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Tactical Renaissance

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My most recent post that stated and advocated that fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us. HERE

A common theme has been evident here at FRI in Dallas related towards the continued identified need for the fire service to begin what I call a Tactical Renaissance. I discussed what defines and identifies the attributes and suggested what needs to be instituted earlier in the week at FRI.

One thing is not only clearly self-evident throughout common themes this past week, but also resonates through direct discussions with various Executive Chief Officers, Field Operations Commanding Officers and Training Officers. They all agree that the fire service needs to do something-and soon in redefining our strategies, tactics and way we are doing business in the streets. “The times they are a changin….”
What do you think?
Posted by Christopher Naum on August 29, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , ,

It’s Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type

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The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified..

Risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments.

Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…

Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…

Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predicable as past Conventional Construction; Risk assessment, strategies and tactics must change to address these new rules of structural fire engagement.You need to gain the knowledge and insights and to change and adjust your operating profile in order to safe guard your companies, personnel and team compositions.

Again strategic firefighting operations; Strategies and tactics must be based on occupancy risk not occupancy type. The occupancies and buildings ( of all types and vintage) that require combat fire engagement and structural today demand firefighting strategies and tactics that are NOT the same as they were twenty or even ten years ago.

  • Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled;
  • Most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures.
  • This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.
  • Modern building construction is no longer predicable
  • Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
  • Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
  • Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
  • Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessmentRisk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
  • Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
  • Command & Company Officer dereliction
  • Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 27, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , ,

The Winds of Change, from the Floor of FRI

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Fire suppression tactics must be adjusted for the rapidly changing methods and materials impacting all forms of building construction, occupancies and structures. The need to redefine the art and science of firefighting is nearly upon us.

Some things do stand the test of time, others need to adjust, evolve and change.
Not for the sake of change only, but for the emerging and evolving buildings, structures and occupancies being built, developed or renovated in our communities.

The fire service is beginning to fully recognize the merits in adjusting, altering, and changing our strategic and tactical ways of doing business in the streets.

  • The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified;
  • Risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.
Posted by Christopher Naum on August 27, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , ,

The Job: Doing the Right Thing, At the Right Time, for the Right Reasons

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On Monday August 24th, two Buffalo (NY) Firefighters sustained injuries and died in the line-of-duty (LODD) during the conduct of operations at a two-story Type III (brick and joist) commercial occupancy in Buffalo, New York. The 911 call reported someone may be trapped inside the 1815 Genesee Street occupancy just before 4:00 hours. (more HERE and HERE)
Arriving companies reported a working fire in the basement. Lt. Charles “Chip” McCarthy of Rescue Company 1 was conducting search and rescue operations, when the number one floor collapsed, plunging him into the basement. Firefighter Jonathan Croom of Ladder Company 7 entered the building to search for Lt. McCarthy in response to the Mayday call. The mayday was called a little more than a half-hour into the incident. At about 4:09 AM, Command gave the following report:
“Twenty minutes into 1815 Genesee Street. Two-story ordinary. We are now operating three, inch and three quarter lines. We are doing an aggressive interior search. We still have a report of civilians trapped. We believe they may be in the basement. We are going to hold everybody we have including the two and one.”
Command soon asks for the balance of the second alarm. According to published reports and radio communication transcripts, companies reported difficulty getting into a basement door and deteriorating conditions on the number one floor. Genesee Street Command reported at the thirty-minute mark:
“Thirty minutes into 1815 Genesee Street. Still continuing to operate all hands. We will continue to hold the second alarm.” ( MP3 Communications, HERE)
There’s been a lot of talk of recent regarding the fire service cultural divides. We should take a moment to pause and reflect on the job of firefighting in light of the Buffalo LODD’s and refocus and recognize the job of firefighting has inherent risks, and the job requires us to; Do the Right Thing, at the Right Time, for the Right Reasons.
Lt. Chip McCarthy and Firefighter Jonathan Croom were doing the right thing, when deployed on the primary search and rescue assignment on the first-due, and the subsequent search and rescue on the RIT/mayday assignment. Their sacrifice in the line-of-duty, reflects the honor, courage, protection, fortitude and duty of the fire service.
Operations at buildings of Ordinary and Heavy Timber construction require a clear understanding of their inherent structural features and conditions, and a firm knowledge of structural degradation and compromise resulting from fire suppression operations. Firefighter safety and operational integrity is contingent upon knowing how these buildings perform and may be impacted by structure fires within their occupancies. More information and support training materials HERE and HERE. Remember; Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.
Posted by Christopher Naum on August 26, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , ,

