Staffing at dozens of the city’s busiest FDNY engine companies will be cut starting February 1st, in a cost-saving move that the firefighters union argues will compromise public safety.
One firefighter will be removed from 60 of the city’s 194 engine companies once an agreement with the Uniformed Firefighters Association expires at midnight Tuesday.
The agreement – in place since 1996 – provided for those 60 engine companies to have a fifth firefighter plus a lieutenant – an arrangement that the union says allows crews to get water on a fire quicker.
Those 60 engine companies, which have a high volume of emergencies, will now be left with four firefighters and an officer – the same staffing as the FDNY’s 134 other engine companies.
FDNY expects to save about $30 million a year by not having to pay overtime to staff the extra firefighters, officials said. No firefighters will be laid off as a result of the change.
The UFA is fighting to reverse the staffing reduction by filing a petition with the city’s Office of Labor Relations.
UFA President Steve Cassidy stated, “Reducing staffing levels in firehouses costs the city more than it saves,” he said in a statement Monday.”We will have larger, more expansive fires that will cost the city of New York more money in the end–and that is unacceptable for public safety and firefighter safety.”
FDNY Commissioner Salvatore Cassano defended the staffing reduction according to published sources. “We just recorded the fewest fire deaths on record, and our response time to fires is the fastest ever,” he said, citing data from 2010.
The Commissioner stated FDNY has systems in place to address reduced staffing, including a protocol that calls for two engine companies, not one, to operate a hose line at a fire and went on to state that FDNY’s number one commitment to this city has always been and continues to be the safety of New Yorkers
The FDNY Press Release issued on January 31, 2011 read as follows:
Beginning tomorrow, February 1, the FDNY will reduce staffing by one firefighter on 60 of its engine companies so that all 194 engines in the city will be staffed with four firefighters and one officer. No firefighters will be laid off as a result of this change, which will provide savings of approximately $30 million in overtime that is currently needed to staff the fifth firefighter position. The change comes as the FDNY’s 15-year agreement with the Uniformed Firefighters Association (UFA) expires at midnight tonight.
“We just recorded the fewest fire deaths on record and our response time to fires is the fastest ever,” Fire Commissioner Salvatore J. Cassano said. “Our number one commitment to this city has always been and continues to be the safety of New Yorkers.”
The Department proposed the staffing reduction in last year’s budget and the city gave notice to the UFA months ago that it would not be continuing the agreement, known as “Roster Staffing,” that provided for the “fifth” firefighter on 60 engines.
The FDNY has existing operational protocols to address reduced staffing on engine and ladder companies, including when firefighters go on medical leave during a tour. The city’s 143 ladder companies will continue to be staffed with five firefighters and an officer at the start of the tour. Also, Department protocol calls for two engine companies – not one – to stretch and operate a hose line at a fire.
The city has in the last seven years reduced the 60 engine staffing level four times due to high rates of firefighter medical leave, a change provided for in the original 1996 Roster Staffing agreement.
No other fire department in the country operates with five firefighters on an engine.
The call had come at 7:59 on a Sunday morning, the day after a January blizzard had shut down the city. There was still more than a foot of unplowed snow on East 178th Street off the Grand Concourse, and some of it was still swirling in 45-mile-an-hour gusts. Wind like that has a habit of working like gasoline on even the tiniest fires.
Five trucks from five companies inched through the snow to converge on the tenement, a cookie-cutter version of thousands of other old buildings in the South Bronx. Engine 42 got there first; its men were stretching hoses from their truck and running them upstairs. Ladder 33 got there next, and a number of its men were sent to the third floor, where the fire was burning. The firefighters from Ladder 27 and Rescue 3 had arrived next; they were sent to the floor above the fire to clear it and keep the flames from spreading upward.
When the six men got to the fourth floor, they started searching from apartment to apartment, but they’d found no civilians (except the skinny guy and naked fat lady one of the guys saw hightailing it out of there just as they came up the stairs). Now they were in Apartment 4-L, feeling their way along the walls from room to room—six men loaded down with gear, sucking in air from their tanks—and soon they got turned around, lost in the smoke. Brendan Cawley, the probie with just a month on the job, kept seeing padlocks on the doors of every room and was confused; he hadn’t been around long enough to know how many apartments in this neighborhood had been converted into cheap, crowded rooming houses. This place had been chopped up, probably illegally. Random walls and carelessly thrown-up partitions created a maze.
The men were trying to make their way to the source of the heat surge, but among the locks and the walls and the smoke, they couldn’t seem to get there. And there was another problem: The men didn’t have working hoses. First, there was a frozen hydrant; then, something seemed wrong with some of the hoses themselves. The six men on the fourth floor couldn’t fight a fire they couldn’t find—and if any fire did come, they had nothing to fight it with.
At 8:26 a.m., Curt Meyran, the lieutenant in charge of the Ladder 27 crew, checked in on his radio. He was asked about the status of the fire on the fourth floor. “Slight extension, slight extension,” Meyran said—meaning they still saw just smoke, no fire.“Ten-four,” came the response.Somewhere between 18 and 23 seconds later—still 8:26 a.m., maybe even as the responder was talking—a turret of flame roared up though the floorboards. None of them saw it coming—in an instant, all six were pinned against the windows that faced the back. “We need a line on the floor above,” someone barked into the radio. “We have heavy fire on the floor above. Rescue to Battalion. Urgent.”
In the background, another voice—no one’s sure whose—could be heard: “We got no water!”
The flames formed a wall between the men and the apartment door. Walking out was no longer an option. Meyran called in a Mayday and he and Gene Stolowski and Cawley stuck their heads outside for air. At the windows next to them were two guys from Rescue 3, Jeff Cool and Joe DiBernardo. They had lost track of the sixth man, John Bellew. It was 17 degrees outside, but even as their faces were freezing, the men felt a scorching heat on their backs. Leaning out, they could see a fire escape two windows away—but it was too far for them to jump.
Meyran called in a Mayday at 8:29. Seconds later, DiBernardo radioed an outfit on the roof: “Brothers on the roof, you’re gonna need to send a rope over the side. Roof team—send a rope over the side to the two-four side of the building.” The flames were closer now. Jeff Cool could feel them at his neck. Cool had a wife and two kids. Meyran had a wife and three kids. Bellew had a wife and four kids. Stolowski had a daughter, and his wife was expecting twin girls in June. DiBernardo’s dad was a retired deputy fire chief. Cawley had an older brother who had died on 9/11.
Take the time to read both NIOSH reports and remember the sacrafice…
Three veteran FDNY firefighters died in the LODD in Brooklyn, New York and the Bronx on Sunday January 23, 2005, a day that has become known as “Black Sunday” and called one of the saddest in fire department history. Two firefighters were killed and four others were badly hurt when they were forced to jump from a fourth-floor window of a burning building in the Bronx. Later, a third firefighter died after tackling a basement blaze in Brooklyn.Lt. Curtis Meyran, 46, of Battalion 26, and Firefighter John Bellew, 37, of Ladder 27, died after battling the Bronx blaze on East 178th Street in the Morris Heights section.
Three firefighters were in critical condition at St. Barnabas, and a fourth was in serious condition at Jacobi Medical Center. Six Bronx firefighters became trapped in the building while searching for people on the fourth floor. When the fire from the third floor broke through to the fourth, they were faced with a horrifying choice. They jumped out a fourth-floor window, knowing that they would be critically injured.
Firefighters Jeffrey Cool, Joseph DiBernardo, Eugene Stolowski, and Cawley were badly hurt in the Bronx fire. They were trapped on the fourth floor and were left with the life-or-death choice of leaping 50 feet or burning up. The Brooklyn firefighter, Richard Sclafani, 37, died at a hospital after being injured at a two-alarm fire in the East New York section.
It will forever be remembered as Black Sunday – and now a highly-critical FDNY report into the double-fatal fire reveals how so many things went wrong on that day.
Two firefighters died and four were critically injured when fire and smoke in an illegally partitioned apartment forced them to jump from a fourth floor window.
Jeanette Meyran, Firefighter’s Widow: “You have to envision that it turned badly in seconds.”
The FDNY Internal Report of the event documented details of a long list of mistakes made from the top brass down to the front line.
Its key findings include:
Failure to provide firefighters with escape ropes.
Failure to update operational procedures.
Inadequate training.
Failure to communicate level of danger to command.
Failure to thaw two frozen hydrants.
Water loss in main hose line.
Partitioned walls.
Audio Radio Transmissions
NIOSH REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSIONS
Recommendation #1: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for structural fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters operating in hazardous areas have charged hoselines.
Discussion: It is department policy to initiate an aggressive interior attack (offensive strategy) whenever possible. Fire departments should ensure that a hoseline is in position prior to entering hazardous or potentially hazardous areas. At this point, the hoseline can be charged and entry made. If the hoseline doesn’t charge or flow is restricted, fire fighters will still have time and space to escape.According to Dunn, the most important fire fighting operation at a structure fire is stretching the first attack hoseline to the fire.
