Skip to content


Archives for

See all posts in the network tagged with

National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System; Untapped Resource

2 comments

Have you heard about the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System (NMRS)? Have you used the NMRS Reports, or submitted a near miss event? Did you know there is a wealth of resources available on the NMRS web site or that there is a Report of the week that is published weekly?

If not, this is a great opportunity to learn about this national fire service program.

The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.

Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.

Have you submitted a near-miss event? If not, Why Not?

The reporting system is funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. The program was originally funded by DHS and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company.

There are three main goals:
1. To give firefighters the opportunity to learn from each other through real-life experiences;
2. To help formulate strategies to reduce the frequency of firefighter injuries and fatalities; and
3. To enhance the safety culture of the fire and emergency service.

Fire fighters can use submitted reports as educational tools. Analyzed data will be used to identify trends which can assist in formulating strategies to reduce fire fighter injuries and fatalities. Depending on the urgency, information will be presented to the fire service community via program reports, press releases and e-mail alerts.

Why should I submit a near-miss report? A near miss experienced by a firefighter can improve the knowledge, skills and abilities of everyone who is made aware of it. Reporting your near-miss event to www.firefighternearmiss.com will help prevent an injury or fatality of a firefighter. Near-miss reporting has worked effectively in other industries, especially aviation, since team members have more knowledge. Industries using near-miss reporting systems have lower injury rates and fewer worker fatalities.

  
 
 
 
Take the time to browse through the NMRS web site and familiarize yourself with the content, resources and information available to you.
 
Realize that the resource center and the near-miss reports are all formulative and can very easily support training drill development, just in time training, table-top discussions, scenario based exercises and review discussions with company, staff or command officers and all station or company personnel.NMRS Resource Section, HERE
 
Links:  
 
Near-Miss Reporting Form example, HERE

 Got a Near-Miss Report to Submit?

Click on the button for a direct link to the NFNMRS here

 

 

Frequent Questions:

 

Taking it to the Streets, Blogtalk radio on Firefighternetcast.com (link here)

Taking it to the Streets presented a great program originally aired on Wednesday March 16th , 2011 where we discussed the National Near Miss Reporting System and program with Chief Steve Mormino, NMRS Program Advisor past Chief with South Farmingdale (NY) Fire Department and retired Lieutenant , FDNY. Download this exceptional program from iTunes or here

 

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

 

Podcast: Play in new window | Download

The progam was produced from the Live Broadcast on March 16th, 2011

Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

On Your Street, In Your City, Across the Country, Around the WorldTM

The direct show link is here

The line-up of Program guests included, Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret), Captain CJ Haberkorn Denver (CO) Fire Department and Special Guest Captain Michael Long, Camp Taylor (KY) Fire Protection District.

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the National Near-Miss Reporting System and the untapped resources that the program and system provides with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire service leaders. The second part of the program will dedicated to the personal account of Captain Long’s Close Call event from July 25, 2010 (NMR #10-1072) when a catastrophic floor collapse at a residential occupancy plunged him into a fire involved basement.

Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
  • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE  

Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

Taking it to the StreetsTM, is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production, in affiliation with the Command Institute

 

National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System’s Support for the 2011 Safety Week

Don’t forget to go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System for  number of exceptional training aids, resources, PPT and more. NFFNMRS, HERE

Here are some of the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System Programs that were produced for this year’s  2011 Safety

 
File Title File Size File Description
  • Presentation: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Presentation: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
  • Presentation: Fire Fighter Expectations of Command
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about fire fighter expectations of command.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Skills
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival skills at a mayday.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival procedures.
  • Grouped Report: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Grouped Report: Self Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A grouped report about self survival procedures
  • Grouped Report: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems

    For more information on the NMRS:
    Rynnel Gibbs
    nearmiss@iafc.org
    703-537-4858 www.firefighternearmiss.com

    Near Miss Reporting System Advisory Board

    • Dennis Smith, Chairman, First Responders Financial Co. (Chair of Advisory Board)
    • Jim Brinkley, Director of Occupational Health and Safety, International Association of Fire Fighters.
    • Alan Brunacini, Fire Chief
    • Linda Connell, Director, NASA/Aviation Safety Reporting System
    • I. David Daniels, Fire Chief/CEO, Woodinville Fire and Rescue (WA)
    • Gordon Graham, Graham Research Consultants
    • William Goldfeder, Deputy Chief, Loveland-Symmes Fire Dept. (OH)
    • Manuel Gomez, Chief, City of Hobbs Fire Dept. (NM)
    • Bill Halmich, Fire Chief, Washington Fire Dept. (MO)
    • Christopher Hart, Vice Chair, National Transportation Safety Board
    • Mark Light, Executive Director/Chief Executive Officer, International Association of Fire Chiefs
    • Ed Mann, State Fire Commissioner, Office of the PA State Fire Commissioner

    Take a look at the NMRS Partners, HERE

    As a Company or Command Officer you have an obligation to capture your department’s near-miss events and contribute to the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System data base so the fire service can learn from each event with the objective that they are not repeated or escalate into something more severe or significant in terms of injuries or line of duty death events.

    NIOSH Findings Reported on Bridgeport (CT) Double LODD Fire; Failed to Respond to Maydays

    No comments

     

    2 Bridgeport firefighters die in line of duty: wtnh.com

    Fire vented through the roof. Note: NIOSH investigators believe this photo shows conditions very close to the time that the Mayday was called for Victim #2 by FF4. Wind was pushing the smoke plume from right to left. (Photo courtesy of Keith Muratori.)

    Bridgeport (CT) fire officials’ failure on nearly ever level led to the line-of-duty deaths of two firefighters battling a fire in a residential occupancy in Bridgeport, CT on July 24, 2010. 

    Among the findings of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) released Wednesday:

    • the deputy fire chief and his assistant at the scene of the Elmwood Street fire were having a discussion about whether they heard a mayday call from the two fallen firefighters instead of taking immediate action to rescue them.
    • The report also stated firefighters failed to immediately treat one of the firefighters who managed to make it to relative safety before collapsing.
    • Officials also did not properly managed firefighters’ air supplies — both firefighter’s air cylinders were empty when they were found, the report stated.
    • The department’s incident safety officer, who is required to be on scene for assistance in a fire also did not arrive more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch.

    Lt. Steven Velasquez and Firefighter Michel Baik were on the third-floor of the wood-frame home at 41 Elmwood Ave. checking for hot spots and making sure there were no people in the smoldering blaze. Then trouble hit. The two sent mayday signals back to dispatch. Within minutes, the fire department’s rapid intervention team found the pair on the floor, unconscious, and gave them CPR. The two men could not be revived.

    Full NIOSH Report F2010- 18 FINAL CT F2010-18

    NIOSH Executive Summary

    On July 24, 2010, a 40-year-old male career fire lieutenant and a 49-year-old male career fire fighter were found unresponsive at a residential structure fire. The victims and two additional crew members were tasked with conducting a primary search for civilians and fire extension on the 3rd floor of a multifamily residential structure. The fire had been extinguished on the 2nd floor upon their entry into the structure.

    While pulling walls and the ceiling on the 3rd floor, smoke and heat conditions changed rapidly. The first firefighter transmitted a Mayday (audibly under duress) that was not acknowledged or acted upon. Minutes later the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the 3rd floor. As a fire fighter exited the 3rd floor, the lieutenant was discovered unconscious and not breathing, sitting on the stairs to the 3rd floor.

    Approximately 7 minutes later, the second firefighter  was discovered on the 3rd floor in thick, black smoke conditions. Both victims were removed by the rapid intervention team (RIT) and other fire fighters who assisted them. Both victims were pronounced dead at local hospitals.

    Contributing Factors

    • Failure to effectively monitor and respond to Mayday transmissions
    • Less than effective Mayday procedures and training
    • Inadequate air management
    • Removal and/or dislodgement of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
    • Incident safety officer (ISO) and rapid intervention team (RIT) not readily available on scene
    • Possible underlying medical condition(s) (coronary artery disease)
    • Command, control, and accountability.

    Aerial View of House and Exposures

     
     

    Key Recommendations

    • Ensure that radio transmissions are effectively monitored and quickly acted upon, especially when a Mayday is called
    • Ensure that Mayday training program(s) and department procedures adequately prepare fire fighters to call a Mayday
    • Train fire fighters in air management techniques to ensure they receive the maximum benefit from their SCBA
    • Ensure that fire fighters use their SCBA during all stages of a fire and are trained in SCBA emergency procedures
    • Ensure that a separate incident safety officer (ISO), independent from the incident commander, is appointed at each structure fire with the initial dispatch
    • Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is readily available and prepared to respond to fire fighter emergencies
    • Consider adopting a comprehensive wellness and fitness program, provide annual medical evaluations consistent with NFPA standards, and perform annual physical performance (physical ability) evaluations for all fire fighters.

    Timeline

    This timeline is provided to set out, to the extent possible, the sequence of events according to recorded and intelligible radio transmissions. Two channels were used during this incident: the main dispatch channel and channel 2 (fireground). Times are approximate and were obtained from review of the dispatch records, witness interviews, photographs of the scene, and other available information. Times have been rounded to the nearest minute. NIOSH investigators have attempted to include all intelligible radio transmissions, but some may be missing. This timeline is not intended, nor should it be used, as a formal record of events.

    • 1544 Hours E3 and L5 dispatched to a report of an elevator rescue.
    • 1546 Hours While en route, E3 contacted the dispatcher on the main dispatch channel and advised them they needed to redirect all companies to a possible house fire.
    • 1547 Hours L5 copied E3‘s transmission on the main dispatch channel and redirected to the possible house fire. E3 advised the dispatcher, on the main dispatch channel, that they had a fire on the 2nd floor and that they did not have a hydrant. Note: It is unclear whether E3 established command, but L5 arrived just after E3 and established command.
    • 1548 Hours E3, E4, E1, E7 as RIT, L11, L5, R5, and B1 were dispatched on the main dispatch channel to the house fire.
    • 1549 Hours L5 arrived on scene and their officer stated over the main dispatch channel, ―2½-story wood frame with heavy fire coming from the 2nd floor, Alpha/Bravo side, L5 is now command.‖
    • 1550 Hours E7 en route.
    • 1551-1552 Hours E4 arrived on scene and laid a supply line in from the hydrant. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer (initial arriving IC) advised the dispatcher that the bulk of the fire was knocked down by E3 and the primary search was in progress. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised L11 and E7 which way they should approach the scene. Over the main dispatch channel, L5 officer requested an ambulance for an injured fire fighter (ankle injury). Over the main dispatch channel, B1 advised the dispatcher that he was on scene, and he confirmed the first report of heavy fire with the bulk of the fire knocked down. B1 then took command of the incident.
    • 1553 Hours L11 arrived on scene. E1 took an additional hydrant. A7116 dispatched to the incident for an injured fire fighter. Note: Dispatch of A7116 was not part of the initial fire assignment. The 9-1-1 center contacted the EMS dispatch center via landline to request an ambulance for the injured fire fighter on scene after the request from the L5 officer.
    • 1554 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the BA advised the dispatcher that the command post would be in front of the fire building and tag collection would be at the command post. On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 to charge the second hoseline. E7 (RIT) arrived on scene.
    • 1555 Hours On channel 2, E4 officer asked E3 again to charge the second hoseline. Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested the dispatcher to have the safety officer respond to the incident. IC checked on the status of the ambulance. Fire dispatch advised the IC that the ambulance was en route.
    • 1556 Hours E3 advised the IC (on the main dispatch channel) that he needed hooks on the 2nd floor in the room of origin; the IC acknowledged the request. Over the main dispatch channel, IC advised all companies, ―Channel 2 fireground, channel 2 fireground.‖ Note: Up to this point, companies on scene were operating on the main dispatch and channel 2. Fire dispatch assigned fireground operations to channel 2 for the incident.
    • 1557-1558 Hours IC called L11 on channel 2. IC (on the main dispatch channel) confirmed with the dispatcher who was RIT (which was E7) on scene and advised them that their equipment was available at the command post. Victim#1 acknowledged the IC‘s request for L11 on channel 2, but the IC did not respond. E3 officer, who incorrectly identified himself as ―E4,‖ called command on channel 2 and stated they had a slight extension into the A/B corner. Note: He was working overtime the day of the incident at the station that houses E3 and E4, which is also his normal duty station. The IC copied the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2 and asked him if he had enough hooks available; the E3 officer stated he did. A7116 arrived on scene.
    • 1559 Hours E3 officer on channel 2 advised the IC that they needed a hoseline to the 3rd floor because they could not reach it (fire extension) from the 2nd floor. The IC acknowledged the E3 officer‘s transmission on channel 2. The IC, on channel 2, advised Victim #1 that E1 was bringing a hoseline to the 3rd floor. Victim #1 acknowledged the IC‘s transmission on channel 2 and advised, ―A primary is in progress, which is negative; and, they are still checking for extension.‖ The IC acknowledged Victim #1‘s transmission.
    • 1600 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the ISO advised the dispatcher that he was responding (from home). A7116 contacted EMS dispatch requesting a single ambulance to standby at the incident per the IC. A7110 dispatched and en route to fire to standby. On channel 2, the IC (at the command post) advised the E4 officer that he could see fire extending up the A/B corner. Note: NIOSH investigators were not sure if this transmission was meant for the E4 officer or the officer from E3 who identified himself as E4. At 1559 hours, the E3 officer advised the IC of the extension to the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the E4 officer advised the IC that he was working on getting a line up to the 3rd floor.
    • 1601 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher advised the IC that the ISO and DC were responding. On channel 2, the L5 officer contacted ―L5-Alpha‖ (believed to be L5‘s aerial ladder) to assist in the bucket; L5-Alpha acknowledged the transmission.
    • 1602-1603 Hours On channel 2, the IC contacted the L5 officer to verify whether he thought he could make the roof with L5. On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
    • 1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
    • 1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
    • 1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, ―…line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
    • 1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
    • On channel 2, the L5 officer stated that he was sending the driver down to talk to him. R5 officer advised the IC on channel 2 that the primary was negative on the 2nd floor. E4 attempted to contact L5 on channel 2, but was walked-on by R5-Alpha attempting to contact the R5 officer twice. E3 officer advised L5 on channel 2 that they needed to overhaul the porch on the 2nd floor, but he did not think L5 could get to it. L5 officer acknowledged E3 engineer‘s transmission on channel 2.
    • 1604 Hours DC en route to the incident. Over channel 2, R5 called the IC three times (no response). Over channel 2, the E4 officer called the E3 pump operator twice to shut the fog nozzle hoseline down; the E3 pump operator acknowledged. Victim #1 called the IC twice on channel 2 (no response).
    • 1605 Hours Over the main dispatch channel, the IC requested another RIT from the dispatcher. On channel 2, R5-Alpha advised the R5 officer that the primary above the fire floor (2nd floor) was complete. On channel 2, the R5 officer attempted to contact the IC (no response). E4 officer advised the E3 pump operator to recharge the fog nozzle hoseline; the E3 pump operator acknowledged.
    • 1606-1607 Hours A7110 arrived on scene. E12 dispatched and responded as the RIT. Note: At 1604 hours, E12 was en route to the elevator rescue. On channel 2, the IC advised Victim #1 that he was getting a second hoseline to the 3rd floor for him. The IC asked Victim #1, ―What‘s the situation up there?‖ Victim #1 stated, ―We got the line in place, it‘s charged, we have extension into the attic space…‖ The IC then asked for Victim #1 to verify ―if‖ he already had a line in place, but there was no response. A member of E4 advised the IC that they had, line in operation on the number three floor.‖ A7116 en route to hospital with injured fire fighter.
    • 1608 Hours R5 contacted the IC on channel 2 and advised him that they had one line in operation and he recommended that the roof be opened. Note: A Vibralert® could be heard alarming during his transmission. IC advised R5 that they were preparing ground ladders to access the roof.
    • The IC called the L11 officer (Victim #1) on channel 2 (no response).
    • 1615 Hours On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to all companies on the 3rd floor, vacate the 3rd floor; I repeat, command to L11 and E1, vacate the 3rd floor.‖
    • 1616-1619 Hours (2nd Mayday Call) The IC attempted to contact L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The IC, on channel 2, then stated, ―Command to E1.‖ (1616.50 hours) On channel 2, FF2 stated, ―Mayday, Mayday…Rescue 5 Bravo command we have a downed fire fighter rear steps. Mayday-Mayday-Mayday fire fighter down rear steps, 2nd floor.‖ IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11‖ (no response). Note: An apparatus air horn is heard sounding in the background of this transmission. FF2 on channel 2 stated, ―Rescue 5 Bravo command, Rescue 5 Bravo command we need help 2nd floor, send the RIT, we need fresh bodies.‖ Note: No audio transmissions or emergency tones are heard on channel 2 or the main dispatch channel advising that the Mayday call had been acknowledged. DC contacted the IC on channel 2 to have him send the RIT to the rear stairs; the IC acknowledged. Note: The RIT may have already been advancing up the rear stairs, but they ran into difficulty accessing the 2nd floor landing off the rear stairs because a charged hoseline was against the closed door. Dispatch attempted to contact command on channel 2 (no response). The IC called L11 again on channel 2 (no response). The DC contacted the IC requesting the ambulance on scene to come to the rear of the house. Victim #1 was extricated out the rear of the house.
    • 1620 Hours A7110 began medical care for the downed fire fighter (Victim #1). Over the main dispatch channel, the BA requested an advanced life support ambulance to the fire scene. A7126 was dispatched to intercept A7110 at the fire scene to provide advanced life support. (~1620.35 Hours) The following transmission is heard on channel 2, ―…Ladder 11 ‗mayday‘ (very quick transmission)…Ladder 11 (unintelligible word(s)).‖ Note: The dispatch caller ID for this radio is designated as “L-11 FF3,” which was assigned to the fire fighter (designated as FF4 for this report) who later finds Victim #2 (see below 1624 hours). FF4 had not found Victim #2 at the time of this transmission. On channel 2, FF4 stated, ―Ladder 11 irons to Ladder 11 can‖ (no response). Note: “Ladder 11 can” was Victim #2’s designation that shift.
    • 1621 Hours A7126 en route to fire scene.
    • 1622 Hours On channel 2, the ISO advised the IC that the fire fighter (Victim #1) was removed and they needed to do a roll call for everyone on scene. On channel 2, the IC advised all company officers that the ―incident is taking a PAR‖ (personnel accountability report). Officers began calling in their respective PARs.
    • 1624 Hours (3rd and 4th Mayday Calls) FF4 on channel 2 stated, ―Mayday-Mayday, I have a fire fighter trapped on the 3rd floor, Mayday-Mayday-Mayday 3rd floor.‖ Note: This Mayday is for Victim #2. A PASS device is heard alarming during FF4‘s transmission. On channel 2, the IC stated, ―This is command to all companies, vacate the building, I report, command to all companies, vacate the building.‖ FF4 on channel 2 stated again, ―Mayday-Mayday-Mayday, I‘ve got another fire fighter down, another one, 3rd floor, hurry!‖
    • 1625 Hours Over channel 2, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones. Note: It is unknown why the evacuation tones were sounded instead of the Mayday tones. Their evacuation tone is an alternating, high-low sound, similar to a European siren. Their Mayday tone is a rapid, high to low pitch, chirping sound. This was dispatch’s first acknowledgement of a Mayday over the radio. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on channel 2. Over the main dispatch channel, the dispatcher stated, ―For a Mayday,‖ and activated the emergency evacuation tones as well. No further radio traffic regarding the Mayday was provided by the dispatcher following the tone activation on the main dispatch channel.
    • 1626 Hours The IC contacted the DC on channel 2. DC acknowledged with no further traffic from the IC. The IC on channel 2 again advised all companies to vacate the building. The dispatcher then activated the emergency tones on channel 2 and the main dispatch channel, and stated, ―All companies per command vacate the building, all companies vacate the building.‖
    • 1627 Hours The ISO contacted the IC on channel 2 and stated, ―We need to make contact with that Mayday, we need more information, we have not heard from them since the initial call.‖ On channel 2, the IC stated, ―Command to company declaring a Mayday; I repeat, command to the company declaring a Mayday sound off, sound off.‖ A fire fighter from the RIT advised the IC on channel 2 that they were moving the fire fighter off the 3rd floor. On channel 2, the dispatcher advised the IC that the Mayday call was for the 3rd floor. A7126 arrived at the fire scene.
    • 1628 Hours RIT advised the IC that they have the fire fighter (Victim #2) on the 3rd floor and will be bringing him down the rear stairs from the 3rd floor.
    • 1630 Hours A7110 en route to the hospital with Victim #1 without assistance from A7126.
    • 1632 Hours ISO asked for a progress report from the RIT on the Mayday. RIT replied, ―Coming down…3rd floor.‖ ISO asked RIT to repeat their traffic. A radio was keyed, but there was no transmission.
    • 1634 Hours RIT personnel advised the IC that they had the fire fighter (Victim #2) down to the 2nd floor landing.
    • 1640 Hours A7110 arrived at local hospital with Victim #1.
    • 1643 Hours A7126 began medical care on second downed fire fighter (Victim #2). Note: This time was taken from Victim #2’s patient care report and may not be accurate.
    • 1703 Hours A7126 arrived at local hospital with Victim #2.