Predictability

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THE MODERN ENVIRONMENT
The built-environments that form and shape our response districts and communities pose unique challenges to the day-to-day responses of fire departments and their subsequent operations during combat structural fire engagement. With the variety of occupancies and building characteristics present, there are definable degrees of risk potential with recognizable strategic and tactical measures that must be taken.

Although each occupancy type presents variables that dictate how a particular incident is handled, most company operations evolve from basic strategic and tactical principles rooted in past performance and operations at similar structures.

This basis is based upon Predictability of Performance.
• Modern building construction is no longer predicable
• Command & company officer technical knowledge may be diminished or deficient
• Technological Advancements in construction and materials have exceeded conventional fire suppression practices
• Some fire suppression tactics are faulted or inappropriate, requiring innovative models and methods.
• Fire Dynamics and Fire Behavior is not considered during fireground size-up and assessment
• Risk Management is either not practiced or willfully ignored during most incident operations
• Some departments or officers show and indifference to safety and risk management
• Command & Company Officer dereliction
• Nothing is going to happen to me (us)

Situation Awareness related to Building Construction, Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety is another mission critical element. Situation Awareness (SA) is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future.

It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic situations and incidents.

Both the 2006 and 2007 Firefighter Near-Miss Reporting System Annual Reports identified a lack of situational awareness as the highest contributing factor to near misses reported.

• Situation Awareness involves being aware of what is happening around you at an incident scene to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact operational goals and incident objectives, both now and in the near future.

Command and company officers and firefighters MUST understand the building, the occupancy features and the inherent impact of fire within and on the structure, AND be able to identify, communicate and take actions necessary to support the incident action and battle plans, mitigate incident conditions and provide for continuous safety protection to themselves, their team, their company and the entire alarm assignment operating at the incident scene.

If you’re in Dallas this coming week for the IAFC Fire Rescue Conference, I’ll be presenting two programs: Structural Anatomy; Building Construction for the Command and Company Officer and Dynamic Risk Assessment of Occupancies for Combat Engagement. Stop by, or catch me in the street during the week, you can’t miss me. In addition, stop in at the IAFC Safety, Health and Survival Section meeting on Friday August 21 to hear the latest on FF SH&S; issues.

Check for updates from the IAFC Conference floor from my reports on Twitter: http://twitter.com/Bldgsonfire and http://twitter.com/commandsafety

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 22, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , ,

Remembrance: Deutsche Bank Fire FDNY LODD- August 18, 2007

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Remembrance: Deutsche Bank Fire and Double FDNY LODD in lower Manhattan, NYC- August 18, 2007
Structural Anatomy; Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites
Fire operations for structures undergoing construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and danger to operating personnel. This reality was clearly validated when two FDNY firefighters died in the line-of-duty during a seven-alarm fire that tore through the abandoned Deutsche Bank skyscraper in lower Manhattan, next to ground zero in New York City on Saturday August 18, 2007.The Deutsche Bank Building located at 130 Liberty Street adjacent to the quarters of FDNY Engine 10, Ladder 10, was once a 40-story high-rise structure that had been systematically reduced to 26-stories at the time of the fire. Significant building contamination from numerous toxic substances that included asbestos and lead resulting from the destruction of the World Trade Center during the September 11th attacks required the deliberate floor-by-floor dismantling effort as part of the deconstruction process that would ultimately remove the building from its present site.
The two FDNY firefighter fatalities were Fr. Joseph Graffagnino, an eight year veteran and Fr. Robert Beddia a twenty-three year veteran, both assigned to Engine 24 and Ladder 5 in SoHo. The seven alarm fire was being worked with a contingent of over 275 firefighters when the pair became trapped on the 14th floor of the building after being overcome by blinding concentrations of dense smoke after their air supply was depleted during the course of combat fire suppression operations.
Its these types of unique and dangerous elements confronting incident commanders, company officers and operating forces that demands a clear understanding that fire suppression operations in buildings during construction, alterations, deconstruction, demolition and renovations present significant risks and consequences that require a methodical and conservative approach towards incident stabilization and mitigation.
You cannot implement conventional tactical operations in these structures. Doing so jeopardizes all operating personnel and creates unbalanced risk management profiles that are typically not favorable to the safety and wellbeing of firefighters.
For more information on Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites, go HERE and HERE
Operational Safety at Deconstruction & Demolition Sites Power Point program download, HERE
Posted by Christopher Naum on August 18, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , ,