A properly positioned and functional fire attack line saves the most lives during a fire.“It confines the fire and reduces property damage. Searches will proceed quickly, rescues will be accomplished under less threat, sufficient personnel will be available for laddering, ventilation will be effective, and overhaul above the fire room will be unimpeded.”Firefighters should continually train on SOPs including but not limited to establishing effective water supply, proper hose deployment, and advancing and operating hoselines to ensure successful interior attacks.
Refresher training should be provided to all fire fighters on a regular basis or as needed to ensure effective fire fighting skills are maintained.
Recommendation #2: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters are trained on the hazards of operating on the floor above the fire without a charged hoseline and follow associated standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Discussion: The most dangerous location on the fire ground is operating above the fire, especially during operations without the protection of a hoseline. Before operating above a fire, it is a good practice to deploy a hoseline. Where there is risk of extension to concealed spaces, additional precautionary hoselines are needed. According to Dunn, fire fighters are most often trapped on a floor above a fire because they fail to size-up the fire below them.Fire fighters should make certain that they take all necessary precautions and size-up the fire before making entry above it. Fire fighters should determine whether suppression teams are capable of extinguishing the fire and notify command.
If not, then command should not permit fire fighters above the fire until conditions change. In this incident, operations continued above the fire on the 4th floor after the withdrawal of Engine 75’s hoseline.
Recommendation #3: Fire departments should ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations provide the incident commander with progress reports.
Discussion: Frequent progress reports to the IC are essential in the continuous size-up and assessment of an incident. Interior crews working in areas not visible to the IC are the IC’s eyes and ears during an incident. Progress reports also provide everyone on the fireground with information on aspects of the incident that relate to their activities (primary search, suppression, ventilation, etc.).
Recommendation #4: Fire departments should ensure that team continuity is maintained during interior operations.
Discussion: Fire fighters should always work and remain in teams whenever they are operating inside a burning structure. Team continuity means knowing your team members and who is the team leader, staying within visual contact at all times (if visibility is low, teams must stay within touch or voice distance of each other), communicating needs and observations to the team leader, staging as a team, and watching out for other team members. Teams that enter burning structures should enter and leave together to ensure that team continuity is maintained. Working in teams and maintaining team continuity provides an added safety net of fellow team members.
Recommendation #5: Fire departments should review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for incident commanders to divide up functions during complex incidents.
Discussion: Incident commanders have to address multiple tasks simultaneou
sly during high stress activities.Incident commanders can only manage so much information and should divide up functions to make the span of control more manageable. During complex events, the IC should assign other personnel to functions such as accountability, radio communications, incident safety, company tracking, and resident evacuation in order for the IC to effectively focus on fire command.
Recommendation #6: Fire departments should ensure that Mayday transmissions are prioritized and fire fighters are trained on initiating Mayday radio transmissions immediately when they become trapped inside a structure.
Discussion: In this incident, there was an initial delay in determining who made the initial Mayday transmission. The incident commander must monitor and prioritize every message, but only respond to those that are critical during a period of heavy communications on the fire ground. A radio transmission reporting a trapped firefighter is the highest priority transmission that command can receive. Mayday transmissions must always be acknowledged and immediate action must be taken. As soon as fire fighters become lost or disoriented, trapped or unsuccessful at finding their way out of the interior of structural fire, they must initiate emergency radio transmissions. They should manually activate their personal alarm safety system (PASS) device and announce “Mayday-Mayday” over the radio.
A Mayday call will receive the highest communications priority from dispatch, the IC, and all other units. The sooner the IC is notified and a RIT is activated, the greater the chance of the fire fighter being rescued. A transmission of the Mayday situation should be followed by the fire fighter providing his last known location. A crew member who initiates a Mayday call for another person should quickly try to communicate with the missing member via radio and, if unsuccessful, initiate a Mayday providing relevant information.
Recommendation #7: Fire departments should develop standard operating procedures (SOP’s) for fire fighting operations during high wind conditions.
