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Still and Box for CFD: Near Miss Stairwell Collapse in Chicago

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A fire in a three story multiple family apartment building injured four City of Chicago (IL) firefighters when an interior stairway collapsed during firefighting operations.

The building was constructed in 1927 and consisted of 5456 square feet of space with 3-5 apartment units. Built of masonry wall construction with a wood floor joist system, the fire was reported at 8:43 a.m., in the Type III classified occupancy.

Street View Pre-Fire

The fire began as a basement fire that travelled up two floors, eventually compromising an upper stairway which resulted in compromise and collapsed injuring four Chicago firefighters.

The inherent characteristics of the building and the manner of fire travel and impingement are apparent contributors to the event.

 

Aerial- Alpha; Goggle Maps

CFD Fireground Operations: Photo Tim Olk

 

The four firefighters sustained injures during operations when the internal stairwell connecting the second and third floors gave way.

The mayday was transmitted, and a  211 Plan 1 at approximately 09:00 hrs., seventeen minutes into the operation according to published reports issued by Deputy District Chief Lynda Turner.  Following the mayday and firefighter removals, defensive operations were initiated.

Two of the firefighters sustained smoke inhalation and two firefighters minor injuries, according to Fire Department officials.

Posted by on April 13, 2013 • Filed under: "Situational Awareness" assessment, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, close-call, Collapse, construction, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighter, firefighting-operations, floors, Mayday, near-miss, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Large Warehouse Fire: Gastonia, NC

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A large warehouse fire in a 211,000 SF complex resulted from from a transformer explosion this morning at the Wix Distribution Center in Gastonia, NC.  The building complex was a former textile mill and was built in 1917.

Published report indicate that more than 60 firefighters operated at the scene to control the fire.

It was reported that  Fire Chief Phillip Welch stated firefighters started fighting the fires inside the building after the transformer explosion occurred, but it quickly got out of control.“There was an aggressive attack inside, but just because of the storage fight, we were not able to overcome that nor was the sprinkler system,” Welch said.

 

Aerial View, BING Map Capture

Considerations and Thoughts

  • How prepared is your department for a large scale fire in a large footprint warehouse?
  • Have you completed pre-fire plans, walk through tours and table top exercises for the key at risk buildings or complexes?
  • Do you know what the sustained water flow requirements might be for a heavily or fully involved complex or building?
  • Practices and honed your skills on establishing and managing  a complex, multi-operatonal period incident?
  • Have you looked at creating box alarms or pre-arranged greater alarm response and resource requests?
  • Have you trained with the departments, jurisdictions and companies that might respond?
  • Do you have strategies and tactics identified and have you trained on them for operations in large scale buildings?  Don’t implment and treat the incident like you would a residential or small commercial fire….
  • Respect the building and predict with conservative decision-making
  • Manage and expect compromise and collapse, rapid fire extention and operational challenges to fixed suppression systems and protectivies
  • Don’t over extend companies while attmtping to operate in the interior: These are typcially closed building ( lack of immedate exiting capabilties) with a special need for air management and accountability and access control.
IMAGES: Scene of Gastonia warehouse fire Saturday gallery

Posted by on April 13, 2013 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, construction, fire behavior, Fire Flow, firefighter, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting-operations, fires, occupancies, operations, pre-planning, size-up, Systems, Systems and Assemblies, tactics, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Three Alarm High rise Fire: FDNY Bronx

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Lucas Jackson / Reuters/REUTERS

 

FDNY Bronx 66-33-2224 Third Alarm at 225 E 149th Street;

A three-alarm blaze tore through a South Bronx building on Saturday morning — leaving at least 37  people, including a child, hurt, according to published reports. The fire started on the fifth floor of the 27-story E. 149th St. building near Park Ave. about o7:40 a.m. More than 135 firefighters were operating. News media is reporting taht the fire was under control in a two hour time span.  Fire officials say 37 people suffered injuries as a result of a three-alarm fire Saturday morning at a 27-story building in the Bronx.

From NYC Fire Wire on Facebook

There are almost 500 apartments in the building, along with more than 20 stores. Video Clip and FDNY Interview HERE

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Aerial of Complex, BING Maps

Google Street Maps Image Capure

Links:

 

Posted by on April 13, 2013 • Filed under: Bronx, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, FDNY, firefighting, firefighting-operations, fires, Highrise, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , ,

Predictability of Building Performance – Expect Fire

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The Predictability of Building Performance must take into consideration that in the context of today’s fire ground, buildings and fire dynamics, small changes on initial compartment or structure conditions may often produce and result in large-scale or magnitude changes that affect the long term outcome of the incident.
 