Structural Stability of Engineered Systems: What do you really know?

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I recently posed some questions related to Engineered Structural Assemblies & Systems (ESS) and asked if you knew what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence incident operations. In addition, I asked you to do some research and check the terms that were presented for starters. OK, its examination day…Did anyone do any basis research yet? Did you ID the terms? (…I can hear those crickets chirping).

In preparation for a program presentation at IAFC FRI in Dallas the end of this month on Building Construction, specifically aimed for Command and Company Officers, it occurred to me that many personnel have not taken advantage of an exceptional resource tool available to them (FREE) thru the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Online University (HERE), where they offer over 1500 courses, many of which have direct interest to the Fire Service.One program of note is the Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions, online CBT.

This two-hour presentation summarizes a research study on the hazards posed to firefighters by the use of lightweight construction and engineered lumber in floor and roof designs. The program provides comparative test results related to legacy (conventional) versus modern engineered construction systems. The operative insights that I want to draw your attention to are the opportunities to gain mission critical insights on time to collapse timelines, as well as operational limitations and readings related to thermal imaging devices while working above fire involved floor or roof areas.

Pay particular attention to the time-to-collapse sequences and times; consider these in you IAP and tactical deployment. The tests also provides indicators that floor or roof assembly deflection (give or bounce), which has been a universal tactic as an possible indication of imminent collapse, may actually not be a reliable indicator, with some floor assembly tests having a deflection of less than 3/4” immediately before structural failure. Add to this carpeting or lightweight concrete coatings, top-side surface temperature (TIC readings) may change little even as the structural integrity of the support system is rapidly diminished below.

You do not have the buffer of allotted operational time that you might have presumed. These faulted assumptions may have catastrophic consequences. In my lecture series Buildingsonfire: Engineered Structural Systems & Fireground Operations, as I’ve traveled around the country presenting these programs, common themes prevail from coast to coast; the fire service assumes it has more operational time than is actually present before a collapse will occur, that the collapse will be isolated and survivable, that RIT will prevail in a successful outcome and that there is an inadequate knowledge base of understanding of ESS, legacy/conventional construction and the relationships of command risk managment and tactical operations by commanding officers.

I would encourage you to invest some time in taking this program and gaining a fresh view of Engineered Structural Assemblies & Systems (ESS) and how these emerging test results and data may influence your field operations the next time you’re in the street confronted with fire suppression operations in an occupancy with suspected or known ESS.For those of you attending the IAFC FRI in Dallas, here are a couple of programs worth looking at (there are many more..), HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE and HERE.

Remember, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 13, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , ,

The Consciences Observer or Activist

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The Consciences Observer or Activist. So… the operative question today is this: What did you do on your last alarm response related to operational safety and enhanced situational awareness? Do you: participate in, contribute, join in, share, lead, promote, instruct, present, facilitate, help, assist, aid, or neglect, disregard, undermine, abuse, challenge, demoralize, undercut, damage, torpedo, circumvent, or avoid?

Taking it to the Streets
The adage that the fire service has more recently adopted states; “There are no “routine calls”; referring to the safety consciousness that all responding companies should endeavor to consider when responding to an incident . We seem to do a lot of things at times out of common practice and repetition, you know; “We’ve always done it that way….” syndrome.