Discussion: Fire departments should develop SOPs to protect firefighters, including using defensive tactics if necessary, during incidents when high wind affects fire conditions. According to Dunn, “when the exterior wind velocity is in excess of 30 miles per hour, the chances of a conflagration are great; however, against such forceful winds the chances of successfully advancing an initial hoseline attack on the structure are diminished. The firefighter won’t be able to make forward hoseline progress because the flame and heat under the wind’s additional force will blow into the path of advancement.” The wind at the time of the incident was gusting up to 45 miles per hour, blowing from the northwest, speeding the fire extension to the 4th floor.Fire fighters encountering high wind conditions should change their strategy. According to Dunn, “the interior line should be withdrawn and the door to the fire area closed.
The officer in command must be notified of the inability to advance the interior attack hoseline due to the strong wind. A second hoseline should be advanced on the fire from the opposite end, the window or door through which the wind is blowing. This method may require the firefighters to stretch the line up an aerial ladder, fire escape or portable ladder. The second attack line will advance on the fire from the upwind side.”
Recommendation #8: Fire departments should provide fire fighters with the appropriate safety equipment, such as escape ropes, and associated training in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely.
Discussion: According to NFPA 1500 Standard on Fire Department Occupational Safety and Health Programs, 2007 Edition, Section 7.1.1, “the fire department shall provide each member with appropriate protective clothing and protective equipment to provide protection from the hazards to which the member is or is likely be exposed.”
In this incident, aerials and ground ladders were unable to access the rear of the apartment. When fire fighters are beyond the reach of ladders, aerials, or elevated platforms, an option of last resort is a rope rescue. NFPA 1500, Section 7.16 Life Safety Rope and System Components states “all life safety ropes, harnesses, and hardware used by fire departments shall meet the applicable requirements of NFPA 1983, Standard on Life Safety Rope and Equipment for Emergency Services.” NFPA 1983 specifies the minimum design, performance, testing, and certification requirements for life safety rope, water rescue throwlines, life safety harnesses, belts, and auxiliary equipment for emergency services personnel. Fire departments in jurisdictions where high-rise fires are likely should provide all fire fighters with escape ropes per NFPA 1983 and the appropriate training to effectively utilize their escape ropes during emergencies.
Additionally,Recommendation #9: Building owners should follow current building codes for the safety of occupants and fire fighters.
Discussion: State building codes require that single room occupancies (SROs) in non-fireproof tenement buildings have automatic fire sprinklers in every hall or passage within the apartment and at least one sprinkler head in every room. This apartment building did not have sprinklers. The transformation of the 4th floor apartment into a SRO led to the construction of an interior partition wall that impeded the discovery of the fire and hindered the fire fighters’ searches. It also prevented fire fighters from reaching the rear fire escape, their secondary means of egress.
FDNY Report Says “Black Sunday” Deaths May Have Been Avoided
Anatomy of a Fall from NY1
Anatomy of the Mayday
(1) Firefighters Curt Meyran, Gene Stolowski, Brendan Cawley, and John Bellew, all from FDNY Ladder 27, arrive at 236 East 178th Street in the Bronx at approximately 8:05 a.m. on Sunday, January 23, 2005. Firefighters Jeff Cool and Joe DiBernardo, from the FDNY’s Rescue 3 unit, arrive soon after that.
(2) With firefighters from other companies already battling the blaze on the third floor, the main site of the fire, Meyran, Stolowski, Cawley, Bellew, Cool, and DiBernardo are sent to the fourth floor to clear it and prevent the fire from spreading. The six men case the area, but their efforts are made difficult by dense smoke and the mazelike structure of the chopped-up tenement building. Because of problems with a hydrant and other equipment, the men are also operating without working hoses.
(3) A burst of fire erupts through the third floor, trapping the six firefighters in Apartment 4-L. Their attempts to find a safe way out are thwarted by an illegal partition wall (in red, above) that hampers their efforts to find a fire escape.
(4) With the flames inches from their backs, the six men are forced to jump from four windows—a 50-foot drop. Meyran and Bellew die from the fall. They are survived by their wives and seven children, ranging in age from 5 months to 16 years old. The four other men suffer multiple critical injuries, are left with permanent disabilities, and are forced to retire from duty. The four survivors and two widows later sue the city for not supplying the firefighters with personal-safety ropes. Pinning the blame on the partition walls, the Bronx district attorney charges the building’s landlord and two tenants with manslaughter, criminal negligence, and reckless endangerment. Both legal actions are ongoing.
No Way Out
Then came the transmissions:
8:30:43: “Mayday! Mayday 56!Man down, fell out the window!”
8:30:48: “Mayday! Mayday!”
8:30:49: “Fireman down in the rear! Two firemen down in the rear!”