We have assumed that the routiness or successes of past operations and incident responses equates with predictability and diminished risk to our firefighting personnel.
 
Our current generation of buildings, construction and occupancies are not as predictable as past construction systems, occupancies and building types; therefore the risk assessment and size-up process, and resulting strategies and tactics must adapt to address these evolving rules of combat structural fire engagement that challenge anecdotal practices and methodologies.

Today’s evolving fireground demands greater adaptive insights and management with an amplified understanding of buildings, occupancy risk profiling (ORP) and building anatomy by all operating companies on the fireground; demanding greater skill sets and knowledge of building construction, architecture, engineering, fire dynamics and fire suppression methodologies.

The equation for success rests directly on Building Knowledge = Firefighter Safety.

Don’t be complacent based on alarm type, building or occupancy type…expect fire, be prepared and understand the predictability of building performance. It should not be a surprise upon arrival of the first-due.

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Some Training Aide Links from past Ten Minutes in the Streets

Ten Minutesin the Street  A Buildingsonfire.com SeriesExecutive Producer: Christopher Naum, SFPE Ten Minutes in the Street; bringing you insightful and provoking street scenarios for the discriminating and perspective Firefighter, Company Officer and Commander; where you make the call. You don’t have to have any special rank to participate in this interactive forum, just the desire to learn and expand you knowledge, skills and abilities in order to better yourself, create new insights, while sharing your experience and perspectives to help you and others in the street in making the right call; so everyone has the opportunity of going home. Access the Series on Buildingsonfire.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com Don’t forget to access CommandSafety.com and TheCompanyOfficer.com . Buildingsonfire is also on Facebook.  

 

Posted by on April 13, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Combat Fire Engagement, decision-making, fire suppression, firefighter, firefighting-operations, fires, first-due, Taking it to the Streets, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Fire in Syracuse: Four Firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978

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The 701 University Ave Fire- 1978

 

Fire in Syracuse: Four firefighters LODD: The 701 University Avenue Fire April 9, 1978

April 9th marks the 35th anniversary of the 701 University Ave. fire that claimed the lives of four Syracuse (NY) firefighters in 1978 while conducting search & rescue and suppression operations at an apartment building on the Syracuse University Campus, in Syracuse, New York.  

 

The fire began when one of the tenants lit a candle in a styrofoam wig stand and left it unattended. At 00:46 hours on Sunday April 9, 1978, an alarm of fire was transmitted for a reported building fire at 701 University Avenue on the campus of Syracuse University.

The Victorian style house was a three story building constructed of wood balloon framing and was built circa 1898. The house had been converted into ten (10) apartments that were occupied by SU students. The gross area of each of the three floors was approx. 1,750 sq. ft., with a predominate rectangular footprint shape measuring 69 ft. x 35 ft.  The third floor apartments only had access via a stairway in the rear, down a long narrow corridor that measured only 33 inches wide.

Post Fire View of Building from Bravo Side. Photo CJ Naum, 1978

 

The building had inherent vertical and horizontal concealed spaces indicative of balloon frame style construction along with additional concealed spaces in the third floor ceiling area. A partial automatic sprinkler system had been installed in the building in order to comply with a 1952 State of New York law. This system provided protection to the basement, means of egress, a storage area and a portion of the concealed space above the third floor.

The fire originated in a second floor apartment, and then spread into the combustible concealed space above the third floor ceiling. Approximately sixteen minutes into fireground operations the first indications of firefighting personnel being in distress were received.  The first call to the Alarm center was made at 0045:17 hrs., with the first-due engine arriving at 0048:05 and first water applied at 0051 (est).

 

The four SFD fire fighters, Frank Porpiglio Jr., Stanley Duda, Michael Petragnani, and Robert Schuler, who were assigned to the Squad and Rescue Companies, entered the house to conduct a primary search of the premises for SU students thought to be trapped in the house.

While operating on the third floor inside, a scalding steam caused by triggered sprinklers prevented the four firefighters from escaping, and they eventually depleted their air supply and suffocated to death. The firefighters were operating with full PPE that was complaint at that time ( 1978) and were utilizing state-of-the art SCBA in the form of the new 4.5 SCBA systems.   All the tenants had escaped safely before the fire fighters had entered the house. The fire was subsequently investigated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) at the request of the City of Syracuse and NFPA Report No. LS-3 was published.  