  • There’s a resonating theme that is making its way around the fire service dealing with an apparent “culture of extinguishment” and the suggested and inaccurately described “diametrically opposing” fire service safety culture promoted by those on the “Dark Side”
  • Are you an active participant, engaged and contributing towards safety operational parameters of our profession or are you the consciences observer, passively or aggressively sitting on the sidelines of the apparatus floor? Campaigner or militant; advocate or protester? Where do you stand?
  • I began this discussion today with one distinct, poignant contemplation and value; Do YOU have the Courage to be Safe?
  • The resonating theme that challenged all of us and carried the banner of Safety during this year’s Safety week was; Protect Yourself: Your Safety, Health and Survival Are Your Responsibility.
  • YOUR Responsibility-Not someone else’s, but your; responsibility, task, job, duty, charge, accountability conscientiousness, and obligation.
  • We don’t really think anything is going to happen to us, certainly nothing so adverse that I don’t go home after the call.
  • Nothing is going to happen to YOU; it happens to someone else….
  • BUT to everyone else-YOU are the other Guy!

On any give day, at any give alarm, the dynamics around us at times may be in or out of our direct control. We may not be able to see what the cards have in store for us, BUT we must ensure we use every fragment of training, fortitude, knowledge, skills, courage, bravery, insights, luck and sometimes (other divine) intervention to get us through.We must have the fortitude and courage to be both safety conscious and measured in the performance of our sworn duties while maintaining the appropriate balance of risk and bravery.

The demands and requirements of modern firefighting will continue to require the placement of personnel within situations and buildings that carry risk, uncertainty and inherent danger. As a result, risk management must become fluid and integrate all personnel. We must manage dynamic risks with a balanced approach of effective assessment, analysis and probability within command decision making that results in safety conscious strategies and tactics.

Stop and reflect today, where do you stand? What are your true beliefs and convictions in regards to the developing safety culture that is being forged and institutionalized within our fire service? Are your professing one thing, but implementing or allowing another circumstance?

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 9, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , ,

Fourteen Minutes to Mayday

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Fourteen Minutes to Mayday

On April 04, 2008, a 37-year-old female career captain and a 29-year-old male part-time fire fighter were fatally injured when a section of floor collapsed and trapped them in the basement during a fire at a residential structure. At 0611 hours, an automatic alarm dispatched the fire department. Dispatch upgraded the alarm to a working structure fire 9 minutes later. At 0623 hours, the victims’ engine was the first to arrive on scene. The homeowner met the engine crew and stated that the fire was in the basement and everyone was out.

With moderate smoke showing, the captain and the fire fighter donned their self-contained breathing apparatus and entered the residence through the opened front door with a 1¾” hoseline. A second fire fighter joined the captain and fire fighter at the basement stairs doorway. After the captain called for water several times, the line was charged and both fire fighters took the hoseline to the bottom of the stairs but needed additional hoseline to advance.

The second fire fighter went back up the stairs to pull more hose at the front door. As he returned to the basement stairway, he saw the captain at the top of the stairs, trying to use her radio and telling him to get out. A captain from the second arriving engine noticed the smoke getting black, heavy, and pushing out the front door and requested the incident commander (IC) to evacuate the interior crew.

The second fire fighter exited the structure alone. The IC made several attempts to contact the interior crew with no response. At 0637 hours, the IC sent out a “Mayday.” A rapid intervention team was activated and followed the hoseline through the front door and down to the basement. Returning to the first floor, they noticed a collapsed section of floor and went to investigate the debris in that area of the basement.At 0708 hours, the captain was found near a corner of the basement. At 0729 hours, after removing debris from around the captain, the other fire fighter was located underneath her and some additional debris. Both victims were pronounced dead at the scene.

Key contributing factors identified included;

  • the initial 360-degree size-up was incomplete,
  • likely disorientation of victims effecting key survival skills,
  • radio communication problems,
  • well-involved basement fire before the department’s arrival, and
  • potential fire growth from natural gas utilities.