8:30:51: “Two firemen down in the rear—let’s go!”
8:30:54: “Seventy-five, put your pumps…”
8:30:58: “Mayday! Mayday! Two firemen jumped from the top floor in the rear. We need a…”
8:31:09: “Brother in the…”
“Oh, man!”
8:31:15: “Start a mixer off—we got a whole company in the rear, they had to jump.”
8:31:23: “No way, no…”
“We got six guys…”
8:31:35: “Roof, let the rope down!”
8:31:40: “Mayday! Mayday in the rear! We need EMS in the rear.”
8:32:20: “One, two, three, four, five, six who jumped in the rear! We need massive EMS here! Massive injuries!”
On the morning of January 23, 2005, six firefighters jumped out of four fourth-story windows of a tenement at 236 East 178th Street in the Bronx, falling 50 feet to the pavement. Two of them, Curt Meyran and John Bellew, died from their injuries; another four—Gene Stolowski, Brendan Cawley, Joe DiBernardo, and Jeff Cool—barely survived, sustaining massive injuries of their own that left several of them in the hospital for months and effectively ended their careers. Another firefighter, Richard Sclafani, died at an unrelated fire in Brooklyn that same afternoon, making that day the first since 1918 that men had died in two separate incidents in the city; the dual tragedies have come to be known as Black Sunday.
Now the surviving firefighters are telling their version of the story for the first time. To date, the men have spoken publicly only briefly, but because of litigation they’ve filed against the city, they’ve avoided giving a full account of what happened that day. In the past few months, however, the four of them have begun appearing at private firefighter gatherings to tell their story, and three of them sat with New York Magazine for their first extensive interviews, speaking out about controversies that have surrounded the fire for two years. Shouldn’t the department have outfitted the firefighters with personal-safety ropes—a piece of equipment that was once standard issue but was not provided at the time? Is the building’s landlord primarily to blame, for blocking off access to the fire escape with an illegal subdivision?
Should the department have kept the six men on the fourth floor that long, given the problems with the hydrants and hoses? Or were the men themselves in part at fault for not making their situation clear to the officers on the ground? The survivors’ stories also reveal for the first time something much more personal: just how deeply the tragedy has affected them and their families. Their lives—once centered around straightforward concepts like action and adrenaline, honor and bravery—are more complicated than they once were. They are heroes, but they are lost.
It took the Ladder 27 crew longer than they expected—about six minutes—to make it just ten blocks. The blizzard was part of the problem, as was a double-parked truck on East Tremont Avenue. It didn’t help that they had the wrong address, though that was quickly corrected. When Gene Stolowski saw Engine 42 and Ladder 33 stretching hoses up to the third floor of the building, he knew this one was real. “I think we got something,” he told Brendan Cawley. “Let’s go.”
Curt Meyran, Stolowski, and Cawley walked into the front entryway, a wide foyer where they saw the first signs of smoke (John Bellew, the driver, came up a few minutes later). Up they marched, passing the guys from Ladder 33 on the third floor. But already, things had started going wrong.
At 8:05 a.m., about the same time that Ladder 27 had arrived, the driver from Engine 42 had reported the frozen hydrant. Outside, firefighters hustled to connect hoses to a booster tank on their truck, while others stretched hoses to hydrants farther away. For a moment, the third floor got water back, then lost it again; then the water came back but the pressure was too weak and the nozzle would shut. Now the hoses seemed to be frozen or ruptured: No one knew which. Without water, the fire was spreading unchecked.
When the Ladder 27 crew reached the fourth floor, Meyran told Stolowski to prop open the stairway door with his maul. Meyran, Stolowski, and Cawley slipped on their oxygen masks and walked into Apartment 4-L. Everything was pitch-black—no lights, no windows, nothing but smoke. Clothes and furniture were everywhere. Cawley had to feel his way around so he wouldn’t trip. In one of the bedrooms, he ran into another firefighter, knocking him to the floor; he looked at the uniform and saw a number three. He later guessed it was Jeff Cool, who’d made it upstairs with Joe DiBernardo and others from Rescue 3.
A Typcial Modular Home-Can you Tell The Difference?
Modular homes are built using an engineered approach to produce buildings in a more efficient and cost effect method that can deliver lower home prices per square foot. Instead of the traditional stick-built, on-site construction methods, most of the work is pre-fabricated at an off-site climate controlled factory. As each sub-section is finished it is transported to the building site and constructed together using the same methods the current stick built homes use.
