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Albuquerque Fire Department; Learnings from Close Call Collapse and Fire Fighter Injuries

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The Albuquerque Fire Department seeks to improve operations from past performance

Four firefighters with the Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department were injured during operations at a three-alarm fire that injured raged through the Royal Crown Apartment Complex  in southeast Albuquerque on Friday February 4, 2011.

The injured firefighters were among four who fell through the floor from the second story to the first while searching for residents of the, according to the Albuquerque Fire Department. Both suffered leg injuries, one had minor burn, and they were treated and released from University of New Mexico Hospital a few hours later, an AFD spokesperson said.

According to published reports at the time of the event, the first alarm came in at 3 p.m. bringing personnel and apparatus to the three-story building at 4801 Gibson SE. First units on the scene reported heavy smoke and flames on the north side of the building.

A crew from AFD Engine 13 entered the building and during a search rescued two uninjured residents from one apartment and also save a cat.

At 3:40 p.m. Incident command transitioned to a defense operations to fight the fire from outside the building. The third alarm was transmitted due to the projected heavy fuel load in the large complex.

Overall 75 fire personnel responded and operated at the alarm.

The fire is believed to have started behind a washing machine in the first-floor laundry room. An electric cause is suspected, but AFD said the exact cause is still under investigation.

The three-story multiple occupancy apartment complex was built in 1976 and housed 47 apartment units in 31,896 square feet of space.

In the months since the fire, the Albuquerque Fire Department has conducted a critique and post incident assessment of the operations, mayday and close-calls and overall performance of the department. As reported in the media video leading into this article, the department has taken the results of that post incident assessment and has developed training being delivered to al personnel to increase future operational performance, efficiencies and to reduce the likely hood of a similar event from occurring.

According to the Fire Department, they were playing catch-up from the early advancing stages of the incident and experienced difficulty in being able to make strategic strides to get ahead of the escalating incident severity, magnitude and rapid development.

The unexpected events leading to the multiple maydays and firefighter injuries challenged incident command and operations and could have resulted in possible multiple firefighter LODDs versus the close-call, near-miss events that subsequently lead towards the efforts to undertake  critical review of the incident and operations.

Some Insights and Learning’s from the Incident included that have resulted in enhancements;

  • Communications
  • Situational Awareness
  • Calling the Mayday
  • Radio Communications
  • Distractions and Error Prevention
  • Accountability
  • Command Response to Mayday Events
  • Communications Mayday Alerts

It is imperative that all departments initiate at the least a formal or informal post incident critique or review. This may be at the company or station level or escalated to a more formal department level assessment and review based upon the incident parameters and conditions.

The initiation and development of post incident analysis or assessment can be more involving and complex, with the commitment of personnel, resources and time but the benefits derived from such a review will contribute highly to the continued development and improvement of any organization. 

There are a number of recent after action, post incident or assessments reports that have been published and have been reviewed and discussed here on CommandSafety.com.

Take the time to review your incidents and runs at the company, station or battalion level. These reviews will identify and address low threshold, latent or emerging conditions before they escalate into apparent or root cause conditions that may contribute to significant adverse events and incidents.

The Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s self-critical review of this event has identified short comings at a number of levels that they are working to improve.

As they state in the video report, the outcome of this event could have been a lot worse than the injuries sustained and the resultant near-misses. The focus on improvements and enhancements within the functional areas of Calling the Mayday, Rapid Intervention and Mayday Communications and Operations is commendable and aligns with this year’s theme for Safety, Health and Survival Week.

The 2011 Safety Week theme is; Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

  • Previous Safety Week announcement and details; HERE.
  • We’ll post under a separate article details on the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program soon.

Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s Web Site, HERE

This year’s Safety Week will focus on delivering the online IAFF Fire Ground Survival (FGS) awareness training course to all fire departments. The program is the most comprehensive survival skills and MAYDAY prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Additional planning tools and resources will be available on the Safety Week website.

The IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program (FGS) is the most comprehensive survival-skills and mayday-prevention program currently available and is open to all members of the fire service. Incorporating federal regulations, proven incident-management best practices and survival techniques from leaders in the field, and real case studies from experienced fire fighters, FGS aims to educate all fire fighters to be prepared if the unfortunate happens.

For links to the IAFF Fire Ground Survival Program, HERE and HERE

The program will provide participating fire departments with the skills they need to improve situational awareness and prevent a mayday. Topics covered include:

  • Preventing the Mayday: situational awareness, planning, size up, air management, fitness for survival, defensive operations.
  • Being Ready for the Mayday: personal safety equipment, communications, accountability systems.
  • Self-Survival Procedures: avoiding panic, mnemonic learning aid “GRAB LIVES”— actions a fire fighter must take to improve survivability, emergency breathing.
  • Self-Survival Skills: SCBA familiarization, emergency procedures, disentanglement, upper floor escape techniques.
  • Fire Fighter Expectations of Command: command-level mayday training, pre-mayday, mayday and rescue, post-rescue, expanding the incident-command system, communications.

Keep watching the website and the IAFC’s Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn pages for continuing updates to this year’s program and planning resources.

Remember to visit the SHS Section’s website for more information on health and safety issues and the IAFF’s Health, Safety and Medicine’s website for more information on health, wellness and safety programs.

Additionally, look for a comprehensive series of articles, activities, insights, downloads, podcasts, video clips and resources that will be posted each day of Safety, Health and Survival Week here on Commandsafety.com, Thecompanyofficer.com and Buildingsonfire.com.

Announcements and campaign materials will begin posting in Mid-May.

We will be offering a special series of live shows nightly on Taking it to the Streets on Firefighternetcast.com and blogtalkradio during the week of June 19-25, 2011 addressing key issues with a stellar line-up of fire service leaders.

This will be an exceptional opportunity to listen in, call in and participate actively in the week’ theme of Surviving the Fire Ground – Fire Fighter, Fire Officer and Command Preparedness.

These shows will be mission critical. Stay Tuned for more upcoming information.