Spend some time today discussing operational issues affecting tactical deployment for basement fires, or fires in areas with limited access and initial operations above the fire. Think about fire dynamics, fire behavior, building construction; features and systms, structural stability and the 360 Assessment.

Take the time to conduct an appropriate 360 degree risk assessement of a structure and perform the necessary structural triage of the occupancy, assess the observations and communications into safe and well define incident action plans (IAP), that also take into account the dynamics of the evolving incident, time considerations and situational
awareness.

NIOSH Report Here http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200809.html

Aditional References; HERE , HERE and HERE

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 8, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , ,

History Repeating Events: Waldbaum’s Fire FDNY August 2, 1978- SIX LODD

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31th Anniversary of the Waldbaum’s Fire

The Waldbaum’s fire, Brooklyn, New York occurred on August 2, 1978. Six firefighters died when the roof of a burning Brooklyn supermarket collapsed, plunging 12 firefighters into the flames. The fire began in a hallway near the compressor room as crews were renovating the store, and quickly escalated to a fourth-alarm. Less than an hour after the fire was first reported, nearly 20 firefighters were on the roof when the central portion gave way.

Thirty-four firefighters, one emergency medical technician and one Emergency Services police officer were injured in the fire and the tragedy is remembered as one of the worst disasters in the New York City Fire Department’s 143-year history.

The FDNY members killed in the Waldbaum’s fire included:
• Lt. James E. Cutillo, Battalion 33;
• Firefighter Charles S. Bouton, Ladder Company 156;
• Firefighter Harold F. Hastings, Battalion 42;
• Firefighter James P. McManus, Ladder Company 153;
• Firefighter William O’Connor, Ladder Company 156; and
• Firefighter George S. Rice, Ladder Company 153.

The fire started at 8:40 am in Waldbaum’s supermarket, Ave. Y and Ocean Ave., Sheepshead Bay. Nearly 23 electricians, plumbers etc were renovating the building when the fire started in the mezzanine area. , All hands at 8:49 2nd at 9:02. Shortly after 9:20 with 20 firefighters on the roof a crackling sound was heard and the center portion of the roof fell into the smoke and flames. Some of the firefighters were seen running toward the edge of the roof, some made it, others nearby fell into the hole. At 9:18 3rd alarm sent in. Later it went to a 5th alarm.

Laborers and firefighters managed to pull out some who were near walls, some crawled out. Several holes were made into the wall to pull out injured survivors and victims.Two factors contributed to the collapse of this bowstring arch truss, a double roof (rain roof) alteration and the extent and severity of the fire.

This roof collapsed 32 minutes after the initial units arrived.

References:http://stevespak.com/waldbaums.html

Fire Investigation: An Analysis of the Waldbaum Fire, Brooklyn, New York, August 3, 1978. Quintiere, J. G. NISTIR 6030; June 1997http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=442&itemID;=18676&;…

The lessons learned in the years following the Walbaum’s fire in 1978 and the subsequent Hackensack Ford Fire, NJ in 1988 focused on understanding building construction systems, occupancies and structural assemblies, in both of these cases the timber bowstring truss systems. Over the years the foundation of knowledge necessary to build competencies and knowledgeable firefighters, fire officers and commanders cognizant in the science and technology of building construction has waned and at time has been less than an area of focus.

Take the time to read and learn about the FDNY Walbaum’s fire, its History Repeating significance as a major fire service LODD event, the lessons learned from the Hackensack Ford Fire (July 2, 1988).Look at your buildings within your response areas and jurisdiction. Understand how they’re built and more importantly how they are affected by the exposure and impingement of fire and its byproducts. Understand key building performance indicators and appropriate strategic and tactical actions based upon building profiles, occupancies, fire loading, construction features and fire service resources.Take the time to honor the brave brother firefighters from FDNY who made the supreme sacrifice thirty years ago, and gave a legacy to learn from in this and in future fire service generations.