 

Syracuse Post Standard Front Page April 10, 1978

 

Killed in the Line of Duty on April 9th, 1978:

Syracuse (NY) Fire Department

  • FF Michael Petragnani, Age 27.   ~  Rescue Company – appointed 8/20/1973
  • FF Frank Porpiglio Jr., Age 24.   ~  Squad Company – appointed 8/20/1973
  • FF Robert Shuler, Age 31.  ~  Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973
  • FF Stanley Duda, Age 34.   ~  Squad Company – appointed 1/24/1973 

 

Remembrance, Honor, Courage and Sacrifice

Never Forgotten

 

 

 

Post Fire View, East Adams Street and University Ave. Photo: CJ Naum, 1978

 

Martin J. Whitman School of Management stands today at the corner, Photo CJ Naum, 2013

Memorial Plaque placed in 2005 in the Martin J. Whitman School of Management located on the site of 1978 fire. Photo: CJ NAum, 2013

 

Remembrance 1978-2013 SFD Rescue ~ Squad

 

 

Posted by on April 9, 2013 • Filed under: building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, construction, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighting, firefighting-operations, honor, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, NFPA, operations, Remembrance, Reports, Sprinklers, Uncategorized • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Colerain and Eleven Minutes to Mayday: Lessons from 2008 Resonate Today

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Remembering the Sacrafice: Capt. Broxterman and FF Schira

On Friday, April 4, 2008 at 06:13:02 hours, what began as a routine response for Colerain Township Fire and EMS Engine 102 to investigate a fire alarm activation at 5708 Squirrels nest Lane, Colerain Township, Ohio resulted in the deaths of Colerain Township Captain Robin Broxterman and Firefighter Brian Schira.

Upon their arrival at the scene of the two-story wood framed, residential building working fire conditions existed in the basement. The initial attack team consisted of Broxterman, Schira, and one other firefighter. The team advanced a 1¾-inch attack hose line through the interior of the building for fire control.

Even though, they were provided with some of the most technologically advanced protective clothing for structural firefighting and self-contained breathing apparatus, it appeared that Broxterman and Schira were overwhelmed by severe fire conditions in the basement. 

During their attempt to evacuate the building, the main-level family room flooring system in which the two were traveling on collapsed into the basement trapping the firefighters. Eleven minutes elapsed from time of arrival to the catastrophic chain of events.

This is one of those distinctive reports that has influential and critical operational, training and preparedness elements embedded throughout the report. 

It’s apparent there continues to be common threads shared by this event from 2008 and other events and incidents in the past five years where a single of multiple firefighters have lost their lives due to similarities in the apparent and common cause deficiencies and short comings identified.

All company and command officers should read and comprehend the lessons learned. Then, take these new found insights and see what the gaps are at the personal level (yours or those you supervise) as well as the shift, group, station, battalion, division or department as a whole.

If there are gaps, then identify a way to implement timely changes as necessary so there are No History Repeating (HRE) events.

The importance of Reading the Building, taking the time to complete the three sixty and being combat ready and “expecting fire”.

Remember their sacrifice, so we can learn.

 

  • Past Post on CommandSafety.com with Report Narrative and Incident Details HERE

 

The following factors were believed to have directly contributed to the deaths of Captain Broxterman and Firefighter Schira:

  • A delayed arrival at the incident scene that allowed the fire to progress significantly;
  • A failure to adhere to fundamental firefighting practices; and
  • A failure to abide by fundamental firefighter self-rescue and survival concepts

 Although the aforementioned factors were believed to have directly contributed to their deaths, they might have been prevented if:

  • Some personnel had not been complacent or apathetic in their initial approach to this incident;
  • Some personnel were in a proper state of mind that made them more observant of their surroundings and indicators;
  • The initial responding units were provided with all pertinent information in a
  • timely manner relative to the incident;
  • Personnel assigned to Engine 102 possessed a comprehensive knowledge of their first-due response area;
  • A 360-degree size-up of the building accompanied by a risk – benefit analysis
  • was conducted by the company officer prior to initiating interior fire suppression operations;
  • Comprehensive standard operating guidelines specifically related to structural
  • firefighting existed within the department;
  • The communications system users (on-scene firefighters and those monitoring the incident) weren’t all vying for limited radio air time;
  • The communications equipment and accessories utilized were more appropriate for the firefighting environment;
  • Certain tactical-level decisions and actions were based on the specific conditions;
  • Personnel had initiated fundamental measures to engage in if they were to become disoriented or trapped inside a burning building; and
  • Issued personal protective equipment was utilized in the correct manner.

 

 

References

WLTW.com Previous Stories:

 

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Posted by on April 4, 2013 • Filed under: "firefighter safety", assemblies, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, Collapse, Combat Fire Engagement, construction, Deployment, fire behavior, fire suppression, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, first-due, floors, in-the-line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Mayday, NIOSH, RIT, Safety, size-up, strategies, structure fires • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Cugees Restaurant Roof Collapse-1981 LAFD

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LAFD January 28, 1981

 

Was working on an LODD report and came across a past notable incident that occurred over 32 years ago, that should be recognized,  for many of you that may not of heard or read about it previous to this.

Here’s an intro and a link to the LAFD January 28, 1981 incident;

http://lafire.com/lastalarm_file/1981-0728_Taylor/ThomasTaylor.htm

On January 28, 1981, at 3:33 a.m, a full alarm assignment was dispatched to Cugees Restaurant,5300 Lankershim Boulevard, in the North Hollywood area.
Firefighters found heavy smoke with some fire showing in the interior of the restaurant.

Because a back draft explosion was a distinct possibility and because the smoke had to be cleared in order to begin a meaningful fire attack, ventilation procedures were begun on the roof.
Four members of Truck 60 were cutting a hole near the center of the roof when, without warning, it began to sink beneath their feet. One firefighter described the sensation as similar to standing on the deck of a rapidly listing ship. As the roof sank, it fell at a steep angle, slowly and agonizingly pulling Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor to his death.

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Some additional links:

In Memory of Apparatus Operator Thomas G. Taylor
Truck Company 60 B Platoon
Appointed July 22, 1973
Died January 28, 1981
Died of burns in roof collapse at arson fire.
Cugee’s Restaurant
5300 Lankershim Boulevard

 

 

Posted by on March 31, 2013 • Filed under: Arson, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, buildingsonfire.com, Christopher Naum, construction, firefighter-safety-health, firefighting, firefighting-operations, in-the-line-of-duty, line-of-duty, LODD, major-incidents, Mayday, roof • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

The Bowstring Truss

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The Bow String Truss

The Bowstring Truss:
There’s a tremendous lack of understanding in the American Fire Service as to what accurately defines and comprises a Heavy Timber Bowstring Truss and the Operational and Safety Precautions that must be recognized, implemented and trained on, in order to achieve and maintain operational excellence, company integrity and firefighter safety on the fireground.

All bowstring trusses are not created equal and do not share the same characteristics when found in a building and occupancy.

They may have the same shape, but shape alone does not define the bowstring truss.
Based on the type, design, construction, materials, age, span, spacing, configuration, occupancy and application there are vast differences AND similarities.

There are significant differences in terminology when referring to them and tactics that should be employed on the fireground- and yes there are prominent differences between east coast and west coast types and tactics.

The Bowstring Truss- They are not All the Same

Do you know what they are?

I’m working on an article series for a major fire service publication with on-line accompaniments that will provide uniformity and clarity on the subject and the much needed continuity so were’ talking the same language.For the mean time let me offer the following terms that some of you may be familiar with – in your world. Here are some Bowstring Type Truss terms:

  • The Heavy Timber Bowstring Truss,
  • Arch-Rib Bowstring Truss,
  • Laminate Cord Bowstring Truss,
  • Lattice Bowstring Truss,
  • Easybow Truss,
  • Mack Truss,
  • Summerbell Bowstring Truss,
  • Mono-chord Bowstring Truss
  • Duo-Chord Bowstring Truss,
  • Segmental Multi-Cord Bowstring Truss,
  • Tension Rod Bowstring Truss,
  • Bowstring Arch Truss,
  • Bowstring K-Truss,
  • Split-Ring Bowstring Truss…..to name a few.

We’ll be posting lots more on this on CommandSafety.com as well as expanded coverage on Buildingsonfire.com …. Stay Tuned

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Posted by on March 30, 2013 • Filed under: "pre-fire planning", Architectural Design, building construction, Building Construction for the Fire Service, buildings, Christopher Naum, Engineered, Engineered Structural Systems, Fire Protection Engineering, firefighting-operations, hazards, Lumber • Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,