     

    Fire Behavior

    The room and contents fire was determined to have originated in a bedroom on the 2nd floor, A/B corner; it was quickly knocked down by E3 (see Photo 2). It is believed that the fire got into the eves when it was lapping out the A/B corner windows, and then spread within the large void spaces in the ceiling and walls of the 3rd floor. The fire was situated toward the A/B corner of the 3rd floor, but the open void areas allowed smoke to accumulate within the ceilings and walls before they were opened.

    Operating on the 3rd floor at varying times were members from L5, R5, L11, E4, and E7. Initially, light-to-moderate smoke conditions were observed on the 3rd floor, depending on how close fire fighters were to the A-side of the 3rd floor. Fire fighters recalled the 3rd floor being very hot. TICs used by different individuals on the 3rd floor showed the room to be hot on the A-side and ceiling. Windows on the A-, B-, and D-sides were opened, allowing most of the smoke to self ventilate. Light smoke remained within the 3rd floor, with good visibility.

    Extension was checked around A- and B-side baseboards. Some fire fighters recall Victim #1 telling them the fire was in the ceiling and possibly the walls, and to not open those areas until a hoseline was in place. Even after providing horizontal ventilation on the 3rd floor, smoke conditions worsened, banking down to fire fighters‘ chin levels and becoming denser.

    While waiting for the hoseline, L5 members were reassigned by the IC to ventilate the roof to provide additional relief to the 3rd floor. The IC reported to NIOSH investigators that he ordered the roof vented because he saw smoke pushing out the B-side windows. Personnel from E4 advanced the charged hoseline to the 3rd floor, allowing the ceilings and walls to be opened. A mixture of thick, brown/black smoke quickly filled the room, reducing visibility.

      

    Initial conditions observed when the BC arrived on scene at approximately 1551 hours. Note: Fire was under control on the 2nd floor and fire fighters were checking for extension. White-to-gray smoke can be seen flowing in the direction of right to left from the gables. The A-side window on the 3rd floor had been opened for ventilation (unsure at what stage of the fire or by whom).

      

      

    Structure

    Built in the early 1900s, the two-and-half-story house (see Photo 1) was purchased approximately 4 years prior to the incident as a multifamily rental occupancy. One family lived in the 1st floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.); a second family lived in the 2nd floor apartment (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.) and the owner occupied the finished half-story or attic space (approx. 700 sq. ft.).  The house also contained an unfinished basement (approx. 1,300 sq. ft.).

    The common front entrance contained access to the 1st floor apartment and a private stairwell, located at the A/D corner of the house, which provided access to the 2nd floor apartment. The house also had a single rear-entry door that provided access to a stairwell that led up to the owner‘s apartment and had landings to access all the apartments from the rear. According to the owner of the house, smoke detectors were installed within the house about a year prior to the incident. These smoke detectors were installed in every bedroom, in each hallway, and in the stairwells.

    The house did not have an installed sprinkler system and had been inspected in accordance with Department of Housing and Urban Development Section 8a guidelines, according to the homeowner. The house was Type V wood frame construction, but, during the initial stages of the fire, was presumed by arriving fire fighters to be balloon-framed due to the era when it was constructed. State fire investigators were able to confirm Type V construction after closer inspection.

    The Office of the State Fire Marshal‘s building code compliance inspection showed that the house did not meet certain Connecticut Fire Safety Code requirements for this type of structure. NIOSH investigators do not believe that these non-compliance issues contributed to the deaths of the two fire fighters.

      

    Typical Ballon Framing Construction

     

     LINKS

     

    2 Bridgeport firefighters die in line of duty: wtnh.com

    NIOSH LODD Report Issued: Fire Department faulted in firefighter deaths

    No comments

    NIOSH Released its report (F2010-18) on the July 24, 2010 house fire that resulted in the two fire fighter LODDs. Bridgeport fire officials’ failure on nearly every level led to the deaths of two firefighters battling a West Side blaze last July, the NIOSH report has concluded.

    Among the findings of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health report released Wednesday:

    • The deputy fire chief and his assistant at the scene of the Elmwood Street fire had a discussion about whether they heard a mayday call from the two fallen firefighters instead of taking immediate action to rescue them.
    • There was no rapid intervention team readily available to come to the firefighters’ aid.
    • The report stated firefighters failed to immediately treat one of the firefighters who managed to make it to relative safety before collapsing.
    • Officials also did not properly manage firefighters’ air supplies — both firefighters’ air cylinders were empty when they were found, the report stated.
    • The department’s incident safety officer, who is required to be on scene for assistance in a fire, also did not arrive until more than 20 minutes after the initial dispatch.

    According to the NIOSH report, the 40-year-old Velasquez and the 49-year-old Baik, along with two other firefighters, had been assigned to conduct a search for victims and hot spots on the third floor of the multi-family house. The fire already had been extinguished on the second floor.

    While the two were pulling the walls and ceiling on the third floor, the fire suddenly reignited. Velasquez transmitted a mayday that was not acknowledged or acted on, the report states. Minutes later, the incident commander ordered an evacuation of the third floor. As a firefighter exited the third floor he discovered Velasquez sitting on the stairs unconscious and not breathing. Baik was found about seven minutes later on the third floor in heavy smoke conditions.

    The investigation of this fatal fire by CT State Fire Marshal’s Office remains ongoing.

    The NIOSH report details will be published following a more detailed review of the findings and recommendations.

    Supervisor cleared on all charges in Deutsche Bank Building Fire that killed 2 FDNY Firefighters

    1 comment

    AP Photo

     

    5-5-5-5 August 18, 2007

    Published reports are being stating that the least senior of three construction officials in the Deutsche Bank manslaughter trial was acquitted of all charges today — after telling jurors that he had no idea the giant pipe he helped remove from the basement had anything to do with providing water to firefighters.

    A construction foreman charged with the deaths of two firefighters in the Deutsche Bank building blaze was acquitted of all charges. Salvatore DePaola was cleared by a Manhattan jury of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide on the eighth day of deliberations.

    According to reports published in a number of NYC newspapers; “It’s a happy day and a sad day,” said DePaola. “We’ve still got two firefighters that are deceased.” Firefighters Robert Beddia, 33, and Joe Graffagnino, 53 perished after they raced into the burning Ground Zero tower in 2007.

    Prosecutors argued that DePaola, who works for the John Galt Corporation, and two of his colleagues should have known a key firefighting pipe had been cut. Salvatore DePaola, 56, of Staten Island, broke into tears as he was found not guilty of manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges in the August, 2007, smoke inhalation deaths of firefighters Robert Beddia and Joseph Graffagnino.

    “I had no idea it was a standpipe,” DePaola insisted of the primary physical evidence in the case — a 42-foot section of pipe that all three defendants were accused of intentionally disregarding and discarding after it crashed to the ground from the basement ceiling nine months before the fire.

    The jury is still deliberating in the case of DePaola’s colleague, site safety manager Jeffrey Melofchik.

    AP Photo   Deutsche Bank office building Fire in New York
     

    Jurors have yet to reach a verdict on identical manslaughter and endangerment charges against their remaining defendant, Jeffrey Melofchik, 48, who worked as site safety manager for the demolition’s general contractor, Bovis Lend Lease. They will continue their deliberations tomorrow.

    A third defendant, project asbestos abatement director, Mitchel Alvo, 58, has opted for a non-jury verdict; Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Rena Uviller has not said when she will render that decision.

    As to who he thought should have been prosecuted in the defendants’ stead, De Paola — whose own son is a firefighter at Engine 160 in Staten Island — made a reference to “lieutenants” with the FDNY before his lawyer advised him to remain silent on that issue, given that deliberations are continuing.

    Today was the seventh full day of deliberations in the three-month-long trial.

    Previous CommandSafety.com coverage:

    Other References and postings;

  • NY Daily News: Battle to save trapped firefighters
  • WABC: Fatal Deutsche Bank fire report released (2008)
  • FDNY Penalties After Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Lawyers: Evidence Withheld in Deutsche Bank Fire Trial
  • FDNY Disciplines Company Officers Following Tragic Deutsche Bank Fire
  • Attorney Claims Deutsche Bank Contractors Are “Scapegoats”  
  • 188 Days of Opportunity to make a Difference: Surviving the Fire Ground

    No comments

    During this week, there were on average, over 8,600 structure fires in the United States. According to NFPA statistics the following occur on average in the U.S;

    • A fire department responded to a fire every 23 seconds.
    • One structure fire was reported every 66 seconds.
    • One home structure fire was reported every 87 seconds
    • One civilian fire injury was reported every 31 minutes.
    • One civilian fire death occurred every 2 hours and 55 minutes.
    • One outside fire was reported every 49 seconds.
    • One vehicle fire was reported every 146 seconds.

    There are on average of Eight to Ten Firefighter Line-of-duty Deaths each month.

    Thus far in 2011 there have been Forty-seven (47) LODD events in the United States. During the same period in 2010, there were thirty-seven (37) LODD events.

    During the month of June, there have been nine (9) Fire Fighter Line-of-Duty Deaths, four (4) occurring during Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week.

    The following from the USFA LODD notification page;  

    Firefighter’s Name City, State Date of Death
    Pham, Chris  Dallas, Texas 06/23/2011 
    Burch, Josh  Lake City, Florida 06/20/2011 
    Fulton, Brett  Lake City, Florida 06/20/2011 
    West, Robin Erlic Wellford, South Carolina 06/19/2011 
    Shaw, Corey  Du Quoin, Illinois 06/17/2011 
    Davis, Scott  Muncie, Indiana 06/15/2011 
    Rasmussen, Garet  Wenatchee, Washington 06/12/2011 
    Valerio, Anthony M. San Francisco, California 06/04/2011 
    Perez, Vincent A. San Francisco, California 06/02/2011 

     

    From the NFPA

    Firefighter fatalities (NFPA 2010)  

    • There were 72 firefighter deaths in 2010 (NFPA)
    • There were 87 firefighter deaths in 2010 (USFA)
    • Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, almost always account for the largest share of deaths in any given year. Of the 39 exertion- or medical-related fatalities in 2010, 34 were classified as sudden cardiac deaths and five were due to strokes or brain aneurysm.
    • Fireground operations accounted for 21 deaths.
    • Residential structure fires accounted for the largest share of fireground deaths (eight deaths).
    • Eleven firefighters died in nine vehicle crashes. In addition to those deaths, four other firefighters were struck and killed by vehicles.

    Firefighter injuries (NFPA 2009)

    • There were 78,150 firefighter injuries in 2009.
    • 32,205 of all firefighter injuries in 2009 occurred during fireground operations. Other firefighter injuries by type of duty include: responding to, or returning from an incident (4,965); training (7,935); non-fire emergency (15,455); and other on-duty activities (17,590).
    • The major types of injuries received during fireground operations were: strain, sprain; muscular pain; wound, cut, bleeding, bruise; and smoke or gas inhalation.
    • The leading causes of fireground injuries were overexertion, strain (25.2%) and fall, slip, jump (22.7%).
    • Regionally, the Northeast had the highest fireground injury rate.

    This past week, the Fire Service set aside and dedicated a week to allow departments and organizations to focus and concentrate efforts and attention on Fire and EMS safety, health and survival.

    The theme and focus in 2011 was Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness. Primary to the theme was a focus on the mayday event and its various workings and components. Seven days were designated for Safety, however what did you or your organization devoted towards the goals and objectives of Safety Week?

    Recognizing there are unique and diverse circumstances and demands within all of our organizations, operations and jurisdictions, and not everyone may have scheduled time or had enough time to allow for the planning and execution of applicable training programs, drills and activities attentive and objective to Safety week. Regardless, it is not too late to plan, develop, schedule, implement and execute. Opportunities are there, you just need to make it happen or advocate for such.

    • There are 188 days of opportunity remaining in 2011.
    • There are approximately 358 days of opportunity until the 2012 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week.  
    • Enhance upon what you are doing well, improve on what may need advancement or what isn’t up to standards and identify and develop that which is needed but has yet to be implemented.
    • Don’t miss these opportunities to make a difference or to influence and change destiny; You have that ability.
    • You have choices and decisions to be made, they all have ramifications; Like choosing the red or blue pill…..

     

    There are choices to be made; more than just red or blue...

    The Consciences Observer or Activist

    So, at the conclusion of Safety week and as you begin a new week and soon a new month the operative question today is this:

    • What did you do on your last alarm response related to operational safety and enhanced situational awareness?
    • How about your last training evolution or training drill?
    • How about Safety week, hopefully you engaged and participated…
    • Do you: participate in, contribute, join in, share, lead, promote, instruct, present, facilitate, help, assist, aid, or
    • neglect, disregard, undermine, abuse, challenge, demoralize, undercut, damage, torpedo, circumvent, or avoid?

    Take a minute to look over the following list that I first published on December 31, 2010 in advance of the new year, think about what each of  these line items can do for you, your organization and the fire service in 2011.  It’s mid year and coming on the closing days of this year’s Safety Week activities, it seemed appropriate to list them again. Don’t sacrifice or forego on these mission critical areas when so much is at stake in the domain of combat structural fire suppression, fire ground survival and the integrated operational and safety needs shared by firefighters, company officers and commanders.

    Understand the predictability of performance in the buildings and occupancies not only in your jurisdiction, first or second-due areas, but also in those areas that you may be called upon to respond to for greater alarms or mutual aid. Remember Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety. Understand and improve upon your skill set levels  and those of your company, battalion, division, department or region.

    Twenty Eleven (2011)

    Here are twenty-one (21) Suggested activities, actions or initiatives for you to consider completing in next six months of 2011….

    Above all, be safe in all your endeavors, assignments and incident tasks.

    1. Regardless of my years of experience, I will increase my understanding of the basic principles of Building Construction, because; Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.
    2. Identify eleven (11) buildings within your first-due or response district and complete a pre-fire plan and present this to my company of organization.
    3. Identify an area where new residential construction is underway and follow the construction process from foundation through completion to gain an understanding of operational issues.
    4. I will complete the UL Structural stability of engineered lumber in fire conditions online course AND the new UL Fire Behavior course and implement the lessons learned in my strategic and tactical operations.
    5. I will not take any building or occupancy for granted, and shall take all precautions to ensure crew integrity and safety during my task assignments.
    6. Complete a 360 assessment of all buildings upon arrival (or delegate), whenever feasible to gain reconnaissance information on the building and incident risks and implement this info into my strategic, tactical plans or company task assignments.
    7. Research the issues affecting; Engineered Structural Systems (ESS), Fire Behavior/Fire Dynamics or Fire Suppression Management/Fire Loading and develop a training drill to share the lessons learned.
    8. Select a new or previous published fire service text book and read up on a subject area that I may have neglected or ignored to increase my skill set.
    9. Implement an objective approach towards effective risk assessment and profiling of all buildings and occupancies during incident operations and implement balanced tactical deployment with aggressive/measured assignments; recognizing that my company and I are not invincible.
    10. During demanding Combat Structural Fire Engagements, I will; Do the Right Thing at the Right Time for the Right Reasons and will not practice Tactical Entertainment.
    11. Read the Report of the Week (ROTW) on the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System web site and share the operating experience (OE) lessons with my company or department, to reduce the likelihood of a similar or more serious event.
    12. I will read Eleven (11) NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Reports and present the lessons learned in a discussion, table top, and drill or training program.
    13. I will attend a regional or national training conference to increase my perspective and awareness of other firefighting, safety or operational methodologies, process or practices to increase firefighter safety in my home organization.
    14. I will increase my understanding of the NFFF Everyone Goes Home Program initiatives, including the Sixteen Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives, Safety Thru Leadership and the Courage to Be Safe Programs and other new program initiatives and advocate and promote enhanced safety measures in my organization.
    15. I will advocate and promote safe and defensive apparatus operations during emergency responses and will always buckle-up my seat belt and ensure my crew is always belted-in, not placing my company at risk and obeying traffic signals and postings.
    16. I will implement the New Rules of Engagement during combat structural fire operations; while monitoring and reacting to on-going building performance and fire behavior.
    17. I will increase my understanding of the Predictability of Building Performance and base my operational deployments on Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type.
    18. I will become a mentor to a new or less experienced firefighter and promote the traditions, honor and duty of our fire service profession, tempered with an emphasis on firefighter safety, survival and wellness.
    19. I will take NO emergency incident responses as being routine in nature, due to frequency , regularity or  past performance, demands or outcomes, nor will I take any building for granted; Company, Team and personal safety and integrity is paramount and I will not be complacent, but remain vigilant based upon my training, skills and experience.
    20. I will be an aggressive firefighter; operating smarter, working within the parameters of my Department’s protocols, regulations and expectations while employing Tactical Patience and NOT underestimate the fireground, fire behavior or building performance
    21. I will not settle for status quo; but strive to achieve my highest potential as a firefighter, company officer or commander; and remember I am a brother/sister (firefighter) to everyone in this great profession

    Ensure you’re glancing occasionally in your rear view mirror to monitor where you’ve been, while driving your initiatives, programs, processes and actions forward. Above all, maintain the courage to be safe.

    Stop and reflect today, where do you stand? What are your true beliefs and convictions in regards to the developing safety culture that is being forged and institutionalized within our fire service? Are your professing one thing, but implementing or allowing another circumstance?

    Keep an eye in the rear view mirror; learning from the wisdom and knowledge from where you’ve been, what you’ve done and all your past experiences and practice; but at the same time focusing on the road before you with keen attentiveness on situational awareness, anticipating error-likely conditions and balanced risk assessment and operational management in both your strategic and tactical deployments. Take those opportunities; all 188 days of opportunity remaining in 2011 AND the 358 days of opportunity until the 2012 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week.  Make a difference, however small. You can do it.

    Here are the links to this week’s previous Safety Week postings and articles on CommandSafety.com

    If you didn’t have a look and read, take some time to do so. If you didn’t do anything during Safety Week, there’s always next week or the week after… find the time and commit to some training, insights, dialog, discussion…Get Prepared.

    Day One: Fire/EMS Safety, Health & Survival Week 2011: Day One- Are You Ready?

    Day Two: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

    Day Three: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

    Day Four: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Four -The New Fire Ground

    Day Five: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011: Day Five: Near-Misses, Maydays and Floor Collapses

    Day Six: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Six; From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack-Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

    Day Seven: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Seven; Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Training and Preparedness

    Extra from Thecompanyofficer.com: Mayday and Rapid Intervention Realities: The Phoenix Perspective

    Hey, I'm talking to YOU; You can make a difference!

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Seven; Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Training and Preparedness

    3 comments

    Preparing for the Mayday Event; Not a matter of IF, But a Question of When… Are you ready? Are you Prepared?

    As the official Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011 begins to wind down, in many stations around the country this weekend is dedicated to training, drills and evolutions dedicated toward the many facets and functional elements that focus upon Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness. 

    The Safety Planning and Resource Aid and Guide published by the IAFC and IAFF (HERE) and the direct link here 2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries provided resources and planning templates and suggested training and activities to support the focus and emphasis on fire ground survival, increased focus on firefighter operations and mayday elements crucial to company integrity, firefighter safety and operational excellence.

    Being ready for a mayday (mentally and physically), self-rescue and self-survival training and methodologies are mission critical when engaging in structural firefighting operations. Proficiencies, capabilities, rigor, demeanor and performance must be orchestrated in a manner that requires optimum execution of required actions and engagements to enable a successful outcome to a reported single or multiple mayday calls.

    On a crisp fall day in October, 2009 two fires, both in residential occupancies but over 350 miles apart had similar operational needs, deployment and fire suppression and rescue engagement consistent with modern firefighting practices, methodologies and expectations.