Its time to think; BUILDING KNOWLEDGE = FIREFIGHTER SAFETY

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 4, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , ,

Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) Tactics

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Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV) Tactics
Improving firefighter safety is an ongoing effort for the fire service. A series of fire experiments were conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Building and Fire Research Laboratory to better understand the effectiveness of using fans at different locations to reduce the temperature in stairwells, corridors, room of origin, etc.

The tests were not limited to a single-family home, but high-rise buildings of different heights were also investigated. All of the fire tests, videos, and technical reports are compiled on a DVD entitled, Positive Pressure Ventilation Research: Videos and Reports, by Stephen Kerber and Daniel Madrzykowski (April 2008).

The DVD contains two discs. Disc one contains six complete reports on Positive Pressure Ventilation (PPV), covering PPV characteristics using Computation Fluid Dynamics (CFD) and in several different fire test configurations: Room fire, firefighter training building, high-rise pressure experiments, and high-rise fire experiments. Another report evaluates the ability of the Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) to simulate PPV in the laboratory and in regular environments.

Disc 1 also has a narrated video presentation: Overview of NIST Positive Pressure Ventilation Research, experiment videos from the apartments on the 3rd and 10th floors, as well as full versions of all the reports. Disk 2 has additional experimental videos from the apartments on the10th and 15th floors.

NIST received support for this work from the U. S. Fire Administration/Department of Homeland Security (USFA/DHS), and fire departments across the United States. NIST has taken engineering principles and applied them to fire service PPV tactics so that firefighter safety may be improved.

To obtain a copy of the DVD set, contact Dan Madrzykowski via e-mail (madrzy@nist.gov)
providing your name and complete mailing address. More information on NIST’s PPV research is available online at: http://www.fire.gov/PPV/index.htm.

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 4, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , ,

The NEW Lexicon and Challenges

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Engineered Structural Assemblies & Systems (ESS)

· THE Predominate Fire Service Challenge….The NEW Lexicon to add to your operational safety vocabulary and incident action plans…

  • · Do you know what they represent and how these components, assemblies and systems may affect or influence incident operations?
  • · Do some research and check these terms out for starters. We’ll talk more about these components and assemblies in the near future. So get busy on your down time today…
  • It’s a Lot More than just talking about “Light Weight” Construction….

  • From Plywood-CDX….to…
  • Particle Board- PB
  • Orient Strand Board-OSB
  • Structural Composite Lumber- SCL
  • Laminate Strand Lumber- LSL
  • Laminate Veneer Lumber-LVL
  • Structural Insulated Panels-SIP
  • Parallel Strand Lumber-PSL
  • Machine Stress Rated Lumber- MSR
  • Medium Density Fiberboard-MDF and MDL (Lumber)
  • Finger Jointed Lumber-FJL
  • Adhesives…

Take a look at an informative posting over at the Firegeezer, HERE. He has some great contributed information and manufacturer “insights” on the subject engineered wood I-joists and beams and firefighter safety. There are some interesting statistical extrapolations, correlations and conveniences’ that attempt to make the case. But then again, You be the judge. Take at look at the presentation developed by the American Forest and Paper Association, HERE and HERE. This material has been out for a while and is now, just getting more exposure and distribution. Take the time to review the NIOSH reports for mission critical lessons-learned and risk reduction strategies and insights. Think about what your tactical needs are and how they align with the risk of the structure and occupancy.

We’ll have some more detailed follow-up on engineered systems information here at Taking it to the Streets.

Remember, Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety (Bk-F2S)

Don’t forget to check out the free online training program on Structural Stability of Engineered Lumber in Fire Conditions at the UL University HERE

Other Important Reference links:

  • NIOSH Publication No. 2009-114: Preventing Deaths and Injuries of Fire Fighters Working Above Fire-Damaged Floors HERE
  • NIOSH Publication No. 2005-132: Preventing Injuries and Deaths of Fire Fighters Due to Truss System Failures HERE
  • Volunteer Deputy Fire Chief Dies after Falling Through Floor Hole in Residential Structure during Fire Attack—Indiana, HERE
  • First-floor collapse during residential basement fire claims the life of two fire fighters (career and volunteer) and injures a career fire fighter captain – New York, Report HERE
  • Career Fire Fighter Dies After Falling Through the Floor Fighting a Structure Fire at a Local Residence – Ohio, HERE
  • Colerain Township, Ohio Double LODD Preliminary Report, HERE /li>
  • NFPA Report on Light Weight Construction, HERE
Posted by Christopher Naum on August 4, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , ,