Everyonegoeshome.com Learning Media Center.
A recent informational video was produced and developed on Residential Modular Construction Fires -Lessons Learned. This video discusses the hazards and lessons learned from fighting fires in modular construction homes. Chief Kevin A. Gallagher, Acushnet Fire & EMS Department, MA presented an informative session on operational issues an insights on construction methods and practices.
Check out the results of Acushnet Fire & EMS Department’s efforts to change building code issues: Safety rule sparked by Acushnet fire takes effect HERE
Based upon the information presented in the EGH video, here’s some additional information to increase your awareness on this construction system and process. The question is this; “Are you aware of Modular Construction taking place in your response district, first-due area, greater alarm locations or mutual-aid districts?” Operational strategies, tactics and task assignments at buildings constructed of modular construction will perform differently than those of engineered, conventional or legecy construction, continuing the challenages in identifying building construction features, occupany risk and selecting the appropriate operational deployment profile and tactics. Remember, Building Knowledge=Firefighter Safety.
Modular buildings and modular homes are sectional prefabricated buildings or houses that consist of multiple modules or sections which are manufactured in a remote facility and then delivered to their intended site of use. The modules are assembled into a single residential building using either a crane or trucks.
Modular buildings are considerably different from mobile homes. Off-frame modular dwellings differ from mobile homes largely in their absence of axles or a frame, meaning that they are typically transported to their site by means of flat-bed trucks; however, some modular dwellings are built on a steel frame (on-frame modular), which can be used for transportation to the site. Many modular homes are of multi-level design, and are often set in place using a crane.
MODULAR HOMES ARE NOT MOBILE HOMES
Mobile names (also known as manufactured homes) are built according to the federal HUD building Code. This requires all mobile homes to built on a non-removable steel chassis, which severely limits their design options. Modular homes and buildings have no design limitations they can be any shape or size and will meet or exceed you local and state building codes. Modular buildings are just like any traditional building except they are modules (pieces) that are pre-built in factories and then assembled together using giant cranes in a similar fashion to lego blocks. Factory Built Housing (FBH) dates as far back as the early 1900′s with the advent of the Sears & Roebuck homes that were purchased out of a catalog and shipped to the customer. Customers would choose their design and several weeks later their new home (in 30,000 pieces) arrived via railcar! This was the beginning of the factory built concept where components of a home would be constructed off site and shipped to a building location.
After World War II wartime factory production quickly changed over to providing consumer products for a growing post war economy. This included providing housing. The manufactured housing industry saw a dramatic increase in popularity as the nation’s citizens became more affluent.
The 1960’s and early 1970’s saw manufacturers start to create a “modular” home product. This was basically a site built or “stick built” home completed in two units, transported to the building site on flat bed frames and then erected onto a permanent foundation. During this period the style of home was typically limited to a ranch home and normally consisted of a single floor and two major components or modules.
Manufactured and modular construction both grew substantially during the late 1970′s and into the early 1980′s. During this time, traditional builders (stick builders) struggled to keep up with demand. As a result, factory built homes began to emerge in the marketplace. Designs of modular homes moved from the typical ranch style to more complex split level, Cape Cod (1 ½ story) and two-story homes. Commercial applications of modular construction including motels, offices and school classrooms also began to emerge. Multiple rooflines, customized exteriors and more contemporary designs also began to develop.
During the mid-to-late 1990’s growth continued as home manufacturers began to build larger and more complex homes. Modular manufacturers ventured into sophisticated two-story, multi-family dwellings and customized luxury homes.
By this time many high-end modular homes cost more than $500,000, and that only included the unfinished units from the factory. This was in sharp contrast to consumers’ traditional mindset regarding modular homes. The industry had begun to mature and be recognized as a viable option that was in many cases preferable to traditional (stick built) homes.
Since 2000, modular building systems have seen an increase in production due to the favorable building conditions throughout the United States. As the demand for skilled labor and quality materials increases, modular construction will continue to be an attractive option for those seeking top quality construction at competitive prices.
Modular Home: A modular home is a home constructed in multiple sections in a factory. It is built to the same building code used by conventional site-builders and is transported to the home site where it is placed on a permanent foundation.
Modular Manufacturer: A company that constructs modular homes in multiple sections inside a climate controlled factory.
Modular Builder: The company that sells the home to the homebuyer and is responsible for ordering the home from the manufacturer. The modular builder constructs the foundation for the permanent installation of the home and is responsible for some final finish work after the home has been installed.