    In one, three firefighters become trapped, resulting in a mayday, bailout and resulting LODD of a 16 year fire service veteran. City of Yonkers (NY) Firefighter Patrick Joyce  died during the operations at a 3-Alarm fire in a three story residential occupancy while conducting search and rescue operations for reported trapped civilians. Incident overviews; HERE and HERE .

    The other structure fire in a residential occupancy in Syracuse, NY, results in a fire fighter mayday and successful RIT extraction that is captured on video.  Two structure fires with common elements, each with projected predictable outcomes based upon past fire department operational experiences at similar structures, occupancies and fire conditions and reports; however with two different outcomes.

    The program information from The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)which forms a major component of thsis year’s Safety Weeks activities with the focus on comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention programming  incorporating incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, with the FGS program objectives  aimed to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.

    • For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

    Here’s a recap of the Self-Survial Procedure insights from the FGS Chapter 3 Section;

    Self-Survival Procedures

    FGS Online Program Chapter 3
    To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
    When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:

    • First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
    • Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
    • If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
    • Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
    • Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
    • Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall. 

    The following video clip depicting FDNY Rescue Co. 1 operations at a Mayday, and provides some insightful and subtle commentary that should put some things in proper perspective about the job its hazards and the unexpected that can occur in the blink of an eye.

     

    Another exceptional training piece that we are providing again here on CommandSafety.com are the two part video clips provided by TheBravestOnline.com that covers the mayday distress cakk an subsequent RIT extraction of HFD Captain Joel Eric Abbt at a four alarm fire with civilian fatalities in a six story high rise office building on March 28, 2007.

    This video along with the information obtained from the FGS  program can provide substantial opportunites for training, discussions and dialog.  Take the time to watch the HFD vdeo and the elapsed time, communications and actions deployed. This mayday event had a successful outcome due to a variety of factors.

    The question is how prepared are you, your firefighters, the officers and commanders? Surviving the fire ground requires a  wide variety of skills, knowledge , training and experience.

    Training is the foundation from which proficiencies are developed. If your organization has invested in supporting this weeks activities, don’t stop here. There are additional day ahead to take teh momentum gathered from this week and use it to chart a new course of actions and committments for the weeks and months ahead. If you didn’t have the opportunity to engage or involve, its not a missed opportuity- just find the right time and place to have your own safety day of week.

    Houston FD Mayday Part 1

    Houston FD Mayday Part 2

    Other Training and Drill Opportunties

    Suggested Considerations include the follow, as well as encouraging Departments to identify and integrate local issues, needs and identified gaps or enhancements that can contribute towards operational excellence and safety integration

    • Review and Select a Near Miss Event Report from the National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System or the Report of the Week (ROTW) series related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
    • Review and Select a NIOSH LODD Report from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/
    • Take out your Rapid Intervention Equipment and review the purpose and function of each piece of equipment. Identify and discuss alternative uses or tools that can be obtained or used in the event of unavailability, malfunction or additional resource needs. Discuss protocols, procedures, safety awareness and operational hazards, expectations and precautions. Inspection the equipment for operability and integrity.
    • Identify and select a recent departmental or local/regional incident event that was either a near-miss/close-call or transitioned into a mayday event. Discuss and facilitate dialog on lessons learned, gaps, enhancements or operational successes, achievements and positive elements. Identify any factors or elements that were presented in the FGS training series that are applicable to the event, strategies, tactics or operations: can anything be improved or enhanced?
    • Lead a discussion on how to call and initiate a Mayday. Discuss the factors and insights from FGS Program Chapter 3 Self-Survival Procedures and Chapter 4 Self-Survival Skills.
    • Select and lead a discussion on a pertinent incident case study from either the list provided or your own selection and discuss the relevancy of the event in terms of mayday operations, fire ground survival, incident outcome and relationship to your Department or agency. What is the relevancy, similarities or differences? Can this event or circumstances occur in your jurisdiction?  What can be done to prevent a history repeating event (HRE)?
    • Review and discuss Roles and Responsibilities for mayday events and operations. How do they match up with your operating procedures, policies and expectations?
    • Develop and facilitate a table top exercise (TTE) on a mayday event scenario utilizing a building in your first-due or response jurisdiction. Take photographs and integrate into your program. Refer to example of a simple TTE  attached or go to Fire Fighternation.com for an example here; http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an
    • Visit a residential or commercial construction site (with pre-arrival authorization and approvals) and tour the stage of construction, looking critically at the type of construction and structural systems being implemented, materials used, workmanship and signs of deficient or adverse conditions that may affect operational integrity, safety or collapse and compromise once the building is occupied. Discuss issues such as structural integrity, collapse risk, occupancy risk versus occupancy type considerations, avenues for fire travel, effects on fire load package and rate of heat release and projected fire intensity. How would you fire a fire in the occupancy? What will define the strategy and tactics that would be or should be selected and used?
    • In a controlled setting with or without PPE, Practice calling a mayday with the identified communication attributes defined in the FGS training program. Critique and practice the evolution until the group feels that it is acceptable.

    Here are some additional Resource Links to Support your training and drill needs;

    Selected References

    • IAFC: The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety, HERE and HERE
    • NIOSH Publication No. 2010-153:NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires, HERE
    • What’s on your Radar Screen; http://commandsafety.com/2010/07/whats-on-your-radar-screen/
    • Reflecting upon these days of June; http://commandsafety.com/2010/06/reflecting-on-these-days-of-june/
    • http://www.isfsi.org/Resources/ResourceLinks.aspx
    • ·         NIST References HERE and HERE 
    • ·         Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE 
    • ·         Reference Data HERE 
    • ·         NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments download at the NIST, HERE or Synopsis HERE 
    • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002
    • Report: Early Warning Capabilities for Firefighters:Testing of Collapse Prediction Technologies
    • ·         UL University on-line Program HERE 
    • NIOSH LODD Reports
      • Each year an average of 105 fire fighters die in the line of duty. To address this continuing national occupational fatality problem, NIOSH conducts independent investigations of fire fighter line of duty deaths. The dedicated web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other fire fighter safety resources.
      • NIOSH Web Page HERE
      • Through the Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, NIOSH conducts investigations of fire fighter line-of-duty deaths to formulate recommendations for preventing future deaths and injuries. The program does not seek to determine fault or place blame on fire departments or individual fire fighters, but to learn from these tragic events and prevent future similar events.
      • Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Reports, HERE
      • NIOSH Alert: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters using Risk Management Principles at Structure Fires
        • Fire fighters are often killed or injured when fighting fires in abandoned, vacant, and unoccupied structures.
        • These structures pose additional and sometimes unique risks due to the potential for fire fighters to encounter unexpected and unsafe building conditions such as dilapidation, decay, damage from previous fires and vandals, and other factors such as uncertain occupancy status. Risk management principles must be applied at all structure fires to ensure the appropriate strategy and tactics are used based on the fireground conditions encountered.
        • Report HERE
        • NIOSH Report; Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire Damaged Floors
          • Fire fighters are at risk of falling through fire-damaged floors. Fire burning underneath floors can significantly degrade the floor system with little indication to fire fighters working above.
          • Floors can fail within minutes of fire exposure, and new construction technology such as engineered wood floor joists may fail sooner than traditional construction methods.
          • NIOSH recommends that fire fighters use extreme caution when entering any structure that may have fire burning beneath the floor.
          • Report HERE
          • NIOSH ALERT: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures
            • Fire fighters may be injured and killed when fire-damaged roof and floor truss systems collapse, sometimes without warning.
            • The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) requests assistance in preventing injuries and deaths of fire fighters due to roof and floor truss collapse during fire-fighting operations. Roof and floor truss system collapses in buildings that are on fire cannot be predicted and may occur without warning.
            • NIOSH recommends that fire departments review their occupational safety programs and standard operating procedures to ensure they include safe work practices in and around structures that contain trusses. Building owners should follow proper building codes and consider posting building construction information outside a building to advise fire fighters of the conditions they may encounter.
            • ALERT Report HERE
            • National Near Miss Reporting System (NNMRS) Operating Experience
              • The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is a voluntary, confidential, non-punitive and secure reporting system with the goal of improving fire fighter safety.
              • Submitted reports will be reviewed by fire service professionals. Identifying descriptions are removed to protect your identity. The report is then posted on this web site for other fire fighters to use as a learning tool.
              • National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System Web Site, HERE
              • Search Reports, HERE
              • Resources, HERE
              • Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report-Remembrance and Learning’s HERE
                • Resources and Report
                • LODD Report Fact Sheet (23.9kb)
                • LODD Investigative Report (9.16 mb)
                • LODD Report Presentation (6.65 mb)
                • LODD Report Basic House Model (Section 1) (1.87 mb)
                • LODD Report Fire Model (Section 3) (5.16 mb)
                • LODD Flashover Chart (60 kb)
                • Prince William County (VA) Fire and Rescue Web Site, HERE
                • NIOSH LODD REPORT: Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire – Virginia, HERE
                • NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments
                  • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
                  • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
                  • Reference Data HERE
                  • Colerain Township Eleven Minutes to Mayday; What You Need to Know HERE
                    • Colerain Township Department of Fire and Emergency Medical Services, Web Site HERE
                    • Investigation Analysis of the Squirrels nest Lane Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths April, 2010 Full Report HERE
                    • NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2008-09| CDC/NIOSH July, 2009, Report HERE
                    • WLTW.com news report Summary HERE
                    • Charleston Sofa Super Store Fire; Final NIST Report
                    • Analytical Study Reveals Patterns in U.S Firefighter Fatalities Report 
                      • The entire report is available at a nominal fee, HERE; 
                      • Journal Reference: 
    1. Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith, David M. DeJoy. Line-of-duty deaths among U.S. firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2011; 43 (3): 1171 DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2010.12.030

     

    Training Drill Template

    This Training Schedule Template utilizes a Three Hour, Thirty minute (3.5) Hour Format integrating Suggested basic Functional Area Topics as a lead-in introduction that can be interchanged based on local needs and incorporates two (2) primary modules of the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS). Please note you can select any modules determined to be of local need or interests. An optional Weekend Session is attached for FGS Chapter 3 and 4 Module Deliveries and a Hands-on Field Exercise Component.

    Go HERE for the Color PDF Format

    Safety Week 2011: Surviving the Fire Ground-Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

    Functional Area 3.5 Hour Schedule with FGS Modules

    Time

    Hour Functional Area Key Issues and Considerations

    Reference and Links

    00:30 1 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives Procedures, Policies and Guides
    • Discuss and facilitate discussion on organizational

     

    • Review key SOPs & SOGs related to Fire Ground Operations culture and safety

     

    • How does Safety Week 2001 fit into your operational environment?

     

    • Agency Mission Statement
    • Overview & Explanation: View | Download 
    • Initiative 1: CultureView | Download 
    • Initiatives 1 – 4View | Download 
    • Initiatives 5 – 8View | Download 
    • Initiatives 9 – 12View | Download 
    • Initiatives 13 – 16View | Download
    • Agency SOPs, SOGs, Policies
    • Agency Expectations
    • Company Expectations or Gaps
    • What defines your level of preparedness?
    00:30 Building Construction
    • Discuss pertinent issues relate to Building Construction that is present in your area

     

    00:30          

     

    2

    Review FGS Chapter 1; Preventing the Mayday  Modules 1-1 thru 1-4
    • Mayday Prevention
    • Pre-Planning
    • Building Construction
    • UL Structural Stability
    • LT Wt. Truss Systems
    • Overhead Hazards

     

    00:30 Review FGS Chapter 1;  Preventing the Mayday Modules 1-5 thru 1-8Continued
    • Mayday Prevention
    • Pre-Planning
    • Building Construction
    • UL Structural Stability
    • LODD Reports
    • Interior Size up
    • Reading Smoke
    • Air Management
    • Defensive Operations
    • Situational
    • Awareness
    • Rapid Heat Release
    • Fire Suppression OPS
    • NIST Fire Modeling

     

    00:30 3 Review FGS Chapter 2;Mayday Ready Modules 2-1 thru 2-3
    • Preparing for the Mayday
    • Are You Ready?
    • Mayday Training
    • Personal safety Equipment
    • Tools & Equipment
    • Mission Critical Resources

     

    00:30 Review FGS Chapter 2;Mayday Ready Modules 2-4 thru 2-5Continued
    • Three Point Communications
    • Role of Dispatch
    • Personal Radio Position
    • Communications Training
    • Radio Discipline
    • Comm Order Model
    • Portable Radios
    • Why “Mayday?”
    • Accountability

     

    00:30 4 Wrap-up and Closing Discussions
    • Facilitate discussion on the presentations
    • Are there any identified gaps or identified areas for improvement?
    • How will the information presented be implemented during future shifts or operations?
    • What level of individual and/or company level accountability can be implemented?
    • How can the organization become safer and effective to minimize and reduce risk to mayday events to improve fire ground survivability?
    • Agency Specific and/or developed or;
    • Utilize  resources from the Functional Matrix
     
    00:00  
    •  
    •  
     

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011, Day Six; From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack-Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety

    3 comments

    Fire Service Tradition and The Brotherhood

    For those of you that follow or have attended one of my many seminar and lecture program offerings, one program seems very pertinent in both context and content on this, the Sixth Day of Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011 that resonates around the theme and focus of Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

    “From Waldbaum’s to Hackensack-Worcester to Charleston; Legacies for Operational Safety”; in most cases, any discussion of these four landmark incidents in the fire service leads directly to a rich discussion and dialog on a myriad of facets, aspects and issues characteristic of the incidents; the time, the place, the circumstances, the names and faces, the deployment, the operations, the challenges and the tragic outcomes.

    The legacies of these iconic events as well as so many others of national prominence and impact; and others with lesser national significance, but having far reaching implications, impacts and power on the regional and local levels continue to shine in the remembrance, honor and memory of those impacted by those events and incidents.

    I still find it astonishing during my lecture travels around the country lecturing and presenting these programs on building construction and fireground operations, that when those in attendance were posed with a simple question; “What do the Walbaum’s Fire and Hackensack fire share in common?”, the response at times was less than stellar, or at best difficult to solicit let alone convey the commonalities.

    The more seasoned and experienced veterans (translation; older firefighters) when present, were able to convey some information on the subject – Some, with a firm and reflected understanding of the question and its ramifications, others not so much. But yet, the true essence of the basic incident particulars and the lessons learned in most cases failed to be fully conveyed. It’s sad to state but; we are not remembering the past!

    History Repeating Events-Integrate into your Training

     

    Are the fire service legacies of the past and the lessons learned from those incidents and the sacrifices that were made transcending time? Or are they lost in the immediacy of day to day challenges, issues and operations.

    Or are these events, lessons and operations issues dismissed and disregarded as a result of their “time and place” not being relevant to “today’s” operations and modern fire service advancements or lack the relevancy to local organizations, operations, make-up and risks. Is it just a “Big City” issue or is it a failure to comprehend the commonality of the event parameters and distill those lessons learned and operations into the essence that is formulative of all of our organizations and operations?

    Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness, has a multitude of facets, features and functional elements. I spoke of some of these commonalities in a previous post this week on Day Two (HERE).

    I’ve spoken on numerous occasions about History Repeating Events (HRE), and the common themes related to fire fighter line-of-duty deaths, close-calls, near-misses, maydays and incident operations that had less than desirable outcomes or performance.

    These History Repeating Events and incidents on a wide variation of scale, outcome and operations have common issues, apparent and contributing causes and operational factors that share legacy issues that the fire service at times fails to identify, relate to and implement. In other words, (we) fail a times to learn from the past or we make a deliberate choice to ignore those lessons and the apparent similarities and prevailing fireground indicators due to other internal or external influences, pressures, authority, beliefs, values or viewpoints.

    What are we Learning? What are we Applying?

    We make choices and we determine our direction, path and destiny. Officers, Commanders, Companies fail to connect with situational factors, parallels and signs that have the full potential to direct the incident towards favorable or disastrous conclusions.  The Job isn’t as fatalistic as we sometimes make it out to be.

    The prevailing topical areas being addressed this year during Safety week have focused on the mayday component of an incident operation and have included:

    • Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
    • Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
    • Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
    • Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
    • Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

    There’s ample opportunity this week or in the weeks ahead to do some insightful research or cull some information on the four legacy events we discussed earlier;

    • FDNY Waldbaum’s Fire (1978) HERE and HERE
    • Hackensack (NJ) Auto Dealership Fire (1988) HERE and HERE
    • Worcester (MA) Cold Storage Fire (1999) HERE and HERE
    • Charleston (SC) Sofa Super Store (2007) HERE and HERE

    These have tremendous Legacies for Operational Safety, lessons and a wealth of applications for Safety Week and for training, dialog, discussions, tabletops, skillsets and drill activities throughout the entire year.

    Integrate the lessons from these as well as other legacies and HRE into your Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness; training and deliveries. The reality is, we, the present generation of veteran firefighters and officers have the profound obligation and responsibility to recognize the importance of passing along the lessons of the past as well as integrating and playing forward the lessons of our life’s journey throughout our fire service careers; the events of our day and the profound tough lessons and sacrifices learned the hard way. Understand and embrace the shared responsibilities, accountability and requirements that contribute towards Surviving the Fire Ground.

    We sometimes need a receptive, sympathetic and compassionate audience that is willing to listen, hear and comprehend the messages conveyed. There needs to be a high degree of empathy related to these past History Repeating Events, the legacies of national, regional and local level prominence. For each event, each and every line of duty death, close-call, near-miss and mayday event has a message and a Legacy of Operational Safety.

    Make the time to research, learn and understand the factors of these events, the lessons and opportunities that are borne from each and how they relate to the theme, message and initiatives that make up Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week and beyond.

    Here’s a great Resource from FDNY’s 2011 Safety Initiatives,  SurvivingtheFireground_SafetyWeek2011(2)_0

    Prepare for the When, not the IF

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011: Day Five: Near-Misses, Maydays and Floor Collapses

    1 comment

    Do you know what's underneath you as you're making entry?

    During the last quarter of 2010 and leading well into the second quarter of 2011 there has been a significant emerging trend developing in basement fires, compromised floor systems and assemblies leading to collapse and numerous near-miss events, close calls and unfortunatly, line of duty deaths during fire operations.

    If you’ve been paying attention to the various news and on the job reports these past number of months, you may have noticed the increasing numbers of emerging trend evident in near miss, close-calls resulting in maydays, RIT deployments and self-rescue resulting from floor compromise and floor collapse. The double line of duty deaths of two San Francisco (CA) Fire fighers while operating in a Terraced (Hillside construction) residential occupancy while operating below the base level diaphragm (upper street level access). (HERE)

    In December 2010,  I was doing some research and posting links related to the first one or two events on Buildingsonfire on Facebook, HERE, it became evident at the time that there was an immediate opportunity to get some learning’s and insights out. If you have a chance head over to Facebook and link into Buildingsonfire and check out the incident links posted as well as some immediate report links. (Demember 2010 time frame)

    In a coincidential posting on July 28, 2010, I posted on CommandSafety.com an interesting incident that I came across while preparing for a new post related to a near-miss event that occured in which a Camp Taylor (KY) firefighter survived a floor collapse that momentarily trapped him proximal to the seat of a working basement fire. Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long sustained second and third degree leg burns after falling through the floor of the burning home and subsequently being rescue by other fire department personnel after calling a mayday.

    This event has all the ingrediants the the 2011 Safety Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground and managing the Mayday. Little did I know that later, in February 2011, while participating in the National FireFighter Near-Miss Reporting System Stakeholders meeting in California, would I have the chance to hear Captain Long’s story first hand, and then also have the opportunity to have him as a guest, sharing his story live on the Taking it to the Streets Radio program in February. (HERE)

    Camp Taylor (FD) Captain Michael Long’s near-miss and story of survival resonates with this year’s theme of  Surviving the Fire Ground- Firefighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness and Managing the Mayday and provides an opportunity to focus on the event in this, Day Five of the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Surival Week activities. The details of Captain Long’s story can be found on the National FireFighter Near Miss Reporting System web site (HERE) as well as in the June 2011 issue of Fire Engineering Magazine titled, Floor Collapse: A Survivors Story. Let me state upfront also the Captain Michael Long will be presenting the accounts of his near miss event and the lessons-learned at IAFC Fire-Rescue International Conference in Atlanta in August (HERE).

     On July 25, 2010, Captain Michael Long of the Camp Taylor (Ky.) Fire Protection District fell through the floor of a house during a four-alarm fire and suffered severe burn injuries. On Aug. 30, 2010, Capt. Long submitted a near-miss report based on this event. The National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System is an anonymous and confidential reporting system; however, Capt. Long wanted to have his name associated with this report so that others would understand the value of sharing near-miss events. What follows is an excerpt from his report and excerpts from a recent phone interview. To read his full report, including an extensive lessons learned section, search by report number for report #10-1072 on the Search Reports page of www.firefighternearmiss.com.

      

    Near Miss Report Event #2010-1072

      

     “I made sure my crew was ready to enter, sounded the floor for stability and then crossedover the threshold, entering the structure. When I was approximately 5 feet inside the structure, I felt the floor start to give way. I turned toward the front door to try to bail out, and at the same time yelled at others to get out, when the floor system collapsed. This was no ordinary collapse. More than two-thirds of the first floor collapsed simultaneously. The living room, dining room, kitchen, bathroom and foyer all fell at once. “When the collapse happened, I was the only one who fell into the basement, right into the heart of the fire. All I could see around me were flames.

    I could not see the hole that I had fallen through. I could not see my fellow firefighters above me. All I could see was fire. I began to try to find something to use to climb back up with. Since I did not know what type of collapse had occurred, I just started clawing away at anything as I was trying to climb. During this time, my legs were burning.

    Fire was burning up between my boots and my bunker pants. The pain was intense. My deputy chief was trying to put a line on me for protection, but the fire was extremely intense. He was lying on the porch with fire shooting out over his head. He stated he could occasionally see the top of my helmet and the reflective stripes on my coat sleeves.

    By a bit of luck, a roof ladder was laying in the front yard that had just been taken off the roof after the completion of a ventilation operation.

    My deputy chief directed the crew to put the ladder into the hole for my escape. “By this time, I was burned on my legs and struggling with exhaustion and the intense heat. I was screaming both from pain and due to fear. I could hear screaming coming from above, butwas unable to make out the majority of it. I finally heard the word “ladder” and then felt something across my back. Once they got the ladder into the basement, I had to get around to it. I still could not see anything but fire, so this was all by feel. As I started up the ladder, I got two rungs up, reached for the third rung, and lost my grip and fell back into the basement landing on my back. I was so exhausted that I started making my peace with God that this was where I was going to die.

    For the full excerpt from Captain Long’s near miss report go to the NFF Near Miss Reporting Site and Resource Link, HERE

      

    Captain Long

    Incident Lessons Learned from Captain Long:

    • Train as if it is real. Train, train, train, and then train some more. Take advantage of every opportunity to train. The better we are trained, the less our chance of injury. The training must be physically and mentally. Crews must focus on more hands-on scenario-based training that allows for problem solving. If crews are taught that the outcome to every scenario is static, they are not being encouraged to think. Every run is different; no single solution applies to every situation. Adaptations or decisions that are not in step with changing conditions can actually be disadvantageous. We must make the right decisions based on the correct interpretation of the environment and blend those observations with our knowledge, skills, and abilities to map a course of action that will lead us to a successful outcome. Read reality and come up with the best possible plan. In my situation, quick thinking and adapting to the problem that presented itself saved my life.
    • Mutual-aid training is a must. We must train more with our neighboring departments to improve operations. It is occasionally difficult to work in situations where you do not really know with whom you will be working or where the command structure and tactics differ from those of your department. We all learn from the same book; however, the interpretations and tactics differ from person to person and department to department. I am not saying anyone is right or wrong in the way they do things—we all just need to do a better job of understanding that there is more than one way to get the job done.
      We cannot know exactly how everyone on an emergency scene will perform because each person has a different interpretation of his surroundings and role in the system. Standard operating guidelines (SOGs) can assist in this area, but SOGs rely on perceptions and interpretations by individuals to be implemented as intended. Accidents often happen because everyone has a unique perspective on the environment, and each makes different decisions based on their perception.
      We must perceive the environment correctly to ensure we make the right move. If these actions are not communicated and coordinated in the intricate system that is the fireground, accidents will be the inevitable and regrettable results. Training and frequent reviewing of SOGs are vital to our safety.
    • Risk assessment. Sounding the floor prior to entry is not always a good indicator of the floor’s stability. Less than two minutes before I made entry, there were three other firefighters, at least the same weight as I, in the same area where the collapse occurred. Everything changed in a very short time. There was no warning. Adkins told me at the hospital that all he heard was a “whoosh” sound when the floor collapsed. Then I disappeared. Within two minutes, the floor assembly went from being able to sustain a live load of at least 900 pounds in that area (accounting for gear, equipment, SCBA, and so on) to collapsing with about a 300-pound load, and I was close to a load-bearing wall. A good way to evaluate risk vs. gain is to get the most accurate report on burn time as possible to help determine structural integrity.
    • Rapid intervention. RIT is a critical fireground benchmark and is very important for safety, but it would have been ineffective in this situation. Had my crew not reacted the way they did immediately, I would not have been able to last long enough to wait for the RIT. In the time it would have taken for the RIT to gear up, come up with a plan, and enter, I would have died. The stars aligned in my favor that night. The person calling the Mayday or a nearby crew often mitigates personnel emergencies. My crew was able to act decisively at the correct time, and I am alive because of it. It is important to remember that a large percentage of Maydays are mitigated by the crew to which the lost firefighter is assigned or a nearby crew. RIT deployments account for a small number of rescues; we must always be alert and ready for the “incident within the incident.”
    • Manage your emotional response. From a personal standpoint, you must rely on your training and try not to panic. Know your equipment and procedures well. I did panic, but I was still able to keep myself together enough to know not to leave the area since I had been told that the stairs had burned away. Keeping my SCBA on, resisting the emotional reaction to remove my mask because of claustrophobia, was a huge factor in my survival. If I had tried to find another way out, my crew could not have gotten to me with the ladder. Had I removed my mask, the story would have ended quite differently. When I teach, I try to train as if it is the real thing. Never take a run for granted. Always expect the worst; you will be better prepared to deal with the unexpected.
      If we continually study accident reports and learn from them, the likelihood of being surprised will be diminished. Peter Leschak writes in Ghosts of the Fireground: ”In fire and other emergency operations, you must not only tolerate uncertainty; you must savor it, or you won’t last long. The most efficient preparation is a general mental, physical, and professional readiness nurtured over years of training and experience. You live to live. Preparing is itself an activity, and action is preparation.”
    • Talk about it. Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) is important for ensuring that personnel from all departments on scene are taken care of emotionally. CISD needs to extend beyond just one or two briefings. Personnel involved in a highly emotional event must be given the opportunity to speak to a trained CISD team member early and be given as much time as is needed to work through their issue. Some firefighters have a macho attitude and try to deal with their emotions on their own, or maybe they don’t deal with them at all. Others self-medicate with alcohol or, worse, these difficult emotional events are allowed to fester with no relief. People should be accepting of those who deal with issues up front and tell their stories. Telling these stories makes us better and helps to keep us safe. This reduces the possibility of “snapping” because you have too much pent-up emotion.
      My fellow firefighters are still affected by this event, even those who were not there. Department personnel must be open-minded and receptive to the fact that emotional events will affect your performance and your personal life and that it is acceptable to be open and deal with them. When difficult emotional situations present themselves, members should attempt to deal with them as soon as possible.
    • Know what is possible and what is not. Know the experience level of your crew. Going into a bad situation with a crew that may not have exposure to a lot of different situations or that you aren’t that familiar with could make operations more difficult. I had everything from a 30-year veteran to a one-year recruit, so the experience level was all across the board. I knew that the situation we were going into was getting worse and required quick action, so I took the lead to ensure that the operation would be completed as quickly as possible. I knew my deputy chief would be watching us to ensure things were proceeding safely. I knew my crew could get the job done; however, this was an operation that is not often practiced and I wanted to make sure it was done correctly. I will not send my crew into an area that I am not comfortable going into. The more you train and the more people you can train with, the better you will understand your capabilities.

     Listen or download the special interview I had with Captain Mike Long as well as

    Taking it to the Streets Radio Program and Interview with Capt. Long

     

    Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

    Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

    Podcast: Play in new window | Download

    The progam was taped from the Live Broadcast on March 16th at 9pm EST

    Taking it to the Streets: Near Miss Reporting and One Captain’s Close Call

    On Your Street, In Your City, Across the Country, Around the WorldTM

    The direct show link is here

    The line-up of Program guests included, Lt. Steve Mormino, FDNY (ret), Captain CJ Haberkorn Denver (CO) Fire Department and Special Guest Captain Michael Long, Camp Taylor (KY) Fire Protection District.

    Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special two part, two hour program with Taking it to the Streets on Firefighernetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the National Near-Miss Reporting System and the untapped resources that the program and system provides with Christopher Naum and this outstanding group of fire service leaders. The second part of the program will dedicated to the personal account of Captain Long’s Close Call event from July 25, 2010 (NMR #10-1072) when a catastrophic floor collapse at a residential occupancy plunged him into a fire involved basement.

    Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

    • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
    • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE  

    Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

    Taking it to the StreetsTM, is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production, in affiliation with the Command Institute

     

    National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System’s Support for the 2011 Safety Week

    Don’t forget to go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System for  number of exceptional training aids, resources, PPT and more. NFFNMRS, HERE

    Here are some of the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System Produced 2011 Safety Week Products

     
    File Title File Size File Description
  • Presentation: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Presentation: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
  • Presentation: Fire Fighter Expectations of Command
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about fire fighter expectations of command.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Skills
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival skills at a mayday.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival procedures.
  • Grouped Report: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Grouped Report: Self Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A grouped report about self survival procedures
  • Grouped Report: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems

    In the meantime here are some links I pulled together that you should take the time to read and share with your companies, personnel and staff…..

    This seems like a good time to have a ten minute drill on these events as Operating Experience (OE) on floor systems and operational safety, calling or commanding the mayday.

     Or take some time to visit the The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS)site which has the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.  (Day One: Are you ready, HERE)

    • For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

    Self-Survival Procedures

    FGS Online Program Chapter 3
    To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
    When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:

    • First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
    • Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
    • If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
    • Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
    • Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
    • Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall. 

    Self-Survival Skills

    FGS Online Program Chapter 4

    Disentanglement Maneuvers

    Fires inside an enclosed structure create a mess for fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters often encounter debris that has fallen off shelves, and ceiling and wall fixtures that have burned and are left hanging to the floor. These hazards, coupled with the mess a fire fighter creates when searching for victims in smoky environments, can create egress problems for a fire fighter.

    As fire burns draperies, blinds, lighting fixtures, computer wiring, and HVAC ducting, the possibility of encountering an entanglement hazard increases. The overhead ducting of the HVAC system contains wires that give the ducting its stability.

    If a fire breaches the ceiling and burns the ducting, the wires within the ducting fall to the floor. These wires can cause a dangerous entanglement hazard to fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters must anticipate these hazards and have a plan to follow when egress is cut off.

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters

    Fire Fighter Expectations of Command

    FGS Online Program Chapter 5
    A discussion of what command must communicate to the distressed fire fighter, dispatch, the RIT group supervisor and all others assigned to the incident to assure a successful rescue.

    Here are Some Mission Critical Reference Links for Operational Insights and Operating Experience (OE) to support Your Training and Operational Needs not only this week, but through the entire year.

     

    Here are some Safety Considerations related to Residential Occupancies (non-inclusive) for Operations at Basement Fires that will support fireground operational safety:

    • Conduct a thorough fire size-up and communicate the findings to all personnel on-scene before entering the building.
    • Conduct an assessment of the Building Profile ( building construction type, structural assembly systems and features and age) and assesss fire behavior and intensity levels.
    • Ensure an adequte Risk Assessement is conducted and that Risk versus Gain is determined
    • Maintain situational awareness throughout the tactical deployment of crews within the interior of the structure
    • Conduct a 360 degree perimeter assesement when feasible to determine access and egress points, fire location and travel and other mission critical operational perameters.
    • Incident commanders and company officers should be trained and experienced in structure fire size up to avoid putting fire fighters at unneeded risk of working above fire-damaged floors.
    • Do not enter a structure, room, or area when fire is suspected to be directly beneath the floor or area where fire fighters would be operating, or if the location of the fire is unknown.
    • Never assume structural safety of any floor (regardless of the construction) having a significant fire under it.
    • Conduct pre-incident planning inspections during the construction phase to identify the type of floor construction.
    • If pre-planning is not conducted, assume residential construction and small commercial buildings built since the early 1990s may contain engineered wood I-joists.
    • Report construction deficiencies noted during preplanning to local building code officials. For example, engineered wood floor joists should only be modified per manufacturer specifications—usually limited to cutting to length and removing pre–cut knockouts for utility access. Report damaged or cut chords or webs to building officials.
    • Develop, enforce, and follow standard operating procedures (SOPs) on how to size up and combat fires safely in buildings of all construction types. Rapid intervention teams (RIT) should include a portable ladder with their RIT equipment when deployed at basement fires.
    • Ensure Time Compression is considered: Ensure Command has the ability to monitor progress or elapsed incident time and adjusts strategic and tactical plans accordingly and in a time effective manner. 
    • Provide training on identifying signs of weakened floor systems (soft or spongy feel, heat transmitted through floor, downward bowing, etc.).
    • Make fire fighters aware that all floor types can fail with little or no warning.
    • Use a thermal imaging camera to help locate fires burning below or within floor systems, but recognize that the camera cannot be relied upon to assess the strength or safety of the floor. (Refer to the recent UL Test Data and Operational Safety Considerations ”Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions” available at http://www.uluniversity.us/ )
    • Fire fighters should be trained on the use of thermal imaging cameras, including limitations and difficulties in detecting fire burning below floor systems. (See reference to UL above)
    • Immediately evacuate and, if possible, use alternate exit routes when floor systems directly beneath the floor where fire fighters would be operating are weakened by fire.
    • Use defensive overhaul procedures after fire extinguishment in structures containing fire-damaged floor systems of all types.
    • Consider becoming active in the building code process and influence requirements for fire resistance of floor and ceiling systems to further fire fighter safety and health.
    • Ensure RIT personnel area staged and have complete a site assessment of the building and occupany upon thier arrival and set-up
    • Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment

    Here’s some screen shots from Buildingsonfire on Facebook. Go HERE or follow the link at the left column. Join the growing list of over 3900 fans with Buildingsonfire on Facebook and Buildingsonfire.com

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Four -The New Fire Ground

    4 comments

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Four -The New Fire Ground    

     

    There is an immediate need for today’s emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their foundation of knowledge and insights related to the modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to adjust and modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions.

    Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk, not occupancy type, and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire and building profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumptive fire behavior. It is not your old method of size-up and operational deployment.

    The dramatic changes in buildings and occupancies over the past ten years have resulted inadequate fire suppression methodologies based upon conventional practices that do not align with the manner in which we used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. These past presumptions, which many of us debated with our esteemed colleagues, are being validated through empirical data resulting from the cutting edge research and testing being conducted today by UL and NIST.

    Predicting Fire Behavior and Building Stability

    We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system and given an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions, we can safely and effectively mitigate a structural fire situation in any  given building type and occupancy.

    • Past operational experiences, both favorable and negative; gave us experiences that define and determine how the fireground is assessed, react and how we expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future; this formed the basis for the naturalistic decision-making process.

    Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built upon nine decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

    Are you aware of the defining changes in structural systems and support, the degree of compartmentation,

    • the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of the fire-loading package in today’s buildings and occupancies?
    • When was the last time you were out in the street with the companies, or spent some time doing a walk-through of construction or renovations site?
    • Have you asked you commanding officers, division or battalion chief or your company officers for insights into what operational demands and risks are being imposed upon them while operating in the street and within the buildings, occupancies and structures that comprise your jurisdiction?

    The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

    It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned command and company officer knows that at times. It’s what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances.

    However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective; aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal-oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed strategic processes that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

    The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

    Today’s incident commanders need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling, while implementing Tactical Patience.

    Think about the following;

    • Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
    • Take a tour of your response area, district, community or city.
    • Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that are affecting your incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
    • Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory
    • Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
    • Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type and align your operations and deployments to match those risks
    • Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling
    • Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of  conducting fire service operations
    • Think about Adaptive Fire Ground Management and Command Resiliency
    • Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going to do about that gap?

    If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures.

    This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations. You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at risk. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious.

    Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies … You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

    It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

      

    Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

    Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

    • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
    • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

     A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production

      

    Taking it to the Streets had its premier July 21st on Firefighter Netcast.com with a lively and provoking discussion on “What’s on YOUR Radar Screen?” The program theme aligned with a recent posting on the same topic. Joining me on the program were two prominent and nationally recognized fire service leaders, who I’m honored to have known for many years, Chief Billy Hayes and Chief Doug Cline; the program explored leading fire service issues affecting firefighter safety, training, credentialing and education; fireground operational variables related to the continuing changes in building construction, engineered systems and extreme fire behavior,  and the emerging need for “Tactical Patience” as I’ve been exploring the relationships towards the need for tactical enhancements to our current fire suppression theory and firefighting models.

    Conversations expanded on the NFFF/Everyone Goes Home Campaign and programs, the newest EGH initiatives on Behavioral Health and the successes achieved through the Courage to be Safe Programs and the Advocacy Program.

    The Premiere of Christopher Naum’s “Taking It to the Streets”

    Podcast: Play in new window | Download

    Taking it to the Streets premiered  on  Wednesday July 21st 9:00pm ET

    Download the Program HERE

    The New Fire Ground

    NIST Wind Driven Fire Study

    • Smoke and heat spreading through the corridors and the stairs of a building during a fire can limit building occupants’ ability to escape and can limit fire fighters’ ability to rescue them.  Changes in the building’s ventilation or presence of an external wind can increase the energy release of the fire.  This can also increase the spread of fire gases through the building.  In some cases, such as the Cook County Administration Building fire in October 2003, the fire gas flow, into the corridors and the stairway prevented fire fighters from suppressing the fire from inside the structure.  This fire resulted in 6 building occupant fatalities and fire fighter injuries in the stairway.  The Fire Department of New York City has experienced many wind driven fire incidents which have resulted in fire fighter fatalities and injuries, as have a number of other incidents nationally that have resulted in increased research into this operational and tactical challenge.
    • What tactics or tools are appropriate for use with a wind driven fire and how should the tactics or tools be implemented?  Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) is being used by fire departments on smaller structures, such as single family homes, to control the fire flow by introducing pressure from the front door and venting the house through a strategic exit opening.  If done correctly, this tactic can remove significant amounts of heat and smoke from the structure, thus improving the fire fighters’ working environment and improving the chances of survival for the building occupants.  NIST has completed several studies which have a two fold impact: 1) providing guidance on the safe use of PPV and 2) characterizing and validating the modeling of PPV with a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) computer model, so that the model can be used as a training tool for the fire service.
    • This project extends previous work for ventilation under wind driven conditions.  There are many questions regarding wind driven fires.  For example can these PPV fans be used successfully under wind driven fire conditions in large structures?  Large structures, such as high rise buildings, provide additional challenges to fire fighter and building occupant safety: increased travel distance (exposure time), more complicated egress path, and potentially larger fires.  In 2002 there were 7,300 reported fires in high rise structures.
    • Other tactics incorporating devices, such as wind control devices (WCD) to control the ventilation conditions or the use of a “high rise” nozzle from the floor below the fire floor have been tried by the fire service under “real fire” conditions with varying levels of success.
    • A comprehensive free DVD set from the NIST includes a presentation video that explains PPV, examines the results of NIST’s PPV research, and closes with a focus on the use of PPV tactics in high-rise buildings.  All of the NIST PPV reports referenced in the presentation are included on Disc 1 of the set.  All of the videos from the high-rise fire experiments are also provided with a user-friendly, graphic menu that can be used on a PC or a DVD player.  NIST, with support from USFA, DHS, and fire departments across the country, has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics in order to improve fire fighter safety
    • NIST References HERE and HERE

    NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments

    • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
    • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
    • Reference Data HERE

    NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments

    • The NIST Firefighter Safety and Deployment Study; Titled- Report on Residential Fireground Field Experiments was recently released to the public providing . A copy of the report is attached.
    • Report Abstract:
    • Service expectations placed on the fire service, including Emergency Medical Services (EMS), response to natural disasters, hazardous materials incidents, and acts of terrorism, have steadily increased. However, local decision-makers are challenged to balance these community service expectations with finite resources without a solid technical foundation for evaluating the impact of staffing and deployment decisions on the safety of the public and firefighters. For the first time, this study investigates the effect of varying crew size, first apparatus arrival time, and response time on firefighter safety, overall task completion, and interior residential tenability using realistic residential fires.
    • This study is also unique because of the array of stakeholders and the caliber of technical experts involved. Additionally, the structure used in the field experiments included customized instrumentation; all related industry standards were followed; and robust research methods were used. The results and conclusions will directly inform the NPFA 1710 Technical Committee, who is responsible for developing consensus industry deployment standards.
    • This report presents the results of more than 60 laboratory and residential fireground experiments designed to quantify the effects of various fire department deployment configurations on the most common type of fire—a low hazard residential structure fire. For the fireground experiments, a 2,000 sq ft (186 m2), two-story residential structure was designed and built at the Montgomery County Public Safety Training Academy in Rockville, MD. Fire crews from Montgomery County, MD and Fairfax County.
    • Report results quantify the effectiveness of crew size, first-due engine arrival time, and apparatus arrival stagger on the duration and time to completion of the key 22 fireground tasks and the effect on occupant and firefighter safety.
    • The report is also available for download at the NIST, HERE
    • Synopsis HERE

    USFA/NIST Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse, 1979-2002

    • Between the years 1979 and 2002 there were over 180 firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse, not including those firefighters lost in 2001 in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. Structural collapse is an insidious problem within the fire fighting community. It often occurs without warning and can easily cause multiple fatalities.
    • As part of a larger research program to help reduce firefighter injuries and fatalities the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to examine records and determine if there were any trends and/or patterns that could be detected in firefighter fatalities due to structural collapse. If so, these trends could be brought immediately to the attention of training officers and incident commanders and investigated further to determine probable causes.
    • Report: Trends in Firefighter Fatalities Due to Structural Collapse1979-2002

    UL Fire Academy CBT

    • UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions
    • Base on the UL research and
    • This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
    • This online firefighter training course is the result of a research partnership among UL, the Chicago Fire Department, IAFC, and Michigan State University, funded in part by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This self-guided course, which focuses on the structural stability of engineered lumber under fire conditions, is targeted toward the 1.1 million fire service personnel in the United States and Canada. The knowledge developed and shared in this course is critically important to firefighter and civilian safety.
    • This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. This free on-line computer based presentation will allow fire professionals to better interpret fire hazards and assess risk for life safety of building occupants and firefighters.
    • Program Objectives:
    • Provide brief history of events leading up to DHS Grant tests
    • Identify the fire test hypothesis, parameters, and steps completed in the testing process
    • Compare tests results (legacy vs. modern construction)
    • Communicate learnings from our partners representing the fire service
    • Discuss code recommendations
    • UL University on-line Program HERE

    Fire Behavior 101; Taking it to the Streets

      

      

    Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

    For many of you that have been following my writings and perspectives on building construction, firefighting, command risk management and operational excellence for firefighter safety have long recognized that I have been promoting and advocating the fact the fireground is changing, our strategies and tactics demand change and does the demand for increased knowledge within the areas of building construction, fire dynamics, while integrating the art and science of firefighting. The most recent release of the testing report from Underwriters Laboratories; Impact of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction and the accompanying empirical data further validates assumptions and premises that many of us shared based upon field observations and first hand incident operations related to the dramatic changes being witnessed as a result of operational challenges in a wide variety of occupancies and building types.

    This material is a must read for all emerging and practicing company and command officers ( for starters) to being grasping the magnitude and extent of quantifiable data that supports the premise that combat fire engagement and suppression operations and the rules of engagement are going to change and that change is fast approaching.

    Here’s the executive summary of the report and findings from UL. For an download of the entire UL Report, go HERE.

    The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

    Under the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program, Underwriters Laboratories examined fire service ventilation practices as well as the impact of changes in modern house geometries.

    There has been a steady change in the residential fire environment over the past several decades. These changes include larger homes, more open floor plans and volumes and increased synthetic fuel loads. This series of experiments examine this change in fire behavior and the impact on firefighter ventilation tactics.

    This fire research project developed the empirical data that is needed to quantify the fire behavior associated with these scenarios and result in immediately developing the necessary firefighting ventilation practices to reduce firefighter death and injury.

    • Two houses were constructed in the large fire facility of Underwriters Laboratories in Northbrook, IL.
    • The first of two houses constructed was a one-story, 1200 ft2, 3 bedroom, 1 bathroom house with 8 total rooms.
    • The second house was a two-story 3200 ft2, 4 bedroom, and 2.5 bathroom house with 12 total rooms.
    • The second house featured a modern open floor plan, two story great room and open foyer.

     Fifteen experiments were conducted varying the ventilation locations and the number of ventilation openings. Ventilation scenarios included ventilating the front door only, opening the front door and a window near and remote from the seat of the fire, opening a window only and ventilating a higher opening in the two-story house.

    One scenario in each house was conducted in triplicate to examine repeatability. The results of these experiments provide knowledge for the fire service for them to examine their thought processes, standard operating procedures and training content. Several tactical considerations were developed utilizing the data from the experiments to provide specific examples of changes that can be adopted based on a departments current strategies and tactics.

    Room Flashover from Sofa Fire

     

    The tactical considerations addressed include:

    • Stages of fire development: The stages of fire development change when a fire becomes ventilation limited.
      • It is common with today’s fire environment to have a decay period prior to flashover which emphasizes the importance of ventilation
    • Forcing the front door is ventilation: Forcing entry has to be thought of as ventilation as well.
      •  
      • While forcing entry is necessary to fight the fire it must also trigger the thought that air is being fed to the fire and the clock is ticking before either the fire gets extinguished or it grows until an untenable condition exists jeopardizing the safety of everyone in the structure.
    • No smoke showing: A common event during the experiments was that once the fire became ventilation limited the smoke being forced out of the gaps of the houses greatly diminished or stopped all together.
      • No some showing during size-up should increase awareness of the potential conditions inside.
    • Coordination: If you add air to the fire and don’t apply water in the appropriate time frame the fire gets larger and safety decreases.
      • Examining the times to untenability gives the best case scenario of how coordinated the attack needs to be.
      • Taking the average time for every experiment from the time of ventilation to the time of the onset of firefighter untenability conditions yields 100 seconds for the one-story house and 200 seconds for the two-story house
      • In many of the experiments from the onset of firefighter untenability until flashover was less than 10 seconds.
      • These times should be treated as being very conservative. If a vent location already exists because the homeowner left a window or door open then the fire is going to respond faster to additional ventilation opening because the temperatures in the house are going to be higher.
      • Coordination of fire attack crew is essential for a positive outcome in today’s fire environment.
    • Smoke tunneling and rapid air movement through the front door: Once the front door is opened attention should be given to the flow through the front door.
      • A rapid in rush of air or a tunneling effect could indicate a ventilation limited fire.
    • Vent Enter Search (VES): During a VES operation, primary importance should be given to closing the door to the room.
      • This eliminates the impact of the open vent and increases tenability for potential occupants and firefighters while the smoke ventilates from the now isolated room.
    • Flow paths: Every new ventilation opening provides a new flow path to the fire and vice versa.
      • This could create very dangerous conditions when there is a ventilation limited fire.
    • Can you vent enough?: In the experiments where multiple ventilation locations were made it was not possible to create fuel limited fires.
      • The fire responded to all the additional air provided.
      • That means that even with a ventilation location open the fire is still ventilation limited and will respond just as fast or faster to any additional air.
      • It is more likely that the fire will respond faster because the already open ventilation location is allowing the fire to maintain a higher temperature than if everything was closed. In these cases rapid fire progression if highly probable and coordination of fire attack with ventilation is paramount.
    • Impact of shut door on occupant tenability and firefighter tenability: Conditions in every experiment for the closed bedroom remained tenable for temperature and oxygen concentration thresholds.
      • This means that the act of closing a door between the occupant and the fire or a firefighter and the fire can increase the chance of survivability.
      • During firefighter operations if a firefighter is searching ahead of a hoseline or becomes separated from his crew and conditions deteriorate then a good choice of actions would be to get in a room with a closed door until the fire is knocked down or escape out of the room’s window with more time provided by the closed door
    • Potential impact of open vent already on flashover time: All of these experiments were designed to examine the first ventilation actions by an arriving crew when there are no ventilation openings.
      • It is possible that the fire will fail a window prior to fire department arrival or that a door or window was left open by the occupant while exiting.
      • It is important to understand that an already open ventilation location is providing air to the fire, allowing it to sustain or grow.
    • Pushing fire: There were no temperature spikes in any of the rooms, especially the rooms adjacent to the fire room when water was applied from the outside. It appears that in most cases the fire was slowed down by the water application and that external water application had no negative impacts to occupant survivability.
      • While the fog stream “pushed” steam along the flow path there was no fire “pushed”.
    • No damage to surrounding rooms: Just as the fire triangle depicts, fire needs oxygen to burn.
      • A condition that existed in every experiment was that the fire (living room or family room) grew until oxygen was reduced below levels to sustain it.
      • This means that it decreased the oxygen in the entire house by lowering the oxygen in surrounding rooms and the more remote bedrooms until combustion was not possible.
      • In most cases surrounding rooms such as the dining room and kitchen had no fire in them even when the fire room was fully involved in flames and was ventilating out of the structure.

    Online Training Program

    In order to make the results of this study more user friendly for the fire service to examine, UL developed an online interactive training module that can be viewed by clicking here. The program includes a professionally narrated description of all of the experiments, their results and the tactical considerations. Experimental video is used and graphical data is explained in a way that brings science to the street level firefighter.

    UL University On-Line CBT

     

     

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

    5 comments

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Three-The New Rules of Engagement

     With so many changes (budget cuts, staffing reductions, reduced training, etc.) in so many fire departments, it is critical for fire fighters to focus on their own survival on the fire ground. There is no other call more challenging to fire ground operations than a Mayday call the unthinkable moment when a fire fighter’s personal safety is in imminent danger. Fire fighter fatality data compiled by the United States Fire Administration have shown that fire fighters becoming trapped and disoriented represent the largest portion of structural fire ground fatalities. The incidents in which fire fighters have lost their lives, or lived to tell about it, have a consistent theme inadequate situational awareness put them at risk.

    New Rules of Engagement

     Fire fighters don’t plan to be lost, disoriented, injured or trapped during a structure fire or emergency incident. But fires are unpredictable and volatile, and they will not always go according to plan. What a fire fighter knows about a fire before entering a blazing building may radically change within minutes once inside the structure. Smoke, low visibility, lack of oxygen, structural instability and an unpredictable fire ground can cause even the most seasoned fire fighter to be overwhelmed in an instant.

    It's Not a Matter of IF, It's a Matter of When

    It’s not a matter of IF the MAYDAY happens, it’s WHEN! Thius the reason for the 2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week focus on Surviving the Fire Ground Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

    Theme: Surviving the Fire Ground Fire Fighter, Fire Officer & Command Preparedness

    • IAFC Safety Week Resources: Firefighter Survival, HERE
    • National Fire Fighter Near Miss Reporting System Resources, HERE

    With that being said, there must be a means and a method to better defined and more accurately

    • Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.
    • Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.
    • There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
    • Refer to: Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety 
    • When we look at various buildings and occupancies, past operational experiences; those that were successful, and those that were not, give us experiences that define and determine how we access, react and expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future.
    • Naturalistic (or recognition-primed) decision-making forms much of this basis. We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system; in addition to having an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions.
    • Executing tactical plans based upon faulted or inaccurate strategic insights and indicators has proven to be a common apparent cause in numerous case studies, after action reports and LODD reports.
    • Our years of predictable fireground experience have ultimately embedded and clouded our ability to predict, assess, plan and implement incident action plans and ultimately deploy our companies-based upon the predictable performance expected of modern construction and especially those with engineered structural systems.
    • If you don’t fully understand how a building truly performs or reacts under fire conditions and the variables that can influence its stability and degradation, movement of fire and products of combustion and the resource requirements for fire suppression in terms of staffing, apparatus and required fire flows, then you will be functioning and operating in a reactionary manner, that is no longer acceptable within many of our modern building types, occupancies and structures.
    • This places higher risk to your personnel and lessens the likelihood for effective, efficient and safe operations.
    • You’re just not doing your job effectively and you’re at RISK. These risks can equate into insurmountable operational challenges and could lead to adverse incident outcomes. Someone could get hurt, someone could die, it’s that simple; it’s that obvious

     

    Original IAFC 2001 ROE

     

    • Combat Fire Suppression and Engagement has been dramatically influenced by numerous challenges in terms of effectiveness, methodologies, risk and operational capabilities….yet we implement strategic and tactical models and protocol predicated on past performance of building structures and occupancies and fire fighting successes….
    •  It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations
    • We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations.
    • These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.
    • 2009 was a significant and decisive year for the fire service in a number of ways….
    • Controversy, debate, argument; enlightenment, knowledge, insights, awareness, comprehension, understanding….
    • Which leads me to call this the emerging tactical renaissance….

     

    The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is committed to reducing firefighter fatalities and injuries. As part of that effort the nearly 1,000 member Safety, Health and Survival Section of the IAFC has developed the NEW  “Rules of Engagement of Structural Firefighting” to provide guidance to individual firefighters, and incident commanders, regarding risk and safety issues when operating on the fireground.

    The intent was to provide a set of “model procedures” for Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting to be made available by the IAFC to fire departments as a guide for their own standard operating procedure development.

    In August, 2008, following a year of discussion, the Section moved to develop a set of “Rules of Engagement for Structure Firefighting”.

    A project team was created consisting of Section members and representatives of other several other interested fire service organizations.

    These included the;

    • Fire Department Safety Officer Association (FDSOA),
    • the National Fallen Firefighter Foundation (NFFF),
    • the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC), the
    • National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and other organizations.
    • All draft material has also been shared with representatives of the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) who developed a joint IAFF/IAFC Fire Ground Survival Project”.

     Three Section members also participated in the IAFF project.

    The direction provided the project team by the Section leadership was to develop rules of engagement with the following conceptual points;

    • Rules should be a short, specific set of bullets
    • Rules should be easily taught and remembered
    • Rules should define critical risk issues
    • Rules should define “go” or “nogo” situations
    • A companion lesson plan/explanation section should be provided

    Early in development the Rules of Engagement, it was recognized that two separate rules were needed –one set for the firefighter, and another set for the incident commander.

    Thus, the two sets of Rules of Engagement were conceived and developed.

    Each set has several commonly shared bullets and objectives, but the explanations are described somewhat differently based on the level of responsibility (firefighter vs. incident commander).

    The 2010 Rules of Engagement reflects nearly two years of public comment and feedback from several presentations at fire service conferences, including the National Fallen Fire Fighters Safety Summit held at the National Fire Academy this past March 2010.

    The “Rules” was formally adopted by the IAFC Health, Safety and Survival Section at the Fire Rescue International Conference that was held in Chicago this past August 2010

    The project team was lead by Chief Gary Morris,

    Document Description

    Section One

    • includes introduction statements and background regarding the Rules of Engagement project.

    Section Two

    • acknowledges the Project team members and others that assisted in the project.

     Section Three

    • contains the individual “Bullets” for both the Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival as well as the Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety.

     Section Four

    • describes the objectives attached to each of the individual “bullets” for both set of Rules.

     Section Five

    • provides an introduction and overview of the lesson plans for the Rules of Engagement.

     Section Six

    • includes the lesson plan for the Rules of Engagement of Firefighter Survival.

     Section Seven

    • contains the lesson plans for the Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety.

     Section Eight

    • serves as appendixes and contains full investigation reports of several significant firefighter fatality incidents.

     The Need for Rules of Engagement

    • Firefighter safety must always be a priority for every fire chief and every member. Over the past three decades, the fire service has applied new technology, better protective clothing and equipment, implemented modern standard operating procedures, and improved training.
    • According to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data during this same period the fire service has experienced a 58 percent reduction in firefighter line of duty deaths. But, the country has also seen a paralleling 54 percent drop in the number of structural fires over the same period – thus, reducing firefighter exposure to risk.
    • With a continued annual average of more than 100 firefighter fatalities, the question remains; have we really made a difference with all these technology improvements? Or, is there more that we can do to improve the safety culture of the American fire service?
    • The U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study, conducted by Captain Willie Mora, San Antonio, Texas, Fire Department, conducted a review of 444 firefighter fireground deaths occurring over a recent 16 year period (1990-2006).
      • The project broke out traumatic firefighter fatalities occurring in “open structures” and “enclosed structures”. Open structures was defined as smaller structures with an adequate number of windows and doors (within a short distance) to allow for prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation.
      • Enclosed structures were defined as large buildings with inadequate windows or doors to allow prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation. Research determined that 23 percent occurred when a fast and aggressive interior attack was made on an “opened structure”. When fast, aggressive interior attacks occurred in “enclosed structures” the fatality rate rose to 77 percent. Many occurred in “marginal” or rapidly changing conditions in which the firefighter should not have been in the building.
    • The fireground creates a significant risk to firefighters and it is the responsibility of the incident commander and command organization officers to minimize firefighter exposure to unsafe conditions and stop unsafe practices.
    • The fire service has always been a para-military organization when it comes to fireground operations. In most cases, the Incident Commander makes a decision, sends the order down to through supervisors to the company officer and crew.
    • Fire crews generally view these orders as top down direction. There is often little two‐way discussion about options.
    • Where this culture exists, crews have been trained to accept the order and do it – generally without question.
    • While these orders may be viewed as valid when issued they may involve inadequate risk assessment.
    • There has been little national development of basic “rules” that the incident command should use in defining risk assessment process and what is too high risk that may result in a “no-go” decision.
    • Furthermore, for the individual firefighter who is exposed to the greatest risk, we have not defined “rules” for them to follow in assessing their individual risk and when and how to say “no” to unsafe conditions or practices. The “Rules of Engagement” changes that.
    • The “Rules of Engagement” have been developed to assist both the incident command (as well as command team officers) in risk assessment and “Go” – “No-Go” decisions. Applying the rules will make the fireground safer for all and reduce injuries and fatalities.

     

    The development of the rules integrated several nationally recognized programs and principles. They included risk assessment principles from NFPA Standards 1500 and 1561.

    Also included where concepts and principles from Crew Resource Management (available from iafc.org) and data and lessons from the National Near-Miss Reporting System (firefighternearmiss.com).

    The development process also included review of lessons learned from numerous firefighter fatality investigations conducted by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program.

    It’s incumbent that the fire chief and the Departments management team insure the safety of all firefighters working at structural fires.

    • All command organization officers are responsible for their own safety and the safety of all personnel working with them.
    • All officers and members are responsible are responsible for continually identifying and reporting unsafe conditions or practices.
    • The Rules of Engagement allows both the firefighter and the incident commander to apply and process these principles.
    • One principle applied in the Rules of Engagement is firefighters and the company officers are the members at most risk for injury or death.
    • The Rules integrate the firefighter into the risk assessment decision making process.
    • These members should be the ultimate decision maker as to whether it’s safe to proceed with assigned objectives.
    • The “Rules” allow a process for that decision to be made while still maintain command unity and discipline.

     

    Operational Excellence and the ROE

     

    The NEW Rules of Engagement

    It is well known that firefighting is hazardous with varying levels of risk to the firefighter.

    However, firefighting is not a military campaign where lives are lost to establish a beach head.

    No firefighter’s life is a building that eventually will be rebuilt. Keep all members safe so “Everyone Goes Home”!

    Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival

    • Size-Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.
    • Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
    • DO NOT Risk Your Life for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved.
    • Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
    • Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
    • Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together
    • Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions.
    • Constantly Monitor Fireground Communications for Critical Radio Reports.
    • You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
    • You Are Required to Abandon Your Position and Retreat Before Deteriorating Conditions Can Harm You.
    • Declare a May Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger. 

    The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety

    • Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Size‐Up of the Incident.
    • Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.
    • Conduct an Initial Risk Assessment and Implement a SAFE ACTION PLAN.
    • If You Do Not Have The Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
    • DO NOT Risk Firefighter Lives for Lives or Property That Can Not Be Saved – Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
    • Extend LIMITED Risk to Protect SAVABLE Property.
    • Extend Vigilant and Measured Risk to Protect and Rescue SAVABLE Lives.
    • Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Firefighters. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.
    • Maintain Frequent Two‐Way Communications and Keep Interior Crews Informed of Changing Conditions.
    • Obtain Frequent Progress Reports and Revise the Action Plan.
    • Ensure Accurate Accountability of All Firefighter Location and Status.
    • If, After Completing the Primary Search, Little or No Progress Towards Fire Control Has Been Achieved -Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy.
    • Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires
    • Always Have Firefighter Rehab Services in Place at All Working Fires

      

     
     
     

    ROE Fire Fighter

     

      

      

    ROE Command

     

    Other ROE Insights

    Size-Up Your Tactical Area of Operation.