Risk-Preferring and Self-Indulging Firefighting

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I had the privilege to spend some time recently with a tremendous group of knowledgeable and dedicated command and company officers at the 2009 Arizona Fire Service Leadership Conference hosted by the Arizona Fire Chief’s Association in Glendale, Arizona. Chief Ron Dennis, the Executive Director of the AFCA did a wonderful job of planning and facilitating a rich and rewarding program of presentations by some of the fire service’s foremost leaders that included Chief Charlie Dickinson, Deputy Administrator, USFA, (ret), Chief Dennis Rubin, Chief Jeff Johnson, Chief Alan Brunacini (ret), Chief Rich Marinucci, Chief Greg Cade (ret), Howard Cross, Chief Kevin Brame and Chief Bill Jenaway to name a few.

I had the opportunity to present a though provoking program addressing current trends in Building Construction, and the impact and influence on Command Risk Management and Firefighter Safety. An interesting discussion prevailed during one segment of the presentation that I’d like to share with you. While on shift today or at the station this evening or during the week, think about the following and where and how you fit into the big scheme of things. Explore and discuss the ramifications of risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There’s more here than meet’s the eye, IF you look hard enough.

Risk-Preferring and Self-indulging Firefighting
Don’t mistake determined, effective and proactive firefighting with that of reckless, baseless and risk-preferring and self-indulging firefighting. There is a difference, a big difference! When we address relationships of Building Construction, Command Risk Management and FireFighter Safety with the occupancy and structural environment, all personnel, regardless of rank, need to equate the occupancy risk with strategic and tactical incident action plans.These safely compliment the identified firefighting operation risk, with the projected building risk profile and interface appropriate behavioral characteristics in the task level firefighting activities. Again, equating building, occupancy risk profiles with determined, effective and proactive firefighting.

The traditional attitudes and beliefs of equating aggressive firefighting operations in all occupancy types coupled with the correlating, established and pragmatic operational strategies and tactics MUST not only be questioned, they need to be adjusted and modified; risk assessment, risk-benefit analysis, safety and survivability profiling, operational value and firefighter injury and LODD reduction must be further institutionalized to become a recognized part of modern firefighting operations.

Risk-Preferring and Self-Indulging Firefighting It’s no longer just brute force and sheer physical determination that define structural fire suppression operations. Aggressive firefighting must be redefined and aligned to the built environment and associated with goal oriented tactical operations that are defined by risk assessed and analyzed tasks that are executed under battle plans that promote the best in safety practices and survivability within know hostile structural fire environments. Consider the following definitions as they relate to defining structural combat fire suppression operations.

Aggressive and Measured Approach
Aggressive: Assertive, bold, and energetic, forceful, determined, confident, marked by driving forceful energy or initiative, marked by combative readiness, assured, direct, dominate…

Measured: Calculated; deliberate, careful; restrained, think, considered, confident, alternatives, reasoned actions, in control, self assured, calm…

You be the judge as to what should be appropriately defining interior fire suppression operations.

It’s all about understanding the building-occupancy relationships and integrating; construction, occupancies, fire dynamics and fire behavior, risk, analysis, the art and science of firefighting, safety conscious work environment concepts and effective and well-informed incident command management. This is what it’s going to take to truly provide a means for “everyone to go home”. It’s Occupancy Risk not Occupancy Type. Many of today’s incident commanders, company officers and firefighters lack the clarity of understanding and comprehension that correlate to the inherent characteristics of today’s buildings, construction and occupancies. We assume that the routiness of our operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.

Posted by Christopher Naum on August 3, 2009 • Filed under: Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , ,