
All fire service personnel should have awareness level training and an understanding of recognizing collapse indicators for buildings of masonry construction and tactical safety considerations
Company and Command Officers must have a higher level of knowledge and training to be able to recognize subtle or obvious construction, conditions or indicators that will affect IAP, strategic, tactical or task assignments and be able to act upon those indicators with immediacy and urgency as conditions and risk dictate.
The Collapse Zone should be at a minimum be equal to the full height of the exterior masonry wall face and also take into consideration additional distance due building material momentum, bounce and toss due to individual bricks, steel lintels and other components and materials acting as projectiles and traveling distances greater than the defined “collapse zone”.

From CommandSafety.com' s 2010 postings: Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse and Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse-PDF Download

Some additional Insight Materials for discussion from CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com

Operational Safety Training Aide: Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies Training Download from Commandsafety.com
Lessons Learned: Buffalo, NY Three Alarm Fire and Double LODD Report
San Francisco: Collapse of Bowstring Truss Roof Seriously Injures Fire Fighter
FDNY: The Waldbaum Fire Collapse FDNY 1978 Remembrance
Ordinary Construction Floor Collapse: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200923.html
Brick Parapet Wall Collapse: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200821.html
Partial Roof Collapse: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200509.html
Roof Collapse during interior operations: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face9617.html
Trapped during fire suppression operations at a millwork facility: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200807.html
Don’t forget o research some of the Near Miss Reports on the NFFNMRS: http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse-PDF Download
Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse
Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Days One thru Seven;Training and Preparedness

Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies Training Download

Note: CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com is in the process of revising and expanding this Training Download.

We hope to have the update published in early September 2011. Watch for posting announcements

Take at Look at this: Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Types

Resources:

National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Operational Safety Considerations at Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies PowerPoint Program developed by Christopher Naum, HERE
Informational Support Narrative download, HERE

Do you know what to look for upon arrival?
What Building features and factors will affect your operations?

Program Screenshot

The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.

For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics covered include:

Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

Take some time to look at the Photos from Tom Olk at http://olkee.smugmug.com/

Chicago Fire Department Funeral Service For Fire Fighter Ed Stringer

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT FUNERAL SERVICES FOR FALLEN FIRE FIGHTER EDWARD STRINGER Engine Co # 63 & Truck Co # 16

CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT FUNERAL SERVICE FOR FIREFIGHTER COREY ANKUM FROM ENGINE CO#72 AND TOWER LADDER # 34

Chicago Fire Department 3-11 Alarm Fire W/a EMS Plan 2 And a Mayday For the Roof collapse At The Working Fire

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 5, 2011 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, failures, firefighting-operations, LODD, Mayday, NIOSH • Tagged: "pre-fire planning", Bowstring Truss, Brick & Joist, Brick wall collapse, building construction, buildingsonfire.com, Chicago Anatomy of Collapse 12.22.2010, Chicago FD LODD 12.22.2010, Chicago Fire Department, Chicago1222, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, Collapse, commandsafety.com, dead loads, East 75th Street Collapse Chicago, fire collapse, fire suppression, Firefighter Close-call, firefighter injuries, Firefighter Near Miss, firefighting-operations, Mayday, National Near Miss Reporting System, NIOSH ALERT, NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigative Reports, NIOSH LODD Report Released on Fire and Collapse Which Killed Two Chicago Firefighters, NIOSH report F2010-38, Operational Safety, Operational Safety Considerations at Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies, ordinary, RIT, Roof Collapse, search and rescue, Structural Collapse, Structural failure, Taxpayer, Truss collapse, Two Career Fire Fighters Die and 19 Injured in Roof Collapse during Rubbish Fire at an Abandoned Commercial Structure – Illinois, Type III and Type IV construction characteristics, Type III Ordinary Construction, vacant versus unoccupied

Remembrance: Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978 – 2011

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The Waldbaum’s Supermarket Fire and Collapse FDNY 1978 - 2011

The Waldbaum Super market fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died in the line of duty when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.

The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
• Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33
• Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156
• Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42
• Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153
• Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156
• Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153

Remembrance and Honor

Detailed information and insights previously posted on CommandSafety.com, HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 2, 2011 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Combat Fire Engagement, FDNY, firefighting-operations, History Repeating Event • Tagged: "firefighter safety", 1978, 2892 Ocean Avenue Brooklyn, Battalion 33, Battalion 42, building types, buildingsonfire.com, Chris Naum, Christopher Naum, Collapse, collapse rescue operations, commandsafety.com, concealed ceilings, concealed spaces, FDNY, FDNY August 2, FDNY Box 3300, FDNY Six LODD 1978, fire behavior, Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Firefighter George S. Rice, Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Firefighter James P. McManus, Firefighter William O’Connor, Hackensack Ford Fire, Hackensack LODD, Heavy Timber Truss, Ladder Company 153, Ladder Company 156, LODD, Lt. James E. Cutillo, multiple alarm, pilaster, renovations, Rescue, roof assembly, Roof Collapse, strategies and tactics, thecompanyofficer.com, truck company, truck company operations, Truss, type III, ventilation, Waldbaum Collapse FDNY, Waldbaum Fire, Waldbaum Fire 32nd anniversary, Waldbaum's Fire Brooklyn

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home". Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)

Archives for

REMEMBRANCE

Buffalo (NY) Fire Deparment- August 24, 2009 1815 Genesee Street, Buffalo, NY

SUMMARY

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should ensure that all personnel are aware of the dangers of working above a fire, especially a basement fire, and develop, implement, and enforce a standard operating procedure (SOP) that addresses strategies and tactics for this type of fire.

Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives interior status reports and performs/continues evaluating risk-versus-gain.

Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that crew integrity is maintained at all times on the fireground.

Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that the incident commander (IC) receives accurate personnel accountability reports (PAR) so that he can account for all personnel operating at an incident.

Recommendation #5: Fire departments should ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire.

Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters use their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures.

Recommendation #7: Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should conduct research into refining existing and developing new technologies to track the movement of fire fighters inside structures.

Recommendation #8: Manufacturers, equipment designers, and researchers should continue to develop and refine durable, easy-to-use radio systems to enhance verbal and radio communication in conjunction with properly worn self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

FDNY- August 27, 2006 Walton and East Mount Eden Avenues, Bronx, NY

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONS

Recommendation #1: Fire departments should consider the possibility of a substandard structure when building information is not available from pre-incident plans, and implement a defensive strategy when no occupants are at risk.

Recommendation #2 : Fire departments should consider the live load of water on the structure and go defensive when water load potentially compromises the structural integrity.

Recommendation #3 : Municipalities should explore means of coordinating information sharing between building and fire departments to increase safety for fire fighters and civilians

Recommendation #4: Municipalities should consider conducting inspections on all commercial structures where a change of occupancy has occurred or renovations are known or suspected, giving special attention to non-sprinklered commercial retail structures

Firefighters work at a fire site in Hung Hom, south China's Hong Kong, June 15, 2011. Four were killed and 19 others injured. (Xinhua/Lui Siu Wai)

Fire Death Rate Trends: An International Perspective

Contributing Factors

Key Recommendations

Recommendations

Join in on Wednesday August 17th at 9pm ET for another special and exciting program continuing our series discussion on the Emerging Tactical Renaissance in the Fire Service.

Buildingsonfire -2012 Building Construction and Systems Training for Fire Service Commanders, Company Officers and Fire Fighters

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Take at Look at this: Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Types

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