    Objective:    To cause the company officer and firefighters to pause for a moment and look over their area of operation and evaluate their individual risk exposure and determine a safe approach to completing their assigned tactical objectives.

    Rapidly Conduct, or Obtain, a 360 Degree Situational Size Up of the Incident

    Objective:    To cause the incident commander to obtain an early 360 degree survey and risk assessment of the fireground in order to determine the safest approach to tactical operations as part the risk assessment and action plan development and before firefighters are placed at substantial risk.

    ______________________________________________________________________________

    Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.

    Objective: To cause the company officer and firefighter to consider fire conditions in relation to possible occupant survival of a rescue event as part of their initial and ongoing individual risk assessment and action plan development.

      

    Determine the Occupant Survival Profile.

    Objective: To cause the incident commander to consider fire conditions in relation to possible occupant survival of a rescue event before committing firefighters to high risk search and rescue operations as part of the initial and ongoing risk assessment and action plan development.

      

    Go in Together, Stay Together, Come Out Together

    Objective: To ensure that firefighters always enter a burning building as a team of two or more members and no firefighter is allowed to be alone at any time while entering, operating in or exiting a building. 

      

    Maintain Continuous Awareness of Your Air Supply, Situation, Location and Fire Conditions

    Objective: To cause all firefighters and company officers to maintain constant situational awareness their SCBA air supply and where they are in the building and all that is happening in their area of operations and elsewhere on the fireground that may affect their risk and safety.

    ______________________________________________________________________________

    You Are Required to Report Unsafe Practices or Conditions That Can Harm You. Stop, Evaluate, and Decide.

    Objective: To prevent company officers and firefighters from engaging in unsafe practices or exposure to unsafe conditions that can harm them and allowing any member to raise an alert about a safety concern without penalty and mandating the supervisor address the question to ensure safe operations.

      

    Act Upon Reported Unsafe Practices and Conditions That Can Harm Them. Stop, Evaluate and Decide.

    Objective: To prevent firefighters and supervisors from engaging in unsafe practices or exposure to unsafe conditions that will harm them and allowing any member to raise an alert about a safety concern without penalty and mandating the incident commander and command organization officers promptly address the question to insure safe operations. 

    ______________________________________________________________________________  

    Declare a May-Day As Soon As You THINK You Are in Danger

    Objective: To ensure the firefighter is comfortable with, and there is no delay in, declaring a May Day when a firefighter is faced with a life threatening situation and the May Day is declared as soon as they THINK they are in trouble.

      

    Always Have a Rapid Intervention Team in Place at All Working Fires.

    Objective: To cause the incident commander to have a rapid intervention team in place ready to rescue firefighters at all working fires.

    ______________________________________________________________________________

    Ensure Accurate Accountability of Every Firefighter Location and Status

    Objective: To cause the incident commander, and command organization officers, to maintain a constant and accurate accountability of the location and status of all firefighters within a small geographic area of accuracy within the hazard zone and aware of who is presently in or out of the building.

    If You Do Not Have the Resources to Safely Support and Protect Firefighters, Seriously Consider a Defensive Strategy

    Objective: To prevent the commitment of firefighters to high risk tactical objectives that cannot be accomplished safely due to inadequate resources on the scene.

    SOPs/SOGs

    Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting (pdf)

    Risk Management

    General Order: Two-In, Two-Out Compliance, Rapid Intervention Team, and Firefighter Survival

    Emergency Evacuation
    This policy identifies a standard system for the emergency evacuation of personnel at an emergency incident or training exercise.

    Fire and Rescue Departments of Northern Virginia – Rapid Intervention Team Command and Operational Procedures
    A collaborative RIT manual developed by fire and rescue departments in Northern Virginia. Promotes interoperability between multiple fire agencies.

    Lost or Trapped Firefighters
    This policy identifies the required actions for the search and rescue of lost or trapped firefighter(s).

    Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a Biological Threat
    Local and world events have placed the nation s emergency service at the forefront of homeland defense. The service must be aware that terrorists, both foreign and domestic, are continually testing the homeland defense system.

    Safety Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
    This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).

    Safety Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)
    This policy establishes the department s criteria and procedures for Rapid Intervention Teams.

      

    Operational Excellence in 2011 and Beyond

      

    Taking It To The Streets: My Closing Commentary and The Rules of Combat Fire Suppression  

    The essence of fire service suppression operations is predicated upon the deployment and application of water as an extinguishing agent, in sufficient quantities, location and duration to extinguish a fire within an enclosed structural compartment. The universal engine company correlation of: “putting the wet stuff on the red stuff” is fundamental to structural fire suppression operations but is ambiguous at best in the context of today’s modern building construction, occupancies, structural systems and building features. 

    We used to discern with a measured degree of predictability, how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions. Implementing fundamentals of firefighting and engine company operations built upon eight decades of time tested and experience proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

    The lack of appreciation and the understanding of correlating principles involving fire behavior, fuel and rate of heat release and the growth stages of compartment fires within a structural occupancy are the defining paths from which the fire service must reexamine engine company operations in order to identify with the predictability of occupancy performance during fire suppression operations thus increasing suppression effectiveness and firefighter safety.

    Our buildings have changed; the structural systems of support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of fire loading. The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

    The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed, but we have yet to write the rule book from which the new games plans must be derived…..

    However, we now have a new set of Rules for Engagement….

    • The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
    • Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival
    • Tactical Renaissance ……….Tactical Patience

    …….integrate cutting edge research and emerging concepts on Tactical Patience, Tactical Entertainment, Command Compression, Structural Anatomy of Buildings, Five Star Command Model, Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling and Integrating the RULES OF ENGAGEMENT for Structural Firefighting much more.  

    It’s really all about Fighting Fire with More Knowledge and smartly

      

     

    Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum

       

    Taking it to the StreetsTM, radio program hosted by highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer Christopher Naum, continues to provide provocative insights and dynamic discussions with leading national fire service leaders and guests on important issues affecting the American Fire Service with applications internationally within the tradition and brotherhood of the Fire Service.

     

    Taking it to the Streets “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement”

    Podcast: Play in new window | Download

    Share

    This is the netcast which was offered live on September 22, 2010. Taking it to the Streets “Tactical Renaissance and the Rules of Engagement” Chief Gary Morris (ret) Phoenix (AZ) Fire Department, and Dr. Burt Clark from the NFA join Chris Naum as they discuss the emerging Tactical Renaissance of Combat Fire Suppression Operations [...]

    Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by nationally renowned fire service leader Christopher Naum, a  36-year fire service veteran and highly regarded national instructor, author, lecturer and fire officer and  the distinguished leading  national authority on building construction and fire ground operations.  Taking it to the StreetsTM is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved 

    Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

    • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
    • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 
    • Buildingsonfire.com, HERE

      

    A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production

    Taking it to the StreetsTM  with Christopher Naum
     
     

    Listen to all of the Taking It To The Streets shows here

     On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com

    Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.

     

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

    7 comments

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two- Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

     

    Know Your World Buildingsonfire.com

    Other Considerations in Program Planning for Safety Week; Other considerations to support the theme, objectives and initiatives of Safety Week include wide latitude of activities and interactive actions that can achieve the goals for increasing awareness and providing dialog, interaction, training while encouraging discussion and interchange.

    These functional area topics can be integrated into planned program development to support the FGS training presentations, delivery and support a comprehensive strategy for integrated Fire Ground Survival training, awareness and insights. These functional areas are supported with references and links to support program develop and deliveries.

    Suggested Functional Areas for Alignment with the Theme and Focus during Safety Week;

    • 16 Fire Fighter Life Safety Initiatives

    • Rule of Engagement

    • Fire Fighter Near-Miss Learning‘s

    • Procedures, Policies and Guidelines

    • Pre-Fire Planning

    • Building Construction

    • Structural Systems

    • Occupancy Risk Profiling

    • Fire Dynamics & Fire Behavior

    • Reading Smoke

    • Survivability Profiling

    • Risk Management

    • Crew Resource Management

    • Situational Awareness

    • Disorientation Awareness

    • Structural Collapse & Compromise

    • Mayday & Rapid Intervention

    • Fire Ground Survival

    • Air Resource Management

    • Tactical Patience

    • Go to the Planning Resource Guide for Direct Resources, templates and suggested planning and instructional aids. HERE

    Suggested considerations include the following, as well as encouraging fire/EMS departments to identify and integrate local issues, needs and identified gaps or enhancements that can contribute towards operational excellence and safety integration.

    • Review and select a Near Miss Event Report from the National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System or the Report of the Week (ROTW) series related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.firefighternearmiss.com/
    • Review and select a NIOSH LODD Report from the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Program related to functional area topics or mayday actions and discuss the event in a small group or company setting to identify similarities or difference from your our organization. Is your company or department susceptible to a similar event? What should be addressed? http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/
    • Take out your Rapid Intervention Equipment and review the purpose and function of each piece of equipment. Identify and discuss alternative uses or tools that can be obtained or used in the event of unavailability, malfunction or additional resource needs. Discuss protocols, procedures, safety awareness and operational hazards, expectations and precautions. Inspection the equipment for operability and integrity.
    • Identify and select a recent departmental or local/regional incident event that was either a near-miss/close-call or transitioned into a mayday event. Discuss and facilitate dialog on lessons learned, gaps, enhancements or operational successes, achievements and positive elements. Identify any factors or elements that were presented in the FGS training series that are applicable to the event, strategies, tactics or operations: can anything be improved or enhanced?
    • Lead a discussion on how to call and initiate a Mayday. Discuss the factors and insights from FGS Program Chapter 3 Self-Survival Procedures and Chapter 4 Self-Survival Skills.
    • Select and lead a discussion on a pertinent incident case study from either the list provided or your own selection and discuss the relevancy of the event in terms of mayday operations, fire ground survival, incident outcome and relationship to your Department or agency. What is the relevancy, similarities or differences? Can this event or circumstances occur in your jurisdiction? What can be done to prevent a history repeating event (HRE)?
    • Review and discuss Roles and Responsibilities for mayday events and operations. How do they match up with your operating procedures, policies and expectations?
    • Develop and facilitate a table top exercise (TTE) on a mayday event scenario utilizing a building in your first-due or response jurisdiction. Take photographs and integrate into your program. Refer to example of a simple TTE attached or go to Fire Fighternation.com for an example here; http://www.firefighternation.com/forum/topics/box-2752reported-fire-in-an
    • Visit a residential or commercial construction site (with pre-arrival authorization and approvals) and tour the stage of construction, looking critically at the type of construction and structural systems being implemented, materials used, workmanship and signs of deficient or adverse conditions that may affect operational integrity, safety or collapse and compromise once the building is occupied.
      • Discuss issues such as structural integrity, collapse risk, occupancy risk versus occupancy type considerations, avenues for fire travel, effects on fire load package and rate of heat release and projected fire intensity.
      • How would you fire a fire in the occupancy? What will define the strategy and tactics that would be or should be selected and used?
    • In a controlled setting with or without PPE, Practice calling a mayday with the identified communication attributes defined in the FGS training program. Critique and practice the evolution until the group feels that it is acceptable.

    Understand your Response District

     

    “Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety”, Know Your District and its Risk

    Protect Yourself: Your Safety, Health and Survival Are Your Responsibility.

     Within the focus area of Survival and the elements of Structural Size-Up and Situational Awareness, some suggeted key functional components could include the following;

    • Keep apprised of different types of building materials and construction used in your community.
    • The operative question today is this: “What do you “really” know about the buildings in your district?”
    • As you drive about your response district today, coming back from an alarm, heading to the firehouse tonight or running errands around your community, take a good look around. Ask your self a simple question; “How well do you know the buildings, structures and occupancies in your response jurisdiction?”
    • Be honest, do you really understand how those “older residential” structures were built and understand how fire travels and impacts your fireground operations?
    • Are your aware of the newest features of engineered structural support systems being constructed within that new set of homes going up in your second-due area?
    • Are you aware, that vacant office building is being converted into a light manufacturing and assembly business?
    • How about those unoccupied store fronts and businesses that have recently closed up due to the tough economic times…. any special hazards or operational concerns to your company should you get a dispatch to respond?
    • Have the senior members of your station or department shared their stories of operations and incidents at various buildings around your district or community?
    • Did you listen to them, or were you quick to dismiss those “old war stories”. There’s a wealth of “pre-planning’ nuggets hidden in those stories. Take the time to listen, remember or postulate
    • Take a good look around….think about any given building, the one across the street that you’re looking at while you waited for the traffic light to change; Think about a fire in that same building.
    • Do you really understand how it will truly perform under combat structural fire conditions?
    • What’s the building’s collapse profile?
    • How much operational time will you have? Will you need?
    • What’s the fire load package size?
    • What are your concerns for rapid fire extension, extreme fire behavior and vent path issues that amy affect firefighter safety?
    • What dynamic risk assessment factors will you have to deal with?
    • How safe is it for you to engage in interior operations upon your arrival?
    • How can this building, its occupancy and structural system hurt, my team, my company, my firefighters, my department, me?

    Sometimes things aren’t as obvious as them seem. You may have responded and operated at numerous incidents at a wide variety of buildings in your response area, or very few; some routine, others maybe more demanding…the question remains, “What do you really know about your buildings?” Your life may one day depend on what you actually do know or recollect. Take a good look around.

    Pre-Incident planning is formulative to any effective fire service organization. A good staring point is to look at the NFPA 1620 Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning document. ( NFPA Codes and Standards, HERE)

    The purpose of the NFPA 1620 Recommended Practice for Pre-Incident Planning document is to aid in the development of a pre-incident plan to help responding personnel effectively manage emergencies with available resources and should not be confused with fire inspections, which monitor code compliance.

    The Pre-Incident Plan document is developed by gathering general and detailed data used by responding emergency service personnel to determine the necessary resources and actions necessary to mitigate anticipated emergencies at a specific facility, structure or occupancy.The Pre-Incident Plan document can contain a variety of useful information related to the construction features and systems, building materials and components, occupancy, layout and floor plan, access/egress, built-in protective, detection and suppression systems, special hazards, fire loading, fire suppression flow needs, pre-determined resource needs, exposure factors, etc.The Pre-Incident Plan document can be as simple or detailed as occupancy and/or operational factors dictate.

    The import issue here is that you HAVE Pre-Incident Plan documents available for at the very least targeted or high hazard occupancies and buildings, and that they have been updated at some periodic frequency. There’s nothing worst that arriving at a particular box alarm, pulling open the pre-fire “binder” and finding the occupancy was last planned twenty years ago at best.

    The 2007 Deutsche Bank Building fire in lower Manhattan, New York City that resulted in the LODD of FDNY Fr. Joseph Graffagnino and Fr. Robert Beddia, stressed the need for timely and accurate pre-incident plans, when a seven alarm fire progressed through the 40 story high-rise building that was in the process of being deconstructed.An informative Training PDF download is attached that provides Operational Safety Considerations at Demolition and Deconstruction sites.

    The full power-point version is available for direct download HERE.

    Think about your Buildings and Occupancies and correlate your incident operations using an effect acronym called BECOME SAFE.

    Our world has evolved and changed. There are a variety of technological and sociological demands that create a continuing element of change in the built environment and our infrastructure. With these changes and demands come the requirements to assess these vulnerabilities, hazards, threats and dangers with effective and dynamic risk management and competent command and control.

    These changes influence the way we do business in the street, the interface-up close and personal with the buildings in your community and equate to the risks and hazards you and your personnel will be confronted with and the level of safety afforded them during incident operations. Dynamic Risk and Command Management and the integration of BECOME SAFE concepts, ingredients for safer operations.

    • Building
    • Evaluation
    • Construction/Occupancy
    • Operational Hazards
    • Manage Time and Elements
    • Engagement
    • Situational Awareness
    • Assessment and Risk Analysis
    • Fire Behavior and Effects
    • Evaluate and Execute

    BECOME SAFE Buildingsonfire.com

     

    With the advancements in technology, software and programs, there is a vast extent of options and financial levels available to all organizations to develop publish and revise pre-incident planning documents. The key safety message here is that Pre-Fire Plans and Incident Plans can provide a significant margin of support to you during incident operations and can increase firefighter safety, reduce operational risk and aid in the risk management and command management of a give incident.

    Regardless of your agency and respond district size, complexity of simplicity, Pre-Incident Plans are a necessary part of modern firefighting and all-hazards operations. An informative planning flow chart is available within the NFPA 1620 document, Figure 4.2.3. ( Order the NFPA 1620 document through the NFPA (HERE)

    • Attached is a copy of the Tempe, AZ Fire Department Pre-Incident Planning SOP
    • The Phoenix, AZ Fire Department Pre-Incident Planning SOP is available HERE
    • An informative Pre-Fire Planning article by Battalion Chief Michael Lee is available HERE

    Spend time touring through construction sites as you monitor the progress of a building or occupancy going up.

    Look at the manner in which structural support systems are fabricated and assembled. Observe the types of materials that are being used and how they are assembled to form rooms and compartments within the structure.

    Take a good look at the manner in which floor and roof systems are constructed, these will become mission critical informational items that can be used to determine your operational profile and formulate your incident action plans. Keep abreast of changes, renovations and alternations to buildings and structures, especially as commercial and business occupancies change owners. These are special areas of concerns on wide latitude of safety and operational considerations.

    With the continued challenges in these economic times, pay very close attention to the state of your vacant and unoccupied structures. A change in strategic and tactical deployment considerations MUST be instituted; it shouldn’t be business as usual in these structures.

    • Keep apprised of different types of building materials and construction used in your community.
    • Document those conditions and aspects and train your personnel to understand the occupancies within your community.
    • Understand the Structural AnatomyTM of your buildings and occupancies.
    • The operative response to the opening question this time next year will be this: “What do you “really” know about the buildings in your district?” …The answer will hopefully be…”A lot!”

    Are you keeping up the latest construction terminology, materials and methods? Changes are you are not. But I can assure you, somewhere in your community, jurisdiciton, first, second or third-due or mutual aid area; there is new construction features, systems, components and materials being used that will affect the manner you which a structural fire will need to be addressed; The Rules of Structural Fire Suppression have changed- but know has told you…yet.

    Of the many issues affecting the Fire Service, the prevailing challenge that has a pronounced impact on operational safety is the assimilation of engineered structural systems (ESS) into mainstream building design and construction. The presence of engineered structural systems (ESS) are no longer considered to be an innocuous feature in a given building or occupancy; it is the predominate feature in nearly all current construction, renovation and adaptive reuse or infill applications. It has become far more than just concerning ourselves with the presence of a simple light-weight or “engineered” truss roof system or a wood I-beam  floor assembly.

    There is a new lexicon of building construction components and systems that must be added to your operational safety vocabulary and incident action plans. There is a new terminology, applications and a knowledge base to learn that will support operational excellence and support the integrity of incident safety performance of companies and personnel. Do you know what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence an incident?

    Take a tour of your local construction sites; You’ll be surprised what you’ll see

    The fire service continues to apply the term “light weight construction” to a wide variety of building construction and systems. This expression has become a miss-application of both term and the correlation of risk and severity related to operational profiling. In other words, we apply and express the use of “light weight construction” for all types of engineered components, systems, designs and assemblies in nearly all types of building construction and occupancy use.

    Although the roots of the term can be traced back to the early 1980′s, and its application to the (then) emerging use of trussed roofing systems and the advent of wood I-beam floor supports (sans solid dimensional lumber joists), the use of the terminology in today’s context of risk assessment, strategic and tactical management and deployment models and within the context of incident operational tactics is no longer applicable, valid or suitable. It must be expanded into a more specific and descriptive level of classification and correlation.

    For the most part, when discussing buildings and occupancies, aside from classifications related to code type or class as an element of fire resistance; the emphasis has been to differentiate between conventional and engineered construction, and the application of the term “light weight construction”. I continue advocating and promoting through my lectures that it’s much more than this when looking at the spectrum of construction and the structural anatomy of buildings. Current and past generations of buildings, construction and occupancies can be more accurately differentiated and classified within six (6) expanding categories in the following Building Construction Systems;

    • Heritage:              Pre-1900
    •  Legacy:                1900-1949
    • Conventional:      1950-1979
    • Engineered:         1980-current 2011
    • Blended Hybrid:  2005- current 2011

             
    We’ll discuss these six classifications in greater details in a series of future postings and expand the level of details on the CommandSafety.com and Buildingsonfire.com sites.

    Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past “conventional” construction, therefore risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address the advancement of new rules of combat structural fire engagement. But if you don’t understand or know what and how those changes in predictability have occurred, you may be operating with a false sense of operational risk and safety margin.

    It’s a Lot More than just talking about “Light Weight” Construction….

    • From Plywood-CDX….to
    • Particle Board- PB…..to;
    • Orient Strand Board-OSB
    • Structural Composite Lumber- SCL
    • Laminate Strand Lumber- LSL
    • Laminate Veneer Lumber-LVL
    • Structural Insulated Panels-SIP
    • Parallel Strand Lumber-PSL
    • Machine Stress Rated Lumber- MSR
    • Medium Density Fiberboard-MDF and MDL (Lumber)
    • Finger Jointed Lumber-FJL
    • Adhesives…..
    • Do some research and check these terms out for starters.
    • We’ll talk more about these components and assemblies in the near future. So get busyover the next few days during Safety Week and discover the implications these components may have in your community….

    New Materials, New Construction; New Problems

    Here’s a link to a past informative posting related to engineered systems and their relationship to firefighter safety and operations, HERE.

    There’s some great contributed information and manufacturer “insights” on the subject engineered wood I-joists and beams and firefighter safety. There are some interesting statistical extrapolations, correlations and conveniences’ that attempt to make the case. But then again, You be the judge.

    Take at look at the presentation developed by the American Forest and Paper Association, HERE and HERE.
     
    If you haven’t done so yet, don’t forget to check out the free online training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions at the UL University developed and provided by Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL),  HERE and   Tactical Patience and the New Considerations of Ventilation on Fire Behavior in Legacy and Contemporary Residential Construction

    Here’s a series of other important Reference Links that provide some insights on operational safety, incident conditions and factors and the lessons-learned from a number of LODD events;  

    • NIOSH Publication No. 2009-114: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors HERE
    •  NIOSH Publication No. 2005-132: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters Due to Truss System Failures HERE
    • Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE
    • First-floor collapse during residential basement fire claims the life of two fire fighters (career and volunteer) and injures a career fire fighter captain – New York, Report HERE
    • Career Fire Fighter Dies After Falling Through the Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence – Ohio, HERE
    • Colerain Township, Ohio Double LODD Preliminary Report, HERE
    • Career engineer dies and fire fighter injured after falling through floor while conducting a primary search at a residential structure fire – Wisconsin, HERE
    • NFPA Report on Light Weight Construction, HERE
    • Informative USFA Coffee Break series postings related to Building Types & Fire Resistance:  HERE. HEREHERE, HERE, and HERE

     Just Look Over your Shoulder….

    I’ve commented with more than a few postings on the issues related to engineer building construction components and assemblies. I posed some questions related to Engineered Structural Assemblies & Systems (ESS) and asked if you knew what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence incident operations.

    I also presented some information on the pioneering efforts and quantitative results of the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) engineers and fire service representatives from the Chicago Fire Department, HERE and HERE.

    If you’ve spent any amount of time reading through the NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, LODD Reports or have invested time and effort to look through the data base of near miss reports and ROTW at the National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System, you’d recognize the magnitude of the issues and multi-faceted challenges confronting the U.S. Fire Services in the areas of engineered structural assemblies, components and building features.

    Paul Comb’s editorial image provides a poignant and distressing reality that the fire service needs to come to terms with, addressing and implementing the necessary components that assimilating refined combat firefighting techniques and methodologies; that align with the risks and hazards presented by current and emerging construction techniques, materials and consumer lifestyles that comprise our buildings and occupancies. We need to start looking over our shoulders; we need redefined strategies and tactics for today’s buildings and occupancies. When we do have the opportunity to engage in firefighting with the dragon; we may not recognize the dragon has changed, it has evolved. Yet we stand poised to engage or take-on the dragon with faulted incident operations, strategic plans and tactical intentions that provide less than adequate results.

    In those situations where we are deficient or we achieved less than expected results, we continue to miss the apparent or root causes and fall back on perceived notions and excuses. Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety; Understanding today’s building construction, fire dynamics, fire loading and behaviors and instituting appropriate firefighting methodologies, we can achieve safe and successful fireground operations.

    Better Look Over your Shoulder

     

    •   Have you and your company, battalion or department discussed limiting factors, enhanced firefighting tactics or operational experiences related to engineered systems, past fires, observed new construction or renovations and what it all means to your assigned duties or company assignments?
    • Are you and your company adequately trained to address “modern” construction, occupancies and conditions or is a much bigger dragon lurking in the shadows?

     Remember, the Predictability of Performance and the combat firefighting based upon Occupancy Risk not Occupany Type.

      

    Remember its Occupancy RISK not Occupancy TYPE

     

    Here’s the New Formula for Fire Fighter Safety ; Bk = f2S; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

     

    STOP THE ENTERTAINMENT

    There’s another factor contributing to unsafe practices, one that we rarely talk about. In short, we need to stop “entertaining” ourselves during fire suppression operations and instead focus on comprehending and reacting to evolving risks. Rather than practicing appropriate risk management, it is suggested that some individuals employ adverse behaviors that occur on a tactical level while Incident Commanders and Company Officers believe firefighters are completing their assigned tasks, thus compromising accountability.

    These behaviors include;

    Tactical amusement: engaging in any practice or tactic during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk for the sake of entertainment. 

    Tactical diversion: diverting from an assignment while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations in such a way that places personnel at risk.

    Tactical circumvention: deliberately “getting around” an assignment or disregarding risk assessment and incident action plans.

      

    Here’s the expanded versions in case this is the first time you’ve seen them;

    TACTICAL AMUSEMENT*tak-ti-kəl ə- *myüz-mənt

    1: of or relating to structural fireground tactics: as a (1) a means of amusing or entertaining during fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk

    2: the condition of being amused while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations that places personnel at risk

    3: pleasurable diversion while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operations: entertainment; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL DIVERSION*tak-ti-kəl də- *vər-zhən

    1: the reckless act or an instance of diverting from an assignment, task, operation or activity while engaging in fire suppression, support tasks or operation for the sake of amusing or entertainment; that places personnel at risk

    2: the reckless act of self determined task operations that diverts or amuses from defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

    TACTICAL CIRCUMVENTION*tak-ti-kəl sər-kəm- *ven(t)-shən

    1: to deliberately manage to get around especially by ingenuity or approach that diverts for the purpose of amusing; assignment, operations or tasks that countermand or disregard defined risk assessment and incident action plans; that places personnel at risk

      

    TACTICAL PATIENCE (NEW) This is a new one that’s called Tactical Patience…I’ll post more on Tactical Patience  later this month.

    If we’re going to reduce firefighter injuries and deaths, we must be doing the right thing, at the right time, for the right reasons, and in the right place. We must stop the entertainment.

    ” The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures.

    The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change.

    Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities.

    It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations.

    Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments, while maintaining the values and tradition that defines the fire service.”

      

     

    Remember one thing…Don’t ever under estimate what you might encounter on any structure fire, or what might change in a second;  focus on the Occupancy Risk not the Occupancy Type….. And Know your buildings, your team and your capabilities

     

     

    Remembering FDNY Black Sunday…Multiple Firefighter LODDs January 23, 2005

     

    Chicago: Anatomy of a Building and its Collapse

     

    Anatomy of a Building and Its Collapse

     

    Buildingsonfire.com

    Buildingsonfire.com

    If you have not had a chance to look over the emerging website, Buildingsonfire.com…take some time to explore…its still under construction, with a wealth of information, research and data today’s Firefighter, Company Officer and command Officer need to know.

    The authoritative and informational site that provides leading insights on fire service issues related to Building Construction for the Fire Service,  Firefighting Operations and Command Risk Management for Operational Excellence and Firefighter Safety. 

    •  Buildingsonfire.com Link HERE

    • Buildingsonfire.com coupled with it’s companion sites CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyofficer.com will continue to provide prominent and timely information to support the continuing traditions and missions of the Fire and Emergency Services. 

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health & Survival Week 2011: Day One- Are You Ready?

    8 comments
    Fire/EMS Safety Week 2011

    Fire/EMS Safety Week: Day One

     Today is Day One of Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011.

     The previous week leading up to today has brought with it two significant incidents; one in Illinois, the other in Indiana, both involving structure fires and combat fire engagement, both  different types of occupacies with assocated risks; both having structural collapse- both fireground operations leading to fire service line of duty deaths. ( Indiana, HERE and Illinois, HERE )

    During this past week we also solemnly remembered three events, The Hotel Vendome Collapse in Boston, MA (1972), The Father’s Day Fire, FDNY (2001) and the Super Store Fire in Charleston, SC (2007) Here and Here

    The International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) and the International Association of Fire Fighters(IAFF) were formative in developing this year’s  2011 Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week (also known as Safety Week)which commences today, June 19th and ends on June 25th. ( Week of June 19-25, 2011)

    The message this year is: Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness

    Safety, Health and Survival Week (Safety Week) is a collaborative program sponsored by the IAFC and the IAFF, coordinated by the IAFC’s Safety, Health and Survival Section and the IAFF’s Division of Occupational Health, Safety and Medicine, in partnership with more than 20 national fire and emergency service organizations.

    Fire departments are encouraged to suspend all non-emergency activity during Safety Week and instead focus entirely on survival training and education until all shifts and personnel have taken part. An entire week is provided to ensure each shift and duty crew can spend one day focusing on these critical issues.

    With so many changes (budget cuts, staffing reductions, reduced training, etc.) in so many fire departments, it is critical for fire fighters to focus on their own survival on the fire ground. There is no other call more challenging to fire ground operations than a MAYDAY call — the unthinkable moment when a fire fighter’s personal safety is in imminent danger.

    Fire fighter fatality data compiled by the United States Fire Administration have shown that fire fighters “becoming trapped and disoriented represent the largest portion of structural fire ground fatalities.” The incidents in which fire fighters have lost their lives, or lived to tell about it, have a consistent theme — inadequate situational awareness put them at risk.

    Fire fighters don’t plan to be lost, disoriented, injured or trapped during a structure fire or emergency incident. But fires are unpredictable and volatile, and an unpredictable fire ground can cause even the most seasoned fire fighter to be overwhelmed in an instant.

    This year’s Safety Week focuses on delivering the online IAFF Fire Ground Survival (FGS) awareness training course to all fire departments.

    The program is the most comprehensive survival skills and MAYDAY prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Additional planning tools and resources will be available on the Safety Week website.

    The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.

    • For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

    The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday.

    Topics covered include:

    • Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
    • Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
    • Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
    • Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
    • Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

    Keep watching the website and the IAFC’s Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn pages for continuing updates to this year’s program and planning resources.

    If you’re still in need of resources, visit the SHS Section’s website for more information on health and safety issues and the IAFF’s Health, Safety and Medicine’s website for more information on health, wellness and safety programs.

    Don’t forget to go to the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System for  number of exceptional training aids, resources, PPT and more. NFFNMRS, HERE

    Here are some of the National Firefighter Near Miss Reporting System Produced 2011 Safety Week Products

     
    File Title File Size File Description
  • Presentation: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Presentation: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems
  • Presentation: Fire Fighter Expectations of Command
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about fire fighter expectations of command.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Skills
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival skills at a mayday.
  • Presentation: Self-Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A powerpoint presentation about self survival procedures.
  • Grouped Report: Preventing The Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about situational awareness, planning, size-up, and defensive operations
  • Grouped Report: Self Survival Procedures
  • 176 KB A grouped report about self survival procedures
  • Grouped Report: Being Ready for the Mayday
  • 176 KB A grouped report about personal safety equipment, communications, and accountability systems

    Look for a continuing comprehensive series of articles, activities, insights, downloads, podcasts, video clips and resources that will be posted each day this week during Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week here on Commandsafety.com, Thecompanyofficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com.

    We hope to be offering a special live show on Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com and blogtalkradio later this week pending some last minute logists addressing key issues with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders. Stay tuned to anouncements and postings for the date and time . This will be an exceptional opportunity to listen in, call in and participate actively in the week’ theme of Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

      

    Download the Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries

    2011 Planning and Resource Aid for Training Deliveries (pdf, 1.8 mb)

    IAFC Safety Week , Direct Link, HERE

    Preventing the Mayday

    FGS Online Program Chapter 1
    Between 1997 and 2008 NIOSH investigations reported that 25 fire fighters died in unprotected light-weight truss collapse events related to roof or basement truss system failures. A total of 11 injuries also occurred in these fatalities. Additionally, between 2005 and 2006, the National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System reported 20 near-misses related to unprotected light-weight truss systems. Considering the Near-Miss Reporting System is relatively new, and it is a self-reporting system, it is likely there are far more near-miss incidents occurring than presently indicated.

    Construction-Related Considerations

    The NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters due to Truss System Failures provides information on roof collapses in structures containing truss systems and includes case studies where fire fighters have become trapped and were injured or killed.

    UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions

    Reading Smoke

    Fire fighters must be able to recognize the dangers associated with the smoke conditions when en route, upon arrival, and during fire fighting operations. Missing signs indicative of flash over, smoke explosions, backdraft, or rapid fire development has proven deadly to fire fighters in the past. The ability to read smoke correctly will prevent a Mayday situation from occurring.

    Being Ready for the Mayday

    FGS Online Program Chapter 2
    Understanding what safety equipment is required and what fire fighter tools are necessary for readiness, accountability system functionality and dispatch responsibilities.

    Radio Communications Training

    Having a radio assigned to each person is not enough. Fire fighters must be trained in using the radio to request resources and, most importantly, to call a Mayday.
    In 2003, NIOSH issued a firefighter radio report detailing the challenges surrounding fire ground communications. Although the report is several years old, many of these same issues are still challenging the North American fire service. Under the topic of “Inadequate Training” it states: “Though firefighters receive hundreds of hours of training on emergency response, radio communications do not typically receive the same amount of attention. As such, firefighters may not be aware of proper radio usage. Examples include how to use the radio in general, how to use the radio while wearing SCBA, and how radio communications are affected by a Mayday event” (pages 17-18).USFA Voice Radio Communications Guide for the Fire Service 

    Self-Survival Procedures

    FGS Online Program Chapter 3
    To improve survivability in a Mayday situation, a fire fighter must know how to alert rescuers to his or her location and perform self-survival techniques. Through the study of fire fighter fatalities, NIOSH has identified specific actions fire fighters can take to help save themselves. Variations of this same NIOSH recommendation have appeared in numerous fire fighter fatality reports. These recommendations were used to create a self survival procedure that is easy to remember using a mnemonic (GRAB LIVES). Following these steps increases the likelihood of the rescuers finding and assisting the fire fighter to safety.
    When a fire captain died when trapped by partial roof collapse in a vacant house fire in Texas, NIOSH recommended in report number F2005-09 that trapped fire fighters should:

    • First, transmit a distress signal while they still have the capability and sufficient air.
    • Next, manually activate their PASS device. To conserve air while waiting to be rescued, try to stay calm and avoid unnecessary physical activity.
    • If not in immediate danger, remain in one place to help rescuers locate them.
    • Survey their surroundings to get their bearings and determine potential escape routes.
    • Stay in radio contact with the IC and other rescuers.
    • Attract attention by maximizing the sound of their PASS device (e.g., by pointing it in an open direction); pointing their flashlight toward the ceiling or moving it around; and using a tool to make tapping noises on the floor or wall. 

    Self-Survival Skills

    FGS Online Program Chapter 4

    Disentanglement Maneuvers

    Fires inside an enclosed structure create a mess for fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters often encounter debris that has fallen off shelves, and ceiling and wall fixtures that have burned and are left hanging to the floor. These hazards, coupled with the mess a fire fighter creates when searching for victims in smoky environments, can create egress problems for a fire fighter.

    As fire burns draperies, blinds, lighting fixtures, computer wiring, and HVAC ducting, the possibility of encountering an entanglement hazard increases. The overhead ducting of the HVAC system contains wires that give the ducting its stability.

    If a fire breaches the ceiling and burns the ducting, the wires within the ducting fall to the floor. These wires can cause a dangerous entanglement hazard to fire fighters operating on the floor. Fire fighters must anticipate these hazards and have a plan to follow when egress is cut off.

    NIOSH Alert: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters

    Fire Fighter Expectations of Command

    FGS Online Program Chapter 5
    A discussion of what command must communicate to the distressed fire fighter, dispatch, the RIT group supervisor and all others assigned to the incident to assure a successful rescue.

    Near-Miss

    National Fire Fighter Near-Miss Reporting System
    This program aims to turn near-miss experiences into lessons learned.

    • 2011 Safety Week Near-Miss Resources

    SOPs/SOGs

    Rules of Engagement for Structural Firefighting (pdf)

    Risk Management

    General Order: Two-In, Two-Out Compliance, Rapid Intervention Team, and Firefighter Survival

    Emergency Evacuation
    This policy identifies a standard system for the emergency evacuation of personnel at an emergency incident or training exercise.

    Fire and Rescue Departments of Northern Virginia – Rapid Intervention Team Command and Operational Procedures
    A collaborative RIT manual developed by fire and rescue departments in Northern Virginia. Promotes interoperability between multiple fire agencies.

    Lost or Trapped Firefighters
    This policy identifies the required actions for the search and rescue of lost or trapped firefighter(s).

    Model Procedures for Responding to a Package with Suspicion of a Biological Threat
    Local and world events have placed the nation’s emergency service at the forefront of homeland defense. The service must be aware that terrorists, both foreign and domestic, are continually testing the homeland defense system.

    Safety – Initial Rapid Intervention Crew (IRIC)
    This policy establishes procedures for ensuring the highest level of safety when conducting interior operations in an atmosphere that is Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH).

    Safety – Rapid Intervention Team (RIT)
    This policy establishes the department’s criteria and procedures for Rapid Intervention Teams.

    Accident Reports

    Firefighter Fatality Report – Southwest Supermarket, Phoenix, AZ
    PFD full report on the LODD of Firefighter Brett Tarver. Report contains extensive analysis of fire ground operations, may-day and lessons learned.

    NFPA Fire Investigation Report of 1995 Pittsburgh Fire
    This report describes the investigation of a fire which killed three firefighters in 1995.

    NIOSH LOD Report
    This report recounts a residential basement fire that claimed the life of a career lieutenant in Pennsylvania.

    Training & Drill Topics

    Technical Rescue resources

    Analysis of Structural Firefighter Fatality Database (pdf)

    Hazelton Firefighter caught in Flashover
    PowerPoint presentation

    Firefighter Survival Training

    Rapid Intervention Crew Standard Operating Guidelines
    Provided by the Town of Menasha Fire Department

    Standardized Actions of a Lost/Disoriented Firefighter

    Understanding Fireground LODDS
    A fresh perspective on an old problem.

    General Resources

    Observing Firefighter Performance (pdf)

    Emergency Radio Protocol

    “Everybody Goes Home” Campaign: Sticker use memo

    EveryoneGoesHome.com
    Several applicable resources to assist you in your Stand Down planning.

    50 Ways to Save Your Brother (or Sister)
    Provided by the South Milwaukee Fire Department.

    Fire Chief Magazine article – “No more maydays”
    Disorientation Prevention Article

    National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
    This web page provides access to NIOSH investigation reports and other firefighter safety resources.

    The Incident Commander’s Response to a “May-Day” Lost Firefighter Incident
    A check list of items to consider when handling a may-day incident, provided by Chief Gary Morris, Scottsdale, AZ.

    U.S. Firefighter Disorientation Study (1979-2001)
    This study was conducted in an effort to stop firefighter fatalities caused by smoke inhalation, burns, and traumatic injuries attributable to disorientation. It focused on 17 incidents occurring between 1979 and 2001 in which disorientation played a major part in 23 firefighter fatalities.

    USFA – Firefighter Fatality Retrospective Study (1990-2000)
    This report identifies trends in mortality and examines relationships among data elements on firefighter fatalites between 1990-2000.

      

      

      

    Keep this week In Perspective 

    Take a look at these videos and the messages conveyed….

    Are YOU getting it, is Your Company, Your Officers, Your Commanders, Your Firefighters? …..

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     


     

    When was the last time you looked at the Initiatives?

    1. Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.
    2. Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.
    3. Focus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.
    4. All firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.
    5. Develop and implement national standards for training, qualifications, and certification (including regular recertification) that are equally applicable to all firefighters based on the duties they are expected to perform.
    6. Develop and implement national medical and physical fitness standards that are equally applicable to all firefighters, based on the duties they are expected to perform.
    7. Create a national research agenda and data collection system that relates to the initiatives.
    8. Utilize available technology wherever it can produce higher levels of health and safety.
    9. Thoroughly investigate all firefighter fatalities, injuries, and near misses.
    10. Grant programs should support the implementation of safe practices and/or mandate safe practices as an eligibility requirement.
    11. National standards for emergency response policies and procedures should be developed and championed.
    12. National protocols for response to violent incidents should be developed and championed.
    13. Firefighters and their families must have access to counseling and psychological support.
    14. Public education must receive more resources and be championed as a critical fire and life safety program.
    15. Advocacy must be strengthened for the enforcement of codes and the installation of home fire sprinklers.
    16. Safety must be a primary consideration in the design of apparatus and equipment.

    The Following links From the NFFF/Everyone Goes Home web site, HERE

    Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Resources

    16 Intiatives Overview & Explanation

    Watch Media Resources:

    » Overview & Explanation: View | Download
    » Initiative 1: CultureView | Download
    » Initiatives 1 – 4View | Download
    » Initiatives 5 – 8View | Download
    » Initiatives 9 – 12View | Download
    » Initiatives 13 – 16View | Download

    Related Resources:
    » 16 Initiatives in Español
    » Power Point Presentations: Part 1 | Part 2
    » Resolution: Home Fire Sprinklers (Initiative 15)

    In Print:
    » 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Handout
    » 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives Poster
    » Everyone Goes Home® Bookmark

    For Your Computer:
    » 16 Initiatives Desktop Wallpaper

     It is NOT too late to set plans into motion for Safety, Health and Survival Week 2011…..You have ALL week and the rest of the year…..

    The Consciences Observer or Activist
    The operative question going forward will be this: What will you personally commit to for Safety, Health and Survival week, or what will your department choose to do; participate in, contribute, join in, share, lead, promote, instruct, present, facilitate, help, assist, aid, or neglect, disregard, undermine, abuse, challenge, demoralize, undercut, damage, torpedo, circumvent, or avoid?

     

    Coming Monday on;

    Fire/EMS Safety, Health and Survival Week: Day Two-Building Knowledge = Fire Fighter Safety

    Firefighter LODD battling Pinckneyville (IL) Blaze from Wall Collapse

    1 comment

    ALAN ROGERS ALAN ROGERS / THE SOUTHERN The Kunz Opera House burns out of control Friday, June 17, 2011 in downtown Pinckneyville, Ill.

     

    ALAN ROGERS ALAN ROGERS / THE SOUTHERN The front facade of the Kunz Opera House collapses during a fire Friday, June 17 in downtown Pinckneyville.

     

    A massive two-building fire on the Pinckneyville town square Friday afternoon claimed the life of a Du Quoin firefighter, the fire chief’s son.

    Corey Shaw, 22, son of Du Quoin Fire Chief Bob Shaw, died from injuries sustained while combating the fire that engulfed the Pinckneyville Antique Mall and the Kunz Opera House.

    The younger Shaw, whom officials described as a son, husband and father, started as a volunteer firefighter in 2010.

    During the fire, Perry County Emergency Services Director David Searby confirmed that Shaw was airlifted to a St. Louis-area hospital. Witnesses said the young firefighter was near the east wall of the antique store when it collapsed.

    The fire, which began in the antique store, was called in about 3:30 p.m. and quickly spread, according to witnesses.

    • More from published reports, HERE
    • Photos, HERE

    Related Video

    Alpha Side from Google Maps

     

    Some additional Insight Materials for discussion;  

    Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies Training Download

    Resources:

    • National Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Operational Safety Considerations at Ordinary and Heavy Timber Constructed Occupancies PowerPoint Program developed by Christopher Naum, HERE  
    •  Informational Support  Narrative download, HERE
    Do you know what to look for upon arrival?
    What Building features and factors will affect your operations?
     
    Program Screenshot

    Other Related Links posted from Firefighter Nation.com

    Related Links

  • TheSouthern.com: Du Quoin firefighter dies battling Pinckneyville blaze
  • KPLR: Fatal Pinckneyville Fire Consumes Historic Opera House
  • STLToday: Fire guts buildings on Pinckneyville, Ill., town square
  • CarmiTimes: 2 downtown Pinckneyville buildings damaged in fire
  • Pantagraph.com: One killed as blaze guts Illinois opera house, mall
  • KMOV: Firefighter dies from injuries suffered after wall collapses during Pinckneyville blaze
  • KSDK: Fire destroys Pinckneyville, IL Antique Mall
  • DuQuoin.com: Antique Mall/Opera House Burn in Pinckneyville
  • Du Quoin Fire Department website
  • Firegeezer: LODD – Illinois
  • STATter911: Firefighter Corey Shaw, Du Quoin Fire Department, killed in wall collapse in Pinckneyville, Illinois. Was son of fire chief.
  • VIDEO

    Firefighter Killed In Roof Collapse at Church Fire

    1 comment

    Tabernacle of Praise church in Muncie, Indiana burns while a firefighter jumps out of a broken window. .(Maria Strauss/The Star Press)

    A major fire took command of the roof area at Tabernacle of Praise Church on the southside of Muncie, Indiana on Wednesday June 15, 2010. The fast moving fire caused significant the structural support of the roof system to collapse during fire suppression operations. This resulted in one firefighter becoming trapped with later reports indicating the firefighter died in the lin of duty.

    The fire was reported around 3:55 p.m. The Muncie Fire Department was leading efforts to battle the blaze with help from surrounding volunteer departments, who are bringing water to the incident site on tanker trucks. The structure that collapsed and on fire was sanctuary. Published reports indicate that the church was hand built by church members. Radio dispatch indicated at 4:15 p.m. a firefighter was missing after the roof collapsed.

    Dispatchers learned of the fire shortly before 4 p.m., and one reported the firefighter went missing after the roof collapsed about 15 minutes later, the newspaper reported.

    Chris Bergin / The Star Press

     

      

     

    LINKS

    • The Indy Channel HERE
    • Firefighter dies in Muncie church fire, PHOTOS HERE
    • Video Clips, HERE

    NFPA Research Report on Firefighter Fatalities 2010 Released

    No comments

    According to the recently published NFPA Research Report on Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2010; In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977.

    • Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, continued to account for the largest number of fatalities.
    • More than half of the deaths resulted from overexertion, stress and related medical issues.
    • Of the 39 deaths in this category, 34 were classified as sudden cardiac deaths (usually heart attacks) and five were due to strokes or brain aneurysm.

     

    • Download the NFPA 2010 FF LODD PFD Report, HERE
    • NFPA Web Site Link, HERE

    2010 Experience

    In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S. This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977. The average number of deaths annually over the past 10 years is 95.

    Figure 1 shows firefighter deaths for the years 1977 through 2010, excluding the 340 firefighter deaths at the World Trade Center in 2001.

    Of the 72 firefighters who died while on duty in 2010, 44 were volunteer firefighters, 25 were career firefighters, two were employees of state land management agencies, and one was a member of a prison inmate crew.

    In 2010, there were four double-fatality incidents. Two firefighters died in a vehicle crash while returning from a training weekend, two died in an apparatus crash while responding to a structure fire and four firefighters were killed during interior operations at two structure fires. More details are presented throughout the report.

    Analyses in the NFPA Research Report examine the types of duty associated with firefighter deaths, the cause and nature of fatal injuries to firefighters, and the ages of the firefighters who died. They highlight deaths in intentionally-set fires and in motor vehicle-related incidents.

    Finally, the NFPA study presents summaries of individual incidents that illustrate important concerns in firefighter safety.

    The victims include members of local career and volunteer fire departments; seasonal, full-time and contract employees of state and federal agencies who have fire suppression responsibilities as part of their job description; prison inmates serving on firefighting crews; military personnel performing assigned fire suppression activities; civilian firefighters working at military installations; and members of industrial fire brigades. Fatal injuries and illnesses are included even in cases where death is considerably delayed.

    When the injury and the death occur in different years, the incident is counted in the year of the injury.

    The NFPA recognizes that a comprehensive study of on-duty firefighter fatalities would include chronic illnesses (such as cancer or heart disease) that prove fatal and that arise from occupational factors. In practice, there is no mechanism for identifying fatalities that are due to illnesses that develop over long periods of time. This creates an incomplete picture when comparing occupational illnesses to other factors as causes of firefighter deaths. This is recognized as a gap the size of which cannot be identified at this time because of limitations in tracking the exposure of firefighters to toxic environments and substances and the potential long-term effects of such exposures.

    The NFPA also recognizes that other organizations report numbers of duty-related firefighter fatalities using different, more expansive, definitions that include deaths that occurred when the victims were off-duty. (See, for example, the USFA and National Fallen Firefighters Memorial websites.*)

    Readers comparing reported losses should carefully consider the definitions and inclusion criteria used in any study.

    Type of Duty

    Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 72 deaths by type of duty. The largest share of deaths occurred while firefighters were operating on the fire ground (21 deaths).

     

    This total is well below the average 32 deaths per year on the fire ground over the past 10 years, and less than a third the average of 69 deaths per year in the first 10 years of this study (1977 through 1986). The low number of fire ground deaths in 2010 is not only because of the small number of multiple-fatality fire incidents – the number of fire incidents resulting in firefighter deaths in 2010 was the lowest recorded, with 19 fatal fires, compared to an average of 28 annually in the previous 10 years. Fourteen of the 21 fire ground deaths occurred at 12 structure fires. Deaths in structure fires are discussed in more detail later in this report. There were seven deaths at seven wildland-related incidents.

     There were no firefighter deaths at vehicle fires in 2010.

    • Twelve of the 21 fire ground victims were career firefighters, eight were volunteer firefighters and one was a firefighter with a state land management agency.
    • The average number of career firefighter deaths on the fire ground over the past 10 years is 12 deaths per year, while the average for volunteer firefighters is 16 deaths per year.
    • An additional four or more deaths of state or federal wildland management agency personnel, on average, occur on wildland fires each year.

     Eighteen firefighters died while responding to or returning from emergency calls. It is important to note that deaths in this category are not necessarily the result of crashes. Twelve of the deaths were due to sudden cardiac events or stroke, five occurred in four collisions or rollovers and one firefighter was crushed between two fire department vehicles as one was backed into the station. All 18 victims were volunteer firefighters. All crashes and sudden cardiac deaths are discussed in more detail later.

    Eleven deaths occurred during training activities. Two firefighters died when their personal vehicle crashed while they were returning from a training weekend. Four firefighters collapsed and died of sudden cardiac events after training exercises and one died during unsupervised physical fitness activities. One suffered a stroke after a weekly training meeting at the station, one suffered a brain aneurysm after hose loading training, one died after being exposed to smoke at a wildland live fire training exercise, and one hit his elbow during training and died of necrotizing fasciitis (also known as flesh-eating disease).

    Five firefighters died at non-fire emergencies, including two at the scene of motor vehicle crashes (one victim was struck by a vehicle and the other suffered sudden cardiac death), one drowned during a swift water rescue, one died after clearing downed trees after a storm and one was asphyxiated while attempting to rescue a worker from a manhole without SCBA and before the oxygen levels were tested.

    The remaining 17 firefighters died while involved in a variety of non-emergency-related on-duty activities. These activities included normal administrative or station duties (11 deaths), fire station construction projects (two deaths), vehicle maintenance (one death), driving to check on a wildland fire the previous day (one death), and a work project in a wildland area (one death). One firefighter died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound while on-duty.

     

    Report Authors

    Firefighter Fatalities in the United States 2010
    Rita F. Fahy, Paul R. LeBlanc and Joseph L. Molis, June 2011. 33 pages.
    Overall statistics on line-of-duty firefighter fatalities in 2010, including non-incident-related deaths. Includes patterns, trends, career vs. volunteer comparisons, and brief narratives on selected incidents. 

    Abstract: In 2010, a total of 72 on-duty firefighter deaths occurred in the U.S.  This is another sharp drop from the 105 on-duty deaths in 2008 and 82 in 2009, and the lowest annual total since NFPA began conducting this annual study in 1977. Stress, exertion, and other medical-related issues, which usually result in heart attacks or other sudden cardiac events, continued to account for the largest number of fatalities. More than half of the deaths resulted from overexertion, stress and related medical issues. Of the 39 deaths in this category, 34 were classified as sudden cardiac deaths (usually heart attacks) and five were due to strokes or brain aneurysm. 
     

    Download this report. (PDF, 151 KB)
     See older versions of this report.

    Woonsocket (RI) Eight Alarm Mill Fire: Caused by Welding

    No comments

    Woonsocket mill fire courtesy Matt Gregiore Providence Fire Video

      A 112-year-old building, once the home of the Woonsocket Rubber Co., a firm that made decoy tanks for the D-Day invasion in World War II and later manufactured Keds sneakers, was destroyed Tuesday night by a spectacular fire. Smoke from the blaze could be seen as far away as Providence.Fire Chief Gary Lataille said 10 to 15 departments from Rhode Island and Massachusetts were called in to help battle the seven-alarm blaze. While the fiire appeared to be small at first, according to Mayor Leo T. Fontaine, the fire quickly spread to engulf the 180,000-square-foot mill structure.Lataille said that with the river bordering one side of the complex, and a huge parking lot bordering another, he determined early that the best strategy was to contain the fire so it would not spread to houses along River Street and to let it burn completely to the ground
      .

      

    Aerial Overview

     

    • According to tax records, the factory was built in 1889 and is more than 217,000 square feet. It was sold to real estate company Fairmount LLC in Decemeber 2010 for $310,000.
    • The assessed value of the building and land is more than $900,000 according to tax records.
    • The building, known as Alice Mills, has been vacant since 2009 and is a very historic Woonsocket landmark. 

    Aerial View

     

     

    Situational Awareness: Wall Collapse Near Miss

    No comments

    UK Firefighter Narrowly Escapes Wall Collapse
    Collapse captured on dash cam shows Greater Manchester (UK) Fire and Rescue Service close call

    This was recently posted on Firefighternation.com and depicts a a video clip that captures a dramatic near miss of a colleague who could have been killed when a house collapsed today released footage of the incident. Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service said the incident in Littleborough, Rochdale, in September 2010 was being released as part of health and safety training for its staff and other fire and rescue services in the UK.

    The dramatic footage, caught by a CCTV camera on a fire engine attending the scene, shows a fire fighter narrowly escaping death or serious injury as the front of a derelict terrace house collapsed, almost on top of him. The firefighter seems hardly fazed by the close call.

    County Fire Officer and Chief Executive Steve McGuirk said the footage provided terrifying viewing for the service, who would use it as a training example to ensure crew were more aware of the dangers.

    He added: “The footage is unbelievable. Our crew and the police are diligently attending this incident, where a derelict property is on fire. But who could have predicted the front of the house would collapse in this way. It is frighteningly close and this fire fighter could so easily have been killed. It’s a powerful example of how our fire fighters put themselves at risk each and every day to keep people across Greater Manchester safe.”

    The footage will now form part of the service’s operational assurance processes and used to make fire fighters aware of the potential risks of similar incidents.

    Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service has 41 stations across the 10 boroughs of the county and attended approximately 50,000 incidents involving fire and collisions on roads and motorways, and other emergencies, last year.

    • Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Services  Link HERE

    2nd San Francisco Firefighter Dies After Diamond Heights Fire

    2 comments

    SFFD Firefighter Anthony Valerio

    It’s being reported that San Francisco Fire Fighter Anthony Valerio passed away this morning as a result of injuries sustained while operating the Diamond Heights fire on Thursday June 2nd. This becomes the second line of duty death from this incident that also resulted in the LODD of Lt. Vincent Perez.  Anthony “Tony” Valerio, a 53-year-old firefighter and paramedic critically injured in the Thursday blaze, died at San Francisco General Hospital at about 7:40 a.m., city officials said.

    Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/06/04/BA2F1JPNS2.DTL#ixzz1OKjGjnNs

    San Francisco firefighter Anthony Valerio is the second firefighter to die from Thursday’s Diamond Heights fire.  According to San Francisco Fire Chief Joanne Hayes-White, Valerio had “significant damage to his respiratory system” and burns across his body after Thursday’s fire. Valerio has burns to 12 percent of his body.

     WKGO TV  ABC7 reports that according to San Francisco Fire Deputy Chief Mike Gardner said most of Fire Fighter Valerio’s burns were from steam and not from fire, adding that the temperature inside the structure was between 500 and 700 degrees.

    Previous Coverage, HERE, HERE and HERE

    • Logs show desperate hunt for doomed SF firefighters, HERE

    Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/06/03/BAJG1JPBKV.DTL#ixzz1OKn7vgot

    From Thursday

    San Francisco FD: The Diamond Heights Fire Updates

    5 comments
     
    Courtesy Patty Stanton

     

    Courtesy Patty Stanton

     

    Courtesy Patty Stanton

     

    Updates from San Francisco;

     

    Charlie Side

     

    Charlie Side, Fire Extending

     

    Alpha Street Side from Google Streets

     

    Aerial Charlie Side

     

    Coincidentially, we posted a remembrance to the DCFD Cherry Road Townhouse Fire and Double FireFighter LODD from May, 1999 that is worth another look as it has similar connotations related to fire behavior, flashover conditions and multiple floor level construction factors during initial fire suppression operations, HERE

    Flags at the NFFF Memorial; SFFD LODD

    3 comments

    National Fallen Fire Fighters Memorial this morning

    The flags at the National Fallen Fire Fighter Memorial at the National Fire Academy are once again lowered this morning as a result of the line of duty death of Lieutenant Vincent Perez of the San Francisco (CA) Fire Department as a result of injuries sustained while conducting  fire suppression operations in a residential occupancy on June 2, 2011.  More on the incident HERE.

    Lt. Vincent Perez, San Francisco FD

    Another SFFD Fire Fighter Anthony Valerio, 53, is still in critical condition at San Francisco General Hospital’s intensive care unit with severe burns as a result of operations in the same fire.

    Firefighter Anthony Valerio remains in critical condition

    Being on campus this week at the NFA, there is seldom a time in which the flags are at full staff, and if so, its for a short time span. We should take pause and reflect on our job as fire fighters this morning and keep our brothers and sisters of the San Francisco Fire Department and these firefighter’s families in our thoughts and prayers.

    The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger in order for  us to carry out our mission, goals and objectives, because of who we are; Fire Fighters.

    Other Links;

    Update:

    • The fire was first reported around 10:45 a.m. in a four-story home in the 100 block of Berkeley Way, according to San Francisco Fire Lt. Mindy Talmadge.
    • Perez, Valerio and an unidentified female firefighter were inside the structure fighting what was described as an “aggressive fire” when an emergency alarm beacon attached to the active department employees went off, according to Talmadge.
    • Staff tried to contact the firefighter, but was unable to do so.
    • The communications center then notified the command staff of the problem.\Additional crew members were sent in, and they found two firefighters down and “pretty badly burned,” Talmadge said.
    • Perez and Valerio were pulled out of the burning building, the woman walked out on her own.
    • Perez later went into full cardiac arrest after suffering burns and smoke inhalation during the morning blaze,  Hayes-White said at a news conference outside San Francisco General Hospital.

     

    Side Charlie Balcony, Photo Jeff Chiu/AP

    AP Photo/Patty Stanton

     

    SFFD

    San Francisco FD Flashover LODD, two others injured

    3 comments

    San Francisco firefighters carry one of their own from the scene of a house blaze today in the Diamond Heights neighborhood. Patty Stanton / Special to The Chronicle

    San Francisco (CA) Fire Department Lt. Vincent Perez, 48, died in the line of duty during fire suppression operations trying to extinguish a fire at a four-story residential occupancy in the Diamond Heights section of San Francisco. FF Anthony Valerio, 53, is reported in critical condition at San Francisco General Hospital’s intensive care unit with severe burns.

    According to published reports, a third firefighter was treated and released for minor burns and smoke inhalation, Talmadge said. Her name was not released.

    The single family home was constructed in 1975 and has 2058 square foot of living space,  3 bedrooms and 3.0 bathrooms.

    by Mark (via uReport) ( Photo)

    Alpha Street Side

     

     

    San Francisco Chronical; S.F. firefighter dies, second fighting for life; Article and Photos HERE