Modular Installer: A subcontractor who specialized in the installation of the modular home on the foundation.
Stick-built / Site-built home: A home constructed on the site it will occupy. This is the “traditional” method of home construction.
Modular Building Systems Association – National trade association representing the legislative and regulatory interests of the modular housing industry
ModularCenter.com Modular Homes National network of modular home builders & manufacturers along with general information on modular homes and a large database of modular home plans
Modular Building Institute – International trade association representing non residential modular construction professionals
The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) has recently issued a special report examining the characteristics of Attic Fires in Residential Buildings (PDF, 884 Kb). Developed by USFA’s National Fire Data Center, the report is based on 2006 to 2008 data from the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS).
According to the report:
An estimated 10,000 attic fires in residential buildings occur annually in the United States, resulting in an estimated average of 30 deaths, 125 injuries, and $477 million in property damage.
The leading cause of all attic fires is electrical malfunction (43 percent).
The most common heat source is electrical arcing (37 percent).
Almost all residential building attic fires are nonconfined (99 percent) and a third of all residential building attic fires spread to involve the entire building.
Ninety percent of residential attic fires occur in one- and two-family residential buildings.
Residential building attic fires are most prevalent in December (12 percent) and January (11 percent) and peak between the hours of 4 and 8 p.m.
Attic Fires in Residential Buildings is part of the USFA’s Topical Fire Report Series. Topical reports explore facets of the U.S. fire problem that USFA shares with fire departments and first responders around the country to help them keep their communities safe. Each report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in context.
The location of the attic provides many difficulties for firefighters when extinguishing the fire. Careful planning goes into deciding the best way to extinguish an attic fire.
Firefighters must decide whether to fight the fire from above or below, both of which present many difficulties. In both instances, firefighters have to consider that roofs or ceilings may collapse. The large amounts of water used to extinguish the blaze causes the insulation and wood beams to become saturated. Firefighters have been known to fall through the roof into the attic or through the attic into the floor(s) below.
In addition, not all attics have flooring. If firefighters enter the attic, they must be careful not to step outside the flooring area since they risk falling through the ceiling.
The construction of the attic is another area that presents difficulties to firefighters. Older and newer homes are constructed using different techniques. Older homes tend to have roofs that are framed with larger sized lumber, 2 by 6 inches.
These attics usually provide a continuous attic space with a peak as high as 8 feet. Conventional attics are not generally compartmentalized like many new home attics. Newer home attics typically employ a truss-framed construction that involves smaller wood boards placed in “A” (or triangular) shapes throughout the attic from the ceiling to the floor.
This construction can be difficult for a firefighter to navigate.
In addition, wood members in truss-framed construction can conceal fires and make extinguishing the fire more difficult. In large new homes and multifamily dwellings, many attics are constructed with fire stops, which can be as substantial as 2-hour, fire-resistance rated walls.
These help limit the spread of the fire from the attic to surrounding areas.
N.J. Firefighter bailout from Second-Story Window as a result of room fashover
An Asbury Park (NJ) firefighter was seriously burned while fighting an apartment fire in the seaside community. 41-year-old firefighter Jason Fazio was in listed in critical condition at St. Barnabas Burn Center in Livingston following Monday’s afternoon fire.
Officials indicated that Firefighter Fazio was injured when he went into the apartment above a row of stores on Main Street and the fire suddenly flashed over.
Fire Chief Kevin Keddy said Fazio jumped out the second-story window to save himself and suffered broken bones in addition to burns.
No one was home when the fire broke out at midmorning Monday. An adjacent apartment and a first-floor restaurant also were damaged.
Fazio’s 41st birthday was Monday, a day the 17-year veteran was acting captain of the truck company and went into the building at 400 Main St., which contains 12 apartments upstairs and stores on the street level at the corner of Main Street and Bangs Avenue.
The fire call came in at 10:13 a.m. from a merchant who reported smoke and fire inthe second-floor apartment listed as 418 Main, said Monmouth County Prosecutor Peter E. Warshaw Jr., whose office along with the county Fire Marshal’s Office and state Division of Fire Safety investigated the blaze.
By Monday night, Warshaw reported the fire had been determined to be accidental and originated in the front bedroom of the second-floor apartment. He said fireinvestigators were unable to rule out a failure in an electrical cord, supplying either a lamp or a space heater, that may have ignited paper, clothing or carpet in the area.
A fast-moving fire at a Philadelphia (PA) elementary school, which challenged PFD firefighters early this morning, has finally been placed under control. Crews responded out to the 5100 block of Warren Street in the city’s Parkside section just before 6:00 a.m. after a passing police officer noticed flames coming from the Global Leadership Academy Charter School. The school serves as many as 500 students grades K through 8.The first arriving firefighters found flames shooting from the basement and quickly went to work battling the fire.
A second and third alarm were quickly struck. A fourth alarm was called at 6:36 a.m. and as of 7:45 a.m., the response had been upgraded to 5 alarms.
Engine-16 arrived on scene with fire in the basement of a three story school, 50×75. B/C-11 placed all hands in service. D/C-1 reported heavy fire extending through out the building. Requested the second alarm struck and third alarms struck.
All companies went in service with heaviest water lines. Fire extended to an exposure in the rear. Fourth Alarm struck. The fifth alarm was eventually struck by command.
Firefighters established a collapse zone in the rear of the fire in anticipation of walls starting to fall. One firefighter was reported injured.
Some things to think about around the fire station today;
How prepared are your company or command officers to ascertain the magnitude and severity of what appears to be a fast moving fire upon arrival and quickly strike additional alarms or request mutual aid?
What are some of the concerns for fires within school occupancies in building structures of either Type II or III construction with vintage 1950-1960 construction?
Do your companies practice effective and efficient deployment and implementation of master stream devices?
Do you have the manpower and resources to place multiple ground and elevated master stream devices in service distributing adequate fire flows rates for sustained operations?
Are your companies and personnel familiar with the layout, configuration and construction features of similar structures in your jurisdiction, response, box or first-due areas?
The United States Fire Administration (USFA) has announced there were 85 onduty firefighter fatalities in the United States as a result of incidents that occurred in 2010, a 6 percent decrease from the 90 fatalities reported for 2009.The 85 fatalities were spread across 31 states. Illinois experienced the highest number of fatalities (9).
In addition to Illinois, only New York (8), Ohio (8), Pennsylvania (7), and Kansas (5) had 5 or more firefighter fatalities.
Acting U.S. Fire Administrator Glenn Gaines noted that “When evaluating the trend in onduty firefighter fatalities over more than three decades, the past two years have seemed to reflect a possible change in the firefighting culture of the United States where Everyone Goes Home, including all firefighters.” Gaines then added, “Working closely with our partners, USFA will continue every effort to be sure that when it comes to firefighter health and safety this downward trend in onduty firefighter deaths continues.”
Heart attacks and strokes were responsible for the deaths of 51 firefighters (60%) in 2010, nearly the same proportion of firefighter deaths from heart attack or stroke (58%) in 2009.
Nine onduty firefighters died in association with wildland fires, about half the number that died in association with wildland fires in 2009 and a third of the 26 such fatalities in 2008.
Forty-eight percent of all firefighter fatalities occurred while performing emergency duties.
Eleven firefighters died in 2010 as the result of vehicle crashes, down substantially from 16 deaths in 2009, and for the first time since 1999, none the of the deaths involved aircraft.
Four firefighters in 2010 died in accidents involving firefighters responding in personal vehicles.
Seven firefighter deaths involved fire department apparatus, one of which was a double firefighter fatality incident.
These 2010 firefighter fatality statistics are provisional and may change as the USFA contacts State Fire Marshals to verify the names of firefighters reported to have died onduty during 2010. The final number of firefighter fatalities will be reported in USFA’s annual firefighter fatality report, expected to be available by July.
Here’s some USFA/NFA Training Program Course Titles and direct Links to their respective Student Manuals (PDF Files) that you can download, review and take away some information for a company or department level drill or integrate into a class.
Without understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management, company level supervision and task level competencies…You are derelict and negligent and "not "everyone may be going home".
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past conventional construction; risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement. There is a need to gain the building construction knowledge and insights and to change and adjust operating profiles in order to safe guard companies, personnel and team compositions. It's all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and the art and science of firefighting, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk=F2S)
The Newest radio show on FireFighter Netcast.com at Blogtalk Radio… Taking it to the Streets with Christopher Naum. On the Air Monthly on Firefighter Netcast.com. A Buildingsonfire.com Series and Firefighter Netcast.com Production. Advancing Firefighter Safety and Operational Integrity for the Fire Service through provocative insights and dynamic discussions dedicated to the Art and Science of Firefighting and the Traditions of the Fire Service.
2010 Firefighter Fatality Provisional Statistics
2010 Firefighter Fatality Provisional Statistics