Be Self-Critical and a Learning Organization

  • In the meantime think about your operations; are you self-critical and a learning organization seeking to identify gaps or areas for improvement?
  • There is a lot that can be learned from our daily responses and operations, whether they be that single company response or that multiple alarm incident. 
  • All it takes is the recognition to see things for what they are and your may not be as good as you think and the understanding and desire to identify those conditions and improve .

 

Addtional Resources, videos and images related to the Albuquerque (NM) Fire Department’s operations at the Royal Crown Apartment Complex

Alpha Street Side View

 

Aerial View from the Delta Side

 

KASA News 13 photo by Alex Tomlin.

Survivability Profiling and the Fire Ground Size-Up

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In support of recent program on Taking it to the Streets regarding Survivability Profiling with our  special guest Captain Stephen Marsars, FDNY we are posting some of the research and articles to aid in your own individual research and increased awareness on this emerging concept and refined methodology expanding traditional size-up into a new element.

The radio program, presentation, dialog and discussions added richly to the continuing efforts to improve and challenge the fires service into exploring new directions in an effort to increase our proficiencies, capabilities and operations.

You can download or listen to the the full program HERE.

Here are those reference links;

  • National Fire Academy, Executive Fire Officer Program: EFO Paper: Can They Be Saved? Utilizing Civilian Survivability Profiling to Enhance Size-up and Reduce Firefighter Fatalities in the Fire Department, City of New York  http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/pdf/efop/efo44310.pdf

Other Links from CommandSafety.com

Taking it to the Streets Radio Program On Firefighter Netcast.com

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Survivability Profiling Live on Taking it To the Street

Taking it to the Streets Radio Program On Firefighter Netcast.com

April 20, 2011 Show  9:00 pm – 10:15 pm ET

Live and Online Taking it to the Streets with your host Christopher Naum will present another timely and insightful look at an emerging element of today’s evolving fire ground.

Join in on Wednesday April 20th at 9pm ET for a very special and exciting program discussing the concepts and theory of Survivability Profiling.

The direct link for the live show is here

        Capt. Stephen Marsar, FDNY

Joining the program will be special guest, Captain Stephen Marsar, FDNY assigned to Engine Co. 8 in the Third Division, Manhattan, NYC.

Captain Marsar, FDNY has researched and developed insights into the theory and application of Survivability Profiling.

Links to Captain Marsar’s published articles:

  • Survivability Profiling: Are the Victims Savable?, HERE
  • Survivability Profiling: How Long Can Victims Survive in a Fire?, HERE
  • NFA/EFO Research Paper, HERE

FirefighterNetcast.com HERE

Program Promo, HERE

Survivability Profiling: Taking it to the Streets

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Live Online April 20th at 9pm ET

Live and Online Taking it to the Streets with your host Christopher Naum will present another timely and insightful look at an emerging element of today’s evolving fire ground.
 
Join in on Wednesday April 20th at 9pm ET for a very special and exciting program discussing the concepts and theory of Survivability Profiling.
 
Joing the program will be special guest, Captain Stephen Marsar, FDNY assigned to Engine Co. 8 in the Third Division, Manhattan, NYC.
Captain Marsar, FDNY has researched and developed insights into the theory and application of Survivability Profiling.
The Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Fire Administration announced on April 4 that Capt. Stephen Marsar, Engine 8, is one of three fire service executives from across the country who was selected to receive the National Fire Academy’s 2010 Annual Outstanding Research Award.

The award recognizes Executive Fire Officer Program students for exceptional research projects.

Capt. Marsar’s project, titled Can They Be Saved? Utilizing Civilian Survivability Profiling to Enhance Size-Up and Reduce Firefighter Fatalities in the Fire Department, City of New York, was selected as the Executive Leadership Course award winner. The National Fire Academy said it was chosen from among the more than 60 Applied Research Projects submitted this year, the highest number in the program’s 26-year history.

The Executive Fire Officer Program provides senior fire officers with information and education on various facets of fire administration. After a four-year course of study, participants are required to complete an applied research project that attempts to resolve a problem in their own organization.

View Capt. Marsar’s project: http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/pdf/efop/efo44310.pdf

Grab a cup of coffee and sit down for a special  one hour program with Taking it to the Streets on FirefighterNetcast.com where we’ll be discussing the concept, research and application of Survivability Profiling with Captain Marsar and the manner in which it might be implemented in today’s emerging and evolving fire ground operational methodologies with Christopher Naum and this outstanding fire service leader.    

Capt. Stephen Marsar, FDNY

STEPHEN MARSAR is a captain in the Fire Department of New York, covering in Engine Company 8 in Manhattan. He has previously served in Engine Company 16 and Ladder Companies 7 and 11. An ex-commissioner in the Bellmore (NY) Fire Department, he has certifications as a national and New York State fire instructor, NY instructor coordinator, and NY State Department of Health regional faculty member.

He serves on the adjunct faculty for the Nassau Community College, NY Fire Science Degree Program, and teaches for the FDNY and Nassau County, Long Island, Fire and EMS academies. He has a bachelor’s degree in fire science and emergency services administration and is enrolled in the Executive Fire Officer Program at the National Fire Academy.

Taking it to the StreetsTM is a monthly radio show featured on BlogTalk Radio and is hosted by Christopher Naum and is a Buildingsonfire.com Series and FireFighternetcast.com Production,   © 2011 All Rights Reserved    

Join in on the live open discussion with other fire service personnel from around the country. Check out the latest downloads of recent programs in the archives by visiting Taking it to the Street’s webpage on Firefighternetcast.com or for program insights at CommandSafety.com.    

  • Tune in to the Program Wednesday evening April 20th at 9:00 pm ET, HERE
  • Firefighternetcast.com HERE
  • Taking it to the Streets Radio Programs, HERE and HERE 

Analytical Study Reveals Patterns in U.S Firefighter Fatalities

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While the number of structural fires in the United States continues to decline, firefighter line of duty deaths (LODD) do not exhibit the same rate of proportion decline. A review of both NFPA and USFA Firefighter LODD annual reports, statistics and retrospective studies and analysis suggest a noted change in the adverse trends noted for a number of previous years, but we are lagging in achieving the goals established by the NFFF’s Everyone Goes Home Program and initiatives.

 A recently published study and research conducted at the University of Georgia may provide insights and help explain why.

 Researchers in the UGA College of Public Health found that cultural factors in the work environment that promote getting the job done as quickly as possible with whatever resources available lead to an increase in line-of-duty firefighter fatalities.

“Firefighting is always going to be a hazardous activity, but there’s a general consensus among firefighting organizations and among scientific organizations that it can be safer than it is, “according to study co-author David DeJoy, of the Workplace Health Group in the College of Public Health.

The research, published in the May edition of the journal Accident Analysis and Prevention, examined data gathered from 189 firefighter fatality investigations conducted by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health between 2004 and 2009.

Each NIOSH investigation gives recommendations directed at preventing future firefighter injuries and deaths. The researchers looked at the high-frequency recommendations and linked them to important causal and contributing factors of the fatalities.

The following is the Abstract from the Line of duty deaths among U.S. Firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations, published by Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith and David M. Dejoy.

Inadequate preparation for/anticipation of adverse events during operations,

Abstract

More than 100 firefighters die in the line-of-duty in the U.S. each year and over 80,000 are injured. This study examined all firefighter fatality investigations (N=189) completed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for fatalities occurring between 2004 and 2009.

  • These investigations produced a total of 1167 recommendations for corrective actions.
  •  Thirty-five high frequency recommendations were derived from the total set: six related to medical fatalities and 29 to injury-related fatalities.
  • These high frequency recommendations were mapped onto the major operational components of firefighting using a fishbone or cause-effect diagram.
  • Over 70% of the 30 non-external recommendations were categorized within the personnel and incident command components of the fishbone diagram.

Root cause techniques suggested four higher order causes:

  1. under-resourcing,
  2.  inadequate preparation for/anticipation of adverse events during operations,
  3. incomplete adoption of incident command procedures, and
  4. sub-optimal personnel readiness.

These findings are discussed with respect to the core culture of firefighting. (Copyright © 2011, Elsevier Publishing)

Excerpt from the study introduction

The United States depends on about 1.1 million career and volunteer firefighters to protect its citizens and property from losses caused by fire. Firefighting is considered to be one of the most stressful and dangerous occupations. Each year more than 100 firefighters die in the line of duty and over 80,000 are injured (Karter and Molis, 2009; United States Fire Administration, 2009). The fatality rate for firefighters is three times worse than for the general working population (International Association of Firefighters, 2001).

Advances in technology, personal protective equipment, engineering controls, environmental management, medical care, and safety legislation produced substantial reductions in fatalities during the 1970s and 1980s; however, these numbers have not improved during the past 25 years and have been trending upward for the past decade. Without question, firefighting is high hazard work, but it is unique beyond this. In most high hazard work situations, the goal is hazard avoidance. In contrast, for firefighting, the principal work activity is hazard engagement, which is usually further complicated by extreme time pressure.

High hazard work situations

The customary safety strategy in many high hazard work situations is to implement multiple safety measures, or what is sometimes referred to as: “defenses in depth” (Rasmussen, 1997; Reason, 1997). That is, several layers of precautions are put in place to protect the workers and the integrity of the overall system, even when components fail or errors occur. There is little protective redundancy in firefighting, and risks to personnel must continually be assessed and reassessed as the fire situation develops and changes, often with little predictability or advanced warning. Most efforts to protect firefighters fall into two general categories: preparative measures and operational measures.

Preparative measures encompass actions that prepare the firefighters to do their work in as safe a manner as possible. This would include personnel selection and placement, training, professional socialization, as well as the provision of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other safety devices. Operational measures focus on maintaining an adequate margin of safety during actual firefighting activities. This would include adherence to various standard operating procedures (SOPs), continued monitoring of risk–benefit ratios, communications, staffing, and other command and control activities.

As part of the effort to reduce firefighter line-of-duty fatalities, the United States Fire Administration (USFA) collects and evaluates information regarding line-of-duty (LODD) firefighter fatalities and publishes the data in the annual firefighter fatality reports (e.g., United States Fire Administration, 2009)

In 1998, Congress appropriated funding to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to conduct independent, onsite investigations of firefighter line-of-duty (LOD) deaths (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2009). The investigations conducted as part of the NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program (FFFIPP) are voluntary and not all fatalities are investigated. Cases are selected for investigation using a decision algorithm (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2009), with the primary goal not to find fault or assign blame, but rather to learn from these events and to formulate recommendations directed at preventing future firefighter injuries and deaths.

Since the program’s inception, NIOSH has completed over 470 fatality investigations. There have been several prior efforts to compile and analyze various portions of this accumulated database. Hodous and colleagues (Hodous et al., 2004) reviewed firefighter fatalities from 1998 to 2001 and synthesized NIOSH recommendations for cases involving structural firefighting activities.  

 
 

 
 
 

Risk and Culture

 

These researchers identified eight frequently occurring recommendations that highlighted three general areas of concern:

(1) use and enforcement of standard operating procedures (SOPs) related to structural firefighting techniques and strategies;

(2) adequate staffing and adherence to contemporary incident command practices, and

(3) increased attention to communications and personnel accountability and rescue.

  • Peterson and colleagues (Peterson et al., 2006) examined recommendations from the first five years of fatality investigations (1999–2003).
  • Their analysis identified 31 “key” recommendations, 22 involving traumatic injury fatalities and 9 involving cardiovascular fatalities.
  • These were further reduced to 17 sentinel recommendations involving training, standard operating procedures, safety practices, and the safety environment of fire departments.
  • More recently, Ridenour and associates (Ridenour et al., 2008) reviewed all investigations completed between 1998 and 2005.
  • This analysis highlighted ten categories of recommendations, two focusing on medical cases and the other eight focusing on traumatic injuries.

The clear majority of medically-related fatalities involve cardiovascular events and these have produced two predominant recommendations: the need for improvements in medical screening, and the need for wider adoption of fitness/wellness programming for firefighters.

These are both preparative measures designed to identify and address cardiovascular risk in operational personnel. Trauma cases, on the other hand, have yielded a much more diverse array of recommendations and a less clear picture of high priority needs. These recommendations address both preparative and operational measures, and cover a broad territory that includes command and control functions, operations and tactics, and equipment and resources.

  • The present study continues this line of inquiry but expands it in several ways.
  • The first objective was to determine the extent to which the incidents investigated by NIOSH are representative of all firefighter LOD fatalities.
  • NIOSH investigations are voluntary on the part of the fallen firefighter’s organization and NIOSH does not have sufficient resources to investigate all fatalities.
  • This issue has potentially important implications for the generalizability of any key recommendations extracted from the accumulated database of reports.
  • The second objective was to better describe the procedures used to derive key or sentinel recommendations.

In the analyses described above, only limited procedural details were provided on how the high frequency recommendations were actually determined.

The Fire Service Culture

For example, it would be useful to know how frequent the high frequency recommendations were, not only in absolute terms but also relative to other recommendations. Since most investigations contain several recommendations, it would be useful to know how similar recommendations were handled within and across investigations. The third objective involved the issue of causation.

The recommendations contained in these reports speak primarily to the “what” – that is, what needs to be done, not done, done better, or done differently in the future to reduce risk.

These recommendations almost always draw upon contemporary knowledge and accepted best practices in the firefighting and emergency response professional communities. Logically, it should be possible to link high frequency recommendations to causal factors or clusters of causal factors. Therefore, we were interested in determining whether insights into important causal factors could be extracted from these reports.

Identification of such factors is a requisite step in the development of effective prevention strategies (Higgins et al., 2001). With these objectives forming the organizing framework, the present research sought to examine NIOSH investigations for the years 2004–2009. This time period was chosen to complement the previous analyses and to provide a current perspective.

The study analyzed the investigations in terms of the core culture of the firefighting profession. Firefighting culture should not be construed as one of negligence, said DeJoy, but one based on a long-standing tradition of acceptance of risk. A job that relies on extreme individual efforts and has too few resources leads to the chronic condition of doing too much with too little, he said.

  • “If you get used to taking risks, it’s easy to take a little more risk,” DeJoy said.
  • “Most of the time when we take risks, like walking across the street or driving a car, nothing bad happens.
  • This level of risk gets ratcheted up and becomes part of normal activity.” Acceptance of risk becomes extremely perilous in a situation in which adverse events can happen at any time and margins of safety are very thin, he added.

Firefighter deaths dropped in the 1970s and 1980s, largely due to improvements in protective clothing, breathing equipment and radio communication, explained DeJoy. In the last decades, fatality numbers actually edged upward while the number of fires has gone down, he said.

On average, more than 100 firefighters die on the job in the U.S. each year, which is three times higher than the fatality rate for the general working population. The number one cause of death identified in the study was not smoke inhalation or traumatic injury, but cardiovascular events.

  • Eighty-seven of the 213 deaths examined in the study were cardiac-related.
  • Deaths from cardiovascular events resulted in two predominant recommendations from the researchers: the need for improvements in medical screening and the need for wider adoption of mandatory fitness/wellness programming.

Many of the recommendations can be traced to a lack of finances the report states. Not only does under-resourcing affect the ability of a fire department to acquire innovative technology, it can lead to a shortage of personnel at a fire, compromising rapid intervention and the ability to maintain command and control functions during operations, according to the authors.

The authors also acknowledged that there is a certain amount of subjective interpretation that goes into analyzing incident investigations. In addition, NIOSH investigations are not mandatory and can be refused by a fire department. NIOSH also mostly investigates deaths involving career, or paid, firefighters, although a majority of firefighters in the U.S. are volunteers and a majority of line-of-duty deaths involve volunteers. The authors further stated they hoped NIOSH will do more investigations of volunteer firefighter fatalities, as those organizations may have the greatest need for evaluation and technical assistance.

 The entire report is available at a nominal fee, HERE;

Journal Reference:

  1. Kumar Kunadharaju, Todd D. Smith, David M. DeJoy. Line-of-duty deaths among U.S. firefighters: An analysis of fatality investigations. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 2011; 43 (3): 1171 DOI: 10.1016/j.aap.2010.12.030
  • Science Daily Article HERE  
  • University of Georgia (2011, April 14). Comprehensive study reveals patterns in firefighter fatalities. ScienceDaily. Retrieved April 16, 2011, from http://www.sciencedaily.com­ /releases/2011/04/110412171208.htm

Other Report Links of Interest

Compromised Floor Assembly Traps Firefighters

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Residential Fire and Floor Compromise Norwichbulletin.com

A Taftville (CT) Firefigher was caught in a compromised floor condition while fighting a fire in a residential occupancy on Friday morning April 15th in Norwich, CT., resulting in a mayday and RIT deloyment to support the extrication and firefighter removal from the interior.

Published reports from Theday.com indicated a fire fighter issued a mayday after his foot plunged through the floor up to his knee, according to  according to Taftville (CT) Fire Chief Tim Jencks.

Two other fire fighters held him up so he wouldn’t fall through any farther, while several others rushed over to help.

A half dozen fire fighters worked to untangle wires that had dropped down from the sagging ceiling and to extricate the fire fighter from the damaged floor; the two who were holding him up also started to break through the floor, Jencks said.

Mutual aid from the Yantic Fire Company as well as the rapid intervention team from the Mohegan Sun Tribal department responded. 

  • Fire ground Photos NorwichBulletin.com, HERE
  • Additional Links, HERE and HERE

The single family residential occupancy was constructed in 1932 and was a four bedroom colonial design with 1,965 square feet of space. The floor assembly was conventional full dimensional wood floor joist construction.

Two Story Four Bedroom Colonial, Circa 1932

Alpha Side Post Fire

Aerial View from Bing.com

 

Here’s some diagrams and images for common floor joist assembly systems Circa 1932

 

 
 
 

 

Common Balloon Frame Wall-Floor Construction

 

Full Dimensional Floor Joists

Circa 1930's Floor Joist Configurations

Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD 2007; Is This on Your Radar Screen?

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Technician I Kyle Wilson

Prince William County (VA) Fire Rescue Kyle Wilson LODD Report-Remembrance and Learnings

The Prince William County (VA) Department of Fire and Rescue published a comprehensive line of duty death report for Technician I Kyle R. Wilson on Saturday, January 26, 2008. Have your read it?

Technician I Wilson was the first line of duty death in the Department’s 41-year history. The Department shared the LODD Investigative Report to honor Kyle, and in an effort to reduce and prevent firefighter line of duty deaths at the local, region, state, and national levels.

Technician Kyle Robert Wilson was 24-years old and was born in Olney, Maryland. He grew up in Prince William County and graduated from Hylton High School and George Mason University. He was an avid baseball and softball player. Technician Wilson joined the Prince William County Department of Fire and Rescue on January 23, 2006.

  • Technician Kyle Wilson died in the line of duty on April 16, 2007 while performing search and rescue operations at a house fire on Marsh Overlook Drive, located in the Woodbridge area of Prince William County.

On that day, Technician Wilson was part of the firefighter staffing on Tower 512 which responded to the house fire that was dispatched at 0603 hours. The Prince William County area was under a high wind advisory as a nor’eastern storm moved through the area. Sustained winds of 25 mph with gusts up to 48 mph were prevalent in the area at the time of the fire dispatch to Marsh Overlook Drive.

  • Initial arriving units reported heavy fire on the exterior of two sides of the single family house and crews suspected that the occupants were still inside the house sleeping because of the early morning hour. A search of the upstairs bedroom commenced for the possible victims. A rapid and catastrophic change of fire and smoke conditions occurred in the interior of the house within minutes of Tower 512’s crew entering the structure.
  • Technician Wilson became trapped and was unable to locate an immediate exit out of the hostile environment. Mayday radio transmissions were made by crews and by Technician Kyle Wilson of the life-threatening situation. Valiant and repeated rescue attempts to locate and remove Technician Wilson were made by the firefighting crews during extreme fire, heat and smoke conditions. Firefighters were forced from the structure as the house began to collapse on them and intense fire, heat and smoke conditions developed. Technician Wilson succumbed to the fire and the cause of death was reported by the medical examiner to be thermal and inhalation injuries.

The Department of Fire and Rescue immediately formed a multi-dimensional investigation team following the incident. The investigation team was comprised of five Department of Fire and Rescue uniform personnel and two external members from area fire departments. For eight months, the team thoroughly examined the events that occurred at the Marsh Overlook fire incident and identify the factors involved with the line of duty death of Technician I Kyle Wilson. The resulting report represents thousands of hours of effort to analyze fire and rescue operations and is a factual representation of the events that occurred. The report also provides a frame work for organizational level improvements.

Time Line

  • The major factors in the line of duty death of Technician I Wilson were determined to be:
    • The initial arriving fire suppression force size.
    • The size up of fire development and spread.
    • The impact of high winds on fire development and spread.
    • The large structure size and lightweight construction and materials.
    • The rapid intervention and firefighter rescue efforts.
    • The incident control and management.
    • The Marsh Overlook fire incident was an immense fire fueled by extremely flammable building material products and a vicious wind. It was an environment where information gathering and decision making had to be performed in the time measurement of seconds. During the chain of events that occurred and under severe circumstances, fire and rescue personnel performed at exceptional levels.
  • During the repeated attempts to reach and rescue Technician I Wilson, personnel displayed heroic efforts and jeopardized their own safety.
  • The Department will never forget the sacrifice that Technician Wilson made in an attempt to ensure others were safe.
  • By sharing the knowledge gained from this very tragic and painful incident, the Department will ensure his sacrifice was not in vain and hope that other fire and rescue departments can avoid another similar occurrence.
  • It’s up to you to learn from this event and determine if there are lessons that can be applied to your organization and operations.

 

Resources and Report

NIST Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions: Laboratory Experiments

  • A series of experiments was conducted in our Large Fire Laboratory to examine the impact of wind control curtains and externally applied hose streams on a wind driven fire.  The results from these experiments will allow us to better understand the fire dynamics within a structure and provide guidance as to the important measurements needed in the future experiments in a high-rise on Governor’s Island in New York City.
  • Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions Report, HERE
  • Reference Data HERE

Overview

 

Incident

 

The Predictability of Performance; It's Occupany Risk not Occupancy Type

 

Today’s incident demands on the fireground are unlike those of the recent past, requiring incident commanders and commanding officers to have increased technical knowledge of building construction with a heightened sensitivity to fire behavior, a focus on operational structural stability and considerations related to occupancy risk versus the occupancy type.

There is an immediate need for today’s emerging and operating command and company officers to increase their foundation of knowledge and insights related to the modern building occupancy, building construction and fire protection engineering and to adjust and modify traditional and conventional strategic operating profiles in order to safeguard companies, personnel and team compositions.

Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk, not occupancy type, and must have the combined adequacy of sufficient staffing, fire flow and tactical patience orchestrated in a manner that identifies with the fire profiling, predictability of the occupancy profile and accounts for presumptive fire behavior.

The dramatic changes in buildings and occupancies over the past ten years have resulted inadequate fire suppression methodologies based upon conventional practices that do not align with the manner in which we used to discern with a measured degree of predictability how buildings would perform, react and fail under most fire conditions.

We predicate certain expectations that fire will travel in a defined (predictable) manner that fire will hold within a room and compartment for a predictable given duration of time; that the fire load and related fire flows required will be appropriate for an expected size and severity of fire encountered within a given building, occupancy, structural system and given an appropriately trained and skilled staff to perform the requisite evolutions, we can safely and effectively mitigate a structural fire situation in any  given building type and occupancy.

Past operational experiences, both favorable and negative; gave us experiences that define and determine how the fireground is assessed, react and how we expect similar structures and occupancies to perform at a given alarm in the future; this formed the basis for the naturalistic decision-making process.

Implementing fundamentals of firefighting operations built upon nine decades of time-tested and experience-proven strategies and tactics continues to be the model of suppression operations. These same fundamental strategies continue to drive methodologies and curriculums in our current training programs and academies of instructions.

Are you aware of the defining changes in structural systems and support, the degree of compartmentation, the characteristics of materials and the magnitude of the fire-loading package in today’s buildings and occupancies? When was the last time you were out in the street with the companies, or spent some time doing a walk-through of construction or renovations site? Have you asked you commanding officers, division or battalion chief or your company officers for insights into what operational demands and risks are being imposed upon them while operating in the street and within the buildings, occupancies and structures that comprise your jurisdiction?

The structural anatomy, predictability of building performance under fire conditions, structural integrity and the extreme fire behavior; accelerated growth rate and intensively levels typically encountered in buildings of modern construction during initial and sustained fire suppression have given new meaning to the term combat fire engagement.

The rules for combat structural fire suppression have changed; but no one has told us. The IAFC Safety, Health & Survival Section (SH&S) spent that past year refining and updating The IAFC Ten Rules of Structural Fire Engagement. First published in 2001, the original Ten Rules of Engagement for Structural Fire Fighting provided a set of principles and parameters that incident commanders, commanding and company officers could utilize and implement during incident operations to decrease operations risk, increase and The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety will provide a crucial link towards integrating occupancy risk considerations with more educated and informed understandings of buildings, occupancies, and the behavior of fire with a structure.

It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations, although any seasoned command and company officer knows that at times. It’s what gets the job done under the most arduous and demanding of circumstances.

However, from a methodical and disciplined perspective; aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal-oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed strategic processes that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within known hostile structural fire environments.

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrated with intelligent tactical deployments and operations recognizing the risk problematically and not fatalistically, resulting in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

Today’s incident commanders need to think about the Predicative Strategic Process, refined Tactical Deployment Models integrating intelligent Structural Anatomy and Predictive Occupancy Profiling, while implementing Tactical Patience.

Think about the following;

  • Read, comprehend and implement the new IAFC The Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Survival and The Incident Commanders Rules of Engagement for Firefighter Safety
  • Take a tour of your response area, district, community or city.
  • Take a good look around and begin to recognize the apparent or subtle changes that are affecting your incident operations; Take note and think about what needs to be adjusted, modified or changed in your operations.
  • Read up on the latest research and technical literature on wind driven fires, extreme fire behavior, structural ability of engineered lumber systems, fire loading and suppression theory
  • Take the time to personally read a series of the latest NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program LODD reports and relate them to your organizations operations and jurisdictional risks.
  • Start thinking in terms of Occupancy Risks versus Occupancy Type and align your operations and deployments to match those risks
  • Increase your situational awareness of today’s fireground and refine your strategic and tactical modeling
  • Implement both Strategic and Tactical Patience; Slow down and allow the building to react and stabilize, for fire behavior to stop behaving badly and for your companies to increase survivability ratios while meeting the demands of  conducting fire service operations
  • Reprogram your assumptions and presumptions and options on building construction and firefighting operations; the buildings have changed, our firefighting has not; what are you going to do about that gap?

Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company-level supervision and task-level competencies … You are derelict and negligent and “not “everyone may be going home”.

It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, equating to Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

BECOME SAFE Buildingsonfire.com

Double Mayday Deployments at Three Alarm FDNY Fire

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2 Firefighters Escape Close Call in Belle Harbor: MyFoxNY.com

Published reports from various NYC eMedia outlets indicated that two FDNY firefighters battling a three-alarm fire on Saturday April 9th in the Rockaways section of the Borough of Queens (NY) transmitted Maydays signals during fire suppression operations after a fire officer was partially trapped in a compromised  floor collapse and in another area of the occupancy a firefighter route was blocked due to fire extension resulting in the need to deploy this personal safety system (PSS)  to bail from a window. Reports indicated that FDNY Fire Lt. Richard Barnes fell through the second floor of the three-story Rockaways taxpayer building, but managed to hang on by his armpits until FAST firefighters could pull the 22-year veteran to safety, officials stated.

FDNY Firefighter Evan Davis transmitted a mayday signal when he was trapped by flames in another part of the building’s second floor, resulting in the eight-year veteran deploying his personal escape rope to lower himself out a window, unaware there was an adjacent roof less than 10 feet below.

  • The first mayday was transmitted 27 minutes into the operations, the second mayday was transmitted 43 minutes elapsed time into the operations
  • 10:36 hours – Duration 27 minutes elapsed incident time:  First Mayday, Trapped firefighter due to partial  floor collapse
  • Sixteen minutes later;
  • 10:54 hours – Duration 43 minutes elapsed incident time: Second Mayday, Firefighter bailout of window

A dozen of the 138 firefighters who responded to the fire suffered minor injuries.

Fire Officials reported the fire started about 10:oo hours near an oil burner in the basement of the building.

Read more: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/queens/close_call_for_qns_bravest_v120FHtVrYnSOlvMeile1L#ixzz1JAPLC1c6

The building (Fire Building) consisting of a single story commerical occupancy on the Alpha (street side) that was attached to a three story wood frame multiple occupancy (MO) structure 30 x 100 (ft)

From FirefighterSpot.com

 

Aerial From Bing Maps

 

Alpha Side Street View from GoogleStreets

 

Surrounding Properties consisted of the following based upon radio transmissions;

  • Exposure #1: Is a street
  • Exposure #2: Is a 2 Story Similar attach (structure)
  • Exposure #3: Is a Rear Yard
  • Exposure #4: Is an Alleyway

All – Hands transmitted:
7 – 5 – 1407 @ 10:19
Batt. 47 reports: Box 1407, All – Hands on arrival.
Extra Engine & truck. We have a heavy fire condition in a 3 Story Commercial.
Engine 309 & Lad. 134 are s/c

2nd Alarm:
2 – 2 – 1407 @ 10:21
Engs. 264, 328, 323
T. Lad. 153
Eng. 284 w / Satellite 4
Batt. 39 “Safety Officer”
Batt. 43 “Resource Unit Leader”
Rescue Battalion / Safety Battalion
Fieldcom 1 / Tactical Support Unit #2

Links and coverage;

Here’s the incident particulars based upon radio transmssions and transcript : From the Nassau FD Rant (HERE) NassauFDrant.com

  • FDNY Belle Harbor, Queens, New York April 9th, 2011
    Address: 424 Beach 129 st between Cronston and Newport Aves10:10 hours
    Phone Box 1407 – Report of fire in a restaurant
    Engs. 268, 329, 266
    L137, TL121
    Battalion 4710-75-1407 – 10:13 hours
    E265
    TL159 (FAST Truck)
    Battalion 33
    Division 13
    Squad 270
    Rescue 4

CIDS for 420 Beach 129 st:
Restaurant 1 story 30×100 class 3. Partial sprinkler siamese on exposure 1 for cellar and kitchen areas

7-5-1407 – 10:19 hours
Battalion 47: We have a heavy fire condition, extra engine and truck. All-Hands on Arrival.
E309, L134 S/C
RAC2

2-2-1407 – 10:19 hours
Engs. 264, 328, 323
E284 w/ Satellite 3
TL153
Battalion 39 (Safety Officer)
Battalion 43 (Resource Unit Leader)
Safety, Rescue Battalions
Tactical Support 2
FieldCom 1

10:23 hours – Duration 14 minutes
BC47: Box 1407, the address 424 Beach 129 st, we have fire on the 1st and 2nd floor extended to the 3rd floor, check the basement for extension. Exposure 1 is a street, 2 is a similar attached, 3 is a rear yard, 4 is an alley, k.

10:27 hours
TL157 S/C

10:29 hours
The staging area is Cronston Ave and Beach 131 st

10:29 hours – Duration 22 minutes
Division 13: 2nd Alarm Box 1407, we’ve got 4 lines stretched, 2 in operation, we have heavy fire on the 2nd floor of a 2 1/2 story commercial. You’ve got a 30×100, fire on the 2nd floor. 1st floor commercial occupancy, 2nd floor multiple dwelling, 3rd floor possibly apartments also.

10:31 hours – Duration 23 minutes
DC13: 2nd Alarm Box Box 1407, we have 4 lines stretched, 2 in operation. We’re going to change it from a 2 1/2 story to a 3 story building. Fire’s Doubtful, searches in progress, trucks are opening up, the 2nd Alarm is still Doubtful.

10:36 hours – Duration 27 minutes
DC13: 2nd Alarm Box 1407, a MAYDAY has been transmitted, the MAYDAY has been recovered and removed from the building. We put the FAST Truck to work, special call another FAST Truck. We’re Doubtful on the 2nd Alarm.
L173 (FAST Truck) S/C

10:38 hours – Duration 30 minutes
E321 S/C

3-3-1407 – 10:40 hours
Division 13 to Queens, URGENT, 3rd Alarm, as soon as you get the companies give me a rundown.
Engs. 254, 331, 225
Battalion 50
Battalion 58 (Staging Manager)
Battalion 42 (Air-Recon Chief)
Mask Service Unit
Car 4A( AC James Manahan, Assistant Chief of Operations)

10:41 hours
Car 1E (Commissioner’s Liaison) is responding

10:52 hours
Car 36A (Department Chaplain) is responding

10:54 hours – Duration 43 minutes
DC13: 3rd Alarm Box 1407, we had a 2nd MAYDAY, he used his PSS to escape the building.

10:55 hours
Car 11A (BC Thomas J. Richardson, Chief of Rescue Operations) is responding

11:00 hours – Duration 52 minutes
FieldCom: Progress report on the Queens 3rd Alarm Box 1407, the address 424 Beach 129 st near Cronston Ave, fire on the 2nd and 3rd floor of a 3 story commercial 30×100. Division 13 reports he has 6 handlines stretched in operation, truck companies continuing to open up and they’re in the process of setting up the tower ladder operation. Fire is Doubtful.

11:14 hours – Duration 1 hour 5 minutes
FC: Special call 1 additional truck, have them respond to the staging area.
TL107 S/C

11:18 hours – Duration 1 hour 9 minutes
FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, at this time Car 4A, Assistant Chief Manahan reports: a roll call has been conducted and all members are accounted for. Members have been backed out of the building and a tower ladder operation is in progress, and the fire remains Doubtful.

11:20 hours – Duration 1 hour 11 minutes
FC: Notify the Buildings Dept. to respond, they want to check the stability of the building.

11:25 hours
FC: By authority of the Incident Commander you can 10-2 the Air-Recon Chief.

11:27 hours – Duration 1 hour 18 minutes
FieldCom requests mixer-off message

11:33 hours – Duration 1 hour 24 minutes
FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, at this time Car 4A, Chief Manahan reports that they have 4 handlines in operation, they have 1 tower ladder in operation on exposure 1. Conditions remain the same and searches will be delayed. Fire remains Doubtful.

11:58 hours – Duration 1 hour 49 minutes
FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, at this time Car 4A, Chief Manahan reports that the safety chief is going to enter the building to assess the stability, searches are delayed, and the fire is now Probably Will Hold.

12:02 hours
Car 14C (Fire Marshal) is 10-84

12:09 hours
Car 14 (Chief Fire Marshal Robert Byrnes) is 10-84

12:11 hours
Car 4A is 10-8, Division 13 is Incident Commander.

12:32 hours – Duration 2 hours 23 minutes
FC: Progress report on Box 1407, primary searches on the 2nd and 3rd floors are complete and negative, k, the secondaries are in progress.

12:36 hours – Duration 2 hours 27 minutes
FC: Progress report on the 3rd Alarm Box 1407, Division 13 reports: The primary searches throughout the fire building are complete and negative, the secondaries are underway, and the fire is Under Control.

Relocations
Engines: 275/265, 319/266, 233/329, 259/331
Ladders: 155/121, 135/155, 150/134, 120/137, 125/173
Battalions: 48/43, 51/47, 52/51


FDNY Radio Codes HERE

Building Construction and Systems Training for Commanders, Company Officers and Firefighters

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Building Construction and Systems Training for Commanders, Company Officers & Firefighters

New for 2011

An intense and concentrated  series of programs examining trends and methods in building construction for the fire service with an emphasize on construction and  occupancy risk assessment, structural and construction systems, and their direct relationship on structural combat firefighting operations, firefighter survivability and the command decision-making process. Understand building systems and occupancy performance under fire conditions is mission critical with new and emerging technical information and data that is redefining tactical and operational models and firefighting protocols with new rules of engagement.

 Firefighters and Officers will gain a new understanding of inherent construction features and hazards that directly influence effective risk management and decisive strategic and tactical considerations with a focus on key construction features, inherent occupancy profiles that will influence strategic, tactical and task level operations and crucial assembly systems affected by fire dynamics, extreme fire behavior and combat fire suppression operations.

These programs & seminars examine crucial considerations for Reading the Building, Occupancy Risk Profiling, Adaptive Fireground Management, Tactical Patience, Predicative Occupancy Performance and Construction Resiliency correlating building construction performance toward combat structural fire suppression operations. Case studies will reinforce concepts presented and evoked.

2011 Training Program Offerings

  • Building Construction for the Company and Command Officer
  • Tactical Patience and the New Rules of Combat Fire Engagement
  • The New Fireground: Engineered Systems, Construction & Tactics
  • Building Construction and Tactical Operations
  • Reading the Building: Predictive Occupancy Profiling
  • The Doctrine of Combat Fire Operations 2011
  • Dynamic Risk Assessment & Firefighting
  • Tactical Renaissance:  Building Construction & Tactical Excellence
  • Extreme Fire Behavior & Fireground Operations
  • Tactical Entertainment and Firefighter Safety
  • Occupancy Risk Profiling and Firefighting Strategy & Tactics
  • Keynotes, Lectures, Special Presentations & Programs Available
  • Other Building Construction, Command, Tactics and Fire Fighter Safety and Operations programs Available  
  • More Here

Roof and Ceiling Collapses DCFD and Gary FD

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There have been two fire ground collapse events this week; the first in Gary Indiana on April 5th, the other in Washington DC on April 8th that resulted in a total of eight firefighters being injured. The collapse conditions presented themselves during the course of operations in which suppression or search and rescue operations were being conducted.  Each occupancy and construction type presents unique challenges and risks related to construction, materials, dead load and resiliency when impacted by fire, heat or fire suppression activities.

Maintaining effective and focused situational awareness of developing and progressing fire conditions, position and company assignments, and related monitoring of occupancy risk profile conditions may provide timely insights to changing conditions that may influence the incident action plan, strategies and tactics deployed or implemented. 

As always, when physical conditions allow and there is an uncertainty of building risk profiles, occupancy charactoristics, construction type and fire conditions, a 360 is advised.

Never under estimate the severity of what may transpire when a partial collapse of a roof or ceiling assembly may have on operating companies and personnel. 

  • When ever feasible, timely opening up of concealed spaces within the ceiling void, cockloft or truss loft of a roof assembly is imperative to assess the extent of fire, travel and intensity.
  • Observations openings within the ceiling membrane (from below) or roof deck (above) allows assessment determination for impingement of structural or support members and systems.
  • Use caution and be conservative in the use of Thermal Imaging devices for determining extent and magnitude of fire conditions within the concealed compartment; Refer to test results from the UL Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions Report and test data, HERE
  • When feasible, ensure eitehr dedicated truck/ladder companies or assigned task resources are available to provide coordinated tactical support to interior suppression and search and rescue assignments to manage fire behavior factors with appropriate incident, occupancy and building defined tactical deployments.
  • Think about what’s burning above you…it may very well be burning around or ontop of you, if systems, assemblies or components fail.

Three Gary (IN) firefighters were injured when the third floor ceiling of a burning building collapsed on Tuesday April 5th during search and rescue operations. According to published reports their injuries weren’t believed to be life-threatening, but they were taken to a hospital.

Battalion Chief Robert Groszewski stated about 20 firefighters responded to the fire at the site of the former Campbell Friendship House. He says no one was at home when the fire began.

Groszewski says the fire may have begun in a third-floor stairwell.

Other related links;

A ceiling collapse during a fire at a three-story building in Gary, Ind., injured three Gary firefighters Tuesday afternoon. (Credit: Gary Post-Tribune)

 

Aerial View

Aerial Delta Side

Aerial of Charlie Side, Roof and Exposure

 

The fire and collapse in Washington, DC has resulted in five DCFD firefghter injuries, of which one firefighter is in critical condition following a roof collaspse, entrappment and mayday in an unoccupied single family residential structure during primary search and rescue operations that was known to have homeless people occupy the structure on occassion.  According to various published reports, companies were making entry with pronounced fire conditions when the roof collapsed trapping the operating companies.

Reports from both STATter911.com and DCFD provided the following; DC Fire & EMS Department spokesman Pete Piringer indicated that five firefighters were hurt during a two-alarm house fire at 813 48th Street, NE. The fire was reported around 12:40 this morning. Three of the firefighters were from Rescue Squad 3 and were caught in the collapse of the roof of the one story, wood frame, single family home. At 7:30 AM Piringer reported one firefighter was in critical condition with significant burns, the other three with varying degrees of burns with expected early release.  

View more videos at: http://www.nbcwashington.com.

View more videos at: http://www.nbcwashington.com.

Street Side-Alpha

Aerial View from Bing

For some previous insights on ceiling systems, refer to the Gypsum Board Ceiling Systems and Firefigher Safety post related to the  Los Angeles (CA) FD line of duty death of veteran LAFD Firefighter Glenn Allen who died in the line of duties in February 2011 from injuries he sustained when a ceiling collapsed on him in a house fire. (HERE)

The Right View Point of the Fire Service

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This video speaks for itself, no other comments required; Listen in…..